Case No. 10-cv-5022-LHK-HRL

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PLAINTIFF'S OPP. TO DEFENDANTS' MSJ OR MOTION UNDER RULE 56(D)

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Plaintiff Art of Living Foundation ("Plaintiff"), by and through its counsel of record, respectfully submits the following: a) memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Doe/Klim and Doe/Skywalker (collectively, "Defendants"); motion for denial of Defendants' motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d); and c) evidentiary objections.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff is an educational and humanitarian organization, which offers courses on breathing, meditation, and yoga. Among Plaintiff's courses is the Breath Water Sound course. The methods used in the Breath Water Sound Course are contained in a written Breath Water Sound Manual (the "BWS Manual"). Plaintiff owns the copyright to the BWS Manual.

Without Plaintiff's consent, Defendant Skywalker (possibly in coordination with other anonymous Defendants) published the full text of the BWS Manual on his blog. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, asserting a claim for copyright infringement. Skywalker has moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's copyright claim. However, Defendants' motion is more manifesto than legal argument supported by admissible evidence. The Court should deny Defendants' motion for the following reasons, and as explained more fully herein:

- Contrary to Defendants' claims, Plaintiff owns the copyright to the BWS Manual. To the extent there is an ambiguity or mistake in the copyright registration, that circumstance does not affect Plaintiff's claim.
- Defendants' affirmative defense of fair use fails under all of the fair use factors where Defendants copied and posted the entirety of the BWS Manual without transforming the work at all. Moreover, courts have found that educational and spiritual works like the BWS Manual are creative works and offer value to their owners, thereby requiring a significant showing by Defendants to establish fair use. Defendants have failed to make such a showing.

•	While Plaintiff need not quantify its damages to succeed on its copyright claim, it
	has done so here. Specifically, Plaintiff has shown that a percentage of the
	students of its Breath Water Sound course subsequently enroll in Plaintiff's fee-
	based courses. Defendants' posting of the BWS Manual deterred these students.

While Defendants accuse Plaintiff of filing this suit as a pretext, and that
Defendants should succeed on the theory of copyright misuse, Defendants have
offered no evidence of misuse. To the contrary, Plaintiff brought its copyright
claim solely to enforce its copyright in the BWS Manual.

For all of these reasons, the Court should deny Defendants' motion. As an additional basis for denial, the Court should exclude most of Defendants' evidence because it is unauthenticated, lacking foundation, constituting hearsay, and/or violating the best evidence rule. Without this evidence, Defendants' motion fails. Finally, even if the Court finds that Defendants have met their evidentiary and legal burdens, the Court should still deny Defendants' motion under Rule 56(d) where Plaintiff has not had a meaningful opportunity to pursue discovery.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff & Plaintiff's Teachings

Plaintiff, the Art of Living Foundation, is a California non-profit corporation based in Goleta, California. (Declaration of Ashwani Dhall [D.E. No. 40] ("Dhall Decl.") ¶11.) Plaintiff is a non-denominational educational and humanitarian organization dedicated to the teachings of Sri Sri Ravi Shankar ("Shankar"). (*Id.* ¶13.) Plaintiff offers courses on breathing, meditation, and yoga, including Sudarshan Kriya, a rhythmic breathing technique. (*Id.* ¶14.)

Generally, individuals who wish to take a course offered by Plaintiff must register and pay the course fee. (Dhall Decl. ¶18.) The fee is typically \$250 for the Art of Living Course, which teaches the basics of Sudarshan Kriya. (*Id.* ¶18.) Plaintiff uses the money it raises through its courses to maintain its facilities, to train new teachers for its courses, and to provide humanitarian aid and community service. (*Id.* ¶19.)

B. Plaintiff's Breath Water Sound Course & Manual

Prior to 2002, Shankar came up with the idea for the Breath Water Sound course, which explains some of Shankar's basic teachings, including basic breath exercises, sound relaxation methods, meditation techniques, tools for healthy living, and processes to work together as a community. (Dhall Decl. ¶40; Declaration of Jaina Desai in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Desai Decl.") ¶2.) The Breath Water Sound course is typically offered by Plaintiff at no charge. (Dhall Decl. ¶39.) Many students who take the Breath Water Sound course subsequently enroll in one of Plaintiff's fee-based courses. (*Id.* ¶41; Declaration of Natalie Kaharick [D.E. No. 43] ("Kaharick Decl.") *passim*; Declaration of Michael Fischman in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Fischman Decl.") ¶4.)

Prior to 2002, Shankar also came up with the idea of memorializing the Breath Water Sound course in a written manual. (Desai Decl. ¶3; Fischman Decl. ¶5.) Thereafter, Shankar and employees and volunteers at the Art of Living Foundation in India, the Art of Living Foundation in the U.S., and other Art of Living chapters began writing the BWS Manual. (Desai Decl. ¶4; Fischman Decl. ¶6.) This work was done for the benefit of the Art of Living Foundation in India with the understanding that the Art of Living Foundation in India would own the all of the rights to this BWS Manual. (Desai Decl. ¶4; Fischman Decl. ¶6.) The 2002 publication attached to the third Skywalker declaration as Exhibit B was a draft of the BWS Manual. (Desai Decl. ¶4; Fischman Decl. ¶6.)

In 2003, control over the work on the BWS Manual was transferred from the Art of Living in India to Plaintiff. (Desai Decl. ¶5; Fischman Decl. ¶7.) All copyrights in the BWS Manual were also assigned to Plaintiff. (Desai Decl. ¶5; Fischman Decl. ¶7.) In 2003, Plaintiff finalized the BWS Manual, and in 2010, Plaintiff registered the Manual with the United States Copyright Office, Registration No. TX0007240203. (Dhall Decl. ¶¶37-38 & Ex. D; Fischman Decl. ¶9 & Ex. A.)

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C. Defendants' Blog

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In or before May 2010, Defendant Skywalker (in coordination with other anonymous Defendants) started the blog entitled Beyond the Art of Living and located at <aolfree.wordpress.com> (the "Blog"). (Dhall Decl. ¶44; Declaration of Doe/Skywalker [D.E. No. 15] ¶3.) The ostensible purpose of the Blog is to provide former students of Plaintiff and those doubting Plaintiff's teachings a space to heal, find answers, and understand the experiences they went through as students of Plaintiff. (Declaration of Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Special Motion to Strike, and Motion to Quash [D.E. No. 39] ¶¶3-5 & Exs. A-C.) In fact, the Blog is used to disparage Plaintiff and its teachings to thousands of viewers each month. (Dhall Decl. ¶46; Declaration of Dr. Frederick B. Cohen in Opposition to Defendants' Motions [D.E. No. 54] ¶2-7 & Exs. A-B.)

In or around July 2010, Defendant Skywalker (possibly in coordination with other anonymous Defendants) published the full text of the BWS Manual on the Blog. (Declaration of Doe/Skywalker [D.E. No. 15] ¶10 & Ex. E.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed its initial complaint against several Doe Defendants who operate and contribute to the Blog [D.E. No. 1.] The initial complaint asserted claims for copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, defamation, and trade libel. [D.E. No. 1.] On December 17, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to take expedited discovery, authorizing Plaintiff to issue subpoenas to identify the pseudonymous Defendants. [D.E. No. 10.] Thereafter, Plaintiff served subpoenas on Google, Inc. and Automattic, Inc. (Declaration of Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Rosenfeld Decl.") ¶2.)

On January 31, 2011, pseudonymous Defendants Klim and Skywalker filed a motion to quash the subpoenas to Google and Automattic. [D.E. Nos. 11-13.] On August 10, Magistrate Judge Lloyd denied the motion to quash in part. [D.E. No. 90.] Thereafter, Defendant Skywalker filed a Motion for Relief from Nondispositive Pretrial Case No. 10-cv-5022-LHK-HRL

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On September 12, 2011 Defendants filed a special motion to strike Plaintiff's trade secret claim under California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. [D.E. No. 100.] As of the date of this opposition, Defendants' motion to strike is also pending before the Court.

On August 24, 2011 Plaintiff served its first set of requests for production and first set of interrogatories on Skywalker. (Rosenfeld Decl. ¶3.) Additionally, on August 29, 2011 Plaintiff served a subpoena on Automattic seeking, among other things, all of the analytic data associated with the Blog. (*Id.* ¶4 & Ex. A.) Plaintiff has received objections and responses from Skywalker and an emailed response from Automattic. (*Id.* ¶5-8 & Exs. B-D.) While Plaintiff finds these responses highly deficient, it has chosen not to move to compel further responses or to conduct depositions until the resolution of Skywalker's pending special motion to strike and motion for relief from the magistrate judge's order. (*Id.* ¶9.) Plaintiff made this decision to keep its costs down until Defendants' dispositive motions are resolved. (*Id.*)

IV. <u>ARGUMENT</u>

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense for which it has the burden of proof, the defendant must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the defense in order to justify judgment in its favor. *Stuart v. Radioshack Corp.*, 259 F.R.D. 200, 202 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting *Martin v. Alamo Cmty. College Dist.*, 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir.2003)).

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Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must establish that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial. Id. The non-moving party must submit evidence from which a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1989). In determining whether a jury could reasonably render a verdict in the non-moving party's favor, all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n.2 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).

Here, Defendants have failed to submit evidence supporting the elements of their affirmative defenses, and they have failed to establish an absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff's claims. Thus, the Court should deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Alternatively, the Court should find that Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to present facts essential to its opposition, where it has not had any meaningful opportunity to pursue discovery, and on that basis, should deny Defendants' motion under Rule 56(d).

Α. Plaintiff owns the copyright to the BWS Manual; any ambiguity or mistake in Plaintiff's copyright registration does not affect Plaintiff's copyright claim.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot prevail on its copyright claim because Plaintiff does not own the copyright to the BWS Manual. (Mot. at 6:10-7:12.) This is incorrect. Plaintiff was an author of the BWS Manual, and all copyrights to the BWS Manual have been assigned to Plaintiff. (Desai Decl. ¶5; Fischman Decl. ¶7.) Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to enforce its copyright in the BWS Manual. 17 U.S.C. §501(b).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff knowingly failed to advise the Copyright Office of a prior published work (i.e. Exhibit B to the 3rd Skywalker Declaration), and thus Plaintiff's copyright should be invalidated. (Mot. at 6:19-7:12.) This argument also fails. First, Exhibit B to the third Skywalker Declaration is not a prior, published work. Rather, it is

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another version of the BWS Manual. Second, even if Exhibit B were a prior work, Plaintiff's mistake in not identifying it in its copyright application does not affect its infringement claim. The Ninth Circuit has been clear that in the absence of an intent to mislead the Copyright Office, mistakes on registration certificates do not invalidate a copyright and thus do not bar infringement actions. See United Fabrics Int'l, Inc. v. C&J Wear, Inc., 630 F.3d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003).

Because Plaintiff has submitted evidence that it owns the copyright to the BWS Manual, Defendants' motion fails.

В. Defendants' complete infringement of the BWS Manual cannot qualify for fair use protection.

Under the Copyright Act, the copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute the work. See Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000). Fair use is an exception to a copyright holder's exclusive rights, which recognizes that some limited use of copyrighted material may be necessary to allow artists and authors to improve upon, to comment on, or to criticize prior works. See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150-51 (C.D. Cal. 2010). However, "[t]he fair use doctrine is not a license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work contains material of possible public importance." See Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1115-16 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).

The Copyright Act identifies four factors to consider in evaluating a fair use claim: 1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. §107. Because fair use is an affirmative defense, the

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27 28 defendant bears the burden of proving fair use. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).

The issue of fair use in this action closely parallels the discussion in Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc. 227 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000). In Worldwide Church of God, the plaintiff, a religious organization, held a copyright in a book entitled Mystery of the Ages ("MOA"), which it had distributed to over nine million people at no charge. Id. at 1113. The plaintiff brought an infringement action against a competing religious organization, which had made copies of MOA to use in connection with its religious services. Id. The defendant claimed that MOA was central to its religious services, and that it was entitled to make copies under the fair use doctrine. Id. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the four fair use factors and rejected the defendant's argument, finding that none of the factors supported the defendant's position. See Id. at 1117-1120.

The situation is the same here. As in Worldwide Church of God, Defendants have failed to submit sufficient evidence that any of the fair use factors support their position. let alone that a weighing of all of the factors establishes that their infringement was a fair use. Thus, the Court should deny Defendants' motion.

1. The first fair use factor weighs against Defendants when they did not transform the BWS Manual in any way.

Under the first fair use factor, the Court considers the extent to which the new work is transformative. Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1151. To be transformative, something new must be added to the original work, altering its purpose or character with new expression, meaning, or message. See id. "There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work." Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117 (quoting *Folsom v. Marsh*, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).

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In Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1117, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the purpose and character of the use of MOA and found that the defendant's "copying of [MOA] in its entirety bespeaks no intellectual labor and judgment. It merely supersedes the object of the original MOA, to serve religious practice and education."

Similarly, Defendants' publication of the BWS Manual was not transformative in Defendants posted the entirety of the BWS Manual on the Internet, as originally published by Plaintiff. (Declaration of Doe/Skywalker [D.E. No. 15] ¶9 & Ex. E.) Defendants did not modify, annotate, or otherwise transform the BWS Manual. (Id.) Rather, Defendants posted the BWS without commentary, allowing others to view it and use it as they pleased. (Id.) Defendants claim that their use of the BWS Manual was transformative because it was posted as part of a larger argument about Plaintiff. (Mot. at 9:18-19.) Even if that was Defendants' subjective intent, nothing of that intent was reflected in any addition or change to the BWS Manual. In other words, Defendants have failed to show that they used any intellectual labor or judgment to transform the BWS Manual into a new work.

Despite the foregoing, Defendants argue that the first fair use factor weighs in their favor because their use was non-commercial. (Mot. at 9:3-4.) This argument fails for several reasons. First, while the commercial/non-commercial distinction is relevant to the first fair use factor, it is less important than whether the work is transformative. See Calkins v. Playboy Enter. Int'l, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Second, it is unclear that Defendants' use of the BWS Manual was non-commercial, and Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to conduct discovery about this issue. See infra Part VI. Third, even if Defendants' posting of the BWS Manual were non-commercial, the crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the motive for the use was monetary gain, but whether the user stood to benefit from exploiting the copyrighted material without paying the customary price. See Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118. Thus, in Worldwide Church of God, the Ninth Circuit found that the defendant benefitted from its distribution of MOA when it did not have to account to the plaintiff, even though the

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defendant was a non-profit organization that did not sell its copies of MOA. See id. at 1118. The same situation exists here. Defendants used the complete text of the BWS Manual for unclear reasons (e.g. to spark discussion about the Manual, to attract users to their Blog, to advocate for competing ideologies, or for some other reason) without accounting to Plaintiff. Under Worldwide Church of God, Defendants' alleged noncommercial status does not support their fair use argument.

Because Defendants engaged in wholesale copying of the BWS Manual without any transformation, the first fair use factor weighs strongly against them.

2. The second fair use factor weighs against Defendants when the BWS Manual is a creative approach to teaching concepts of energy, breathing, and meditation.

The second fair use factor asks whether the original work is informational or creative. See Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1151. Defendants assume that the BWS Manual is informational. (Mot. at 10:7-8.) However, this assumption does not comport with the case law.

In Worldwide Church of God, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the religious book, MOA, was informational or creative. See Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1118. Even though MOA was described by the parties as primarily a textual, historical account of views on the Bible, the court found that the creativity, imagination, and originality embodied in MOA tilted the scale against fair use. See also Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824 (D. Ariz. 2008) (finding that the appropriate test under second fair use factor was whether original work was created for purpose of selling products rather than for aesthetic or educational purposes); Newport-Mesa Unified Sch. Dist. v. State of California Dep't of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177-78 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that development of test questions was creative, imaginative, and original process under second fair use factor).

Because the BWS Manual is a creative approach to the teaching of personal energy, breathing, and meditation, the second fair use factor weighs strongly against Defendants under Worldwide Church of God and its progeny.

3. The third fair use factor weighs against Defendants when they copied the entirety of the BWS Manual.

The third fair use factor asks the Court to examine the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. 17 U.S.C. §107. "While wholesale copying does not preclude fair use per se, copying an entire work militates against a finding of fair use. *Worldwide Church of God*, 227 F.3d at 1118 (quoting *Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc.,* 796 F.2d 1148, 1150-51 (9th Cir.1986)) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, "the fact that a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value of the copied material, both to the originator and to the plagiarist who seeks to profit from marketing some else's copyrighted expression." *See id.* (quoting *Harper & Row*, 471 U.S. at 565) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the third fair use factor weighs strongly against Defendants where they copied the entirety of the BWS Manual. (Declaration of Doe/Skywalker [D.E. No. 15] ¶9 & Ex. E.)

4. The fourth fair use factor weighs against Defendants when Defendants' use of the BWS Manual deterred people from taking Plaintiff's courses.

The fourth fair use factor considers the effect of the defendant's use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. §107. The burden is on the defendant seeking protection under the fair use doctrine to submit evidence that potential markets will not be harmed by the defendant's use of another's copyright. See *Henley*, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1151.

Even when a conventional market for a work does not exist, such as where the copyrighted is owned by a nonprofit, the owner's use of the work may be affected. See Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1119. "If evidence of actual or potential monetary loss were required, copyrights held by nonprofits would be essentially worthless. Religious, educational and other public interest institutions would suffer if their publications invested with an institution's reputation and goodwill could be freely

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appropriated by anyone." Id. Thus, the fair use analysis is not limited to market effect, but looks at any effect on the plaintiff's ability to obtain the benefits guaranteed under the Copyright Act. See id.

Thus, in Worldwide Church of God, the Ninth Circuit found that even though millions of copies of MOA had been given away for free by its non-profit owner, MOA's value continued as a marketing device for the plaintiff. See Worldwide Church of God, 227 F.3d at 1119. Moreover, the court found that people who received copies of MOA from the defendant were actual or potential adherents of the plaintiff. See id. Thus, by reproducing MOA, the defendant deterred actual and potential adherents of the plaintiff away from the plaintiff's service, making the fourth fair use factor at best neutral for the defendant. See id. at 1119-20.

The same situation exists here. Plaintiff does not use the BWS Manual as part of a fee-based course, but does use it, for among other reasons, to encourage students to enroll in Plaintiff's fee-based course. (Dhall Decl. ¶41; Kaharick Decl. passim; Fischman Defendants' posting of the BWS Manual deterred existing and potential students of Plaintiff from taking Plaintiff's courses. (Id.) Thus, under Worldwide Church of God, this factor is at best neutral for Defendants.

Defendants argue that their publication of the BWS Manual did not displace but rather discouraged demand for the original work as a result of the Blog's critical context. (Mot. at 11:2-13.) Defendants argue that such discouragement is not a cognizable harm under the Copyright Act. (*Id*.) However, Defendants have submitted no evidence showing that their posting of the BWS Manual discouraged as opposed to displaced viewers from enrolling in Plaintiff's courses, and it is their burden to do so. Moreover, Defendants' argument is belied by the fact that Defendants posted the BWS Manual in its entirety, without any criticism, parody, or other annotation that would discourage viewers. Conversely, Plaintiff has demonstrated through competent evidence that a percentage of people who take Plaintiff's Breath Water Sound course enroll in Plaintiff's fee-based course. (Dhall Decl. ¶41; Kaharick Decl. passim; Fischman Decl. ¶4.) This is the same Case No. 10-cv-5022-LHK-HRL

As a reminder, Defendants bear the burden of proof for their fair use defense, and must establish all of the essential elements of the defense through competent evidence. Here, Defendants have failed to establish that any of the fair use factors weigh in their favor. Thus, the Court should deny Defendants' motion.

C. Plaintiff is prepared to show recoverable damages caused by Defendants' infringement.

Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot show any recoverable damages. Defendants' argument fails for multiple reasons.

First, quantifiable damages is not an element of a claim for copyright infringement. See *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto*, 628 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2011). Rather, the Copyright Act specifically permits judicial relief even when damages are not readily quantifiable. See 17 U.S.C. §501 *et seq.* In Plaintiff's prayer for relief, Plaintiff asks the Court to enter a judgment finding that Defendants have infringed on Plaintiff's copyright. Plaintiff is entitled to this relief regardless of whether it can demonstrate recoverable monetary damages.

Second, Plaintiff has submitted evidence supporting its actual damages under 17 U.S.C. §504(b). Specifically, Plaintiff has submitted evidence that a percentage of students of Plaintiff's free Breath Water Sound course later enroll in Plaintiff's fee-based courses—this percentage is referred to as a "conversion rate." (Dhall Decl. ¶41; Kaharick Decl. passim; Fischman Decl. ¶4.) Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount equal to the conversion rate multiplied by the number people to whom Defendants improperly showed the BWS Manual. Defendants claim that only 498 people viewed the BWS Manual as posted on the Blog. (Mot. at 15:10-18.) However, Defendants have refused to produce data supporting this claim despite a specific discovery request by Plaintiff,

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Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to Defendants' wrongful profits under 17 U.S.C. §504(b). Specifically, Plaintiff is entitled to any revenue that Defendants earned from their publication of the BWS Manual, including any indirect profits. See Masterson Mktg., Inc. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (describing recoverability of indirect profits). While Skywalker claims that he has not derived any revenue from the Blog or the BWS Manual, the sole support for this claim is his anonymous declaration. This is hardly competent evidence, particularly where Skywalker has refused to produce relevant information or make himself available for deposition. (Rosenfeld Decl. ¶6 & Ex. B at Nos. 13-14.) Plaintiff has the right to determine if Skywalker has earned revenue from the BWS Manual and to recover that revenue under 17 U.S.C. §504(b).

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has established its right to relief under the Copyright Act, and Defendants' motion should be denied.

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27 28 ¹ While Defendants have submitted a single printout of their supposed analytic data in support of their motion, they have refused to produce this data to Plaintiff in any format, let alone in native electronic format, in response to Plaintiff's specific discovery requests. (Rosenfeld Decl. ¶7 & Ex. C at Nos. 15-22.) It's entirely unclear from Defendants' printout whether the 498 number accurately represents the number of people who viewed the BWS Manual on the Blog, and Plaintiff has had no opportunity to vet this

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D. Plaintiff has brought a bona fide copyright claim, despite Defendants' unsupported accusation of pretext.

Defendants have also moved for summary judgment on their affirmative defense of copyright misuse, arguing that Plaintiff's lawsuit is pretextual. Defendants' argument fails where Plaintiff owns the copyright to the BWS Manual and has done nothing more than try to enforce its rights in the Manual under the Copyright Act.

Misuse is a defense to copyright infringement. The misuse defense "prevents copyright holders from leveraging their limited monopoly to control areas outside of the monopoly. See McIntosh v. N. California Universal Enter. Co., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2009). The test for copyright misuse asks whether the plaintiff's use of its copyright violates the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2002). As a practical matter, however, this test inevitably requires courts to rely on antitrust principles or language to some degree. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1103. Thus, courts require the proponent of the misuse defense to submit sufficient evidence to establish a nexus between the alleged anti-competitive leveraging and the policy of the copyright laws, namely evidence that the copyright holder has leveraged its copyright to restrain creative activity. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 997 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

Plaintiff has submitted evidence that it owns the copyright to the BWS Manual. (Fischman Decl. ¶9 & Ex. A.) Plaintiff has also submitted evidence that it earns revenue using the BWS Manual by encouraging students to enroll in Plaintiff's fee-based courses. (Dhall Decl. ¶41; Kaharick Decl. *passim*; Fischman Decl. ¶4.) Skywalker has admitted that he copied and posted the complete text of the BWS Manual on his Blog, which is viewed by thousands of people each month. (Declaration of Doe/Skywalker [D.E. No. 15] ¶10 & Ex. E.) Cohen Decl. [D.E. No. 54] ¶2-7 & Exs. A-B.) Plaintiff's copyright claim challenges this misconduct, seeking only to protect Plaintiff's rights under the Copyright Act.

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As a reminder, Defendants bear the burden of proof for their misuse defense, and must establish this defense through competent evidence. Defendants have failed to show that Plaintiff has sought to leverage its copyright in the BWS Manual to control areas outside of the monopoly. Thus, the Court should deny Defendants' motion.

V. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

A district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment may only be based on admissible evidence. In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 385 (9th Cir. 2010). Unauthenticated documents and hearsay evidence are inadmissible, and consequently, may not be considered on summary judgment. *Moore v. Thomas*, 653 F. Supp. 2d 984, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Moreover, the party seeking admission of evidence on a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of showing its admissibility. See id. Here, the Court should exclude the following evidence of Defendants as inadmissible, and on that basis deny Defendants' motion.

- Skywalker Third Declaration Generally: Rule 56(e) requires that declarations be made on personal knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff objects to the third declaration of Skywalker [D.E. No. 115] in its entirety, as Skywalker's anonymous testimony lacks the foundation required by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and deprives Plaintiff of the opportunity to assess the accuracy of the declaration. Specifically. Skywalker has not established that his declaration is based on his personal knowledge or the source of that knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Moreover, Skywalker asks the Court and Plaintiff to believe his testimony without providing Plaintiff any opportunity to contest it or assess it. Such a presumption is antithetical to the U.S. judicial system, particularly on summary judgment where Skywalker seeks a dispositive ruling as to the entire case. Thus, the Court should exclude Skywalker's third declaration in its entirety.
- Lacking Foundation & Authentication: Federal Rule of Evidence 602 provides that a witness may not testify to a matter unless sufficient evidence is introduced to support a Case No. 10-cv-5022-LHK-HRL PLAINTIFF'S OPP. TO DEFENDANTS' MSJ

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finding that the witness has personal knowledge of that matter. Moreover, unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for summary judgment. The authentication of a document requires evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Las Vegas Sands, LLC v. Nehme, 632 F.3d 526, 532-33 (9th Cir. 2011). Skywalker's third declaration is riddled with unauthenticated testimony. In particular, Skywalker fails to provide any explanation about the purported analytic data he attaches as Exhibit D to his declaration. Skywalker fails to explain how he obtained this data, what the data purports to represent, how the data was calculated, or even if Skywalker has any knowledge about this data. The Court should exclude the following portions of Skywalker's third declaration as lacking the required foundation and authentication: 2:10-12, 2:13-19, 2:26-3:3, 3:4-13 and Exhibits B, D, and E.

- <u>Containing Hearsay</u>: Under Federal Rule of Evidence 802, hearsay is not admissible unless it falls within one of the specific exceptions in Rules 804 and 805. Exhibit D contains inadmissible hearsay where it consists of a statement by a third party (presumably Automattic), offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted (*i.e.* the number of viewers of a page on the Blog). Plaintiff has no idea how Skywalker obtained this document or whether it accurately represents the data of Automattic. The Court should exclude Exhibit D as containing inadmissible hearsay.
- <u>Violating the Best Evidence Rule</u>: The best evidence rule, Fed. R. Evid. 1002, excludes secondary evidence offered to prove the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph. Exhibit D to Skywalker's third declaration purportedly summarizes analytic data from the Blog. The analytic data that Exhibit D purportedly represents is an electronic file created by a third party, presumably Automattic. Defendants have refused to produce that file to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has no way of assessing the accuracy of the purported data in Exhibit D, including whether the numbers are accurate and what the numbers represent. Thus, the Court should exclude Exhibit D.

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Because most of Defendants' evidence is inadmissible, the Court should deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

VI. MOTION FOR DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION UNDER FED. R. CIV. P. 56(D)

Even if the Court finds that Defendants' have met their evidentiary and legal burdens, the Court should still deny Defendants' motion under Rule 56(d). Under Rule 56(d), the Court may deny a motion for summary judgment or defer considering the motion where the non-moving party cannot present facts essential to its opposition. Rule 56(d) applies with particular force where a summary judgment motion is filed early in the litigation, before a party has had a meaningful opportunity to pursue discovery relating to its theory of the case. See Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2003). In such situations, courts should freely grant a Rule 56(d) motion because courts disfavor summary judgment where relevant evidence remains to be discovered. See id.; Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1988). In order to rely on Rule 56(d), the requesting party must show: 1) that it has set forth in an affidavit the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery, 2) that the facts sought exist, and 3) that the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary judgment. See Getz v. Boeing Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010) aff'd, 10-15284, 2011 WL 3275957 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2011). Plaintiff has satisfied this three-factor test.

First, Plaintiff intends to elicit the following specific facts through further discovery and by compelling responses to discovery that Plaintiff has already served:

All fora and media on which Skywalker—and other anonymous Defendantsposted the BWS Manual. This information will be obtained from Skywalker. While Plaintiff has requested this information from Skywalker through written discovery, his response is ambiguous and Plaintiff would like the opportunity to depose Skywalker about the accuracy of his response. (Rosenfeld Decl. ¶¶6-7, 10 & Exs. B-C.)

Skywalker's sources of income, including specifically any that relate to the teaching of breathing, meditation, or yoga, and any in which he may have used Plaintiff's BWS Manual. While Plaintiff has requested this information from Skywalker through written discovery, Skywalker has refused to produce it. (Rosenfeld Decl. ¶¶6-7, 10 & Exs. B-C.)

Second, the facts identified above exist. The facts are straightforward and should be easily obtainable. The facts either reside with Skywalker (e.g. media on which Skywalker published the BWS Manual, Skywalker's sources of income) or consist of data that is readily accessible to Skywalker or third parties (e.g. the analytics). Plaintiff has served discovery requests on Skywalker and third parties regarding these facts. However, the responses received to date have all been highly deficient. (Rosenfeld Decl. ¶¶6-8 & Exs. B-D.) While Defendants' other dispositive motions are pending, Plaintiff has intentionally postponed compelling further responses and conducting depositions, in order to save what may prove unnecessary costs. (*Id.* ¶9.)

Finally, the sought-after facts are essential to oppose Defendants' motion for summary judgment. In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish its actual damages, and that Defendants have earned no revenue from the BWS Manual. As described above, see *supra* Part IV.C, Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages equal to Plaintiff's conversion rate multiplied by the number of viewers of Defendants' wrongful publications of the BWS Manual. (Rosenfeld Decl. ¶11.) Defendants have not produced sufficient, credible data for Plaintiff to perform this calculation. (*Id.*) Moreover, Plaintiff is entitled to any revenue that Defendants earned from their misuse of the BWS Manual.

Defendants have not produced sufficient information for Plaintiff to perform this assessment either. (*Id.* ¶12.) The facts set forth above are directly relevant to Plaintiff's calculation of its actual damages and Defendants' wrongful profits.

For the foregoing reasons, if the Court does not deny Defendants' motion outright for Defendants' failure to meet their burden, the Court should deny it under Rule 56(d) where Plaintiff has not had a meaningful opportunity to discover essential facts.

VII. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

DATED: October 11, 2011 KRONENBERGER BURGOYNE, LLP

By: <u>s/Karl S. Kronenberger</u>
Karl S. Kronenberger

Attorneys for Plaintiff Art of Living Foundation