On July 2, 2012, Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., a Virginia rug cleaning company, filed a complaint for defamation and conspiracy to defame against seven anonymous Yelp reviewers in the Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria.

Hadeed claimed these users' reviews were false and defamatory because it "had no record that the negative reviewers were ever Hadeed Carpet customers." Additionally, Hadeed noted that many of the negative reviews contained similar "themes" (for example, that Hadeed had doubled the price) and that one of the reviewers was from an area where Hadeed does not do business. Based on this evidence, Hadeed alleged that the authors of the negative reviews "acted together for the purpose of willfully and maliciously injuring Hadeed Carpet's reputation." Hadeed requested $1.1 million in punitive and compensatory damages, attorney's fees and costs, and a permanent injunction.

On July 3, 2012, Hadeed issued a subpoena duces tecum to Yelp seeking information identifying the anonymous commenters.

Yelp responded with a written objection to the subpoena on July 19, 2012. It contended: (1) that Hadeed had not complied with Virginia's procedure for subpoenas to identify anonymous Internet users, Code § 8.01-407.1, because it did not list the allegedly defamatory comments with adequate specificity; (2) that the First Amendment prevented disclosure of the defendants' identities because Hadeed had failed to present a prima facie case that their speech was defamatory; and (3) that the subpoena could not be enforced against a foreign non-party company.

On July 30, 2012, Hadeed filed a renewed subpoena that complied with the procedural requirements of Code § 8.01-407.1 by attaching documents allegedly establishing the basis for Hadeed's belief that the challenged posts were actionable. In its accompanying Notice of Filing Supporting Material, Hadeed asserted that "determining whether or not Defendants were customers of Hadeed is centrally necessary for Hadeed to advance any defamation claim."

Yelp filed written objections to the renewed subpoena on September 5, 2012. Yelp again asserted that Hadeed had failed to meet the appropriate legal test for obtaining identifying information about anonymous speakers because it had not "produce[d] evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case" of defamation. Yelp noted that numerous appellate courts, most notably in Dendrite v. Doe and Doe v. Cahill, had held that that this was the proper test under the First Amendment, and argued that to the extent that Virginia had set a more permissive standard than Dendrite, Virginia should "join the national consensus standard on this issue." Yelp also asserted that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Virginia because it had no property there, and because Hadeed had consented to exclusive jurisdiction in California by agreeing to Yelp's terms of service when it chose to advertise on Yelp. Finally, Yelp argued that the subpoena was overbroad because Hadeed sought all documents Yelp possessed for the users that "relate[d] in any way" to Hadeed, which could encompass private communications subject to other legal protections or not reasonably accessible to Yelp.

On September 26, 2012, Hadeed moved to overrule the objections and enforce the subpoena. Hadeed argued that the proper legal standard for obtaining information about Yelp's anonymous users came from Virginia Code § 8.01-407.1 and was satisfied by its good faith claim that "it reviewed its own detailed customer files and c[ould] find no evidence that these specific seven persons were ever Hadeed customers." Hadeed also claimed that its attempts to obtain those identities through publicly available information or through discussions with Yelp had been unsuccessful. Hadeed also maintained that it had properly subpoenaed Yelp's records by serving the subpoena on Yelp's registered agent for service of process in Virginia, and argued that "Yelp conducts business over the internet in Virginia, and is present in Virginia through its registered agent." Further, Hadeed argued, it had not waived jurisdiction in Virgina, claiming that Yelp's terms of service only pertained to disputes arising out of the advertising relationship. Finally, Hadeed argued that the subpoena was not overbroad, as it only requested "postings" relating to Hadeed, not "communications," and Yelp's objection that the subpoena might encompass private communications was therefore unfounded.

On October 22, 2012, Yelp filed a memo in support of its objections to the subpoena and opposing Hadeed's motion to compel discovery. Yelp reiterated that the First Amendment "provides special protections for anonymity on the Internet," and argued that the court should apply the Dendrite test. The subpoena could not be enforced under this test, Yelp argued, because Hadeed had "failed to produce any evidence that any of the statements made about it are false." Yelp also continued to assert that it was not subject to jurisdiction. It argued that "predicating personal jurisdiction on the mere fact that Yelp enables its users to make statements accessible in Virginia through the Internet offends traditional principles of state sovereignty."

Hadeed responded to Yelp's objections on Oct. 31, 2012, reiterating its previous arguments.

The trial court held oral arguments on November 14, 2012, and enforced the subpoena on November 19, 2012. According to the court, it had jurisdiction over the motion based on service of the subpoena on Yelp's registered agent. The court added, however, that "even if a registered agent alone was an insufficient basis for jurisdiction," the court had jurisdiction "in light of Yelp's conduct directing electronic activity in Virginia and business relationships with Virginia companies and residents." The advertising agreement between the parties, the court held, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, because the motion to compel was not a dispute between Hadeed and Yelp but rather a dispute between Hadeed and the anonymous reviewers, parties not governed by the agreement.

Finally, the trial court held that the proper standard for compelling the identity of anonymous speakers was laid out in Virginia Code § 8.01-407.1, which requires a showing that the statements "may be tortious" and that the speaker's identity is "important" or "relates to a core claim." Hadeed had met the statutory standard, the court held, because "the statements [we]re tortious if not made by customers" and "the identity of the communicators [w]as essential to maintain a suit for defamation." The court found no constitutional problem with this result. Although the court "recognize[d] that anonymous speech and even false speech is entitled to protection under the First Amendment," it stated that such speech is "not entitled to the same level of protection as truthful or political speech." Without citing Dendrite or Cahill, the court therefore ordered Yelp to produce information identifying the anonymous speakers.

Yelp refused to enforce the subpoena and, on January 9, 2013, the court held Yelp in contempt and imposed a $500 fine and $1000 in attorney fees. The sanctions were stayed pending appeal.

Yelp appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and filed its opening brief on May 7, 2013. Yelp argued that the circuit court violated the First Amendment by ordering Yelp to identify the defendants, because Hadeed should have been required to do more than articulate a good faith belief that the speech "may be tortious." Indeed, Yelp asserted, the constitution requires "a factual showing, . . . that the statements are actionable and that there is an evidentiary basis for the prima facie elements of the claim." Yelp also argued that the court erred in concluding that the speech at issue did not warrant First Amendment protection because it was defamatory, because that argument begged the question by relying on the defamatory nature of the speech to compel evidence to prove its defamatory nature. Yelp also pointed to the constitutional requirement of proof of fault in defamation cases.

Yelp next argued that, even if Hadeed had made a sufficient showing that the reviewers were not Hadeed customers, the statements were not actionable. The parts of the reviews that Hadeed alleged were false -- the identities of the reviewers -- were not the parts of the reviews that could negatively impact Hadeed's reputation. Under Fourth Circuit precedent, Yelp claimed, "the falsity of a statement and the defamatory ‘sting' of the publication must coincide" for a statement to constitute defamation. And in this case, "Hadeed never allege[d] that the substantive problems set forth in the reviews, such as charging twice the advertised price, [we]re themselves false." Additionally, Yelp argued that Hadeed was libel-proof and could not sue for defamation because, in light of the large number of negative Yelp reviews of Hadeed that were not included in the lawsuit, a few more negative comments "would [not] cause Hadeed any incremental harm."

Yelp finally argued that, if the statements could be actionable, Hadeed had not presented a sufficient factual basis for the subpoena. When a party is "seeking discovery of information protected by the First Amendment," Yelp claimed, it should be required to show that "there is reason to believe that the information sought will, in fact, help its case." Hadeed had failed to make this showing, Yelp stated.

On May 8, 2013, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the American Society of News Editors, Gannett Co., and The Washington Post filed a brief in support of Yelp. They argued that: the court should recognize "a heightened standard for compelled disclosure of identities" consistent with a consensus that has developed in the courts; allowing plaintiffs to compel the identity of authors "of any speech that ‘may be tortious' simply based on an unsupported allegation is inconsistent with the First Amendment"; and a "heightened standard is important to news organizations and other Internet publishers in creating a meaningful exchange of ideas on their web sites."

Hadeed filed its appellee's brief on May 30, 2013, arguing that the Virginia statute "clearly meets the minimal constitutional protections required under the First Amendment." But even if the Dendrite test were constitutionally required, Hadeed contended that the test had been satisfied because its complaint had "provided the actual statements, and if the posters are not customers, their statements are defamatory per se." Even under Dendrite, Hadeed argued, it was not required to present "all evidence necessary to survive a tough cross examination, summary judgment, or even . . . a jury verdict." Hadeed claimed it could not present more detailed information rebutting the Yelp reviews because it "serves 35,000 customers per year and its staff encounters all variety of circumstances," and the experiences of its thousands of other customers would not be relevant to "whether one specific person was defrauded through a bait and switch." Hadeed also contested Yelp's argument that it was libel proof, arguing that the many other negative Yelp reviews were not reliable.

Yelp filed a reply brief on June 27, 2013. It asserted that "even apart from the fact that a state statute cannot overrule the requirements of the First Amendment, there is no inconsistency between section 8.01-407.1 and the Dendrite-Cahill line of cases." Under the statute, Yelp claimed, it "is not enough for the plaintiff to show good faith; it must have a ‘legitimate' basis for claiming that the speech was tortious." Yelp argued that Hadeed had "alleged defamation, but ha[d] of yet proved nothing," and pointed out that Hadeed had not filed an affidavit from any employee actually denying that Hadeed engaged in the misconduct alleged in the Yelp reviews.

The Court of Appeals of Virginia, by a vote of two to one, affirmed the trial court's decision on January 7, 2014.

First, the court stated that although anonymous speech is protected by the First Amendment, "defamatory speech is not entitled to constitutional protection." Therefore, the court stated, "if the reviews are unlawful in that they are defamatory, then the [reviewers'] veil of anonymity may be pierced." Further, the court found that the speech at issue was commercial speech, as it was "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Because courts have recognized a lower level of First Amendment protection for commercial speech," the court held that the anonymous reviewers' "right to anonymity is subject to a substantial governmental interest in disclosure." In contrast, the court stated, a "business's reputation is a precious commodity."

The court also rejected the argument that the reviews were non-actionable opinion. "Generally," the court stated, "a Yelp review is entitled to First Amendment protection because it is a person's opinion." However, the court explained, this protection "relies upon an underlying assumption of fact: that the reviewer was a customer of the specific company and he posted his review based on his personal experience with the business. If this underlying assumption of fact proves false, . . . then the review is not an opinion; instead, the review is based on a false statement of fact."

The court next turned to Virginia law. It held that Virginia Code § 8.01-407.1 provided the proper test for uncovering the identity of an anonymous Internet communicator. The court noted that it was "reluctant to declare legislative acts unconstitutional" and ultimately refused to do so, because there was no constitutional infirmity that was "clear, palpable, and practically free from doubt." The court also refused to "adopt persuasive authority from other states," including Dendrite and Cahill, noting that the Virginia legislature had considered that authority and ultimately made its own policy decisions.

In applying the Virginia statute, the court held that Hadeed presented sufficient evidence to show that the reviews were or may have been defamatory by "indicating that it made a thorough review of its customer database" and could not match the defendants' reviews with customers. Further, the court believed that Hadeed acted on a "legitimate, good faith belief that the Doe defendants were not former customers," and "took reasonable efforts to identify the anonymous communicators." Finally, according to the court, the reviewers' identities were "not only important," but "necessary" because "without the identity of the Doe defendants, Hadeed cannot move forward with its defamation lawsuit."

The court also concluded that the trial court properly exercised subpoena jurisdiction over Yelp because Virginia statutes "explicitly allow for service on a registered agent of a foreign corporation that is authorized to do business in the Commonwealth."

Senior Judge James Haley dissented. Judge Haley agreed that Virginia Code § 8.01-407 provided the proper framework for analysis, and stated that correct analysis under the statutory framework properly "balances the First Amendment protection of an anonymous speaker and the right of redress for defamation." However, he concluded that, in this case, "the balance envisioned by [the statute] should weigh for the protection afforded by" the U.S. and Virginia constitutions. Judge Haley noted that Hadeed had not "claimed that any of the substantive statements [we]re false," and, at oral argument, "candidly admitted that it [could] not say the John Doe defendants are not customers." By arguing that the reviewers "may not have been customers, and, if they were not, the substantive statements may be tortious," Hadeed failed to provide sufficient supporting material to justify the subpoena, he asserted. Instead, Judge Haley said, Hadeed's claim was merely "a self-serving argument -- one that proceed[ed] from a premise the argument [wa]s supposed to prove."

Linda Ellis is the author the motivational poem "the Dash" and actively enforces her copyright to this poem. Matthew Chan runs the Extortion Letter Info website (ELI), featuring a message board often used for exposing alleged copyright trolls and "extortion letter schemes." An individual who claimed to have received a copyright infringement notice and settlement offer from Ellis contributed to a discussion on ELI in 2012. This discussion developed into insults, accusations of copyright trolling and extortion, and other comments that Ellis interpreted as threats to her safety.

On February 13, 2013, Ellis filed a petition for a "stalking temporary protective order" with the Georgia Superior Court, asserting that she was "in reasonable fear of her safety." Ellis alleged that Chan posted threats of death such as "we are coming after you," along with personal information such as her home address. In this petition, Ellis requested that Chan be restrained from any acts that harass or intimidate her or her family and approaching within 1000 yards of her.

Chan presented a memo in opposition to Ellis's petition for an order of protection at the hearing on February 27. In it, he argued that the charges brought by Ellis were inappropriate under the OCGA §§ 16-5-90(a) and 94(d) and the elements of this charge of stalking could not be satisfied. Chan argued that a protective order for stalking was inappropriate as Ellis failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that [Chan's] actions ... placed [Ellis] in reasonable fear for [her] safety by establishing a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior." Chan also argued that Ellis failed to satisfy every element of the statute, such as contact and the purpose of harassment and intimidation. Chan did not contact Ellis directly, and did not follow or place her under surveillance. Further, Chan argued that his online speech, including the posting of Ellis's home address, was protected by the First Amendment. Lastly, as penalty for allegedly abusing the court system, Chan moved for sanctions against Ellis for filing a petition without substantial justification pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14.

After the hearing, the Superior Court of Muscogee County issued a broad permanent protective order on March 4, 2013, with a cover sheet entitled "Domestic Relations Case Final Disposition Information Form." In the order, Judge Frank Jordan held that Chan "placed [Ellis] in reasonable fear for [Ellis's] safety" by contacting Ellis and posting her personal information in order to harass and intimidate her. Judge Jordan also emphasized Chan's ability to remove posts as the moderator and his decision not to remove those directed at Ellis. Judge Jordan permanently ordered Chan to remove all posts related to Ellis and to stay 1,000 feet away from her. Chan was also ordered to refrain from "contact of any type, direct, indirect, or through another person, . . . including but not limited to: telephone, fax, email, voicemail, mail, texting, spoofing, Facebook and other forms of social media."

On March 27, Chan filed a notice for appeal to the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Due to delays in production of the transcript from the case, Chan requested multiple extensions of time to file the transcript; his third application for an extension of time to file the transcript was granted on June 28, 2013.

UPDATES:

October 1, 2013: Chan filed his appellant's brief with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court made four reversible errors.

First, Chan argued that the facts alleged cannot meet the elements of the charge of stalking, because publicly posting comments about Ellis online was not contacting her within the meaning of the statute, and that even if posting comments could constitute contact, he did not post his comments "for the purpose of harassing or intimidating" her. Second, Chan argued that he was deprived of due process because the court found him guilty of violating a statute (OCGA §§ 16-5-90(a)(2), relating to stalking in violation of a court order) that he had not been charged with violating. Third, Chan argued that the court improperly admitted an ex-parte affidavit containing "inflammatory, unsupported allegations." Finally, Chan claimed that his speech was protected under the First Amendment, the Georgia Constitution, and the Communications Decency Act.

Specifically, he contended that his speech could not constitute incitement to lawless action. Instead, he claimed, it was political speech, "a call to ‘rally the troops' to use public information about Appellee to show her hypocrisy vis-a-vis the theme of her poem." Chan further argued that the trial court's order violated the Georgia Constitution, because "Georgia courts have held that the State Constitution provides even broader protection of speech than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution." Chan also asserted that many of the allegedly threating posts were posted by other parties, and, as a provider of an interactive computer service, he cannot be treated as the publisher or speaker of those posts under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

Chan further argued that the court's order was overbroad, unduly burdensome, and exceeded the relief demanded by Appellee, because it "did not just require the Appellant to remove the few offending posts that Appellee placed in the record; it forced Appellant to remove all 1,900 posts . . . related to Appellee and her business practices and it forced him to do so forever."

October 21, 2013: Ellis filed her appellee's brief, arguing that the elements of Georgia's stalking law were met, that Chan received proper notice of the charges he faced, and that, with respect to the alledegly inadmissible affidavit, Chan failed to object to the on hearsay grounds, much the affidavit was admissible, and any error was harmless.

Additionally, Ellis argued that the First Amendment provides Chan no protection, because his speech was a true threat-speech that was "intend[ed]" to put her "in fear of bodily harm or death." Even if Chan's speech was protected, Ellis contended that the trial court's order was narrowly tailored "because it is reasonably limited and allows other forms of communication." Ellis claimed that the permanent injunction is a content neutral time, place, and manner restriction subject to intermediate scrutiny because it merely "limits the place for speech, namely the Internet," leaving "open other channels of communication."

Finally, Ellis argued that the CDA does not protect Chan from responsibility for content posted by other users on his website. Relying on Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012), Ellis urged the court to find that Chan does not qualify for CDA protection because he "posts offensive content, comments, and encourages others to do so by responding to pending forum posts." This conduct, Ellis contended, makes Chan "more than a mere spectator on the ELI website, he is the ringleader."

 

October 30, 2013: Timothy B. McCormack of McCormack Intellectual Property Law Business Law P.S. submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of Ellis. McCormack argued that the First Amendment does not protect Chan because his speech was a true threat, and that the CDA's safe harbor protection does not apply because he participated in and encouraged harassing speech. He further argued "for a bright line rule" that Internet harassment is illegal, regardless of physical proximity," and highlights the negative consequences of Internet bullying.

November 1, 2013: Chan filed a motion requesting leave to file a supplemental reply brief in response to McCormack's brief.

As of November 5, 2013, the case has not been scheduled for argument.

On May 21, 2012, Tennessee State Governor Bill Haslam signed Public Chapter 1075 ("SB 2371") into law. Tennessee's SB 2371 defined the felony offense of advertising "commercial sexual abuse of a minor" which a person commits if he or she "knowingly sells or offers to sell an advertisement that would appear to a reasonable person to be for the purpose of engaging in what would be a commercial sex act of a minor." The law prohibited a defense of ignorance of the minor's age. A violation of SB 2371 could result in up to 15 years in prison and a minimum fine of $10,000.  SB 2371 was scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2012.

Backpage.com is a classified advertisements website with one section of its website dedicated to adult services. In 2010, Tennessee State Attorneys General sent a letter to Backpage.com demanding that the website remove its "adult services" section. Backpage.com did not comply with this initial demand. In 2011, the National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") publically released a second demand letter to Backpage.com. This second letter again demanded removal of Backpage.com's adult section; it also requested detailed information from Backpage.com in "lieu of a subpoena." 

On June 27, 2012, Backpage.com brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee against Tennessee State Attorney General Robert E. Cooper, Jr., and each of the state's 31 district attorneys to prevent enforcement of SB 2371. In its initial complaint, Backpage.com argued that the law violates the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Backpage.com contended that SB 2371 violated § 230 as it would treat Backpage.com as the publisher of information which was provided by another content provider. In its First and Fourteenth Amendment argument, Backpage.com argued that SB 2371 was unconstitutional under the as it is overly broad in its restriction of free speech. In its Commerce Clause argument, Backpage.com argued that SB 2371 places an undue burden on interstate commerce.

The same day, on June 27, 2012, Backpage.com filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to prevent enforcement of SB 2371. The Motion contended that SB 2371 would affect millions of online providers and would violate the immunity 47 U.S.C. § 230 granted to online publishers against third-party content.

On July 26, 2012, Cooper and the other defendants filed a response in opposition to Backpage.com's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Defendants argued that SB 2371 was not preempted under 47 U.S.C. § 230 because it does not apply exclusively to internet usage, while § 230 applies only to internet communications. Further, defendants argued that SB 2371 did not prohibit the posting of advertisements "that would appear to a reasonable person to be for the purpose of engaging in a commercial sex act with a minor" but, instead, criminalized only the selling or offering for sale of such advertisements. The key difference, they argued, is that SB 2371 permits the posting of such advertisements so long as Backpage.com does not charge money or offer to charge money in exchange for posting them. In addressing the First and Fourteenth Amendment argument, the response argued that the advertisements were unlawful and therefore not considered protected speech; they also argued that the law was not overly broad or unconstitutionally vague. In its Commerce Clause argument, defendants argued that illegitimate commerce -- such as the money made from the illegal advertisements -- is not protected. 

On August 29, 2012, the court held a hearing on Backpage.com's motion, and on January 3, 2013, the court granted Backpage.com's Motion and issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining enforcement of SB 2371. United States District Court Judge John T. Nixon stated that Backpage.com was likely to succeed on all of its claims as SB 2371 was likely preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 230 and that it likely violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.

On March 27, 2013, the court granted a motion by Backpage.com to convert the temporary injunction into a permanent injunction; Cooper and the other defendants did not oppose the motion. The court further found that no disputed factual issues remained and that summary judgment for Backpage.com was proper. United States District Court Judge John T. Nixon reiterated that Backpage.com was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims because: (1) SB 2371 was likely preempted by 47 U.S.C. § 230; (2) SB 2371 likely violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment because it was vague, overly broad, and not narrowly tailored; and (3) SB 2371 likely violated the Commerce Clause.

On June 2, 2012, attorney Charles Carreon sent a letter on behalf of FunnyJunk, LLC ("FunnyJunk") to Matthew Inman, creator of TheOatmeal.com, which threatened legal action on the basis of a May 2011 blog post by Inman titled "What should I do about FunnyJunk.com?".

In the post, Inman stated that he had discovered a number of his comics displayed without permission or attribution on FunnyJunk, and that he contacted FunnyJunk by email in an attempt to have them removed from the site. He claimed that FunnyJunk took down the images that were identified in the email, but that FunnyJunk had since "practically stolen [his] entire website and mirrored it on FunnyJunk." The post included screen shots of Inman's comics on FunnyJunk.com, and links to FunnyJunk image boards containing his work (as well as that of other artists that Inman alleged had been republished without permission).  

A few days later, Inman posted an update that indicated FunnyJunk had removed some, but not all, of the content at issue.

The June 2 letter from FunnyJunk included a copy of Inman's original post, and alleged that statements made therein constituted a false accusation of willful copyright infringement. Thus, it stated, Inman "exposed [himself] to a lawsuit for defamation per se, in which damages are presumed." The letter also alleged that Inman had engaged in false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act. It concluded by demanding the immediate removal of all mentions of FunnyJunk from TheOatmeal.com and the payment of $20,000.

On June 11, 2012, Inman formally responded to the June 2 letter through his attorney, Venkat Balasubramani. The response letter denied FunnyJunk's claims that the original post was defamatory and constituted a violation of the Lanham Act. The response letter pointed out that FunnyJunk did not appear to have filed a notice of designation naming an agent as required of service providers who seek to rely on the Digital Milennium Copyright Act, placing FunnyJunk in a position where it might be held responsible for third-party infringements. 

On June 12, 2012, Inman issued an informal response to the letter in a post entitled "FunnyJunk is threatening to file a federal lawsuit against me unless I pay $20,000 in damages," published on TheOatmeal.com. Inman included an annotated copy of the June 2 letter, and proposed that he would raise $20,000 in donations and donate the money to two charitable organizations: the National Wildlife Federation, and the American Cancer Society. A link was provided to the fundraising website Indiegogo.com. 

On June 15, 2012, Carreon filed a lawsuit in his own name against Inman, Indiegogo, Inc., the American Cancer Society, the National Wildlife Federation and 100 anonymous Internet users for their role in the fundraising effort. As of July 20, 2012, no further action appears to have been taken by FunnyJunk.