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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

* * *

AMERICAN BROADCASTING)
COMPANIES, INC., THE ASSOCIATED)
PRESS, CABLE NEWS NETWORK LP,)
LLLP, CBS BROADCASTING INC.,)
FOX NEWS NETWORK, L.L.C., and)
NBC UNIVERSAL, INC.,)

2:06-CV-01268-PMP-RJJ

Plaintiffs,

O R D E R and
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

v.

DEAN HELLER, in his official capacity as)
the SECRETARY OF STATE OF)
NEVADA,)

Defendants.

Plaintiffs are news-gathering organizations which seek to conduct polls of voters leaving polling places in the State of Nevada at the forthcoming general election scheduled for November 7, 2006. Plaintiffs commenced this action on October 10, 2006, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enable them to conduct exit polls within the 100-foot barrier currently imposed under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740(1)(a) which, among other things, makes it unlawful for any person to speak to a voter on the subject of marking their ballot “. . . within 100 feet from the entrance to the building or other structure in which a polling place is located.”

Plaintiffs allege that to the extent the Nevada statute is enforced by Defendant Secretary of State of Nevada to prohibit exit polling within 100 feet of the entrance to Nevada polling places, the statute impermissibly restricts Plaintiffs’ free speech and

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1 commentary about the political process in violation of the First and Fourteenth
2 Amendments to the United States Constitution.

3 Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Preliminary
4 Injunction (Doc. #2), filed October 11, 2006, and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
5 #10), filed October 20, 2006. On October 31, 2006, the Court held a hearing regarding both
6 Motions and expressed a preliminary ruling denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and
7 granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction which ruling the Court now confirms.

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9 **I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

10 The right of every citizen to vote at a polling place which is peaceful and free of
11 disruption and harassment is fundamental to our democracy. Clearly the State of Nevada
12 has a compelling interest in protecting that right, and a variety of state and federal laws
13 exist to ensure the voting rights of every citizen. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 293.710, 293.730,
14 293.740, and 42 U.S.C. § 1973i. As news-gathering and reporting organizations, Plaintiffs
15 also enjoy important speech and press rights protected under the First Amendment of the
16 United States Constitution and made applicable to the states under the Fourteenth
17 Amendment. Indeed, the free flow of information and ideas protected under the First
18 Amendment is essential to the ability of citizens to cast an informed vote, and to the robust
19 discussion of governmental affairs.

20 Plaintiffs have retained two polling organizations, Edison Media Research
21 ("Edison") and Mitofsky International ("Mitofsky") to assist them in conducting the exit
22 polling. (Compl. at ¶ 11; Emergency Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Relief & Mem. of P. & A. in
23 Support Thereof [Doc. #2], Aff. of Joseph W. Lenski ["Lenski Aff."] at ¶ 1.) Generally, an
24 exit poll is conducted by the exit pollster approaching voters as they exit the polling
25 location and asking them if they would like to participate in a voluntary, anonymous poll.
26 (Compl. at ¶ 12; Lenski Aff. at ¶¶ 4-7.) Plaintiffs argue the further away from the polling

1 place's exit the pollster must stand, the less reliable the exit poll results because of the
2 possibility of the voter getting into his or her car and driving away or melding into a crowd
3 of non-voters, and because it undermines the scientifically selected pattern of those to be
4 polled (every fourth or fifth voter, for example). (Compl. at ¶ 13; Lenski Aff. at ¶ 8.)

5 The statute at issue prohibits "any person to solicit a vote or speak to a voter on
6 the subject of marking his ballot" within 100 feet from the polling place's entrance. Nev.
7 Rev. Stat. § 293.740(1)(a). Violation of the statute gives rise to both criminal and civil
8 penalties. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740(3) (gross misdemeanor); § 293.840 (civil penalty).

9 In October 2004, Plaintiffs requested Defendant construe the statute in such a
10 way that it did not apply to exit polling. (Emergency Mot. for Enlargement of Time
11 Pursuant to FRCP 6(b) [Doc. #7], Ex. 1.) Defendant responded by indicating he would
12 "decline to allow exit polling within the 100 foot mark established by our state Legislature
13 to protect voters from possible harassment and intimidation." (Id., Ex. 2.) Despite this
14 response, in 2004, Plaintiffs conducted exit polling at some Nevada polling places within
15 the 100-foot zone "without incident and without any complaint by the Secretary of State or
16 any other election official." (Compl. at ¶ 17; Lenski Aff at ¶ 21.) According to Kristi D.
17 Geiser, Program Officer with the Nevada Secretary of State's office, Nevada has received
18 only four complaints alleging violations of § 293.740 since 1998, none of which pertained
19 to exit polling. (Mot. to Dismiss & Opp'n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Relief, Aff. of Geiser at
20 ¶¶ 1-2.) Geiser also states that to her knowledge, the Secretary of State's office has not
21 civilly or criminally enforced § 293.740 or referred violations of the statute to any other
22 entity for prosecution. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

23 On September 16, 2006, Plaintiffs' representative, John W. Zucker,¹ contacted
24 the Nevada Secretary of State's office and asked whether Defendant would permit Plaintiffs

25 ¹ John W. Zucker is Senior Vice President, Law and Regulation for ABC, Inc., parent
26 company of Plaintiff American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (Zucker Aff. at ¶ 1.)

1 to conduct exit polls within the 100-foot zone in Nevada on November 7, 2006. (Compl. at
2 ¶ 18; Emergency Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Relief & Mem. of P. & A. in Support Thereof [Doc.
3 #2], Aff. of John W. Zucker [“Zucker Aff.”] at ¶ 2.) On September 29, 2006, Ellick Hsu
4 (“Hsu”), Deputy Secretary of State for Elections at the Office of the Nevada Secretary of
5 State responded that Defendant would prohibit exit polling within 100 feet of polling
6 places, citing Nevada Revised Statute § 293.740(1)(a). (Compl. at ¶ 18; Zucker Aff. at ¶ 4.)
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8 **II. DISCUSSION**

9 The foregoing events gave rise to the filing of Plaintiffs’ Complaint less than one
10 month prior to the general election and spawned Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for
11 Injunctive Relief. Since this Court cannot decide the Emergency Motion for Injunctive
12 Relief unless it has jurisdiction, the Court first will address Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
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14 **A. MOTION TO DISMISS**

15 Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe because Plaintiffs lack a concrete
16 plan to violate the law, Plaintiffs are under no threat of prosecution, and by Plaintiffs’ own
17 allegations they have conducted exit polling in Nevada in the past without enforcement by
18 Defendant. Additionally, Defendant argues he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
19 immunity because Plaintiffs do not challenge any particular action Defendant has taken, and
20 because criminal and civil violations of the relevant statute must be prosecuted either by a
21 district attorney or the Attorney General.

22 Plaintiffs respond the case is ripe because Plaintiffs have stated their intent to
23 violate Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740 on November 7, 2006 and Defendant has stated his intent
24 to enforce that law by prohibiting exit polling within the 100-foot zone. Plaintiffs also
25 assert Defendant is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because Nevada law
26 specifically vests Defendant with authority to enforce Nevada election law and Plaintiffs

1 have challenged both the statute's constitutionality as well as Defendant's decision that
2 § 293.740 applies to exit polling.

3 **1. Ripeness**

4 "[R]ipeness is 'peculiarly a question of timing' . . . designed to 'prevent the
5 courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
6 disagreements.'" Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th
7 Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974) &
8 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)). The ripeness doctrine contains both a
9 constitutional component derived from Article III limitations on judicial power and a
10 prudential component. Id. The constitutional component of the ripeness inquiry is similar
11 in scope to determining whether a party has suffered an injury in fact under a standing
12 analysis. Id.; Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Bayless, 320 F.3d 1002, 1007
13 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff's injury must be "definite and concrete, not hypothetical
14 or abstract," and the plaintiff must face "a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a
15 result of the statute's operation or enforcement." Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139 (quotations
16 omitted). Injury that is "too imaginary or speculative" will not support a finding of
17 ripeness. Id. (quotations omitted). With respect to the prudential aspects of ripeness, the
18 Court considers whether the issues are fit for judicial decision and the hardship to the
19 parties if the Court declines to address the matter. Id. at 1141.

20 **a. Constitutional Ripeness Inquiry**

21 In some situations, individuals may challenge an allegedly unconstitutional
22 statute before the government has made any specific threat of prosecution or enforcement
23 against the plaintiff. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973) (finding physicians
24 had standing to challenge statute criminalizing abortions despite a lack of threatened
25 prosecution); see also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298-99
26 (1979) ("When contesting the constitutionality of a criminal statute, it is not necessary that

1 the plaintiff first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge
2 the statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.”) (quotation and
3 alteration omitted). However, the mere existence of a proscriptive statute or a generalized
4 threat of prosecution is insufficient to establish a realistic threat of a definite and concrete
5 injury. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139. “Rather, there must be a genuine threat of imminent
6 prosecution.” Id. (quotation omitted). To determine if there is a genuine threat of
7 prosecution, the court evaluates whether “the plaintiffs have articulated a concrete plan to
8 violate the law in question, whether the prosecuting authorities have communicated a
9 specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings, and the history of past prosecution or
10 enforcement under the challenged statute.” Id.

11 These requirements are relaxed in the context of First Amendment protected
12 speech. Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2003). A
13 plaintiff raising a First Amendment claim need not speak first and risk criminal prosecution
14 or enforcement but instead may challenge the law pre-enforcement. Id. This exception for
15 First Amendment cases is based on the chilling effect of statutes that prohibit speech and
16 the fear that individuals may self-censor rather than risk enforcement or prosecution, and
17 thus the plaintiff is harmed through the suppression of his or her speech even without being
18 prosecuted. Id.; San Diego County Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1129-30
19 (9th Cir. 1996). Additionally, the public at large suffers when speech is chilled.
20 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965). Accordingly, where enforcement of
21 the statute implicates free speech rights, the analysis “tilts dramatically toward a finding of
22 standing.” Ariz. Right to Life Political Action Comm., 320 F.3d at 1006.

23 This exception for First Amendment speech is available only to a plaintiff who
24 has “an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against [him or her].”
25 Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc., 328 F.3d at 1095 (quotation omitted, alteration in original). A
26 fear of prosecution is well founded when the challenged statute arguably covers the

1 plaintiff's intended speech. Id.; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. Heller, 378
2 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2004) ("In First Amendment cases, it is sufficient for standing
3 purposes that the plaintiff intends to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a
4 constitutional interest and that there is a credible threat that the challenged provision will be
5 invoked against the plaintiff.") (quotation and alteration omitted).

6 **_____ i. Concrete Plan to Violate the Law**

7 A concrete plan to violate the law is not a hypothetical intent to violate the law,
8 but includes particulars such as when, where, and under what circumstances. Thomas, 220
9 F.3d at 1139. "A general intent to violate a statute at some unknown date in the future does
10 not rise to the level of an articulated, concrete plan." Id.; San Diego County Gun Rights
11 Comm., 98 F.3d at 1127 (holding that a stated intention to violate the law "some day"
12 without describing concrete plans was insufficient to establish standing).

13 Plaintiffs clearly have indicated the requisite concrete plan to violate the law.
14 Plaintiffs have stated they intend to conduct exit polling within the 100-foot zone on
15 November 7, 2006 at approximately 20 polling locations in Nevada. Plaintiffs have
16 identified the date, generally the location (there are a set number of polling places in
17 Nevada, so the locations at which Plaintiffs may operate is a closed universe capable of
18 determination), and the circumstances of how they intend to violate Nev. Rev. Stat. §
19 293.740. Moreover, Plaintiffs have stated that they violated the statute during the 2004
20 election by conducting exit polling at certain polling locations in Nevada within the 100-
21 foot zone and that they intend to do so again on November 7, 2006. Plaintiffs therefore
22 have established they have concrete plans to violate Nevada Revised Statute § 293.740 on
23 November 7, 2006.

24 **_____ ii. Threat of Enforcement**

25 The threat of enforcement must be "credible, not simply imaginary or
26 speculative." Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1140 (quotations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs have a well-

1 founded fear of enforcement. Defendant, through his agent Hsu, recently advised Plaintiffs
2 that Defendant would “prohibit” exit polling within the 100-foot zone.² Plaintiffs’ speech
3 undisputably falls within the challenged statute’s reach, as Defendant has indicated the
4 statute prohibits exit polling within the 100-foot zone. Defendant, in effect, is making
5 Plaintiffs choose either to self-censor and stay outside the 100-foot zone or to risk being
6 ejected from the 100-foot zone on November 7 and face possible civil and criminal
7 penalties. Under such circumstances, the Court finds Plaintiffs have a well-founded fear of
8 enforcement and prosecution for conducting exit polls on November 7, 2006 in violation of
9 the statute.

10 Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs suffer no threat of prosecution from
11 Defendant because Defendant cannot prosecute violations of § 293.740 is not supported by
12 Nevada law. Section 293.740(3) makes it a gross misdemeanor to violate the statute.³
13 Section 293.740 does not specify an enforcement authority. Under Nevada law, district
14 attorneys and the Attorney General are charged with initiating criminal prosecutions. See
15 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 228.120, § 252.080. However, Nevada law provides that the Secretary of
16 State is the chief officer of elections “responsible for the execution and enforcement of the
17 provisions of Title 24 of NRS and all other provisions of state and federal law relating to
18 elections in this state.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.124(1). The Secretary of State “may provide
19 interpretations and take other actions necessary for the effective administration of the
20 statutes and regulations governing the conduct of primary, general, special and district

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22 ² Defendant argues this statement is hearsay, but it is an admission by a party’s agent and
23 therefore is admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) (statement is nonhearsay when offered against
24 a party and is a statement by the party’s agent concerning a matter within the scope of the agency, made
25 during the existence of the relationship). Plaintiffs offer the statement against Defendant and the
26 statement was made by Defendant’s Deputy Secretary of State for Elections in the course of his duties
in responding to Plaintiffs’ inquiry.

³ As for civil penalties, Nevada law provides that such an action must be brought by a district
attorney or the Attorney General. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.840(1).

1 elections in this state.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.247(3).⁴

2 Nevada state law specifically vests enforcement authority over election laws in
3 the Secretary of State. Defendant has indicated he will exercise this authority and prohibit
4 exit polling within the 100-foot zone on election day. Accordingly, Defendant may enforce
5 the statute against Plaintiffs by removing their pollsters from the 100-foot zone, even if
6 Defendant’s enforcement does not ultimately result in criminal or civil prosecution.

7 Furthermore, Defendant effectively enforces the statute’s criminal penalties. In a
8 prior case, this Court found the Secretary of State was a proper defendant under similar
9 circumstances. In Americans for Medical Rights v. Heller, the plaintiff intended to violate
10 article 2, section 10(2) of the Nevada Constitution, which limited contributions to
11 campaigns for the approval or rejection of ballot initiatives to \$5,000 and set forth criminal
12 penalties for violating this provision. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1309 (D. Nev. 1998) (Pro, J.).
13 The plaintiff sought to urge passage of a ballot initiative on the legalization of medical
14 marijuana and intended to spend and seek contributions in excess of \$5,000. Id. at 1310.
15 The plaintiff sued the Nevada Secretary of State seeking an injunction prohibiting the
16 Secretary of State from enforcing the spending limits pending a determination as to whether

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18 ⁴ Other provisions of Nevada election law are more specific in identifying the Secretary of
19 State as the responsible party for initiating investigations or enforcement proceedings. See Nev. Rev.
20 Stat. § 294A.342 (requiring a county clerk, city clerk, or registrar of voters to report certain persuasive
21 polling violations to the Secretary of State, and if it appears to the Secretary of State the law was
22 violated, the Secretary must report the alleged violation to the Attorney General to institute
23 proceedings); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 294A.410 (indicating Secretary of State is the entity with authority to
24 investigate alleged campaign practices violations and “cause the appropriate proceedings to be
25 instituted and prosecuted” in court or refer the alleged violation to the Attorney General who “shall
26 investigate the alleged violation and institute and prosecute the appropriate proceedings . . .”). No
similar statute exists specifically directing the Secretary of State to initiate proceedings for violations
of § 239.740. However, Nevada’s decision to require the Secretary of State to initiate proceedings or
refer violations to the Attorney General for prosecution of certain election law violations does not mean
the Secretary of State lacks enforcement authority for other election law violations. Rather, Nevada
has granted the Secretary of State general enforcement authority over all election laws. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 293.247, § 293.124(1).

1 article 2, section 10(2) violated the First Amendment. Id.

2 Among other defenses, the Secretary of State argued, as he does here, that the
3 plaintiff sued the wrong entity because a district attorney, not the Secretary of State, had the
4 authority to bring criminal actions for violating the relevant provision. Id. at 1312-13. In
5 rejecting the Secretary of State’s argument, this Court noted that had the Nevada legislature
6 enacted a law implementing article 2, section 10(2) of the Nevada Constitution, it would
7 have been codified in the campaign practices chapter, and the Secretary of State had the
8 power to “take such action as necessary to enforce the campaign practices laws.” Id. at
9 1312-13 (citing Nev. Rev. Stat. § 294A.385 (1997)).⁵ Accordingly, the Secretary of State
10 would have been the enforcement authority. Id. This Court further noted that the “reality is
11 that a prosecution for violation of article 2, section 10(2) will not likely occur unless the
12 Secretary of State notifies a district attorney of a campaign practices violation” because the
13 Secretary of State was responsible for insuring parties followed campaign rules and parties
14 were required to report contributions to the Secretary of State. Id. Therefore, the Secretary
15 of State would be the party with knowledge of potential campaign practices violations. Id.
16 The Court concluded that “[s]ince the Secretary of State is the party primarily responsible
17 for enforcing limits on contributions to ballot measures and since the Secretary of State can
18 request that a district attorney prosecute, the fact that AMR did not include a district
19 attorney as a defendant does not mean that there is not an adequate threat of prosecution.”
20 Id. at 1313.

21 Here, Nevada law specifically identifies the Secretary of State as the state officer
22 responsible for enforcing election laws and grants him authority to “take other actions
23 necessary for the effective administration of the statutes and regulations governing the
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25 ⁵ The opinion cites Nevada Revised Statute § 294A.385 but should cite Nevada Revised Statute
26 § 294A.380 (providing that the secretary of state may “take such actions as are necessary for the
implementation and effective administration of the provisions of this chapter.”).

1 conduct of primary, general, special and district elections in this state.” Nev. Rev. Stat.
2 § 293.247(3), § 293.124(1). Defendant has indicated, both in the October 2004 letter and in
3 the September 2006 phone call, that he will prohibit exit polling within the 100-foot zone.
4 Accordingly, because Defendant is the party responsible for enforcing Nevada election laws
5 and because Defendant may expel Plaintiffs from the 100-foot zone and refer criminal
6 violations to the district attorney or attorney general,⁶ Plaintiffs’ failure to include a district
7 attorney or the attorney general as a defendant does not mean there is not an adequate threat
8 of enforcement or prosecution in this case.

9 Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs themselves face no fear of enforcement or
10 prosecution because Edison and Mitofsky employees who actually conduct the exit polling
11 would be prosecuted is similarly without merit. Plaintiffs have hired Edison and Mitofsky
12 to perform exit polling on their behalf. Suppressing Plaintiffs’ agents’ speech therefore
13 suppresses Plaintiffs’ speech. Furthermore, under Nevada law:

14 Every person concerned in the commission of a felony, gross
15 misdemeanor or misdemeanor, whether he directly commits the act
16 constituting the offense, or aids or abets in its commission, and
17 whether present or absent; and every person who, directly or indirectly,
18 counsels, encourages, hires, commands, induces or otherwise procures
19 another to commit a felony, gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor is a
20 principal, and shall be proceeded against and punished as such.

21 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 195.020; see also Gordon v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev.,
22 913 P.2d 240, 247 (Nev. 1996) (holding indictment properly charged night club owners
23 with aiding and abetting nightclub employees by hiring them, inducing them to use a pitch
24 to influence patrons into believing that if they bought a bottle of non-alcoholic wine the
25 patron would be allowed to have sex with a female employee, and by providing them with a
26 place in which to do this). Plaintiffs have hired Edison and Mitofsky to conduct exit polling

⁶ See Culinary Workers Union, Local 226 v. Del Papa, 200 F.3d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1999)
(noting a case or controversy exists where state official “intends either to enforce a statute or to
encourage local law enforcement agencies to do so”) (quotation omitted).

1 on their behalf and the exit pollsters will wear badges and have boxes identifying them as
2 associated with Plaintiffs. (Lenski Aff. at ¶ 7, Exs. B & C.) Plaintiffs therefore face
3 enforcement and prosecution for hiring and encouraging Edison and Mitofsky employees to
4 conduct exit polls within the 100-foot zone.

5 **iii. History of Enforcement**

6 The absence of any past prosecutions under the challenged statute may
7 undermine a plaintiff's argument that he or she faces a genuine threat of imminent
8 prosecution. San Diego County Gun Rights Comm., 98 F.3d at 1128. Where a statute has
9 been in existence for many years but authorities never or rarely have prosecuted anyone
10 under the law, the plaintiff may not have a well founded fear of imminent prosecution.
11 Doe, 410 U.S. at 188 (comparing 1879 law under which only one prosecution had been
12 pursued with a recently enacted statute that was "not moribund"). However, a recently
13 enacted statute or one under which prosecutions have been pursued may give rise to a well
14 founded fear of prosecution. Id.

15 The record before the Court does not reveal whether the Secretary of State or
16 other prosecuting authorities ever have prosecuted anyone under § 293.740 for conducting
17 exit polls within 100 feet of a polling place.⁷ However, the 100-foot zone is less than ten
18 years old⁸ and thus it would be premature to declare that historically it has not been
19 enforced or that it has fallen into a state of disuse. Regardless, Defendant has expressed a
20 present intent to enforce the statute. Additionally, a litigant may have a well founded fear
21 of enforcement even where the statute in question previously never has been enforced. See

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23 ⁷ Although Plaintiffs admit they violated the statute in 2004 with no consequences, it is
24 unclear from the record currently before the Court whether that is because Defendant declined to
25 enforce the statute or because Defendant was not aware at the time that Plaintiffs had violated the
26 statute.

⁸ History of Assembly Bill 18, 69th Leg. (Nev. 1997), available at
<http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/research/library/1997/ab018,1997.pdf>.

1 Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302. Accordingly, the Court concludes Plaintiffs' concrete plan to
2 violate the statute in the face of Defendant's communicated intent to prohibit such activity
3 during the November 7, 2006 election creates a ripe case or controversy within this Court's
4 Article III jurisdiction.

5 **b. Prudential Ripeness**

6 With respect to the prudential aspects of ripeness, the Court considers whether
7 the issues are fit for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties if the court declines to
8 address the matter. Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1141. "A claim is fit for decision if the issues
9 raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged
10 action is final." United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotation
11 omitted).

12 Defendant does not argue the case is not ripe under the prudential component of
13 ripeness. While factual discovery remains to be conducted in this case, the issues raised
14 primarily are legal. If the Court declined to address the matter now, Plaintiffs would suffer
15 hardship in having to choose between self-censorship or risking civil and criminal penalties
16 on election day. Additionally, should Plaintiffs choose to self-censor, the public is harmed
17 through the suppression of speech. Further, Defendant has expressed his final decision that
18 § 293.740 applies to exit polling. The case is ripe for adjudication in this Court.

19 **2. Eleventh Amendment Immunity**

20 The Court also rejects Defendant's claim of immunity under the Eleventh
21 Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment generally bars a private party from bringing suit in
22 federal court against a state without the state's consent. Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v.
23 Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992). "However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
24 actions seeking only prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in
25 their official capacities." Id. (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908) &
26 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974)). To obtain prospective injunctive relief

1 against a state officer, the state officer sued “must have some connection with the
2 enforcement of the act” the plaintiff challenges. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. “This
3 connection must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general
4 supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will
5 not subject an official to suit.” Los Angeles County Bar Ass’n, 979 F.2d at 704. State law
6 determines whether the state officer has a direct connection to enforcing the challenged law.
7 Snoeck v. Brussa, 153 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1998). In determining whether the defendant
8 has a connection with enforcing the law under Ex Parte Young, Article III justiciability and
9 the Eleventh Amendment analysis are closely related inquiries. Culinary Workers Union,
10 Local 226 v. Del Papa, 200 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1999).

11 As discussed above, Nevada law specifically vests Defendant with the power to
12 enforce election laws in Nevada. Defendant has indicated an intent to exercise that
13 authority through his decision that § 293.740(1)(a) applies to exit polling and through his
14 stated intent to prohibit exit polling within the 100-foot zone on election day. Plaintiffs
15 challenge both the law and Defendant’s decision to apply § 293.740 to their exit polling
16 activity. Defendant therefore has a connection with enforcing the statute and he is not
17 entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this action for prospective injunctive relief.
18 Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

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1 **B. EMERGENCY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

2 Having determined that this Court has jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’
3 Complaint, the immediate issue before the Court is whether the 100-foot barrier established
4 by Nev. Rev. Stat. § 273.740 can be applied lawfully with respect to Plaintiffs’ proposed
5 exit polling on November 7, 2006. The Court concludes it cannot.

6 **1. Preliminary Injunction Standard**

7 “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must make a clear showing of either
8 (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and a possibility of irreparable injury,
9 or (2) that its claims raise serious questions as to the merits and that the balance of
10 hardships tips in its favor.” Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. New Images, 321
11 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2003). “These formulations are not different tests but represent two
12 points on a sliding scale in which the degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability
13 of success on the merits decreases.” Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover,
14 462 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coal. for
15 Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991). Further, “[i]n cases where the public
16 interest is involved, the district court must also examine whether the public interest favors
17 the plaintiff.” Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, 303 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir.
18 2002) (quoting Fund for Animals v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992)).

19 **a. Probability of Success on the Merits**

20 Plaintiffs argue that they are likely to succeed on the merits because Nev. Rev.
21 Stat. § 293.740 restricts speech in public forums based on its content and therefore can
22 survive constitutional scrutiny only if it is narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling
23 government interest and is the least restrictive means available. Defendant responds
24 Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits because Plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient
25 and Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740 is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.
26

i. Insufficient Evidence

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2 Defendant argues Plaintiffs' insufficient evidence eliminates the probability of
3 success on the merits, and that Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1983)
4 ("Daily Herald II") requires courts to make certain factual findings in response to specific
5 questions identified in the Court's opinion regarding exit polls. Specifically, Defendant
6 argues Plaintiffs have not provided sufficient evidence showing (1) exit polling in Nevada
7 would be conducted in a "systematic and statistically reliable manner"; (2) what specific
8 locations Plaintiffs intend to conduct their polling activities; (3) whether information
9 obtained from exit polling could be gathered effectively from another method; and (4)
10 whether exit polling is disruptive to the voting process. Plaintiffs argue that Defendant
11 misapprehends the preliminary injunction standard and the procedural posture of the Daily
12 Herald case. The Court agrees.

13 Defendant's assertion that this Court must resolve the factual questions cited
14 above contradicts the preliminary injunction standard. To grant a preliminary injunction,
15 the court must "assess the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, not whether the
16 plaintiff has actually succeeded on the merits." Southern Oregon Barter Fair v. Jackson
17 County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, "decisions on preliminary
18 injunctions are just that - preliminary - and must often be made hastily and on less than a
19 full record." Id. Thus, "the possibility that the party obtaining a preliminary injunction may
20 not win on the merits at the trial is not determinative of the propriety or validity of the trial
21 court's granting the preliminary injunction." B.W. Photo Utilities v. Republic Molding
22 Corp., 280 F.2d 806, 807 (9th Cir. 1960).

23 Further, the procedural posture of Daily Herald distinguishes that case from the
24 one before the Court. In Daily Herald I, 758 F.2d 350, 351 (9th Cir. 1984) the district court
25 entered summary judgment sua sponte in favor of the State of Washington upholding a
26 statute prohibiting exit polling on election day within 300 feet of a polling place. The Ninth

1 Circuit reversed holding genuine issues of material fact remained and proceeded to identify
2 specific factual questions that the district court was to consider on remand. Id. at 351-52.

3 On remand, the court found the statute was unconstitutional. Daily Herald II, 838
4 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988). Specifically, “[t]he district court found that the media
5 plaintiffs conducted their exit polling in a ‘systematic and statistically reliable manner’; that
6 information obtained from exit polling could not be obtained by other methods; that the
7 300-foot limit precluded exit polling; and that exit polling was not *per se* disruptive to the
8 polling place.” Id. Thus, procedurally, Daily Herald is distinguishable from this case
9 because Daily Herald was decided at the summary judgment stage, which requires that there
10 be no genuine issues of material fact remaining, and not the preliminary injunction stage,
11 which recognizes that injunctions often are granted “hastily and on less than a full record.”

12 Plaintiffs have submitted three sworn affidavits describing what exit polls are, the
13 accuracy and reliability of exit polls, the value of exit polls, how exit polls are conducted,
14 why an exit poll’s statistical reliability decreases when polling reporters are required to
15 stand great distances from the polling place, how exit polling information is used, Plaintiffs’
16 plans to conduct exit polling in Nevada, and the lack of any reported disruptive behavior by
17 exit pollsters. Moreover, to the extent Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740 is subject to strict scrutiny,
18 Defendant, not Plaintiffs, would have the burden of showing that the statute is narrowly
19 tailored to further a compelling government interest. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
20 Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (stating that “[f]or the state to enforce a content-
21 based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
22 interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”). Plaintiffs are likely to succeed
23 on the merits because Defendant has not shown that statute is narrowly tailored to advance
24 the State’s interest and is the least restrictive means available.

ii. Constitutional Standard

1
2 Plaintiffs argue Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740 is a content-based regulation that
3 restricts speech in traditional public forums and therefore should be subject to strict
4 scrutiny. Defendant argues that the areas outside polling places are not necessarily public
5 forums, but even if they are, the statute survives strict scrutiny because it is narrowly drawn
6 to accomplish a compelling state interest. Whether a strict scrutiny standard is applied or
7 some lesser test, the Court finds the same result pertains.

8 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states “Congress shall
9 make no law . . . abridging the freedom on speech[.]” U.S. Const. amend. I. The First
10 Amendment protects, *inter alia*, “the free discussion of governmental affairs[.]” which
11 “includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in
12 which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to
13 political processes.” Mills v. State of Ala., 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966). Accordingly,
14 “[e]xit polling is . . . speech that is protected, on several levels, by the First Amendment.”
15 Daily Herald, 838 F.2d at 384. Exit polling is protected not only because “the information
16 disseminated based on the polls is speech, but also in that the process of obtaining the
17 information requires a discussion between pollster and voter.” Id. Consequently, “the state
18 may regulate exit polling only in limited ways.” Id.

19 The standard to determine whether a regulation restricting protected speech, such
20 as exit polling, is constitutional “depends on whether the speech to be regulated occurs in a
21 traditional public forum . . . and whether the [regulation] is content-based or amounts to an
22 absolute prohibition of a type of speech.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “A content-based
23 statute that regulates speech in a public forum is constitutional only if it is narrowly tailored
24 to accomplish a compelling government interest . . . and is the least restrictive means
25 available.” Id. at 385.

26 Traditional public forums include streets, parks, and sidewalks. United States v.

1 Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). In Burson v. Freeman, the Supreme Court found that a
2 100-foot zone around polling locations “bars speech in quintessential public forums . . .
3 such as parks, streets, and sidewalks.” 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992); see also Daily Herald,
4 838 F.2d at 384 (stating “public areas within 300 feet of the entrance to the polling place
5 are traditional public forums because they traditionally are open to the public for expressive
6 purposes . . . and encompass streets and sidewalks.”).

7 Here, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740 prohibits any person from speaking to a voter on
8 the subject of marking his ballot within 100 feet from the entrance to any polling location.
9 The statute makes no exceptions for public streets, sidewalks, or other traditional public
10 forums. Defendant relies on Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Burson and a Sixth
11 Circuit case, United Food & Commercial Workers Local 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d
12 738, 750 (6th Cir. 2004), to support the proposition that streets, parking lots and sidewalks
13 outside of polling places are not always public forums.

14 In United Food, the Court distinguished between public sidewalks, which are
15 public forums, and parking lots and walkways on private and school property leading up to
16 polling location entrances. 364 F.3d at 747-49. The Sixth Circuit determined that parking
17 lots and walkways on private and school property did not temporarily convert into public
18 forums just because those locations were being used as polling places. Here, Defendant
19 argues that many polling places in Nevada are located in churches, recreation centers and
20 schools and therefore those polling locations’ walkways and parking lots are not necessarily
21 public forums. However, the plurality in Burson and the Ninth Circuit in Daily Herald both
22 concluded, without distinguishing between private and school properties and public
23 properties, that streets and sidewalks within the restrictive zones surrounding polling places
24 are public forums.

25 The Court further finds that Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740 constitutes a content-based
26 restriction on speech rather than a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction. A

1 statute is content-based if it regulates discussion of a specific subject matter. Daily Herald,
2 838 F.2d at 385. In Daily Herald, the Court found the statute prohibiting exit polling within
3 300 feet of the polling place was content-based “because it regulates a specific subject
4 matter, the discussion of voting” Id. Here, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740 is a content-
5 based restriction because it prohibits any person from speaking to a voter on the subject of
6 marking his ballot inside a polling place or within 100 feet from the entrance of the polling
7 place.

8 “A content-based statute that regulates speech in a public forum” is subject to
9 strict scrutiny and “is constitutional only if it is narrowly tailored to accomplish a
10 compelling government interest . . . and is the least restrictive means available.” Id. at 385.
11 The Ninth Circuit has ruled that “[s]tates have an interest in maintaining peace, order, and
12 decorum at the polls and ‘preserving the integrity of their electoral processes.’” Id.
13 Acknowledging that important state interest, Plaintiffs argue that Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740
14 is neither narrowly tailored to meet that interest nor the least restrictive means available.

15 In Daily Herald, the Court found that a 300-foot buffer zone prohibiting exit
16 polling around polling places was not narrowly tailored to advance the state’s interest in
17 preventing disruption and harassment at the polling place because the statute prohibited all
18 exit polling, including non-disruptive exit polling. Id.; see also CBS Inc. v. Smith, 681 F.
19 Supp. 794, 803 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that a statute prohibiting solicitation of voters
20 within 150 feet of polling place was not narrowly tailored because the statute “prohibits
21 even peaceful, thoughtful discussions with voters regarding how they voted and why.”).
22 Further, the Court found the statute was not the least restrictive means of furthering the
23 state’s interest because the State of Washington already had another statute prohibiting
24 disruptive conduct at the polls. Id.

25 Notwithstanding Defendant Secretary of State Heller’s affidavit stating that he
26 “believes” harassment or disruptions within the 100-foot buffer zone may discourage

1 people from voting (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss and Opp. to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. [Doc. #10],
2 Ex. A, Affidavit of Dean Heller ("Heller Aff.") at ¶ 3), Defendant has not produced any
3 evidence that a voter has decided not to vote because of exit polls or that exit poll reporters
4 have been the cause of harassment or disruption in the past.

5 The Court finds that Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740 is not narrowly tailored to satisfy
6 the compelling State interests articulated here. The pertinent provision of the statute does
7 not prevent polling within the 100-foot buffer zone regarding political or other subjects
8 unrelated to how a person marked their ballot. Neither can the statute be construed as the
9 least restrictive means of advancing the State's interest because Nevada already has other
10 statutes at its disposal prohibiting disruptive conduct at the polls. Nev. Rev. Stat. §
11 293.710 makes it unlawful for any person to use or threaten force, coercion, violence,
12 restraint, or undue influence against any other person in connection with any election or
13 petition. Further, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.730 prohibits a person from remaining "in or
14 outside of any polling place so as to interfere with the conduct of the election."

15 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have demonstrated a probability of success on the
16 merits.

17 2. Irreparable Harm

18 The Court rejects Defendant's argument that Plaintiffs have not presented
19 evidence that exit polling more than 100 feet from polling locations will cause unreliable
20 results and thus irreparable harm. The Supreme Court has ruled that "[t]he loss of First
21 Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
22 irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976). Thus, regardless of the
23 reliability of Plaintiffs' polls, because Nev. Rev. Stat. § 293.740 restricts free speech, it
24 causes irreparable harm. In addition, Plaintiffs have submitted evidence in the form of a
25 sworn affidavit that upholding the statute would result in the loss of important voter
26 information in this election year. (Lenski Aff. at 4-5.)

1 **III. CONCLUSION**

2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
3 Complaint (Doc. # 10) is denied.

4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Preliminary
5 Injunction (Doc. #2) is granted and that Defendant Secretary of State is hereby enjoined
6 from prohibiting exit polling activities of Plaintiffs within 100 feet of Nevada polling places
7 on election day, November 7, 2006.

8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Secretary of State shall forthwith
9 advise all State election officials of this Court's Preliminary Injunction Order.

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11 DATED: November 1, 2006

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14 PHILIP M. PRO
15 Chief United States District Judge
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