Baker v. Haiti-Observateur Group [1]

On Sept. 10, 2012, Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe and "prominent businessman" Patrice Baker filed suit [2] in federal court against Haiti-Observateur Group, an online and printed news publication, and Leo Joseph, a Haitian-American journalist who owns and edits Haiti-Observateur. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants published defamatory statements in two articles, titled "La Haitel en vente pour 25 million $?" and "Global Voice et SOWCI ensemble pour ruiner la TELECO." The articles reported on the roles Lamothe and Baker played in the sale of the Haitian telecommunications company Haitel, claiming that the plaintiffs orchestrated or already profited from the sale.

The complaint alleged that 10 specific statements published were false and defamatory, calling the statements "outrageous, scandalous and reminiscent of a tabloid publication." The plaintiffs argued that the statements were defamatory both (1) facially, saying the statements attributed conduct including illegal business practices, racketeering, corruption and conspiracy to the plaintiffs; and (2) per quod, implying degrading conduct when taken in context and thereby exposing the plaintiffs to "distrust, hatred, contempt and obloquy." The complaint alleged that the defendants' statements were "false and conjured to destroy reputations" and had injured the plaintiffs' good names, "stellar" reputations, and standing in their communities, noting the large Haitian population that resides in the Southern District of Florida, where the suit was filed. In filing suit, the plaintiffs sought damages, interests, costs, and attorney's fees.

On Jan. 16, 2013, the clerk entered a default [3] against defendant Joseph because he failed to respond to the complaint. Haiti-Observateur Group had already been dismissed as a defendant in the plaintiff's amended complaint.

On Feb. 5, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion [4] for entry of default judgment, attaching a proposed order [5] for the court to use. The court formally issued [6] the same order on Feb. 6. The order stated that the plaintiffs had succeeded on the merits of their defamation claim, that the defendant's statements were made with actual malice, and that the damage to the plaintiffs' reputation constituted irreparable harm. Further, the order permanently enjoined Joseph from publishing any future communications about Lamothe or Baker "in either their professional, personal or political lives."

On March 4, 2013, Joseph filed a motion with the court to set aside [7] its entry of default and default judgment. Joseph claimed that the court's order constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint and that the court was not allowed to permanently enjoin defendants in defamation cases. Joseph also argued that the order contained an error of law because there were no well-pleaded allegations of actual malice, and therefore the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. He argued that the complaint had not alleged clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, but merely presented a legal conclusion not entitled to the assumption of truth, especially in the case of default. Joseph further argued that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a presumption of injury, and that he had not been properly served.

In an opposition [8] filed on March 21, 2013, the plaintiffs claimed that they properly pleaded actual malice because the complaint listed the defamatory statements and alleged that they were made with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Lamothe and Baker claimed there was a presumption of injury because "the defamatory statements made malign their position and professional competence and their fitness to engage in their profession." The opposition also stated that the damages suffered by the plaintiffs fell under a business interference exception to the general rule against injunctive relief and prior restraints on speech, because there was an inference of adverse effects on the plaintiffs'
relationships and difficulty quantifying the actual damages. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendant was properly served.

On April 9, 2013, the judge issued an order on the motion [9] to set aside the default judgment. The court found that the complaint's assertion that "[d]efendants' statements were made with actual malice" was a legal conclusion and thus did not fulfill the requirements for a well-pleaded allegation. Therefore, the court ordered the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint setting forth the facts that support their allegation of actual malice. Regarding whether the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint, the court found that because the plaintiffs had not asked for an injunction in their complaint, injunctive relief should not have been entered. The order stated, "[T]he Court cautions Plaintiffs that prior restraints on speech are disfavored." The court noted that the plaintiffs sought to enjoin more than just defamatory speech, and "[j]udgments that enjoin the publication of non-defamatory statements are invalid." Because there is a well-settled rule prohibiting injunctions in defamation cases, the court noted, the plaintiffs were required to include specific facts in their second amended complaint that would warrant such "extraordinary relief." The court also found that there was no proof of the plaintiff's assertions that the defendant had been properly served.

The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint [10] on April 19, 2013, which asserted that defendant Joseph knew that the allegedly defamatory statements were false, in part because of his business relationship with a shareholder of Haitel, and also because it was common knowledge that Haitel was never sold. Additionally, the second amended complaint included a new claim of tortious interference with advantageous relationships. The plaintiffs claimed that the alleged defamatory statements caused the plaintiffs' business relationships and political counterparts to question whether Baker was being investigated by the FBI and whether Lamothe acted consistently with Joseph's allegations, causing damage to the plaintiffs. The second amended complaint also asked the court to enjoin Joseph from publishing false and defamatory statements concerning the plaintiffs.

On April 25, 2013, Joseph filed a motion to dismiss [11] the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Joseph claimed that the second amended complaint did not satisfy the pleading requirements because it did not directly quote the specific statements alleged to be defamatory and the plaintiffs did not attach copies of the relevant articles. Joseph also asserted that the second amended complaint did not allege that Joseph published the statements with actual malice because it did not allege Joseph's subjective knowledge of falsity. Joseph also argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for tortious interference, because (1) that claim was based on the same statements as the defamation claim and would fail with it and (2)  the second amended complaint did not properly allege all of the elements of the claim.

The court issued its order on the motion [12] on May 30, 2013. It agreed with Joseph that the second amended complaint was defective because the court could not determine whether the statements were defamatory without the plaintiffs submitting the relevant articles and because the plaintiffs merely summarized the allegedly defamatory statements. The court granted the plaintiffs an opportunity to cure this in a third amended complaint. The court also advised the plaintiffs that some of the summarized statements were not clearly defamatory. Regarding actual malice, the order stated that the second amended complaint's allegation that Joseph had knowledge of the falsity of his statements, while "not a model of clarity," could arguably be sufficient to support the plaintiffs' claim of actual malice. The court thus ordered the plaintiffs to file a more definite statement of the allegation. The court further stated that "a determination on whether the single publication rule bars [the tortious interference claim] is premature at present." The order also stated that the plaintiffs could only amend their complaint "to cure the defects identified in this order," and that the order was the final opportunity for the plaintiffs to cure the defects.

On June 14, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint [13]. The third amended complaint asserted, among other things, that Joseph had acknowledged the falsity of his statements in a teleconference and that he acted with actual malice "by utilizing his publication to publish statements which benefit him and his business partners/creditors while having knowledge as to their falsity." The third amended complaint gave exhibit citations for each statement allegedly written by the defendant. It contained no claim for tortious interference.

On June 25, 2013, Joseph filed a motion to dismiss [14] the third amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The motion argued, among other things, that:

(1) the plaintiffs exceeded the scope of leave to amend they were granted, because the third amended complaint "was premised almost entirely upon statements that are different than the ones summarized in the [second amended complaint]";

(2) as to three of the articles identified in the new allegations, the plaintiffs did not satisfy the statutory requirement in Florida that requires a plaintiff to issue a retraction demand before filing a defamation suit;

(3) the alleged statements were not actionable as defamation, because some of the plaintiffs' summaries of alleged statements did not reflect actual statements in the articles, the plaintiffs did not allege what parts of some of the statements were false, and some of the statements did not identify the plaintiffs, were opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, or fair and accurate reports of government information; and

(4) the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead actual malice, because rather than alleging facts to indicate Joseph's state of mind at the time of publication, they relied upon alleged facts occurring only after the statements were published.