UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

MASSACHUSETTS BAY

TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,

Plaintiff,

OCivil Action

V.

No. 08-11364-GAO

ZACK ANDERSON, RJ RYAN,
ALESSANDRO CHIESA, MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,

Defendants.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GEORGE A. O'TOOLE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MOTION HEARING

John J. Moakley United States Courthouse
Courtroom No. 9
One Courthouse Way
Boston, Massachusetts 02210
Thursday, August 14, 2008
11 a.m.

Marcia G. Patrisso, RMR, CRR
Official Court Reporter
John J. Moakley U.S. Courthouse
One Courthouse Way, Room 3510
Boston, Massachusetts 02210
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Mechanical Steno - Computer-Aided Transcript

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1 PROCEEDINGS THE CLERK: All rise for the United States 2 District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Court 3 4 is now in session. 5 You may be seated. 6 Calling Civil Action 08-11364, MBTA versus Zack 7 Anderson, et al. 8 Counsel, please state your names for the record. 9 MR. MAHONY: Ieuan Mahony from Holland & Knight for the plaintiffs, Massachusetts Bay Transportation 10 11 Authority. MR. DARLING: Scott Darling, in-house counsel 12 for MBTA. 13 14 MR. BODOIN: Max Bodoin for the MBTA. MS. GRANICK: Good morning, your Honor. 15 Jennifer Granick from the Electronic Frontier Foundation 16 for defendants Anderson, Ryan and Chiesa. 17 18 MR. SWOPE: Good morning, your Honor. Jeffrey 19 Swope, Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge for MIT. With me at counsel table is counsel Jaren Wilcoxson from the MIT 20 21 general counsel's office. 22 THE COURT: All right. Good morning, everyone. 23 I understand we have parties on the line as 24 well -- on the telephone line -- the defendant --25 MS. GRANICK: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: The student defendants.

MS. GRANICK: Yes. And I have my lawyers -colleagues of mine -- from the Electronic Frontier

Foundation, and I believe that it's defendants Ryan and
Chiesa who are on the line. Mr. Anderson is out of the
country and is unable to join in the hearing this
morning.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me just make a couple of preliminary comments before we get to any of the issues between the parties.

First of all, because there is some -- I think the lawyers know all of this, but for the benefit of the people in the audience who may or may not, let me just set the stage why we're here and what the proceedings are.

We have a standard procedure in this court for the handling of emergency or short-notice matters. All our cases, both civil and criminal, are assigned to a particular district judge by random assignment, something we jealously protect. But we have a procedure if a matter comes in on an emergency basis after hours, or when the assigned judge is not available, that it can be referred to an emergency-duty judge. And that's what happened in this case. The case came in late Friday, and although it was assigned to me I was not available

immediately, and Judge Woodlock, our emergency-duty judge, happened to be present. And so that's why he handled the first parts of the proceedings. But the case had been assigned to me and all further proceedings will be here in front of me. And that's entirely regular under our processes.

But I just want to acknowledge Judge Woodlock's prompt and attentive response to the matters, including the extraordinary hearing on Saturday at which the matters were resolved. And I told him privately that I owe him one for having done that.

Let me just say also from my review of the papers that I appreciate the professionalism displayed by counsel in the case for all the parties. It is apparent that they are, in their respective roles, vigorously advocating for their clients' interests, but I think so far, anyway, from what I see, adhering to the high standards that we expect of counsel in these cases.

And just a brief word about temporary restraining orders and how they fit into the process of a case. Our civil rules provide in emergency, or exigent, circumstances for an application for and perhaps even a grant of a motion for a temporary restraining order. Under the rules that can even be made -- to use the language that lawyers use -- ex

parte; that is, by one side without the other, although it's usually -- an effort is made to involve both sides, as happened here.

Temporary restraining orders usually reflect, at least, the movant's view that there are emergent circumstances which require shortening of otherwise-applicable time periods and then expediting address to the merits of the motion which can involve, obviously, an assessment of the merits of the underlying cause of action. Because of their rather extraordinary nature, temporary restraining orders are limited in duration to ten days, after which they expire of their own force, unless extended -- they can be extended for an additional period -- or during any of that time the party -- if a restraining order is issued, the party may move to extend that as a preliminary injunction, which has more formal procedures attached to it sometimes, and usually follows -- well, follows, perhaps, a more-detailed presentation of the parties' views than is practical on a short-notice temporary restraining order.

So in the history of this case, obviously, Judge Woodlock had the hearing, granted the temporary restraining order that is in the record that we're here to consider. The rules also provide that if a temporary restraining order is issued -- well, actually, I'm not

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sure it applies here, ex parte -- a party may move to dissolve it on short notice.

Here what we have is a motion by the plaintiff to amend the terms of the order issued by Judge Woodlock and a motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants -- at least the student defendants -- which may be equivalent to a motion to dissolve. I think the objective of the reconsideration would be to withdraw the restraining order.

There has been a late flurry of papers filed.

I'm not sure when -- there was a motion for a scheduling conference and for some interim discovery that was filed, I guess, late yesterday. I saw it the first thing early this morning. And then there are also some additional matters and formal opposition to the motion to reconsider filed by the plaintiff, and accompanying paper, and then a sealed document, Number 32 on the docket.

MS. GRANICK: Would you like me to address that briefly, your Honor?

THE COURT: Let me get to one other matter first before we do that. I set this hearing in response to the plaintiff's motion on Monday, I guess, to amend the order. Shortly after that the hearing time was set. I think that we had the motion for reconsideration and so

on. There's no -- the matter of when, within the ten-day period, a hearing on such matters to amend or perhaps extend or to reconsider or dissolve is something that is really a scheduling matter and there's no necessary particular time for it.

So let me raise a thought I had when I saw the motion for discovery this morning, and that is whether, depending on the defendants' views on this, it might be appropriate to postpone the merits question in either direction on the existence of the TRO to permit some limited discovery such as that is moved for in the plaintiff's motion. So I guess I'm looking to the defendants for a reaction to that.

Let me just say that what appealed to me about that possibility was it would perhaps enable me to make a sounder decision if I knew a little bit more about the facts of the case that might be developed during discovery or not. Expedition is important on matters such as this, but it is not the only value. And the soundness and rationality and evidentiary foundation for any ruling in either direction are also very important considerations that I think I have an obligation to take account of.

So simply as a scheduling matter, without addressing the pros and cons of the underlying issues at

all, I wonder whether prudence might not dictate a little further information development.

MS. GRANICK: Your Honor, the Court has before it today all the information that it needs to decide the validity of the temporary restraining order. The issue in the temporary restraining order is different from the issues underlying the merits of the case. The issue is whether the restraining order is required in order to prevent harm to the plaintiff.

And what this case is about is an unconstitutional gag order, prior restraint, on my clients' ability to speak about a matter of great public interest. Every day that goes by where this gag order is in place is an irreparable harm to my clients and to the First Amendment, yet the information -- on the other side, the information that this Court has is enough to know whether what my clients want to talk about will do irreparable harm to the MBTA.

I filed this morning with the Court, and provided to opposing counsel yesterday, a document which is a confidential report which encompasses all the findings -- all the reported findings, all the research that my clients, the students, have done. And I provided that report to counsel and to the Court because it seemed to me from discussions with -- from what

counsel was saying in the press, and from discussions with him and from what Judge Woodlock was concerned about on Saturday, that there was a lot of uncertainty and worry about what my clients might actually say, on the one hand, and some dismissiveness about whether it was a prank or whether it was serious on the other.

And in order to make both parties -- both the MBTA and the Court more comfortable with what exactly we're talking about here, I have provided the Court with the entire universe of information that my clients would like to talk about.

Now, it is much more than my clients ever intended to talk about. They always intended to withhold the details of their research when they were going to give their talk at the conference and ongoing into the future. But this document enables the Court and counsel to know that there's not going to be another shoe that's going to drop sometime later on. This is what we're talking about, just the information that's in this report.

Now, I filed it under seal also --

THE COURT: Yeah. I was just going to clarify.
You're talking about the sealed document that is
docketed as Number 32?

MS. GRANICK: Yes, your Honor. Docket No. 32.

And I filed it under seal because, as I said, our clients never intended to reveal all of these details; that was never their intention. It was a document -- it is a document that we prepared for settlement purposes. We offered to provide this document since the MBTA's concern was what are these students going to say.

But instead of engaging in this kind of back-and-forth interchanging over settlement, we just decided that it was important that all of the parties and the Court be on the same page about what we're talking about. And that is the core of the TRO question. There needs to be no further discovery on that matter; that's all there is that the Court needs to be concerned about going forward.

And our contention, your Honor, is that looking at that report -- first of all, everything in that report is First-Amendment protected speech; and second of all, discussing any information in that report is not and cannot be a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. And I think the Court is eminently able to make that determination today given the irreparable harm and the prior restraint that's imposed upon my clients and the consideration that the First Amendment -- of the First Amendment in this area where we're talking about a

1 gag order. 2 THE COURT: Okav. 3 Mr. -- was that --4 MS. GRANICK: Yes. I have some comments on the 5 proprietary of discovery at this point in time. 6 THE COURT: Well, yeah. Go ahead. Why don't 7 you address that as well. MS. GRANICK: Okay. Thank you, your Honor. 8 First of all, the complaint has not been served 9 10 on my clients yet, and this lawsuit is less than a week 11 There has not been any meet-and-confer and there 12 have not been any initial disclosures. My understanding 13 from looking at my e-mail this morning -- I was on the 14 plane yesterday coming out here from California. It was my understanding from looking at my e-mail this morning 15 that there were some disclosures made after the initial 16 discovery was propounded. That's not appropriate under 17 18 the rules. 19 And, you know, there is a reason why we have meet-and-confer rules and timeframes for this and 20 21 initial disclosures, and it's in order to allow the 22 parties, you know, some time from the time that the 23 lawsuit is filed to, you know, do service, to look at 24 all the facts and to deal with everything. 25 So these discovery requests are too soon and

1 inappropriate at this stage of the case. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Swope? 3 MR. SWOPE: Thank you, your Honor. 4 The only discovery sought from MIT is the 5 deposition of Professor Rivest. The difficulty I have is Professor Rivest has a prescheduled airplane flight 7 out to the West Coast tomorrow, and he won't be back in Cambridge for -- I think there's maybe one day of the 8 9 week after next, and then he's out in Canada and won't 10 be back until after Labor Day. 11 So there would be no way to have his deposition 12 tomorrow, and we would have to wait a week to see if he 13 could fit it in at some point the following week. 14 MS. GRANICK: Your Honor, on a scheduling matter also which I forgot to mention, it is also true that the 15 students are out for summer session, so none of them are 16 here in Boston now. One of them's out of the country; 17 18 another one is scheduled to leave the country; one's on 19 the West Coast. I mean, they're just not here now and 20 they will not be back in Boston until September. 21 THE COURT: Mr. Mahony? 22 MR. MAHONY: Hi, your Honor. If I may, I'll address counsel for the individual defendants' arguments 23 first. 24 25 Your Honor, my sister said that the Court has

before it all that's needed. Your Honor -- and my sister also made mention of what my clients want to talk about. And my sister's papers are full of statements about "my clients' good faith" and statements from the clients.

Your Honor, there is no declaration, affidavit, any statement by the individual defendants before the Court at all. All of those statements that my sister made about what her clients want, what they intend to do are simply statements; they're not evidence. And there's no evidence before the Court. So that's one point.

The second point, your Honor: My sister

mentions a gag order. Your Honor, there's a conflict in

the position that the EFF is taking. First, I hear from

my sister that the individual defendants never intended,

and don't intend, to reveal the key information that

they have which we believe, at least in partial review,

because it's a complex document, is in that sealed

document. So there's a statement that the individual

defendants don't intend to reveal the key information,

and that means the other information they do intend to

reveal, but that other information is public domain, of

low sensitivity, that is not a concern.

Your Honor, that's precisely what the TRO says:

Do not reveal -- and our motion on Monday was intended to make that crystal clear. In contrast to that, the findings and rulings of Judge Woodlock, we understood the TRO to say: You can talk about things in the public domain, just don't reveal the key information, the key details. The motion that the Court has before it is intended to emphasize that again.

So, your Honor, there is no gag order. There's no harm to the particular defendants here from the TRO because they've already said, "We don't want to talk -- we don't intend to talk -- about the key information."

That's the only information we care about.

Your Honor, in terms of the document under seal -- I'm sure we'll get to this in more detail -- it's a complex document. I received it last night. We do think, your Honor, that the provision of that information is a good step forward in this case. Our papers are perhaps too detailed about the efforts that we've gone through to try and pull the information from the defendants.

There is still a good deal of information out there, your Honor; for example, there's a source code that's referenced in the presentation that we don't have; there's the A paper that Professor Rivest -- that they did for Professor Rivest, that we've been refused;

therefore, your Honor, there is a range of discovery, a range of information, that we don't have that the Court doesn't have the benefit of.

And when I say "range," your Honor, in our discovery requests we've tried to be quite targeted. The easiest way to look at that targeted intent, and hopefully accomplishment, is the length of the depositions. We stated for Mr. Anderson, who's the lead defendant, the lead individual defendant, a four-hour deposition, and for Professor Rivest a two-hour deposition. So when Mr. Swope says he'll be unavailable but maybe a week from now we could fit it in, that is literally correct, your Honor, because we're only asking for two hours. And we're happy to go to his office or wherever it's convenient for him to be scheduled.

Now, your Honor, let me turn briefly to the technical arguments that my sister makes about service. Your Honor, back last weekend all of the individual defendants were out in Las Vegas. We had retained local counsel in Las Vegas who had a private investigator ready to serve the defendants with the TRO. My sister, on the record -- and Judge Woodlock confirmed with her and with the individual defendants that they had notice, that they understood that they were subject to the TRO. I spoke with my sister on the phone, and I confirmed it

with an e-mail, that service was not required on her clients. So if that's changed, that's something that needs to be addressed, but I think it's wholly inappropriate.

Second, in terms of meet-and-confer? Your

Honor, again, I view -- we view that document under seal
as a good step forward in terms of getting the parties
to talk. We have a huge interest in understanding what
the exposure is, what's going on. But, your Honor,
there is -- you know, for example, that A paper, there
are some things where talking just isn't working.

A meet-and-confer is a limited utility at this point. A structure from the Court would be very helpful. And the point that an evidentiary -- better evidentiary record assists everyone, we strongly agree with.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, let me just press a little further on that point. It may be, given the practicalities, that oral depositions are not easily accomplished on the time frame that I'm having in mind. What I was contemplating is not something that would be on the other side of a week from now, as Mr. Swope refers to, but the oral depositions are only part of what's requested. There is also a document request, and

there are at least a couple of things on that that would seem to be available to be produced that might be illuminating. And, of course, chief among those would be the paper. I think just to flush it out, maybe some -- and I'm looking at -- there's an exhibit to the request that is a proposed service of document request.

The other thing that occurs to me that might be readily available and illuminating, potentially, would be communications between the defendants, the undergrads, and DefCon about the content of the presentation.

So, now, let me just say with respect to the argument that the Court's scheduling of events on the hearing related to the TRO requires resolution of whatever issues there are with respect to the First Amendment I think is -- under the circumstances, anyway, where there is no event on the horizon, as there was on Friday and Saturday, is not particularly -- that is not particularly germane to the scheduling question. In other words, my suggestion is not to resolve any of the substantive issues until -- strike the "until" -- but on a sensible schedule within the scope of the force of the TRO that permits an address to those issues which include, perhaps, the First Amendment issue.

But I'm not inclined, at least on the facts as I understand them, to first consider the merits of the First Amendment claim in order to decide what our schedule should be as long as we are operating within the ten-day period under the rules.

That said, let me just ask about the feasibility as a practical matter now, and any other substantive objections there might be, to the production of those limited items. Let me just look at the -- if you have -- it is Exhibit 1 to Docket No. 28, which is the

Those matters -- that would be under -- basically, very limited -- under 1.1, 1.2 and 2.1. I don't know if you have it with you. I can read it for you if you don't have it in front of you.

plaintiff's request for an interim discovery order.

MS. GRANICK: I know which documents you are referring to, your Honor.

THE COURT: It is basically the communications between the undergrads and DefCon and a copy of the class paper.

MS. GRANICK: I understand, your Honor. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 says that a minimum of 30 days' notice is required for document requests. It's simply untimely.

THE COURT: The discovery rules also say that

the Court can set any schedule for good reason. So I mean, if it's a question of authority, there's no question that I have the authority in a sort of expedited emergency -- the rules also allow, indeed permit, discovery before the action is brought, in some circumstances. So there's wide latitude. So I don't have any doubt of my ability to do that, so...

MS. GRANICK: I understand. But my point is, your Honor, that the discovery that's sought goes to the underlying merits of the case and not to the issues that are before the Court for either a TRO or a preliminary injunction. So there's no reason to change the Rule 34 --

THE COURT: Well, but the underlying merits of the case are a key consideration in whether the plaintiffs have met the burden required for obtaining a TRO, or continuing it, once obtained, and that is the likelihood of success on the merits. So it's necessary to consider the merits of the case.

MS. GRANICK: That's correct, your Honor. Only if the plaintiffs have come here and presented the Court with a valid legal theory on which relief may be based. And there is a manifest legal error that underlies Judge Woodlock's TRO which needs to be addressed by this Court and can be addressed without any reference to other

documents. And that underlying fallacy is the idea that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act prevents the distribution of information.

What plaintiff is claiming is that there is a notion of responsible disclosure, which they define as you disclose everything to MBTA and wait until they've had a chance to fix it, and that that notion is enshrined in law in the CFAA and that it's consistent with the First Amendment. That is wrong.

First of all, responsible disclosure is -responsible disclosure is what the students engaged in
here. They never intended and -- at the talk at DefCon
to reveal the information that they believed was the
important piece of information that would allow or teach
a bad guy to circumvent the system and to get free
subway rides from the MBTA.

That withholding was responsible. And there's a letter in the -- from 11 renowned computer science professors and computer scientists which says that this is how computer science security research is done. It's how it's done every day. There are hundreds of conferences --

THE COURT: Let me just interrupt because I understand that that's your argument on the merits of the questions that are going to be presented, and you

may well be right, but my discovery-related comments are made without getting to -- in other words, what I'm talking about is a way of getting to a reliable, from my point of view, information base on which to address the merits questions. And so to address the merits questions to decide whether I need discovery I think has it backwards.

What I'm talking about is being sure that I can have a sufficient understanding of both parties' positions so that I can, as I say, reliably resolve the merits questions which include: Is this a lawful TRO? That's your question. And your position is it's not. You may be right. My question is setting a schedule and developing the information that will help me make a good call on that point.

MS. GRANICK: Whether it's a lawful TRO, your Honor, is a question of law, not of fact. It's a question that discovery will not help us answer. And forcing the defendants to go through a bunch of discovery when the underlying legal theory of the case -- the claim that is the only claim that gives this Court jurisdiction over the case -- is flawed, is putting the cart before the horse.

And they have to show this Court before they can continue the TRO, before they can seek discovery, that

the CFAA claim is valid. And the CFAA claim is not valid. Because if you look at the plain language of the statute, the legislative history and all of that, it very clearly shows that the transmission of information can't be to the public in a conference; it has to be a human-protected computer.

And it's a provision that Congress added not to enshrine some notion of responsible disclosure in the law. CFAA, this provision of it, well predates all the debates in the security community about responsible disclosure. It was a provision that was added in order to protect computers from viruses and worms. And the plaintiff is misreading that provision to squelch speech at a conference.

That is not something on which this Court needs to take discovery. Those are legal matters that this Court can decide -- and indeed has to decide -- right now because of the First Amendment harm that's ongoing.

THE COURT: Okay. Before I go back to Mr.

Mahony, Mr. Swope, anything on that question?

MR. SWOPE: No, your Honor. The document request is not to MIT.

MR. MAHONY: Your Honor, if I could simply add the two more document requests at 5.4 and 5.5? The 1.1 and 1.2 and 2.1 the Court suggested is fine for the

MBTA's purpose on an interim basis; the 5.4 -- and 5.5 -- which asks for the code that's referenced in the materials; and the 5.5 is just a catch-all to say: If there's anything else you're planning on providing at that conference, let us take a look at it.

And, your Honor, I would like go back to the deposition question to see if there's a way maybe we could do a telephonic deposition, if folks are unavailable. In other words, the goal here is if we can't have face-to-face -- we've already went down to four hours and two hours, if we can't have face-to-face, your Honor, we're willing to work to get something, you know, second best, again, for this interim -- you know, for this in-between or beginning phase.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. GRANICK: Your Honor, I just -- if -- before the Court does a serious consideration of this, if this is what the Court is considering, which is to continue the TRO --

THE COURT: No, I would not continue the TRO.

I'd do nothing to the TRO. The TRO continues on its

own. That's my whole point. I am not reaching the

question under this plan. There's no implicit approval

of the TRO; it is simply deferring to permit development

of information at which that question will be

1 considered. And maybe to reduce anxiety, I should tell you 2 the schedule I am thinking of is to continue this only 3 until next Tuesday, so a very short period of time, well 4 5 within the ten days of the duration of the TRO. MR. MAHONY: And what would -- would the thought 7 on Tuesday be that we'd have this same hearing and maybe we could supplement, because we certainly want to move 8 9 to convert this to a protective order. 10 THE COURT: I guess to flush out more details. I'm talking about very limited document discovery which 11 12 I -- is as forthwith as can be -- I don't know what the 13 practicalities are in that -- and then the parties to 14 submit anything that they want to say about that, I 15 mean, by, I guess, the close of business on Monday, and then we'll take it up on Tuesday morning. That would be 16 my thought. We can pick one day or the other, I guess, 17 18 to do it. 19 MR. MAHONY: So that the papers for the Tuesday hearing would be due Monday, and the discovery would be 20 21 Friday --22 THE COURT: Not later than the end of business 23 tomorrow. 24 MR. MAHONY: That's wonderful. 25 THE COURT: That's my thought.

MS. GRANICK: Your Honor, it just -- as a practical matter it is highly impractical. One of our clients is out of the country; another of our clients is neither in Boston nor in San Francisco, where our offices are; we are losing one of our clients to another overseas trip, since they're on their summer break, I think on Monday of next week; I am going to be flying back to San Francisco all day today and then we have the weekend which intervenes. So this is -- it's going to be extremely difficult for us to pull this information together before Monday.

I also think that, you know, as I said, it does not weigh upon the issues that are before this Court.

And then one of the lawyers from our office -- it actually can't be me because I am going to be flying on this weekend -- will have to come back here to Boston in order to appear before the Court and argue these issues.

So I don't -- I mean, I don't understand how the documents that are the subject of plaintiff's request weigh upon the issues of whether this TRO is, A -- has legal basis under the CFAA; and, B, is in accordance with the First Amendment, because those are factual issues, and what the plaintiff needs to show is that it's legally appropriate.

THE COURT: Well, I've already addressed the --

whether this would involve -- the scheduling decision would involve consideration of the First Amendment.

Let me just say I don't think you're right about the fact that it's a pure legal question. The question in any case is whether -- unless it's a -- you know, you might have an objection that the statute is invalid or on its face it can't cover the range of possibilities on the facts, but usually the question on a case is whether on the facts as pled does the plaintiff have a cause of actions as alleged under the cited authority. And so there's always a mixed question of fact and law.

The legal meaning of the -- or the legal scope of the statute, properly understood, obviously has something to do with deciding whether the facts that the plaintiff pleads fit within the proper scope so that there's relief, but it can't be a pure legal question.

MS. GRANICK: Your Honor, assuming all the facts that plaintiff has alleged are true -- assuming for the sake of argument they are all true -- there is no claim. There's a pure legal question. And this Court can address that. It has absolutely nothing to do with the factual allegations. If everything in the plaintiff's complaint and everything that they've argued is true, the CFAA doesn't cover it because the CFAA, by its very terms as a legal -- pure legal matter -- does not cover

the transmission of information to people; it only covers the transmission of information to a protected computer. So there is no factual dispute here for the purposes of this TRO. We're assuming, for the sake of argument, that everything they say is true. It's a pure legal question as it's a First Amendment question. THE COURT: Okay. I understand your point but I'm not in agreement with it because, even as you say it, what you're saying is that, on the facts they pled, there's not a legal remedy, which is, of course, a fact and legal question. But anyway, let me --MS. GRANICK: Your Honor, if you -- I would --I'm sorry. THE COURT: Let me consider your practical

THE COURT: Let me consider your practical considerations. I mean, the class paper I would assume is easily available. I mean, if not from you, then they can serve Mr. Swope, and he has a copy, I assume.

MR. SWOPE: We do have a copy, your Honor. The federal educational -- the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act say the students have to be given notice, which I guess they're getting now, and have a right to object, which I guess they can do now, and your Honor can rule on it. We do have a copy, obviously, but I

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1 assume your Honor will go through the appropriate dance 2 for us to provide it. THE COURT: Okay. If it can't be produced by 3 4 the students, and I don't know what the practicalities 5 are, and nor --6 MS. GRANICK: Your Honor, everything that's in 7 that paper and more is contained in the document that I 8 provided to the Court and to --THE COURT: Well, that's one thing I'm 9 10 interested in, is how they compare, frankly. If they're 11 the same, that's one thing; if they're not the same, I 12 might be interested in the differences. They might be, 13 too, but I am. 14 MS. GRANICK: How could those differences weigh 15 upon the question of the validity of the claim? THE COURT: I don't know. I don't know what 16 17 they are. 18 Anyway, let's do this: I will grant the request 19 for discovery as outlined in 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 5.4 and 5.5 understanding that the defendants have to use reasonable 20 21 efforts to comply. If they're unable, for practical 22 reasons, reasonably to comply, then they may state those circumstances which make it difficult to comply. But at 23 24 least we'll get that answer. So I would say by, say --25 why don't we say by four o'clock Eastern time tomorrow,

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    either production or otherwise a response. And then
 2
    we'll permit the parties to evaluate that.
 3
            And we'll continue this hearing on Tuesday, the
 4
    19th. Why don't we say --
 5
             I think I have something at ten, Gina?
 6
             THE CLERK:
                         Yes.
 7
            THE COURT: Why don't we say 10:30 on Tuesday
    morning.
8
            MS. GRANICK: Your Honor, we are intending to
9
10
    seek a writ to the First Appellate -- the First Circuit
11
    Court of Appeals. Can I ask the Court to stay this
12
    discovery order to give us an opportunity to seek that
13
    writ?
14
             THE COURT: You can ask, but the request is
    denied.
15
            MS. GRANICK: Thank you, your Honor.
16
            THE COURT: Okay. I'll see you Tuesday morning.
17
18
            THE CLERK: All rise.
19
            Court is now in recess.
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             (The proceedings adjourned at 11:46 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATE I, Marcia G. Patrisso, RMR, CRR, Official Reporter of the United States District Court, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript constitutes, to the best of my skill and ability, a true and accurate transcription of my stenotype notes taken in the matter of Civil Action No. 08-11364-GAO, MBTA v. Zack Anderson, et al. /s/ Marcia G. Patrisso MARCIA G. PATRISSO, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter