1 2 3	H. Dean Steward SBN 85317 107 Avenida Miramar, Ste. C San Clemente, CA 92672 949-481-4900 Fax: (949) 496-6753 deansteward@fea.net	
4	Attorney for Defendant Lori Drew	
5	HOII BICW	
6 7		
8	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
9	CENTRAL DISTRIC	T OF CALIFORNIA
10	UNITED STATES,	Case No. CR-08-582-GW
11	Plaintiff,	NOTICE OF MOTION; MOTION TO
12	vs.	DISMISS INDICTMENT- UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF
13	LORI DREW,	PROSECUTORIAL POWER; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
14	Defendant.	Date: Sept. 4, 2008 Time: 8:30 AM
15		J
16 17	TO: UNITED STATES ATTORNEY TH	OMAS O'BRIEN AND ASST. U.S
18	ATTORNEY MARK KRAUSE, please take	notice that on September 4, 2008
19	at 8:30 AM, defendant, through cou	nsel, will bring the attached
20	motion to dismiss the indictment i	n the courtroom of the Honorable
21	George Wu, United States District	Judge, 312 N. Spring St.,
22	Courtroom 10, Los Angeles, Califor	nia.
23		
24		. Dean Steward ean Steward
25	Coun	sel for Defendant
26	Lori	Drew
27		

# MOTION

COMES NOW defendant Lori Drew, together with counsel, and moves this honorable court for an order dismissing the instant indictment pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure 12(b). As set forth below, the indictment violates constitutional due process by delegating prosecutorial powers, and it must be dismissed.

Dated: July 23, 2008
San Clemente, California

S./ H. Dean Steward

H. Dean Steward

Counsel for Defendant

Lori Drew

# POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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The defense believes that at least two other persons and perhaps as many as four had the "Josh Evans" password and communicated to M.T.M. as "Josh Evans".

# I. BACKGROUND

The defense here challenges the government's delegation to the power to set quidelines and terms of what will be a criminal law violation to individuals and entities. The public in general, (and defendant Drew in particular), are denied due process under the Constitution when private parties, not the government, are given these rights and powers.

#### II. FACTS

According to the indictment, defendant Lori Drew and others set about creating a MySpace social network on line personal profile in the Fall of 2006. The profile was of a teenage boy. The indictment further alleges that Ms. Drew and others set up the profile to gain information from one M.T.M., a teenager. In setting up the profile, the government alleges that Ms. Drew and others violated the terms of service [hereinafter TOS] that MySpace maintains as a feature of their website. The government theory is that a violation of any TOS renders any accessing of a website by the violator to be "unauthorized", and therefore potentially a violation of 18 USC §1030(a)(2)(C) and (c)(2)(B)(ii) [hereinafter §1030],

The profile was open for 29 days, during which M.T.M. sent messages back and forth to the fictional person allegedly named "Josh Evans" . On the last of those 29 days, the messages from

several people to M.T.M., and her responses, became heated, and M.T.M. soon thereafter took her own life.

The facts in this matter are deeply in dispute. For the purposes of a dismissal motion only, the court is limited to the four corners of the indictment.  $\underline{\text{U.S. v. Edmonds}}$  103 F.3d 822 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996).

### III. DISCUSSION

Under §1030, virtually anyone, (be it giant MySpace, the social network, or an individual computer owner), can determine whether access to a server or site is authorized, and they can determine under what circumstances. A computer owner can set the scope of authorization by contractual language, by a TOS. This can lead to criminal violations for those who run afoul of the TOS/contract.

Turning to this matter, MySpace dictated, through its TOS, what acts supposedly constituted a crime. What the government in its view of §1030 has done is to delegate the responsibility of deciding what conduct will be criminal to private parties like MySpace.

In Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Use Statutes, Kerr, 78 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1596 (2003) Professor Orin Kerr points up the chilling effect of allowing an entity such as MySpace to anchor and, in truth, dictate \$1030 charges:

"Imagine that a Website owner announces [and puts in his TOS] that only right handed people can view

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his Website, or perhaps only friendly people.

Under the contract-based approach, a visit to the site by a left-handed or surly person is an unauthorized access that may trigger state and federal criminal laws. A computer owner could set up a public web page, announce that 'no one is allowed to visit my web page', and then refer for prosecution anyone who clicks on the site out of curiosity. By granting the computer owner essentially unlimited authority to define authorization, the contract standard delegates the scope of criminality to every computer owner."

Id. at p. 1650,51

Allowing computer owners to set terms that can cause law violations is similar to the vintage cases in the Supreme Court where governmental powers were unconstitutionally delegated between governmental agencies. The Supreme Court invalidated the delegation of these powers in the 1930's in a series of cases. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 293 U.S. 388 (1935).

For example, at issue in <u>Panama Refining</u> was a delegation to the President of authority to prohibit interstate transportation of what was known as "hot oil" - oil produced in excess of quotas set by state law. The problem was that the Act provided no guidance to the President in determining whether or when to exercise this

authority, and required no finding by the President as a condition of exercise of the authority. Congress "declared no policy, . . . established no standard, [and] laid down no rule," but rather "left the matter to the President without standard or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased." Id. at 293 U.S. at 430.

At issue in Schechter was a delegation to the President of authority to promulgate codes of fair competition that could be drawn up by industry groups or prescribed by the President on his own initiative. The codes were required to implement the policies of the Act, but those policies were so general as to be nothing more than an endorsement of whatever might be thought to promote the recovery and expansion of the particular trade or industry. The President's authority to approve, condition, or adopt codes on his own initiative was similarly devoid of meaningful standards, and virtually unfettered. The Act supplied "no standards" for any trade or industry group, and, unlike other broad delegations that had been upheld, did not set policies that could be implemented by an administrative agency required to follow "appropriate administrative procedure." "Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, [the Act] authorize[d] the making of codes to prescribe them." Id. 295 U.S. at 541.

Here, §1030 has delegated power, not between branches of government, but to every day citizens and entities. But like the older cases above, there are no standards for computer owners when setting up TOS's. At the same time, however, these owners now have the power to set guidelines, rules and terms that can, if violated, cause criminal liability. Such power, by the government's

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interpretation of §1030, is now in the hands of Internet behemoths like MySpace, or anyone or any entity that can get on the Internet and set up a rudimentary Website. The enormous danger in this interpretation is well set out in Professor Kerr's examples, above.

In testimony before Congress in 1992, the Vice President and General Counsel of the Computer and Communications Industry Association warned, "You do not want to be accidently taking a large percentage of the American people, either small businesses or citizens, into the gray area of criminal law." <u>U.S. v. LaMacchia</u> 871 F. Supp. 535, 544 (D. Mass. 1994), n. 18. The indictment here does just that, with no due process protections at all. Almost any computer owner can set up whatever arbitrary and unique rules they want, and a violation of those rules can lead to a §1030 prosecution.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Simply put, access that merely breaches a contract conditioning access should not suffice to trigger criminal liability. If violating user agreements is a crime, millions of Americans are probably committing crimes on a daily basis and don't know it.

Basing a federal prosecution on TOS violations, on a contract theory, denies due process, in that "it allows a computer owner to harness the criminal law at his or her discretion, using his or her unilateral power to control authorization by contract as a tool to criminalize any viewpoint of status the owner wishes to target."

Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in

1	Computer Use Statutes supra at p. 1658. Such a delegation is
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3	constitutionally infirm, and the indictment must be dismissed.
	Dated: July 23, 2008 San Clemente, California s./ H. Dean Steward
4	H. Dean Steward
5	Counsel for Defendant Lori Drew
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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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4	IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT:
5	I, H. Dean Steward, am a citizen of the United States, and am at
6	least 18 years of age. My business address is 107 Avenida Miramar
7	Ste. C, San Clemente, CA 92672.
8	I am not a party to the above entitled action. I have caused
9	on July 23, 2008, service of the defendant's:
10	NOTICE OF MOTION; MOTION TO DISMISS; POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
11	
12	On the following parties electronically by filing the foregoing
13	with the Clerk of the District Court using its ECF system, which
14	electronically notifies counsel for that party.
15	AUSA Mark Krause
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17	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
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19	correct.
20	Executed on July 23, 2008
21	H. Dean Steward
22	H. Dean Steward
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