Bosley Medical Institute v. Kremer [1]

Bosley Medical Institute, a hair restoration company, sued Michael Kremer for federal trademark infringement, trademark dilution, unfair competition, and cybersquatting after Kremer created anti-Bosley "gripe sites" at bosleymedical.com [2] and bosleymedicalviolations.com [3]. Bosley also included state law claims for libel, trademark infringement, and unfair competition. According to Bosley's amended complaint, Kremer planned to "solicit money from Bosley in exchange for the domain name and Kremer agreeing not to publish the website."

After Bosley filed its complaint [4] in federal court in Illinois, Kremer made a motion to transfer the case to California federal court, which the court granted [5]. In California, Kremer argued that Bosley had not stated with sufficient specificity which statements he made were defamatory, and he moved to dismiss [6] for failure to state a claim and for a protective order [7] to prevent discovery until Bosley stated its claims more specifically. The court granted [8] Kremer's motion for a protective order. Bosley and Kremer settled [9] the libel claim.

Kremer then moved [10] to dismiss the other claims for failure to state a claim, to strike the complaint under California's anti-SLAPP statute, and for partial summary judgment. Bosley moved for summary judgment on its claims of trademark infringement [11] and trademark dilution [12].

The district court denied both of Bosley's motions, and granted all of Kremer's motions. It ruled [13] that Bosley had failed to show that Kremer had made commercial use of its trademarks because Kremer's websites contained no paid advertising, sold no goods or services, and included disclaimers saying that they were "non-profit" and "for consumer information purposes only." The court concluded that the websites' "sole purpose [was] to provide critical content of Bosley and its services, and to inform the public about the varous government inquiries into Bosley's business practices."

Nor did Bosley show, the court wrote, that Kremer's website would cause confusion between Bosley's and Kremer's goods and services, as Kremer offered none. The court also granted summary judgment to Kremer on the claims of cybersquatting. Finally, the court found that Bosley's claims did impair Kremer's exercise of his right to free speech, and as a result, it granted Kremer's motion to strike under the state anti-SLAPP law, thereby making Kremer eligible to receive attorneys' fees.

Bosley appealed the ruling. The court of appeals affirmed [14] the lower court's decision on the trademark claims, but reversed the lower court's decision on cybersquatting, writing that it was necessary for discovery to be completed before summary judgment for Kremer would be appropriate. The court of appeals also overturned the lower court's anti-SLAPP ruling, finding that Bosley's trademark claims did not show the bad faith necessary to merit striking under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Upon remand, Kremer moved to dismiss [15] Bosley's state claims and for summary judgment [16]. Kremer also filed an answer [17] to Bosley's complaint. The court denied [18] both of Kremer's motions. After the court ordered the parties to begin discovery proceedings, the parties settled, and the court dismissed [19] the case.