Arizona recognizes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as one of four invasion of privacy torts. Valencia v. Duval Corp., 132 Ariz. 348, 350 (1982), overruled on other grounds in Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335 (1989). For a basic overview of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, see the Elements of an Intrusion Claim page.
Arizona generally follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts for invasion of privacy torts, see Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 342. The Court of Appeals of Arizona has relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts' formulation of intrusion upon seclusion, Hart v. Seven Resorts, 190 Ariz. 272, 279 (1997), as has the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals when interpreting Arizona law, Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002).
Arizona used to require that a plaintiff prove the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, including extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant, in order to prove intrusion upon seclusion and other invasion of privacy torts. See Valencia, 132 Ariz. at 350; Davis v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 124 Ariz. 458, 463 (1979); Cluff v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 10 Ariz. App. 560, 564 (1969). However, the Supreme Court of Arizona has since overruled these decisions, and proof of extreme and outrageous conduct is no longer required to sustain a claim for invasion of privacy, including intrusion upon seclusion. Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 340.