Note: This is a user-submitted description. 

The Red Diamond company is suing a Texas consumer for defamation, libel and business disparagement for the website www.reddiamondteaistoxic.com. A consumer discovered toxic chemicals in a jug of Red Diamond Tea and tried to get a government agency, like the Health Department and the FDA to take action. When no agency nor the company would do anything, she put up a website to warn other consumers in March 2008. Later, she sued Red Diamond and the company who manufactured the tea, Plains Dairy, for personal injury. Red Diamond responded with a SLAPP suit for defamation. The Red Diamond company has two prior FDA complaints from other customers about chemical smells and bad taste in their tea.

Nevada attorney Samuel A. Harding filed a defamation and cybersquatting lawsuit against Joan L. Green after Green allegedly created a website critical of Harding at www.attorneysamharding.com. Harding alleged that Green's site "falsely states that Plaintiff committed illegal and criminal acts in the representation of clients." Harding's Complaint ¶ 11. Harding also alleged that Green was using his professional name and service mark in her domain name with a bad-faith intent to profit and in a manner likely to confuse Internet users.

The complaint claims Harding tried to the resolve the dispute by asking Green to transfer the domain to him. Green allegedly responded by putting the domain up for sale on auction site Afternic.com. The complaint seems to rely on Green's attempted sale of the domain to argue that Green had a bad-faith commercial motivation for launching the site. See Harding's Complaint ¶¶ 13-14, 17-18.

In the suit, Harding filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that would (1) prevent Green from using Harding's name and service mark (2) order Green and registrar Register.com to transfer the attorneysamharding.com domain to Harding. The court granted the motion, but it ordered only that Register.com "lock" the domain so that Green could not sell it.

Harding later dropped his motion for preliminary injunction on the ground that he had "obtain[ed] some of the relief sought by his Motion for Preliminary Injunction." See Harding's Motion to Vacate Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at pg. 1.  A website favorable to Harding soon appeared at the attorneysamharding.com domain.

On February 13, 2009, Green, acting pro se, filed her answer to the complaint. Harding filed a motion to strike Green's answer on the ground that it failed to comply with various rules of civil procedure.

Update:

04/27/2009 - Greeen filed her Counterclaim and Complaint for Damages.

08/26/09 - The parties appeared before federal magistrate judge Hon. Lawrence Leavitt for oral argument, and Green agreed to dismiss her counterclaims against Harding.

10/14/2009 - After the parties settled, the court dismissed the case pursuant to a Stipulation and Order for Dismissal, With Prejudice, of All Claims and Counterclaims, and for a Permanent Injunction. In the order, the parties stipulated that the court would enter a permanent injunction against Green prohibiting her from "(1) using Harding's name or confusingly similar variations thereof, alone or in combination with any other letter, word, letter string, phrase or design, for any purpose (including, but not limited to, on web sites and in domain names); and (2) registering owning, leasing, selling, or trafficking in any domain name containing Harding's name or service mark, or confusingly similar variations thereof, alone or in combination with any other letters, words, phrases or designs."

Susan Scheff, a self-described “parent advocate” who “assists parents of troubled teens research and identify programs and schools that can assist their troubled teens in getting back on track to a healthy, productive lifestyle” and the publisher of www.suescheff.com, filed an administrative complaint with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center against "Psyborgue" pursuant to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). (The UDRP is a policy that website operators automatically agree to when they register a domain name; the policy enables trademark owners to initiate an administrative proceeding challenging the registration of a domain name in "bad faith.") 

"Psyborgue" is the name Michael Crawford used to register the domain name "sueschefftruth.com."  Mr. Crawford, who represented himself in the WIPO action, stated in a declaration that he registered the domain name primarily to "provide information to the public regarding Sue Scheff, her company PURE, and the quality of services offered under the name free of charge to parents."  According to the WIPO administrative panel:

The website associated with the Domain Name posts Mr. Crawford’s blog comments, media articles, court documents, and postings by readers concerning [Sue Scheff]. Typical postings question [her] objectivity, assert that she or her daughter have financial ties to some of the institutions and programs that [she] recommends to parents, and allege that some of these programs have been implicated in charges of child abuse or neglect.  A disclaimer at the head of the website advises, “This site is not endorsed by or affiliated with Sue Scheff™.

The WIPO panel denied Scheff's complaint, finding that Mr. Crawford was making a legitimate, nomcommercial fair use of the domain name for purposes of criticism.  The panel indicated that "[t]o the extent the Complaint may be read as suggesting that the Respondent registered and used the Domain Name in bad faith because his purpose was to defame the Complainant, such a claim is essentially outside the scope of the Policy."

Dr. Brett Prince contacted Mayflower Transit company, a moving company that uses the service mark MAYFLOWER, to assist him with a move.  Prince eventually contracted with Lincoln Storage, a company that he believed was a local affiliate of Mayflower.  Some of Prince's belongings were stolen during the move, and Prince was very dissatisfied with his experience.

In March 2000, Prince developed a series of websites critical of Mayflower and used the name Mayflower in the domain names.  He registered the domains "mayflowervanlinebeware.com" and "mayflowervanline.com," among others.   The "gripe sites" warned customers against using Mayflower based on Prince's claimed bad experience with the company.   Mayflower disputed that it was ever involved in Prince's move, claiming that only Lincoln Storage was involved.

On October 30, 2000, Mayflower sued Prince, claiming a violation of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).  Mayflower also asserted claims for libel, trade libel, and trademark dilution.

The district court granted Prince's motion to dismiss the trademark claims, determining that the gripe sites did not violate the ACPA because Prince was not attempting to profit financially from Mayflower's name.  Thus, the sites constitued a "bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark."  The court allowed the libel claims to proceed

In May 2004, the parties settled the case.  It appears that as a result of the settlement, Prince's websites were taken down (they are no longer accessible).

Bosley Medical Institute, a hair restoration company, sued Michael Kremer for federal trademark infringement, trademark dilution, unfair competition, and cybersquatting after Kremer created anti-Bosley "gripe sites" at bosleymedical.com and bosleymedicalviolations.com. Bosley also included state law claims for libel, trademark infringement, and unfair competition. According to Bosley's amended complaint, Kremer planned to "solicit money from Bosley in exchange for the domain name and Kremer agreeing not to publish the website."

After Bosley filed its complaint in federal court in Illinois, Kremer made a motion to transfer the case to California federal court, which the court granted. In California, Kremer argued that Bosley had not stated with sufficient specificity which statements he made were defamatory, and he moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for a protective order to prevent discovery until Bosley stated its claims more specifically. The court granted Kremer's motion for a protective order. Bosley and Kremer settled the libel claim.

Kremer then moved to dismiss the other claims for failure to state a claim, to strike the complaint under California's anti-SLAPP statute, and for partial summary judgment. Bosley moved for summary judgment on its claims of trademark infringement and trademark dilution.

The district court denied both of Bosley's motions, and granted all of Kremer's motions. It ruled that Bosley had failed to show that Kremer had made commercial use of its trademarks because Kremer's websites contained no paid advertising, sold no goods or services, and included disclaimers saying that they were "non-profit" and "for consumer information purposes only." The court concluded that the websites' "sole purpose [was] to provide critical content of Bosley and its services, and to inform the public about the varous government inquiries into Bosley's business practices."

Nor did Bosley show, the court wrote, that Kremer's website would cause confusion between Bosley's and Kremer's goods and services, as Kremer offered none. The court also granted summary judgment to Kremer on the claims of cybersquatting. Finally, the court found that Bosley's claims did impair Kremer's exercise of his right to free speech, and as a result, it granted Kremer's motion to strike under the state anti-SLAPP law, thereby making Kremer eligible to receive attorneys' fees.

Bosley appealed the ruling. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision on the trademark claims, but reversed the lower court's decision on cybersquatting, writing that it was necessary for discovery to be completed before summary judgment for Kremer would be appropriate. The court of appeals also overturned the lower court's anti-SLAPP ruling, finding that Bosley's trademark claims did not show the bad faith necessary to merit striking under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Upon remand, Kremer moved to dismiss Bosley's state claims and for summary judgment. Kremer also filed an answer to Bosley's complaint. The court denied both of Kremer's motions. After the court ordered the parties to begin discovery proceedings, the parties settled, and the court dismissed the case.

In 2002, TMI Inc., a homebuilder operating under the name Trendmaker Homes, sued Joseph Maxwell over his gripe site, alleging that Maxwell had violated federal and Texas anti-dilution provisions, and the federal Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”).

Maxwell registered the domain name www.trendmakerhome.com and posted a website at this address to air his complaints about Trendmaker Homes, with whom he had a negative business experience. The website told Maxwell's story of his dispute with Trendmaker Homes, contained a "Treasure Chest" section, where users were meant to post information about trustworthy contractors and tradespersons, and included a disclaimer at the top of the home page indicating that it was not TMI's site. After Maxwell's one-year registration expired, TMI sent him a cease-and-desist letter. Maxwell then registered another domain name, www.trendmaker.info, and TMI sued him in federal court in Texas.

After a bench trial, the district court found that Maxwell, who represented himself, had violated the federal and state anti-dilution provisions and the ACPA and ordered him to pay $40,000 in statutory damages and $40,000 in attorneys' fees.

On appeal, Maxwell was wepresented by Public Citizen attorneys Paul Alan Levy and Alan B. Morrison. On April 21, 2004, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held that the federal anti-dilution provision required a commercial use of the mark in question, and that Maxwell's airing of gripes without any anticipation of commercial gain was not a commercial use. The court emphasized that Maxwell had not attempted to divert business from TMI, the Treasure Chest did not receive any postings (other than one added by Maxwell about a tradesperson he had engaged in the past), and Maxwell's website did not receive any paid advertisements. On the ACPA claim, the Court of Appeals determined that there was no evidence that Maxwell registered the domain name with a bad faith intent to profit. Again, the court emphasized the non-commercial nature of the site, as well as the fact that Maxwell never offered to sell the domain name to TMI. Finally, the court also overturned the district court's adverse finding under the Texas anti-dilution provision, citing Express One Int’l, Inc. v. Steinbeck, 53 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2001) ("[The Texas anti-dilution statute] is not intended to address non-trademark uses of a name to comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or disparage the goods or business of the name’s owner").

In 1999, Christopher Lamparello registered the domain name www.fallwell.com and used the website to criticize Rev. Jerry Falwell's views concerning gays and lesbians. In September 2003, Falwell initiated an arbitration action against Lamparello pursuant to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, claiming trademark infringement, cybersquatting and other torts, and sought to have the domain name transferred to him.

The National Arbitration Forum ruled that Lamparello's use of the domain name was confusing and had been registered in bad faith, and it ordered that the domain name be transferred from Lamaparello to Falwell. Lamparello commenced a lawsuit against Falwell in federal district court, seeking relief from the arbitration decision and a declaration of non-infringement. Falwell counter-claimed, alleging federal trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition under federal and Virginia law, and cybersquatting.

The district court granted summary judgment to Falwell, enjoined Lamparello from using the mark, and required him to transfer the domain name to Falwell. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and entered judgment for Lamparello. Avoiding the larger question of whether trademark law applies to websites like Lamparello's that do not use the disputed mark to sell a good or service, the court ruled that Lamparello's use of the domain name, in the overall context of his gripe site, did not create a likelihood of confusion between his site and Falwell's official site. The court rejected the doctrine of "initial interest confusion" for establishing trademark infringement, at least as applied to non-commercial sites critical of the trademark holder. The court also found that Lamparello did not have the "bad faith intent to profit" required for a cybersquatting claim, primarily because he used the domain name and website to engage in criticism and did not have a profit motive.

Bestselling author Ellen Fein created gripe site about her former dentist, Larry Rosenthal, on which she made negative comments about his work.

In January 2007, Rosenthal sued Fein for defamation in New York state court.  According to the New York Supreme Court docket, there has been no activity in the case since March 2007.

Update: 

On 11/19/2007  a stipulation of discontinuance was filed.

Paul McMann, a Massachusetts real estate developer, sued the anonymous operator of an Internet "gripe site" about him. The website contained a photograph of Mr. McMann, the statement that he "turned lives upside down," and a suggestion to "be afraid, be very afraid." The website announced that it would soon be updated with specific evidence of McMann's alleged misdealings. McMann claimed that the unknown party operating the website violated his statutory and common law right of privacy, infringed his common-law copyright, and committed defamation. McMann sought to subpoena ISPs to discover the identity of the website operator.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because McMann asserted only state-law claims and did not identify the citizenship of the anonymous defendant. The court observed that diversity of citizenship between McMann and the ISPs that he sought to subpoena could not bestow subject-matter jurisdiction on the court. The court stated in the alternative that it would dismiss the underlying case for failure to state a claim. Relying on Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del.2005), an important case from the Delaware Supreme Court, the court opined that First Amendment protections for anonymous speech requires courts to impose a heightened preliminary burden on plaintiffs seeking to discover the identity of anonymous posters.

The court concluded that McMann could not meet this heightened burden because his complaint failed to even state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the court held that the unknown website operator's publishing of a description of McMann's business activity and distributing a publicly available photograph did not impinge McMann's statutory right of privacy as a matter of law. It also found that McMann could not recover for misappropriation of his likeness because the website operator had not used his photograph for a commercial use, but rather for purposes of criticism. The court also held that Massachusetts does not recognize a common law cause of action for false light invasion of privacy, and that McMann's common law copyright claim was preempted by federal copyright law. Finally, the court indicated that McMann's defamation claim was fatally flawed because the statements at issue were non-actionable personal opinions that could not be proven true or false. McMann v. Doe, 460 F.Supp.2d 259 (D.Mass. 2006).