This guide addresses the practical issues that you may encounter as you gather information, create new and exciting content, and publish your work online. It is intended for use by citizen media creators with or without formal legal training, as well as others with an interest in these issues.
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Whether you're just getting started or you're a seasoned A-list blogger, there are many legal and practical issues to consider in deciding how to carry on your online publishing activities. We had to start somewhere, so we started at the beginning -- forming a business entity and choosing an online platform. We move on from there to address some other critical issues and questions relating to the mechanics of online publishing.
Here is a list of the topics addressed in this section:
This section discusses the issues you should consider when forming a business or choosing a business structure to support your online publishing activities. While we suggest that you review these sections in the order they are listed below, if you know exactly what you're interested in, feel free to jump that section.
Whether you're already publishing material on your website or justgetting started, the question of what business structure to operateunder is an important one. Depending on whether you work alone or inconjunction with other content creators, you may face hard questions about ownership of assets, management structure, payment of taxes, splitting up of profits (if any), transfer of ownership, and dissolution of your working relationship. Additionally, as we address in detail in other parts of this guide, publishing material online exposes you to the risk of liability for defamation, invasion of privacy, copyright infringement, and other legal claims. What kind ofbusiness structure you choose to adopt can have a significant impact on these and other issues.
Before proceeding, a word or two of caution are in order.There is no magic business structure that will make all legal risks and problems go away. Each person or group of people must make the choice based on their goals and personal preferences. What's more, there is agreat deal of uncertainty about how old-school business law applies tothe online publishing context, so the guidance found here should be taken with a grain of salt.
So what are your options?
Keep in mind that operating as a business (as opposed to as anindividual or as part of an informal group) may provide certain legal and non-legal benefits. For example, operating as a business can give your enterprise an air of legitimacy, which may influence the reception of your work or make it easier for you to raise capital or obtain grants (some granting organizations only give money to qualified 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations). It may also help you get press credentials.
Importantly, you may have a better argument for inclusion under some state shield laws if you are affiliated with a business, and you may have a better chance of invoking the reporter's privilege to avoid having to testify in a legal proceeding regarding your sources and/or information gathered in the course of your news gathering activities. You can refer to the State Shield Laws page for more information, and we will be dealing with the reporter's privilege in forthcoming sections of this guide.
A sole proprietorship is a business owned by a single individual. Being a sole proprietor doesn't mean that you necessarily operate the business alone. This can be the case, but you also may hire employees and/or independent contractors to do work for you and still operate as a sole proprietorship. The key issue is ownership -- you can have hundreds of employees or freelance workers, but if you are the only owner of the business (and you haven't incorporated or created another formal business entity), then your business is a sole proprietorship. A sole proprietorship springs into existence whenever an individual commences doing business, and the business has no separate existence from the owner.
In determining whether you want to operate as a sole proprietorship, you may want to consider the following factors:
If you operate a blog or website individually, but do not generate revenue or intend to make a profit, then you are not operating a sole proprietorship, and the law will treat you like any other individual. You will be personally liable for your own unlawful actions and any debts or other obligations you incur in the course of your activities. If you start collaborating with others, the issues raised in the Informal Group section will become relevant.
Perhaps the most common way of carrying on online publishingactivities is as part of an informal group of individuals actingcollaboratively. In this situation, there is no written partnership agreement or LLC operating agreement, and the individuals involved have taken no steps to create a formal business entity such as an LLC, a corporation, or a nonprofit organization.
A common example of this type of relationship is a so-called"co-blogging" arrangement. This could be a situation where two or morebloggers publish their content on a single jointly-run blog or websiteon a regular basis, sharing administrative responsibilities to agreater or lesser degree. Alternatively, it could be a situation wherea blogger or group of bloggers invite a "guest blogger" to publishcontent for a limited period of time (generally with no administrativeresponsibilities). Co-blogging is not the only example of this kind ofcollaborative relationship – any citizen media or other site runinformally (without an agreement or formal entity structure) by two ormore individuals fits the bill. For the sake of convenience, in thissection we will refer to individuals working in such a relationship as"co-publishers" because the activity all these different groups shareis publishing their content online.
While this form of publishing content has the advantage ofinformality and flexibility (no formation or operating costs, noburdensome bureaucratic requirements), it creates a great deal ofuncertainty about the legal and tax status of the co-publishers' relationship.This uncertainty can have negative consequences, including exposingco-publishers to personal liabilityfor the unlawful acts of their colleagues, and creating complicationsin the management and/or dissolution of the enterprise, as well as certain tax consequences. The sectionsthat follow discuss the advantages and disadvantages of operating as aninformal group and outline two methods for dealing with the legaluncertainty that goes along with it.
There are several potential disadvantages to operating as an informal group:
There are two ways that co-publishers can reduce the uncertaintyinherent in their informal group arrangement: (1) entering into a"co-publishing" agreement; or (2) forming a limited liability businessentity like an LLC, a corporation, or a nonprofit organization. Neither or these routes is a complete solution, but, in the words of Eric Goldman, both are "preferable to co-bloggers [or other co-publishers] doing nothing proactive to override the default rules."
Co-publishers can enter into a formal "co-publishing" or"co-blogging" agreement in order to clarify the status of theirrelationship and set out the parameters under which the group willoperate. If co-publishers are carrying on a business for profit, thenthis agreement will be legally indistinguishable from a partnership agreement, and they will have adopted the partnershipform of business. If co-publishers are not carrying on a business forprofit, then the group won't legally be a partnership, but theagreement can set out group decision-making procedures, delegateduties, and describe what assets (including copyrights) will belong toand be licensed to whom.
The benefits of adopting this approach is two-fold. First, itis cheap and involves few requirements in terms of paperwork.Co-publishers can draft the agreement themselves, although there is noassurance that the entire agreement will be legally enforceable withoutthe assistance of an attorney. Besides signing the agreement, there areno other steps or legal requirements to make it binding. Second, thisapproach allows for a great deal of customization to take into accountthe specific circumstances of the group and its publishing activities.In other words, much of the flexibility of the informal group structurecan be maintained, but now with some framework to fall back on.Effective customization, however, sometimes increases complexity in thedrafting process, and may necessitate the assistance of an attorney tomake the agreement fully enforceable.
Despite these advantages, there are limitations on what aco-publishing agreement can do. For instance, in an effort to avoidpersonal liability, co-publishers might put a clause in their agreementspecifying that the group is "not a partnership," or saying thatcertain individuals are not the employees of others. A court could givesome weight to this type of language, but would disregard it if thefacts showed otherwise. Additionally, assuming that the group isoperating for profit, a co-publishing agreement would not eliminatepersonal liability for the acts of co-publishers. As noted, with suchan agreement, the group would be treated like a partnership,which still exposes partners to personal liability for the unlawfulacts of partners taken in furtherance of the partnership. The agreementcould allocate liability in a particular way among the co-publishersthemselves (for instance, requiring one co-publisher to indemnify orpay back the others for liability arising out the group's publishingactivities), but this would not be binding against injured thirdparties. To obtain limited liability for the actions of other co-publishers, the group would have to form an LLC, Corporation, or nonprofit organization.
Co-publishers can create a formal business entity like an LLC, corporation, or nonprofit organization. The common benefit here is limited liability,and each will bring the desired level of certainty to the grouprelationship (though not necessarily any more than a co-publishingagreement).
There are benefits and disadvantages to each of these businessforms -- for specifics, please see their respective pages (linkedabove). The common disadvantage vis-a-vis a co-publishing agreement isthe relative expense and burden that they all require to form andoperate. Additionally, adopting these forms may remove some of theflexibility in management and other affairs that the group enjoyed inits informal days. This is not necessarily the case, however -- ownersof an LLC usually enter into an operating agreement,which allows for the same kind of customization found in aco-publishing agreement. Keep in mind that, even with a limitedliability business entity, co-publishers would remain personally liablefor their own personal misconduct, like writing a defamatory article orpost.
For a group that is not operating for profit, a co-publishingagreement may be the best course to take, because liability exposure islimited (the agreement does not affect this), and the agreementprovides a relatively cheap and easy way to bring increased certaintyto the relationship. Moreover, if the group generates no revenue, itmay be hard to justify the costs of forming and operating a more formalbusiness entity.
For a group that is operating for profit, whether to go with aco-publishing agreement or a business entity with limited liabilityprotection depends to a great extent on the group's potential liabilityexposure. Some factors to consider in determining this exposure includethe number of individuals publishing content (the more people, the morerisk of liability) and the character of the published work (is it thekind of material that might be defamatory? other problems?). Theco-publishers would also need to evaluate their comfort threshold forrisk and any economic constraints that might stand in the way ofcreating a formal business entity.
A partnership is an "association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit." Uniform Partnership Act § 202. These co-owners can operate the business by themselves, or hire employees and/or independent contractors to carry out tasks for them. As a practical matter, a partnership is usually created by the partners entering into a formal partnership agreement, which sets down ground rules for what capital contributions are required from the partners, how the business will be managed, and how profits and losses will be allocated, among other things.
In determining whether you want to operate as a partnership, you may want to consider the following factors:
If you are carrying on your online activities with a group of other journalists or bloggers (e.g., a co-blogging relationship) without a formal partnership agreement, it is still possible that a court could deem your group an informal legal or tax partnership, bringing with it potential personal liability for the actions of your co-publishers. This risk is greatly reduced, however, if your group does not intend to make a profit, or if your revenues are all scrupulously re-invested in the enterprise without distribution to group participants. For details, please see the Informal Group section of this Guide. Eric Goldman's article, Co-Blogging Law, gives the definitive treatment of liability pitfalls for co-bloggers operating informally.
Before commencing operations, it is strongly suggested that you and your partners sign a partnership agreement laying out the rights and responsibilities of the partners. The agreement normally specifies the amount of capital or the kinds of services that each partner is to contribute to the partnership, and it specifies how profits and losses are to be allocated to the partners. The agreement specifies the identity and status of the partners, the scope and limitation of partnership activities, and the managerial powers and authority of the partners. The agreement may also detail how the partnership is to be operated: who is to work full-time, and in what capacity, how management will be compensated, whether unanimous agreement is needed to admit new partners, how partnership decisions are to be made, the withdrawal or expulsion of partners, and how and when the partnership is to be dissolved.
Drafting a partnership agreement can be complex, and partners may want the assistance of a lawyer to protect their interests, thus driving up costs. But there are strategies for writing a satisfactory partnership agreement without the expense of hiring a lawyer. FindLaw has an overview of creating a partnership agreement and some sample agreements, including actual partnership agreements from various companies. You can also purchase form partnership agreements at office supply stores or various places online.
If you do not sign a partnership agreement, certain aspects of your relationship with your partner will be determined by state law that may be difficult to find or understand, and may not be what you would expect. A written agreement can help to avoid confusion or conflict when unexpected circumstances arise. Even if no partnership agreement exists, two or more people working together can be held to have established a partnership. If an informal partnership decides later to incorporate or officially form another entity, it may be necessary to document the informal partnership for tax purposes or to convey properly the interests of the informal partnership to the new entity.
Limited liability companies (LLCs) have become the most common typeof new business since their introduction by state laws in the last 30 years because LLCs combine the tax advantages of partnerships with the limited liability of corporations. This business form may be a good option for a website or blog with significant liability exposure. Owners of an LLC are called "members." You can operate an LLC as the sole owner (single-member) or in conjunction with fellow owners (multi-member). Members can run the business by themselves, or hire employees and/or independent contractors to carry out tasks for them. Among other requirements discussed below, an LLC is formed by filing articles of organization with the state and executing a formal operating agreement,which sets down ground rules for what capital contributions arerequired from the members, how the business will be managed, and how profits and losses will be allocated, among other things.
In determining whether you want to operate as an LLC, you may want to consider the following factors:
You must file formal articles of organization with your state (usually with the Secretary of State) and pay a filing fee in order to form an LLC. The filing fee generally ranges between $70 and $200 depending on the state, but certain states have higher fees (e.g., Illinois ($500), Massachusetts ($500), and Texas ($300)). See the State Law: Forming an LLC section for details on state filing fees.
The articles function like the constitution for the LLC. Ordinarily, the document is short and simple, and you can prepare your own in a few minutes by filling in the form provided by your state's filing office or preparing your own based on a sample. Generally, all of the members may prepare and sign the articles, or they can appoint one person to do so. Each state has its own required version of this document, so the precise requirements may vary. Below is a list of some of the most common information required by the states:
You can find the required forms and sample articles of organization for the fifteen most populous U.S. states and the District of Columbia in the state pages on forming an LLC.
If you want to amend the articles of organization, you can do so by filing articles of amendment with the same official to whom you submitted the original. Usually there is a prepared form.
An operating agreement is the basic written agreement between the members (i.e., owners) of the LLC, or between the members and the managers of the company, if there are managers. In most states, creating an operating agreement is not a legal requirement, but it is highly advisable for the smooth operation of your business and for avoiding internal disputes. Even if you will form a single-member LLC, you should create an operating agreement between yourself (as a member) and the company in order to separate your business and personal affairs. Many states have laws saying that an operating agreement for a single-member LLC is not invalid simply because only one individual signed the document.
Although there is no set criteria for the content of an operating agreement, it usually covers topics such as:
Free sample operating agreements for most U.S. states are available from the Internet Legal Research Group. Whether or not you need the assistance of a lawyer to craft a good operating agreement depends upon the level of customization you want to achieve.
An operating agreements does not have to be filed with the state like the articles of organization, and they may be changed without officially filing amendments. If you do alter the agreement, remember to keep a copy of the previous version on file.
The amount of paperwork and other formalities required by state governments in order to form and properly maintain a limited liability company should not be underestimated. In addition to the two major "constitutional" documents (the articles of organization and the operating agreement), LLCs are required to keep copies of a number of other records relating to the the organization, finances, and ownership of the business.
State record-keeping requirements vary. You can find links to your state's specific record-keeping requirements in the state pages on forming an LLC. However, as a matter of best practices you should keep copies of the following documents in the company's principal office in the state in which it was formed:
These requirements are in addition to those required for all small businesses for tax purposes. For more on the tax obligations of small businesses, see the Tax Obligations of Small Businesses section and the IRS's informational guide, Publication 583 (1/2007), Starting a Business and Keeping Records.
The corporation is the best known business form. Most big companies that are "household names" are corporations, including companies like Google Inc., Microsoft Corp., and Yahoo! Inc. A corporation has a legal identity that is separate from its owners (usually referred to as "shareholders" or "stockholders"). Although many corporations are large organizations with many employees, it is possible for a single person to form and operate a corporation individually.
Operating as a corporation offers limited liability to shareholders, transferability of ownership interests (shares), and perpetual existence of the corporation, even after original shareholders have left the business. Because most successful, big-name companies are corporations, many believe that operating as a corporation must be advantageous, but this is not always true. In fact, however, corporations often have disadvantages, including "double taxation" and the cost and hassle associated with forming and operating a corporation. Because of these disadvantages, in many cases an LLC will be a better choice for a small citizen media business with owners who are concerned about liability exposure. In fact, unless you plan on taking your business "public" (i.e., selling shares of the company to the general public) in the near future, or you are working with venture capitalists who require you to form a corporation, there generally are few reasons to operate your small business as a corporation.
A few technical points are worth mentioning up front. First, when we mention a "corporation" in this guide, we mean a "C corporation" unless we specify otherwise. Probably all of the big companies you think of as "corporations" are C corporations. There is another type of corporation, however, called an "S corporation," which we discuss briefly on the S Corporation page. The important difference between the two is how they are treated for tax purposes. While S corporations are generally not subject to "double taxation" like C corporations, they still require most, if not all, of the costly and burdensome formalities associated with C corporations, and they offer no significant benefits over LLCs. Second, certain states recognize what is known as a "close corporation," which we discuss briefly on the Close Corporation page. This business form generally allows for greater flexibility and informality in managing business affairs than a C corporation, but it requires creation of a shareholders' agreement and significant limitations on transfer of stock, and LLCs are generally regarded as superior vehicles for obtaining an informal, de-centralized management structure with limited liability.
In determining whether you want to operate as a corporation, you may want to consider the following factors:
You must file articles of incorporation (sometimes called a "certificate of incorporation" or "charter") with your state (usually with the Secretary of State) and pay a filing fee in order to form a corporation. The filing fee generally ranges between $70 and $200 depending on the state, but certain states have higher fees -- for example, Massachusetts ($275) and Texas ($300). See the state pages on forming a corporation for details on state filing fees.
The articles function like the constitution for the corporation. Ordinarily, the document is short and simple, and you can prepare your own in a few minutes by filling in the form provided by your state's filing office, or by drafting your own based on a sample. Generally, all those people who will be initial shareholders may prepare and sign the articles, or they can appoint one person to do so. Each state has its own required version of this document, so the precise requirements may vary. Below is a list of information commonly required by the states:
In other states, you are not required to identify the initial directors in the articles of incorporation (although you may do so if you want). When the initial directors are not named in the articles, the incorporator or incorporators have the authority to manage the affairs of the corporation until directors are elected. In this capacity, they may do whatever is necessary to complete the organization of the corporation, including calling an organizational meeting for adopting bylaws and electing directors.
It is important to keep in mind that, in the articles of incorporation, you designate the number of shares the corporation is authorized to issue -- the corporation is not required to issue all of those shares right away (or ever). It is common practice for corporations to hold on to authorized but non-issued shares in order to add additional owners later or to increase the ownership interest of a current shareholder. In the articles, it is generally a good idea to authorize a large number of shares (several thousand), keeping in mind that the number of authorized shares may be tied to the corporation's state franchise tax liability. For instance, in Delaware, it is a good idea for new corporations to authorize 3000 shares, because this is the maximum number of shares that a corporation can authorize and still qualify for the minimum $35.00 annual franchise tax.
You can find the required forms and sample articles of incorporation for the fifteen most populous U.S. states and the District of Columbia in the state pages on forming a corporation.
If you want to amend the articles, you can do so by filing articles of amendment with the same official to whom you submitted the original articles. There is usually a prepared form for doing this.
Corporations are required to write and keep a record of their bylaws, but do not have to file them with a state office.
Bylaws are the rules and procedures for how a corporation will operate and be governed. Although there is no set criteria for bylaws content, they typically set forth internal rules and procedures for the corporation, touching on issues like the existence and responsibilities of corporate offices, the size of the board of directors and the manner and term of their election, how and when board and shareholder meetings will be held, who may call meetings, how the board of directors will function, and to what extent directors and officers will be indemnified against liabilities arising out of performance of their duties. A comprehensive discussion of bylaw content is beyond the scope of this Guide.
Drafting bylaws can be complex, but there are strategies for writing satisfactory bylaws without the expense of hiring a lawyer. FindLaw has posted links to the bylaws of many corporations. Some of these may prove useful as templates, although many of these companies have bylaws that are more complex than your small business would ever need. For a small fee (approximately $15), Nolo Press offers a software program, eForm: Corporate Bylaws, which helps you generate bylaws.
The incorporator(s) (i.e., person(s) filing the paperwork) or initial director(s) (if named in the articles of incorporation) generally have the authority to adopt a corporation's original bylaws at the corporation's organizational meeting.
Bylaws may be changed without officially filing amendments.
As an alternative to the ordinary "C corporation" discussed on the Corporation page, you may carry on your online publishing activities as an "S corporation." An S corporation has the same basic organizational structure as a C corporation, with some of the potential tax advantages of a partnership. A corporation obtains "S" status by filing Form 2553 with the IRS. An S corporation generally does not pay federal income tax at the entity level, except for tax on certain capital gains and passive income. Instead, the corporation's profits and losses "pass through" to shareholders, and profits are taxed at individual rates on each shareholder's Form 1040. However, an S corporation must file an annual tax return on Form 1120S with the IRS.
S corporations are formed in the same way as C corporations, but with the "S" tax designation filed with the IRS via form 2553 within two-and-a-half months of the date of formation. Federal law imposes certain requirements on a corporation in order to qualify for "S" status: (1) the corporation may have no more than 100 shareholders; (2) all shareholders must be individuals, estates, or certain trusts (i.e., no corporations, LLCs, or partnerships); (3) no shareholder may be a nonresident alien; and (4) the corporation may only have one class of stock. There are additional requirements, which you can learn about by reading the Instructions for Form 2553.
Your election of "S" status for federal tax purposes does not guarantee that the profits of your S corporation will not be taxed at the state level. The District of Columbia, for example, does not recognize "S" status and subjects the profits of S corporations to the ordinary state corporate income tax. Other states, such as California and Illinois, still tax the profits of S corporations, but at much lower rates than for C corporations. You can find more information about your state's tax laws in the state pages on forming a corporation.
S corporations generally are preferable to C corporations for small businesses because they require basically the same amount of paperwork, but may incur less tax than a C corporation. One drawback of an S corporation, when compared to a partnership or LLC (which have the same potential tax benefits as S corporations), comes with the inflexibility of profit distribution. With an S corporation, profit distributions must be pro rata to stock ownership, not practical contribution to the success of the business or any other relevant criteria. Thus, if a person owns 10% of the company, but does 90% of the work, he or she may only be allocated 10% of the profits. (Keep in mind, however, that this person could be compensated for work through a salary.) Another drawback is that S corporations are generally subject to the same operating formalities required of ordinary corporations, and this makes them a somewhat costlier and more cumbersome option than an LLC or partnership. For details, see the Corporation section.
Some states, such as California and Texas, have special provisions allowing you to create what is known as a "statutory close corporation." Close corporations generally are formed in the same way as ordinary corporations, but the articles of incorporation for a close corporation must state that the corporation shall be considered a "close corporation" and impose restrictions on transfer of shares of stock. Close corporations also must have a limited number of shareholders -- often 35 or 50 shareholders maximum. For state-specific requirements on forming a close corporation, see the state pages on forming a corporation.
The major reason for forming a close corporation is that it allows shareholders to operate the business under the terms of a shareholders' agreement, which can provide for greater flexibility and informality in managing the affairs of the business (as compared to an ordinary corporation). Shareholders of a close corporation may agree to waive certain operating formalities, such as required shareholder or board meetings. Pursuant to the terms of such an agreement, they can also dispense with the need to form a board of directors and name corporate officers, and they (the shareholders) may run the corporation themselves in a de-centralized fashion. (Incidentally, they may also agree to a distribution of corporate profits other than proportionally based on share ownership.) The downside is that a shareholders' agreement that allows shareholders to manage the corporation may make the shareholders liable for acts or omissions for which the corporate directors are usually liable.
Operating as a close corporation is not popular among incorporators. Negotiating and drafting an effective shareholders' agreement may be a complex and costly undertaking, and there is no apparent advantage of operating as a close corporation rather than an LLC (which also features decentralized management and limited liabiliy and no double taxation). If you are interested in forming a close corporation, you should consult with a lawyer.
The profits of corporations are taxed twice -- once at the entity level (at the applicable state and federal corporate income tax rate), and again at the individual level when profits are distributed to individual owners as dividends (at the applicable individual income tax rate). Avoiding double taxation is one of the commonly noted advantages of operating as a sole proprietorship, partnership, or LLC. Nonprofit organizations that qualify for 501(c)(3) status are exempt from federal (and usually state) income tax at the entity level, so in a sense they avoid double taxation as well.
As noted, avoiding double taxation generally is considered advantageous, but it may not always prove beneficial, depending on your particular circumstances. Owners of businesses whose income "passes through" to them for tax purposes must pay income tax on their share of the net profits of the business, regardless of the amount of money they actually take out of the business each year. Thus, even if all profits are reinvested into the business, the owners of these businesses must pay taxes on their share of the profits. Shareholders of a corporation, on the other hand, pay income tax only when those profits are actually distributed to them as dividends. In addition, paying reasonable salaries to shareholders who participate in the operation of the business can ameliorate the burden of income tax at the entity level to a certain extent. Additionally, there may be situations where you as an individual pay income tax at a rate that is higher than the corporate tax rate.
Note: Tax questions are complex, and the details of such questions are beyond the scope of this guide. Consult a tax accountant and an attorney (if necessary) before choosing a business entity based on tax issues.
In addition to the two major "constitutional" documents (the articles of incorporation and the bylaws), corporations are required to keep copies of a number of other records relating to the the organization, finances, and ownership of the business.
State record-keeping requirements vary. You can find links to your State's specific record-keeping requirements in the State Law: Forming a Corporation section of this Guide. However, as a matter of best practices you should keep copies of at least the following documents in the corporation's principal office (where it is operating on a day-to-day basis) and on file with the corporation's registered agent (this latter step is applicable only if the corporation is incorporated in a state other than the state in which it does business):
These requirements are in addition to those required for all small businesses for tax purposes. For more on the tax obligations of small businesses, see the Tax Obligations of Small Businesses section and the IRS's informational guide, Publication 583 (1/2007), Starting a Business and Keeping Records.
Surprisingly, there is no legal definition of a nonprofit organization. In general, a nonprofit organization is one that is organized to achieve a purpose other than generating profit. Despite this, a nonprofit organization is not precluded from making a profit or engaging in profit-making activities. It is prohibited from passing along any profits to those individuals who control it, like founders, directors, officers, employees, and members. Nothing, however, prevents a nonprofit from paying reasonable salaries to officers, employees, and others who perform a service for it.
This section is aimed at those seeking to start and operate a nonprofit corporation that is a public charity under section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (the "tax code"). A corporation is the most common and generally most appropriate structure used to create a nonprofit organization. You should seek the advice of an experienced nonprofit lawyer if you wish to establish a nonprofit organization using some other business structure.
Section 501(c)(3) of the tax code exempts certain nonprofit organizations from federal corporate income taxes. Gaining tax-exempt status gives a nonprofit corporation credibility with potential donors because it shows that the organization has a legitimate charitable purpose, a formal structure for accomplishing its goals, and is publicly accountable. Section 501(c)(3) tax exemptions are denied to any nonprofit organization engaging in certain political or legislative activities, which will be discussed below.
Section 501(c)(3) classifies nonprofit organizations into private foundations and public charities. In all likelihood, you want your nonprofit organization to avoid being classified as a private foundation because a number of complex additional regulations and restrictions apply to them. When you fill out your application for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, you should request to be classified as a public charity in Part X of Form 1023, usually by checking the box in Line 5g, 5h, or 5i (depending on the nature of your funding).
In order to qualify as a public charity, a nonprofit
corporation must be formed and operated for a charitable purpose.
"Charitable" is a narrow descriptor given the many types of
organizations covered under section 501(c)(3). The section
also applies to organizations with religious, educational, scientific,
or literary purposes, among others. These purposes must be for the
benefit of some significant section of society, whether it be the
general public or a specific community.
Additionally, a public charity must be publicly supported. This means that the nonprofit corporation must normally receive funds from governmental entities or multiple private donors. Contrast this with a private foundation, which typically gets its funds from a single source. The calculations behind what "public support" means are complicated, see the Nonprofit Law Blog's Public Support Tests for details.
Keep in mind the following factors as you consider whether to operate as a nonprofit public charity corporation:
Like other corporate entities, nonprofit organizations can be sued for any number of reasons, including:
Like shareholders in a for-profit corporation, directors of a nonprofit corporation, and other individuals who participate in the founding and/or operating of the nonprofit organization, enjoy limited liability for the debts and obligations of the organization, including for the unlawful acts of other directors, officers, and employees.
However, directors, officers, and employees may be personally liable for their own wrongful conduct, regardless of whether they are paid for their work or are volunteers.
Note that if you apply for a small business loan to help fund your nonprofit corporation, the lender probably will require you to give a personal guarantee. In that case, you are personally responsible for the paying back the debt, even if your business is a nonprofit corporation and even if there is no basis for piercing the corporate veil.
Nonprofit organizations usually incorporate in the state where they expect to do business. Forming a nonprofit 501(c)(3) corporation is burdensome. The section on Forming a Nonprofit Corporation provides the steps necessary to get established in general; the section on State Law: Forming a Nonprofit Corporation outlines what is required by the fifteen most populous U.S. states and the District of Columbia.
There are two main steps involved in forming a nonprofit corporation:
1. Incorporating as a nonprofit corporation at the state level
If you want to incorporate, you must file articles of incorporation with a state office, usually the Secretary of State. Creating articles of incorporation for a nonprofit corporation can be more involved than creating one for a for-profit corporation because you will need to include language about the purpose of your nonprofit corporation in order to be eligible for 501(c)(3) tax exemptions. Drafting the articles of incorporation generally does not require the assistance of a lawyer, and usually the filing fees are significantly less than the filing fees for incorporating as a for-profit corporation.
You will also need to create corporate bylaws which are the internal rules and procedures of the nonprofit corporation. Drafting bylaws that are highly customized to your business may involve some complexity. Additionally, you must keep a records book at the nonprofit's place of business.
The incorporators and/or directors of a newly formed nonprofit corporation should hold an initial organizational meeting to adopt bylaws and elect initial directors (if not named in the articles of incorporation), among other things. Minutes of this meeting must be recorded.
2. Applying for 501(c)(3) corporate income tax exemptions at the federal level
You need to file Form 1023 in order to apply for tax-exempt status under 501(c)(3). The application process is complicated, but can be done without the assistance of a lawyer if you are willing to devote the requisite time and energy in to the process. IRS resources (both the website and the call centers) are of immense help as is Anthony Mancuso's book "How to Form a Nonprofit Corporation," which provides line-by-line guidance on how to complete the application form. For detailed information on how the IRS evaluates journalism non-profits to see whether they qualify for a tax exemption, see the Citizen Media Law Project's Guide to the Internal Revenue Service Decision-Making Process under Section 501(c)(3) for Journalism and Publishing Non-Profit Organizations.
The filing fee for the application is high: $300 if your gross receipts have not exceeded or will not exceed $10,000 annually over a 4-year period, and $750 otherwise. You do not have to apply for tax-exempt status if you anticipate bringing in gross receipts of less than $5,000 per year. If you actually bring in more than $5,000 in any particular year, however, you will need to file Form 1023 within 90 days of the end of the year. See Application for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for details.
Note that if the IRS classifies you as a private foundation and not a public charity, you should contact an experienced nonprofit lawyer immediately to understand the implications of such a classification.
Like other corporations, a nonprofit corporation consists of the following classes of people:
Another category unique to nonprofits is members. Members are a special class of individuals and/or organizations that have rights to participate in the current and future affairs of the nonprofit organization. Nonprofit organizations are not required to have members. You should consult with an experienced nonprofit lawyer if you wish to become a membership organization.
State corporate laws and the nonprofit organization's corporate bylaws govern such things as:
The full array of issues surrounding nonprofit governance is beyond the scope of this Guide. For example, there are reasons to both limit a board's numbers (concentrate control) and broaden a board's numbers (live up to the ideals of representation). A good legal professional or legal resource should be able to help you find the best structure for your nonprofit. For the board example above, in "Starting and Managing a Nonprofit Organization," Bruce R. Hopkins suggests creating an additional advisory committee, thus satisfying concerns of representation and control. You should seek out resources such as Hopkins' book, or consult with a lawyer experienced in nonprofit matters.
Operating a nonprofit organization is often burdensome and costly. There are reporting requirements and operating restrictions that you need to keep in mind in order to to comply with the law and maintain 501(c)(3) exempt status. Expect increased paperwork and red tape in order to comply with:
Note that the operating restrictions and requirements are even more stringent if your organization qualifies as a private foundation and not as a public charity.
Additionally, you will also be responsible for the tax and other regulatory obligations imposed on all small businesses. For more on the tax obligations of small businesses, see the Tax Obligations of Small Businesses section and the IRS's informational guide, Publication 583 (1/2007), Starting a Business and Keeping Records.
Once incorporated, the newly created nonprofit organization is a separate legal entity from its incorporators, directors, and employees. In fact, a nonprofit has no owners, at least not in any ordinary sense. The nonprofit corporation owns all assets of the business and is entitled to receive all profits from its operation. Among the most important assets of any nonprofit corporation that operates a website or blog are its articles, posts, videos, and other content. For details on who owns what from a copyright perspective, see the Copyright Ownership of Articles and Posts section.
Despite its name, a nonprofit organization is not precluded from making a profit or engaging in profit-making activities. However, a nonprofit is prohibited from passing along any profits to those individuals who control them, like founders, directors, officers, key employees, and members. (A handful of states allow a nonprofit corporation to issue stock as a mechanism of control, but no dividend rights accompany the issued stock.) Instead, a nonprofit organization must use any profits to further its program activities or "exempt functions." It may also invest profits in another tax-exempt organization.
Although a nonprofit organization may not distribute profits to its directors, officers, key employees, or members, a nonprofit organization may pay its employees a salary and give them benefits. A nonprofit organization may also pay directors for their expenses and time spent attending director meetings. The key is that the salaries and payments must be reasonable. Excessive payments or exorbitant amounts posturing as salaries or compensation violate the tax code and may lead to penalties and a loss of tax-exempt status.
Note: If you dissolve your nonprofit organization, you must invest all profits into another nonprofit organization.
If you obtain 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, your nonprofit corporation will be exempt from paying federal corporate income tax. However, the 501(c)(3) tax exemption does not apply to unrelated business taxable income or "UBTI," which refers to income generated from regular trade or business activity that is not substantially related to the nonprofit organization's exempt purpose.
Note that your nonprofit corporation may engage in unrelated trade or business activity, but will be liable for the taxes on the gross income exceeding $1,000 generated by it. In this situation, you will need to file Form 990T, the UBTI return, with the IRS.
For example, the sale of advertising in a periodical constitutes UBTI, according to the IRS. Therefore, if your nonprofit organization sells advertising space on a website, in a print periodical, or for a broadcast, you must report the income generated from advertising as taxable. However, you might be able to deduct the cost of selling advertising space as an ordinary and necessary trade or business expense.
For more information on advertising sales as UBTI, or UBTI in general, consult the IRS publication, Tax on Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations.
If you achieve 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, you will still need to file an annual tax return with the IRS, unless your organization's gross receipts are normally $25,000 or less. Organizations beyond the $25,000 threshold with gross receipts below $100,000 and total assets at the end of the year less than $250,000 can file the return on Form 990EZ. Organizations with gross receipts above $100,000 and assets above $250,000 must file the return on Form 990. For details, including how to calculate gross receipts, see the Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ.
Beyond exemption for federal income tax, qualifying under 501(c)(3) provides another important benefit: donations to the organization will be tax deductible by donor, making fundraising easier. Moreover, some donors, like foundations and the federal government, are barred from funding projects that don't have 501(c)(3) status.
You may also be eligible for other special benefits, such as:
Taxation is a very technical subject and you should consider having the nonprofit corporation's tax returns and reports handled by an experienced tax accountant.
An important issue is the federal tax code's rule against 501(c)(3) organizations engaging in political and legislative activities. Because the proscribed activities violate the tax code (and may result in the revocation of the organization's tax-exempt status, the imposition of an excise tax, and liability for back taxes), you must understand how 501(c)(3) defines each type of activity. See the section on Prohibitions on Political and Legislative Activities in this guide for more information.
As discussed above, forming and maintaining a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation can take a lot of time, energy, and money, especially if you are beyond the gross receipts threshold requiring you to formally apply for 501(c)(3) exempt status. You may worry that the work needed to incorporate will distract you from your online publishing activities, but also believe that the benefits of tax-exempt status are too important to pass up.
One option to explore is whether a relationship with a "fiscal sponsor" is right for you. Fiscal sponsorship is the mechanism by which a nonprofit organization with 501(c)(3) status lends its legal and nonprofit status to persons, groups, or businesses that engage in activities related to the sponsor's mission. Through fiscal sponsorship, you may be able to function as a nonprofit organization (including receiving tax-deductible donations) without going through the hassle of forming your own independent organization. Fiscal sponsorship also offers the possibility of benefiting from the sponsor's established administrative infrastructure, financial liquidity, and expertise. In exchange for these services, the fiscal sponsor generally keeps a percentage of each financial transaction or charges a monthly or yearly membership fee. Note that fiscal sponsors that work on a percentage basis or provide services beyond simply acting as an umbrella organization often have a minimum fundraising requirement for eligibility.
Seeking a fiscal sponsor may be best if you are:
When evaluating potential fiscal sponsors, you may want to consider several factors, including:
When determining if fiscal sponsorship is right for you, you should weigh the benefits of gaining immediate tax-exempt status and administrative support (if selected) against the time and effort it takes to research fiscal sponsors and apply for sponsorship, the control relinquished in the relationship, and the fees charged by a sponsor.
Some examples of fiscal sponsors include:
In order to form a nonprofit corporation, you must file articles of incorporation (sometimes called a "certificate of incorporation" or "charter document" or "articles of organization") with the state and pay a filing fee. The filing fee generally ranges between $30 and $125 depending on the state. See State Law: Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details on state filing fees.
The articles function like a constitution for the nonprofit corporation. Ordinarily, the document is short and simple, and you can prepare it on your own by filling in the form provided by your state. A number of items in the articles, however, are important in order to obtain tax-exempt status from the federal government, such as the statement of purpose and statements indicating that the organization will not engage in prohibited political and legislative activity and that all of its assets will be dedicated to its exempt purpose under 501(c)(3). These items are discussed below. Consult the IRS website for a list of the Required Provisions for Articles and sample articles of incorporation to help you draft articles that meet the federal requirements for tax-exemption. State requirements for nonprofit articles of incorporation vary, however, so you may need to adapt the IRS sample to meet your state's specific requirements. Below is a list of information commonly required by the states and the IRS:
Said corporation is organized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, and scientific purposes, including, for such purposes, the making of distributions to organizations that qualify as exempt organizations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or the corresponding section of any future federal tax code.
Some states also ask for a Statement of Lawful Purpose and a Statement of Specific Purpose.
A sample "Statement of Lawful Purpose":
The purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under the laws of State.
A sample "Statement of Specific Purpose":
The specific purpose for which this corporation is organized is to publish a blog providing information to the public on deep sea fishing practices off Hawaii.
is not for-profit:
No part of the net earnings of the corporation shall inure to the benefit of, or be distributable to its members, trustees, officers, or other private persons, except that the corporation shall be authorized and empowered to pay reasonable compensation for services rendered and to make payments and distributions in furtherance of the purposes set forth in the Statement of Purpose hereof. The property of this corporation is irrevocably dedicated to [your 501(c)(3) exempt purpose(s)] and no part of the net income or assets of this corporation shall ever inure to the benefit of any director, officer, or member thereof, or to the benefit of any private individual.
will not engage in prohibited political and legislative activity under 501(c)(3):
No substantial part of the activities of the corporation shall be the carrying on of propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and the corporation shall not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distribution of statements) any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office. Notwithstanding any other provision of these articles, this corporation shall not, except to an insubstantial degree, engage in any activities or exercise any powers that are not in furtherance of the purposes of this corporation.
if dissolved, will distribute its assets within the meaning of 501(c)(3):
Upon the dissolution of the corporation, assets shall be distributed for one or more exempt purposes within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, or the corresponding section of any future federal tax code, or shall be distributed to the federal government, or to a state or local government, for a public purpose.
You can find the required forms and sample articles of incorporation on your state's page. If you must amend the articles, you can do so by filing articles of amendment with the same official to whom you submitted the original articles (usually the Secretary of State).
Bylaws are the rules and procedures for how a nonprofit corporation will operate and be governed. Although there are no set criteria for bylaw content, they typically set forth internal rules and procedures for the nonprofit corporation, touching on such issues as:
A comprehensive discussion of bylaw content is beyond the scope of this Guide. Drafting bylaws can be complex, but there are strategies for writing satisfactory bylaws without the expense of hiring a lawyer. Nolo publishes Anthony Mancuso's "How to Form a Nonprofit Corporation," which guides the reader through creating bylaws appropriate to the nonprofit organization.
Nonprofit corporations are required to write and keep a record of their bylaws, but do not have to file them with a state office. Thus, unlike amendments to the articles of incorporation, bylaws may be changed without officially filing amendments.
The incorporator(s) (i.e., person(s) filing the paperwork) or initial director(s) (if named in the articles of incorporation) generally have the authority to adopt a nonprofit corporation's original bylaws at the nonprofit corporation's organizational meeting.
In addition to the two major "constitutional" documents (the articles of incorporation and the bylaws), nonprofit corporations are required to keep copies of a number of other records relating to the organization, finances, and ownership of the business.
State record-keeping requirements vary. You can find links to your state's specific record-keeping requirements in State Law: Forming a Nonprofit Corporation. However, as a matter of best practice you should keep copies the following documents in the nonprofit corporation's principal office (where it is operating on a day-to-day basis) and on file with the nonprofit corporation's registered agent (this latter step is applicable only if the nonprofit corporation is incorporated in a state other than where it does business):
These requirements are in addition to the tax obligations for all small businesses. For more information, see the Tax Obligations of Small Businesses section and the IRS guide Publication 583 (1/2007), Starting a Business and Keeping Records.
We strongly recommend seeking the assistance of an attorney in applying for Section 501(c)(3) status. If you choose to apply for 501(c)(3) tax exemptions yourself, set aside an entire day to devote to the form; the IRS says it takes ten hours for the average person to complete. It is also important to understand how the IRS evaluates these applications; you can find more information about that process here.
While line by line guidance on how to fill out Form 1023 and advice on strategy are beyond the scope of this Guide, here are the steps you will need to take when you are ready to start the application process:
1. Ensure that your venture is organized as a nonprofit corporation under state law
With very few exceptions, you must be formally organized as a nonprofit corporation under the laws of a particular state in order to be eligible for a federal tax exemption. Information about forming a nonprofit corporation can be found here.
2. Check whether your nonprofit corporation has to go through the IRS application process in order to gain tax-exempt status
Assuming that your nonprofit organization has been established as public charity with a 501(c)(3) purpose, you do not have to apply for federal tax exemption if the organization's gross receipts are normally less than $5,000 per taxable year.
i. $7,500 or less in gross receipts, during its first tax yearii. $12,000 or less in gross receipts, during its first 2 tax years
iii. $15,000 or less in gross receipts, during its first 3 tax years
You will want to have your tax exempt status retroactive to the date of incorporation, so that your nonprofit corporation can take advantage of the exemptions and so that any donations are tax-deductible. You have 15 months from the date of incorporation to file Form 1023, with a 12 month extension. (If you delay, your tax exempt status is retroactive to the date of application.)
5. Request public charity classification in Part X of your application
Every organization that qualifies for 501(c)(3) exempt status is further classified into a public charity or a private foundation. Private foundations are subject to different tax obligations and the IRS imposes additional restrictions and requirements on them. In all likelihood, you will want your nonprofit organization to avoid being classified as a private foundation. To do so, you must give notice to the IRS that your organization is a public charity. You do this in Part X of 1023, usually by checking the box next to Line 5g, 5h, or 5i (depending on the nature of your funding).
6. While Your Application Is Pending
While waiting for the IRS to approve your application, your nonprofit corporation may operate as a tax-exempt organization. When you file your annual federal and state information returns for your nonprofit corporation, note that your 501(c)(3) application is pending IRS approval.
7. Advance and Definitive Rulings
If you have not completed a tax year of at least 8 months at the time of application, you must ask for an advance ruling.
8. Know your audience
Remember that your application is not only going to be read by the IRS, but also (at least potentially) by members of the public.
9. Sign up for "Exempt Organizations Update"
Stay abreast with the latest developments about 501(c)(3) with Exempt Organizations Update, a newsletter published by the IRS.
***
OTHER RESOURCES:
What is Section 501(c)(3) status, and does it make sense for your organization?
Guide to the IRS decision-making process for journalism non-profits
Successful 501(c)(3) applications
An important issue is the federal tax code's rule against 501(c)(3) organizations engaging in political and legislative activities. Because the proscribed activities violate the tax code (and may result in the revocation of the organization's tax-exempt status, the imposition of an excise tax, and liability for back taxes), you must understand how 501(c)(3) defines each type of activity.
a. Political activity
Political activity refers to direct or indirect participation in any political campaign for elected public office. The focus is the partisan nature of the activity. Some guidelines:
Deciding whether or not any particular activity is prohibited "political activity" may often require some difficult line drawing. Refer to the IRS' Revenue Ruling 2007-41 for more information. The Revenue Ruling outlines 21 scenarios and explains why each situation does or does not run afoul of the ban on political campaign intervention.
b. Legislative activity
Legislative activity refers to attempts to influence legislation, popularly known as lobbying. While the prohibition discussed above bars any political activity supporting or opposing a candidate running for office, the prohibition on legislative activity is more nuanced. No "substantial part" of a 501(c)(3) organization's activities may be devoted to lobbying.
Influencing legislation includes any of the following activities:
The focus is on influencing legislation and legislative bodies, like
Congress or a state legislature, and not on influencing executive,
judicial, or administrative bodies. However, the prohibition against
political activity applies to these arenas as well. For example, a
nonprofit organization may not endorse or oppose candidates running for
judicial office. Refer to the IRS Publication on Lobbying which lists detailed examples of legislative activities.
At this point you may be asking yourself: what exactly can I do without jeopardizing my 501(c)(3) status?
You may author and publish:
This area of law is complex. In particular, determining whether your writing is "political activity" or "issue advocacy" requires difficult and fact-sensitive analysis. In addition, figuring out whether a particular lobbying activity involves a "substantial part" of your organization's overall activity is challenging. Given the penalties for violating these prohibitions, you should seek a lawyer's assistance when deciding whether to undertake activities that seem borderline.
A cooperative corporation (or simply, a "cooperative") is a special form of corporation that places ownership and/or control of the corporation in the hands of the employees or patrons of the corporation. A cooperative is intended to be community-based, giving those whom the entity serves or employs a direct say in the operation of the entity. You might be familiar with cooperative corporations in the form of local food cooperatives or credit unions, in which control of the cooperative is vested in the patrons of the organization; however, many states allow for the formation of other kinds of cooperatives as well, including journalism cooperatives.
Although the manner in which cooperatives function can vary from state to state (see State Law: Forming a Cooperative Corporation), most states seek to enhance the community-based nature of cooperatives by limiting the power that individual stakeholders can wield in the cooperative. In general, no matter how large an individual's ownership stake in the cooperative might be, each stakeholder is entitled to no more than a single vote in the operation of the cooperative. This helps to ensure that no single voice in a community dominates the operation of the cooperative.
Like other forms of corporation, operating as a corporation offers limited liability to shareholders, transferability of ownership interests (shares), and perpetual existence of the corporation, even after original shareholders have left the business. Some states (alternatively or additionally) allow for the creation of non-profit cooperatives, which generally follow cooperative rules with respect to control of the organization by members of the cooperative, and the rules for non-profit corporations with respect to other issues.
Forming as a cooperative can also provide significant tax benefits over other forms of corporation. For-profit cooperatives that distribute their profits to their patrons as a special "patronage dividend" (which is similar to a refund) will not be taxed on those profits at the federal level so long as the distributions follow specific statutory rules. This can reduce or eliminate the "double taxation" issue faced by regular corporations. Non-profit cooperatives will by default be treated the same way, but, like other non-profit corporations, might be able to apply for an exemption from federal taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. However, the rules governing taxation of cooperatives can be complex, and you will likely require the assistance of a tax professional to take maximum advantage of these benefits.
In determining whether you want to operate as a cooperative corporation, you may want to consider the following factors:
Cooperatives, like other forms of legal entity, are subject to the legal doctrine known as "piercing the corporate veil," which can result in shareholders losing limited liability protection in extremely rare circumstances.
If you apply for a small business loan, the lender probably will require you to give a personal guarantee. In that case, you are personally responsible for the paying back the debt, even if the business is a cooperative and even if there is no basis for piercing the corporate veil.
If you contemplate issuing shares to more than ten people, or to people not actively involved in the business, you should consult an attorney regarding potential securities laws obligations.
Cooperatives do not have to distribute stock dividends every year; rather, the board of directors decides whether to distribute them or to invest proceeds back into the business. Cooperatives that issue stock dividends will be "double taxed" on the amount of the dividends at both the corporate and personal levels.
In this respect, stock dividends are different from "patronage dividends," another type of distribution that a cooperative can make. In general, a "patronage dividend" consists of a refund to the patrons of a business proportional to the amount that each patron has paid to the cooperative during a given year. Although a cooperative can limit the patrons that receive "patronage dividends" to people who are also shareholders or members, they are generally not required to do so. Unlike stock dividends, a cooperative may deduct the amount of any patronage dividends from its gross income before calculating its taxable income.
Shareholders also can sell their shares, unless there is a restriction on transfer imposed in the articles of incorporation or a shareholders' agreement.
Among the most important assets of any business that operates a website or blog are its articles, posts, videos, and other content. For details on who owns what from a copyright perspective, see the Copyright Ownership of Articles and Posts section.
For some cooperatives, paying reasonable salaries to shareholders who participate in running the business can also help ameliorate the potential burdens of double taxation. Shareholders of a cooperative cannot deduct business losses to offset income from other sources. Also, cooperatives are generally taxed at a relatively high rate (currently about 34% or 35%) on earned income, which may be higher than applicable individual rates.
Cooperatives are ideally suited to responding to situations where market forces in a given industry have failed to serve a particular community. In the journalism context, such a situation might be a "news desert" in which local coverage is not available from traditional news outlets. A cooperative allows a community in such a situation to come together and raise funds to provide necessary goods or services that are not otherwise available. The one-person/one-vote system of control by shareholders (or members in the case of a non-profit cooperative) helps to ensure that all participating people in the community feel that they have an equal voice in the cooperative.
On the other hand, the fact that shareholders in a cooperative are limited to a single vote regardless of the number of shares held might discourage institutional investors, who usually seek significant control over a corporation in return for their investment. Similarly, the fact that cooperatives will normally issue patronage dividends to dispose of their profits, as opposed to stock dividends, might make a cooperative a less attractive investment vehicle. This can limit the growth of a cooperative beyond the means of a particular community.
However, this corporate form offers full transferability of shares, which can make it easier for a company to raise capital from outside investors, and it also makes it somewhat easier for individual shareholders to "get out" of the business by selling their shares to other shareholders or outsiders. If you are interested in operating a small business with others that you know and trust, the free transferability of shares may be a disadvantage to adopting the corporate form.
If you want your cooperative to "do business" in states other than the one in which it is incorporated, you need to register as a "foreign" corporation doing business in the other states. You do not need to do this simply because your website or content reaches the residents of other states. It might be an issue, however, if one of the officers or employees of the cooperative works (i.e., contributes content to the website or blog) from another state, and it would likely be required if your cooperative has an office there. State procedures for obtaining this registration vary, but commonly there is a specific form that you need to complete, and you will need to submit copies of the articles of incorporation and a certificate of good standing from your state. There will also be a registration fee. To get the process started, you should visit the Secretary of State's website for the state in which you want to register.
Banyan Project (introducing reader-owned community news cooperatives to the United States to help counteract news deserts, distrust of media, and widespread misinformation)
National Cooperative Business Association (the nation’s oldest and largest national membership association, representing cooperatives of all types and in all industries)
University of Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives (university-based research project focused on a research, educational, and outreach agenda that examines cooperative issues across multiple business and social sectors)
CooperationWorks (national cooperative created to grow the cooperative model across the United States)
For-profit cooperative corporations are given special treatment with respect to federal taxation. Although they are generally taxed as normal corporations, they can reduce their tax exposure by issuing what are known as “patronage dividends” to patrons of the cooperative.
A “patronage dividend” is essentially a refund issued to those who purchase goods or services from a cooperative, and is calculated based upon the amount that each patron spends at the cooperative in a given taxable year. 26 U.S.C. § 1388(a). When filing its federal tax returns, a cooperative may deduct the amount of the patronage dividends that it issues in a particular tax year from its gross income in that year. 26 U.S.C. § 1382(b). As a result, this income is not taxed at the corporate level. Certain patronage dividends may also be deducted on the personal tax returns of the patrons who receive them. 26 U.S.C. § 1385(b).
“Patronage dividends” are distinct from the more familiar “stock dividends” that a corporation pays to its shareholders in an amount proportional to their respective ownership of the corporation. Although a for-profit journalism cooperative usually can have shareholders and can issue stock dividends to them, there is no federal tax deduction at either the corporate or individual level for stock dividends. 26 U.S.C. § 1388(a). Thus, it is infrequent that a cooperative will issue stock dividends as opposed to patronage dividends.
For that reason, purchase of shares in a cooperative is usually less a personal investment strategy and more an investment in the community. This is emphasized by the fact that, under most state cooperative laws, shareholders in a cooperative receive only a single vote in the management of the business regardless of the number of shares they own.
In order to qualify for the federal tax deduction, patronage dividends must, under 26 U.S.C. § 1388(a), meet the following two criteria:
o In order to be deductible by the cooperative, the amount that a particular patron receives as a patronage dividend must reflect the relative contribution of that patron to the net earnings of the cooperative from “business done with or for its patrons.” In many circumstances, the patronage dividend is calculated as a percentage of each patron’s individual purchases made during the tax year, but other calculations may be possible.
o Qualifying patronage dividends cannot be paid out of earnings or income other than from “business done with or for its patrons.” Therefore, a patronage dividend will generally not be tax-deductible if it is made out of the capital contributions of shareholders, donations to the cooperative, or sources of revenue other than business with or for the cooperative’s patrons.
o However, if a cooperative earns income through secondary activities that are integrally intertwined with its ordinary functions and are commercially reasonable, those activities might constitute business “for” or on behalf of its patrons and the income might be available for distribution as a patronage dividend. See Cotter & Co. v. U.S., 765 F.2d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (rental income from lease of warehouse space and interest income from commercial paper and certificates of deposit held to have resulted from business conducted on behalf of patrons).
o Identifying income that can be distributed as a patronage dividend and calculating those dividends in a manner that qualifies for the federal tax deduction can be very complex, and you are advised to seek the assistance of a tax attorney or other tax professional when determining how to calculate the amount that each patron receives.
o A cooperative cannot use a patronage dividend to reduce its tax exposure on income earned prior to deciding to issue the dividend. Thus, a cooperative cannot wait to decide to issue a patronage dividend until after it sees how much it has earned for the year.
o Usually, this issue can be avoided by building the obligation to pay patronage dividends into the bylaws or articles of incorporation of the cooperative during its formation.
In general, cooperatives are not required (by federal law, at least) to issue patronage dividends to all patrons, and can define classes of patrons who receive more or less than one another, or nothing at all. These classes can be based on purchase of a “membership,” residency in a particular geographic area, or other criteria (so long as the criteria do not violate anti-discrimination laws). Some cooperatives only issue patronage dividends to patrons who are also shareholders; thus, a capital investment in the cooperative might be a prerequisite to receipt of a patronage-based refund.
However, if you create different classes of patrons that receive different patronage dividends, it will limit the amount of distributed income that can be deducted by the cooperative. The cooperative may not deduct from its income any dividend paid to a patron out of income earned from other patrons who receive a smaller refund or no refund. 26 U.S.C. § 1388(a). In other words, if a cooperative earns 5% of its net business income from patrons who are eligible to receive a patronage dividend and 95% from other patrons that are ineligible, the cooperative can distribute a maximum of 5% of its net income as a qualifying patronage dividend and must pay taxes on the remaining 95% (regardless of what the cooperative does with that other 95%). This rule prevents a cooperative from using patronage dividends to funnel all of its profits to a select class of individuals while simultaneously claiming a tax benefit.
The federal Internal Revenue Code also contains provisions allowing cooperatives to issue "qualified written notices of allocation" (such as shares of stock, certificates of indebtedness, or other redeemable notes) as patronage dividends in lieu of cash. 26 U.S.C. § 1382(b). These provisions are complex, and may require advance consent from the patron receiving such alternative compensation. Again, determining how to fulfill the cooperative’s obligation to issue patronage dividends can be very complex, and you are advised to seek the assistance of a tax attorney or other tax professional when making these decisions.
Note that state (as opposed to federal) taxation of cooperatives varies from state to state. You are advised to contact the Department of Revenue in the state where you are considering forming a cooperative to determine how taxes are handled there.
Note: The information contained on this page is meant for general, information purposes only, and CMLP makes no claim as to comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information. Because of the complexity of tax issues associated with starting any business, you are encouraged to consult with a tax attorney and/or accountant to ensure compliance with federal, state, and local tax requirements. The CMLP is not a substitute for individualized legal advice, especially not individualized tax advice.
Given the newspaper industry's financial difficulties and the social significance of news reporting and analysis, many journalism start ups are considering the L3C business form. Proponents argue that the L3C offers journalism ventures a sustainable business model with the potential to save newspapers. Yet, there are serious limitations to the L3C, including a capital structure largely dependent on an uncommon type of private foundation investment. For more information on whether forming an L3C is right for your project, see the Should You Form an L3C? section of this Guide.
L3C Business Form Basics
The L3C is a variation on the Limited Liability Company designed to take advantage of both non-profit and for-profit sources of capital. As the term "Low-Profit" suggests, an L3C typically engages in socially-beneficial activities which may not be lucrative enough to attract sufficient commercial investment. By using a tiered capital structure, the L3C can potentially attract a diverse group of creditors to finance its operations, including private foundations and socially-conscious for-profit entities.
In addition to the financing benefits, an L3C may offer a marketing advantage over the standard LLC in attracting socially-conscious investors and consumers. In contrast to a standard LLC, which can be organized for any lawful business purpose, an L3C must operate to significantly further a charitable goal as required by IRS Regs. Sec. 53.4944-3(a) . Still, any LLC can function exactly like an L3C if its articles of organization and operating agreement are drafted to track the provisions of Regs. Sec. 53.4944-3(a).
Tax Treatment of the L3C
Despite its socially-conscious mission, an L3C is not a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and donations and investments in L3Cs are not tax deductible. Since the profits of an L3C "pass through" to its members and are taxed at individual rates, L3Cs operate like standard LLCs for federal tax purposes.
The L3C's primary advantage is its ability to attract private foundation Program-Related Investments (PRIs) though its formal compliance with the PRI requirements set out in Regs. Sec. 53.4944-3(a). PRIs are a means for private foundations to invest in for-profit entities without incurring certain penalty taxes. State laws authorizing L3Cs require their organizing documents to track the provisions of Regs. Sec. 53.4944-3(a).
As a cautionary note, however, the IRS has not ruled whether private foundation investments in L3Cs qualify as PRIs. State laws authorizing L3Cs do not bind the federal tax authorities regarding PRIs, which may limit the utility of the business form until the IRS makes its determination.
We also have a PDF version of our "Primer on Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies" that you can download here.
An L3C can create a tiered capital structure, allocating risk and returns differently across different types of members. In an L3C, Program Related Investments (PRIs) by private foundations can be allocated the highest risk and lowest rates of return. Thus, the investing foundations are essentially subsidizing returns on commercial investment. In exchange, private foundations may retain decision-making powers in the L3C in order to ensure that the investment qualifies as a PRI.
Private socially responsible investors may be willing to accept below-market returns from a venture with charitable goals. In an L3C, these investors may assume less risk and receive a higher share of profits than private foundations, but in general they may also have fewer management powers.
Private commercial investors seeking market-rate returns may be allocated the highest returns and lowest risk in an L3C. Such investors may include pension funds, banks, insurance companies, or endowments.
Whether or not the L3C's tiered capital structure imposes excessive risk on private foundations remains an open question. If the IRS determines a private foundation's investment in an L3C to be a jeopardy investment, the foundation is subject to significant penalty taxes. Even if the investment qualifies as a PRI, the foundation must still ensure that its charitable goals are accomplished and guard against private inurement. If any part of the foundation's net earnings accrue to the benefit of a private individual, such as a commercial investor in the L3C, the foundation will lose its tax exemption. To minimize these risks, a private foundation may require approval authority on L3C investments, regular reports and other controls.
Advantages
Disadvantages
Nonprofit organizations are either public charities or private foundations. Typically, public charities receive broad public support in the form of donations, grants, or funds from the government. Unlike public charities, private foundations are funded by a limited number of private sources. To prevent them from improperly advancing private interests while taking advantage of the tax exemptions for nonprofits, the IRS imposes additional regulations on private foundations.
Section 4943(a) of the Internal Revenue Code prevents private foundations from investing in joint ventures by imposing an initial 10 percent excise tax on the value of excess business holdings. In addition, Section 4942 requires a private foundation to disburse a certain amount of its assets annually and imposes penalty taxes for a failure to do so. Most importantly, Section 4944 imposes penalty taxes on jeopardy investments.
Jeopardy Investments
Jeopardy investments are defined as investments that risk a private foundation's ability to carry out its charitable purpose. In general, this means that the investment risks the foundation's resources in an imprudent way. To determine whether an investment is a jeopardy investment, the IRS engages in a case-by-case fact-intensive examination of the information available to foundation managers at the time the decision to invest was made. As a result, it is difficult for a private foundation to know with certainty whether or not it is making a jeopardy investment at the time of the investment. Since an L3C's tiered capital structure requires that private foundations assume a high risk at low rates of return, private foundation investments in L3Cs are likely to be considered jeopardy investments, unless they qualify for an exception as Program Related Investments.
A determination that an investment is a jeopardy investment has severe consequences for the investor. Private foundations must pay an initial tax of 5 percent of the value of such investments for every taxable year from the point when the investment was made up until the tax is assessed or the investment is corrected. If the investment is not removed from jeopardy within the taxable period following the assessment of the initial tax, the foundation must pay an additional tax of 25 percent. Furthermore, a foundation manager who made a jeopardy investment knowingly and willfully must pay a 5 percent penalty tax, unless her behavior was due to reasonable cause. If the manager refuses to remove the investment from jeopardy after the initial tax is assessed, she must pay an additional 5 percent. The manager is personally liable for these taxes and may not pass them on to the foundation.
Exception for Program-Related Investments
The Internal Revenue Code provides a narrow exemption from jeopardy investment penalty taxes for a private foundation's Program-Related Investments (PRIs). PRIs may involve high risk and low returns, but the IRS does not treat them as jeopardy investments because they further the investing foundation's charitable goals. PRIs may take the form of below-market-rate loans, loan guarantees, linked deposits, or equity investments.
The test to qualify as a PRI set out in Regs. Sec. 53.4944-3(a) requires that:
(1) the primary purpose of the investment must be to accomplish a charitable purpose;
(2) producing income cannot be a significant purpose of the investment; and
(3) the investment cannot be made for political or lobbying purposes.
An investment in an L3C does not automatically qualify for the PRI exception. The IRS may retroactively declare the investment was not a PRI, and the foundation would have to pay the relevant penalty taxes for jeopardy investments.
As a consequence, a private foundation's investment in an L3C exposes it to the risk of incurring penalty taxes. To reduce the uncertainty, the foundation may seek a written opinion from legal counsel that clearly explains why an investment qualifies as a PRI. Such an opinion may protect the foundation and its managers from incurring the initial penalty tax for jeopardy investments even if the IRS declares it to be incorrect. However, a lawyer's opinion may be costly to obtain and would only protect the foundation until the IRS makes an official determination of the nature of the investment. If the IRS declares the investment does not qualify as a PRI and the investment is not removed from jeopardy within the tax period following that determination, penalty taxes will be imposed on the foundation as well as its manager.
A private foundation may also request that the IRS pre-approve its investment though a private letter ruling. Such requests may take up to eighteen months to process. In the mean time, the foundation may incur tens of thousands of dollars in filing and legal fees without any guarantee of positive results. Even if the investment is pre-approved as a PRI, the foundation would have obligations to monitor the recipient L3C's use of PRI funds and ensure that the foundation's charitable goals are attained, or it may still be liable for penalties.
To determine whether it is making a PRI prior to investing in an L3C, a foundation would consider each of the following factors:
(1) the investing foundation's own charitable mission;
(2) the social goals of the recipient L3C;
(3) whether the social goals the L3C seeks to accomplish further the foundation's charitable mission;
(4) whether the governance and financial structure of the recipient L3C insure that the PRI requirements of Regs. Sec. 53.4944-3(a) will be met; and
(5) the cost of obtaining a written opinion from legal counsel or a private letter ruling from the IRS.
Tax Treatment of Program Related Investments
Private foundations benefit when their investments in ventures like L3Cs are officially determined to be PRIs. Such investments qualify as a disbursement under Section 4942 of the Internal Revenue Code, which required private foundations to distribute a certain amount of their assets annually. The foundation may earn income from the PRI, for which it will have to pay no tax. Finally, if the private foundation receives its investment back, it will have more funds to distribute via PRIs and grants. A foundation must reinvest a PRI and any income from it within a year of receipt.
There are many steps to starting a business. Each state has its own setof laws and requirements regarding the formation of business entities.The following links will take you to general and state-specificinformation about how to form a sole proprietorship, partnership, LLC, corporation, and nonprofit organization.
You become a sole proprietor in a legal sense anytime you go into business for yourself. This page outlines the steps you need to take in order to make sure that your sole proprietorship is in compliance with applicable laws. Make sure to consult your state page for state-specific details.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a Bank Account for Your Business.
Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on becoming a sole proprietor:
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Arizona. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Obtain any required local licenses.
3. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
4. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in California. You should also read the general section for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Florida. You should also read the general section for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Georgia. You should also read the general section for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Illinois. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Indiana. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Massachusetts. You should also read the general section for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Michigan. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in New Jersey. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in New York. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in North Carolina. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Ohio. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Pennsylvania. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
- The fictitious name;
- The address, including street and number, if any, of the principal office or place of business of the business to be carried on under or through the fictitious name;
- The name and address, including street and number, if any, of the person filing the registration; and
- A statement that an application for registration of a fictitious name is to be or was filed "under 54 Pa.C.S. (relating to names)."
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Texas. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Virginia. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in Washington. You should also read the general section for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. File a Business License Application with the Washington Department of Licensing.
3. Get an Employer Identification Number from the IRS.
4. Report Any New Hires.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you should follow to get started as a sole proprietor in the District of Columbia. You should also read the general section for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your sole proprietorship and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Obtain any required local licenses.
4. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your sole proprietorship has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
5. Open a bank account for your business.
Here are the general steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in compliance with applicable laws. Make sure to consult your state page for state-specific details.
1. Choose a business name for the partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Negotiate and execute a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax obligations the partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on forming a partnership:
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Arizona. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in California. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Florida. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Georgia. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Illinois. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Indiana. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Massachusetts. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Michigan. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in New Jersey. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in New York. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in North Carolina. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Ohio. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Pennsylvania. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
- The fictitious name;
- The address, including street and number, if any, of the principal office or place of business of the business to be carried on under or through the fictitious name;
- The name and address, including street and number, if any, of the person filing the registration; and
- A statement that an application for registration of a fictitious name is to be or was filed "under 54 Pa.C.S. (relating to names)."
One of the newspapers must be a legal periodical or newspaper. If there is no legal periodical or newspaper published in the county, then two newspapers of general circulations are sufficient. If there is only one newspaper of general circulation in a county, advertisement in that newspaper is sufficient. The Department of State has a list of legal newspapers. Proof of satisfaction of the advertising requirement should not be submitted to the Department of State, but the partnership should retain proof in its business records.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Texas. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Virginia. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Virginia. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in Washington. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. File a Business License Application with the Washington Department of Licensing.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Get an Employer Identification Number from the IRS.
5. Report Any New Hires.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a partnership in the District of Columbia. You should also read the general section on forming a partnership for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for your partnership and check for availability.
2. Register the business name with local, state, and/or federal authorities.
3. Draft and sign a partnership agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations your partnership has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here are the general steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in compliance with applicable laws. Make sure to consult your state page for state-specific details.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the appropriate state office, usually the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
- by submitting the required information online at the IRS website. The EIN is issued immediately once the application information is validated;
- by telephone at 1-800-829-4933 from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. in your local time zone; or
- by mailing or faxing Form SS-4, Application for Employer Identification Number. Instructions for Form SS-4 are available on the IRS website.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on forming an LLC:
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Arizona. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Arizona Corporation Commission.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in California. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. File a Statement of Information with the Secretary of State.
5. Obtain any required local licenses.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
Other Notable Requirements for Maintaining an LLC in California
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Florida. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Department of State, Division of Corporations.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Georgia. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Illinois. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Indiana. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Massachusetts. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file a certificate of organization with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Michigan. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Department of Labor & Economic Growth, Bureau of Commercial Services, Corporation Division.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in New Jersey. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file a certificate of formation with the Division of Revenue.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in New York. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Department of State.
3. Publish a notice of LLC formation and file a Certificate of Publication.
4. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
5. Obtain any required local licenses.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in North Carolina. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Ohio. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Pennsylvania. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file a certificate of organization with the Department of State.
3. File a Docketing Statement.
4. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
5. Obtain any required local licenses.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Texas. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file a certificate of formation with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Virginia. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the State Corporation Commission of Virginia.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. Obtain any required local licenses.
5. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
6. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in Washington. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Washington Secretary of State's website and the Department of Licensing website, which have useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file a certificate of formation with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. File a Business License Application with the Washington Department of Licensing.
5. File an Initial Annual Report with the Secretary of State.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an LLC in the District of Columbia. You should also read the general section on forming an LLC for information that is applicable in any state. The D.C. Bar Pro Bono Program provides a helpful Guide for Business Owners on the Formation of a Limited Liability Company, and you can find additional information on the law governing D.C. LLCs on the D.C. Bar website.
1. Choose a business name for the LLC and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs.
3. File a Written Consent to Act as a Registered Agent form with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs.
4. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
5. Obtain any required local licenses.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the LLC has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
Here are the general steps you need to follow in order to form an corporation (specifically, a C corporation) in compliance with applicable laws. Make sure to consult your state page for state-specific details.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the appropriate state office, usually the Secretary of State.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
- by submitting the required information online at the IRS website. The EIN is issued immediately once the application information is validated;
- by telephone at 1-800-829-4933 from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. in your local time zone; or
- by mailing or faxing Form SS-4, Application for Employer Identification Number. Instructions for Form SS-4 are available on the IRS website.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on forming a corporation:
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
You can check the availability of a corporate name or reserve a corporate name for up to 120 days at the Arizona Corporation Commission website, at http://www.azcc.gov/divisions/corporations/filings/namingpolicy.asp
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Arizona Corporation Commission.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in California. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the California Secretary of State's website, which has useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. File a Statement of Information with the Secretary of State.
6. Hold an organizational meeting.
7. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Florida. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations website, which has useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Florida Department of State, Corporations Division.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a Bank Account for Your Business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Georgia. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Georgia Secretary of State's website and the First Stop Business Guide, which contain useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
4. Publish a notice of intent to incorporate in a local newspaper.
5. Create the corporation's bylaws.
6. Hold an organizational meeting.
7. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
8. Obtain any required local licenses.
9. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
10. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Illinois. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Illinois Secretary of State's website and its Guide to Organizing Domestic Corporations, which contain valuable resources and information.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
4. Record the certificate of incorporation and articles with the Recorder of Deeds.
5. Create the corporation's bylaws.
6. Hold an organizational meeting.
7. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
8. Obtain any required local licenses.
9. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
10. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Indiana. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Indiana Secretary of State's website, which has extremely useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a Bank Account for Your Business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Massachusetts. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, Corporations Division website, which has helpful resources and information.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Michigan. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Michigan Department of Labor & Economic Growth, Bureau of Commercial Services website, which has useful resources, but is difficult to navigate.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Department of Labor & Economic Growth, Bureau of Commercial Services, Corporation Division.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in New Jersey. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the New Jersey Division of Revenue website, which has useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file a certificate of incorporation with the Division of Revenue.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Note: New Jersey law requires incorporators to be at least eighteen years old.
Other Notable Requirements for Maintaining a Corporation in New JerseyHere is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in New York. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the New York Department of State's website, which has useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file a certificate of incorporation with the Department of State.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Note: New York law requires that incorporators (i.e., the people filing the paperwork) be at least eighteen years old.
Other Notable Requirements for Maintaining a Corporation in New YorkHere is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in North Carolina. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the North Carolina Secretary of State's website, which has extremely useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Ohio. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Ohio Secretary of State's website, which has useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
4. Create the corporation's "regulations."
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Pennsylvania. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Pennsylvania Department of State, Corporations Bureau website, which has useful resources and information.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Department of State, Corporations Bureau.
4. File a Docketing Statement.
5. Fulfill the "advertising requirement."
6. Create the corporation's bylaws
7. Hold an organizational meeting.
8. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
9. Obtain any required local licenses.
10. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
11. Open a bank account for your business.
Note: Pennsylvania law requires incorporators (i.e., those people who file the paperwork) to be at least eighteen years old.
Other Notable Requirements for Maintaining a Corporation in PennsylvaniaHere is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Texas. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Texas Secretary of State's website, which has useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file a certificate of formation with the Secretary of State.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the State Corporation Commission of Virginia.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. Obtain any required local licenses.
8. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
9. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in Washington. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information that is applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Washington Secretary of State's website and the Department of Licensing website, which have useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
4. Create the corporation's bylaws.
5. Hold an organizational meeting.
6. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
7. File a Business License Application with the Washington Department of Licensing.
8. File an Initial Annual Report with the Secretary of State.
9. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
10. Open a bank account for your business.
Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form a corporation (specifically, a "C corporation") in the District of Columbia. You should also read the general section on forming a corporation for information applicable in any state. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs website, which has useful information and resources.
1. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint a director or directors for the corporation.
3. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs.
4. Raise $1000 in capital.
5. Create the corporation's bylaws.
6. Hold an organizational meeting.
7. Issue stock certificates to the initial owners of the corporation.
8. Obtain any required local licenses.
9. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the corporation has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
10. Open a bank account for your business.
- A heading stating the name of the corporation and that it is a close corporation.
- A provision stating that all of the corporation's stock, of all classes, is not to be held by more than thirty-five persons.
- A provision stating that all of the corporation's stock is subject to certain transfer restrictions.
- A provision stating that the corporation shall make no offering of any of its stock of any class which would constitute a "public offering" within the meaning of the United States Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.).
- The articles may also include a provision stating that the corporation will be managed by its shareholders rather than a board of directors pursuant to D.C. Code Ann. § 29-305.42.
These are the general steps you need to follow in order to form a nonprofit corporation in compliance with local, state, and federal laws. For information specific to your state, please see State Law: Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
1. Preliminary Mattersa. Your mission
Take the time to write out a mission statement that identifies the societal need you wish to satisfy. Then outline how your nonprofit corporation will go about satisfying the need. See MinnPost.com for a terrific example of a mission statement in the context of online journalism.
This may sound like a distraction at first, but do not underestimate its importance: you will return to this statement time and again throughout the process, whether in preparing your articles of incorporation or planning your fundraising activities. You need to be clear about why you are investing time, effort, and money into forming a nonprofit organization not only for yourself, but because clarity of vision will help attract others to your nonprofit organization, whether as directors, officers, employees, or donors.
b. Figure out a fundraising plan
501(c)(3) status not only gives your nonprofit corporation tax exemptions, but also makes the ability to raise money easier because donations are tax-deductible. You will need to have a plan on how to attract and collect donations. Refer to resources such as Network for Good and Nonprofit Good Practice Guide for information on fundraising plans and ideas.
Remember that organizations that inspire confidence in donors are ones that:
1. are able to communicate who they are and what they do
2. define reasonable and attainable short-term and long-term goals
3. show financial acumen in how to fulfill these goals
4. can chart progress made toward the goals
5. have programs that clearly speak to the organization's mission
6. keep accurate and up-to-date accounting books and corporate records
7. are professionally and efficiently run
8. have 501(c)(3) status so that donations are tax-deductible
c. Plan the annual budget
You should create an operating budget for the upcoming year. An operating budget outlines your planned revenue and expenses, broken down by category. These categories include: personnel (salaries and benefits), administrative (computer equipment and office supplies), and fundraising (marketing and soliticing donations). Once you've incorporated, the board of directors has to authorize the annual budget. Plan the nonprofit corporation's finances for the year using resources such as Free Management Library, The Nonprofit Times, and Nonprofit Guides.
This budget will be of immense help when applying for grant money or asking for donations as you will be able to show how you plan to use the funds. See Bush Foundation's Sample Budget.
d. Reassess your decision to incorporate
Now that you have a mission, a fundraising plan, and a budget, reassess your decision to incorporate. Ask yourself whether the ban on political and legislative activity frustrates your mission. If so, consider one of the other business types available. Also ask yourself whether your budget allows you to operate for a year, or whether you have the time to execute on your fundraising plan. If you feel a financial crush approaching, but still feel that your goal is to become a 501(c)(3) organization, perhaps starting out with a fiscal sponsorship may be best for you.
2. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
Most small nonprofit organizations incorporate in the state where they are operating. If you are thinking of something different, Findlaw has a good overview on choosing where to incorporate.
Get in touch with your Secretary of State and request all the forms needed to incorporate as a nonprofit corporation. Additionally, ask whether you can get copies of any statutes on establishing and running a nonprofit corporation as they will be a valuable resource throughout this process. The State Law: Forming a Nonprofit Corporation section in this Guide has many state-level resources to help you in this process.
a. Choose a business name for the corporation and check for availability.
If you are currently operating under a business name, you may want to keep that name because it already identifies your business. However, you could also take this opportunity to change your organization's name to something more appropriate. Please see our section on choosing and checking the availability of a name for your non-profit organization, as well as our section on the trademark law aspects of choosing a name.
Although the details vary based on state law, ordinarily the name of a nonprofit organization:
i. must not be the same as that of another corporation on file with the state (substantially similar names will likely be rejected as well)
ii. must contain the words "Corporation" or "Incorporated" or an abbreviation of one of these words ("Corp." or "Inc.")
iii. must not contain words that suggest an association with certain specialized entities like the federal government (prohibited names include: "Federal," "National," or "United States") or a restricted type of business (prohibited names include: "Bank," "Lawyer," or "Doctor") or a special legal entity (prohibited names include: "Cooperative," "Reserve," or "Trust").
Although you are not required to do so, you should consider registering your business name as a federal and/or state trademark. See Trademark for Business Naming for details.
b. Recruit and appoint a director or directors
The board of directors makes the major strategic and financial decisions for a nonprofit corporation, including appointing its officers. Some states require that directors be named in the articles of incorporation, while others allow the owners/incorporators (those filing the paperwork) to appoint directors at the initial organizational meeting. The minimum number of directors and any additional requirements for director eligibility varies based on state law. As you consider who you would like on your board, think about whether the potential director:
- has demonstrated a commitment to your nonprofit organization's purpose
- possesses good fundraising skills
- is well-connected
- has experience managing money
There are a many strategic decisions to make here, which are beyond the scope of this Guide. You should consult with a nonprofit attorney and others experienced in this field about what kind of personalities you will want on your board, as well as setting an appropriate board size.
c. Prepare and file articles of incorporation
Refer to our section on Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations on how to prepare articles for your nonprofit organization. You will want to file the document with the appropriate state office, usually the Secretary of State.
There will be a filing fee, which generally ranges between $20 and $125 depending on the state. See the State Law: Forming a Nonprofit Corporation section for details on state filing fees.
d. Create the bylaws
Bylaws set out the details of how the business will be run, who will make what decisions, when decisions will be made, and so forth. It is important to think about the bylaws carefully because you will be expected to follow them. You are not required to file bylaws with a state office, but you should keep a copy at your principal place of business.
e. Hold an organizational meeting
The owners/incorporators, or the initial directors if named in the articles of incorporation, should hold an initial organizational meeting to:
1. appoint directors (if not named in the articles)
2. appoint corporate officers3. adopt the bylaws4. set the nonprofit corporation's budget for the fiscal year5. designate a bank6. select a corporate seal
Someone present at the meeting should record minutes of the meeting, and the minutes should be stored at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
f. Keep a Records Book
You will need to set up a records book to store all the important documents pertaining to your incorporation in one place.
3. Get your Employer Identification Number
You will need to apply for an Employer Identification Number, also known as EIN, from the IRS for your nonprofit corporation. You can apply for an EIN:
You will also likely need to obtain a state employer identification number or account for tax purposes. See State Law: Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details on state requirements.
For general information on the tax obligations of corporations, including requirements relating to self-employment and employment taxes, see the Tax Obligations of Small Businesses section of this Guide.
4. Apply for tax exemptionsAs with any corporation, a nonprofit corporation initially is subject to federal, state, and local taxes. You will have to apply for federal income tax exemption before being able to enjoy state and local tax exemptions.
a. Federal Income Tax Exemption
You will likely have to to apply to the IRS in order to become a tax-exempt organization under 501(c)(3) of the tax code. Refer to Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more on this process, and also see our detailed guide to the IRS's decision-making process for granting tax exemptions to journalism non-profits. There are many potential pitfalls in this process. We strongly recommend reviewing this guide before applying for an exemption.
b. State Tax Exemptions
Your state may impose taxes on your nonprofit corporation based on its net earnings. In some states you will receive state tax exemptions once you've filed your articles of incorporation and have gained 501(c)(3) tax exemptions from the federal government. In others, you will have to apply for state tax exemptions. Refer to our state guide for more information on how to obtain state tax exemptions.
c. Local Tax Exemptions
5. Other steps to takeYour nonprofit organization may be exempt from paying property taxes on property it owns or leases. Such exemptions vary widely by location; check with the tax assessor of your local government (town or city hall, or the seat of county government) to find out how to apply for applicable exemptions.
a. Register with your State's Attorney General
One duty of a state's Attorney General is to oversee nonprofit organizations and ensure that they are in compliance with the law. As a result, some states require nonprofit organizations to register with the Attorney General's Office and send periodic reports on the allocation of the nonprofit organization's funds. Refer to our state guide for more information on the requirements of your state.
b. Open a Bank Account for Your Business
You should keep the nonprofit corporation's finances separate from your personal accounts. A good way to do this is by opening a bank account for your nonprofit corporation. You will probably need your EIN, a copy of the articles of incorporation, and a resolution identifying authorized signers if those names are not listed in the articles. Here is one example of the documentation that banks ask for.
c. Obtain any required local licenses or permits
As a business doing journalism, you are not required to obtain any federal or state licenses or permits relating to carrying on a particular trade. Most local or city governments, however, require every business to obtain a basic business license, sometimes called a tax registration certificate. You get this license from your city or county. The best way to get information about fees and procedures is to contact your county or city clerk's office or other local government authority. The local chamber of commerce and other small business owners might also be a good resource for information regarding local licenses and permits.
d. Apply for a Nonprofit Postal Permit
In general, 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations qualify for significantly reduced postage rates for certain types of printed mail. In order to take advantage of these rates, you will have to apply for a nonprofit mailing permit from the U.S. Post Office using PS Form 3624.
e. Insurance
Obtain the appropriate insurance for your nonprofit corporation. You will probably need to take out new policy for the nonprofit corporation from organizations such as The Nonprofits Insurance Alliance Group, Nonprofit Insurance Services, First Nonprofit Insurance Company, and Riverport Insurance. Talk to a legal professional about what you need coverage for, and consider what you are willing to risk.
Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on forming a nonprofit organization:
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Arizona. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with Title 10, Chapters 24 to 35 and Chapters 36 to 40 of the Arizona Revised Statutes (abbreviated here as “A.R.S.”).
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Determine your known place of business and your statutory agent
4. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Arizona Corporation Commission.
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must file your articles of incorporation with the Arizona Corporation Commission.
- The filing fee is $30. A.R.S. § 10‑3122.
- A.R.S. § 10‑3202 provides more details on what the Articles of Incorporation must include. The Arizona Corporation Commission website provides a simple, fill-in-the-blank form for nonprofit corporation Articles of Incorporation, with instructions. Note that the form must be submitted with a cover sheet.
- Every nonprofit corporation in Arizona must file an Annual Report with the State Corporation Commission and pay a $10 fee. A.R.S. § 10‑11622, § 10‑3122. The Annual Report can be filed electronically on the State Corporation Commission’s website. The State Corporation Commission does not send a reminder of the need to file an annual report.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures of the corporation. See A.R.S. § 10‑3206.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation’s principal office, known place of business, or the office of its statutory agent. A.R.S. § 10‑11601.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details. You can find the Arizona statute regarding organization meetings at A.R.S. § 10‑3205.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store the important documents of your nonprofit corporation.
- See A.R.S. § 10‑11601 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Arizona law.
5. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Arizona, you must inform both the IRS and the state of Arizona.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number (EIN) from the IRS. This can be done via its online application. There is no filing fee.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- For details on reporting the hiring of an employee to the state of Arizona, see the Arizona New Hire Reporting website.
- Arizona law requires employers in Arizona to use the “E-Verify” system (a free Web-based service offered by the federal Department of Homeland Security) to verify the employment authorization of all new employees hired after December 31, 2007. A.R.S. § 23‑214.
- If you have an employee or employees to whom you page wages for services performed in Arizona, you must register complete the Joint Tax Application for employer withholding and unemployment insurance. You can do this via the Arizona Department of Revenue website (click on “License a New Business”), which you can also use to register for other business taxes (if applicable).
- All employers who regularly hire workers in their customary business must also carry workers’ compensation insurance. ARS § 23‑902. The Industrial Commission of Arizona administers the Arizona workers’ compensation program. For more information, see their Employers’ Frequently Asked Questions.
6. Register with state offices
a. Arizona Secretary of State
- Before engaging in fundraising activities, you must register with the Arizona Secretary of State. A.R.S. § 44‑6552. You must also file an annual registration statement with the Arizona Secretary of State between September 1 and September 30 each year thereafter. Id.
- The website of the Arizona Secretary of State maintains a form you may use for your initial registration and renewal.
b. Department of Revenue
- For more information on state tax obligations, see the Arizona Department of Revenue website, including their guide for nonprofit organizations.
7. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- All organizations exempt from federal income tax under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code are exempt from Arizona income tax. A.R.S. § 43‑1201. See A.R.S. § 43‑1201 for further discussion of other entities exempt from Arizona income tax, including “[c]orporations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes . . . [when] no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.
c. Local
- According to the Arizona Department of Revenue guide for nonprofit organizations, “[g]enerally, it is unnecessary to applyto the Department of Revenue for a letter confirmingexemption from state Income Tax.”
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
California uses the term nonprofit public benefit corporation
to refer to the public charity nonprofit corporation that is the focus
of this Guide. Here are the steps to form a nonprofit public benefit
corporation in California. You should read this page in conjunction
with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with sections 5110 - 6910 of the California Corporations Code (abbreviated as "Cal. Corp. Code") and with the California Secretary of State's Business Portal.
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general discussion on how to Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- The Secretary of State has a sample article of incorporation for a California nonprofit public benefit corporation.
- Read Cal. Corp. Code § 5130 for more information on how to construct your articles. For example, the statute requires the following statement:
This corporation is a nonprofit public benefit corporation and is not organized for the private gain of any person. It is organized under the Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law for (public or charitable (insert one or both)) purposes.
- You must file your articles of incorporation with Secretary of State's office. The filing fee is $30.
b. Create the bylaws
- California law requires bylaws for your nonprofit public benefit corporation.
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information; for specific information see Cal. Corp. Code §§ 5150-5153.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit public benefit corporation's principal place of business.
c. Prepare and file a Statement of Information with the Secretary of State
- A Statement of Information is a public disclosure of information concerning a business entity operating in California, including:
i. a general description of what it does
ii. the names and address of its officers
iii. the address of its principal office
iv. the name and address of an agent to accept the delivery of legal and tax documents on behalf of the business entity
- You must file a Statement of Information with the Secretary of State within 90 days of filing your articles of organization.
- The filing fee is $20.
- You can also do this online at the Secretary of State's website which has a simple, fill-in-the-blank form for the Statement of Information. Instructions are included.
- Note that you will have to file a Statement of Information with the Secretary of State every two years after the original Statement of Information is filed.
d. Hold an organizational meeting
- See the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation for details.
e. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit public benefit corporation.
- See Cal. Corp. Code §§ 6320-6325 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under California law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in California, you must inform both the IRS and the State of California.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see the general section on gorming a nonprofit corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- If you will be paying at least $100 to employees in a quarter (including the president), you are subject to California employment taxes and must register for a California employer account number within 15 days of paying that $100.
- You can register for employment taxes and get your account number online using the Employment Development Department's website.
- These taxes must be paid quarterly. For more information on being an employer see the California Employer's Guide.
5. Register with the Office of the Attorney General
Once your nonprofit corporation receives donations, you must submit the Initial Registration Form CT-1 in the next 30 days to the Registry of Charitable Trusts at the California Attorney General's Office.6. Apply for tax exemptions
All business entities are taxed in a variety of different ways. Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit public benefit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- Apply for tax-exempt status in California by filing Form FTB 3500A, the Affirmation of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), with the State of California Franchise Tax Board.
- You will need to submit a copy of your federal determination letter if you have one.
- For more information, check the Franchise Tax Board's FAQ on Exempt Organizations.
c. Local
- See the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Florida. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with chapter 617 of the Florida Statutes (abbreviated as "Fla. Stat.") and with the Florida Department of State's Division of Corporations.
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- File your nonprofit corporation's articles of incorporation with the Florida Division of Corporations.
- Click here to view a sample article of incorporation for a Florida nonprofit corporation.
- The filing fee is $35; the Designation of Registered Agent fee is $35.
- Note that you must file an Annual Report with the Division of Corporations one year after your date of incorporation.
- See Fla. Stat. § 617.1622 for more information.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information; for specific information see Fla. Stat. § 617.0206.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation.
- See Fla. Stat. § 617.1601 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Florida law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Florida, you must inform both the IRS and the State of Florida.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- Refer to Florida New Hire Reporting Center for details.
5. Register with state offices
a. Division of Consumer Services
- If you intend to solicit contributions from Florida public, you must register with the Division of Consumer Services annually.
b. Department of Revenue
- Register for your nonprofit corporation's business taxes using the Florida Department of Revenue Online Registration service.
- The Florida Department of Revenue has compiled a Start-Up Kit for New Business Owners that includes tax forms and brochures for each type of tax for which you will be responsible.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
All business entities are taxed in a variety of different ways. Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- For state income tax exemption, submit your federal determination letter when you file Form 1120: Florida Corporate Income/Franchise and Emergency Excise Tax Return with the Florida Department of Revenue.
- For state sales tax exemption, file Form DR5: Application for a Consumer's Certificate of Exemption with the Florida Department of Revenue.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Georgia. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. Additionally, you should familiarize yourself with:
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
- A sample articles of incorporation is included in the Filing Procedures Guide.
- The filing fee is $100.
- When filing your articles of incorporation, you must also submit a Transmittal Information Form. This form certifies that you are filing articles of incorporation and will fulfill the publishing requirement explained in the next step.
- Note that you must file an Annual Report with the Secretary of State one year after your date of creation.
- See Ga. Code Ann. § 14-3-1622 for more details.
b. Publish a notice of intent to incorporate
- Under Georgia law, you must publish a notice of intent to incorporate in a local newspaper.
- Send $40 to the newspaper within a day of filing your articles of incorporation.
- For more information on what the publication should look like, refer to the Secretary of State's Filing Procedures Guide.
c. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information; for specific information see Ga. Code Ann. § 14-3-206.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
d. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
e. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation.
- See Ga. Code Ann. § 14-3-1601 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Georgia law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Georgia, you must inform both the IRS and the state of Georgia.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- Consult the Georgia New Hire Reporting Program.
5. Register with the state of Georgia
a. Georgia Secretary of State
- If your nonprofit corporation will accept and/or solicit donations you must register with the the Secretary of State Charitable Organizations department.
b. Office of Secretary of State
- Register for taxes using the Georgia Department of Revenue website. Click here for detailed instructions on the different taxes and the registration process.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
All business entities are taxed in a variety of different ways. Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- After you have received your tax exempt determination letter from the IRS, apply for state income tax exemption using Form 3605.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Illinois. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with chapter 805, act 105 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes (abbreviated here as "Ill. Comp. Stat.") and with the Illinois Secretary of State's Guide for Organizing Not-For-Profit Corporations.
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must be at least eighteen years of age to be an incorporator in Illinois.
- The articles of incorporation must be filed with the Secretary of State.
- The filing fee is $50.
- Click here for a sample articles of incorporation for a nonprofit corporation.
- After you file your articles of incorporation, the Secretary of State will send you a certificate of incorporation. Within fifteen days of receiving this certificate, you must record both it and your articles of incorporation with the Office of the Recorder of Deeds in the county where your nonprofit corporation's registered office is located.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information; for specific information see 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 105/102.25.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation.
- See 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 107/105.75 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Illinois law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Illinois, you must inform both the IRS and the state of Illinois.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- Consult the New Hire Reporting section of the Illinois Business Portal to find out what you need to do at the Illinois Department of Employment Security.
5. Register with the state of Illinois
a. Office of the Attorney General
- Before you receive any charitable contributions, you must register with the Charitable Organization Bureau at the Office of the Attorney General.
- To register, submit Form CO-1: the Charitable Organization Registration Statement, to the Charitable Organization Bureau.
- The filing fee is $15.
b. Department of Revenue
- You must register with the Department of Revenue at the Tax Registration Page of the Illinois Business Portal.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
All business entities are taxed in a variety of different ways. Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- Once you obtain federal tax-exempt status, you do not need to file any paperwork with Illinois to qualify for state income tax exemption, and you do not need to file a state tax return.
- Contact the Sales Tax Division with the Department of Revenue to see if you qualify for a state sales tax exemption.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Indiana. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with Title 23, Article 17 of the Indiana Code (abbreviated here as "Ind. Code"), and with the Indiana Secretary of State's Business Services Division.
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
- The filing fee is $30.
- Click here for a sample articles of incorporation.
- Read Ind. Code § 23-17-3-1 for more information on how to construct your articles. For example, the statute requires the following statement:
This corporation is a public benefit corporation.
- Note that you must file an annual Business Entity Report with the Secretary of State. The filing fee is $10, and the form can be filled out online at the Indiana Secretary of State's website. The information required on the report is basic business information, such as the names of all directors and officers and the business's principal location.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information; for specific information see Ind. Code § 23-17-3-8 for more information.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation.
- See Ind. Code § 23-17-27-1 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Indiana law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Indiana, you must inform both the IRS and the State of Indiana.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- See Indiana New Hire Reporting Center website for more information.
5. Register with state offices
a. Office of the Attorney General
- Any consultant you hire for fundraising purposes or any professional solicitor you engage to get donations must register with the attorney general's office prior to beginning a fundraising campaign.
- However, you do not need to register your nonprofit corporation with the Indiana Attorney General's Office if your nonprofit corporation solicits on its own behalf.
b. Department of Revenue
- You must register with the Indiana Department of Revenue for tax purposes.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- Once you have received your determination letter from the IRS, file Form NP-20A with the Indiana Department of Revenue to obtain state corporate income tax exemption.
- You must submit Form NP-20A to the Indiana Department of Revenue to apply for sales tax exemption.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Massachusetts. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with chapter 180 of the Massachusetts General Laws (abbreviated here as "Mass. Gen. Laws"), and with the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth's Corporations Division.
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must be at least eighteen years old be an incorporator in Massachusetts.
- You must file your articles of incorporation with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
- The filing fee is $35.
- Click here for a sample articles of incorporation.
- Note that you will have to file an Annual Report with the Secretary of the Commonwealth one year after your date of creation. The filing fee is $15, and the information required on the report is basic business information, such as the names of all officers and directors and the business's principal location.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information; for specific information see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 180, § 6A for more information.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- Massachusetts law does not set forth specific record-keeping requirements for nonprofit corporations.
- See Corporate Records Book for Nonprofit Corporations to determine which documents you should store at your nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Massachusetts, you must inform both the IRS and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- See Massachusetts New Hire Reporting Center for more information.
5. Register with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
a. Division of Public Charities at the Attorney General's office
- If you plan to solicit donations from the public, you must get a Certificate of Solicitation from the Division of Public Charities at the Attorney General's office.
- To get the certificate, you will need to file one of the two forms:
Short Form PC - File a Short Form PC if you have not yet completed your first fiscal year and intend to solicit donations. The Short Form PC is intended to inform the Attorney General's office of your fundraising activities for the upcoming year.The filing fee for the Short Form PC is $50.
Form PC - After your first fiscal year, you must file a regular Form PC on an annual basis. The Form PC serves to inform the Attorney General's office of the manner in which your nonprofit corporation conducts its solicitation of funds. The filing fee varies based on gross revenue starting at $35 for gross revenue under $100,000. You are exempt from this requirement if you are not going to raise more than $5000 per year, or if your contributions will come from ten or less individuals and all of your organization's functions will be performed by volunteers.
b. Department of Revenue
- You must register for taxes using the Massachusetts Department of Revenue's Business Registration page.
- The Massachusetts Department of Revenue's Guide to Employer Tax Obligations can provide some answers to otherwise complicated employment taxes.
- Refer to Massachusetts Department of Revenue's other publications for more information.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- Once you have received your determination letter from the IRS you can apply to the Massachusetts Department of Revenue for a state income tax exemption.
- Unfortunately, there is no way to do this online. Refer to the Department of Revenue for more details.
- Your nonprofit corporation may also be eligible for an exemption on state sales tax. Contact the Bureau of Sales Excise with the Department of Revenue for more information.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Michigan. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with chapter 45 of the Michigan Compiled Laws (abbreviated here as "Mich. Comp. Laws"), and with the Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs.
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must file your articles of incorporation with the Michigan Secretary of State.
- The filing fee is $20.
- Click here for a sample articles of incorporation.
- See the Michigan Secretary of State's Review Procedures manual for more detailed information on how to draft an articles of incorporation.
- Note that you must file an Annual Report with the Secretary of State every two years after your date of creation. The filing fee is $20, and the information required on the report is basic business information, such as the names of all officers and directors and the business's principal location.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation.
- See Mich. Comp. Laws § 450.2485 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Michigan law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Michigan, you must inform both the IRS and the state of Michigan.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- See Michigan New Hire Reporting Center for more information.
5. Register with state offices
a. The Attorney General's office
- You may need to obtain a Charitable Solicitation License from the Michigan Attorney General.
- First, complete an Initial Charitable Solicitation Questionnaire and send it to the Charitable Trust Division, with a copy of your articles of incorporation, bylaws, and your IRS determination letter, if you have one.
- If the Attorney General's office determines that the license is necessary, file an Application for License to Solicit Donations annually.
- In general, a license is required if you raise more than $8000 per year and pay someone for fundraising services.
b. Department of Revenue
- You must register for taxes using the Business Tax e-Registration website where you will find forms and instructions for all business taxes.
- See the Michigan Business Taxes Registration Booklet for more information.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- Once you receive your federal 501(c)(3) exemption your nonprofit corporation will automatically be exempt from the Michigan Single Business Tax (a tax that combines state corporate income taxes and certain other taxes into a single tax).
- While optional, you may want to file Form C8030: Single Business Tax Notice of No SBT Return Required with the Michigan Department of Treasury.
- To claim the sales exemption, give sellers/vendors a completed copy of Form: 3372: Certificate of Exemption for their records.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in New Jersey. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with:
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint trustees
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation (referred to as a "Certificate of Incorporation" in New Jersey)
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must be at least eighteen years of age to incorporate in New Jersey.
- You must file your articles of incorporation with the Division of Revenue.
- The filing fee is $75.
- A sample Certificate of Incorporation is available from the New Jersey Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts as part of their nonprofit guide for New Jersey artists and artisans (PDF). The sample Certificate appears in Appendix G to the guide at page 54. Note that this sample form is intended for an artists' organization, and might require modification to be suitable for a journalism organization.
- Note that you must file an Annual Report with the Division of Revenue every year after your date of creation. The filing fee is $75, and the information required on the report is basic, such as the names of all officers and directors and the business's principal location.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information.
- Sample bylaws are available from the New Jersey Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts as part of their nonprofit guide for New Jersey artists and artisans (PDF). The sample bylaws appear in Appendix F to the guide at page 39. Note that this sample form is intended for an artists' organization, and might require modification to be suitable for a journalism organization.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- New Jersey law does not set forth specific record-keeping requirements for nonprofit corporations.
- See records book to determine which documents of your nonprofit corporation to store at its principal place of business.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in New Jersey, you must inform both the IRS and the state of New Jersey.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- See New Jersey New Hire Reporting Directory for more information.
5. Register with state offices
a. The Attorney General's office
- After your first fiscal year (and each year thereafter), if you have solicited more than $10,000 in donations that year or if you have paid someone for fundraising services, you must register with the New Jersey Charities Registration.
- You can find forms and information about the registration process here.
- The filing fee is based on the amount you have raised: $30 for amounts under $25,000 and topping off at $250 for amounts more than $500,000.
b. Department of Revenue
- You must register for taxes using the New Jersey Division of Revenue Online Business Filing and Registration Service, where you will find forms and instructions for all business taxes, including corporate and employment taxes.
- See Business Tax Registration Packet for more information.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- Refer to the New Jersey Department of Revenue's Starting A Nonprofit Organization in New Jersey publication for information on how to apply for state tax exemptions.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in New York. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with:
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general discussion on how to Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Department of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- Incorporators must be at least eighteen years of age.
- You must file your articles of incorporation with the Department of State's Division of Corporations.
- Under New York law, Type B and Type C nonprofit corporations may be formed for 501(c)(3) purposes. Your articles of incorporation must state which type of corporation you are forming.
- The filing fee is $75.
- Click here for a sample articles of incorporation.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation.
- See N.Y. N.P. Corp. Law §621 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under New York law.
Whenever you hire an employee in New York, you must inform both the IRS and the state of New York.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- See New York New Hire for more information.
5. Register with state offices
a. New York Attorney General
- You must register with the Charities Bureau of the Attorney General's Office.
b. New York State Department
- You must also register with the New York State Tax Department for state business tax purposes.
- If your business is located or does any business in New York City, see New York City Taxes.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- File Form CT-247 for state franchise tax exemption.
- File Form ST-119.2 for state and local sales tax exemptions. Contact the Sales Tax Information Center (1-800-698 2909) at the Tax Department for the form as it is not available online.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
- For those incorporating in New York City, refer to the New York City Department of Finance for property tax exemption.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in North Carolina. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with chapter 55A of the North Carolina General Statutes (abbreviated here as "N.C. Gen. Stat."), and with the North Carolina Secretary of State's Corporations Division. The division has a helpful publication: Incorporating Your Non-Profit in North Carolina, which you can download by scrolling to the section headed "Guidelines to Incorporating" and selecting the "Nonprofit Corporation".
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must file your articles of incorporation with the North Carolina Department of the Secretary of State Corporations Division by mail or in-person delivery.
- The filing fee is $60.
- Click here for a sample articles of incorporation.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Department of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation.
- See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-16-01 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under North Carolina law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in North Carolina, you must inform both the IRS and the state of North Carolina.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- See North Carolina New Hire Reporting for more information.
5. Register with state offices
a. N.C. Department of the Secretary of State Solicitation Licensing Section
- If you solicit donations for your nonprofit, you will need to obtain a license from the Department of the Secretary of State Charitable Solicitation Licensing Section.
- However, if you receive less than $25,000/year in contributions, and you do not pay officers, directors, incorporators, fundraisers, or lawyers for their services, you need not apply for the license. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131F-3 for more information.
- The license must be renewed annually.
b. Department of Revenue
- You must register for state business taxes. To do so register at any of the taxpayer service centers located throughout the State. The Department of Revenue has a directory of taxpayer service centers to help you find the most convenient location.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- The North Carolina Department of Revenue has an informative guide on State Taxation and Non-profit Organizations to help you apply for appropriate state tax exemptions.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Ohio. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with:
Chapter 1702 of the Ohio Revised Code (abbreviated here as "Ohio Rev. Code"), The Ohio Secretary of State's Business Services, and The Legal Information for Nonprofit Corporations created by the Ohio State Bar Foundation and the Ohio Association of Nonprofit Organizations.1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must file your articles of incorporation with the Ohio Secretary of State. Use Form 532.
- The filing fee is $125.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation. See Ohio Rev. Code § 1702-15 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Ohio law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Ohio, you must inform both the IRS and the state of Ohio.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation. The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- See Ohio New Hire Reporting Center for more information.
5. Register with state offices
a. Ohio Attorney General
- Before engaging in any solicitation activities you must register with the Attorney General by filing the Charitable Organization Registration Form.
- See Charitable Organization Information Network to register online.
- Refer to the Attorney General's Information Sheet for more information.
- The filing fee depends on the nonprofit corporation's estimated contributions for the coming year.
- The fee is waived for nonprofit corporations with estimates less than $25,000. The filing fee is $50 those with estimates between $25,000 and $100,000.
- Additionally, if you have solicited more than $5,000 in the previous year, you will also need to file a Verification of Filing with the IRS Form with the Attorney General on an annual basis. (You can also file the form via the Charitable Organization Information Network).
b. Department of Revenue
- You must register for state business taxes. The Ohio Business Gateway has information on your nonprofit corporation's tax responsibilities.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- The Secretary of State's Legal Guide for Nonprofit Organizations provides information on how to obtain corporate income, sales, and property tax exemptions for your nonprofit corporation.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Pennsylvania. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with:
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must be at least age eighteen to be an incorporator in Pennsylvania.
- The Pennsylvania Department of State's website provides a fill-in-the-blank form for articles of incorporation.
- The filing fee is $125.
- Note that you will have to file an Annual Report with the Department of State by April 30th each year. There is no fee to file this report.
b. File a Docketing Statement
- When you file articles of incorporation, you must also file a Docketing Statement with the Department of State.
- The docketing statement contains only basic information like the name and type of business organization and a description of business activities.
- There is no fee to file this form.
c. Fulfill the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's "advertising requirement"
- You must also publish a statement of your intent to file or the actual filing of the articles of incorporation in two newspapers of general circulation, one of which is a legal journal.
- The Department of State's website has a Geographical Listing of Legal Publications to help you find a legal journal in your county.
- You will not need to send proof of advertising to the Department of State, but you should file the proof with the minutes of the corporation.
- The advertisements must contain the name of the proposed corporation and a statement that the corporation is to be or has been organized under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Law (15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5301 et seq.).
d. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
e. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
f. Create a Records Book
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
- Pennsylvania law does not set forth specific record-keeping requirements for nonprofit corporations.
- Refer to Corporate Records Book for Nonprofit Corporations to determine which documents of your nonprofit corporation to store at its principal place of business.
Whenever you hire an employee in Pennsylvania, you must inform both the IRS and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- See Pennsylvania New Hire Reporting Website for more information.
5. Register with state offices
a. Pennsylvania Attorney General
- If your organization receives more than $25,000 in contributions in a year or if your organization compensates any person for solicitation activities, you must register with the Department of State Bureau of Charities.
- Registration must be performed within 30 days of receiving more than $25,000 as long as the nonprofit corporation's program service revenue does not equal or exceed $5,000,000.
b. Department of Revenue
- Register for taxes at the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Online PA-100 Tax Registration system.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- File Form REV-72 with the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, Tax Forms Service Unit.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Texas. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with: Title 2, Chapter 22 of the Texas Business Organizations Code (abbreviated here as "Texas Bus. Orgs. Code"). The Texas Secretary of State's page on Nonprofit Organizations and Nonprofit FAQs may also be useful.
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- Use Form 202: Certificate of Formation for a Nonprofit Corporation to create your articles of incorporation.
- You must file 2 copies of Form 202 with the Secretary of State.
- The filing fee is $25.
- Click here for a sample articles of incorporation.
- Note that you will have to file a periodic report with the Office of the Secretary of State every four years after incorporation.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation.
- See Texas Bus. Orgs. Code § 3.151 and Texas Bus. Orgs. Code § 22.352 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Texas law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Texas, you must inform both the IRS and the state of Texas.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- Refer to the Texas Employer Portal for more information.
5. Register with the Department of Revenue
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- Submit Form AP-204, Application for Exemption to the Comptroller of Public Accounts for state income tax exemption.
- Refer to the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts' Guidelines to Texas Tax Exemptions for more information.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
In Virginia a nonprofit corporation is known as a nonstock corporation. Here are the steps to form a nonstock corporation in Virginia. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with Title 13.1, Chapter 10 of the Virginia Code (abbreviated here as "Va. Code"), and with the Business section of the Commonwealth of Virginia.
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonstock Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must file your articles of incorporation with the Office of the Clerk at the State Corporation Commission.
- The filing fee is $75.
- Click here for a sample articles of incorporation.
- An Annual Assessment Packet will be mailed to your registered agent every year. You will need to complete the Annual Report form in the packet and send it back to the State Corporation Commission with the annual registration fee of $25.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonstock corporation's principal place of business.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store the important documents of your nonstock corporation.
- See Va. Code § 13.1-932 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Virginia law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Virginia, you must inform both the IRS and the Commonwealth of Virginia.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- You must apply for an account number with the Virginia Employment Commission.
- See the Employer Services section of the Virginia Employment Commission website for more information.
5. Register with state offices
a. Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
- Before engaging in fundraising activities, you must register with the Division of Consumer Protection at the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.
- To register, file Form 102: Registration Statement for a Charitable Organization with the Division of Consumer Protection.
b. Department of Revenue
- Register for your state business taxes at the Department of Revenue's Online Services for Businesses.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonstock corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- The Virginia Department of Revenue has an informative guide to Virginia New Hire Reporting Website to help you apply for the appropriate state tax exemptions. Refer to the Nonprofit Online FAQs for information on sales and use tax exemption.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in Washington. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation, which has additional steps listed that are applicable to all states. You should also familiarize yourself with Title 24 of the Revised Code of Washington (abbreviated here as "Wash. Rev. Code"), and with the Washington Department of Revenue's guide: Information on Washington's Tax Structure for Non-Profit Organizations.
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- Articles of Incorporation for Nonprofit Corporations explains what to include in your articles in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
- You must be eighteen to be an incorporator in the state of Washington. You must file your articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State.
- Washington uses a simplified fill-in-the-box application for filing articles of incorporation.
- The filing fee is $30.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations for general information.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation.
- See Wash. Rev. Code § 24.03.135 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Washington state law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
Whenever you hire an employee in Washington, you must inform both the IRS and the state of Washington.
a. Federal
- Request an Employer Identification Number ("EIN") from the IRS. This can be done via an online application.
- For more on the EIN, see Forming a Nonprofit Corporation.
- The IRS details all of the necessary steps to complete, including verifying work eligibility and withholding allowances certificates, in Hiring Employees.
b. State
- You must file a Master Business Application with the Department of Licensing.
- This form registers the nonprofit corporation for taxes as well.
- The filing fee is $20.
- Once registered, you will receive a packet from the Department of Revenue that will contain a letter with your Unified Business Identifier ("UBI") and a Business Tax Guide.
- See Washington New Hire Reporting Website for more information.
5. Register with the Secretary of State's Charities Division
6. Apply for tax exemptions
Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
b. State
- Washington has no state income tax.
- However, nonprofit corporations are liable for business and occupation taxes.
- See the Department of Revenue's Nonprofit Organizations brochure for information on how to apply for applicable state tax exemptions.
c. Local
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
Here are the steps to form a nonprofit corporation in the District of Columbia. You should read this page in conjunction with the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation which has additional steps listed that may be applicable to the District. You should also familiarize yourself with:
1. Choose a business name and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors
3. Incorporate your Nonprofit Organization
You should read the general section on forming a nonprofit corporation in tandem with the steps outlined here.
a. Prepare and file articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State
- You must have at least three incorporators, age eighteen or older, to form a nonprofit corporation in D.C.
- Click here here to see a sample articles of incorporation for a D.C. nonprofit corporation.
- The articles of incorporation must be filed with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs.
- The filing fee is $70.
b. Create the bylaws
- There are no set criteria for the content of bylaws, but they typically set forth internal rules and procedures.
- Refer to Bylaws for Nonprofit Corporations and the D.C. Business Resource Portal for general information; for specific information see D.C. Code Ann. § 29-301.13.
- You are not required to file bylaws with the Secretary of State, but you must keep a copy at the nonprofit corporation's principal place of business.
c. Hold an organizational meeting
- See Forming a Nonprofit Corporation for details.
d. Create a Records Book
- You will need a records book to store important documents concerning your nonprofit corporation. See D.C. Code Ann. § 29-301.26 for specific information about record-keeping requirements under Washington D.C. law.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number
5. Register with the necessary government offices
a. Department of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs
- If you intend on engaging in charitable solicitation activities (fund-raising, grants, donations, etc.), you must obtain a Basic Business License.
- To obtain an application for this license, email the BBL Info Center (bbl.infocenter@dc.gov) or calling them at (202) 442-4311.
- The filing fee is $253.
b. Office of Tax and Revenue
- Use the FR-500 Combined Business Tax Registration service to register with the District of Columbia for tax purposes.
- The service will inform you about your tax responsibilities and how to meet them.
6. Apply for tax exemptions
All business entities are taxed in a variety of different ways. Once you've incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, you can start applying for tax exemptions.
a. Local
- The D.C. Business portal recommends that you file for D.C. tax exempt status before getting your federal exemption because your exempt status starts on the date you file.
- However, you will not actually be granted D.C. tax exemption until the IRS approves your federal application.
- You will need to file Form FR-164 to apply for tax exemptions from the District.
b. Federal
- The IRS lists a series of questions to help you determine whether your organization is eligible for federal tax exemption.
- See Applying for 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption for more information on how to apply for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the tax code.
7. Obtain a Basic Business License
8. Other Notable Requirements
Not every state allows for the formation of journalism-oriented cooperative corporations. In those states which do have a cooperative form, the procedure for forming a cooperative often tracks the procedures for forming a regular for-profit corporation (or non-profit corporation, if you are forming a non-profit cooperative). However, in addition to the normal process of forming a corporation, cooperatives must also decide whether to permit uneven ownership interests in the cooperative, as well as how and when to issue "patronage dividends" to patrons of the cooperative to reduce federal (and possibly state) tax liability. See the Legal Guide section on Taxation of Cooperatives and "Patronage Dividends."
The specific procedure for forming a cooperative can vary greatly from state to state, and you should review information specific to your state before attempting to form a cooperative there. The State Law: Forming a Cooperative Corporation section will help you determine whether a journalism cooperative can be formed in the states covered in this Guide and, if so, the process for doing so.
Please select a state below for more information about forming a journalism-oriented cooperative corporation in that state.
Please note that not every state recognizes the "cooperative corporation" as a specific business form, and that some states which recognize this form restrict the use of this form to industries other than journalism. The state pages listed below will inform you whether the state recognizes the form, and if so, whether a journalism organization can adopt that form.
Note also that this section of the Guide is under development; new states will be added to our coverage in the future.
The California Corporations Code (often abbreviated as Cal. Corp. Code) governs corporations in California. The Consumer Cooperative Corporations Law ("cooperative law") governs consumer cooperative corporations (or simply "cooperatives"), and is found in Cal. Corp. Code Division 3, Part 2. You should familiarize yourself with Cal. Corp. Code sections 12200 to 12704, which comprise the cooperative law. You should also familiarize yourself with Cal. Corp. Code Division 1, which governs corporations in general.
Because the cooperative law is complex, you may wish to seek the assistance of an attorney if you decide to form a journalism cooperative in California. On this page, you will find general information about (1) choosing a name for your cooperative; (2) recruiting directors and officers for your cooperative; (3) structuring your cooperative; (4) preparing the articles of inforporation and bylaws for your cooperative; (5) registering as an employer with the IRS and the State of California for tax purposes; (6) submitting required forms to the state of California; and (7) tax information.
1. Choose a name for the cooperative and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors and officers for the cooperative.
3. Structure your cooperative.
a. Determine the different levels of membership.
b. Decide on a management structure.
c. Decide how to distribute profits.
- Working Capital. Your cooperative may wish to retain profits as working capital to pay for expenses related to day-to-day operations.
- Investment Dividend. Your cooperative may also distribute profits in the form of payments to members based on their capital contributions to the cooperative (in a manner similar to a shareholder distribution in a regular corporation). California law requires cooperatives to limit such distributions to 15 percent of contributions to the capital of the cooperative in a fiscal year. See Cal. Corp. Code § 12451.
- Patronage Dividend. Patronage dividends must be distributed proporationately and equitably to members of the cooperative, or to other patrons, based on their patronage of the cooperative. See Cal. Corp. Code § 12201. Patronage dividends are based on based on transactions between the cooperative and members, and your cooperative may measure patronage by a member's use of both products and services furnished by the cooperative. See Cal. Corp. Code § 12243. Distributing patronage dividends can provide significant tax benefits at the federal level.
4. Prepare your articles of incorporation and bylaws.
"This corporation is a cooperative corporation organized under the Consumer Cooperative Corporation Law. The purpose of this corporation is to engage in any lawul act or activity for which a corporation may be organized under such law."
See Cal. Corp. Code. § 12310 for a complete list of information that the articles of incorporation must include.
5. Get your Employer Identification Number, register employees.
6. Register with the State of California.
7. Tax information.
Note: The information contained on this page is meant for general, information purposes only, and CMLP makes no claim as to comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information. Because of the complexity of tax issues associated with starting any business, you are encouraged to consult with a tax attorney and/or accountant to ensure compliance with federal, state, and local tax requirements. The CMLP is not a substitute for individualized legal advice, especially not individualized tax advice.
Under Fla. Stat. §§ 618-619, Florida limits the formation of cooperative corporations to businesses in which people or associations are engaged in specific agricultural and related purposes. Therefore, you cannot form a journalism cooperative corporation in Florida. However, you may be able to form a business with aspects of a cooperative under another business form, such as an LLC, a corporation, or a nonprofit corporation. You should consult with an attorney for further information regarding your options for forming a business in Florida.
Georgia's law limits the creation of cooperative organizations to those involved in the production of agricultural products (see O.G.C.A. § 2-10-83). You would therefore not be able to form a journalism cooperative in Georgia. However, you may be able to form a journalism organization with certain aspects of a cooperative under another business form, such as an LLC, a partnership, a corporation, or a nonprofit corporation. You should consult with a Georgia attorney for further information regarding your options for forming a business in Georgia.
Under 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 310/1, Illinois permits the formation of a for-profit cooperative "for the purpose of purchasing of or selling to all shareholders and others, all sorts of groceries, provisions and any other articles of merchandise," which may include the product of a journalism organization. The statute also allows cooperative formation for those "who may be desirous of becoming interested in other like associations," which may be a catch-all provision that could include journalism associations.
Illinois allows non-profit corporations to operate as cooperatives, see 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/103.05(a)(26), but does not have a special corporate form for a non-profit cooperative. Instead, you must follow the general rules for forming an Illinois non-profit organization, and adapt the non-profit form to operate as a cooperative. Note that unlike most non-profit organizations, a non-profit cooperative may include the word "cooperative" in its corporate name. See 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 310/22.
Because the cooperative law is complex, you may wish to seek the assistance of an attorney if you decide to form a journalism cooperative in Illinois (whether for-profit or non-profit). On this page, you will find general information about for-profit cooperatives in Illinois, (1) choosing a name for your cooperative; (2) recruiting directors and officers for your cooperative; (3) structuring your cooperative; (4) preparing the articles of incorporation and bylaws for your cooperative; (5) registering as an employer with the IRS and the State of Illinois for tax purposes; (6) submitting required forms to the state of Illinois; and (7) tax information.
1. Choose a name for the cooperative and check for availability.
3. Structure your cooperative.
a. Determine the different levels of membership/stock and issue shares.
b. Decide how to distribute profits.
4. Prepare your articles of incorporation and bylaws.
5. Get your Employer Identification Number, register employees.
6. Register with the State of Illinois.
7. Tax information.
Formation of a cooperative is a complex endeavor. You should familiarize yourself with two provisions of the Massachusetts General Laws (often abbreviated as Mass. Gen. Laws): Chapter 157, particularly sections 1 and 2, dealing with the creation of for-profit cooperative corporations (or simply "cooperatives"); and Chapter 156B, which governs corporations in general. Where Chapter 157 and Chapter 156B conflict, Chapter 157 is controlling with respect to cooperatives.
An additional layer of complexity is added by the fact that Chapter 156B was itself superseded for many purposes in 2004 by Chapter 156D of the General Laws. It is not presently clear whether references in Chapter 157 to Chapter 156B should be read to refer to the parallel provisions of Chapter 156D instead. If you have any questions about this process, you can contact the Corporations Division of Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth's office; an attorney can also help you to interpret the relevant law.
Note that Massachusetts has no separate non-profit cooperative form suitable for a journalism organization, although it might be possible to form a Massachusetts non-profit organization that operates in a cooperative manner.
1. Choose a name for the cooperative and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors and officers for the cooperative.
3. Structure your cooperative.
a. Determine the different levels of membership/stock.
b. Decide on a management structure.
c. Decide how to distribute profits.
Cooperatives in Massachusetts are limited in how they can distribute profits. See Mass Gen. Laws Ch. 157, § 2.
d. Prepare your articles of incorporation and bylaws
e. Hold an initial meeting.
4. Get your Employer Identification Number, register employees.
5. Register with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
6. Tax information.
Note that the only form of journalism cooperative that is likely to be permitted under New York law is a worker cooperative operated for profit. See N.Y. Coop. Corp. Law §§ 13, 83. A worker cooperative is a cooperative that is formed, owned, and controlled by the business' workers with its membership entirely comprised of workers. A worker cooperative is formed when a corporation organized under the Business Corporation Law elects to be governed as a cooperative and states such in its articles of incorporation. This may occur when the corporation is formed or by amendment afterwards. See N.Y. Coop. Corp. Law § 82. Take care to review Article 5-A of the Cooperative Corporations Law, which focuses on worker cooperatives.
Alternatively, under N.Y. Coop. Corp. Law § 13, New York permits the formation of a cooperative "connected with the acquisition for its members of labor, supplies and articles of common use ... to be used or consumed by the members, their families or guests." Membership in such a cooperative would not be limited to workers. It is at least possible that the product of a journalism organization might be considered "labor, supplies [or] articles of common use," but the term appears to refer primarily to "livestock, equipment, machinery, food products, family or other household and personal supplies."
Because the cooperative law is complex, you may with to seek the assistance of an attorney if you decide to form a journalism cooperative in New York. On this page, you will find general information about (1) choosing a name for the cooperative; (2) recruiting directors and officers for your cooperative; (3) structuring your cooperative; (4) preparing the articles of inforporation and bylaws for your cooperative; (5) registering the state of New York; (6) holding an organization meeting; (7) registering as an employer with the IRS and the State of New York; (8) tax information; and (9) maintenance requirements.
1. Choose a name for the cooperative and check for availability
3. Structure your cooperative.
a. Determine the different levels of membership/stock.
b. Decide on a management structure.
c. Decide how to distribute profits.
4. Prepare your articles of incorporation and bylaws.
5. Register with the State of New York.
7. Get your Employer Identification Number, register employees.
8. Tax information.
9. Other requirements for maintaining a cooperative corporation in New York.
Note: The information contained on this page is meant for general information purposes only, and DMLP makes no claim as to comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information. Because of the complexity of tax issues associated with starting any business, you are encouraged to consult with a tax attorney and/or accountant to ensure compliance with federal, state, and local tax requirements. The DMLP is not a substitute for individualized legal advice, especially not individualized tax advice.
You should familiarize yourself with Title XVII of the Ohio Revised Code, particularly the Ohio Cooperative Law at Chapter 1729. Cooperative associations are considered non-profit organizations "because they are not organized for the purpose of making a profit for themselves as such, or for the purpose of making a profit for their members as such, but for their members as patrons." Despite this, Chapter 1729 rather than Chapter 1702 on Nonprofit Corporation Law governs. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1729.02.
Because the cooperative law is complex, you may wish to seek the assistance of an attorney if you decide to form a journalism cooperative in Ohio. On this page, you will find general information about (1) choosing a name for the cooperative; (2) recruiting directors and officers for your cooperative; (3) structuring your cooperative; (4) preparing the articles of incorporation and bylaws for your cooperative; (5) registering with the state of Ohio; (6) registering as an employer with the IRS and the State of Ohio; (7) tax information; and (8) maintenance requirements.
1. Choose a name for the cooperative and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors and officers for the cooperative.
3. Structure your cooperative.
a. Determine the different levels of membership.
b. Decide on a management structure.
c. Decide how to distribute profits.
4. Prepare your articles of incorporation and bylaws.
5. Register with the State of Ohio.
6. Get your Employer Identification Number, register employees.
7. Tax information.
8. Maintenance Requirements.
Note: The information contained on this page is meant for general information purposes only, and CMLP makes no claim as to comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information. Because of the complexity of tax issues associated with starting any business, you are encouraged to consult with a tax attorney and/or accountant to ensure compliance with federal, state, and local tax requirements. The CMLP is not a substitute for individualized legal advice, especially not individualized tax advice.
Under Chapter 71, a cooperative can be formed in Pennsylvania by "setting forth in its articles a common bond of membership among its shareholders or members by reason of occupation, residence or otherwise."As you will see below, the Pennsylvania formation laws for a for-profit cooperative and a nonprofit cooperative are largely parallel to the Pennsylvania laws governing the formation of for-profit corporations and nonprofit corporations. Therefore you may follow the Pennsylvania corporation formation laws except in areas where the law differentiates between the formation of a corporation and cooperative, which are detailed below.
Although Chapter 71 governs cooperative formation generally, it may also be possible to form a journalism cooperative under Pennsylvania law as a worker cooperative. See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 77. A worker cooperative is a cooperative that is formed, owned, and controlled by the business' workers, with its membership entirely comprised of those workers. Under 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7703, Pennsylvania permits the formation of a workers' cooperative by "five or more farmers, mechanics, laborers or other persons who have incorporated themselves together . . . for the purpose of carrying on agricultural . . . or commercial business; for the purpose of manufacturing, . . . merchandise, chattels, . . . ." It is possible that the product of a journalism organization might be considered a "commercial business." Because the cooperative law is complex, you may with to seek the assistance of an attorney if you decide to form a workers' journalism cooperative in Pennsylvania.
On this page, you will find general information about (1) choosing a name for the cooperative; (2) recruiting directors and officers for your cooperative; (3) structuring your cooperative; (4) preparing the articles of incorporation and bylaws for your cooperative; (5) advertising for your cooperative; (6) registering in the state of Pennsylvania; (7) holding an organization meeting; (8) registering as an employer with the IRS and the State of Pennsylvania; (9) tax information; and (10) maintenance requirements.
1. Choose a name for the cooperative and check for availability
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors and officers for your cooperative.
3. Structure your cooperative.
a. Determine the different levels of membership/stock.
- Sell, market or deliver products produced or to be produced to the corporation;
- Give authorization to the corporation to act on the member's behalf with respect to the products produced or to be produced;
- Buy or procure goods or services from ot through the corporation; and
- Give authorization to act on the member's behalf with respect to the procurement of goods or services. See 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7121.
b. Decide how to distribute profits.
4. Prepare your articles of incorporation and bylaws.
5. Advertise.
6. Register with the State of Pennsylvania.
7. Hold an organization meeting.
8. Get your Employer Identification Number, register employees.
9. Tax information.
10. Other requirements for maintaining a cooperative corporation in Pennsylvania.
Note: The information contained on this page is meant for general information purposes only, and DMLP makes no claim as to comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information. Because of the complexity of tax issues associated with starting any business, you are encouraged to consult with a tax attorney and/or accountant to ensure compliance with federal, state, and local tax requirements. The DMLP is not a substitute for individualized legal advice, especially not individualized tax advice.
You should familiarize yourself with two sections of Texas Business Organizations Code (abbreviated here as "Texas Bus. Orgs. Code"): Chapter 251 on Cooperative Associations and Title 1 on General Provisions. Where these sections conflict, Chapter 251 is controlling with respect to cooperatives. See Texas Bus. Orgs. Code § 1.106.
Because the cooperative law is complex, you may wish to seek the assistance of an attorney if you decide to form a journalism cooperative in Texas. On this page, you will find general information about (1) choosing a name for your cooperative; (2) recruiting directors and officers for your cooperative; (3) structuring your cooperative; (4) preparing the certificate of formation and bylaws for your cooperative; (5) registering the state of Texas; (6) holding an organization meeting; (7) registering as an employer with the IRS and the State of Texas; (8) tax information; and (9) maintenance requirements.
1. Choose a name for the cooperative and check for availability.
2. Recruit and/or appoint directors and officers for your cooperative.
3. Structure your cooperative.
a. Determine the different levels of membership/stock.
b. Decide on a management structure.
c. Decide how to distribute profits.
1. Investment dividends payable from the surplus of the total assets over total liabilities may be paid on invested capital or, if authorized by the bylaws, may be paid on membership certificates. (In this respect, Texas allows cooperatives to give members some of the benefits normally associated with traditional shareholders in a corporation; however, such distribution will not qualify for the special tax treatment applicable to patronage dividends.) Except as otherwise provided by the cooperative's bylaws, an investment dividend may not be cumulative and may not exceed 8% of investment capital. Total investment dividends distributed for a fiscal year may not exceed 50% of the net savings for the period. See Texas Bus. Orgs. Code § 251.301.
2. A portion of the remainder may be allocated to an educational fund to be used in teaching cooperation.
3. A portion of the remainder may be allocated to funds for the general welfare of the cooperative's members.
4. A portion of the remainder may be allocated to retained earnings.
5. Whatever remains shall be allocated at a uniform rate to each of the cooperative's patrons in proportion to individual patronage. For regular a member patron, the proportionate amount of savings return distributed to the member may be any combination of cash, property, membership certificates, or investment certificates. For a subscriber patron (i.e., a member who has agreed to purchase a capital interest pursuant to an agreement), the patronage dividend may be distributed to the subscriber or credited to the subscriber's account until the amount of capital subscribed for has been fully paid.
4. Prepare your certificate of formation and bylaws.
- Texas's cooperatives law does not use the term "patronage dividend" in discussing this final distribution, although it seems clear that this is what is being described. The law separately states that a "patronage dividend" is "a share of the net savings distributed among members of the cooperative association on the basis of patronage." See Texas Bus. Orgs. Code § 251.001(6).This suggests that the mandatory distribution is only to member/subscriber patrons, and not necessarily to all members of the public who have done business with the cooperative.
5. Register with the State of Texas
6. Hold an organization meeting.
7. Get your Employer Identification Number, register employees.
8. Tax information.
9. Maintenance Requirements
Note: The information contained on this page is meant for general information purposes only, and DMLP makes no claim as to comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information. Because of the complexity of tax issues associated with starting any business, you are encouraged to consult with a tax attorney and/or accountant to ensure compliance with federal, state, and local tax requirements. The DMLP is not a substitute for individualized legal advice, especially not individualized tax advice.
An L3C can be formed as a new entity or by converting an existing one. The procedure to establish a new L3C is very similar to the one for forming an LLCs. Like a standard LLC, an L3C is established by filing articles of organization with the state and executing a formal operating agreement. The main difference is that an L3C's organizing documents need to define its purpose in accordance with the provisions of Regs. Sec. 53.4944-3(a):
(1) an L3C must significantly further the accomplishment of one or more charitable purpose;
(2) the production of income and appreciation of property cannot be a significant purpose of the L3C; and
(3) an L3C cannot seek to accomplish any political or legislative purposes.
The provisions of Regs. Sec. 53.4944-3(a) can be incorporated in a sample L3C operating agreement with a statement such as:
(i) the Company shall be organized and operated primarily for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes [...] within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of [the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the Code)]; (ii) no significant purpose of the Company shall be the production of income or the appreciation of property; and (iii) the Company shall not attempt to influence legislation, or participate or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements) any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office, all within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(D) of the Code.
In addition to Regs. Sec. 53.4944-3(a), there may be state-specific requirements governing L3C formation. For instance, in Vermont the label "L3C" must appear in the name of the organization and the articles of organization must conform to the standards for traditional LLCs. For more information, check our L3C state pages.
If you choose to covert an existing entity to an L3C, it would be prudent to consider the tax implications. There should be no adverse federal tax consequences if you are converting a standard LLC to an L3C without shifting membership interests. However, converting a corporation or a non-profit organization to an L3C can be burdensome and costly, requiring legal counsel. If the existing entity is formed in a state which does not allow L3Cs, you would also have to consider the cost of relocating your venture.
The Low-Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C) is a hybrid business form, combining a socially beneficial mission with a for-profit business entity. Please note that only a few states recognize this business form. For general information on L3Cs, please see this page.
Effective as of January 1, 2010, the Illinois Limited Liability Company Act, 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1 to 60-1 (West 2010), authorizes the formation of L3Cs. Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an L3C in Illinois. The process is very similar to the one for forming an LLC in Illinois. You should also read the general section on forming an L3C for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the L3C and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Secretary of State.
1. The company intends to qualify as a low-profit limited liability company pursuant to Section 1-26 of the Limited Liability Company Act and shall at all times significantly further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or its successor, and would not have been formed but for the relationship to the accomplishment of such charitable or educational purposes.
2. No significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the appreciation of property.
3. No purpose of the company is to accomplish one or more political or legislative purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
For general information on articles of organization, see the section on forming an L3C and the Articles of Organization section of this Guide.
1. The company intends to qualify as a low-profit limited liability company pursuant to Section 1-26 of the Limited Liability Company Act and shall at all times significantly further the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or its successor, and would not have been formed but for the relationship to the accomplishment of such charitable or educational purposes.
2. No significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the appreciation of property.
3. No purpose of the company is to accomplish one or more political or legislative purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
Restated articles of organization cannot be filed online, and the filing fee is $500.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. File an annual report with the Department of Business Services.
5. Obtain any required local licenses.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the L3C has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
8. Other Notable Requirements for Maintaining an L3C in Illinois
On December 22, 2009, Maine Representative Charles Priest introduced House Paper No. 1118, proposing that L3Cs be authorized in Maine. The bill was enacted by the Maine legislature on April 6, 2010, and signed into law by Governor John Baldacci on April 9, 2010. Effective as of July 1, 2011, the Maine Limited Liability Company Act will authorize the formation of L3Cs.
Effective as of January 16, 2009, the Michigan Limited Liability Companies Act authorizes the formation of L3Cs. Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an L3C in Michigan. The process is very similar to the one for forming an LLC in Michigan. You should also read the general section on forming an L3C for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the L3C and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of domestic organization with the Secretary of State.
(i) The limited liability company significantly furthers the accomplishment of 1 or more charitable or educational purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) of the internal revenue code, 26 USC 170, and would not have been formed except to accomplish those charitable or educational purposes.
(ii) The production of income or appreciation of property is not a significant purpose of the limited liability company. However, in the absence of other factors, the fact that a limited liability company produces significant income or capital appreciation is not conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property.
(iii) The purposes of the limited liability company do not include accomplishing 1 or more political or legislative purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(D) of the internal revenue code, 26 USC 170.
For general information on articles of organization, see the section on forming an L3C and the Articles of Organization section of this Guide.
(i) The limited liability company significantly furthers the accomplishment of 1 or more charitable or educational purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B) of the internal revenue code, 26 USC 170, and would not have been formed except to accomplish those charitable or educational purposes.
(ii) The production of income or appreciation of property is not a significant purpose of the limited liability company. However, in the absence of other factors, the fact that a limited liability company produces significant income or capital appreciation is not conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property.
(iii) The purposes of the limited liability company do not include accomplishing 1 or more political or legislative purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(D) of the internal revenue code, 26 USC 170.
The restated articles of organization filing fee is $50.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. File an annual statement with the Department of Energy, Labor & Economic Growth.
5. Obtain any required local licenses.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the L3C has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
8. Other Notable Requirements for Maintaining an L3C in Michigan
On February 25, 2009, North Carolina Senator Jim Jacumin introduced Senate Bill No. 308, proposing that L3Cs be authorized in North Carolina. The bill was ratified by the North Carolina legislature on July 9, 2010. It became effective on August 3, 2010, when Governor Bev Purdue signed it into law.
Effective as of March 23, 2009, the Utah Low Profit Limited Liability Companies Act authorizes the formation of L3Cs. Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an L3C in Utah. The process is very similar to the one for forming an LLC. You should also read the general section on forming an L3C for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the L3C and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Utah Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. File an annual report with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code.
5. Obtain any required local licenses.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the L3C has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
Effective as of April 30, 2008, the Vermont Limited Liability Companies Act authorizes the formation of L3Cs. Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an L3C in Vermont. The process is very similar to the one for forming an LLC. You should also read the general section on forming an L3C for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the L3C and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of domestic organization with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. File an annual report with the Corporations division.
5. Obtain any required local licenses.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the L3C has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
Effective as of July 1, 2010, the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-101 to -1105 (West 2010), authorizes the formation of L3Cs. Here is an outline of the steps you need to follow in order to form an L3C in Wyoming. The process is very similar to the one for forming an LLC. You should also read the general section on forming an L3C for information that is applicable in any state.
1. Choose a business name for the L3C and check for availability.
2. Prepare and file articles of organization with the Secretary of State.
3. Negotiate and execute an operating agreement.
4. File an annual report with the Business division.
5. Obtain any required local licenses.
6. Determine what tax and other regulatory obligations the L3C has, and take care of any necessary registrations.
7. Open a bank account for your business.
The pages in this section elaborate on a variety of issues relevant to choosing a business structure and starting a business. They are not meant to stand alone, but rather are pages referenced repeatedly throughout the Choosing a Business Form and How to Start a Business sections. A short description of the pages follow:
Choosing a business name for your website or blog involves understanding something about federal trademark law -- please see the Trademark for Business Naming section for details. For a helpful general guide to choosing a business name, see FindLaw's Picking a Winning Name for Your Business. TNW Entrepreneur also has an excellent article by Julian Shapiro on common pitfalls in selecting a name for an Internet-based business and ways to avoid them.
There are a number of ways to check the availability of a name, including doing a basic internet search, searching the list of "fictitious" or "assumed" business names at your local county clerk's office, searching your state's database of "fictitious" or "assumed" business names, and searching the federal trademark database at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (free of charge). For details on checking the availability of a business name, see FindLaw's Make Sure Your Proposed Business Name Is Available.
You may already have a domain name for your website or blog. If not, when choosing a business name you should consider whether there is an available domain name that would work well with the business name. You can search for and register domain names by visiting a domain name registrar such as Network Solutions, Register.com, or Go Daddy.
Under U.S. copyright law, the author of an article or blog post generally is the owner of the copyrights in that work. The same applies for the creator of a video clip or the photographer who takes a photograph -- as a default rule, the creator is the owner of copyright in her work. This rule is subject to a few exceptions, which we discuss in the Copyright Ownership section of this guide. On this page, we will try to give you a rough estimation of who will own what in terms of copyright in articles, posts, video and other content, when work is carried out through each of the pertinent types of business entity:
If someone else owns the copyright to articles, posts, and other content appearing on your site, then that person may be able to force you to remove the content, for instance, after withdrawal from the business. It could be devastating to your site if you were forced to take down all of this content. As the text above indicates, you don't have to worry about this in the case of employees because the business owns the copyright in their work. In the case of LLCs, corporations, and nonprofits, the term "employee" likely will often encompass high level actors like members, shareholders, and officers who participate in the day-to-day managements of the business. With LLCs and partnerships, uncertainty about who owns copyright can be fixed by express agreement, so you may want to draft the partnership or operating agreement to provide that the business, and not the individual members or partners, own copyright in their work. Alternatively, partners and members could expressly license the firm to continue using their work, even after withdrawal of the relevant individual.
Even absent an express agreement, a court might find that your business has an implied license (i.e., permission) to continue using partner-, member-, or independent contractor-created content on your website. Alternatively, there is a strong argument that a website or blog -- taken as a whole -- is a "collective work" under copyright law and each article or post is a contribution to that collective work. In that case, you may be able to continue publishing any disputed content as "part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series." 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). For more on collective works, see the Works Owned by One or More Creators section of this Guide.
Note: Ownership of copyright is a very complex, fact-specific area of copyright law, and the determination of who is an employee and who is an independent contractor is very difficult to make in the abstract. The material on this page is no substitute for the individual attention of a lawyer who is familiar with your personal circumstances.
In the course of operating a website or blog, you might hire people to perform work for you. For example, you might hire someone to design your website or write code for some functionality that you want on the site. You might hire other journalists or bloggers to create content for the site. Depending on the nature of your enterprise, you might even be able to take on volunteers or interns to perform tasks in return for the opportunity to get some experience or training in the field of online publishing. There are nearly limitless ways that you can structure these work relationships, and how you structure them has legal consequences. Quite often, these legal consequences hinge on whether the person that you've hired is an "employee" or an "independent contractor." This is a question of the law of agency, but it affects copyright ownership, personal liability, and tax issues, to name a few.
The information on this page is mainly geared toward the "hiring party," the person who is hiring someone else to perform work. But it applies equally to the "hired party," the person who is hired to perform work. You may find yourself carrying on online publishing activities in the position of the hired party, and you can draw guidance from this information as well. If you find yourself working as an independent contactor (often called a freelancer), you might find some useful tips in this Salon article: What Every Freelancer Should Know.
The question of whether a hired party is an "employee" or "independent contractor" often comes up after some dispute arises, and someone files a lawsuit. This means that the question won't necessarily be resolved definitively until a court rules on the issue. Before any dispute arises, the parties to an employment relationship can enter into a contract that designates the hired party as an "employee" or "independent contractor," but a court is not obliged to honor that designation if the actual circumstances of the relationship tell a different story. That said, an agreement formalizing the parties' understanding of their relationship may have great weight in a court's determination of the question. It is generally a good idea to create such an express agreement, because it gives both sides more certainty as to their legal status, and will help them meet their respective tax obligations, which must be done without the aid of a court determination. For more on the tax consequences of "employee" versus "independent contractor" status, see the Independent Contractors vs. Employees page on the IRS website.
As a general matter, a hired party is the employee of the hiring party when the hiring party controls (or has the right to control) the manner and means of the hired party's performance of work. The fact that work is performed gratuitously does not mean that the hired party is not an employee. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07(3). In contrast, a hired party is an independent contractor when he "is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2(3). The touchstone, then, is the amount of control that the hiring party exerts over the hired party's work.
Other factors play a role as well. Courts apply a fact-sensitive, multi-factor test in order to determine whether someone is an employee or independent contractor. Some of the factors include:
Other important factors include whether the hired party receives employee benefits, whether the hiring party withholds income and social security taxes for the hired party, and whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired person, all of which support the conclusion that the hired party is an employee. You see these factors in most ordinary employer-employee relationships.
As you can see, it won't always be easy to tell ahead of time if someone is an employee or independent contractor. But some generalizations are possible:
The particular examples are not terribly important. The point is that many factors are involved, but control over the performance of work is the most important one. Despite the complexity of the test, your "common sense" as to who is an employee and who is a "freelancer" will likely serve you well in most instances.
Note: The determination of who is an employee and who is an independent contractor is very difficult to make in the abstract. The material on this page is no substitute for the individual attention of a lawyer and/or accountant who is familiar with your personal circumstances.
Under traditional American legal principles, an owner of a business was liable for harm caused by the business, even if the owner was not personally involved in causing that harm. Contemporary business law removes this ownership-based pathway to liability for limited liability business structures like corporations and LLCs. If you have limited liability, a plaintiff who wins a court judgment against your business cannot satisfy the judgment out of your personal assets simply because of your status as an owner of the business. Rather, the plaintiff must collect out of assets of the business only, which includes amounts you have already invested in it. Limited liability offers you -- in your capacity as an owner of the business -- protection for your personal assets if one of your co-owners or employees commits an unlawful action that injures someone, such as writing a defamatory article or post. Additionally, it protects your personal assets if someone sues your business for nonpayment of a debt (unless you gave a personal guarantee).
Certain kinds of business entity offer limited liability to owners. Members of an LLC and shareholders of a corporation generally are not liable for the debts and obligations of the business, including liability for the unlawful actions of others acting on behalf of the business. The same goes for those individuals who start and/or operate a nonprofit organization, although they are not considered "owners" or "shareholders" of the nonprofit.
Other forms of business do not offer limited liability, but rather expose their owners to personal liability for the debts and obligations of the business, including for the unlawful actions of others participating in it. Owners of sole proprietorships are personally liable for the unlawful actions of their employees committed in the scope of their employment. Partners are personally liable for the unlawful actions of their partners and employees committed in furtherance of the business. Individuals operating in an informal group may be held personally liable for the actions of others in the group if the group is deemed an informal partnership or an employer-employee relationship is found.
No form of business, however, can insulate you from personal liability for your own misconduct. If you write a defamatory article or blog post, for example, a victorious plaintiff could satisfy the judgment out of your personal assets, regardless of what type of business you adopt.
While limited liability is an attractive feature in a business structure, it often is accompanied by increased costs and hassles in terms of formation and operation of the business. You may want to weigh the benefits of limited liability against these other costs. The larger your business or nonprofit enterprise is (in terms of the number of people participating), the more attractive limited liability becomes. On the other hand, if your business or nonprofit enterprise is small -- say it involves just you creating content and publishing it online -- then limited liability is not such an important advantage because no one else is publishing material (and you're liable for your own content in any event). As a rule of thumb, the more people involved, the bigger the benefit from limited liability.
A caveat: If your business will be engaging in significant activities other than publishing material online, or if the business will take on significant debt in order to finance its operations, then the benefit of limited liability grows in significance, regardless of how many other individuals are involved.
While many cities collect income taxes that are separate from and in addition to state and federal taxes, New York City taxes are notoriously complicated and burdensome -- not only re-taxing corporate business profits, but also collecting taxes from otherwise untaxed entities like LLCs, partnerships, and sole proprietorships.
Unincorporated Business Tax (New York City and Washington, D.C.)
New York City:
New York City collects an Unincorporated Business Tax on the business income of every unincorporated business (sole proprietorships, partnerships, and LLCs) carried on - wholly or partly - in New York City. If the business can demonstrate that a portion of its business was done outside New York City, that portion will not be subject to this tax. The rate is 4% of taxable income. You must file for and pay this tax if
If your tax is $1,800 or less, a credit is issued for the entire amount of the tax and no tax will be due. If the tax is between $1,800 and $3,200, a credit is allowed in the amount of the tax multiplied by (3200 minus the tax), then divided by 1400.
The website of the New York City Finance Commissioner has tax forms and other information about the Unincorporated Business Tax.
District of Columbia:
The District of Columbia collects an Unincorporated Business Franchise Tax on the business income of every unincorporated business (sole proprietorships, partnerships, and LLCs) carried on - wholly or partly - in the district. Individuals who earn income from a sole proprietorship, or have earnings from an entity such as a partnership or LLC that does not pay taxes at the entity level, must pay this tax. However, individuals do not need to pay separate individual income tax on income subject to the unincorporated business franchise tax.
The income tax rate is 9.975% on income derived from business in the District of Columbia. The minimum tax is $250 if the business' gross receipts in the District are $1 million or less, and $1,000 if the District gross receipts are greater than $1 million. Gross receipts for purposes of calcluating the minimum tax include any income that is derived from any activity such as sales, rents, services, commissions, etc., from any source within the District. Gross receipts are determined without deduction of any expenses. There is an annual exemption up to $5,000 allowed.
The law exempts:
Unincorporated businesses with over $12,000 of of gross receipts that are not exempted are required to file an unincorporated business franchise tax return each year. Quarterly estimated tax payments are required if the estimated franchise tax for the year is more than $1,000.
Tax forms and further information are available on the District of Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue website.
General Corporation Tax (New York City)
If your corporation does business, employs capital, owns or leases property for business purposes, or maintains an office in New York City, it is subject to the General Corporation Tax. This tax only applies to incorporated businesses (unincorporated businesses are subject to New York City's Unincorporated Business Tax). If the corporation can demonstrate that a portion of its business was done outside New York City, that portion will not be subject to this tax. New York City's General Corporation Tax is imposed at the highest of the following four rates:
S corporations are not recognized by New York City and are subject to full corporate income tax.
The website of the New York City Finance Commissioner has tax forms and other information about the General Corporation Tax.
Note: The information contained on this page is meant for general, information purposes only, and CMLP makes no claim as to comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information. Because of the complexity of tax issues associated with starting any business, you are encouraged to consult with a tax attorney and/or accountant to ensure compliance with federal, state, and local tax requirements. The CMLP is not a substitute for individualized legal advice, especially not individualized tax advice.
Being "personally liable" means that a plaintiff who wins a court judgment against your business can satisfy it out of your personal assets, like your bank account, home, or automobile simply because of your status as an owner of the business. A common reason for a plaintiff to win a judgment against a business is that an employee or other agent of the business committed an unlawful action that injured her. As a general matter, then, personal liability means that your personal assets are exposed if one of your co-owners or employees commits an unlawful action that injures someone, such as writing a defamatory article or post.
Certain kinds of business entity expose you to personal liability for the unlawful actions of others participating in the business. A sole proprietor is personally liable for the unlawful actions of her employees committed in the scope of their employment. A partner is personally liable for the unlawful actions of the other partners and employees committed in furtherance of the business. Individuals operating in an informal group may be held personally liable for the actions of others in the group if the group is deemed an informal partnership or an employer-employee relationship is found.
Other forms of business do not expose you to personal liability for the unlawful actions of others who participate in the business. If you form an LLC, a corporation, or a nonprofit organization you generally will not be held personally liable for the actions of others taking part in the business.
While personal liability is an unpleasant prospect under any circumstances, the larger your business or nonprofit enterprise is, the more intolerable the risk. The major liability risk for most citizen media sites or blogs is getting sued for defamation. Other significant risks includes legal claims for invasion of privacy, copyright and trademark infringement, and violations of trade secret laws, all of which could arise out of the act of publishing content online. If your business or nonprofit enterprise involves just you creating content and publishing it, then personal liability is not such a serious problem because no one else is publishing material and you're liable for your own content in any event. If your business or nonprofit enterprise is bigger, and involves a number of different people publishing content online (whether they are co-owners of the business or employees), then personal liability for their actions is a more significant problem.
A caveat: If your business will be engaging in significant activities other than publishing material online, or if the business will be taking on significant debt in order to finance its operations, then the disadvantage of personal liability grows in significance, regardless of how many other individuals are involved.
A properly formed and operated corporation or LLC offers its owners limited liability for the debts of the business, so that their losses are limited to their investment in the business. In some extreme and rare cases, however, courts hold the owners liable for the debts of the company, including for judgments resulting from lawsuits. In legal terminology, this is called "piercing the corporate veil."
Courts normally pierce the corporate veil in situations where one owner or a small group of owners dominate the management and operation of the corporation or LLC. Without more, the combination of ownership and management is not a problem (indeed, LLCs are designed to be managed that way). The problem arises when one or more of the following factors are present:
The presence of one or another of these factors does not automatically result in piercing the corporate veil. The analysis that courts perform is fact-intensive and unpredictable. The presence of two or more of these factors, however, would make it more likely that a court would disregard the corporate/LLC form and hold you personally liable for the debts of the business.
Note: No piercing of the corporate veil is necessary to hold you personally liable for your own unlawful actions, such as if you write a defamatory article or blog post. In that case, you are independently liable for the injury done. The LLC or corporation may also be liable, but a plaintiff could satisfy the judgment out of your personal assets should the company's assets prove insufficient.
As a small business owner (for-profit), whether a sole proprietorship, partnership, LLC or corporation, you must pay self employment tax and file Schedule SE to Form 1040 if you earn profits of $400 or more in a given year from the business. See the Self-Employment Tax page on the IRS website for details.
If your small business (including a nonprofit) has one or more employees, you will generally be required to withhold federal income tax from their wages. You also may be subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and federal unemployment tax under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). If you are required to report employment taxes or give statements to employees, you need an employer identification number. See the Employment Taxes for Businesses page on the IRS website for details.
If your small business hires independent contractors, you need to report contract payments annually on Form 1099-MISC, which goes to the independent contractor and to the IRS. Please see the Independent Contractors vs. Employees page on the IRS website and the Employee Versus Independent Contractor section of this guide for details.
Additional informational returns requirements may apply to your small business. Check out the IRS Guide To Information Returns for more information.
Partnerships and multi-member LLCs that elect to be treated as partnerships generally do not pay federal income tax at the entity level, but must file Form 1065 annually with the IRS. This return shows the business's income, deductions, and other required information, and must include the names and addresses of each partner or member and each partner's or member's distributive share of taxable income.
Nonprofit organizations that obtain 501(c)(3) exempt status generally do not pay federal income tax, but must file an annual tax return with the IRS, unless their gross receipts are normally $25,000 or less. Organizations beyond the $25,000 threshold with gross receipts below $1,000,000 and total assets at the end of the year less than $2,500,000 can file the return on Form 990EZ. Organizations with gross receipts or assets above that must file the return on Form 990. For details, including how to calculate gross receipts, see the Instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ.
States impose additional taxes, withholdings, and informational
filing requirements on small businesses. Businesses generally must
report any new hires to the state, and take care of workers
compensation requirements. See the How to Start a Business section for details on state requirements.
Note: The information contained on this page is meant for general,
information purposes only, and CMLP makes no claim as to
comprehensiveness or accuracy of the information. Because of the
complexity of tax issues associated with starting any business, you are
encouraged to consult with a tax attorney and/or accountant to ensure
compliance with federal, state, and local tax requirements. The CMLP is
not a substitute for individualized legal advice, especially not
individualized tax advice.
A trademark is a sign, mark, or indicator used by an individual, business, or organization to identify a product or service as its own and to distinguish the product or service from those of its competitors. A business name generally can be protected as a trademark under federal and state trademark law.
Trademark law is designed to avoid consumer confusion over the trademarks that businesses or other organizations use in connection with their goods and services. Stated briefly, trademark law makes it unlawful for a business to use a trademark (e.g., a slogan, a logo, a name) in connection with a good or service if that use is confusingly similar to another business's use of a trademark. To see how this works, imagine a consumer - Sally. If Sally buys a Dell computer, she can be pretty sure that the computer was made by Dell Computer and nobody else. She can take Dell's reputation into account without worrying that a knockoff company is making shoddy computers with the Dell logo on them because trademark law prohibits that kind of confusing commercial activity and it gives Dell the right to sue for money damages and an injunction if someone does it.
As a general rule, if someone in a similar field to yours is already using a particular business or organization name, you should not use it, nor should you use a name that would be confusingly similar. Traditionally, there was nothing to prevent someone from using a trademarked name in a completely unrelated field or industry (for instance, Delta Faucet and Delta Airlines) because there was no possibility that consumers would confuse one for the other. However, the emergence of something called "anti-dilution" law means that the owner of a "famous" trademark (it means pretty much what is sounds like) can prevent you from using it even in an unrelated industry. Therefore, it probably would not be a good idea to call a blog "Kodak News" or "McDonald'sBlog," unless your website is actually about Kodak or McDonald's (in which case you should read Using the Trademarks of Others section closely). Traditionally, the law also permitted multiple companies to use a given name in different geographical areas of the country, but the global nature of the Internet breaks down the importance of geographical isolation and makes it more likely that an Internet use of a name or trademark could be confusing regardless of where the brick-and-mortar businesses or organizations are physically located. Thus, you probably want to steer clear of a name that is the same or similar to a name used by someone else in your field, even if that person or organization is located far away from you.
The process of naming your business and securing trademark rights can be summarized in three basic points:
Choosing a distinctive name is important from a business perspective, but it is also important if you want trademark law to protect your business name. A business name is potentially a trademark protected by the law, but this protection depends on the type of name you choose.
As a general matter, the more unique or distinctive the name is, the greater trademark protection it receives. Fanciful marks (made-up words like "Kodak"), arbitrary marks (existing words used in a way unrelated to their normal meaning, like "Apple" for computers), and suggestive marks (those that hint at a quality or aspect of the product or service, like "Netscape") receive the highest level of protection. You can register these kinds of trademarks immediately, without any evidence of "secondary meaning" -- i.e., proof that, through your use of the name in commerce, the public has come to identify it specifically with your good or service. Similarly, in the event of a lawsuit, you would not need to produce evidence of secondary meaning in order to make out your case.
In contrast, a merely descriptive name can only receive full trademark protection after it acquires secondary meaning. Some examples include names that describe the product or service directly, such as Speedy Rental Car, or one that merely uses a person's name, such as Smith Computers or Jane's Collectibles. Terms that describe the geographic location of a good or service, like the New York Times, also are considered descriptive, and they can be protected as trademarks only upon proof that through use they have acquired secondary meaning. If you choose a merely descriptive name for your citizen media site or blog, you would not be able to register it at first, and you would not be able to successfully sue someone for using a confusingly similar trademark. You might be able to register it and/or bring a successful lawsuit at a later date, however, assuming that Internet users at some point come to identify your business name specifically with your work (i.e., it acquires secondary meaning).
Lastly, a generic name can never receive trademark protection. A generic name is identical to the product or service to which it attaches. For instance, calling a business that hosted email accounts "email" would be a generic name. Keep in mind that a term can be a generic name for one product or service, but a valid trademark for another. For instance, "Apple" is a generic name for selling apples, but a valid trademark for computers, and "Bicycle" is a generic name for selling bicycles, but a valid trademark for playing cards. Some geographical terms like "swiss cheese" and "French fries" are also generic because they are synonymous with the item itself. However, this does not mean that all geographical names are generic.
Choosing a business name presents a special problem for a community journalism site or blogger with a regional focus, where using a geographical or other descriptive term makes intuitive sense. After some thought, you may decide that the appropriate descriptive name is more important to you than strong trademark protection. Or, you may come up with a creative way of using a geographical term in a distinctive way (e.g., h2otown). Be aware also that your descriptive name may obtain secondary meaning should your site prove an influential and often-visited source of information -- think, for instance about the New York Times. So, keep in mind that you may start out with a business name that enjoys little protection under trademark law, but the amount of protection may grow over time.
Once you have chosen a business name, you should make sure that someone else is not already using it in a similar field. The easiest first step is to search an Internet search engine for your proposed name. If it is a common word that brings up a lot of results, add keywords relevant to your business or organizationto see if any similar enterprises have adopted the same name. If you see any other websites doing work similar to yours, you should consider choosing a different name. When you consider whether something is "work similar to yours," take a broad view. This could be anything from a journalism site, a blog, some kind of interactive web service, something tech-y with a heavy online presence, etc. There is little certainty in this area, and you will just have to do your best in making the call. The same goes for all the searching described below -- the task is to weed out names being used by people doing something similar to you, broadly construed.
Next, you should look in TESS, the federal trademark database. Search for the name you're considering as well as close or obvious variations. If anything comes up, check to see if it is "LIVE" or "DEAD." If a mark is canceled, abandoned, or expired ("DEAD"), it probably is safe to use it, but you should do a little extra research to make sure that the company is not still using it in reality. If there are currently registered marks ("LIVE"), look to see with what goods or services the registering company or person is using them. If the company or person is not doing something similar to you, broadly construed, you can probably use the name. However, if the name is famous (i.e., it's a household name like Google or Volkswagen or Prince), you should avoid it. Even if a court would not ultimately conclude that your use of the name constitutes trademark dilution, large companies with famous marks can be very aggressive in policing the use of their trademarks, and they are likely to have highly trained lawyers to make your life difficult. In any case, if you choose to use a name that someone else has registered in connection with a different kind of business, be sure not to use a similar logo, design, or color scheme.
Even after checking the federal database, you're still not necessarily in the clear. Each state and the District of Columbia has its own trademark registry. You can find out where your state's registry is at FindLaw's State Trademark Information page. States have their own trademark laws, which are generally similar to federal law and can be just as powerful if you are sued (or choose to sue someone else). You should perform a search for your business name in your own state and any other state in which you particularly expect to do business or become involved (beyond simply disseminating information to residents of a state via the Internet). To be completely thorough, you would have to search each state's database individually, which would be tedious and time-consuming. You can decide whether this is worthwhile. You can also pay an attorney or one of several Internet-based services to conduct a trademark search for you. FindLaw has more information on hiring a professional firm to conduct a trademark search.
Even if you find nothing through all of these searches, it is still possible that someone somewhere is already using the name you intend to use. This is true because federal and some state trademark laws protect unregistered trademarks, and there is no comprehensive list of all unregistered trademarks in use. The searches described above are the best you can do, and if they turn up negative, the chances that you will run into trouble are greatly reduced.
There are three ways to secure your rights in your trademark: (1) use the mark in commerce in connection with a good or service; (2) register the trademark with your state; or (3) register the trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO").
Once you use a trademark in commerce in connection with a good or service, you begin to acquire what are called "common law" rights in the mark, so long as it is not confusingly similiar to or dilutive of another's mark. The common law rights you gain in a trademark through use are limited to the geographic area in which you have actually used the mark, or those areas into which you have demonstrable plans to expand your use (the so-called "zone of natural expansion"). This limitation is less important for online ventures, however, as availability of your services over the Internet gives rise to a presumption of national trademark rights. It is important to note that if someone else is already using a confusingly similiar mark, you will be unabale to obtain rights in your mark and could potentially be liable for trademark infringement or dilution. If you intend to obtain rights in a trademark through simple use in commerce, then you must be sure to do an effective search of existing trademarks before you begin using it in connection with your good or service. Please see our section on Naming Your Business: Searching for the Trademarks of Others for details. For more information on how to acquire trademark rights, see Sarah Bird's excellent post, Trademark Basics: Be First in Your Market, Be Distinctive, and Don't Confuse the Consumer.
You may also choose to register your trademark with your state or with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, but you are not required to do so in order to bring a lawsuit to protect it against infringement or dilution. State registration is likely to be both cheaper and easier than federal registration, but is probably not the best option for online activities, which by definition have a national and international scope. However, if you would like to find out more about your state's registration process, you can contact your state authority responsible for trademark matters.
Registering a trademark with the USPTO puts the country on notice that you are using a certain mark, and also provides additional protections and procedural benefits if you need to litigate your rights. However, this process is fairly long (usually taking a year or more) and potentially expensive (the fees start at $275). We provide more information about the federal registration process below.
Benefits of Federal Registration
As noted above, federal trademark registration is not required for you to protect your trademark. However, registration provides some advantages. Specifically, registering a trademark with the USPTO provides the following benefits:
Because federal registration is expensive, you'll want to weigh these benefits against the out-of-pocket costs of obtaining a registration.
How to Register
Once you have decided to federally register your trademark, you can
file the necessary forms to apply for federal trademark registration
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office online. The cost is between $275-375 per mark for each International Class in which you seek registration, depending upon the filing method you chose.
The USPTO estimates that filling out the form should take about 15-20 minutes, although first time filers are likely to take longer. A federal application must contain at least four things, in addition to the filing fee: (1) the owner's name and address, (2) a clear drawing of the mark (which can be automatically generated from text if you do not have a logo); (3) a description of the goods or services for which the mark is or will be used and the corresponding International Class number(s); and (4) the filing basis.
You can register your trademark for use in connection with more than one set of goods or services, but you will have to pay an additional filing fee if the goods and services you list fall into more than one International Class. The USPTO has available a searchable index of identifications for goods and services that they recommend you use for your application, but you can also type in something else if your product or service does not fit into one of these categories. If your business does not clearly fall within one category of goods or services, you may want to consider filing in more than one class, as this will would give you the greatest protection and flexibility. The downside to seeking registration in more than one class, aside from the additional filing fees, is that you are more likely to encounter a conflict with someone else who is using the mark or a similar one in another field or industry. Furthermore, if you do expand in the future, you can apply for a new registration at that time (unless someone else has already registered the mark in that area).
There are two
different filing bases for a new trademark application: use based, or
intent-to-use. If you have already begun using the trademark in
interstate commerce, you should file a use based application. To do so, in addition to filling out the application, you must supply the USPTO with a specimen showing the mark as it is used in connection with your goods or services, as well as the date(s) on which you first used the mark anywhere and in interstate commerce. If you have not yet begun using the trademark, you should file an intent-to-use
application. You will be required to submit a specimen and date of
first use later in the application process before your mark is allowed
to register.
If this process sounds too complicated for you, you can hire an attorney to do it. Trademark registration is usually fairly straightforward for attorneys who specialize in it, so it is relatively inexpensive.
Within about 3-6 months after you file the registration forms an attorney with the USPTO will examine and research your application. There are several categories of marks that the USPTO will refuse to register, including "immoral, deceptive, or scandalous" marks (such as those including foul language), those that disparage or falsely imply a connection to other people or entities, and marks that are confusingly similar to others that are already registered.
The USPTO attorney may contact you to resolve any issues in your application, by issuing what's called an "Office Action." If you receive an Office Action, you will have six months in which to respond to any issues raised by the examining attorney. If the issues raised in the Office Action are too complex, you may want to hire an attorney to draft your response.
If the USPTO approves your application, it will publish your trademark in the Official Gazette, and anyone who believes that they would be damaged by its registration (such as a senior user of a confusingly similar mark) will have thirty days in which to oppose registration of the mark. If no one opposes (or requests an extension of time to oppose) within those thirty days, the USPTO will either approve your mark for registration (if you have already submitted an acceptable specimen of use) or issue a Notice of Allowance (if your application is still based on an intent-to-use). If the USPTO issues a Notice of Allowance, you will have six months from the date on which it was issued to either submit an acceptable specimen, or request an additional extension of time in which to do so. You can request up to five 6-month extensions of time in which to submit a specimine of use. All told, the registration process can easily take 1-2 years, but once it is approved your rights date back to the day on which you filed your application.
For additional details on registering a trademark, see the Chilling Effects FAQ on Trademark.
Trademark rights can last indefinitely so long as the trademark owner continues to use the mark in commerce to identify goods or services. The term of a federal trademark registration is 10 years, with 10-year renewal terms upon filing an affidavit of continued use, along with a specimen of use. In addition, between the fifth and sixth years after the date of initial registration, the registrant must file an additional affidavit confirming that the mark is still in use in commerce in order to maintain the registration. If no affidavit is filed, the registration is canceled. At this time, if the mark has been in continuous use in interestate commerce for five years following the date of registration, the owner can file an affidavit of incontestibility that, if accepted by the USPTO, will significantly narrow the grounds upon which a third party can seek to have the registration cancelled.
In addition to renewing your registration (should you choose to register), you need to take some additional steps to make sure that you do not lose your trademark rights:
You can choose to include a trademark notice next to your trademark, but you are not required to do so in order to protect the mark. A trademark notice indicates to others that you claim ownership of the trademark in connection with the goods or services in question, warning them against possible infringement. Any time you believe you have a rightful claim to a mark you may designate the mark with a TM (for goods) or SM (for services). You do not have to register the mark to use these notices. In addition, if you choose to seek federal registration of your trademark, you can use these notices during the registration process. If you obtain a federal registration, you will probably want to use the more powerful ® notice, which can only be used after a successful registration with the USPTO. Even then, you can only use the ® notice in connection with the goods or services listed in your application for registration.
So you've decided that you want to publish online. There is a wide range of platforms you can use to get your words, video, and other content out to the world.
Of course, the easiest way for you to get online is to simply go to a website that allows user comments or forum posts and add your two cents to the mix. If you want a more permanent home -- and one you can control to some degree yourself -- you will want to consider whether to join a service such as Blogger, TypePad, Livejournal, or even MySpace (yes, we know it's a social networking site), that will host and manage your content for you or whether you want to create your own, independent website. Each option has its advantages and disadvantages. Here are some of the things you might want to think about in deciding which platform -- or platforms -- you will use:
As you read through this section you might be asking yourself what the difference is between a blog-hosting service and a web-hosting service. Generally speaking, a blog-hosting service will permit you to publish only a blog on their site, whereas a web-hosting service, depending on which service you choose, will allow you to create a site with almost unlimited functionality. Of course, some blogging software, such as WordPress, will allow you to create a "static blogpage" without any chronological entries as your home page. In terms of what the reader sees, there is no difference between such a site and a standard website, but you will still be limited to the functionality inherent in your blogging software.
Once you've made a decision about what type of platform is best for you, it is time to get online. Go to one of the sections listed below for more information.
Once you decide to publish online, whether by posting in a forum, joining a discussion group, blogging, or starting your own website, there are a host of legal issues that may come into play. Understanding your legal rights -- and potential sources of liability -- can help you make an intelligent choice as to what platform you use and what precautions you take when you speak online. Some of the most important issues to consider are free speech protections, anonymity, ownership of content, and vulnerability to others' copyright claims.
While a number of factors can influence the scope of your rights and liabilities online, the most important is often the "Terms of Use" (or "Terms and Conditions," "Terms of Service" etc.) that you agree to when you sign up for a website account, blog- or web-hosting service. Whether you read these terms or not, they form a legally binding contract between you and the service operator, and in fact govern much of the relationship between you and that site.
It is true that these "Terms of Use" sections can appear difficult to understand: they often contain legal jargon, and may be divided into several webpages (for example, a basic "Terms of Use" page may link to a separate "Privacy Policy"). However, the more aware you are of the terms you are agreeing to, the better you will understand your legal rights and risks. Further, being aware of the differences in the terms of service for using different sites can help you find a platform for your online activities that is appropriate to your specific needs. Please see the section on Evaluating Terms of Service for a comparison of some of the more important terms you might encounter.
If you live in the United States, you have a First Amendment right to engage in speech on the Internet. This legal principle allows you to use the Internet as a powerful medium to communicate facts, ideas, and opinions. However, there are two important limits on your online activities which you should be aware of:
These limits may threaten your ability to publish certain types of content online, especially if you are making a controversial point or are criticizing somebody. You may face situations where your online activity approaches the legal "grey area" between speech that is protected and speech that is not, and offended persons may pressure your hosting service or website operator to remove material that they consider unlawful or simply do not like. Many web hosts will remove content or cancel your account if they receive a complaint or deem content offensive, assuming their terms of service permit them to do so.
Regardless of their public stance on free speech issues, hosting services and websites that allow users to create or submit content enjoy immunity in the United States when it comes to claims of defamation, privacy, and other similar torts based on the activities of their users. This means that hosting services and website operators do not have to remove content just because someone complains about it, and they are protected from liability even when they are on notice of the potential defamatory character of the statements. For more information on this law, see our primer on the Communications Decency Act ("CDA 230").
Unfortunately, many hosting services and website operators are not aware of CDA 230's protections. You may need to remind your hosting service of CDA 230 if they claim they must remove your material. Keep in mind, however, that your hosting service likely has the contractual right to remove your material regardless of their exposure to liability, depending on what their terms of use say.
If you think your content might be controversial, you should think about what sort of platform or service will protect your speech most strongly. You have perhaps the least amount of protection when posting on somebody else's blog or message board, as a moderator can generally remove any post at any time. Starting your own blog gives you more room to operate, but blog-hosting sites generally impose some restrictions on the content that you can post. If you are planning to start a blog, you should carefully consult each hosting provider's terms & conditions to see which site is the most protective of free speech. The section of this guide that provides a evaluation of terms of service might also be helpful.
You are likely to have the most freedom if you start your own website. If you are thinking of starting your own site to publish controversial material, you should consider the extent to which your hosting company will respect your freedom of speech. Sometimes, when faced with a speech-related lawsuit, hosting sites will sacrifice your freedom of speech and send you looking for a new home on the Internet. This type of action is most likely to occur with large, mainstream web hosts that have many users and a public reputation to worry about.
If you know that you will be covering a controversial subject or expressing a controversial opinion, you may want to consider one of the hosts that make an explicit effort to respect free speech rights. Computer Tyme and Project DoD are two examples of web hosts that make it a point to protect free speech. You can find other examples of web hosts that are proud of their free speech stance on the Dedicated Hosting Guide's post "Free Speech Hosting: 11 Web Hosts That Won’t Dump You at the First Sign of Controversy."
You should also keep in mind that your choice of a domain name registrar could have an impact on your ability to keep your site up and running in the face of legal threats. In early 2007, CNET conducted a survey of registrars to see which were more "free speech friendly." They found that the French registrar Gandi.net and New Orleans-based DirectNIC offered the most extensive guarantees against unnecessary domain name suspensions.
Another category of speech that may be removed from a website is speech that allegedly infringes on somebody else's copyright. For information on this subject, please read the section regarding the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
Many people choose to engage in online speech anonymously, or under a pseudonym, for a variety of reasons. For information on making this decision, please see our section on deciding whether to publish anonymously.
While you have a right to engage in anonymous speech in the U.S., there are certain situations in which you can lose this protection. For one, certain sites simply do not allow their users to be anonymous. Social networking sites, for example, like Facebook, often require their users to act under their real names. Accordingly, you should consider a site's terms of service on this subject if anonymity is important to you.
Further, others can use a lawsuit to discover the identity of an anonymous Internet user. For more information on this danger, please consult our sectio on Potential Legal Challenges to Anonymity.
Some sites are more protective of their users' anonymity than others. Of course, virtually any service will reveal your information if served with valid legal process -- otherwise the company would be in contempt of court. But there are still ways to protect yourself. If you are choosing between blog-hosting sites, be aware that Blogger and LiveJournal (but not TypePad) do not require names or credit card numbers for registration. By signing up through an anonymizing service, like Tor, and using an anonymous e-mail account, you gain greater protection from being unmasked, even in the face of a subpoena to the web-hosting service.
If protecting your anonymity is important to you, please consult our list of technical precautions you can take to protect your anonymity ahead of a potential lawsuit.
When you post your original text, video, or audio on a website, the terms and conditions of the website determine whether you keep ownership of it, whether the site owns it, or if there is a more complicated arrangement. For example, with blogging sites, it is common for you to retain ownership of the original material you post, but the blogging site has the rights to reproduce or publish the content for promotional purposes. Here is an example of such a provision from the terms of use for Six Apart, which owns the blog-hosting site TypePad:
Six Apart does not claim ownership of the Content you upload, place or post through this Site or the Services. By uploading, placing or posting Content through this Site or the Services, you grant Six Apart a world-wide, royalty-free, and non-exclusive license to reproduce, modify, adapt and publish the Content solely for the purpose of displaying, distributing and promoting such Content on Six Apart's Internet properties. This license exists only for as long as you continue to be a Six Apart customer and shall be terminated at the time your Account is terminated.
Please see the section on Evaluating Terms of Service for a comparison of some of the sites you may be considering.
If somebody thinks that your online activities are infringing their copyright, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act may come into play. The DMCA is a federal law that establishes how website operators -- such as blog-hosting sites -- can avoid liability if a copyright holder notifies them that one of their users is engaging in infringing activity or has posted infringing content. It is common for hosting sites to have a section describing their DMCA procedure, including what a copyright holder must do to notify the hosting site of alleged infringement by a user, when the hosting site will take down user material that is alleged to be infringing, when and how the hosting site will notify the user of the DMCA allegation, and what the user can do to respond to the allegation and get their material back up on the site. By way of example, here is Google's DMCA policy.
If you receive notification that your material has been the subject of a DMCA notice, Chilling Effects has a helpful section describing what this means and how to respond. Also please refer to our section on responding to a DMCA takedown notice if your material is removed.
This section discusses and compares the key "terms of use" (or equivalent sections) you are likely to encounter when you are evaluating various online services. We've grouped these services into three general categories: social networking sites, blog-hosting services, and web-hosting services. Of course, some of these categories blend into each other, but you should be able to get a general idea of how the terms of service vary among the various types of sites and between individual sites themselves. Please keep in mind that a site's terms of use can -- and often do -- change frequently. This section is only a general guide. Be sure and read the actual terms of service before agreeing to use any of the services listed here.
This section compares the terms of use for two of the most popular social networking sites, Facebook and MySpace. Facebook's terms are contained in its Terms of Use, Privacy Policy, its Content Code of Conduct, and its Copyright Policy. MySpace's terms are contained in its Terms of Use Agreement and Privacy Policy. Below are summaries of how the various sites' terms of use treat key aspects of your legal relationship with the site.
This section compares the terms of use for several of the most popular services that provide blog-hosting: Blogger, TypePad, and WordPress. Please note that each of the sites covered here is part of a larger company (in Blogger's case, Google; in TypePad's case, Six Apart; in WordPress's case, Automattic). Therefore, both companies' policies are relevant to the overall legal relationship between you and the blog-hosting site (For simplicity's sake, in this section "Blogger" will refer to both Blogger and Google; "TypePad" to both TypePad and Six Apart; and "WordPress" to both WordPress and Automattic.). For your reference, here are the key documents for each site:
Blogger: Blogger Terms of Service, Blogger Content Policy, Google Terms of Service, Google Privacy Policy, Google DMCA Policy.TypePad: TypePad Terms of Services, Six Apart General Terms of Use, Six Apart Privacy Policy.
WordPress: WordPress Terms of Service, Automattic Privacy Policy, Automattic DMCA Policy.
Below are summaries of how the various sites' terms of use treat key aspects of your legal relationship with the site.
There are almost as many styles of website hosting service as there are websites on the Internet. This section discusses three examples and how the various sites' terms of use treat key aspects of your legal relationship with the service provider. Go Daddy and Network Solutions are major commercial hosting services, while Project DoD is a “member supported non profit collective intent upon helping the public gain access to tools that are needed for the dissemination of information.” Go Daddy’s terms and policies include Universal Terms of Service and a Hosting Service Agreement, Network Solutions’s extensive policies are centrally indexed as part of its Service Agreement, and Project DoD’s terms are located on the main hosting page.
Starting your own website may be the most appealing option for getting your words and content out to the world, particularly if you are planning to engage in journalism or otherwise need a site that can grow in size or complexity. There are several things you will need to do to create your own website:
The first step in establishing a website is to register a domain name. While Google search has, perhaps, mitigated the importance of having a catchy domain name, the ability to reach a site quickly may prove a marketing boon, so a domain name should preferably be short, catchy, and intuitive if at all possible. If your online activities are being done as a part of a business, it probably makes sense to select a domain name that is related to the name of your business. If you haven't already chosen a business name, see the section on Trademark Law and Naming Your Business for more information.
Many people recommend choosing a URL ending in .com as opposed to .org or .net if at all possible because that is what people tend to put at the end of a web address by default, although dot org endings can emphasize, if appropriate, your site's nonprofit status or the public service nature of your work. Also, if your site is directed solely towards people in your own country, a country-specific domain name may be cheaper to register.
You can check the availability of a domain name through domain registration companies such as Network Solutions, 1&1 Internet, or Dotster. This is hardly an exhaustive list; most domain registration companies will allow you to check the availability of names on their site (and may also provide helpful suggestions if your preferred name is taken).
Once you have settled on a domain name, you will need to register it through a domain registration service. Wikipedia has a list of the largest domain registrars that you can use to as a starting point. Some of the website hosting companies discussed in this guide might also be able to register a domain name for you as part of their hosting package. Keep in mind, however, that it is generally not advisable to transfer control of your domain name to your web host; most hosting services have no obligation to release the domain name should a you decide to switch to another hosting company.
If you are technically savvy and have the necessary equipment, you can host your website on a home or business server that you control. For most people, however, the choice will be between free and paid commercial website hosting services. While free hosts sound attractive, there are several major (often intolerable) disadvantages: first, many have unattractive and distracting advertising, such as pop-ups; second, many are plagued by servers that often crash and have customer service reps that are unresponsive to complaints or requests for technical help; and third, they have a reputation for going out of business without warning. (They are, nevertheless, free.)
There are also a large number of paid hosting companies that provide service of varying quality. Some hosting services charge a flat fee for hosting (with certain file storage and bandwidth caps), while other hosting services have flexible charges based on bandwidth used. The best paid services, however, are more stable than free companies and will provide you with needed technical support. When looking for a web hosting company, consider:
Most guides to creating webpages recommend that you learn at least some HTML (or hire someone who knows it). While programs like Dreamweaver and Front Page will allow you to create webpages without knowing HTML, having some working knowledge of the subject is the best way to ensure that your page looks how you intend it to be, that errors aren't introduced in the process of translating your page into HTML, and that your page doesn't contain unnecessary code that will eat up your bandwidth.
If you want to learn HTML, there are a number of on-line tutorials that treat the subject in varying depths. J-Learning has a tutorial meant specifically for citizen journalists that covers XHTML, which combines traditional HTML with a newer technology, XML. HTML Goodies and Webmonkey have HTML tutorials for beginners.
If you do not want to learn HTML, you might consider building your webpage with a web page design program, roughly equivalent to a word processor. These include Macromedia Dreamweaver, Adobe GoLive, Microsoft FrontPage, and Microsoft Publisher, and they allow you to type in text and add pictures using the types of graphical icons and familiar applications that are found in most software suites. While this has obvious advantages, they also have a tendency to add unnecessary and unwanted code and to appear quite different on the program's preview screen than on the finished webpage. If you know some HTML code, however, it is possible to use these programs to do your initial design and then to edit the HTML manually.
Some web-hosts also provide their own website building software, which can make it very easy to create your site. If you are using your web-host's software, all you generally need to do to publish or upload your files to the web is hit "publish" or "submit." If you are using another type of software to create your site, the process might be slightly more complicated. To publish from Microsoft Front Page, the Front Page extensions must be enabled by your web host; many do this automatically, however some require that you specifically ask. If the extensions are enabled, you need only click the "Publish to Web" button and follow the instructions given, which will mean entering your domain name and the user name and password given to you by your web-host.
Other software will probably require you to install FTP software which will transfer files from your computer to the web host. WS_FTP is one such program.
If you're looking to start a blog, a blog-hosting service may be a good place for an amateur, or sometimes even a professional, to launch one. If you're interested in getting online as quickly as possible, and don't need a formal blog, you might also want to consider using a social networking site, such as Facebook or MySpace, which will allow you to create a blog-like profile page. If you haven't yet reviewed the section of this guide on evaluating different online platforms, you should do so before committing to use one of these services.
There are several factors to consider before choosing a blog-hosting service, such as cost, permitted advertising, customization, and terms of use. Choose carefully, as it is difficult to switch blog-hosting services later and maintain the same readership.
There are a number of blog-hosting services available. For the sake of brevity this section discuss the three most popular services: Blogger, TypePad, and WordPress. We do not endorse any of these services. You should select a blog-hosting service that meets your specific needs. Many of the services' elements below are marked with a + for a positive aspect of the service, - for a negative, and = for an aspect that is neutral.
Please keep in mind that a site's terms of use can -- and often do -- change frequently. Be sure and read the actual terms of service before agreeing to use any of the services listed here.
Blogger is one of the oldest and largest blogging sites around and is where most people will probably start their first blog. If you want to see what blogging is all about or if you are anxious to start blogging now, Blogger may be a good fit for you. If you want a lot of customization and flexibility, however, you may want to consider other sites. On the other hand, Blogger is reliable, flexible, and its Terms of Service provide a journalism-friendly approach to content removal.
Functionality and Ease-of-Use:
+ Very easy: Blogger claims that you can expect to start blogging within ten minutes of your initial visit to the site.
+ Template access: Blogger allows access to template codes.
- Categories: Blogger lacks any method to categorize posts other than by date.
- Blogging only: Blogger doesn't support non-blog pages, files storage, etc. Just blogs.
= Age: According to Blogger's Terms of Service, you must be at least 13 years old to use Blogger.
= Customization: While it is easy to set up one of the basic, plain templates, more significant customization takes quite a bit of HTML and CSS knowledge. The available templates are attractive, but due to Blogger's popularity, they all look familiar, and it may be difficult to make a name for your blog if it looks just like a million others.
Features:
Terms of Service: Here are portions of Blogger's terms of service that may be relevant to journalists. Each bulleted summary is followed by the actual text in smaller print. Blogger is owned by Google, therefore the Google Terms of Service will be applied to Blogger users as well.
From Google's Terms of Service
Advertising: Blogger automatically integrates with Google AdSense. It also allows access to the blog template code to enable use of ads from different sources. This functionality may make Blogger the most desirable of the free sites for traditional and non-traditional journalists seeking to make money from their blogs.
Cost: All of Blogger's services are free.
Example Sites: outonthestoop.blogspot.com; googleearthlings.blogspot.com
TypePad is popular among professionals, but isn't free and doesn't cater to beginners. There are loads of features, but make sure to check out TypePad's price comparison chart, so that you know what you're paying for. If you are familiar with other services offered by TypePad's parent company, Six Apart, you may have an idea of how TypePad works. Six Apart is the force behind Live Journal and, perhaps less well-known, Movable Type. Movable Type is the blogging program TypePad utilizes, which you can download and install on your web server for free (as long as it's for non-commercial use). See Movable Type's website for more information.
Functionality and Ease-of-Use:
+ Customization: TypePad has extensive customization options, including the ability to create sidebars. However, the full array of possibilities is only available to those with the most expensive accounts. Customization is complicated, but does not require learning a programming language.
+ Code Access: TypePad allows access to the template code, but only to the most expensive accounts.
Features: The availability of these features will vary depending on which type of account you sign up for. Some are available to all levels, while others may only be accessed by those with the highest-cost memberships:
Terms of Service: Here are portions of TypePad's terms of service that may apply to journalists. Each bulleted summary is followed by the text in smaller print.
Advertising: TypePad offers two easy advertising tools to its users with the two most expensive accounts (Pro and Premium): TipJar and TypePad TextAds. TipJar allows you to earn "tips" (donations) when users fill out a form. TextAds functions very similarly to Google Adsense. If these features are the only reason why you're thinking about an account upgrade, consider that TypePad allows you to bring in ads on your own, and that the combination of TipJar and TextAds functions similarly to having AdSense and PayPal donations button (for which you'll only pay PayPal per transaction).
Cost: There are four levels: Basic, Plus, Pro, and Premium. The monthly charge for these accounts ranges from $4.95 to $29.95.
Examples Sites: endicottstudio.typepad.com; obscurestore.typepad.com
WordPress, like Blogger, is free and easy to use. Unlike Blogger, WordPress imposes more restrictions on its users and offers certain upgrades for a fee. WordPress also makes an open-source, blogging program that you can install on your own web server if you have one, much like Six Apart's Movable Type (see description of TypePad above). You can find information about this aspect of WordPress at http://www.wordpress.org. This downloadable software is substantially more flexible than the service offered through WordPress.com.
Functionality and Ease-of-Use:
+ Non-Blog Pages: Ability to create web pages that aren't blogs (like an "About Me" page).
- Regulation: More restrictions on controversial content and marketing than most sites.
= Code Access: No access to template codes unless you purchase the upgrade.
Features:
Terms of Service: Here are portions of WordPress's terms of service that may be relevant to journalists. Each bulleted summary is followed by the actual text in smaller print.
From WordPress's Terms of Service
Advertising: Users cannot add Adsense, Yahoo, Chitika and other ads services to their blogs. WordPress will block advertisements that are inserted when using an external blogging program. WordPress also prohibits:
A discrete link to your business in the sidebar or an "About" page is permitted. WordPress also allows one discreet link to Amazon per blog, so long as the primary purpose of the blog is not to drive traffic to the affiliate program.
In the site's own words:
Taken from http://faq.wordpress.com/2005/12/08/adsense/
Cost: WordPress will host your blog for free, but requires a paid upgrade for certain services.
Example Site: http://www.problogger.net
Putting aside the possible legal challenges to anonymity for the time being, there are some practical considerations that you should think about before deciding to carry out your online publishing activities anonymously or pseudonymously.
There are good reasons to publish your blog or website under your real name. Using your real name tends to increase your credibility. Many readers will be inclined to discount anything published anonymously, and for other readers it creates a presumption of unreliability that can be difficult to overcome. You may want to distance yourself from these assumptions, even if you find them unjustifiable. Using your real name may also help you develop a reputation as a quality provider of information and/or commentary. Finally, using your real name promotes transparency. If people know who you are, it is easier for them to determine whether you have a potential bias or conflict of interest when it comes to certain topics.
On the other hand, you may have compelling reasons to publish your blog or website anonymously or pseudonymously. Publishing anonymously may protect you from retaliation by those who don't like what you write. This is a real possibility if you write about those with power over you such as your employer or engage in whistleblower activity. You could be harassed or fired from your job for what you write, even if the person who objects to your speech does not have a valid legal claim against you. In some places, what you write could threaten your safety or lead to your arrest and detention by political authorities. In these situations, there are good reasons for hiding your online identity. Alternatively, you may want to engage in lively debate on local politics without being judged based on widely known personal attributes, or you might want to discuss sensitive topics without being discovered by friends and family. These reasons, while less dramatic, are no less justifiable.
As we discuss in the Potential Legal Challenges to Anonymity section of this guide, you should be aware that publishing anonymously or pseudonymously will not necessarily stop someone from bringing a "John Doe" lawsuit against you and using court procedures to obtain your identity from your Internet service provider or web host. It is a misconception that you can act with impunity when you post anonymously or pseudonymously. However, the law does provide some protection for anonymous online speech. You can read more about these protections in the section on Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech.
In the end, this is a personal decision, and you will have to decide based on your own preferences and assessment of the relevant risks.
The legal guide sections listed below deal with legal and technical issues surrounding anonymous speech online:
There are a number of excellent resources that you can use to learn how to maintain your anonymity online. The details of these strategies are beyond the scope of this guide, but we provide links to some of them below. Keep in mind that there are two broad categories of techniques for maintaining anonymity online:
First, there are tactics relating to the kind of information that you reveal on your website or blog. These tactics will not disguise your IP address, and this information could be disclosed if someone subpoenas your ISP, web host, or email provider.
Second, there are technical means and other strategies you can use to disguise your IP address or make it difficult for someone to associate a specific IP address with you personally. If you carry these out successfully, then information about your identity will not be available, even if someone subpoenas your ISP, web host, or email provider. Note, however, that successfully disguising your IP address takes a great deal of care and involves some hassles and inconvenience.
Here are some links to useful resources on the topic:
A common misconception is that you cannot be sued for blogging or posting material anonymously or pseudonymously because your identity is forever hidden. In fact, there are legal procedures that individuals, companies, and the government can use to discover the identity of an anonymous or pseudonymous online speaker under certain circumstances.
In the civil litigation context, the legal system provides for a kind of lawsuit called a "John Doe" lawsuit, in which a plaintiff sues an unknown defendant -- for example, an anonymous blogger who allegedly libeled the plaintiff or revealed the plaintiff's confidential information. These suits may also be called "Jane Doe" or "Jean Doe" suits if it appears that the anonymous defendant is female. Once a party has filed a John Doe lawsuit, the rules of court procedure give the plaintiff tools to uncover the defendant's identity.
The most important of these tools is a subpoena: a legal order commanding the person or organization named in the subpoena to provide information or testimony at a specified time and place about a matter concerned in an investigation or a legal proceeding. In this type of case, the party issuing the subpoena usually demands that your Internet service provider (ISP), email provider, or web host produce documents or information that will reveal your identity.
You should be aware that sometimes plaintiffs file John Doe lawsuits against anonymous Internet users only to expose their identities, not because they want to pursue a legally valid claim against them.
How can you protect yourself from being exposed through a lawsuit?There are technical precautions you can take to protect your anonymity, so that, even if someone issues a subpoena to your ISP, email provider, or web host, those sources will not have useful information about your identity. Please see the How to Maintain Your Anonymity Online section of this guide for details.
You also have the legal right to contest a subpoena seeking to reveal your identity. You usually do this by filing a "motion to quash" the subpoena, which is discussed below.
What happens when a subpoena is issued?What happens when a subpoena to reveal your identity is issued depends a lot on whether you know about it. If you don't know about the subpoena, then you cannot challenge it in court, and your service provider may give up your identity without much of a fight. Luckily, the chances of you knowing about the subpoena are good (or at least they are getting better). If you find out about a subpoena demanding the disclosure of your identity, you should consider hiring a lawyer and moving to "quash" (i.e., challenge) the subpoena.
How will you know about the subpoena?The hard reality is that there is no assurance that you will know when a subpoena is issued.
Nevertheless, it is becoming more and more common for service providers to notify their clients before responding to subpoenas that ask for identifying information. You might check with your ISP or e-mail service about its policy ahead of time. Some service providers have clauses in their terms of use or privacy policy stating that they make efforts to notify customers before responding to subpoenas of this kind. Please see the section entitled Getting Your Words and Other Content Out to the World for details on locating a web host or service provider that helps protect your anonymity. In the past, some ISPs have even taken it upon themselves to challenge subpoenas asking for identifying information about their clients.
Furthermore, courts in many states require that a plaintiff make reasonable efforts to notify the anonymous Internet speaker before obtaining disclosure of his or her identity. Unfortunately, this requirement only comes up if the plaintiff is required by state procedure to request permission from a court in order to issue the subpoena (which is often the case when a subpoena is issued very early in a lawsuit). The required efforts often including posting a notice about the subpoena on the website or message board where the complained-of statements appeared. Alternatively, the plaintiff may ask the service provider to send a notice to the anonymous poster (the ISP, email provider, or web host usually will have the email and/or physical address of the client, hence the reason for the subpoena in the first place).
Keep in mind, however, that neither of these practices is universal, and there is no guarantee that you will be notified before your identity is disclosed.
If you are notified about a subpoena, how can you protect your identity?In general, judges do not review subpoenas as they are issued. Instead, you need to file a motion to block (or, in legal jargon, "quash") the subpoena.
The amount of time you have to file a motion to quash the subpoena is usually short -- typically around seven days -- so you need to move fast. You should ask your ISP or other provider for a copy of the subpoena, so that you can determine the court under whose authority the subpoena was issued. Assuming you want to challenge the subpoena, you should also contact a lawyer who can file a motion to quash with that court. Because of the generally short time limit for responding to subpoenas, your lawyer may need to file a request for an extension of time to file the motion.
In finding a lawyer to represent you, one option is to contact a local lawyer. Also, there are certain public interest groups, such as Public Citizen and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, that advocate for free speech online and might be interested in assisting you.
You may want to point your lawyer in the direction of the following cases, which are highly protective of Internet anonymity:
You may also want to show your lawyer the following briefs for purposes of crafting legal arguments:
For more information on the legal standards applied by courts before allowing a plaintiff to uncover an Internet speaker's identity, see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section and your relevant state law section on anonymous speech in this guide.
Keep in mind that it might not always be worth it to challenge a subpoena seeking disclosure of your identity. It can be a costly process involving high legal fees, and there is no guarantee that hiring a lawyer will enable you to successfully challenge the subpoena. You should think carefully about whether your anonymity is worth the time and money required to protect it.
Because of these risks and costs associated with fighting a subpoena, you are better off taking steps to minimize the identifying information you provide about yourself if anonymomity is important to you. You'll find some useful information in this regard in the How to Maintain Your Anonymity Online section of the guide.
For more information on responding to subpoenas, see the section on Responding to Subpoenas in this guide. For information about defending against lawsuits generally, please see the Responding to Legal Threats section.
Say that you receive notice that a someone has subpoenaed your ISP for information about your identity, and you move to quash (i.e., block or challenge) the subpoena. How will a court decide whether or not to allow the plaintiff to uncover your identity? This is a complex question that quickly brings us into a realm full of technical legal language and concepts. For those interested, this section and the State Law: Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section that go with it delve into some of the details. If this makes your eyes glaze over, don't worry -- this section could be a good place for your lawyer to begin research.
Courts have recognized that the right to speak anonymously and pseudonymously is part of the First Amendment right to free speech, and accordingly some level of scrutiny is required before stripping an anonymous Internet speaker of that right. At the same time, those harmed by unlawful anonymous speech -- whether by defamation, misappropriation of trade secrets, or whatever else -- also have a right to seek compensation for their injury. When considering a subpoena or other discovery request seeking to unmask a speaker, courts attempt to balance these two competing rights.
While the courts in various jurisdictions have struck this balance in different ways, there is a growing consensus among courts that a would-be plaintiff must make a substantial legal and factual showing that his/her claim has merit before a court will unmask an anonymous or pseudonymous Internet speaker. In other words, these courts require a plaintiff trying to unmask an Internet speaker to bring forward a substantial amount of evidence to support the underlying legal claim (i.e., evidence that the anonymous speaker actually defamed the plaintiff or committed some other unlawful act that injured the plaintiff). These courts also impose a requirement that the plaintiff provide notice to the speaker whose identity is sought and an adequate opportunity to respond.
Here are some of the cases applying a heightened standard: Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009); Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 954-57 (D.C. 2009); Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 2009 WL 320408, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2009); A.Z. v. Doe, 2010 WL 816647 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 8, 2010); Swartz v. Doe, No. 08C-431 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 2009); Zherka v. Bogdanos, 08 Civ. 2062 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal.App. 4th 1154 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254-56 (D. Conn. 2008); Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 F. Supp.2d 1205, 1216 (D. Nev. 2008); Mobilisa v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 720-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Greenbaum v. Google, 845 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007); In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 822-23 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Reunion Indus. v. Doe, 2007 WL 1453491 (Penn. Ct. Comm. Pleas Mar. 5, 2007); McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp.2d 259, 268 (D. Mass. 2006); Best Western Int'l v. Doe, 2006 WL 2091695, at * (D. Ariz. 2006); Highfields Capital Mgmt. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp.2d 969, 975-76 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Dendrite International v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001).
There are some older cases that allowed a would-be plaintiff to uncover the identity of a John Doe defendant without making a substantial evidentiary showing that the claim has merit, but subsequent cases have largely abandoned these approaches. See, e.g. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 2000 WL 1210372 (Vir. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000) (requiring the plaintiff to show only that his claim was made in good faith, and not out of an intent to harass); Columbia Insurance v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (applying a "motion to dismiss" standard that requires only that a plaintiff make allegations that, if true, would entitle her to a legal remedy).
Courts generally apply a different test when the party seeks the identity of an online speaker to serve as a witness, rather than as a defendant in a John Doe lawsuit. These courts adopt a four-part test that requires the court to consider whether (1) the subpoena was issued in good faith; (2) the information sought relates to a core claim or defense; (3) the identifying information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense; and (4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove the claim or defense is unavailable from any other source. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 2010 WL 786275 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010); Sedersten v. Taylor, 2009 WL 4802567 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009); Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Was. 2001), and Enterline v. Pocono Medical Ctr., 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008).
Keep in mind that the cases discussed on this page are defamation cases and other lawsuits where speech played a critical role. Most copyright infringement lawsuits, especially those relating to peer-to-peer file sharing, fit into an entirely different category, even though they sometimes involve anonymous actors. According to an important case in this area, Sony Music Entertainment v. Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), peer-to-peer file sharing "qualifies as speech, but only to a degree." Courts in copyright cases thus tend to impose relatively lenient standards on plaintiffs before allowing discovery of an anonymous defendant's identity. Additionally, it usually is relatively easy for a plaintiff in a copyright case to provide basic evidence to support its claim. Therefore, if you are involved in a copyright infringement case, you should not assume that the First Amendment will protect our identity, even if you are in a state that applies a high-burden standard in defamation cases.
Another wrinkle: be aware that a plaintiff may try to disguise a defamation claim by characterizing it as a copyright infringement claim in order to take advantage of more lenient standards for uncovering your identity. If you get sued for copyright infringement, but you believe that the dispute is really about your criticism of the plaintiff, you should bring this to the attention of your lawyer and/or the court. In re Subpoena Issued Pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to: 43SB.com, 2007 WL 4335441 (D. Idaho 2007), provides a good example of a plaintiff trying to use copyright law to get around First Amendment protection for anonymous speech.
Make sure to check your state's page for cases in your jurisdiction on the First Amendment right to anonymous/pseudonymous speech.
Choose your state from the list below for more information on the legal protections for anonymous speech in your state:
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
In both cases where Arizona courts have considered attempts to unmask an anonymous online speaker, Arizona courts have applied tests that are highly protective of anonymous speech. The two cases are discussed below:
Mobilisa v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)In deciding whether to compel discovery, the trial court applied the "summary judgment" test from Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). This standard requires a plaintiff to make reasonable efforts to notify the anonymous poster about the pending discovery request and to put forward sufficient evidence for each element of its claim (other than those that are dependent on knowing the identity of the defendant). Initially, the court ruled against Mobilisa, but several months later it determined that Mobilisa had made a sufficient showing to justify unmasking the anonymous defendant. The email provider and anonymous defendant appealed.
On appeal,the Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the "summary judgment plus" standard set forth in Dendrite Int'l v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). There are two levels to this test. First, as in the summary judgment test, the plaintiff must put forward sufficient evidence to support its claim. Second, if the plaintiff has put forward enough evidence, the court then must independently balance the strength of the plaintiff's case and need for disclosure against the strength of the speaker's claim to First Amendment protection. Only if the plaintiff's interests outweigh the First Amendment values at stake should the court order disclosure. The appellate court indicated that the balancing test would consider "the type of speech involved, the speaker's expectation of privacy, the potential consequence of a discovery order to the speaker and others similarly situated, the need for the identity of the speaker to advance the requesting party's position, and the availability of alternative discovery methods." The court rejected Mobilisa's argument that a more lenient standard should apply because the lawsuit was based on a property claim (unauthorized "hacking" of a computer system) rather than defamation.
Applying this standard, the appellate court upheld the trial court's earlier determination that Mobilisa had produced sufficient evidence to pass the "summary judgment" test. It remanded the case, however, so that the trial court could apply the extra balancing test.
Best Western International v. Doe, 2006 WL 2091695 (D. Ariz. 2006)Best Western International (BWI) is a non-profit corporation whose members own and operate hotels under the Best Western name. Some of these members used a forum site -- www.freewrites.com -- to communicate amongst themselves, often anonymously. When BWI proposed some changes in company policy, a flurry of commentary went up on the forum. BWI sued the forum's anonymous administrator and several anonymous posters over messages on the site, which BWI claimed were defamatory, revealed confidential information, infringed Best Western's trademark, and harmed the company in a variety of other ways. BWI filed a motion for expedited discovery, requesting permission to serve subpoenas on various Internet service providers to uncover the identities of the anonymous defendants.
Following Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), the court adopted a "summary judgment" standard and denied BWI's motion to expedite discovery. It concluded that BWI had not produced sufficient evidence to overcome the defendants' qualified First Amendment right to engage in anonymous speech. The court stressed that BWI had failed to identify a single false statement made by the anonymous defendants, a single item of confidential information posted on the site by them, or a single instance where BWI's mark was improperly used. The court left open the possibility that BWI could meet its required evidentiary showing on a renewed motion.
Note: This page covers information specific to California. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
The court decisions on anonymity in California are mixed. Columbia Insurance v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999), established a "motion to dismiss" standard that puts a relatively low burden on a plaintiff seeking to unmask an anonymous speaker, and other courts have followed it. Highfields Capital Management v. Doe, 385 F.Supp.2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005), applied a test influenced by Dendrite v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001). Finally, in Krinsky v. Doe 6, H030767 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2008), a California appellate court applied a standard that requires a plaintiff to make a "prima facie" showing on its underlying legal claim, where "prima facie" means bringing forward sufficient evidence for each of element within his or her control.
Columbia Insurance v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999)The Columbia Insurance Company owned the trademark rights associated with See's Candy Shops. Several unknown persons registered the domain names seescandy.com and seescandys.com with Network Solutions. Columbia Insurance sued these anonymous persons for a variety of claims, including trademark infringement and unfair competition. The company requested a temporary restraining order against the defendants' activities. Because imposing the restraining order would be impossible without knowing the defendants' identities, the court considered whether to allow "pre-action" discovery to obtain this information from Network Solutions.
The court announced four criteria for plaintiffs to satisfy before allowing such discovery: (1) the plaintiff should identify the anonymous party specifically enough that the court can determine that the defendant is a real person or entity that could be sued in federal court; (2) the plaintiff should identity all steps previously taken to find the defendant; (3) the plaintiff should establish that their suit could withstand a motion to dismiss; (4) the plaintiff should inform the court of the reasons for its discovery request and identify parties the parties upon which it requests the discovery be served.
The court rendered the "motion to dismiss" standard somewhat vague by indicating that a plaintiff "must make some showing that an act giving rise to liability actually occurred." Ordinarily, a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss simply by making allegations in the complaint that, if true, would entitle them to a legal remedy. The "some showing" language suggests that some kind of evidence might be required. On the other hand, the court stated that the "some showing" requirement was satisfied precisely because "[p]laintiff has demonstrated that their trademark infringement claim could survive a motion to dismiss." This injects some uncertainty into the test.
Later decisions by courts in California have not cleared up this uncertainty. In Rocker Management v. John Does 1 Through 20, the court was able to reject the plaintiff's claims under a "motion to dismiss" standard based on the plaintiff's insufficient pleadings alone. The court in Highfields Capital Management, meanwhile, cited Seescandy.com as requiring the plaintiff to make at least some evidentiary showing.
Highfields Capital Management v. Doe, 385 F.Supp.2d 969 (N.D. Cal. 2005)Highfields Capital Management (HCM) was the largest shareholder of the company Silicon Graphics. In a Yahoo! Finance chat room devoted to Silicon Graphics, an anonymous poster using the pseudonym "highfieldscapital" made statements implying that HCM was profiting at the expense of the company's other investors. HCM sued the anonymous poster in Massachusetts for commercial disparagement and trademark infringement and subpoenaed Yahoo! in the Northern District of California for information regarding the identity of highfieldscapital and another poster. The anonymous defendant moved to quash the subpoena. A federal magistrate judge considered the motion and recommended quashing the subpoena.
The magistrate used a test akin to that applied in Dendrite v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001), and Mobilisa v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). Under this test, first the plaintiff is required put forward substantial evidence that "if unrebutted, tend[s] to support a finding of each fact that is essential to a given cause of action." Second, if the plaintiff passes this hurdle, the court is required balance the competing potential harms to the plaintiff versus to the defendant. The plaintiff must succeed on both counts in order to obtain disclosure.
In this case, the magistrate found that the plaintiff had not put forward enough evidence to pass the first hurdle, and so recommended quashing the subpoena. Further, although the plaintiff did not reach the second hurdle, it stated that the plaintiff would not satisfy it because of the strong First Amendment interests of the defendant and minimal threat to the plaintiff.
The district court accepted the magistrate's reasoning over HCM's objection and granted the anonymous defendant's motion to quash.
Krinsky v. Doe 6, H030767 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2008)
Lisa Krinsky, a former officer of SFBC International, Inc., sued ten anonymous defendants over comments about her posted to a Yahoo! message board. According to court papers, the anonymous forum posters made "scathing verbal attacks" against SFBC, Krinsky, and fellow corporate officers. Krinsky filed a lawsuit in Florida state court in January 2006, alleging defamation and intentional interference with contractual relations. She served a subpoena on Yahoo! in California, seeking the identities of the anonymous forum posters.
After Yahoo! notified the posters, one of them -- Doe 6 -- filed a motion to quash the subpoena in California state court. The court denied the motion to quash, noting (quite strangely) that Doe 6's conduct "appeared to be similar to federal cases involving "'pump and dump' stock manipulation efforts," although no claim to that effect was in Krinsky's complaint.
In February 2008, a California appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling. In doing so, it applied a test that requires a plaintiff to make a "prima facie showing" that he or she has a valid legal claim against the anonymous speaker before allowing disclosure of the speaker's identity. The court made it clear that a prima facie showing required Krinsky to bring forward evidence (not just allegations) to support each element of her defamation and interference with contract claims, except for those elements that were beyond her control or dependent on the identity of the defendant.
Applying this standard, the court held that Krinsky had not made a prima facie showing on her defamation claim because the message board comments, viewed in context, constituted opinion protected by the First Amendment rather than statements of fact about Krinsky. The court further held that Krinsky could not make a prima facie showing on her interference with contract claim because this claim was based on the same constitutionally protected opinion.
Note: This page covers information specific to Connecticut. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
In Connecticut, the law on what test or standard to apply when a plaintiff seeks to uncover the identity of an anonymous Internet speaker is not entirely clear. One court, in La Societe Metro Cash & Carry France v. Time Warner Cable, 2003 WL 22962857 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003), applied an unusual standard that derives from Connecticut's case law on an obscure procedure known as a "bill of discovery." A federal case, Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008), applied a test similar to that applied in Dendrite International v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001).
La Societe Metro Cash & Carry France v. Time Warner Cable, 2003 WL 22962857 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003)La Societe Metro Cash & Carry France sought a "bill of discovery" in Connecticut state court compelling Time Warner Cable to disclose the identity of an individual who allegedly sent an anonymous email to several of its regional directors accusing the company of deceptive and unethical business practices. The request was based on an ex parte order of a French court requiring Time Warner to give up this information. Time Warner notified its subscriber of the Connecticut action, and she intervened through counsel to oppose the bill.
The court granted the bill of discovery. It applied an unusual standard with two requirements. First, the plaintiff must show that what it seeks is necessary to mount a claim or defense in another action, and that it has no other way of obtaining the desired material. Second, the plaintiff must "demonstrate by detailed facts that there is probable cause to bring a potential cause of action." It defined "probable cause" as "knowledge of facts sufficient to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has reasonable grounds for presenting an action . . . Its existence or nonexistence is determined by the court on the facts found."
The court found that La Societe Metro had put forward enough evidence to establish probable cause that it had suffered damages as a result of the defamatory action of the anonymous emailer (potentially under French law), and that it was seeking information about her identity in good faith and not for any improper purpose.
Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008)
In Doe I v. Individuals, the plaintiff, a former Yale law school student, sought the identity of a pseudonymous comment going by "AK47", who allegedly made defamatory, threatening, and harassing comments about her on the AutoAdmit website.
The court applied a test similar to that applied in Dendrite International v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001). The court looked at the following factors: (1) whether the plaintiff has undertaken efforts to notify the anonymous posters and withheld action to afford the fictitiously named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition; (2) whether the plaintiff has identified and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that the plaintiff alleges are actionable speech; (3) the specificity of the discovery request and whether there is an alternative means of obtaining the information called for in the subpoena; (4) whether there is a central need for the subpoenaed information to advance the plaintiff's claims; (5) the subpoenaed party's expectation of privacy at the time the online material was posted; and (6) whether the plaintiff has made a concrete showing as to each element of a prima face case against the defendant.
The court concluded that the plaintiff satisfied all these requirements, including producing sufficient evidence supporting a prima face case for libel, and thus denied the defendant's motion to quash.
Note: This page covers information specific to Delaware. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Delaware courts apply a protective standard before permitting disclosure of an anonymous Internet speaker's identity. The leading case is Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), in which the Supreme Court of Delaware announced a "summary judgment" standard, which requires a plaintiff to bring forward sufficient evidence on those elements of its claim that are within its control. This is one of the most influential cases in this area of law.
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005)Several anonymous Internet users posted negative comments about local politician Patrick Cahill on a blog. Cahill and his wife sued four anonymous defendants for defamation. Through discovery, the plaintiffs determined that Comcast was the ISP for one of the anonymous posters and subpoenaed Comcast for information about the poster's identity. After being notified of the subpoena, the anonymous defendant filed a motion for a protective order to prevent disclosure.
The trial court, in Cahill v. John Doe-Number One, 879 A.2d 943 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005), applied a "good faith" standard to the subpoena, citing the Virginia case In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 2000 WL 1210372 (Vir. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000). The court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied this standard and ordered Comcast to comply with the subpoena. The anonymous defendant appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware rejected the trial court's "good faith" test as "too easily satisfied to protect sufficiently a defendant's right to speak anonymously." Instead, it announced a more rigorous standard. Under this standard, first the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to notify the anonymous defendant of the subpoena. Second, the plaintiff must put forward enough evidence on each element of the claim that it would survive a motion for "summary judgment." Surviving a motion for "summary judgment" mean that the plaintiff can bring forward enough evidence to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute on each of the key elements of its claim. The court loosened the standard in one important respect: a plaintiff need not put forward evidence on those elements of its claim that are beyond its control (meaning that they are difficult to prove without knowing who the defendant is), such as elements involving the defendant's state of mind.
Applying this test, the court found that the defendant's statements were "incapable of a defamatory meaning," and therefore the plaintiffs' evidence was not sufficient to pass the summary judgment test. Moreover, because the defendant's statements were not defamatory, the court ordered the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs' entire claim.
The CMLP has not identified any relevant cases addressing the level of protection for anonymous speech in Florida. For information about the legal protections courts have applied in other jurisdictions, please see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
If you know about an Internet anonymity case in Florida, please contact us.
The CMLP has not identified any relevant cases addressing the level of protection for anonymous speech in Georgia. For information about the legal protections courts have applied in other jurisdictions, please see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
If you know about an Internet anonymity case in Georgia, please contact us.
Illinois has relatively little case law on the First Amendment right to anonymous/pseudonymous speech, though a decision is expected soon in Holsten v. Uptown Update and What the Helen.
One decision, Alton Telegraph v. Illinois, 08-MR-548 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2009), deals with whether a newspaper can invoke the Illinois shield law to protect the identity of anonymous commenters.
Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co., 3-08-0805 (Ill. App. Ct. June 1, 2010)
Plaintiffs had sought the identities of a pseudonymous commenter that had posted allegedly defamatory statements in comments on articles posted on the website of a local newspaper. The lower court applied a modified version of the Dendrite and Cahill test and dismissed plaintiffs' petition for discovery of the commenter's identity. The appeals court rejected the proposition that "anonymous speech, in and of itself, warrants constitutional protection," and accordingly found that there was "no need for the additional procedural requirements articulated in the Dendrite-Cahill test." Slip op. at 11-12. Instead, the court determined that the only test a lower court should apply to a petition seeking the identity of an anonymous commenter was that set forth in Supreme Court Rule 224, which requires the plaintiff to establish all elements of a claim for defamation. Id. at 13-14. The court specifically rejected any additional requirement to balance the commenter's First Amendment rights, and further rejected the application of a summary judgment standard, rather than a motion to dismiss standard, to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims. Id
AltonTelegraph v. Illinois, 08-MR-548 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2009)
In Alton Telegraph v. Illinois, an Illinois trial court denied in part the Alton Telegraph’s motion to quash a subpoena issued by state prosecutors seeking the identity of five pseudonymous posters who commented on a Telegraph story about an ongoing murder investigation. The court rejected the Alton Telegraph’s argument that the pseudonymous commenters were “sources” protected by the Illinois shield law.
While acknowledging in the abstract that commenters could serve as sources, the court ruled that these commenters were not sources because the Telegraph reporter did not use any information supplied by them “in researching, investigating, or writing the article,” and “none of the comments were written until after the article was published.” Slip op. at 5. In the alternative, the court ruled that, even if the shield law did apply to the case, the state had “satisfied its burden to divest the Telegraph of its privilege” because it had exhausted all other sources of information and the sources were relevant. Id. at 6. Nevertheless, the court granted the motion to quash with respect to three of the commenters because their comments did not contain the same highly relevant information and “appear[ed] to be nothing more than conversation/discussion.” Id. at 7. Neither the court nor the parties raised the issue of the commenters’ First Amendment rights to speak anonymously.
The CMLP has not identified any relevant cases addressing the level of protection for anonymous speech in Indiana. For information about the legal protections courts have applied in other jurisdictions, please see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
If you know about an Internet anonymity case in Indiana, please contact us.
Note: This page covers information specific to Louisiana. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
One Louisiana court has addressed the situation of a plaintiff seeking to compel an ISP to disclose the identity of an anonymous Internet speaker. The court applied an ill-defined test, requiring the plaintiff to show either a "reasonable probability" or "reasonable possibility" of success on its claim, depending on the type of speech involved.
In re Baxter, 2001 WL 34806203 (W.D. La. 2001)Anonymous Internet users criticized Richard Baxter, an administrator at the University of Louisiana-Monroe, on a website called "Truth@ULM.com," which was hosted by Homestead Technologies. In preparation for a lawsuit against the anonymous posters for defamation, Baxter filed a "miscellaneous case" in federal court seeking to take discovery from Homestead Technologies about the anonymous posters' identities. In that action, Baxter moved for a court order compelling Homestead to provide this information, and one of the anonymous defendants moved to intervene in order to object.
In deciding the two motions, the district court announced its own, unique test for determining when disclosure of an anonymous defendant's identity is justified. Unfortunately, the test is confusing, and the court's description of it is muddled. The test has different requirements based on whether the speech in question relates to a matter of public or private concern, and whether the plaintiff is a public figure. When the speech relates to a matter of public concern or the plaintiff is a public figure, the plaintiff must show a "reasonable possibility" of success on the merits of the claim. When the speech relates to a matter of private concern, the plaintiff must show a "reasonable probability" of success on the merits of the claim. Apparently, a "reasonable possibility" is less demanding than a "reasonable probability," but the court never makes clear the precise distinction.
More importantly, the court never explains whether actual evidence or mere allegations are required to show either a "reasonable possibility" or "reasonable probability." In deciding to grant Baxter's motion to compel disclosure, the court relied on the offending Internet postings (i.e., actual evidence), but it seemed to assume that some statements were false and that they caused Baxter harm without requiring Baxter to bring forward evidence on these points. Overall, it is difficult to tell exactly what this test requires. Additionally, this test appears limited to defamation cases.
Note: This page covers information specific to Maryland. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Maryland courts apply a protective test before permitting
disclosure of an anonymous Internet speaker's identity. Among other
things, the courts require a plaintiff to bring forth sufficient
evidence for each element of its claim in order to justify disclosure.
In addition, and assuming the plaintiff can meet this burden, the
courts apply a balancing test, under which the strength of the
speaker's claim to First Amendment protection is balanced against the
strength of the plaintiff's underlying legal claim and the need for
disclosure of the speaker's identity. The leading case is the Maryland Court of Appeals decision in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009), discussed below.
Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009)
In Brodie, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial court’s order denying Independent Newspapers’ motion to quash a subpoena seeking the identity of five pseudonymous commenters. The plaintiff, Zebulon Brodie, sought the identities of the commenters to pursue a defamation action against them over statements on a website forum criticizing Brodie for selling his historic home to another developer who allegedly burned it down and accusing Brodie of maintaining a dirty Dunkin' Donuts franchise. The Court of Appeals ruled that Brodie’s subpoena should have been quashed. In the process, it clarified the appropriate standard for the lower courts, indicating that “a test requiring notice and opportunity to be heard, coupled with a showing of a prima facie case and the application of a balancing test,” such as the Dendrite standard, “most appropriately balances a speaker's constitutional right to anonymous Internet speech with a plaintiff's right to seek judicial redress from defamatory remarks.” 966 A.2d at 456.
The Court of Appeals spelled out a five-part test, under which a court should take the following steps before ordering disclosure of the identity of an anonymous or pseudonymous speaker: (1) require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, including posting a message of notification of the discovery request on the message board; (2) withhold action to afford the anonymous posters a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application; (3) require the plaintiff to identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster, alleged to constitute actionable speech; (4) determine whether the complaint has set forth a prima facie defamation per se or per quod action against the anonymous posters; and (5) if all else is satisfied, balance the anonymous poster’s First Amendment right of free speech against the strength of the prima facie case of defamation presented by the plaintiff and the necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity. Id. at 457.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Brodie did not have a valid cause of action against the posters because statements made by certain posters were not actionable and the statute of limitations had run against other posters not named in Brodie’s complaint. See id. at 449.
For additional analysis, see CMLP: Maryland High Court Joins Growing Consensus Protecting Anonymous Speech Online.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
It is not yet clear what standard applies in Massachusetts when a plaintiff seeks to subpoena an ISP for information about an anonymous poster's identity. The one relevant Massachusetts case, McMann v. Doe, 460 F.Supp.2d 259 (D. Mass. 2006), indicated a willingness to adopt a Cahill-like "summary judgment" standard, but this reasoning was not necessary to its decision. The case thus has uncertain value as precedent.
McMann v. Doe, 460 F.Supp.2d 259 (D. Mass. 2006)According to court documents in the litigation, an anonymous internet user created a website critical of Paul McMann, a Massachusetts real estate developer. The website allegedly contained a photograph of Mr. McMann, the statement that he "turned lives upside down," and a suggestion to "be afraid, be very afraid." The website announced that it would soon be updated with specific evidence of McMann's alleged misdealings. McMann filed suit in federal court in Massachusetts, claiming that the unknown website operator defamed him, violated his statutory and common law right of privacy, and infringed his common-law copyright. McMann sought to subpoena two ISPs to discover the identity of the website operator.
The federal court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because McMann asserted only state-law claims and did not identify the citizenship of the anonymous defendant. Although this was sufficient to dispose of the case, the court stated alternative grounds for denying McMann's request for a subpoena and dismissing the case. The court indicated a willingness to follow Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), in which the Delaware Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must bring forth evidence sufficient to survive a motion for "summary judgment" on those claims within its control before obtaining disclosure of an anonymous speaker's identity. (Surviving a motion for summary judgment means that a plaintiff must bring forth sufficient evidence to support its claim, such that the case would ordinarily go to trial, with certain limitations.)
The McMann court expressed some reservations about this standard, but ultimately determined that "it is reasonable to apply some sort of screen to the plaintiff's claim before authorizing the subpoena." The court determined that the plaintiff's claims failed under a summary judgment standard, but also under the more lenient "motion to dismiss" standard. (A motion to dismiss standard just looks at whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient, without requiring any evidence.) This reasoning creates uncertainty as to whether the court applied a summary judgment or motion to dismiss standard. The court's holding on subject-matter jurisdiction further casts doubt on the precedential value of this ruling.
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
In Michigan, there is little case law on the First Amendment right to anonymous/pseudonymous speech, so the issue of what test or standard to apply when a plaintiff seeks to uncover the identity of an anonymous Internet speaker is not entirely clear. The Michigan Court of Appeals, in Thomas M. Cooley Law School v. Doe et al., No. 307426 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2013), declined to adopt any special test providing additional First Amendment protection for anonymous speakers. Instead, it held that Michigan’s discovery rules adequately protect First Amendment interests. The Michigan Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue.
Thomas M. Cooley Law School v. Doe et al., No. 307426 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2013)
In Cooley, a former Cooley Law School student (“Doe 1”, posting pseudonymously as Rockstar05) posted allegedly defamatory statements about the law school on his website, “Thomas M. Cooley Law School Scam.” After filing a complaint against Doe 1 in a Michigan state trial court (Ingham County), the law school petitioned the San Francisco County Superior Court for a subpoena to obtain Doe 1’s identity from California-based Weebly, host of Doe 1’s website. The subpoena was issued, and Doe 1 filed a motion to quash the subpoena in . Doe 1’s motion was denied by the Michigan trial court, which adopted the a form of the First Amendment balancing test in Dendrite International v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001). Doe 1 appealed this order.
On appeal, the Court rejected the trial court’s application of a traditional First Amendment balancing test with respect to anonymous speech online, declining to adopt a test from either Dendrite International v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001) or Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). The Court of Appeals held that Michigan’s procedural rules already protected the anonymous speaker’s first amendment interests: “We conclude that Michigan procedures for a protective order [under Michigan Court Rule 2.302], when combined with Michigan procedures for summary disposition [under Michigan Court Rule 2.116(C)(8)], adequately protect a defendant's First Amendment interests in anonymity.” Under this standard, the Court held that the trial court need have only considered whether good cause existed to prevent enforcement of the subpoena and to what extent to grant relief. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed the trial court’s application of out-of-state law, and sent the case back to the trial court for a determination as to whether Doe 1 was entitled to have the subpoena quashed under Michigan’s own rules of procedure.
Note: This page covers information specific to Missouri. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Missouri law is unclear about exactly what test a court should apply in deciding whether to permit disclosure of an anonymous Internet speaker's identity to name that speaker as a defendant in a John Doe lawsuit. One case, Sedersten v. Taylor, 2009 WL 4802567 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009), addressed a situation where a party sought the identity of an online speaker to serve as a witness, rather than as a defendant.
Sedersten v. Taylor, 2009 WL 4802567 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009)
In Sedersten, a federal district court in the Western District of Missouri denied John Sedersten’s motion to compel The Springfield News-Leader to divulge the identity of "bornandraisedhere," a pseudonymous commenter who commented on an article on the News-Leader's website. The subpoena issued in conjunction with Sedersten's civil lawsuit against the City of Springfield, Missouri, Springfield's police chief, and a former Springfield police officer. The News-Leader article discussed county prosecutors' decision to drop charges against the police officer, a decision that "bornandraisedhere" sharply criticized. Gannett Missouri Publishing, the publisher of the News-Leader, objected to the subpoena, and Sedersten moved to compel the newspaper to turn over information.
The district court briefly reviewed the various standards applied by other courts in anonymous speech cases and determined that “a party seeking disclosure must clear a higher hurdle where the anonymous poster is a non-party.” 2009 Wl 4802567, at *2 (citing Doe v. 2TheMart.com,
140 F.Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Was. 2001)). The court adopted the four-part test applied in 2TheMart.com, which requires the court to consider whether (1) the subpoena was issued in good faith; (2) the information sought relates to a core claim or defense; (3) the identifying information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense; and (4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove the claim or defense is unavailable from any other source. Id. The court also explained that it would “keep in mind other First Amendment principles, such as the strict scrutiny applied to restrictions on political speech.” Id.
Applying this test, the court determined that “this is not the exceptional case that warrants disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identity.” Id. The court found that the evidence Sedersten sought to elicit from bornandraisedhere was cumulative, and that Sedersten could rely on the comments in making out his negligent hiring/retention case against the City without knowing the identity of the speaker. In addition, the court commented that, if bornandraisedhere was in fact the chief of police (a named defendant), then Sedersten could simply question the chief on the comments during a deposition. Id. at *2 n.5.
The court also rejected Sedersten’s argument that bornandraisedhere had waived First Amendment protection by agreeing to the News-Leader’s privacy policy, which reserved to the newspaper "the right to use, and to disclose to third parties, all of the information collected from and about [users] while [using] the Site in any way and for any purpose." Id. at *1, 3. The court was unconvinced by Sedersten’s reliance on “two sentences in a two-page document in which the overarching theme is that information provided by a user of the site may be used for various commercial purposes.” The court further explained that “[n]othing on the face of the privacy policy even hints a user may be waiving his or her constitutional right to anonymous free speech by posting comments or materials on the News-Leader’s website.” Id. at *3.
Note: This page covers information specific to Montana. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Montana has little case law on the First Amendment right to anonymous/pseudonymous speech, but one decision, Doty v. Molnar, No. DV 07-022 (Mont. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 2008), deals with whether a newspaper can invoke the Montana shield law to protect the identity of anonymous commenters.
Doty v. Molnar, No. DV 07-022 (Mont. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 2008)
Russell Doty, a former candidate for local political office in Montana, subpoenaed The Billings Gazette, seeking identifying information for three anonymous individuals who posted comments to an article on the newspaper's website in 2008 using the pseudonyms "CutiePie," "Always, wondering," and "High Plains Drifter." Doty issued the subpoena in connection with a defamation lawsuit against his former political rival, Brad Molnar, in which he alleged that Molnar made false statements in 2004 concerning Doty's qualifications to run for office.
Doty alleged that Molnar was one of the pseudonymous posters (Molnar denied this in a deposition), and that the other posters might serve as witnesses about the harm to his reputation caused by Molnar's 2004 statements. The Billings Gazette filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that Montanta's shield law protected it from having to disclose the commenters' IP and email addresses.
On September 3, 2008, Judge Todd Baugh of Montana's 13th Judicial District granted the motion to quash, ruling that Montana's shield law protected the commenters' identifying information. Montana's shield law says that a news organization or any person "connected with or employed by [a news organization] for the purpose of gathering, writing, editing, or disseminating news” may not be required to "disclose any information obtained or prepared or the source of that information . . . if the information was gathered, received, or processed in the course of [a reporter's] employment or [a news organization's] business." Mont. Code § 26-1-902(1). Judge Baugh agreed with the Gazette's argument that this language is broad enough to encompass data gathered when a newspaper website user posts a comment.
Note: This page covers information specific to New Hampshire. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
We are eagerly awaiting the New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision on appeal from The Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc., No. 08-E-0572 (N.H. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2009), a case in which a New Hampshire trial court ordered the publishers of the mortgage industry watchdog site, The Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter ("ML-Implode"), to turn over the identity of an anonymous source who provided ML-Implode with a copy of a financial document prepared by The Mortgage Specialists, Inc. for submission to the New Hampshire Banking Department. The court also ordered ML-Implode to reveal the identity of a pseudonymous commenter who allegedly posted defamatory statements about the company, and enjoined ML-Implode from re-posting the financial document or the allegedly defamatory comments.
Although ML-Implode argued that both New Hampshire’s common law reporter’s privilege and the First Amendment right to speak anonymously protected the identities of the source and commenter, the Superior Court Judge ordered disclosure without dealing with either of these arguments directly. Instead, the court reasoned that the case was not a “press issue” because Mortgage Specialists was “willing to hold [ML-Implode] harmless with respect to the publication of [the objectionable] information,” and “[a]ll it wants from the respondent is the identity of the individual or entity which provided unauthorized information to [ML-Implode] and also the identity of the entity or individual that made allegedly defamatory statements about the petitioner to the respondent.” Slip op. at 4. With respect to the pseudonymous comments, the court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding the elements of the underlying defamation claim.
For details on the lower court's decision, see CMLP, New Hampshire Court Tramples on Constitution, Reporter's Privilege, Section 230,What Have You
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
New Jersey courts apply a protective test before permitting disclosure of an anonymous Internet speaker's identity. Among other things, the courts require a plaintiff to bring forth sufficient evidence for each element of its claim in order to justify disclosure. In addition, and assuming the plaintiff can meet this burden, the courts apply a balancing test, under which the strength of the speaker's claim to First Amendment protection is balanced against the strength of the plaintiff's underlying legal claim and the need for disclosure of the speaker's identity.
Three New Jersey cases applying this standard are discussed below:
Dendrite v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001)Dendrite International, a company that developed and serviced software for the pharmaceutical industry, brought a "John Doe" lawsuit in New Jersey state court against fourteen unnamed defendants, complaining about critical messages that they posted on Yahoo! message boards under pseudonyms. Dendrite claimed the messages were defamatory and revealed company trade secrets and sought permission from the court to take discovery from Yahoo regarding the identity of certain of the anonymous posters. The trial court allowed Dendrite to conduct limited discovery to find out the identities of John Does 1 and 2, who were current or former employees of the company, but rejected its request for an order compelling Yahoo to identify John Doe 3.
Dendrite appealed, and the New Jersey appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling. In its opinion, the court set out guidelines for lower courts to follow when faced with a request for an order compelling an ISP to reveal the identity of an anonymous Internet poster. The court developed a five-part test: (1) the plaintiff must make efforts to notify the anonymous poster and allow a reasonable time for him/her to respond; (2) the plaintiff must identify the exact statements made by the poster; (3) the complaint must set forth a prima facie cause of action; (4) the plaintiff must bring forth sufficient evidence for each element of its claim; and (5) the court must balance the strength of the speaker's claim to First Amendment protection against the strength of the plaintiff's underlying legal claim and the need for disclosure of the speaker's identity.
Applying the standard to the facts of the case, the appellate court held that Dendrite had failed to produce sufficient evidence for each element of its defamation claim. Specifically, the court held that Dendrite had not produced sufficient evidence of harm resulting from John Doe 3's statements.
Immunomedics v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773 (N.J. App. Div. 2001)An unknown internet user posted information on a Yahoo! message board about the company Immunomedics under the pseudonym moonshine_fr. Immunomedics claimed that moonshine_fr's postings suggested that she was a company employee, and therefore her postings breached the confidentiality agreement she had signed with the company. Immunomedics sued her in a "Jane Doe" suit and subpoenaed Yahoo! for information regarding moonshine_fr's identity. When informed of the subpoena, moonshine_fr filed a motion to quash it. The trial court denied the motion, and she appealed.
The appellate court applied the test created in Dendrite. The court determined that Immunomedics had produced sufficient evidence to support its claim that moonshine_fr was an employee and was thus subject to the company's confidentiality agreement. Without extensive analysis, the court also concluded that Immunomedics's need to identify moonshine_fr in order to enforce its confidentiality agreement outweighed her right to speak anonymously. Therefore, it affirmed the trial court's ruling allowing Immunomedics to subpoena Yahoo! for her identifying information.
A.Z. v. Doe, 2010 WL 816647 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 8, 2010)
In A.Z. v. Doe, a mid-level appeals court in New Jersey affirmed an order quashing a subpoena seeking subscriber information for a Gmail account. The plaintiff was a member of her high school’s “Cool Kids & Heroes” program, comprised of students of high academic achievement who pledged to maintain standards of “exemplary personal conduct.” An anonymous individual set up a Gmail account and sent an email to the faculty advisor for the Cool Kids & Heroes program stating that seven students, including the plaintiff, were “breaking their contracts, and breaking the law.” The email attached several photographs taken off Facebook showing students drinking and smoking pot. Only one of the photographs included the plaintiff, and it showed her standing at a ping pong table about to throw a ping pong ball, but it did not show her drinking or smoking.
The plaintiff filed a John Doe lawsuit against the sender of the email and subpoenaed Google, and the Doe defendant filed a motion to quash. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff failed to show that the strength of her prima facie case and the necessity for disclosure outweighed Doe’s First Amendment right to anonymous speech.
On appeal, the court adhered to the Dendrite standard and affirmed the trial court, though on different grounds. The appeals court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to unmask the defendant because she could not make out a prima facie case of defamation. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff presented no evidence that the statement she was “breaking [her] contract[], and breaking the law” was false. The court noted that the plaintiff “never provided a sworn statement that she was not consuming alcohol while underage, that the photograph was a forgery, that the photograph had been altered, or that she was not the person who was depicted in the photograph.” 2010 WL 816647, at *5. The court also found compelling additional photographs taken off Facebook that Doe submitted in support of the motion to quash. These photographs showed plaintiff holding and drinking alcoholic beverages along with the other students. Id. at *6. The court concluded: “We are satisfied that regardless of whether the balancing test embodied in Dendrite’s fourth prong is applied or not, no plaintiff is entitled to an order unmasking an anonymous author when the statements in question cannot support a cause of action for defamation.” Id. at *7.
Note: Another New Jersey court rejected an attempt to obtain information about the identity of anonymous Internet speakers in Donato v. Moldow. The court applied the Dendrite standard.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
New York law is unclear about exactly what test a court should apply in deciding whether to permit disclosure of an anonymous Internet speaker's identity. New York courts have applied a variety of different tests, though they all essentially require the plaintiff to make a substantial legal and factual showing before obtaining the identity of an anonymous Internet speaker. A number of the key cases are discussed below.
Greenbaum v. Google, 845 N.Y.S. 2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)
The blog "Orthomom" is operated anonymously. Comments critical of Pamela Greenbaum, a local school board member, appeared on the blog in January 2007. Greenbaum objected to both primary blog content and a user comment. In February 2007, Greenbaum filed a motion for "pre-commencement discovery" in New York state court, seeking to compel Google to disclose identifying information about the operator of the blog and a user. (Google owns Blogger, which is the blog hosting service for the Orthomom blog.) After being notified of Greenbaum's discovery request, Orthomom intervened and objected to disclosure of her identity, invoking First Amendment protection for anonymous speech.
In October 2007, the court denied Greenbaum's request for pre-commencement discovery and dismissed the lawsuit. In its order, the court recognized that the First Amendment protects the right of an anonymous poster to engage in speech on the Internet, and that courts must balance this right with the plaintiff's right to pursue a valid cause of action for defamation. The court expressed a willingness to follow the standard set forth in Dendrite v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), in which a New Jersey appellate court held that a plaintiff must produce evidence on each element of its claim and that the court must independently balance the need for disclosure against the First Amendment values at stake. The Greenbaum court indicated that it was not necessary to decide the precise standard to be applied, however, because "the statements on which [Greenbaum] seeks to base her defamation claim [were] plainly inactionable as a matter of law."
Thus, Greenbaum provides some support for applying the Dendrite test in New York, but it is not conclusive.
Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009)
In Cohen, a New York state trial court granted model Liskula Cohen pre-suit discovery from Google to reveal the identity of the anonymous publisher of the “Skanks in NYC” blog. Cohen alleged that the blog author defamed her by calling her a “skank” and a “ho” and posting photographs of her in provocative positions with sexually suggestive captions, all creating the false impression that she is sexually promiscuous.
The court analyzed the discovery request under New York CPLR § 3102(c), which provides for discovery “to aid in bringing an action.” The court ruled that, under CPLR § 3102(c), a party seeking pre-action discovery must make a prima facie showing of a meritorious cause of action before obtaining the identity of an anonymous defendant. See 887 N.Y.S.2d at 426-27 & n.5. While acknowledging the First Amendment issues at stake and citing Dendrite, the court opined that New York law’s requirement of a prima facie showing “appear[s] to address the constitutional concerns raised in this context.” Id. at 427 n.5.
The court held that Cohen adequately made this prima facie showing of defamation, finding that the “skank” and “ho” statements, along with the sexually suggestive photographs and captions, conveyed a factual assertion that Cohen was sexually promiscuous, rather than an expression of protected opinion. Id. at 428-29. Somewhat confusingly, in rejecting the blogger’s argument that her statements should be viewed as opinion because “as a matter of law . . . Internet blogs serve as a modern day forum for conveying personal opinions, including invective and ranting,” the court cited an old case from Virginia, In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, 2000 WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct.), rev’d on other grounds, 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001), which applied a lenient “good faith” standard to a discovery request seeking the identity of an anonymous commenter. This reference is best understood as dicta, however, because the court invoked the case in dealing with a peripheral point. Furthermore, the AOL test is inconsistent with CPLR § 3102’s requirement of a “prima facie showing of a meritorious cause of action,” which the court invoked to sidestep First Amendment analysis. Id. at 427 n.5.
Ottinger v. The Journal News, No. 08-03892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 1, 2008)
In Ottinger v. The Journal News, former House Representative Richard Ottinger and his wife, June Ottinger, sought the identity of three pseudonymous posters to LoHud.com, an online news site operated by The Journal News that focuses on New York's Lower Hudson Valley. A New York state trial court denied the newspaper's motion to quash and ruled that it had to turn over the subpoeanaed information.
Ottinger and his wife subpoenaed The Journal News asking for identifying information for posters to the site's Mamaroneck community forum going by the psuedonyms "SAVE10543," "hadenough," and "aoxomoxoa." The posters allegedly made statements accusing the Ottingers of unsavory conduct in the course of a neighborhood dispute over their construction of a house in the Village of Mamaroneck, NY.The court applied the standard for protecting the First Amendment right to anonymous speech set forth in Dendrite v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), and found that the Ottingers had satisfied the standard.
A second judge later dismissed the Ottingers' subsequent defamation lawsuit against Stuart Tiekert, the commenter unmasked in the previous proceeding. In its ruling, the court invoked New York's anti-SLAPP law and ruled that the Ottingers "failed to demonstrate that their action has a substantial basis in fact or law."
Zherka v. Bogdanos, 08 Civ. 2062 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009)
In Zherka, a federal district court in the Southern District of New York granted The Journal News’ motion to quash subpoenas seeking the identities of three pseudonymous posters to a forum on the LoHud.com website. In ruling on the motion to quash, the court applied a multi-part test derived from Dendrite, Sony Music Entertainment v. Does, 326 F.Supp.2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), and Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008), which has the following elements: (1) the plaintiff must make a reasonable attempt to provide notice to the anonymous poster; (2) the plaintiff has to provide the court with the full statements which are at issue; (3) the plaintiff must make a concrete showing of a prima facie case; (4) the court should consider whether the information is available through alternate means; and (5) if all the other elements are satisfied, the court must balance the First Amendment interests of the anonymous posters against the need for disclosure in order to allow the plaintiff to proceed. Zherka, Tr. at 28-31.
Interestingly, the court indicated that the First Amendment interests of the posters under prong five would be diminished if the website privacy policy warned that identifying information would be disclosed in response to court order or other legal process. Id. at 28. The court did not provide detailed reasoning on this point.
In applying this standard, the court gave considerable weight to prong four, finding that the plaintiff had failed to pursue alternative means of identifying the posters and suggesting that the named defendants likely knew the posters’ identities. Id. at 30-31. The court gave the plaintiff permission to re-serve the subpoena after discovery between the named parties and stated that “it should be done with appropriate notice as outlined above, and with concurrent filing to me showing the full statements, laying out the prima facie case, and describing why there are no effective alternative means to get the information.” Id. at 32.
A number of anonymous internet users used a peer-to-peer network to exchange copyrighted music. Sony and other recording companies who owned the copyrights sued the anonymous internet users for copyright infringement and subpoenaed their ISP, Cablevision, for information that would reveal the defendants' identities. Cablevision notified the anonymous defendants, and several of them filed motions to quash.
In deciding on the motion to quash, the court held that peer-to-peer file sharing "qualifies as speech, but only to a degree." Therefore, the court determined that anonymous file-sharing activity should receive some First Amendment protection, but only to a limited degree. The court identified five factors for determining whether to allow disclosure of an anonymous Internet user's identity: (1) whether there is "a concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm"; (2) the specificity of the discovery request; (3) the absence of alternative means to gain the information; (4) whether the information subpoenaed is central to the plaintiff's claim; and (5) the anonymous party's expectation of privacy. The court found all five factors here to weigh towards the plaintiffs, and thus denied the defendants' motions to quash.
It is not entirely clear whether "a concrete showing of a prima facie claim of actionable harm" requires a plaintiff to put forth evidence, or whether a plaintiff can satisfy it with allegations alone. At times the court seems to suggest that allegations are enough, such as in the paragraph at page 9 of the linked opinion that begins, "Plaintiffs have alleged ownership of the copyrights ...." However, in the next paragraph, the court mentions the plaintiff's evidence, implying an evidentiary component to the "prima facie" inquiry. The "concrete showing" language itself also suggests an evidentiary requirement.
Later courts have interpreted Sony Music in different ways. The Greenbaum court described Sony Music as a "lesser standard" (as compared to Dendrite), and the general trend is for courts to consider Sony Music's standard to be plaintiff-friendly, with the "prima facie" requirement satisfied with little or no evidence. On the other hand, one court has characterized Sony Music as applying a test comparable to the summary judgment standard from Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). See Best Western International v. Doe, 2006 WL 2091695 (D. Ariz. 2006).
Note that, although Sony Music is a copyright infringement case, courts have applied its standard in other types of cases. For example, a federal court in New York applied the Sony Music test in General Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church v. Cablevision, 2004 WL 2904405 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), which involved anonymous "hacking" of a computer system. A New York state court applied it to a defamation case in Public Relations Society of America v. Road Runner High Speed Online, 799 N.Y.S. 2d 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005), which is discussed below.
Public Relations Society of America v. Road Runner High Speed Online, 799 N.Y.S. 2d 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)A staff member of the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) sent an anonymous email to PRSA's board of directors that was highly critical of the board and its executive director, Catherine Bolton. Bolton and PRSA brought a special proceeding in New York state court seeking "pre-action" discovery from Road Runner, the anonymous emailer's ISP. The anonymous defendant moved to intervene in the action in and to dismiss the petition for discovery.
In deciding whether to allow PRSA and Bolton to compel disclosure of the emailer's identity from Road Runner, the court adopted the Sony Music standard (discussed above). The court found all factors weighed in favor of granting disclosure, noting in particular that the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in this situation. The court applied Sony Music's "prima facie" standard as being roughly equivalent to a "motion to dismiss" standard, which looks at whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient, without requiring any evidence.
This case is significant because it applied a standard developed in the copyright infringement context to a defamation case.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Only one North Carolina case, Alvis Coatings v. John Does One through Ten, 2004 WL 2904405 (W.D.N.C. 2004), has considered what standard to apply before permitting disclosure of an anonymous Internet speaker's identity. The court applied a "prima facie" standard, but it is not entirely clear what that standard requires in North Carolina.
Alvis Coatings v. John Does One through Ten, 2004 WL 2904405 (W.D.N.C. 2004)According to court documents, ten anonymous internet users made postings on two online message boards that suggested that the company Alvis Coatings was deceiving its customers. Alvis Coatings sued the anonymous defendants for defamation, violations of federal trademark law, unfair competition, and other claims. Alvis Coatings successfully subpoenaed the websites that ran the message boards for the posters' IP addresses, and then subpoenaed two ISPs, Comcast and Roadrunner, for information revealing the identities of some of the posters. Comcast notified one of the posters, who filed a motion to quash the subpoena.
The district court's opinion is not a model of clarity. The court identified the applicable legal standard as follows: "where a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that an anonymous individual's conduct on the Internet is otherwise unlawful, the plaintiff is entitled to compel production of his identity in order to name him as a defendant and to obtain service of process." The court did not, however, explain exactly what "prima facie" means. Some statements in the opinion suggest that mere allegations might be sufficient -- for instance, the court characterized the relevant legal question as "whether an anonymous Internet speaker is entitled to maintain his anonymity in the face of allegations that his statements falsely impugned a federally-registered trademark or otherwise disparaged the complaining party's business."
On the other hand, in applying its standard, the court relied on statements made by the plaintiff's Chief Operating Officer, apparently in an affidavit (or maybe in a hearing). Unfortunately, the court used the word "avers" repeatedly when describing the Chief Operating Officer's testimony, which obscures the fact that these statements were evidence, not allegations in the complaint. The court concluded that the Chief Operating Officer had "credibly averred that the statements are both false and damaging to the Plaintiff's trademark and to its business generally," and that this was sufficient to compel disclosure of the defendant's identity. The court did not do any analysis explaining how this testimony satisfied the particular elements of any of the plaintiff's claims.
The CMLP has not identified any relevant cases addressing the level of protection for anonymous speech in Ohio. For information about the legal protections courts have applied in other jurisdictions, please see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
If you know about an Internet anonymity case in Ohio, please contact us.
Note: This page covers information specific to Oregon. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Oregon has little case law on the First Amendment right to anonymous/pseudonymous speech, but one decision, Doe v. TS, No. CV08030693 (Or. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2008), deals with whether a newspaper can invoke the Oregon shield law to protect the identity of anonymous commenters.
Doe v. TS, No. CV08030693 (Or. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2008)
In Doe v. TS, an Oregon state judge ruled that Oregon's media shield law, found at Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 44.510 to 44.540, protected the identity of anonymous commenters who posted allegedly defamatory statements on The Portland Mercury and Willamette Week websites.
According to the Portland Mercury, staff writer Amy Ruiz wrote a post in January 2008 about Portland mayoral candidate Sho Dozono. In the comments section, a site user going by "Ronald" posted negative comments about Dozono's ties to a local businessman, Terry Beard. The same commenter allegedly posted similar statements on the Willamette Week site. Proceeding anonymously, Beard filed a lawsuit against "Ronald" and other anonymous commenters and served a subpoena on The Portland Mercury and Williamette Week, seeking documents and records identifying them. When the two newspapers failed to produce responsive documents, Beard moved to compel them to produce documents identifying the anonymous commenters. The two newspapers teamed up to oppose the discovery request and won.
Judge James E. Redman of Clackamas County
Court did not treat the anonymous commenters as confidential
sources. Section 44.520(a) of the Oregon Revised
Statutes protects from disclosure "[t]he source of any
published or
unpublished information obtained by the person in the course of
gathering, receiving
or processing information for any medium of communication to the
public." Instead, the court relied on section
44.520(b), which protects "[a]ny unpublished
information obtained
or prepared by the person in the course of gathering, receiving or
processing
information for any medium of communication to the public." Section
44.510(1) defines "information" as including "any
written, oral, pictorial or
electronically recorded news or other data." The court
characterized "Ronald's" IP address as data.
On the question of whether the newspapers obtained this data in the course of newsgathering, Judge Redman drew a line based on the relevance of the blog comment to the post it's attached to:
If the comment had been totally unrelated to the blog post, then the argument could be made that the Portland Mercury did not receive it in the "course of gathering, receiving, or processing information for any medium of communication to the public." (source)
Concluding that the IP address fit within the shield law's "broad statutory language," the court denied Beard's motion to compel. Presumably, Beard will not be able to pursue the underlying lawsuit without the identity of the anonymous commenters.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Pennsylvania law is not entirely clear on what standard the courts will apply before permitting disclosure of an anonymous Internet speaker's identity. The most recent case on the subject, Reunion Industries v. Doe 1, 2007 WL 1453491 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2007), applied a "summary judgment" standard based on Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). However, courts in other cases have imposed less protective standards.
Pennsylvania courts also have dealt with situations where a party seeks the identity of an online speaker to serve as a witness, rather than as a defendant in a John Doe lawsuit. Two cases, McVicker v. King, 2010 WL 786275 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010), and Enterline v. Pocono Medical Ctr., 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008), are discussed below.
Reunion Industries v. Doe 1, 2007 WL 1453491 (Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County March 5, 2007)Several anonymous Internet users posted negative comments about the company Reunion Industries on a Yahoo! Finance message board. Reunion Industries sued the anonymous posters for commercial disparagement and found out from Yahoo! that AOL was the ISP for one of the defendants ("Doe 1"). Reunion Industries moved for a court order compelling AOL to reveal Doe 1's identity, and Doe 1 moved for a protective order that would prevent AOL from revealing the information.
The court applied a summary judgment standard, similar to that in Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). Applying a summary judgment standard means that the plaintiff must bring forward sufficient evidence for each element of his claim. As in Cahill, however, the plaintiff in this case was not required to meet that standard on elements of the claim that were entirely within the defendant's control, specifically those involving the defendant's state of mind.
In this case, the court found that plaintiff had not put forward enough evidence to compel disclosure from AOL.
Putting this case in the context of Pennsylvania law generally, there are two additional points worth noting:
One or more anonymous Internet users sent Michele Polito a series of upsetting emails and instant messages from various AOL accounts. Ultimately seeking to sue the anonymous Internet users, Ms. Polito first filed suit against AOL to compel disclosure of the identities of the subscribers who were harassing her.
The court announced a four-part test for deciding whether AOL was required to disclose its subscribers' identities. Under this standard, the plaintiff must establish that (1) she has a "prima facie" claim under Pennsylvania law against the anonymous parties; (2) the information requested is directly relevant and necessary to her claim; (3) she is seeking the information in good faith; and (4) she cannot discover the anonymous parties' identities otherwise. The court found her to have satisfied all the criteria, and thus ordered AOL to disclose the subscribers' identities.
In this opinion, the court used the term "prima facie" to mean that the plaintiff "satisfactorily states a cognizable claim under Pennsylvania law entitling her to some form of civil or criminal redress for actionable speech of the unknown declarant(s)." This strongly suggests that the prima facie standard here is one that the plaintiff can satisfy through allegations alone. It is worth noting, however, that the court did examine some evidence that the plaintiff had put forward.
Further, the court found that Polito had satisfied the prima facie test even though she did "not assert a particular cause of action against the anonymous subscribers." In the court's view, it was enough that the emails and messages she received "arguably constitute harassment or stalking by communication under Pennsylvania law," and also that she had a "conceivable claim" of intentional infliction of emotional distress (despite the fact that "the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has never expressly recognized a cause of action" for this claim).
As noted, the Polito court's interpretation of the term "prima facie" is different from the Reunion Industries court's interpretation. This suggests that Pennsylvania law in this area is not settled, and a court's invocation of a prima facie standard does not clearly indicate whether it is applying a high-burden or low-burden test.
Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers v. JPA Development, 2006 WL 37020 (Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County Jan. 4, 2006)In this case, the court used Pennsylvania's own discovery rules to decide on a subpoena directed at an ISP and superficially rejected the Cahill and Dendrite standards. However, because of the case's highly unusual factual background and procedural posture, it is hard to draw any conclusion about the standard it uses. A brief summary is below.
The company JPA Development was involved in litigation, and the law firm Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers represented their opponent. JPA's owner, Jerry Pantelidis, and its employees created and posted content on two websites that accused Klehr Harrison and its attorneys of fraud. Klehr Harrison sued JPA, Pantelidis, and their ISPs for defamation and other claims. In this suit, Klehr Harrison served discovery requests on JPA, Pantelidis and the ISPs to discover the identities of posters on the website, which the court noted was most likely Pantelidis or people acting at his direction. JPA and Pantelidis responded with a motion for protective order to prevent this discovery. The court denied that motion and offered this opinion to the superior court handling the appeal, urging it to affirm its ruling.
In deciding on the discovery requests, the court declined to use the tests from either Cahill or Dendrite v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001), and instead relied on a Pennsylvania civil procedure law forbidding discovery that (1) is sought in bad faith, (2) would cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden, or expense to any party, or (3) is beyond the scope of discovery. The court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied this standard. While such "good faith" standards generally do not require the court to look at the plaintiff's evidence, in this case the court had already taken evidence and used it to reach its decision.
McVicker v. King, 2010 WL 786275 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010)
In McVicker, a federal district court in the Western District of Pennsylvania denied William McVicker’s motion to compel Trib Total Media, the publisher of the South Hills Record and YourSouthHills.com, to disclose identifying information for seven identified screen names. McVicker, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case, sought the posters’ identities in order to impeach the testimony of city council members who made the decision to fire him.
In ruling on the motion to compel, the district court reviewed the various standards applied by other courts in anonymous speech cases and determined that “a party seeking disclosure must clear a higher hurdle where the anonymous poster is a non-party.” McVicker, 2010 WL 786275, at *3 (citing Doe v. 2TheMart.com,
140 F.Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Was. 2001)). The court adopted the four-part test applied in 2TheMart.com and Enterline v. Pocono Medical Ctr., 2008 WL 5192386
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008), which requires the court to consider whether (1) the subpoena was issued in good faith; (2) the information sought relates to a core claim or defense; (3) the identifying information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense; and (4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove the claim or defense is unavailable from any other source. McVicker, 2010 WL 786275, at *5.
The court determined that McVicker failed to show that the identifying information was directly and materially relevant to his employment claim because it was primarily useful for impeachment purposes. Id. The court also found that the identities of the commenters and information in their possession were not strictly necessary for McVicker to impeach the city council members effectively, and that the same or similar information might be obtained through "normal, anticipated forms of discovery." Id. at *6.
In the course of its analysis, the court also “summarily rejected” McVicker’s argument that the YourSouthHills.com's privacy policy created no expectation of privacy, finding that the policy “clearly reflects that [the website publisher] will disclose its users’ personally identifiable information only in very limited situations.” Id. at *5.
The district court also ruled that Trib Total Media had standing to assert the First Amendment rights of individuals posting to its website. See id. at *4
Enterline v. Pocono Medical Ctr., 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008)
Brenda Enterline subpoenaed The Pocono Record, a daily newspaper and news website serving northeast Pennsylvania, seeking the identity of individuals who made anonymous forum posts on its website.
In September 2008, Enterline sued the Pocono Medical Center for sexual harassment. The Pocono Record published an article about her lawsuit in its print and online editions. A number of commenters posted to the website forum associated with the article, and some of the comments suggested that the authors had personal knowledge of the facts at issue in Enterline's lawsuit. She then subpoenaed The Pocono Record, seeking information identifying eight of the anonymous speakers. The newspaper objected to the subpoena, arguing that it was premature (discovery had not yet commenced in the lawsuit), that it violated the First Amendment rights of the commenters, and that the reporter's privilege protected the identity of the commenters as sources. Enterline line moved to compel The Record to comply and for sanctions.
The district court denied Enterline's motion. It held that The Record had standing to assert the First Amendment rights of the third-party anonymous commenters and that disclosure was not warranted under the circumstances. The court refrained from determining "the full extent of the First Amendment right to anonymity," instead deciding the case based on the four-part standard applied in Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Was. 2001), which Enterline had argued for in her brief. Under this standard, the court determined that disclosure was not appropriate because Enterline had not demonstrated that the information was unavailable from other sources. The court did not address the newspaper's other grounds for refusing to comply with the subpoena.
Note: This page covers information specific to Tennessee. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Tennessee has one case, Swartz v. Doe, No. 08C-431 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 2009), which applied a protective test derived from Dendrite International v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. App. Div. 2001). This court required a would-be plaintiff to bring forth sufficient evidence for each element of its claim in order to justify disclosure. In addition, the court applied a balancing test, under which the strength of the speaker's claim to First Amendment protection is balanced against the strength of the plaintiff's underlying legal claim and the need for disclosure of the speaker's identity.
Swartz v. Doe, No. 08C-431 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 2009)
In Swartz, a Tennessee trial court ruled that plaintiffs Donald and Terry Keller Swartz were entitled to discover the identity of the anonymous blogger behind the “Stop Swartz” blog who published critical statements about them and encouraged readers to post information on their whereabouts and activities.
In ruling on the defendant’s motion to quash, the court adopted the Dendrite standard, which requires the following five-part test: (1) the plaintiff must notify the poster that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or discovery request; (2) the plaintiff must give the poster reasonable time to file opposition to the application; (3) the plaintiff must identify the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that give rise to each claim; (4) the plaintiff must make a prima facie or substantial showing of proof for each element of each cause of action; and (5) the court must balance the First Amendment interests of the anonymous poster against the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the need for disclosure to allow the claims to proceed. Slip op. at 7. With respect to prong four of this test, the court indicated that the factual showing “must be made by affidavit, deposition, or sworn statement, and that mere allegations of fact are insufficient.” Id. at 8.
In characterizing the test, the court cut through the semantic differences between the various standards available to courts in anonymous speech cases:
As the Solers and Krinsky courts have noted, the labels of "summary judgment" or even "prima facie" are potentially confusing. By adopting the Dendrite analysis, the Court does not focus on the terminology, but rather the requirement that a plaintiff make a substantial legal and factual showing that the claims have merit before permitting discovery of an anonymous defendant's identity.
Id. The court determined that the Swartzes succeeded in making this substantial legal and factual showing, pointing out that they submitted copies of the offending blog posts and testified regarding the falsity of the statements and damages. Id. at 9-10.
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
The one published decision from Texas to consider the right to anonymous speech adopted a Cahill-like "summary judgment" standard that requires a plaintiff to bring forward evidence on each element of its claim (other than those dependent on the defendant's identity) before permitting disclosure of an Internet' speaker's identity. This case is described below.
Additionally, in February 2009, a Texas court ordered Topix to turn over the identities of 178 anonymous and pseudonymous commenters to Mark and Rhonda Lesher based on claims that the comments were defamatory. It is not clear what standard this court applied.
In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App. 2007)In June 2007, a subsidiary of Essent Healthcare, Inc. filed suit in Texas state court against an anonymous blogger and an undefined number of anonymous posters to his blog. Essent's petition contained claims for defamation, trade disparagement, breach of contract, and breach of the duty of loyalty. The dispute revolved around a blog called "The-Paris-site," which focuses on an Essent-run hospital in Paris, Texas. The operator of the blog goes by the pseudonyms "Frank Pasquale" and "fac_p". He posted critical remarks about the hospital on the blog, including statements that, according to Essent, assert or imply that the hospital is engaged in Medicare fraud. He also posted statements that allegedly accuse the hospital of having a high incidences of bacterial infections and post-surgical complications. Anonymous users also posted comments on the blog. Some of the comments included information that Essent claims was confidential patient health information.
Essent filed an ex parte request with the court for an order compelling the anonymous blogger's Internet service provider to disclose his identity. After being notified of the discovery request, the anonymous blogger objected through counsel. The trial court rejected his arguments, however, and ordered the ISP to reveal his identity. Counsel for the anonymous blogger filed a special kind of appeal called a petition for a "writ of mandamus" with a Texas appellate court.
In December 2007, the appellate court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus, ordered the trial court to vacate its previous order, and sent the case back to the trial court for further consideration. The appellate court held that the lower court had lacked authority to issue its previous order and offered the lower court guidance on what standard to apply to the case on remand. The appellate court indicated that it would follow Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), in requiring that a plaintiff produce evidence sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment before ordering disclosure. "Summary judgment" is a legal term of art, and it means that the plaintiff must show that it has sufficient evidence for each element of its claim. The Texas court, like the court in Cahill, loosened this standard somewhat, indicating that a plaintiff at this preliminary stage of a lawsuit need not provide evidence for elements of its claim that are nearly impossible to show without knowing the defendant's identity (such as whether the defendant acted with the requisite degree of fault).
For more on this case, see the CMLP's database entry: Essent v. Doe.
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Virginia follows a “good faith” test before unmasking an anonymous Internet speaker. The good faith test was first announced by a Virginia circuit court in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online and codified by the Virginia General Assembly in 2002 as Va. Code §8.01-407.1.
Va. Code § 8.01-407.1 requires that a party seeking the identity of an anonymous poster show that the poster has made one or more communications that are or may be tortious or illegal, (such as defamatory statements) or that the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it is the victim of “conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit was filed” – i.e., has a legitimate claim recognized by the jurisdiction where the suit was filed. The party seeking the information must submit a copy of the communications at issue.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia has held that Va. Code § 8.01-407.1 does not require a plaintiff to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that statements are actionable in order to obtain the identity of an anonymous speaker. Rather, it is sufficient if the plaintiff submits sufficient evidence to support a good faith belief that the statements at issue may be actionable. In Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., No. 0116-13-4 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2014), the Court considered a plaintiff's attempt to discover the identity of anonymous Yelp users who posted negative reviews of plaintiff's services. The Court found that if the anonymous users were not in fact former customers of the plaintiff, their negative reviews would be actionably defamatory; however, the plaintiff was not able to submit evidence proving that the users were not former customers. Nevertheless, the Court upheld a subpoena for the users' identities upon the plaintiff's showing that it was unable to confirm that the users were customers after a good faith review of the records in its possession. Slip op. at 21-22.
The party may be seeking the poster’s identity in regards to a claim the party is bringing against the poster, or the party may mean to use the poster as a witness. Either way, the statute requires that the party seeking the information show that other “reasonable efforts” to identify the anonymous communicator have failed and that the anonymous poster’s identity is important, central, or directly and materially relevant to a claim or defense.
When an ISP or other entity receives a subpoena requesting your identifying information, the statute requires that the ISP notify you of the subpoena within five business days of receipt. The ISP must notify you by e mail, if it has your e mail address, and it must also send a copy of the subpoena to your last known address, if available on file. The statute provides a form that the party requesting the information must send to the ISP. The ISP must in turn send the form to you by e mail, if available, and mail. The form states who is seeking the subpoena, that the ISP will be required by law to respond by providing the requested information if no written objection is filed with the court, and that you have a right to file a written motion opposing the subpoena with the clerk of court, as discussed below.
Any “interested person,” such as an anonymous poster whose identity is a target of the subpoena, may file a written objection, motion to quash (a motion requesting that the subpoena be voided or terminated), or motion for a protective order (a court order protecting against the disclosure of your information). If you are the anonymous poster, this means that the ISP or other entity to which the subpoena is addressed may file a written motion opposing the subpoena on your behalf, or that you may file such a motion yourself. The statute indicates that you may file your motion anonymously, signing it “John Doe” and including your e mail nickname or other relevant online alias.
You must file such a motion at least seven business days before the date on which disclosure is sought under the subpoena. Because of the various deadlines set by statute, you could have as few as 10 days to respond to a subpoena after you receive notice of it. As a result, if you receive notice of a subpoena for your identity from your ISP, you should contact a lawyer immediately to ensure there is sufficient time to respond to the subpoena. You also may want to refer to the section on Responding to Lawsuits for more information.
If no written motion opposing the subpoena is filed, the ISP will be required by law to respond to the subpoena by providing the information sought.
You must serve any papers related to your motion on the party seeking the subpoena and the party to whom the subpoena is addressed on or before the date you file the motion with the court. If the ISP seeks to quash the subpoena on your behalf, it must serve any papers relating to the motion on the party seeking the subpoena and you, the anonymous poster, on or before the date of filing.
In addition to stating the grounds relied upon for denying the disclosure, the motion to quash must address “to the extent feasible”:
After a written motion is filed, any interested person may also request a hearing from the court. If you are the anonymous poster, you must be informed of the hearing by registered mail at your last known address.
If the ISP or other entity to whom the subpoena is addressed wishes to comply with the subpoena and reveal your personal identifying information, the statute prohibits it from doing so earlier than three business days before the date on which disclosure is due. This rule is designed to give you the opportunity to object before disclosure is made. The ISP must still notify you of the subpoena by e mail, if available, and by mail, giving you the opportunity to object on your own behalf.
Because there have been no cases involving Code § 8.01-407.1, no court has interpreted its provisions. If you know about a cases involving Code § 8.01-407.1 in Virginia, please contact us.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
Washington law with regard to the protection of anonymous online speech is unclear. The only relevant Washington case is Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Was. 2001), which considered a subpoeana to discover the identity of an anonymous witness, as opposed to the usual situation of an anonymous defendant. For this situation, the court adopted a "good faith" standard with a few extra protections. It is not clear how this case applies to a subpoeana asking for disclosure of the identity of an anonymous defendant.
Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F.Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Was. 2001)Stockholders of the company 2TheMart.com sued its directors, claiming that they were responsible for a recent fall in the company's stock price. The directors tried to defend themselves by arguing that the fall in stock price was actually caused by negative comments about the company posted on an online message board by anonymous users. To support this argument, the directors subpoenaed InfoSpace, the Seattle-based company that ran the website, for the identities of the posters. InfoSpace notified the anonymous posters, and one of them filed a motion to quash the subpoena.
The court announced a standard for deciding when a court should allow disclosure of the identity of an anonymous witness. The court required the plaintiff to satisfy the following four requirements: (1) the plaintiff seeks the subpoena in good faith and not for an improper purpose; (2) the information requested relates to a core claim or defense; (3) the information is directly and materially relevant to the claim or defense; and (4) the information that the plaintiff needs for that claim or defense is not available anywhere else.
Applying that test, the court found that information about the identities of the anonymous posters was not directly and materially relevant to a core claim or defense. Therefore, it granted the anonymous poster's motion to quash the subpoena.
Note: This page covers information specific to Wisconsin. For general information concerning legal protections for anonymous speech see the Legal Protections for Anonymous Speech section of this guide.
The one relevant Wisconsin case, Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006), did not consider an Internet-based claim. However, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's adoption of a "motion to dismiss" standard may be applicable to future Internet anonymity cases. Overall, this test places a higher burden on plaintiffs than do most other "motion to dismiss" standards, owing to special features of Wisconsin law, but it is not as protective of anonymity as tests that require the plaintiffs to put forward evidence, such as the "summary judgment" test used in Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673 (Wis. 2006)Todd Rongstad was the president of Alliance for Working Wisconsin (AWW), a political organization. The organization sent out a mailing that accused Julie Lassa, a state representative, of various kinds of wrongdoing. Lassa sued Rongstad, AWW, Rongstad's company, and five anonymous defendants for their involvement in the mailing, which she claimed was defamatory. After several motions regarding whether Rongstad would be compelled to disclose the anonymous defendants' identities, the parties settled. However, the court had already imposed discovery sanctions on Rongstad for not giving up the names. Rongstad appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, arguing that the sanctions were illegal because they were applied over his assertion of a constitutional privilege. The appeal required the court to consider standards for compelling disclosure of an anonymous defendant's identity.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a "motion to dismiss" standard as the test for compelling disclosure of an anonymous defendant's identity. Like "motion to dismiss" standards generally, this is a test the plaintiff can satisfy by stating a claim in its pleadings, without having to put forth evidence. The court noted with approval the summary judgment standard applied by the Supreme Court of Delaware adopted in Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), but found that a motion to dismiss standard would provide the necessary protection for anonymous speakers under Wisconsin law. It reasoned that Wisconsin law -- apparently unlike Delaware law -- requires a plaintiff to plead the defamatory statements with particularity, and it requires the court to determine whether the pleaded statements are "capable of a defamatory meaning" at the motion to dismiss stage. (Note that lack of defamatory meaning was the basis the Cahill court invoked for quashing the subpoena and dismissing the case.) Despite this reasoning, it appears that the Wisconsin standard is significantly less protective of anonymous speech than the Cahill test.
Courts in the District of Columbia apply a protective test before permitting disclosure of an anonymous Internet speaker's identity. One case in state court and another in federal court, Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009) and Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 2009 WL 320408 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2009), both require a substantial legal and factual showing before ordering the unmasking of an anonymous defendant.
Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009); Software & Information Industry Association v. Solers, Inc., No. 10-CV-1523 (D.C. Jan. 12, 2012)
In Solers, a software developer sued a John Doe defendant for defamation and tortious interference over an anonymous tip submitted to an industry watchdog group claiming that the software developer had engaged in software privacy. Solers subpoenaed the watchdog group, seeking information about the anonymous defendant’s identity. On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals adopted a protective standard for its lower courts to follow and emphasized that a plaintiff "must do more than simply plead his case" to unmask an anonymous speaker claimed to have violated the law. 977 A.2d at 958.
The D.C. Court of Appeals’ test most closely resembles those set out in Doe v. Cahill,
884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), and Krinsky
v. Doe 6, 159 Cal.App. 4th 1154
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008). It requires a court to follow five steps before ordering the disclosure of an anonymous or pseudonymous speaker's identity: (1) ensure that the plaintiff has adequately pleaded the elements of a defamation (or other) claim; (2) require reasonable efforts to notify the anonymous defendant that the complaint has been filed and the subpoena has been served; (3) delay further action for a reasonable time to allow the defendant an opportunity to file a motion to quash; (4) require the plaintiff to proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on each element of the claim that is within its control; and (5) determine that the information sought is important to enable the plaintiff to proceed with his/her lawsuit. 977 A.2d at 954-56. With respect to the fifth prong, the court indicated that it would not require a showing that the plaintiff had exhausted alternative sources for the information, so long as the other elements of the test had been satisfied. The D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for application of this test.
On remand, the trial court reluctantly held that the D.C. Court of Appeals' decision required enforcement of the subpoena, because the appellate court had noted that Solers had properly pleaded damages. Nevertheless, the trial court noted its disquiet with enforcing the subpoena when Solers had admitted that it could not identify lost business or customers from the alleged defamation, and so the trial court urged another appeal.
A second appeal was duly filed with the D.C. Court of Appeals under the name Software & Information Industry Association v. Solers, Inc., No. 10-CV-1523. The D.C. Court of Appeals took the opportunity to clarify the plaintiff's burden when seeking an anonymous speaker's identity, stating the plaintiff must not only plead but produce evidence of damages that resulted "as a direct consequence" of the anonymous speaker's action. Internal costs that the plaintiff incurs as a result of the anonymous speech, such as expending resources to investigate the anonymous claims, do not suffice. Moreover, the damages must be shown to exist independently of any action the plaintiff took to counteract the anonymous speech; lost profits, reluctant customers, or specific examples of impaired business reputation would help show the required damage. Because Solers failed to present such evidence, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order enforcing the subpoena.
Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 2009 WL 320408 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2009)
In Sinclair, a federal district court in the District of Columbia quashed a subpoena seeking the identities of three pseudonymous Internet users. In early 2008, plaintiff Lawrence Sinclair published a YouTube video and blog claiming that he had engaged in sexual activities and done drugs with then-presidential candidate Barack Obama. In response, “TubeSockTedD” uploaded a video to YouTube stating that Sinclair was “spreading lies about Obama.” Another Internet user, “mzmolly,” posted a comment on Democratic Underground.com stating that Sinclair was a mental patient who was institutionalized on the date in 1999 when he claimed to have encountered Obama. A third, “OWNINGLIARS,” posted a comment on Digg.com stating that Sinclair was a liar and was in a mental hospital when he claimed he met Obama. Sinclair filed a John Doe lawsuit for defamation against all three and sought identifying information from the relevant Internet service providers, and the pseudonymous posters moved to quash.
The court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. It surveyed the case law on the First Amendment right to speak anonymously and held that, under either the Cahill or the Dendrite standard, Sinclair was not entitled to the requested discovery because his complaint was facially invalid. Specifically, the court determined that Sinclair's complaint did not plead facts necessary to establish the court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the pseudonymous defendants. In addition, the court ruled that Sinclair's defamation claims failed as a matter of law because he did not plead either actual malice or special damages, and because section 230 of the Communications Decency Act protected mzmolly and OWNINGLIARS for "simply summarizing and reporting information obtained from" a third party. In conclusion, the court stated: “Where the viability of a plaintiff’s case is so seriously deficient, there is simply no basis to overcome the considerable First Amendment interest in anonymous speech on the Internet. Sinclair has provided no ground to do so here.” 596 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
Although the court quashed the subpoena and dismissed the complaint, it refused to award mzmolly and Democratic Underground sanctions against Sinclair because of the novel areas of law involved. Id. at 134 n.4.
A broad array of creative, expressive media are subject to copyright protection, including literature, photographs, music compositions and recordings, films, paintings and sculptures, and news articles – any “original work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102. For more information on copyright creation and ownership see the Copyright Ownership section of this legal guide.
If you are the copyright owner of a work (and you likely will be if you created the work), such as an article, a blog post, a photograph, or a video, you can authorize others to use it. You can do this by transferring to the person or entity that wants to use your work any or all of your rights as a copyright owner, or any subdivision of those rights. Alternatively, you can license any or all of those rights (or any subdivision of them) to that person or entity.
As the person granting the transfer or license, you have a
great deal of freedom in how to structure the transaction. How you
choose to do so can have a substantial impact on your ability to make
money from the work, the amount of control you retain over it, and the
costs associated with the transaction. Often, it will make sense to
hire a lawyer in order to deal with such a transaction because of the
complexity of the subject-matter, the potential flexibility of the
transaction, and the potentially high stakes. On the other hand, there
are three models or approaches that generally do not require the
assistance of a lawyer: an "all rights reserved" approach, using a
Creative Commons license, and a dedication to the public domain.
Whether one of these three approaches or some other approach is best
for you is a matter of personal preference. In the discussion that
follows, we go into more detail to give a sense of the issues involved
and to explain how you can effectively transfer or licensing your work.
The decision about whether and how to license or transfer your work
will depend on your own personal preference. There are a number of
factors that you may want to consider in reaching your decision,
including the potential for making money from the work, the extent of
control retained over the work, the costs involved in the
licensing/transfer transaction, and the permanence of the measure.
These and other issues are addressed below.
One obvious benefit to licensing/transfer is that people or businesses may be willing to pay you for use of your work. In some instances, this payment can be a significant source of income and may help support your project or website as well. In the How to Effectively Transfer or License Your Work section, we discuss three models for licensing/transferring your content: an "all rights reserved" model, using a Creative Commons (CC) license, and dedicating your work to the public domain. The most direct way of seeking revenue from exploitation of a work is to reserve all rights with respect to the public at large and then to pursue selective licensing or transfer deals in exchange for money. This is because granting a CC license to the public does not involve payment in return, although it does not rule out granting other licenses in exchange for money, and a public domain dedication obviously gives up all your rights to exploit the work. In contrast, if you are interested in contributing to, or gaining extra exposure in, an artistic, intellectual, business, or other community (perhaps with indirect financial benefits), a CC license or public domain dedication might be more appropriate.
One thing to keep in mind is that a full transfer of your rights will probably fetch more money in the short term than a non-exclusive license, but this comes with a corresponding sacrifice in terms of control of the work and personal exploitation.
Another thing to consider is whether your goals in relation to your work may change over time. Your aim now might be to gain exposure, but you might wish to commercialize your work down the line. Granting broad permission for others to freely use your work (through a CC license or similar) now may curtail your ability to commercialize the same work in the future. For more, see Association Littéraire et Artistique International's Memorandum on Creative Commons Licenses.
Retaining control of your workRetaining control of your work is another significant issue. The important thing to remember in this regard is that you are not presented with an "all or nothing" scenario. You have significant freedom in how you structure your transfer or license, and the amount of control you retain is largely up to you. For details, please see the Which Rights Can Be Transferred or Licensed section.
For those seeking more control, an "all rights reserved" model combined with selective licensing transactions may be the best route, but this may necessitate the help of a lawyer specializing in intellectual property licensing. A CC license offers slightly less control (because the license is given to the public at large and generally allows sub-licensing on the same terms), but it is much lower cost because the entire process is automated on the CC website. That said, you still retain significant control with a CC license. For instance, you can grant the public a license to copy and distribute your work, but bar them from making derivative works (adaptations) of it or using it for commercial purposes. For more on what constitutes a "commercial use" and a "non commercial use," please see CC's Discussion Draft Noncommercial Guidelines.
Are there any costs involved?Different costs are involved based on which approach you take. For instance, granting a CC license to the public is free, but you will not make money directly from the license. Because a CC license is non-exclusive, you can still enter into one-on-one transactions for money, but these are more complex and likely require the assistance of a lawyer, which is expensive. Registering the transfer with the Copyright Office, an optional step which some copyright transferors take to protect their interests, also carries a fee (see Copyright Office Fees). Likewise, reserving your rights with regard to the public at large and transferring or licensing your rights in one-on-one transactions for money is likely to be expensive for the same reasons. You can dedicate your work to the public domain at no cost, but by doing so you give up all control and prospect of future remuneration.
If I transfer or license my work, is this permanent?Not necessarily. The length of time that a grant lasts will depend on the transfer or license arrangement you enter into. For instance, you can grant a transfer or license your rights in relation to your work for a specified duration of time (see the Which Rights Can Be Transferred or Licensed section). If you do not specify an end date in the executing document, or even if you if specify that the transfer or license is permanent and irrevocable, under the Copyright Act the grant is generally terminable by your (or your successors) within a five year window starting 35 years after the execution of a grant (see the Terminating a Transfer or License section).
It is also worth noting that if you grant a non-exclusive license to a person, and do not receive "consideration" (payment or some other kind of benefit in exchange for the grant) from them, this license is revocable (see the How to Effectively Transfer or License Your Work section).
How this all works with a CC license is not 100% clear. All varieties of CC license have a clause saying that the license grant is non-revocable. According to the CC FAQ:
This means that you cannot stop someone, who has obtained your work under a Creative Commons license, from using the work according to that license. You can stop distributing your work under a Creative Commons license at any time you wish; but this will not withdraw any copies of your work that already exist under a Creative Commons license from circulation, be they verbatim copies, copies included in collective works and/or adaptations of your work.
It is not entirely clear whether the contractual language purporting to make the license non-revocable would stand up to a legal challenge based on the automatic termination right granted by the U.S. copyright law or the argument that a CC license is a non-exclusive license made without consideration. In any event, it is probably safest to assume that a CC license is permanent, so you should think very carefully about whether or not you are happy with the public making use of your work in the way described in the license.
If I license or transfer my work, does it affect what I can do with the work?It depends. If you transfer all or one of your rights to someone else, then you may no longer exercise those rights. If you grant an exclusive license to someone with regard to a particular right or group of rights, then you are similarly prohibited from exercising those rights. But if you grant a non-exclusive license to someone else to exercise a right or group of your rights, then you are free to continue exercising the right or group of rights and authorizing others to do so. A CC license is a non-exclusive license, so granting the public a CC license does not affect your ability to use your work. For more information on what constitutes a "transfer," an "exclusive license," and a "non-exclusive license," please see the Understanding the Difference Between a Transfer and a License section.
Can others use my copyrighted work without being granted a license or transfer?Yes. United States copyright law allows others to make "fair use" of your work without permission. Under the fair use doctrine, third parties are permitted to use your copyrighted work without your permission for limited and "transformative" uses, including criticism, commentary, news reporting, parody, and teaching. For example, if a blogger quotes a paragraph from an article or post on your website and compares your opinion with that of other commentators, this is likely permitted by the fair use doctrine without a license. Nevertheless, fair use is a notoriously fact-sensitive defense to a copyright claim, and it is difficult to determine beforehand whether a particular use is a fair use. See the Fair Use section for more details. For this reason, many people may prefer to seek out a license before engaging in a use that might be a "borderline" fair use. When you grant someone permission to use your work via transfer or licensing, the idea is that you are permitting them to engage in a use that would not be "fair" under the law.
Whether you are just starting out with your first website or blog, or you've been publishing your work for years, it's never too late to to think about the standards and principles you want to uphold in the content that you publish. The Knight Citizen News Network sets out "the bedrock foundations of sound journalism to help citizen reporters master the fundamentals of the craft in a networked age." These five principles -- accuracy, thoroughness, fairness, transparency, and independence -- serve as useful guidelines to good journalistic practice.
That said, there are lots of other resources out there to help you educate yourself about these and other principles of good journalism. Some of these resources are listed below. Complying with these principles and following sound journalistic practice, while not fool-proof, will help minimize your exposure to legal liability in all of the areas of law covered in this guide.
The following resources will provide a good start:Publishing your own content on the Internet sometimes seems like a daunting endeavor, especially when you read press accounts of this blogger or that website getting sued over what they publish online. The hard fact is that there are a number of legal risks involved in online publishing. Nevertheless, proactive measures exist that can help you minimize these risks and/or make them manageable. This section addresses the following four topics:
As a website or blog operator, there are some basic steps to consider that will reduce your legal risks. One is creating terms of use/service and a privacy policy for your site or blog, which will help you structure your relationship with your users and let them know what your practices are regarding personal information.
The second is taking steps to bring your site within the "safe-harbor" provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which can help you avoid liability for linking to other sites containing copyright infringing material and for hosting copyright infringing material posted by your users.
There are two key documents or statements that all websites should post before (or at least soon after) going "live" on the Internet. First, your site's terms of use govern your relationship with users, allowing you to set boundaries of acceptable behavior by your users and potentially limiting your liability. Second, you should create a privacy policy, which informs your users of your practices relating to private information and helps you avoid liability under a complex array of federal and state privacy laws. The following sections address these two important documents in greater detail and provide examples that you can follow in creating your own terms of use and privacy policy.
See one of the sections listed below for more information:
A privacy policy is a statement placed in an easily visible place on a website informing users about how the website deals with users' personal information. Privacy policies generally explain whether and how users' information will be shared with third parties, including parent companies or subsidiaries. It frequently explains whether and how the website uses cookies.
Privacy policies let people know what you will do with information that they provide when registering with your website, as well as information that gets logged while they browse. A privacy policy allows users to find out what you do with their private information and enables them to adapt their conduct accordingly. Beyond that, a privacy policy will help you avoid liability under a complex array of state and federal laws dealing with users' private information.
A well-crafted privacy policy should include the following items (although the particular items included may depend upon the nature of your website):
Another important aspect of a privacy policy is what it says about minors. If your site targets or knowingly collects information from children under age thirteen, it must comply with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. For more information about how to comply with the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, please see COPPA.org's compliance page. If you do not plan to collect information from minors, you should consider adding a statement to your privacy policy saying:
This website's content is intended for adults and we will not knowingly collect personal information from children under 13 years of age. If you are a parent or legal guardian of a child under age 13 who you believe has submitted personal information to this site, please contact us immediately.
There are also rules about collecting medical information and information about criminal records. Unless it is important to the purpose of your website, you should not gather this type of information. If you plan to gather this type of information, you should consult a lawyer about your data collection strategy.
You can find good examples of privacy policies on the following sites: MinnPost.com, HuffingtonPost.com, Ars Technica, and CMLP.
It is common to see the following statement in website privacy policies: "[Name of website] will not collect any personal information about you except when you specifically and knowingly provide such information." While this kind of statement may sound reassuring for your users, it is not true in most cases. When a user visits a website, he or she provides personal information to the website operator simply by virtue of browsing, reading, and downloading material. This information includes IP address, user configuration settings, and what website referred the user to the site, among other things. It is better to tell users that this type of information is being collected automatically on standard web server access logs.
Terms of use (or "terms of service" or "terms and conditions") generally are a statement placed on an easily visible place on a website that governs the relationship between the site and its users or visitors. Users explicitly agree to the terms when they sign up for an account and, depending on how you write the terms, visitors may implicitly agree to them when they use the site.
The terms generally consist of a number of paragraphs describing what you expect from your users and what they can expect from your website. Among other things, terms of use identify what users may post onto or use from your site. They also specify what your obligations are, and what you can do in terms of editing, removing, and changing material. For an example, see the CMLP's Terms of Use.
Terms of use help you put your users on notice of what you consider to be an acceptable use of your site and what you do not. They enable you to reserve the right to deny access to users who engage in objectionable conduct and to remove content that you find offensive or that may subject you to liability from third parties. It also gives you an opportunity to put language up on your website that may help protect you in the event of a lawsuit.
Terms of use are especially important if your website gives out accounts because they help specify the mechanics of how the account system will work. But keep in mind that terms of use can also apply to visitors merely browsing the website or posting comments (assuming you allow comments without an account, which many do not).
Terms of use are also useful in dealing with user-generated content. When a user creates a comment (or any other original expression) and posts it to your website, the user owns the copyright to that comment. Absent an agreement or license (see the Allowing Others to Use Your Work section for details), you could be held liable for copyright infringement for editing or changing the comment. By posting terms of use on your website, however, you can specify (and make clear to users) that you will have a license to edit, change, and remove all content posted to the website. These provisions in the terms of use give you effective control of user-generated content on your site, even if users own the copyright to that content.
As discussed above, terms of use should set out the ground rules for your site. Here are some key items you should consider including in your terms:
Content may not be illegal, obscene, defamatory, threatening, infringing of intellectual property rights, invasive of privacy or otherwise injurious or objectionable.
By posting or contributing content using these Services, you are granting [name of your website] a non-exclusive, royalty-free, perpetual, and worldwide license to use your content in connection with the operation of the Services, including, without limitation, the license rights to copy, distribute, transmit, publicly display, publicly perform, reproduce, edit, translate and reformat your content, and/or to incorporate it into a collective work.
You can find good examples of terms of use on the following sites: MinnPost.com; iBrattleboro.com; Google; and CMLP.
Even frivolous lawsuits dismissed at a relatively early stage of the litigation can be expensive to defend, and the cost skyrockets the longer the litigation continues, particularly if judgment is rendered against you. While most lawsuits never get to trial, if you lack the money to carry out a vigorous defense, the only option available to you may be to settle (perhaps even to take down the allegedly offending content or even your entire site) regardless of the merits of your defense.
For these reasons, it is important to assess whether your online activities are covered by your existing homeowners or renters insurance. If your activities are not covered, it might be worth getting media liability insurance, even if such policies initially appear to be prohibitively expensive. Alternatively, if your online activities are part of an existing business, you may be able to add coverage to your business insurance policy through an add-on rider. Consult your insurance agent for costs and details.
Here are a list of steps to take when evaluating your insurance coverage needs:
To help you determine what type of insurance may be right for you, we've created an interactive question tool for evaluating your insurance options.
If you have homeowners or renters insurance, your policy may cover some of your online activities. Most such policies cover damages and legal fees incurred in suits against the insured for "bodily injury," and "bodily injury" is often defined as including personal injury arising out of defamation or invasion of privacy. Obviously, you are only covered if your insurance contract contains this or similar language and your first plan of action should be to read your policy, paying close attention both to the body of the policy and any separate definition sections.
You should note, however, that your policy may not include coverage for copyright or other intellectual property claims, which do not typically fall within the standard definition of "bodily injury" or "personal injury" covered by most policies.
Homeowners and renters insurance policies generally cover both compensatory damages and legal defense costs, but not punitive damages (damages awarded above and beyond the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff for his or her injury). This is important because plaintiffs often seek punitive damages in defamation suits, and the fear of large punitive damages might prove an insurmountable inducement to settle or remove content. On the other hand, actual verdicts (as opposed to settlements) for plaintiffs are fairly rare in these types of suits and even rarer in the case of punitive damages.
Possible Coverage Exclusions
Most homeowners policies exclude coverage for "business pursuits." How "business pursuits" is interpreted varies from state to state. (See the Insurance Exclusions for Business Pursuits section of this guide for more information.) In most states, your activities may be excluded from coverage if you earn advertising income from your site or blog or you collect money through other online means (say, through a PayPal "Donations Accepted" link on your site). If you are worried about losing coverage because you make a small amount of money from your site or blog, you may want to consider forgoing the advertising revenues and donations.
In a few states, you might still be covered even if you make money if your online activities are not your "primary" occupation. In other states, you will need to show that your online activities are no more than a "hobby," even if you made some money from it. Note, however, that there may be adverse tax consequences from characterizing your business as a "hobby." You should consult a tax adviser before characterizing for tax purposes any income you make from your online activities.
If your existing homeowners or renters insurance policy does not cover your online activities, you may want to consider switching carriers or purchasing additional coverage through an umbrella policy. See the section on Evaluating Homeowners and Renters Insurance Policies for a discussion of the terms and coverage of several large carriers.
If you are interested in further reading on this topic, Eugene Volokh published an excellent post on the Volokh Conspiracy.
Homeowners insurance policies (and renters insurance policies) typically provide some personal liability coverage that may cover claims brought against you arising from your online activities. As a general rule, however, the more you expose yourself to potential claims, the more you should consider coverage beyond your homeowners policy. This is especially true if your online activities even arguably constitute a business.
In general, homeowners insurance policies do not refer specifically to claims arising from online activities, but this does not rule out the possibility of coverage for such claims. When evaluating policies, you should pay particular attention to two factors: (1) the types of potential claims covered by the policy, and (2) the scope of the policy's business activity exclusion.
To help you consider these factors, we have reviewed five policies:
Want to help us create a more comprehensive review? We are hoping to collect homeowners and renters insurance policies from every carrier and every state. Please contact us if you would be willing to send us a copy of your policy (with any personal information redacted, of course).
In the course of your online activities, you may be sued for defamation, invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims may be covered by your insurance policy if it includes coverage for personal injury claims. Personal injury coverage is not dependent on physical injury, and commonly includes (among other things) claims for defamation (including libel and slander), "humiliation," and invasion of privacy. For more information about defamation, privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, see the Risks Associated with Publication section of this guide.
Of the five policies we reviewed, only the Erie and Chubb policies cover personal injury claims. The Chubb policy also includes "shock", "mental anguish", and "mental injury" under its definition of personal injury.
You may also be sued for copyright or trademark infringement in the course of publishing your work online. These claims, as well as other Intellectual Property claims, do not appear to fall within most homeowners insurance policy definitions, and it is therefore unlikely that your homeowners insurance will cover you if you are sued for copyright or trademark infringement. For more information about copyright and trademark, see the Intellectual Property section of this guide.
None of the policies we reviewed provide coverage for injury that the insured "intends" or "expects." Additionally, none of the policies covers punitive damages. This may be particularly relevant to claims involving defamation, where plaintiffs generally seek punitive damages.
All five homeowners insurance policies we reviewed cover claims involving bodily injury as well as property damage.
In general, bodily injury is defined as "bodily harm," "sickness," or "disease." The Erie policy also includes "mental anguish" in its definition of bodily injury. Additionally, each policy states that coverage for bodily harm extends only to situations where the injury results from an "occurrence," which is defined as "an accident."
Given these constraints, if your policy is limited to coverage of bodily injury claims, you will likely not be covered for claims against you that arise from your online activities.
All five policies we reviewed exclude coverage for claims arising out of the insured's business activity. There are differences in the ways that state laws treat this exclusion, as well as important variations in the policies themselves. We discuss the different state approaches in the Insurance Exclusions for Business Pursuits section of this guide.
In order to understand the business activity exclusion in the five policies, we looked at: (1) its definition of "business" and (2) the scope of its exclusion.
1. Definition of "Business"
Although the Chubb policy states that it does not cover damages arising from the insured's "business pursuits" it does not define what a "business pursuit" is. The Erie policy defines "business" as "any full-time, part-time or occasional activity engaged in as a trade, profession or occupation." The Amica Mutual, OneBeacon, and Providence Mutual policies contain identical definitions: "A trade, profession or occupation engaged in on a full-time, part-time or occasional basis . . . or [a]ny other activity engaged in for money or other compensation."
The Amica Mutual, OneBeacon, and Providence Mutual policies further state that an "activity engaged in for money or other compensation" will not be characterized as business (and therefore will not be excluded from coverage) if:
(1) the insured received $2,000 or less in the year prior to the start of the policy, or (2) the insured engaged in a volunteer activity, and only received payment of expenses incurred in the performance of the volunteer work.2. The Scope of the Business Pursuits Exclusion
The five policies that we reviewed vary a great deal in how narrowly they apply the business pursuits exception:
If it seems likely that your online activities will fall under the business pursuits exclusion of your policy, you should consider purchasing Media Liability Insurance.
Otherwise, given the limitations of basic bodily injury coverage, if you engage in substantial online activity you should look for a policy that includes personal injury coverage. Such a policy will likely be more expensive, but the coverage for injuries like defamation may be well worth the additional cost should someone bring such a claim against you.
A more comprehensive alternative is to purchase an umbrella policy as recommended by the (not impartial) Insurance Information Institute, which states that such coverage typically begins in the range of $150-$300 annually. The primary effect of umbrella policies, which do cover personal as well as bodily injury, is to increase your coverage cap. Given the high cost of legal services, this may be worthwhile even if your policy already covers personal injury. Some umbrella policies also augment your coverage in other ways. The OneBeacon umbrella policy we reviewed, for example, eliminates the punitive damages exclusion; this might be crucial if you are sued for defamation, for which punitive damages are often sought.
Most homeowners insurance policies exclude coverage for liability relating to "business pursuits." Although the exact formulation varies by state, the courts generally define a "business pursuit" as a continual or recurrent activity carried out for financial gain. In most states, courts give a broad interpretation to "business pursuits," drawing in almost any activity that results in financial gain. In these states, if you devote a non-trivial amount of time to your online publishing activities and make any money from them -- for example, through advertisements or a tip jar -- then you probably are carrying on a "business pursuit," and your coverage could be lost. Conversely, if you don't make any money from your online publishing activities (or more precisely, if financial gain is not your motivation), then you probably are not engaging in a "business pursuit," and you won't lose coverage under your homeowners insurance. As Eugene Volokh notes, "if you're worried about the risk of libel lawsuits, you might want to consider staying entirely noncommercial." (emphasis in original).
In other states, the courts have interpreted "business pursuits" in a narrower fashion. There, you might be able to argue that your online publishing activities are not business pursuits so long as they are not your primary occupation or making a profit is not your primary motive. In these states, going commercial does not necessarily carry the same risk of losing coverage under your homeowners insurance.
Most homeowners policies do not have a separate provision stating what law will be used to interpret them, so courts ordinarily will apply the law of your place of residence.
Choose from the list below to view state-specific information on the "business pursuits" exclusion in the fifteen most populous U.S. states and the District of Columbia. Keep in mind that there is no case law directly addressing the definition of a "business pursuit" in the online publishing context, so there is substantial uncertainty surrounding this area of law.
Arizona law defines a "business pursuit" as follows:
To constitute a business pursuit, there must be two elements: first, continuity, and, secondly, the profit motive; as to the first, there must be a customary engagement or a stated occupation; and, as to the latter, there must be shown to be such activity as a means of livelihood, gainful employment, means of earning a living, procuring subsistence or profit, commercial transactions or engagements.
Indus. Indem. Co. v. Goettl, 138 Ariz. 315,319 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Krings v. Safeco Ins. Co., 6 Kan. App.2d 391, 393 (1981)). CMLP has identified no Arizona cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
Arizona appellate courts have interpreted the category of business pursuits in a variety of contexts. For example, the Court of Appeals of Arizona has held that childcare services operating out of the insured’s home fell within the exclusion where the insured regularly babysat at least five children, had advertised her babysitting services in the newspaper, kept regular weekday hours, and was paid for her services. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Wiechnick, 166 Ariz. 266 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). In another case, the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that the activities of Humberto B. “Smokey” Santillo, Sr., selling herbs and nutritional advice, constituted a business pursuit. Fimbres v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 147 Ariz. 75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). The Court noted that by selling a prescription for herbs, Smokey’s activities “originated from, grew out of, flowed from and had a connection with his regularly conducted business.” Id. at 77.
Therefore, if you live in Arizona, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you make money from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless those activities are temporary or sporadic.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
California law defines a business pursuit "as a regular activity engaged in for the purpose of earning a profit." Smyth v. USAA Property and Casualty Insurance Co., 152 Cal. App. 3d 864, 869 (1984). CMLP has identified no California cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere). As a general matter, however, California cases have established that an activity need not be full-time or a primary (or even major) source of income in order to qualify as a business pursuit.
Therefore, if you live in California, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you make money from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless those activities are temporary or sporadic.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Florida law defines a business pursuit as "a continuous and comprehensive activity for financial gain." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Friend, 478 So.2d 1198, 1200 (Fla. App. 1985). CMLP has identified no Florida cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere). The Friend case (above) suggests that a short-term, part-time activity carried out for money may not be considered a business pursuit when the primary motive of the activity is not financial gain (in that case, the insured person was helping out a friend).
Therefore, if you live in Florida, you may have an argument that your online publishing activities are not a "business pursuit" if your primary motivation is not financial gain. This argument might be undercut, however, if your publishing is more than a part-time, short-term activity.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Georgia law defines a "business pursuit" as "a usual commercial or mercantile activity customarily engaged in as a means of livelihood and typically involving some independence of judgment and power of decision." Brown v. Peninsular Fire Ins. Co. 320 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. App. 1984). CMLP has identified no Georgia cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
As a general matter, Georgia courts have excluded from the category of business pursuits activities that are not the insured's primary occupation, even if engaged in for profit. See for example Brown (above) and Southern Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Duncan, 206 S.E.2d 672 (Ga. App. 1974). Other courts have indicated that an activity will not be considered a business pursuit if the primary motivation is not financial gain. See for example Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Collins, 222 S.E.2d 828 (Ga. App. 1975).
Therefore, if you live in Georgia, you have a good argument that your online publishing activities are not a business pursuit if you carry them out in your spare time or your primary motivation is not financial gain, even if you make money from those activities.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Illinois law defines a "business pursuit" as a "continuous or regular activity, done for the purpose of earning a profit." State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Moore, 430 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. App. 1981). CMLP has identified no Illinois cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
As a general matter, Illinois courts deem even part-time and supplemental activities done for profit to be business pursuits. On the other hand, Illinois courts have determined that profit-making activities that are temporary or sporadic, or that result in compensation only irregularly, are not business pursuits. See for example the Moore case above.
Therefore, if you live in Illinois, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you make money from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless those activities are temporary or sporadic.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Indiana law defines as business pursuit as "a continued or regular activity for the purpose of earning a livelihood." Mid-American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Shoneys, 843 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. App. 2006). CMLP has identified no Indiana cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
One Indiana court has held that the a for-profit activity is not a business pursuit if it does not occur continually or regularly, or if making a profit is not the primary motivation. See American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bentley, 352 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. App. 1976). In that case, the insured rented storage space in his home to a third party for money, but there was no evidence that he did so regularly, or that profit was his primary motivation. In other cases, however, Indiana courts have held that an activity is a business pursuit even if the activity is not the insured's primary occupation. See for example the Shoneys case above.
Therefore, if you live in Indiana, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you make money from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless those activities are temporary or sporadic.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Massachusetts law defines "business pursuits" as incorporating "two significant elements: profit motive and continuity." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bent, 1999 WL 1203774 (Mass. Super. Nov. 9, 1999). CMLP has identified no Massachusetts cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere). One Massachusetts court has indicated in reasoning not essential to its judgment that the category of business pursuits embraces “[a]ny full or part time activity of any kind engaged in for economic gain." Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Fitchburg, 793 N.E.2d 1252 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
Therefore, if you live in Massachusetts, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you make any money from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless those activities are temporary or sporadic. The law in Massachusetts is not clear on this point, however.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Michigan law defines "business pursuits" as follows:
To constitute a business pursuit, there must be two elements: first, continuity, and secondly, the profit motive; as to the first, there must be a customary engagement or a stated occupation; and, as to the latter, there must be shown to be such activity as a means of livelihood, gainful employment, means of earning a living, procuring subsistence or profit, commercial transactions or engagements.
Riverside Ins. Co. v. Kolonich, 329 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Mich. App. 1982). CMLP has identified no Indiana cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
As a general matter, Michigan law excludes from the category of business pursuits activities engaged in as a hobby, when financial gain is only a side consideration. For instance, in the Kolonich case (above), a Michigan appellate court reversed a lower court ruling because the insured person's activities -- teaching ceramic classes in her home, firing ceramics pieces, and selling the occasional piece -- could constitute a hobby rather than an enterprise conducted for profit.
Therefore, if you live in Michigan, you may have an argument that your online publishing activities are not a "business pursuit" if you carry them out as a hobby and your primary motivation is not financial gain, even if you make some money from those activities. Additionally, you might be able to argue that your publishing activities are not sufficiently continuous to constitute a business pursuit, if you engage in them sporadically and they are not part of your "customary engagement" or "stated occupation."
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
New Jersey law defines a "business pursuit" as an activity involving "continuity" or "customary engagement" and a "profit motive." Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 704 A.2d 597, 602 (N.J. Super. 1998). CMLP has identified no New Jersey cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
As a general matter, however, the New Jersey courts include nearly all profit-making activities carried out on a regular basis in the category of business pursuits. The activity does not need to be the insured person's sole occupation or means of support, but it must be more than merely sporadic or occasional.
Therefore, if you live in New Jersey, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you make money from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless those activities are temporary or sporadic.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
New York law defines a "business pursuit" as an activity regularly engaged in with a view toward earning a livelihood or making a profit. In other words, to constitute a business pursuit, there must be two elements: "first, continuity, and secondly, the profit motive." Showler v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 261 A.D.2d 896, 897 (N.Y App. Div. 1999). CMLP has identified no New York cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
As a general matter, however, the New York courts include nearly all profit-making activities carried out on a regular basis in the category of business pursuits. The activity does not need to be the insured's sole occupation or means of support, but it must be more than merely sporadic or occasional.
Therefore, if you live in New York, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you make money from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless those activities are temporary or sporadic.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
North Carolina law defines the word "business" in "business pursuit" as "an individual's paramount means of earning a livelihood." North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v Briley, 491 S.E.2d 656, 659 (N.C. App. 1997). CMLP has identified no New York cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere). As a general matter, however, North Carolina courts have declined to include part-time work under the exclusion, at least where the insured also had a separate full-time job.
Therefore, if you live in North Carolina, then you may have a good argument that your online publishing activities are not a business pursuit so long as they do not constitute your primary occupation or source of income.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Ohio law defines a business pursuit as work "engaged in regularly" which "produce[s] an income." Watkins v. Brown, 646 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ohio App. 1994). CMLP has identified no Ohio cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere). As a general matter, however, Ohio courts have deemed activities to be business pursuits even when profit was not the primary motive and the amount of money earned was small.
Therefore, if you live in Ohio, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you make money from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless those activities are temporary or sporadic.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Therefore, if you live in Pennsylvania, then you may have an argument that your online publishing activities do not constitute a business pursuit if your primary motivation is not financial gain, even if you make some money from those activities.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Texas law defines a "business pursuit" as incorporating two elements: "(1) continuity or regularity of the activity, and (2) a profit motive, usually as a means of livelihood, gainful employment, earning a living, procuring subsistence or financial gain, a commercial transaction or engagement." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. 2005). CMLP has identified no Texas cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
As a general matter, however, Texas courts recognize that "hobbies" are distinct from business pursuits. One court has defined a hobby as "a specialized pursuit, such as stamp collecting, painting, or gardening, that is outside of a person's regular occupation, usually done in a non-professional way as a means of relaxation during leisure time." United Servs. Auto. Assoc. v. Pennington, 810 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. App. 1991). In that case, the insured, a car salesman, bought a horse in order to experiment with new race training methods. The court held that the jury was entitled to view this as a hobby and not a business pursuit, even though the insured admitted that he would have liked to turn the activity into a business in the future.
Therefore, if you live in Texas, you have a good argument that your online publishing activities are not a business pursuit, so long as you can characterize them as a hobby. It will help if your primary motivation for publishing online is not financial gain, and you have other employment.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Virginia law defines a "business pursuit" as follows:
To constitute a business pursuit, there must be two elements: first, continuity, and, secondly, the profit motive; as to the first, there must be a customary engagement or a stated occupation; and, as to the latter, there must be shown to be such activity as a means of livelihood, gainful employment, means of earning a living, procuring subsistence or profit, commercial transactions or engagements.
Virginia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hagy, 352 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Va. 1987). CMLP has identified no Virginia cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
As a general matter, the Virginia Supreme Court has given a rather broad interpretation to the category of business pursuits. In Hagy (above), the court ruled that an insured person who performed childcare in her home was engaged in a business pursuit as a matter of law, even though she testified that, after experiencing a downturn in her business, her motivation for doing so was "love for the child rather than the prospect of financial gain." The court noted that the childcare operation bore all the outward signs of a business for profit and found that even a small amount of income was sufficient to provide evidence of a "profit motive."
Therefore, if you live in Virginia, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you make money from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless those activities are temporary or sporadic.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall state trend.
Washington law defines a "business pursuit" as an activity that is (1) conducted on a regular and continuous basis; and (2) profit-motivated. Stuart v. Am. States Ins. Co., 953 P.2d 462, 465 (Wa. 1998). CMLP has identified no Washington cases interpreting this test in the context of online publishing out of the home (or elsewhere).
As a general matter, however, Washington courts give this test a broad interpretation. In order to be deemed a business pursuit, an activity does not need to be one's sole source of income and does not need to be full-time, nor does the activity need to be motivated solely by profit. "Some" profit motivation is sufficient to make an activity a business pursuit, so long as it is conducted on a regular and continuous basis. See, e.g., Stoughton v. Mutual of Enumclaw, 810 P.2d 80 (Wash. App. 1991).
Therefore, if you live in Washington, you may be in danger of losing coverage for your online publishing activities if you intend to make a profit from your website or blog, such as through advertisements or a tip jar, unless your activities are temporary or sporadic.
Note that specific language in a policy might lead a court to a result different from the overall trend.
CMLP has identified no District of Columbia cases interpreting the "business pursuits" exclusion. If you know of a case on this topic, please contact us.
If your online activities are not covered under your current insurance policies, a growing number of companies are offering media liability insurance. While these policies are expensive -- perhaps prohibitively so for a newly formed business -- they can also be quite comprehensive. They typically cover costs to defend against suits brought for:
Media liability policies typically have a minimum coverage of $500,000 - $1 million and can run all the way up to $100 million for large publishers. The premiums may be as low as $500 a year, but typically begin at $2,500. Media liability insurance is a growing business with more companies underwriting policies every year, so it makes sense to shop around.
To help you determine what type of insurance may be right for you, we've created an interactive question tool for evaluating your insurance options.
There are two options for obtaining media libility insurance: (1) you can purchase insurance through a group or association (like the Media Bloggers Association or The Authors Guild), or (2) purchase your own policy.
Purchasing insurance through a group or association often has the benefit of offering lower premiums. There can be some downsides to group policies, however. The first issue to consider is whether the policy aggregates damages across the group. If so, one large claim against an individual group member would decrease the amount remaining on the policy limit for the other group members. The second issue to consider before obtaining a group insurance policy is that these policies typically give you less control over the handling and settlement of claims made against you, in many cases resting settlement authority with the insurance company.
If you decide to obtain your own media liability insurance, there are a number of carriers that provide policies in this area. Some of these carriers include: ThinkRisk, Chubb Group, AXIS PRO, First Media Specialists, ACE USA, InsureNewMedia, AIG, Darwin National Assurance Company, The Hartford and Hiscox USA. Keep in mind that you will likely have to go through a licensed agent or broker to secure coverage from these companies.
There are several things to consider when shopping for a media liability policy:
Depending on the company you choose, you may be able to apply for media liability insurance through a direct application process, or you may have to go through a broker, agent or underwriter. Generally, plans that go through an underwriting process are a bit more expensive, but have greater flexibility in tailoring the plan to your needs.
Before contacting the insurance company, you will want to gather the following information:
To help you determine what type of insurance may be right for you, we've provided a decision tree below. For basic information on insurance, see the page on Finding Insurance.
Directions.
For ease of use, you can use the control bar at the bottom of the graphic to zoom in and out. The first icon from the left will center the decision tree in the window, while the second icon from the left will expand or contract the nodes on the decision tree. You can move or recenter the decision tree by clicking and draging the image.
Clicking on the globe icon next to the nodes will take you to a corresponding page of the Legal Guide with additional information.
If you are faced with a situation that needs legal attention, you basically have two options: handle the matter yourself or seekprofessional legal help.
Representing yourself in a legal proceeding may hold someinitial appeal due to the cost of hiring a lawyer or your interest intaking control of the situation. Before you decide to handle a legal matter yourself, however, review the section on Representing Yourself to assess whether you are ready to handle the matter and whether you have access to the resources you will need to succeed.
If you are considering handling the matter yourself, be forewarned that a seemingly simple issue can quickly grow complex. Inmost situations you will be better off hiring a lawyer, who will assess the merits of your case, explain your options, and help you achieve the best result.
If you decide to seek professional legal help, you can hire a lawyer directly or, depending on your situation, request legal assistance from a nonprofit legal assistance organization such as Legal Aid or the Citizen Media Law Project. See the sections on Hiring a Lawyer or Nonprofit Legal Assistance for more information.
If you are a journalist or online publisher you should also visit our sister site, the Online Media Legal Network (OMLN), a free initiative that connects lawyers from across the country with online journalists and digital media creators who need legal help. Lawyers participating in OMLN provide qualifying online publishers with pro bono and reduced fee legal assistance on a broad range of legal issues. More information is available here.
It's not easy to decide whether to represent yourself. Before you make a decision, take some time to consider whether your personality, work ethic, and lifestyle are suited for the task ahead. The following questions should help you assess your situation:
One way to make this determination is to attend a free legal clinic in your area. Call the clerk's office of your local court and ask if there are free legal clinics or a Volunteer Lawyer for a Day program. If there is one, attend it and discuss your case with the lawyer present. You should come away understanding more about the complexity of your case and whether or not you feel able to represent yourself.
- speak in public?
- understand the legal aspects of your case well enough to explain it to a judge?
- meet deadlines?
- perform legal research and understand court rules, cases, and statutes?
- produce documents to file in court?
- take the time and effort to understand and respond promptly to papers issued by the court?
- respond to papers received from the opposing party?
- free up time in your schedule to attend court hearings?
If you are involved in litigation and decide to represent yourself, you will be referred to as a pro se litigant. While a court will hold you to the same standards as a lawyer, most courts will be less stringent with mistakes made by pro se litigants, and might even have a staff attorney at the courthouse to guide you through some of the procedural requirements. However, not all courts are helpful and can in fact be hostile to pro se litigants. Keep in mind that should you come to a point during the legal proceedings where you would prefer to be represented by a lawyer, you may have the option to do so.
In addition to the clerk's office mentioned above, there are several nonprofit institutions and other organizations that may be able to help with your case and provide guidance and resources. In extremely rare cases, they may even offer to represent you in court.
Other good resources include legal form books. Form books contain legal forms that lawyers use in drafting a legal document. Legal forms come in templates with suggested language and must be tailored to fit the situation. There are many types of legal forms available, categorized by subject, procedure, court, or state. Bear in mind that the forms are not meant to be used as boilerplate language. You will need to perform additional research to make sure that the form is appropriate to the situation and complies with current law. Here are some sites that have legal forms:
You can also visit your local law library (at a law school or courthouse) to find legal form books.
Additionally Nolo.com is another wonderful legal resource. Nolo publishes print, software, and online manuals covering a wide variety of legal issues, including materials on taxes, employment, intellectual property, and how to operate a small business. The publications are written for the layperson and are terrific do-it-yourself legal guides.
Like doctors and other professionals, lawyers range from general practitioners to specialists. Typically, lawyers who offer general legal services concentrate on legal issues concerning the general public—for example, wills or real estate transactions. However, if you are seeking a lawyer because of legal problem associated with your online activities, you should look for a specialist who focuses on media law or intellectual property issues on the Internet. If you want to set up a business, you should find a lawyer with experience in corporate and tax matters.
There are several ways to find a lawyer:
The best way to find a good lawyer is by word-of-mouth. Ask your family, friends, or colleagues for recommendations. If you previously hired a lawyer for another situation, ask her for references in the field you need. Don't stop at getting names and contact information; press the referrer for reasons why he thinks the lawyer is good.
Your state or county bar association will likely have a referral service that matches your legal problem with an appropriate lawyer. Visit the American Bar Association's Consumer Guide to Legal Help to find bar associations in your state. Additionally, other types of organizations are focused around a specialty rather than geography. For example, the Media Law Resource Center provides a list of their law firm members who specialize in media law, including First Amendment and intellectual property law. (Organizations that might provide legal representation without a fee are covered under the Nonprofit Legal Assistance section of this guide.)
You may come across advertisements for a lawyer's services through tv, radio, magazines, newspapers, websites, or phonebooks. Remember that the advertisement has little to do with the lawyer's abilities. You should thoroughly research the lawyer by following the steps outlined below.
If someone has brought a lawsuit against you, check with your insurance company to see if you have liability insurance for the situation at hand. If you do, your insurance company should provide you with the necessary legal defense and indemnify you if any money needs to be paid to the other party. In this case, you will be represented by the lawyer from the insurance company and will not need to seek a lawyer of your own.
Once you have a list of lawyers, research them as much as possible. The lawyer's education background and the firm that the lawyer is associated with may be an indication of the quality of a lawyer's practice, but the best indicator of a lawyer's service is experience. Additionally, check your list of lawyers against a legal directory, a resource that contains peer ratings of lawyers, to see the opinions of others in the legal community. Martindale Hubbell is a highly regarded legal directory and is available online.
- the nature of the actions that triggered the situation
- when and how you received any documents about the situation
- any relevant interactions you’ve had with anyone involved in the matter
The act of writing the summary allows you to: record events you may forget during the conversation; better understand your position; and focus your conversation with your prospective lawyer. If there is a lawsuit, you may be required to disclose this summary to the other side, so keep to the facts and do not include your opinions.
There are several ways you may be billed for a lawyer's services:
If there are one or two lawyers with whom you connected, call their references and speak to former clients. Once you're comfortable making the decision to hire a lawyer, make sure you have a written fee agreement to avoid billing surprises.
Lastly, don't lose touch with your case just because you have hired a lawyer. Your lawyer works for you. You need to set the goals, and your lawyer will use her legal expertise to help you achieve them. The only way for you to make decisions about your case is to stay informed.
Many lawyers and legal organizations provide pro bono work. In common usage pro bono refers to volunteer work done for the public good. In the legal field, lawyers who do pro bono work take cases for those who are disadvantaged and unable to secure legal assistance. Additionally, legal advocacy organizations (organizations that take on cases) usually provide pro bono representation for their clients.
There are a number of nonprofit institutions and other organizations that may be able to represent you or provide other legal assistance. Should the organization offer to represent you in court, you will be in the enviable position of enjoying free legal work done by lawyers passionately committed to the underlying causes of your situation. Note that these lawyers may be working on your individual case because they want to break new legal ground or advance the law in a particular way to benefit society as a whole. Thus, you will want to make your individual goals clear to them. More often than not, they will share your goals and you'll be able to forge ahead.
If you are a journalist or online publisher in need of legal assistance, please visit our sister site, the Online Media Legal Network (OMLN), a free initiative that connects lawyers from across the country with online journalists and digital media creators who need legal help. Lawyers participating in OMLN provide qualifying online publishers with pro bono and reduced fee legal assistance on a broad range of legal issues. More information is available here.
See the Nonprofit Legal Assistance Organizations by State section for organizations in your state that may be of help. On a national level, here are some organizations whose work may be of interest (listed alphabetically):
Choose your state from the list below for more information about nonprofit legal assistance organizations in your state.
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Arizona:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in California:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Florida:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Georgia:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Illinois:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Indiana:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Massachusetts:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Michigan:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in New Jersey:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in New York:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in North Carolina:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Ohio:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Pennsylvania:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Texas:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Virginia:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in Washington:
The following organizations provide legal assistance to individuals and organizations in the District of Columbia:
Even if you have done everything right and taken every possible precaution, there may come a time when you are sued or receive a legal threat. The first thing you should do is take a deep breath and assess the situation.
First, determine what type of legal threat you received. Most legal threats come in the form of a letter or email. Typically, the letter or email will demand that you cease whatever activity is being complained about and desist from engaging in the conduct in the future. If you receive such a letter or email, you should carefully check to see if the correspondence includes an attachment that bears the name of a court or otherwise resembles a complaint or legal filing. Consult the following examples to determine what type of threat you've received:
Second, weigh your options as to how to respond. It is imperative that you DO NOT DELAY. Even if you have only received a threatening letter or email and have not been sued, you should take the threat seriously and review the Responding to Correspondence Threatening Legal Action section of this guide to help you formulate a response. If you receive a lawsuit or subpoena, you should review the Responding to Lawsuits or Responding to Subpoenas sections of this guide to determine how to respond.
Third, consider hiring a lawyer or seeking legal self-help. Even if you believe the legal threat you've received is meritless, it is best not to minimize the situation. Do not assume that the threatening party will simply go away. Speaking to a lawyer, even if it is only a phone call, or doing some legal research can help to set your mind at ease and get you started on the right path to deal with the legal threat. See our Finding Legal Help section for some guidance.
You’ve received a letter or email threatening legal action. Now
what? First, do not panic. Don’t immediately comply with the letter,
get angry and write a fiery response, or destroy the letter in the hope
that the issue will go away. You have many decisions to make on how to
respond, and a cool head will serve you well. Although the
correspondence will be unique to your situation and the CMLP cannot
give you specific legal advice, here are some guidelines to help you
determine your course of action.
1. Look carefully at the letter’s contents.
2. Check to see who sent the letter.
If the letter has been signed by anyone but a judge or court official, in all likelihood you have been sent a “cease and desist” letter asking you to stop doing something, or to remove an item from your blog, online post, or website. Even if it is a lawyer who authored the letter, do not immediately assume that the letter has merit and that you are in the wrong. Instead: a. Determine whether the sender has specified a time by which she expects you to comply with her wishes. If you have a reasonable amount of time to respond, keep going down this checklist. If the sender expects immediate compliance, notify the sender that you received her correspondence, are taking it seriously, and need time to investigate the claims she has made. Give her a date (one providing you with a reasonable amount of time to figure out your response) when you will respond further—and keep to it. b. Keep note of when you received the letter; good record-keeping will be important in the event that the sender files a lawsuit against you. If the letter has been signed by a judge or court official, you most likely have received an order mandating some action on your part. You should immediately comply with order, as disobeying a court order can have negative repercussions. After complying with the order, you have three choices: do nothing more, appeal the order, or, if a hearing is scheduled, prepare for the upcoming hearing in which you will have an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. Refer to our sections on Responding to Lawsuits and Finding Legal Help in order to decide which choice is best for you.3. Review the substance of the letter or email.
See if the sender has clearly explained the legal basis for her arguments that you need to stop the activity described. Other sections of our legal guide, especially the Risks Associated with Publication and Intellectual Property sections, may help you understand the terms used in the correspondence. If the sender does not provide a legal basis for her claims or if you are unable to understand what it is she is saying, you should request clarification.Determine what law the sender is using to support her arguments. If the law is from a country that’s different from the one you reside or work in, it likely does not apply to you. However, given that such determinations often involve complex legal analysis, you may want to check with a lawyer to ensure this is the case before disregarding the letter. If you’re wrong, your response, or lack thereof, may work to the sender’s advantage should she bring a lawsuit against you. Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for resources to use in making this determination.
Determine whether the letter relates to material posted on the site by a user.
4. Review the situation and the facts
Once you have a sense of why the correspondence was sent, write down everything you know about the situation, including: when you received the correspondence, the nature of your actions that triggered the sender’s letter, and any relevant interactions you’ve had with the sender. However, if the sender sues you for not complying with her letter, you may have to provide this summary, so keep to the facts only and don’t include your opinions about the situation. The act of making the summary is valuable for you to evaluate your position and figure out your next steps because everything is fresh in your mind and later you may forget certain events; it will also help to focus your conversation with a lawyer (should you wish to consult with one) or be a good starting point for your own legal research; and finally, as you write, you may start to get a sense of the claim’s validity.5. Determine how best to proceed.
In the course of your research and fact gathering, you will probably come to one of three conclusions:
The law protects your activity: Go ahead and draft a letter or email back to the sender explaining why you think your actions are appropriate. Stand your ground, but be polite as abrasive language is likely to result in inflaming the recipient and making the situation worse. Explain to the threatening party that you will be adding the sender’s letter or email to the CMLP Legal Threats Database--and do so! It often helps to ask someone you trust to review and edit your letter before you send it.The law does not protect your activity: If you determine that your activity is not legally defensible, stop it immediately and do not wait for the sender to file a lawsuit against you. In many cases, if you do not cease the activity you may be found to have “knowingly” or “willfully” violated the sender’s rights, which will likely result in larger damages or penalties. Do not ignore the threat on the assumption that no one would sue you because you don't have a lot of financial assets, as recent changes to bankruptcy laws may leave you vulnerable. Oftentimes, acquiescing to a legitimate request will make the threat go away. However, if the sender demands payment of some kind, we strongly advise you to review the section on Finding Legal Help.
You just can’t tell what the law says: Don't be surprised if you are unable to
determine what course of action to take. If you have already requested
clarification from the sender and are still unable to determine whether
their legal claims are valid, you should review the section on Finding Legal Help for additional guidance.
6. Consider whether you should notify your insurance company that you have received a legal threat.
7. Add the sender’s letter or email to the CMLP Legal Threats Database.
This is an important action because creating an entry in the Legal Threats Database will help others who receive similar letters know that they are not alone and assist them in weighing their options regarding how to respond. You will also allow the CMLP to track who is sending legal threats and make it possible for our lawyers to help others in a similar position.
Being on the receiving end of a lawsuit is not a pleasant experience, but you cannot afford to let your emotions dictate your actions. This is not the time to fire off incendiary emails to others about the lawsuit nor should you contact the person who has brought the suit against you. Your goal at this point should be to thoroughly understand your position and gather all the information you can.
Go through the checklist on this page to better understand the
process in front of you. But first, there are two technical terms that
you will need to become fluent with right away: for purposes of the
lawsuit, the person who sued you is called the plaintiff, while you are known as the defendant.
1. Do you have a lawsuit on your hands?
It's important that you understand the papers you've received. While the following is not definitive, most lawsuits contain the following attributes:
If none of these features are present you may be in possession of a different type of legal document—check our sections on Responding to Correspondence Threatening Legal Action and Responding to Subpoenas for help in determining what you received.
If the features described above apply, you have received a complaint, which is a legal document initiating a legal action and explaining the reason for the lawsuit. Accompanying the complaint should be a summons, a legal document from the clerk of the court where the complaint has been filed. A summons lets you know that the plaintiff has brought a lawsuit against you, and also gives you a date by which you need to file an answer or other response. An answer is your response to the complaint: whether you agree with the facts stated in the complaint and/or whether you think the complaint is invalid for procedural reasons.
Highlight, circle, and underline your response date—you will not want to miss the deadline for filing your response or else the court may accept everything that the plaintiff has asserted in her complaint as true and then rule against you.
If no summons accompanies the complaint, call the clerk of the
court listed in the complaint, and find out whether the plaintiff
actually filed it. If the complaint has not been filed, you should not
set the documents aside because the fact that the sender has taken the
time to prepare a draft complaint shows that she takes the situation
seriously. However, lawyers sometimes send legal-styled documents to
confuse and intimidate a defendant into acquiescing to their demands.
Keep reading this section to prepare for the possibility of a lawsuit.
2. Did you properly receive the complaint and summons?
If you have received both a complaint and a summons, then the plaintiff has initiated a lawsuit against you. Since both documents signal the beginning of the lawsuit, the law requires that you receive (are served) both these documents in specified ways. It is important that you check to see what the relevant requirements are for proper service in your jurisdiction.
To do so, you'll need to first find out what kind of court issued the summons. If the title contains the words "United States District Court", then you have been sued in federal court. On the other hand, if title contains the name of a state, (for example: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) and does not contain the words "United States District Court", you have been sued in state court. It is beyond the scope of this guide to cover all of the requirements for service. If you think you might not have been properly served, you can:
If you do not believe that you were served in the proper way, you
need to inform the court about the reasons why in your answer. You will
receive a notice giving you a date to appear in court and further
explain your reasons, and your case should be dismissed. If you don't
inform the court on that date about the improper service both in your
answer and at your hearing, you could be barred from bringing it up at
a later point and getting the case dismissed.
3. Don't destroy documents!
Do not delete or otherwise destroy any blog posts, emails,
documents, backups, or other documents--whether in paper or electronic
form--that may be relevant to the lawsuit. Courts do not look kindly
upon such actions and the destruction of important documents could be
fatal to your case. Besides, you may find these documents useful in
preparing your defense.
4. Consider notifying your insurance company
You may be covered by insurance if you are found to be financially liable for your online activities. Consult the section on Insurance for more information.
5. Determine whether the court can hear your case
You live in Atlanta, Georgia, the plaintiff lives in Sacramento,
California, and the lawsuit has been filed in Dane County, Wisconsin.
Does a court in Wisconsin have authority over you? A lot of ink has
been spilled concerning a court's reach or jurisdiction to hear
a case. Broadly speaking, our legal system divides the question into
whether a court has personal jurisdiction, which is the authority over
the plaintiff and defendant, and whether a court has subject matter
jurisdiction, which is the authority to decide the issues presented in
the lawsuit. Questions concerning jurisdiction can get very complicated
and are beyond the scope of this guide. If you've been sued in another
state or country, you may want to hire a lawyer to examine the
jurisdictional issue.
6. Gather your information
Organization is key to the litigation process. You should keep a file containing all the documents related to the lawsuit including printouts of any relevant emails and webpages. Additionally, note dates and times for each document in the file.
The complaint should outline the claims the plaintiff has brought against you. Typically the claims will be set forth in the titles of sections of the complaint, but sometimes they are buried. Familiarize yourself with the language used in the complaint and use the other sections of this guide, especially the sections on Risks Associated with Publication and Intellectual Property, to understand the reasons for the lawsuit.
Next, write down everything you know about the situation, including: when you received the correspondence, the nature of the actions that triggered the lawsuit, and any relevant interactions you’ve had with the plaintiff. The act of writing the summary allows you to evaluate your position and figure out your next steps because everything is fresh in your mind and later you may forget certain events; it will also help to focus your conversation with a lawyer (should you wish to consult with one) or be a good starting point for your own legal research; and finally, as you write, you may start to get a sense of the lawsuit's validity.
You should know that the plaintiff may request a copy of the summary, but the law will likely protect you from having to give it to her. However, as there are rare instances in which you may need to provide it, keep to the facts only and do not include your opinions about the situation.
The complaint portrays the plaintiff's side of the story; the
answer should portray yours. Go through the complaint and write out
each fact alleged by the plaintiff. Now, rewrite the facts using your
words. Do you dispute how the plaintiff has characterized certain
events or omitted others?
7. Decide how to respond
At this point, you should decide whether you want to represent yourself or hire a lawyer. If you have in fact been sued, you will invariably be better off if you hire a lawyer. Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more help on this issue.
8. Add the information about the lawsuit to the CMLP Legal Threats Database
This is an important action because creating an entry in the Legal Threats Database will help others who receive similar lawsuits know that they are not alone and assist them in weighing their options regarding how to respond. You will also allow the CMLP to track who is sending legal threats and make it possible for our lawyers to help others in a similar position.
You've received a document that might be a subpoena. Your immediate
reaction may be shock and a desire to immediately obey its request. As
with anything legal, it's best not to act on impulse but to carefully
consider the options before you. While you will likely need to comply,
there are times when a court will agree to modify the subpoena's
request or even to terminate it entirely. This guide cannot give you
legal advice about your situation and you should contact a lawyer for
specific legal advice. However, this section should be able to answer
the preliminary questions you may have about how best to respond.
1. What is a subpoena?
A subpoena is a legal order commanding the person or organization named in the subpoena to give sworn testimony at a specified time and place about a matter concerned in an investigation or a legal proceeding, such as a trial. A subpoena duces tecum substitutes the requirement of your appearance to testify with a requirement that you supply specific physical material in your possession. A deposition subpoena means that your sworn testimony will be taken during a phase of the trial process known as discovery, and will likely occur at a lawyer's office.
Subpoenas may be issued by the following people involved in the legal case associated with the subpoena:
Given that a subpoena is an order to produce yourself and/or
tangible items in a very specific legal setting, it is imperative that
you take it seriously. Failure to comply with a subpoena can have
serious consequences. However, you do have certain options in how best
to respond.
2. Did you receive a subpoena?
You'll first want to determine precisely what you've received. In some instances, law enforcement authorities will use a search warrant, rather than a subpoena duces tecum, to access material in your possession. If you have been served with a search warrant, you cannot interfere with the search. You should call a lawyer immediately, note the scope of the search, watch and document where the authorities performed their search, and keep a record of any items seized.
Subpoenas come in several flavors, and you may need someone trained in the law to help you determine what type of legal document you've received. However, a subpoena contains certain distinguishing characteristics. Look carefully at the document for:
Subpoenas are not necessarily filed with the court, so if you
have doubts about the document you've received, ask a lawyer or call
the person who signed the document and ask if they have in fact sent a
subpoena. (An address and or telephone number should follow the
signature.) If none of the above characteristics match your document,
refer to our sections on Responding to Correspondence Threatening Legal Action, and Responding to Lawsuits for help figuring out what you've received.
3. Accepting a Subpoena vs. Complying with a Subpoena
Once you've determined that you have received a subpoena, you
may feel that you want to contest the subpoena because you believe that
it is invalid or unreasonable. You can still do so despite having
received the subpoena (which in most cases arrived by registered mail,
or by a person delivering it to you and requesting your signature).
Acceptance of the subpoena does not constitute your assent to comply
with it. However, if you object to the terms of the subpoena, then you
must inform the court about your decision to challenge it.
4. Inconvenient Date & Cost of Travel
As long as you are not one of the parties in the case and you have to travel an appreciable distance, your transportation costs should be covered and you should be given an attendance fee. The costs and fees are set according to the rules of the court named in the subpoena. Generally, in a civil case you should receive the cash or check before you have to appear. After you testify in a criminal case, you should receive an attendance fee and travel reimbursement.
If appearing at the time and place specified by the subpoena is
of great inconvenience, call the person who issued the subpoena, and he
may be able to reschedule your appearance to a more convenient date.
However, keep in mind that postponement may not be an option because a
court date has been set for the trial and cannot be moved. If so, and
if you would suffer extreme hardship from having to appear, consult a
lawyer who may be able to help.
5. Filing an Objection to a Subpoena
The subpoena will require that you either appear, or produce documents or other material, at a specific time and location. If you want to inform the court of your objections you will need to file a Motion to Quash. Typically, a Motion to Quash contains a request to the court asking to modify or terminate the subpoena based on certain objections, and a memorandum explaining how the law supports the objections.
You should not wait until the date specified to make your objection known to the court. There are many valid reasons to object, the most common being:
It is important to note two things here: the court does not usually monitor who and what is subpoenaed, and under rules of trial procedure, a party to a lawsuit is permitted to send a subpoena to anyone he thinks might have material useful for his case. Additionally the material doesn't even have to relate to the subject of the lawsuit. A party is entitled to request materials it thinks might have the potential to lead to relevant information concerning the subject matter of the case. Thus, unsurprisingly, many subpoenas are drafted to be broad in scope, and in some cases, to have a short deadline.
In some cases, law enforcement authorities use a
subpoena to a build a case against the subpoena recipient before
pressing charges. If you think that you may be the focus of a criminal
investigation, or worry about incriminating yourself when you testify,
do not comply with the subpoena without first consulting a lawyer.
6. Hiring a Lawyer
If you haven't already made a decision at this point, you should decide whether you want to hire a lawyer. If the request is straightforward and you're comfortable with supplying the requested information, you may not need a lawyer's services. However, you will almost always be better off having a lawyer protecting your interests, even if you think you have nothing to hide. You may mischaracterize a situation and make yourself vulnerable to a lawsuit or criminal charges, and if so, will find it hard to rebut the testimony given under oath. Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more help.
Before contacting a lawyer, write down everything you know about the situation, including: when and how you received the subpoena, the nature of the actions that triggered the subpoena, and any relevant interactions you’ve had with either party of the lawsuit. The act of writing the summary allows you to:
7. Adding your subpoena to the CMLP Legal Threats Database
This is an important action because creating an entry in the Legal Threats Database will help others who receive similar subpoenas know that they are not alone, and assist them in weighing their options regarding how to respond. You will also help the CMLP track who is sending legal threats and make it possible for our lawyers to help others in a similar position.
This section of the legal guide highlights the legal and practical issues you may encounter as you gather documents, take photographs or video, and collect other information. Many of the subjects discussed in this section are relevant whether or not you eventually publish the information you gather. (See the section on Risks Associated With Publication in this guide for information on your potential liability when publishing.)
So, where to start?
In addition to the sections listed above, you may want to review the Access to Government Information topic area in this guide. It covers the wide range of information available from federal, state, and local government sources.
We've also created a short video addressing some of the newsgathering and privacy issues
you are likely to face as you head out with camera in hand to cover
the news:
This section provides an overview of the laws that govern your right to access different types of public and private property.
While the First Amendment protects your right to engage in speech, it does not grant you unfettered access to the property of others. You should always keep in mind that your right of access is no greater than the public's right of access. In general:
Even when you have a right to access property, however, you may be asked to leave by law enforcement or the owner of the property. In these situations, it is important that you understand your rights ahead of time. You should read the relevant local statutes, familiarize yourself with the common law, and perhaps contact the police and other government offices in the area to better understand your right to access different locations.
Generally speaking, government officials and persons in possession of private property are the only figures who can restrict your access to property. If one of these figures asks you to leave a place that you believe you have a right to access, you should explain why you have the right to stay. They may tell that current circumstances are an exception, or you may be able to convince them to let you stay. In any case, you must take care—you can be charged with trespass for remaining if you do not have a right to remain there.
Depending on the type of property you will be entering, you should review the section on:
The U.S. Constitution protects your right to speak and, in some instances, grants you a right to access public places to gather information. Your right to access public property is not absolute, however. Generally speaking, you have the same right of access to public property as the general public.
This section covers your access to public (i.e. government-owned) property. (Refer to the section on Access to Private Property for more information on entering privately owned property.) Not all government-owned property is open to the general public. Depending on the type of property you wish to enter, your right to access public places may be constrained by reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions, or by the government's interest in managing its property.
Here is an overview of the three types of public property you are most likely to encounter:
Property That Historically Has Been Open to the Public
Your right to access public property is strongest when the area you wish to access has historically been open to the public for the exercise of speech, public debate, and assembly. These areas are known as public forums and include spaces such as sidewalks, parks, and town squares. You may freely enter and gather information while in these public spaces, but you should do so without disturbing the peace or interfering with those around you. Your right of access does not confer immunity from all liability if your conduct is disruptive or harassing.
Property That Is Open to the Public for a Limited Purpose
Your right to access government-owned property that is only partially open to the public is a bit more limited. If the general public is permitted to access only certain areas or for certain limited purposes, you right to access the property for newsgathering purposes is similarly limited. For example, some parts of a courthouse are open to the general public, but portions of the courtrooms themselves are accessible only by the parties in the litigation and judges' chambers are completely off limits to the public.
However, some public property, even though it is open only for limited purposes, can take on the attributes of a public forum discussed above. A classic example of this type of property is public schools and universities. Although public school and university buildings are not wholly open to the public, some parts of a campus may be considered a public forum. If a school's large open quad is accessed from public sidewalks and streets and freely used by the general public with no apparent objection from the school administration, then the quad may be considered "dedicated" to public use, and therefore more like the traditional public forums of the public park and sidewalk. Additionally, if the school opens certain of its rooms for non-school meetings that are open to the public, those rooms, during those times, will be treated as public forums.
Remember that because public schools are not entirely public forums, school administrators often have the discretion to restrict the entry of outsiders, particularly while the school is in session. Check in with the school administration before entering school grounds or you may be liable for trespass. Additionally, some states laws prohibit people from loitering within a certain distance while school is in session. These "school loitering laws" are mainly aimed at keeping sexual predators and drug dealers away from schoolchildren, but be aware that their language may be broad enough to cover lawful or innocent activity as well.
Property That Is Not Open To the Public
You cannot access or gather information on government-owned property that is not open to the general public. This type of property is known as a nonpublic forum in which the government can charge you with trespass if you enter without authorization. The following are examples of nonpublic forums:
You may wish to access another's private property in order to gatherinformation to publish online. However, while there are (rare)circumstances in which the law will condone your entry onto privateproperty without permission, in general you do not have any right to enter the private property of others without their consent. You should read this section in conjunction with the section on Trespass in order to understand the issue of consent.
Residences: The term "private property" encompasses awide variety of places, from homes to businesses open to the public.Courts are highly unsympathetic to those who try to gather news in private homes without consent, and if you enter a private home without permission, you may be liable for invasion of privacy, trespass and, in certain cases, intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court took on the issue of "companytowns" with regard to the First Amendment. Although the company townwas private property owned by the company, the fact that it had beenopened up to use by the public generally made it subject to theconstitutional requirements of the First Amendment. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Today, there are fewer company towns; however, private, gatedresidential communities may occupy a similar niche. Visitors seekingaccess to a private residential community must usually announcethemselves at the gate or receive permission from the development'ssecurity guards in order to enter. It's often a wise idea to seekpermission before entering such a community. But even if you do not get express permission, your right to access will be strongest if theprivate residential community opens its gates to the public at large.See the section on Access to Public Property in this guide for more information.
Businesses: If you try to access businesses that do not open themselves up to the public, you may be liable for trespass.However, as a member of the public you will be able to accessbusinesses open to the public without fear of liability. Your right ofaccess does not necessarily translate into a right to gatherinformation while you are there. The business has given you consent touse the premises as a patron, and your actions need to be within thescope of that use.
For example, a restaurant consents to your presence for you toenjoy eating a lovely meal in the company of good friends. In thisscenario, taking notes about the food, ambiance, and service may befine, whereas approaching other diners for interviews or forphotographs likely oversteps the scope of the restaurant's consent, andyou could be liable for trespass. See the Trespasssection in this guide for more information. Note that you may onlyaccess the areas of the business that are open to the public.Continuing our example, while you can enter a restaurant, you cannot goto the kitchen without additional permission.
Shopping malls have come to occupy a place in moderncommunities akin to the town square or main street and thus arearguably public, rather than private, in nature. But unlike thetraditional public forum of a town square, these establishments areprivately owned places of business. Since the Supreme Court's decisionin PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,447 U.S. 74 (1980), stating that there is no constitutional right tofree speech in a private shopping mall, the law of access to shoppingmalls has largely been left to the states. State courts vary on thequestion of whether to allow access to shopping malls. Those that dofind them to be public or quasi-public forumsstill note that owners may impose reasonable time, place and mannerrestrictions on expression, provided the regulations arecontent-neutral, narrowly tailored, and leave open sufficientalternative channels of communication.
If you want to go to a shopping mall and gather information,try to avoid disrupting business activities. For example, it would bebetter to approach people walking in the corridors of the mall, or inthe food court, than to station yourself at the door of a store andattempt to talk to everyone entering or exiting.
You may be invited by law enforcement or other government officials to accompany them while they perform their duties. These types of situations are called "media ride-alongs" and can be an effective way to gather information about how public officials do their work. However, ride-alongs may take you to events occurring on private property. The Supreme Court has held that accompanying police in their execution of an arrest warrant in a private home may make you liable for trespass. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has a terrific overview of how courts have treated trespass issues in media ride-alongs. The issue is complex. As a rule of thumb: if you are invited on a media ride-along and enter private property, you should get consent for your presence from the person in possession of the property. Additionally, you should note that depending on the circumstances, your presence may jeopardize an investigation. Thus, do not be surprised if your local law enforcement authorities prohibit media ride-alongs altogether.
If you enter private property without the owner's permission or enter portions of public property that are off limits to the public, you could be liable for civil or criminal trespass. For example, you may not walk into your neighbor's house uninvited, sneak into your congressperson's office, or pretend to be a public official to gain access to someone else's property.
In general, if you are invited onto someone's property or otherwise have permission to be on the property, you will not be considered a trespasser. If you are asked to leave, however, you may be trespassing if you refuse to do so.
Seeking Consent to Enter Property
You should make sure that you get consent before entering someone else's property. This consent must come from the individual, group of individuals, or business entity that is in possession of the property. In many cases this means that you need to get the owner's consent. However, if you want access to leased property, you must get the lessee's consent. Thus, a resident of an apartment complex can invite you into their apartment and you will not be considered a trespasser even if the landlord or owner objects to your presence. Conversely, if the owner gives you permission to access the resident's apartment and the resident declines to do the same, you may be liable for trespass if you enter the resident's property.
In some cases you'll be able to get express consent (verbal or in writing) from the person in possession of the property. In other cases you may believe you have the person's implied consent for your ability to enter her property. This type of situation occurs when:
If you rely on implied consent, you may find it difficult to defend yourself if you are charged with trespassing. You will need to show that a reasonable person in the same situation would have believed that there was implied consent based upon the conduct of the person in possession of the property and the overall circumstance.
Scope of Consent
If you have a right to be present on private or public property you will not be trespassing if your use of the property is consistent with your right to be there. Make sure you understand the scope of the permission you've been given and stay within its boundaries.
For example, you generally have a right to attend, and report on, court hearings, legislative sessions, and some governmental meetings. You can learn more about these rights in our section on Access to Government Information, Electronic Records, Meetings and Public Spaces. However, you have no right to enter a judge's chambers located in the courthouse, or private offices in the same building hosting the legislative sessions and other governmental meetings.
Misrepresenting yourself in order to gain consent
You may want to engage in investigative reporting tactics in order to inform the public about improper business practices or governmental wrongdoing, and thus may feel the need to misrepresent yourself in order to gain the necessary consent. If you do so, you may find yourself facing charges of trespass on the basis that your misrepresentation vitiated the consent given to you.
For example, in Food Lion v. Capital Cities/A.B.C., two ABC journalists falsified their resumes, and became employees of Food Lion grocery stores. 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). The two journalists gained access to areas of the store that were off limits to the general public and used hidden cameras to record unsanitary meat handling practices. The appellate court upheld a jury verdict finding the journalists liable for trespass on the basis that the journalists had breached their duty of loyalty to their employer, Food Lion.
In a second case involving ABC, however, a court did not hold ABC liable for trespass because it concluded that ABC's employees did not actually interfere with the owners possession or use of the property. Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). In Desnick, two ABC employees posed as patients and requested eye examinations at Desnick's eye clinics. The employees used hidden cameras and recorded the eye examinations which were subsequently used for a news story about the care and advice received at Desnick's eye clinics. Despite the ABC employees' misrepresentation of themselves as patients, the court declined to hold ABC liable for trespass because the eye clinics were open to the public, and the ABC employees did not interfere with Desnick's ownership or possession of his property.
Other issues may also come into play when you misrepresent yourself, such as laws against posing as a public official. Given the complexity of the caselaw, if you feel that you must conceal your identity in order to access property, you should get legal assistance to avoid claims of trespass (as well as other claims like fraud and invasion of privacy). Refer to the section on Finding Legal Help in this guide for more information.
While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when entering the property of others, there are a number of ways you can minimize your risk of liability. Some suggestions include:
If you physically enter a private area, photograph or take video of people engaged in private activities in places where they reasonably expect to be private, or in some other other way intrude into a person's privacy (by, for example, opening the person's mail), you could be liable for a violation of what is called "intrusion upon seclusion." If you collect certain personal data, this can also intrude into a person's private affairs. In the newsgathering context, the actual collection of the data could be seen as intrusion if the method you use meets the four general elements for an intrusion claim.
Generally speaking, however, you will not be liable for intrusion if you photograph or capture video of people in public places, even if they have not consented to being recorded, because individuals cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy when in public. Nor will you be liable for intrusion if you gather private information from documents that are available to the general public.
If you plan to gather private information or take photographs or video of people engaged in private activities in places where they could reasonably expect to be private, you should:
You should know that it is not necessary that you publish the photographs or information you gathered; an intrusion claim rests solely on the way in which you gathered your information. If you do subsequently publish the private information you gathered, however, you could also face liability for what is called "publication of private facts." See the section on Risks Associated with Publication in this guide for more information on the risks you may face if you publish private information.
An intrusion on seclusion claim is a special form of invasion of privacy. It applies when someone intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another. In most states, to make out an intrusion on seclusion claim, a plaintiff must generally establish 4 elements:
With respect to the first element of an intrusion claim -- intentional invasion into the private affairs of another -- courts generally require that the intrusion take the form of a "physical trespass." This can be met literally, by physically entering onto private property, or by an electronic or optical intrusion, such as using zoom lenses or highly sensitive microphones to photograph or record a person who has a reasonable expectation of privacy. A court would consider this a "physical trespass" if your use of ultra-powerful or highly sensitive equipment was the only way you were able to obtain your information or recording.
The second element requires that the actions giving rise to a claim must be offensive to a reasonable person. This requires more than mere discomfort or embarrassment. For example, barging in on someone in the bathroom and photographing them using the facilities would be offensive to a reasonable person while taking a picture of them standing at the mirror combing their hair likely would not be offensive.
The third element requires that the intrusion involve a private matter. Generally speaking, if you've intruded into someone's seclusion in a place they expect privacy (e.g., a bathroom or their bedroom) or while they are engaged in an activity that most reasonable people would expect to be private (e.g., intimate contact with another) this element will be met.
The fourth element requires that the intrusion must have resulted in mental anguish or suffering for the person whose privacy was invaded. This suffering can come from surprise, fright, or even anger at having been disturbed. In the case of surreptitious invasions, it can also come from the plaintiff finding out, after the fact, that his or her privacy has been invaded. The degree of anguish or suffering the plaintiff experiences will determine the amount of damages he or she is entitled to if the other elements of an intrusion claim are established.
Keep in mind that consent is typically one of your strongest defenses to an intrusion claim. Consent can often be gained expressly, by someone specifically telling you that you can photograph or collect private information about them (which you should get in writing), but can also be implied. If a person fails to object to your presence after you identify yourself as a member of the media (or publisher of a blog, etc.), courts will generally consider this to be implied consent to your use of recording and photography equipment. If consent is required, however, you must obtain it from someone who is legally able to give it. Permission from a child or mentally handicapped person is unlikely to be valid; in those situations, you should seek consent from the appropriate parent or guardian.
Each state has its own definition of what constitutes intrusion upon seclusion. You should consult the state sections listed below to determine whether your specific state recognizes intrusion on seclusion and, if so, how it defines what is necessary for a claim. (Note that the guide does not include every state at this time.)
Arizona recognizes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as one of four invasion of privacy torts. Valencia v. Duval Corp., 132 Ariz. 348, 350 (1982), overruled on other grounds in Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335 (1989). For a basic overview of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, see the Elements of an Intrusion Claim page.
Arizona generally follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts for invasion of privacy torts, see Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 342. The Court of Appeals of Arizona has relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts' formulation of intrusion upon seclusion, Hart v. Seven Resorts, 190 Ariz. 272, 279 (1997), as has the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals when interpreting Arizona law, Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002).
Arizona used to require that a plaintiff prove the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, including extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant, in order to prove intrusion upon seclusion and other invasion of privacy torts. See Valencia, 132 Ariz. at 350; Davis v. First Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 124 Ariz. 458, 463 (1979); Cluff v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 10 Ariz. App. 560, 564 (1969). However, the Supreme Court of Arizona has since overruled these decisions, and proof of extreme and outrageous conduct is no longer required to sustain a claim for invasion of privacy, including intrusion upon seclusion. Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 340.
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in Arizona is 2 years. A.R.S. § 12-542; Hansen v. Stoll, 130 Ariz. 454, 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
Intrusion law in California does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. California courts have adopted the elements of a claim for intrusion outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463 (1986).
California courts have recognized a more expansive definition of intrusion, however, that includes situations involving the use of deception to obtain private information. For example, a court allowed an intrusion claim where the defendant misrepresented his relationship with the plaintiff to obtain private information from her foster mother. See Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 725 (2007) (available at the Supreme Court's website after entering the citation information).
California courts also recognize some additional limitations on your liability for intrusion. With respect to the first element of a claim -- intentional invasion into the private affairs of another -- California courts have upheld your right to photograph a public figure even if he or she is on private property so long as the subject is in full public view. Being in full public view eliminates any reasonable expectation of privacy that the subject may have.
In California, the plaintiff must prove that you intended to intrude on the seclusion of another. Marich v. MGM/UA Telecommunications, Inc., 113 Cal. App. 4th 415 (2003)(holding that you must desire, or intent, to cause the consequences of your actions or believe that the consequences are substantially likely to follow). In other words, if you were merely scanning the horizon with your binoculars and inadvertently saw into someone's bedroom, this mistaken intrusion into an area of seclusion of another will not likely give rise to liability.
Other Potential Bases for Liability
If you are photographing or recording someone in California, you should be aware that California also has an Anti-Paparazzi Statute: California Civil Code, §1708.8. The statute prohibits you from trespassing onto another person's land or property with the express intention of procuring any kind of visual image, including but not limited to photographs, visual images, sound recordings or other images of a person engaging in a personal or familial activity.
Under this statute, you can also be found liable for invasion of privacy for photographing or video taping a person in a manner that a reasonable person would find offensive regardless of whether you have physically approached the subject. This would include using high power lenses or ultra-sensitive microphones to gain access to a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. These would all be cases where, without actual physical trespass, you would not have been able to capture the image of the person without the use of special equipment.
You should be especially cautious about entering the private property of another when covering the actions of police or government officials (these are often called "ride-alongs"). Even with police or other government permission, you will likely still be liable for intrusion if you enter a private home without the consent of the homeowner herself. See Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1487-88 (1986).
Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information
While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when gathering news or information, there are a number of ways you can minimize your risk of being on the receiving end of an intrusion lawsuit. See the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information for general advice on minimizing your risks. In California, you should also consider:
Intrusion law in the District of Columbia does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information. District of Columbia courts have only focused on the first three elements of the claim as there have yet to be any cases that deal specifically with anguish or suffering.
If you gather news or information in Washington, DC, you should be aware that gathering data from FBI files may be held to a different standard than gathering information from other publicly available sources. For example, a court held that gathering information from FBI files could constitute a claim for intrusion because information contained in FBI files, although sometimes available through public records, are not as easily accessible. Alexander v. FBI, 971 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1997). The court also reasoned that this type of information is highly personal and private and its disclosure could be considered offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
Intrusion law in Florida does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1419 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (interpreting Florida law), which highlights Florida's recognition of intrusion and shows its adoption of the elements of a claim described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
Other Potential Bases for Liability
Florida also has a stalking statute (Florida Statute 784.048) that prohibits engaging in a pattern of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress to that person. If you violate this statute, you could be held liable for stalking and your actions could be viewed as an intrusion.
Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information
While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when gathering news or information, there are a number of ways you can minimize your risk of being on the receiving end of an intrusion lawsuit. See the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information for general advice on minimizing your risks. In Florida, you should also consider:
Intrusion law in Georgia does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 499-500 (Ga. App. 1966). As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
With respect to the first element of a claim -- invasion into the private affairs of another -- Georgia requires that the intrusive conduct must be intentional. See Anderson v. City of Columbus, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1246 (M.D. Ga. 2005). However, a Georgia court has also held that physical intrusion is not always required, finding liability where the defendant repeatedly followed the plaintiff. See Anderson v. Mergenhagen, 642 S.E.2d 105, 110 (Ga. App. 2007).
Other Potential Bases for Liability
If you are photographing or recording someone in Georgia, you should be aware that Georgia has a statute that makes it unlawful for any person, through the use of any device, without the consent of all persons being observed, to observe, photograph, or record the activities of another which occur in any private place and out of public view. This statute just highlights that in addition to your physical trespass, the use of any device to intrude, whether it be a camera, microphone or video, can impose liability in Georgia. See O.C.G.A Section 16-11-62(2).
The Georgia statute specifically states that liability for intrusion does not require that photographs be developed or shown to others to complete the invasion of privacy. The statute is only concerned with the intrusive activity engaged in to obtain the photograph. See O.C.G.A Section 16-11-62(2).
Intrusion law in Illinois does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See Burns v. Masterbrand Cabinets, Inc., 874 N.E.2d 72, 75-77 (Ill. Ct. App. 2007). As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
Illinois courts do, however, differ slightly in describing the second element of a claim, requiring that the intrusion must be "offensive or objectionable." It does not appear that this change materially affects the outcome of cases.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which covers federal courts in Illinois, has hinted that there may be a First Amendment privilege to intrude with respect to matters of public concern. See Desnick v. American Broadcasting Co., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995). Using this logic, a federal district court judge stated that if the media could show that their intrusive activities were necessary to expose improper prison conditions, a highly newsworthy and publicly concerned topic, that could be a possible defense to intrusion. See Huskey v. NBC, 632 F.Supp. 1282, 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Intrusion law in Indiana does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991). As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
Massachusetts courts have not formerly adopted a common law claim for intrusion. Instead, Massachusetts has a statute that defines intrusion as an "unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with privacy." M.G.L. c. 214, Section 1B. Although the courts in Massachusetts formerly use the Massachusetts statute as their guide for intrusion claims, they do look to the general rule outlined in the Restatement to evaluate an intrusion claim. See Schlesinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1991). As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
In addition to gaining explicit consent from the person you wish to photograph or record, Massachusetts courts have extended this consent to other individuals under certain circumstances. For example, in Bevis v. United States, 971 F.2d 744 (unreported), a hospital employee escorted a photographer though the facility and gave permission for the photographer to take pictures. Although patients did not specifically give consent to the photographer, the court held that a claim for intrusion could not succeed because the consent from the hospital extended to its patients.
Intrusion law in Michigan does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881) (recognizing the intrusion tort); Duran v. Detroit News, 504 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (applying intrusion to the media and laying out the elements). As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
The only major difference that distinguishes Michigan's application of intrusion from the general elements applied by other states is that Michigan requires the method of intrusion to be "objectionable", rather than offensive. It is unclear if this makes a practical difference, but it is possible that a court could find conduct to be objectionable, but not necessarily offensive.In addition, Michigan has clarified that a defendant will not be liable for intrusion if he or she has a legitimate interest in the subject matter. See Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes, 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). This added defense deals with the second element of the claim that requires that the matter be private. Although there are no reported cases as of yet specifically geared to the media, this defense shows that a plaintiff's privacy is not absolute and can be subject to the legitimate interest of others.
Intrusion law in New Jersey does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 17 (N.J. 1992). As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
Corporations, partnerships, and unincorporated associations have no right of privacy under New Jersey law and therefore cannot assert a claim for intrusion upon seclusion.
Other Potential Bases for Liability
If you are photographing or recording someone in New Jersey, you should be aware that New Jersey imposes criminal (N.J.S.A 2C:14-9) and civil (N.J.S.A. 2A:58D-1) liability for photographing or filming or disclosing any filming or photography of "another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, without that person's consent and under circumstances in which a reasonable person would not expect to be observed."
New York courts do not recognize intrusion upon seclusion claims. See Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993).
Courts in New York do, however, recognize causes of action for trespass and other illegal acts committed during the course of newsgathering. See the section on Entering the Property of Others for more information about trespass and the other risks you may encounter.
Intrusion law in North Carolina does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 353-55 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
Always attempt to get the consent of any parties you are filming or whose privacy you might otherwise be intruding into. Consent from the subject will likely give you a strong defense against an intrusion claim. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354-55 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
Intrusion law in Ohio does not differ in any significant way from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See Sustin v. Fee, 431 N.E.2d 992, 993-94 (Ohio 1982). As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
In addition, Ohio has gone further with the first element in stating that the intrusive conduct must be intentional. Negligent intrusion is not sufficient. See Filotei v. Booth Broad. Co., 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 10461 at *6. At least one Ohio court has also noted that intrusion includes the making of persistent and unwanted telephone calls. See Clark v. Clark, 2005-Ohio-5252 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information
While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when gathering news or information, there are a number of ways you can minimize your risk of being on the receiving end of an intrusion lawsuit. See the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information for general advice on minimizing your risks. In Ohio, you should also consider:
Intrusion law in Pennsylvania does not differ signicantly from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 483 A.2d 1377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
However, persistent "hounding, harassment and unreasonable surveillance" may constitute intrusion in certain circumstances, even if conducted in a public or semi-public place. See Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F.Supp. 1413 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
Other Potential Bases for Liability
You should also be aware that Pennsylvania also has criminal anti-harassment law, see 18 PA C.S.A. 2709, and an anti-stalking law, see 18 PA C.S.A. 2709.1. Under these laws, following a person under circumstances demonstrating an intent to cause substantial emotional distress could result in criminal liability.
Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information
While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when gathering news or information, there are a number of ways you can minimize your risk of being on the receiving end of an intrusion lawsuit. See the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information for general advice on minimizing your risks. In Pennsylvania, you should also consider:
Virginia does not recognize intrusion claims. See WJLA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 n.5 (2002). However, there are several related causes of action that exist in Virginia.
First, it is a crime in Virginia to knowingly and intentionally videotape, photograph, or film any nonconsenting person if that person is nude or in state of undress so as to expose the genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or female breast in a location where the person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Va. Code. Ann. 18.2-386.1
Second, Virginia has an anti-stalking statute, which makes it a crime to "on more than one occasion engage in conduct directed at another person with the intent to place, or when [you know] or reasonably should know that the conduct places that other person in reasonable fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury to that other person or to that other person's family or household member." Va. Code. Ann. 18.2-60.3.
Intrusion law in Washington does not differ signicantly from the law described in the General Elements of an Intrusion Claim section of this guide. See Doe v. Gonzaga University, 143 Wn.2d 687, 705-06 (2001).
As result, you should follow the general advice outlined in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability When Gathering Private Information.
"Statute of Limitations" is a term used by courts to describe the maximum amount of time plaintiffs can wait before bringing a lawsuit after the events they are suing over have occurred. This time limit is typically set by state statute and is intended to promote fairness and keep old cases from clogging the courts. Generally speaking, the limitations period for intrusion claims begins to run on the date when the intrusion occurred.
Each state sets it own time limits for bringing a lawsuit and a court will typically apply the appropriate statute of limitations of the state in which the suit is filed. A relatively short limitations period is an acknowledgment of the importance of free speech principles, since a short time period reduces the potential chilling effects of speech-challenging lawsuits.
Because each state has its own statute of limitations for intrusion claims, which vary between one and four years, you should refer to the state sections listed below to find out what the specific statute of limitations is in your state. (Note that the guide does not include every state at this time.)
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in California is 2 years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 335.1.
California courts at one time applied a one-year limitations period for injury to persons, but in 2002, California updated its statute of limitations and increased the time period allowed for injury to persons to two years. Therefore, a 2 year statute of limitations will apply for invasion of privacy lawsuits, such as intrusion.
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in Washington D.C is 1 year. See Doe v. Southeastern Univ., 732 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1990).
The statute of limitations for intrusion cases in Florida is 4 years. See Fla. Stat. 95.11 (3)(g) & 95.11(3)(o).
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in Georgia is 2 years. See Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33.
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in Illinois is 1 year. See 735 ILCS 5/13-201. Intrusion claims are governed by the same limitation period that is used for libel, slander and defamation actions.
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in Indiana is 2 years. Although there is no specific statute on point, Indiana uses the same limitations period for intrusion as it does for actions for injuries to persons. See Ind. Code 34-11-2-4.
The statute of limitations for intrusion cases in Massachusetts is 3 years. Because there is no specific statute on point, Massachusetts uses the same limitations period for intrusion as it does for libel, slander and defamation suits, which is 3 years. See M.G.L. c. 260 Sec. 2A.
The statute of limitations for intrusion cases in Michigan is most likely 3 years. There is no specific statute governing the limitation period for a right to privacy suit. It is likely that courts would not apply the 1 year statute of limitations for libel. See Mich. Comp. Laws 600.5805(9). Rather, a court would likely apply the general 3 year statute of limitations for injury to person or property when reviewing an intrusion claim. See Mich. Comp. Laws 600.5805(10).
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in New Jersey is 2 years. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-2.
The state of New York does not recognize intrusion upon seclusion claims, so no statute of limitations is relevant. See Howell v. New York Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1993).
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in North Carolina is either 1 or 3 years. Because there is no specific statute on point, North Carolina courts would either use the same limitations period for intrusion as they do for libel, slander and defamation suits (1 year), see N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-54(3), or the general (3 year) catch-all statute of limitations for claims that are not specified elsewhere, see N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-52(5).
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in Ohio is 4 years. See Ohio Rev. Code 2305.09 (D).
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in Pennsylvania is 1 year. See 42 PA C.S.A 5523(1).
The statute of limitations for intrusion claims in Texas is 2 years. See Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code 16.003.
Courts in Virginia do not recognize intrusion claims, see WJLA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 n.5 (2002), therefore the statute of limitations is inapplicable.
It is not clear what the statute of limitations is for intrusion in Washington because courts in Washington only recently recognized intrusion claims. For defamation and false light invasion of privacy cases, the statute of limitations is 2 years. See RCW 4.16.100(1). At least one source indicates that courts will likely apply this 2 year statute of limitations to intrusion claims as well. See Media Law Resource Center, 50-State Survey 2007-2008: Media Privacy and Related Law (2008). If this is not the case, the statute of limitations is likely the 3 year period applied to other torts. See RCW 4.16.080.
While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when gathering news or information, there are a number of ways you can minimize your risk of being on the receiving end of an intrusion or other newsgathering related lawsuit. Some suggestions include:
Using a recording device, such as a microphone, video recorder, or camera, is often a helpful way to capture and preserve information about conversations, interviews, and phone calls in which you participate. It is also a good way to document what takes place in a court hearing or public meeting, whether for personal reference or later broadcast over the Internet.
Where you do your recording, and what you record, will largely dictate what legal limitations apply to your recording activities. It may also be the case (in fact, it is quite likely) that more than one set of laws or limitations might apply to your use of recording equipment. Before concluding that your activities are in the clear, you should read all of the sections listed below that might apply, as well as the section on Gathering Private Information elsewhere in this guide.
If you plan to record the conversations of others, whether they occur in person or over the telephone, you should review the section on Recording Phone Calls and Conversations. This section discusses federal and state wiretapping statutes that make it a crime to record telephone calls and private conversations in many circumstances. Keep in mind that conduct that could lead to criminal and civil liability under federal and state wiretapping statutes could also lead to possible liability for intrusion. Please refer to the state-specific sections of this guide to get a more in-depth overview of the wiretapping laws in the fifteen most populous U.S. states and the District of Columbia.
If you plan to record the activities of the police or other public officials, First Amendment considerations might override state laws that prohibit recording without consent. See the section on Recording Police Officers and Public Officials for more information.
If you plan to use a recording device at a public meeting or court hearing, you should review the section on Recording Public Meetings and Court Hearings, which looks at the laws affecting your ability to make sound and video recordings and to take photographs in these quasi-public settings. Because laws vary greatly state-by-state, be sure to consult the state-specific sections of this guide for detailed information on the laws regarding use of recording devices at court hearings and public meetings. For more information on your general right to be present at court hearings and public meetings, please see the Access to Government Information section of this guide.
If you plan to take photographs, video, or audio of people engaged in private activities in places where they reasonably expect to be private, you should also read the section on Gathering Private Information in this guide. Various privacy laws could subject you to liability in this context, so you should proceed with caution if you will be recording private activities.
Once you've reviewed the other sections and are prepared to proceed, you should carefully review the section on Practical Tips for Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings, and Hearings. This section provides some practical guidelines for using recording devices, which should help you steer clear of legal trouble.
Browse any of the sections below to get started:
If you plan to record telephone calls or in-person conversations (including by recording video that captures sound), you should be aware that there are federal and state wiretapping laws that may limit your ability to do so. These laws not only expose you to the risk of criminal prosecution, but also potentially give an injured party a civil claim for money damages against you.
From a legal standpoint, the most important question in the recording context is whether you must get consent from one or all of the parties to a phone call or conversation before recording it. Federal law and many state wiretapping statutes permit recording if one party (including you) to the phone call or conversation consents. Other states require that all parties to the communication consent.
Unfortunately, it is not always easy to tell which law applies to a communication, especially a phone call. For example, if you and the person you are recording are in different states, then it is difficult to say in advance whether federal or state law applies, and if state law applies which of the two (or more) relevant state laws will control the situation. Therefore, if you record a phone call with participants in more than one state, it is best to play it safe and get the consent of all parties. However, when you and the person you are recording are both located in the same state, then you can rely with greater certainty on the law of that state. In some states, this will mean that you can record with the consent of one party to the communication. In others, you will still need to get everyone's consent. For details on the wiretapping laws in the fifteen most populous U.S. states and the District of Columbia, see the State Law: Recording section. In any event, it never hurts to play it safe and get the consent of all parties to a phone call or conversation that you intend to record.
Who must give permission to record a telephone or in-person conversation?
Federal law permits recording telephone calls and in-person conversations with the consent of at least one of the parties. See 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d). This is called a "one-party consent" law. Under a one-party consent law, you can record a phone call or conversation so long as you are a party to the conversation. Furthermore, if you are not a party to the conversation, a "one-party consent" law will allow you to record the conversation or phone call so long as your source consents and has full knowledge that the communication will be recorded.
In addition to federal law, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted "one-party consent" laws and permit individuals to record phone calls and conversations to which they are a party or when one party to the communication consents. See the State Law: Recording section of this legal guide for information on state wiretapping laws.
When must you get permission from everyone involved before recording?
Eleven states require the consent of every party to a phone call or conversation in order to make the recording lawful. These "two-party consent" laws have been adopted in California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Washington. (Notes: (1) Illinois' two-party consent statute was held unconstitutional in 2014; (2) Hawai'i is in general a one-party state, but requires two-party consent if the recording device is installed in a private place; (3) Massachusetts bans "secret" recordings rather than requiring explicit consent from all parties.). Although they are referred to as "two-party consent" laws, consent must be obtained from every party to a phone call or conversation if it involves more than two people. In some of these states, it might be enough if all parties to the call or conversation know that you are recording and proceed with the communication anyway, even if they do not voice explicit consent. See the State Law: Recording section of this legal guide for information on specific states' wiretapping laws.
Can you record a phone call or conversation when you do not have consent from one of the parties?
Regardless of whether state or federal law governs the situation, it is almost always illegal to record a phone call or private conversation to which you are not a party, do not have consent from at least one party, and could not naturally overhear. In addition, federal and many state laws do not permit you to surreptitiously place a bug or recording device on a person or telephone, in a home, office or restaurant to secretly record a conversation between two people who have not consented.
Federal law and most state statutes also make disclosing the contents of an illegally intercepted telephone call illegal. See the section on Risks Associated with Publication in this guide for more information.
What if you are recording the activities of the police or other government officials in public?
Special considerations apply when recording police officers or other public officials. You may have a constitutional right to openly record the activities of police and other officials in public, so long as you do not interfere with those activities or violate generally applicable laws. For more information, see the section on Recording Police Officers and Public Officials.
As discussed in other areas of this Guide, a patchwork of state laws applies to recording the communications of others, including wiretapping and eavesdropping laws. These laws may impose liability for recording audio of a conversation without the consent of one or more parties, or for making secret audio recordings.
However, First Amendment considerations arise when you are openly recording the activities of police officers (or other public officials) carrying out their duties in public places. A number of U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that, in such circumstances, the First Amendment protects the right to record audio and video regardless of whether the police/officials consent. This constitutional right would override any state or federal laws that would otherwise prohibit such recording.
Currently, the following U.S. Courts of Appeals have recognized the First Amendment right to record the police and/or other public officials:
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey likewise recognized the existence of such a right in Ramos v. Flowers, Docket No. A-4910-10T3 (N.J. App. Div. Sept. 21, 2012), relying heavily on the First Circuit's reasoning in the Glik case.
If you are recording in New Jersey or in one of the states or territories within the First, Seventh, Ninth or Eleventh Circuits, the First Amendment right to record should protect you against prosecution for recording the police or other public officials as they carry out their duties in public places.
Even if you are not within these jurisdictions, these decisions may be persuasive to other courts. Although two other U.S. Courts of Appeals have declined to hold that a First Amendment right to record was "clearly established" as of particular dates in the past, see Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 261-62 (3rd Cir. 2010); Szymecki v. Houck, 353 Fed. App'x 852, 852 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam), none so far have rejected the existence of such a right. Furthermore, the United States Department of Justice has openly stated its position that the First Amendment protects all U.S. citizens who record the activities of the police in public, and has intervened in at least one civil rights lawsuit against police officers to support that First Amendment right. See Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, No. 1:11-cv-02888-BEL (D. Md. Statement of Interest filed January 10, 2012).
NOTE: The First Amendment right to record does NOT give you the right to interfere in the performance of officials' duties, or violate generally applicable laws. You may still face criminal prosecution or civil liability if, while recording, you: interfere with an arrest; trespass into secure government areas or private property; fail to respond to legitimate measures by law enforcement to control riots or disturbances; or otherwise interfere with official activity or violate private rights.
Public Meetings
Generally speaking, when you attend a public meeting of a government body that is required to be open to the public by law, you are free to record that meeting through note-taking, sound and video recording devices, and photography, so long as the method of recording used is reasonable and not disruptive. Your ability to do so, however, is based largely on state open meetings laws, and the details of these laws vary significantly. At least one court has held that there is no federal constitutional right to make a video recording of an open meeting, at least not when other methods are available for compiling a record of the proceeding, such as written and stenographic notes or audiotaping. Whiteland Woods, LLP v. Township of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3rd Cir. 1999). Government bodies may therefore place reasonable restrictions on the use recording devices, including a ban on certain devices, in order to preserve the orderly conduct of its meetings.
For information on your right of access to the meetings of government bodies, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and the Open Government Guide prepared by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.
Even when no state open meetings law affirmatively gives you the right to record, many state statutes permit the recording of speeches and conversations that take place where the parties may reasonably expect to be recorded. If you are attending a meeting that is open to the public, it is likely that the people running a meeting or giving a speech should reasonably assume that they might be recorded. However, you should always take reasonable steps to make clear that you are recording. Concealing your camera or recording equipment is not a good idea.
For state-specific information about using recording equipment in public meetings, see the State Law: Recording section.
Court Hearings
The law regarding the use of audio and video recording devices in court hearings varies a great deal based on the state. In Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the federal Constitution does not prohibit states from allowing cameras in the courtroom and that states may adopt their own rules permitting such recording equipment. Note that this ruling does not require states to allow recording in the courtroom, it only says that states may choose to do so. Since this ruling, all fifty states have adopted rules on the topic, but the rules vary widely. In some states, cameras and recording equipment are permitted in trial and appellate court proceedings, while in others recording is only allowed in appellate court proceedings. Most states give the court discretion to impose reasonable restrictions on the use of cameras and recording equipment in order to maintain the integrity of its proceedings and to otherwise serve the interests of justice.
For state-specific information about recording in courtrooms, see the State Law: Recording section.
The federal appellate courts may adopt their own rules regarding cameras and recording equipment in the courtroom. At the time of writing, only the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals allow recording equipment.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Using a recording device, such as a microphone, video recorder, or camera, is a helpful way to capture and preserve information about conversations, interviews, and phone calls in which you participate. It is also a good way to document what takes place in a court hearing or public meeting, whether for personal reference or later broadcast over the Internet. A number of laws affect your ability to use a recording device in these contexts. Here are some practical tips to help you avoid legal trouble when recording conversations, phone calls, meetings, and hearings.
Practical Tips for Recording Phone Calls and Conversations
Practical Tips for Recording Public Meetings and Court Hearings
Each state has its own wiretapping statute and its own rule on how many parties need to consent to the recording of a phone call or conversation in order to make it lawful. State law also varies on whether or not (and under what circumstances) you are permitted to use recording devices in public meetings and court hearings. Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on recording laws.
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Arizona's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. Arizona makes it a crime to intercept a "wire or electronic communication" or a "conversation or discussion" unless you are a party to the communication, present during the conversation or discussion, or one party to the communication or conversation consents. A.R.S. § 13-3005, -3012(9). Therefore, if you operate in Arizona, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should abide by the recording law of the most restrictive state involved, or play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
The wiretapping law covers oral communications when the speakers have "an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying the expectation," A.R.S. § 13-3001, but absent the speakers' justified expectation, the law does not apply. See State v. Hauss, 142 Ariz. 159, 164 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). Therefore, you may be able to record in-person conversations occurring in a public place, such as a street or restaurant, without consent. However, you should seek the consent of one or all of the parties before recording any conversation that an ordinary person would deem private.
Violation of the Arizona law is a felony, punishable by imprisonment and fine. See A.R.S. §§ 13-601, -603, -702, and -801 for more details.
In addition, while recording a conversation with the consent of only one party is legal in Arizona, a lawyer's recording of a conversation without the consent of all parties may be unethical under the Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct. See State Bar of Arizona Ethics Opinions 75-13, 95-03. However, an attorney may advise her client to record a conversation without the consent of all parties as long as the recording is legal and the attorney does not participate in the recording. See State Bar of Arizona Ethics Opinion 00-04.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the Arizona wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party. See A.R.S. § 12-731.
Court Hearings
Video and tape recording in Arizona state courtrooms is governed by Arizona Supreme Court Rule 122. Rule 122 allows recording at the sole discretion of the presiding judge. However, recording is flatly prohibited in juvenile court proceedings. The full text of Rule 122 can be found on the Arizona Judicial Branch's Arizona Court Rules website, under the "Current Arizona Rules" link. See also the Arizona Supreme Court website on cameras in the Court.
If the presiding judge wants to limit or prohibit recording, he or she must make "specific, on-the-record findings that there is a likelihood of harm arising from one or more" of the following factors:
"Requests by the media for coverage" of court proceedings must generally be made no less than two days in advance of the hearing. Rule 122(f). "Individual journalists" may use "personal audio recorders in the courtroom." Rule 122(i). However, Rule 122 limits the number of television cameras allowed in the courtroom and establishes requirements for their placement and wiring.
Rule 122(k) forbids "[c]overage of jurors in a manner that will permit recognition of individual jurors by the public." Arizona law also explicitly prohibits interception of jury deliberations. A.R.S. § 13-3005(A)(3).
The federal trial court in Arizona appears to prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom. See D. Ariz. LRCiv 43.1. However, according to the website of the 9th Circuit, the federal appeals court, the 9th Circuit is "one of two federal appellate courts to regularly allow still and video cameras and audio recorders in the courtroom for purposes of reporting on the proceeding." The Court has promulgated guidelines for photographing, recording, and broadcasting in the courtroom. The guidelines vest discretion in the presiding judge to grant or deny requests for recording court proceedings, and requests must generally be made at least three business days in advance. The guidelines apply to coverage by the "media," or "any person or entity regularly engaged in the gathering and dissemination of news." It is not clear from the guidelines whether these terms include non traditional media organizations or citizen journalists.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide.
Public Meetings
Arizona's open meetings law provides that "[a]ll or any part of a public meeting of a public body may be recorded by any person in attendance by means of a tape recorder or camera or any other means of sonic reproduction, provided that there is no active interference with the conduct of the meeting." A.R.S. § 38-431.01(F).
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Arizona.
Note: This page covers information specific to California. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
California's wiretapping law is a "two-party consent" law. California makes it a crime to record or eavesdrop on any confidential communication, including a private conversation or telephone call, without the consent of all parties to the conversation. See Cal. Penal Code § 632. The statute applies to "confidential communications" -- i.e., conversations in which one of the parties has an objectively reasonable expectation that no one is listening in or overhearing the conversation. See Flanagan v. Flanagan, 41 P.3d 575, 576-77, 578-82 (Cal. 2002). A California appellate court has ruled that this statute applies to the use of hidden video cameras to record conversations as well. See California v. Gibbons, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1204 (Cal Ct. App. 1989).
If you are recording someone without their knowledge in a public or semi-public place like a street or restaurant, the person whom you're recording may or may not have "an objectively reasonable expectation that no one is listening in or overhearing the conversation," and the reasonableness of the expectation would depend on the particular factual circumstances. Therefore, you cannot necessarily assume that you are in the clear simply because you are in a public place.
If you are operating in California, you should always get the consent of all parties before recording any conversation that common sense tells you might be "private" or "confidential." In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the California wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party. See Cal. Penal Code § 637.2.
Consult The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: California for more information on California wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
In a California state courtroom, you may be able to use a recording device if specific requirements are met. Anyone may use an inconspicuous personal recording device for note-taking purposes with the advance permission of the judge. For photographing, recording (other than as above), or broadcasting a court proceeding, you must file official media coverage request forms. These forms must be filed with the court at least five days before the event to be covered. The court has broad discretion to grant or deny such requests based on a number of factors. See Rule 1.150 of the California Rules of Court for details.
Federal courts in California are part of the Ninth Circuit. In Ninth Circuit appellate proceedings, cameras and recording devices are permitted at the discretion of the presiding panel of judges. To get permission, you need to file an Application for Permission to Photograph, Record, or Broadcast from the Courtroom three days in advance, although the panel can waive the advance notice requirement. Recording devices and cameras generally are prohibited in federal district courts in California.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
If you attend a public meeting (i.e., a meeting of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law) in California, you may make an audio or video recording unless the state or local body holding the meeting determines that the recording disrupts the proceedings by noise, illumination, or obstruction of view. Cal. Gov't Code § 11124.1(a); Cal Gov't Code §§ 54953.5(a),-.6.
For details on your right of access to public meetings, see the Access section and the The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: California.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Note: This page covers information specific to the District of Columbia. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
The District of Columbia's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. DC makes it a crime to record a phone call or conversation unless one party to the conversation consents. See D.C. Code § 23-542. Thus, if you operate in DC, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the DC wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party.
Consult The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: District of Columbia for more information on DC wiretapping law.
District of Columbia "state" courts prohibit recording in both trial and appellate courtrooms.
Federal courts in the District, at both the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
The District of Columbia has no statutory provision about the use of recording devices or cameras at public meetings (i.e., meetings of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law), but the government body holding the meeting generally must make transcripts of the meeting available for public copying.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: District of Columbia.
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Florida's wiretapping law is a "two-party consent" law. Florida makes it a crime to intercept or record a "wire, oral, or electronic communication" in Florida, unless all parties to the communication consent. See Fla. Stat. ch. 934.03. Florida law makes an exception for in-person communications when the parties do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation, such as when they are engaged in conversation in a public place where they might reasonably be overheard. If you are operating in Florida, you may record these kinds of in-person conversations without breaking the law. However, you should always get the consent of all parties before recording any telephone conversation and any in-person that common sense tells you is private.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the Florida wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party.
Consult The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Florida for more information on Florida wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
Florida state courts generally allow the use of recording devices in the courtroom, both at the trial and appellate level. The presiding judge may prohibit recording devices from the courtroom only upon a showing that the presence of such devices will adversely affect the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
Federal courts in Florida generally prohibit the use of recording devices and cameras in the courtroom, both at the trial and the appellate level.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
If you attend a public meeting (i.e., a meeting of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law) in Florida, generally you are permitted to use sound or video recording devices, so long as your recording does not disrupt the meeting.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Florida.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Georgia's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law for purposes of making audio recordings of conversations. Georgia makes it a crime to secretly record a phone call or in-person conversation "originat[ing] in any private place" unless one party to the conversation consents. See Ga. Code §§ 16-11-62(1), 16-11-66 (link is to the entire code; you need to click through to Title 16, Chapter 11, Article 3, Part I, and then choose the specific provisions). Therefore, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
In addition, Georgia has a special provision regarding the use of a hidden video camera. The law makes it a crime to use a device to "observe, photograph, or record the activities of another which occur in any private place and out of the public view" unless the person making the recording gets the consent of all the persons observed. Ga. Code § 16-11-62(2) (link is to the entire code; you need to click through to Title 16, Chapter 11, Article 3, Part I, and then choose the specific provision).
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating these provisions can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party.
Consult The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Georgia for more information on Georgia wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
You may record state court proceedings in Georgia, subject to a number of restrictions. At the trial court level, in order to record a court hearing, you must file a timely written request on a form provided by the court with the judge involved in the proceeding. The judge may decide to allow only one camera or recording device at a given time, and there is a prohibition on photographing or televising members of the jury.
At the appellate court level, you must make a written request to the court at least seven days in advance, and radio and television media are required to supply the court with a video or audio of the covered proceedings. It is not clear whether this latter requirement would apply to online publishers creating audio podcasts, video podcasts, or other online media similar to radio and television. In the appellate court, limitations are imposed on the number of cameras and photographers allowed in the courtroom at any given time.
In the Georgia Supreme Court, recording, photographing, and broadcasting is allowed without prior approval unless it "distracts from the dignity of the proceeding." The Supreme Court retains the authority to "limit, restrict, prohibit, and terminate the photographing, recording, and broadcasting of any judicial session." Limitations are imposed on the number of cameras and photographers allowed in the courtroom at any given time.
Federal courts in Georgia, both at the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
Georgia law expressly provides that "[v]isual, sound, and visual and sound recording during open meetings shall be permitted." Ga. Code § 50-14-1 (link is to the entire code; you need to click through to Title 50, Chapter 14, and then choose the specific provision).
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Georgia.
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
In People v. Melongo, Docket No. 114852 (Ill. Mar. 20, 2014), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that Illinois' two-party eavesdropping statute, 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-1, -2 (scroll down), was unconstitutional on its face. The statute made it a crime to use an "eavesdropping device" to overhear or record a phone call or conversation without the consent of all parties to the conversation, regardless of whether the parties had an expectation of privacy. The Court held that the recording provisions of the statute, as written, adversely affected the First Amendment rights of people making recordings in a substantial number of circumstances where there were no legitimate privacy interests. The Court further held that a provision of the statute prohibiting the disclosure of recordings likewise ran afoul of the First Amendment.
This does not mean, however, that recording of communications is now universally permitted in Illinois:
Consult The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Illinois for more information on Illinois wiretapping lawyer.
Court Hearings
In Illinois state trial courts, the use of sound and video recording devices is prohibited except by an order of the Illinois Supreme Court. Use of recording devices is permitted in hearings of the state appellate courts, but you must notify the clerk of the court at least five days in advance, and the appellate court may choose to prohibit recording. If media coverage is permitted, only one television and one still camera will be allowed at any given time.
Federal courts in Illinois, both at the trial and appellate level, prohibit the use of sound and video recording devices in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
A provision of the Illinois open meetings law states that "any person may record the proceedings at meetings required to be open by this Act by tape, film or other means." The statute goes on, however, to say that the authority holding the meeting shall make "reasonable rules to govern the right to make such recordings." 5 Ill Comp. Stat. 120/2.05 (scroll down).
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Illinois.
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Indiana's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. Indiana makes it a crime to record a telephone conversation unless one party to the conversation consents. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-176 and Ind. Code § 35-33.5-5-5. Therefore, you may record a telephone conversation if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should play it safe and get the consent of all parties. In-person conversations do not appear to be covered by the law, but it cannot hurt to get consent before recording just in case.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the Indiana wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party. Ind. Code § 35-33.5-5-4.
Consult The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Indiana for more on Indiana wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
You are permitted to use recording devices in the Indiana Supreme Court and in Indiana appellate court proceedings. For the Indiana Supreme Court, you must make a request twenty-four hours before the start of the proceedings. For Indiana appellate courts, you must make a request forty-eight hours before the start of the proceedings. (Note that all appellate oral arguments are also webcast live and are available on-line.)
As part of a pilot project that ended December 31, 2007, Indiana state trial courts allowed recording devices in court where both parties agreed. It is presently unclear whether this state of affairs will continue. Initial reports do not appear positive.
Federal courts in Indiana, both at the trial and appellate level, prohibit the use of sound and video recording devices in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
If you attend a public meeting (i.e., a meeting of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law) in Indiana, the presiding body may not prohibit you from making a sound recording. See Ind. Code § 5-14-1.5-3(a) (scroll down) (meetings of "governing bodies of public agencies must be open at all times for the purpose of permitting members of the public to observe and record them"). The precise status of video recording is less clear under the law, but in practice still photography and video recording are commonplace.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Indiana.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
For additional information about engaging in journalism in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, please see our printable PDF guide Newsgathering in Massachusetts, co-produced with the Harvard Law School Cyberlaw Clinic.
Massachusetts's wiretapping law often referred to is a "two-party consent" law. More accurately, Massachusetts makes it a crime to secretly record a conversation, whether the conversation is in-person or taking place by telephone or another medium. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99. Accordingly, if you are operating in Massachusetts, you should always inform all parties to a telephone call or conversation that you are recording, unless it is absolutely clear to everyone involved that you are recording (i.e., the recording is not "secret"). Under Massachusetts's wiretapping law, if a party to a conversation is aware that you are recording and does not want to be recorded, it is up to that person to leave the conversation.
This law applies to secret video recording when sound is captured. In a 2007 case, a political activist was convicted of violating the wiretapping statute by secretly recording video of a Boston University police sergeant during a political protest in 2006. The activist was shooting footage of the protest when police ordered him to stop and then arrested him for continuing to operate the camera while hiding it in his coat. As part of the sentencing, the court ordered the defendant to remove the footage from the Internet. From this case, it appears that you can violate the statute by secretly recording, even when you are in a public place. However, in a 2011 case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that recording police activity in public is independently protected by the First Amendment, and that it is unconstitutional for the state to prosecute those recording the police in public under Massachusetts's wiretapping law; this ruling might protect secret as well as open recordings.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the Massachusetts wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party.
Consult The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Massachusetts for more information on Massachusetts wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule 1:19 says that judges should "permit broadcasting, televising, electronic recording, or taking photographs of proceedings open to the public in the courtroom by the news media for news gathering purposes and dissemination of information to the public," with certain limitations. Members of the media must make a request to the court a reasonable time in advance of the proceeding. Courts generally do not allow recording devices in certain types of sensitive cases, and the judge retains the discretion to limit the use of recording devices to preserve the decorum of the court and the fairness of the proceeding. See this Massachusetts Bar Association post for details. Supreme Judicial Court oral arguments are webcast and archived online.
Federal courts in Massachusetts, at both the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
Massachusetts open meetings law expressly permits sound and video recording of public meetings (i.e., meetings of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law), except for executive sessions, by anyone in attendance. The statute provides that:
After notifying the chair of the public body, any person may make a video or audio recording of an open session of a meeting of a public body, or may transmit the meeting through any medium, subject to reasonable requirements of the chair as to the number, placement and operation of equipment used so as not to interfere with the conduct of the meeting. At the beginning of the meeting the chair shall inform other attendees of any such recordings.
See Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 30A, § 20(e).
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Massachusetts.
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Michigan law makes it a crime to "use[] any device to eavesdrop upon [a] conversation without the consent of all parties." Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539c. This looks like an "all party consent" law, but one Michigan Court has ruled that a participant in a private conversation may record it without violating the statute because the statutory term "eavesdrop" refers only to overhearing or recording the private conversations of others. See Sullivan v. Gray, 342 N.W. 2d 58, 60-61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). The Michigan Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this question, so it is not clear whether you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to it. But, if you plan on recording a conversation to which you are not a party, you must get the consent of all parties to that conversation. In addition, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
Michigan law also makes it a crime to "install, place, or use in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing, recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that place." Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539d. The law defines a "private place" as a place where a person "may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance but does not include a place to which the public or substantial group of the public has access." Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539a. You should always avoid these kinds of surveillance tactics.
Michigan law also prohibits you from "us[ing] or divulg[ing] any information which [you] know[] or reasonably should know was obtained in violation of the other wiretapping laws. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539e. To the extent this statute forbids you from publishing truthful information on a matter of public concern provided to you by a third-party (when you had no role in the wiretapping), it is probably unconstitutional. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating these provisions can expose you to a civil lawsuit for money damages by an injured party.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Michigan for more information on Michigan wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
Michigan law generally allows sound and video recording of state court proceedings, but you must request permission from the presiding judge at least three business days beforehand. The court has discretion to terminate or prohibit recording if it determines that it would be in the interests of justice. For instance, the court may exclude recordings of particularly sensitive witnesses or testimony involving confidential business information.
Federal courts in Michigan, at both the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide.
Public Meetings
When you attend a public meeting (i.e., a meeting of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law), Michigan law gives you the right to make video and sound recordings of the meeting and to broadcast live. The exercise of this right is not dependent on prior approval by the public body, but the public body may establish reasonable rules and regulations to avoid disruption of meetings. Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.263(1).
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Michigan.
Note: This page covers information specific to Missouri. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Missouri's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. Missouri makes it a crime to intercept or record any "wire, oral, or electronic communication" unless one party to the conversation consents. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 542.402.2. Therefore, if you operate in Missouri, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get prior consent from one party to the conversation, unless you are doing so to commit a criminal or tortious act. Nevertheless, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in Missouri and another state, you should play it safe and abide by the recording law of the most restrictive state involved.
Missouri's law criminalizes recording and attempting to record any wire or oral communications. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 542.402.1. The statute defines "wire communications" as those made "in whole or in part through the use of "wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception." See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 542.400(12). If at least one party in a converation is using a wired device, this statute is applicable; however, communications entirely between cordless phones receiving radio signals are not protected by Missouri's wiretapping law. See State v. Martinelli, 972 S.W.2d 424 (Mo.App. E.D.1998); State v. King, 873 S.W.2d 905 (Mo.App. S.D.1994). Missouri also prohibits the disclosure or use of the contents of any wire communication obtained in violation of this section. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 542.402.1.
This law only extends to oral communications which are "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 542.400(8). Therefore, you may be able to record in-person conversations occurring in a public place where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy without consent.
Violation of the Missouri law is a class D felony, punishable by imprisonment and fine. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 542.402.1. In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the Missouri wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 542.418.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Missouri for more information on Missouri wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
Media coverage is allowed in Missouri state courts with the permission of the presiding judge. See Court Operating Rule 16. Media coverage is explicitly denied in any court proceeding that is required to be held in private under Missouri law, as well as juvenile, adoption, domestic relations, or child custody hearings. See C.O.R. 16.02. Equipment and personnel are limited to one still photographer with two cameras and two lenses, one television camera and camera operator, and one audio system. See C.O.R. 16.04. For additional information, please refer to the Missouri Supreme Court's Cameras in the Courtroom: A Guide to Missouri's Court Operating Rule 16.
Federal courts in Missouri, at both the trial and appellate level, typically prohibit phones, recording devices, and cameras in the courtroom. There is a limited exception to this rule for civil cases in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri participating in the Cameras in the Courtroom Pilot Project issued by the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Local Rule 13.02.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide.
Public Meetings
Missouri law provides for "the recording by audiotape, videotape, or other electronic means of any open meeting," though the public body may establish guidelines regarding the manner of recording in order to minimize disruption. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.020.3. However, a closed meeting cannot be recorded without the permission of the public body; doing so without permission amounts to a Class C misdemeanor. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.020.3.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Missouri.
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
New Jersey's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. New Jersey makes it a crime to intercept or record an in-person or telephone conversation unless one party to the conversation consents. N.J. Stat. §§ 2A:156A-3, -4. (link is to the entire code; you need to click through to Title 2A, Article 156A, and then locate the specific provisions). Thus, if you operate in New Jersey, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the New Jersey wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: New Jersey for more information on New Jersey wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
New Jersey law places restrictions on your ability to make sound and video recordings in state courtrooms. First, the New Jersey Supreme Court guidelines permit audio and video recording for future broadcast only by those with "bona fide press credentials" issued by the New Jersey Press Association or those with identification from a "bona fide media outlet," defined as an "organization that reports the news and whose news reports are made available to the general public by being published or broadcast on a regular schedule by television, radio, retail sales, or by subscription where there is no membership or dues requirement to subscribe." This could present a substantial obstacle for amateur and other non-traditional journalists and online publishers. Second, you must make a request for permission a reasonable time in advance, and the court may limit media coverage where it has the potential to harm parties or witnesses. You may, however, appeal any denial of coverage to a state appellate court (if coverage was denied by a district court) or to the State Supreme Court (if coverage was denied by an appellate court). Recording devices are prohibited in certain particularly sensitive types of proceedings, such as those involving juveniles. In addition, the court may place restrictions on the number of cameras allowed into a courtroom at a particular time. For more detailed information, please consult the Supreme Court Guidelines for Still and Television Camera and Audio Coverage of Proceedings in The Courts of New Jersey.
Federal courts in New Jersey, at both the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
New Jersey law allows sound and video recording devices in public meetings (i.e., meetings of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law), subject to reasonable restrictions, such as advance notice, that generally track those imposed in state courtrooms (above).
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: New Jersey.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
New York's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. New York makes it a crime to record to record or eavesdrop on an in-person or telephone conversation unless one party to the conversation consents. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 250.00, 250.05. (link is to the entire code, you need to click on the Penal Code section, then choose Article 250 and locate the specific provisions). Thus, if you operate in New York, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: New York for more information on New York wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
New York state appellate courts permit recording subject to the approval of the particular court. Only two television cameras and two still cameras are allowed in the courtroom at any given time. New York trial courts do not allow recording devices in courtrooms.
Federal appellate courts in the Second Circuit, which encompasses New York, permit sound and video recordings of oral arguments under certain circumstances. The Second Circuit does not permit recording of criminal matters, but "any person or entity regularly engaged in the gathering and dissemination of news" may record oral arguments in civil cases if they notify the calendar clerk no later than noon two days prior to the proceeding. The presiding judges have the discretion to exclude the media from the courtroom, and there are limitations on the number of cameras that will be allowed at any time. Recording devices are not permitted in federal district courts in New York.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
New York courts have held that persons attending a public meeting (i.e., a meeting of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law) have a right to tape or video record the meeting in an unobtrusive way. This does not mean that a governmental body holding a meeting cannot impose restrictions on the use of recording devices, but it may not ban such devices altogether.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: New York.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
North Carolina's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. North Carolina makes it a crime to intercept or record any "wire, oral, or electronic communication" unless one party to the conversation consents. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-287. Thus, if you operate in North Carolina, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the North Carolina wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-296.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: North Carolina for more information on North Carolina wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
You may use a tape recorder in North Carolina state courtrooms if you obtain the permission of the presiding judge. You may use other recording devices, such as cameras, if you get the permission of the judge and keep them partitioned away from and unobserved by participants in the courtroom. The presiding judge may waive this requirement in certain cases. Only two video cameras and one still photographer are allowed in the court room at a given time, and coverage of certain types of sensitive cases (e.g., trade secrets cases, divorce cases) is prohibited.
Federal courts in North Carolina, at both the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
North Carolina law gives you the right to make sound and video recordings of public meetings (i.e., meetings of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law). The governmental body may "regulate the placement and use of equipment necessary for broadcasting, photographing, filming, or recording a meeting, so as to prevent undue interference with the meeting," but the body must allow equipment to be placed within the meeting room so as to permit its intended use, and "the ordinary use of such equipment shall not be declared to constitute undue interference." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.14.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: North Carolina.
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Ohio's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. Ohio law makes it a crime to intercept or record any "wire, oral, or electronic communication" unless one party to the conversation consents. Ohio Rev. Code § 2933.52. Thus, if you operate in Ohio, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
Additionally, consent is not required for oral communications (e.g., in-person conversations) where the speakers does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the communication. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2933.51. This means that you are free to record a conversation happening between two people in a public place such as a street or a restaurant, so long as you are not using sensitive recording equipment to pick up what you otherwise would not hear.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the Ohio wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Ohio for more information on Ohio wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
Ohio state courts generally allow the use of recording devices, but impose a number of important restrictions. Most importantly, witnesses and victims of crimes have a right to object to recording in state trial courts. If a witness or victim objects, the court will prohibit recording. In addition, you must get the consent of the presiding judge in advance, and the judge may impose limits on the number of recording devices in the courtroom at any given time. Courts may also establish their own local rules regarding recording devices.
Federal courts in Ohio, at both the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
While the Ohio open records law does not specifically state whether you can use recording devices at a public meeting (i.e., a meeting of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law), the Ohio Attorney General has an issued an opinion stating that using them is permissible when it does not unduly interfere with the meeting. As a matter of practice, recording devices apparently are common in Ohio public meetings.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Ohio.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Pennsylvania's wiretapping law is a "two-party consent" law. Pennsylvania makes it a crime to intercept or record a telephone call or conversation unless all parties to the conversation consent. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5703 (link is to the entire code, choose Title 18, Part II, Article F, Chapter 57, Subchapter B, and then the specific provision).
The law does not cover oral communications when the speakers do not have an "expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5702 (link is to the entire code, choose Title 18, Part II, Article F, Chapter 57, Subchapter A, and then the specific provision). Therefore, you may be able to record in-person conversations occurring in a public place without consent. However, you should always get the consent of all parties before recording any conversation that common sense tells you is private.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the Pennsylvania wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Pennsylvania for more information on Pennsylvania wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
Pennsylvania state courts generally prohibit the use of recording devices in the courtroom, both at the trial and appellate court level. However, individual judges may authorize recordings of non-jury civil trials, if both parties to the lawsuit consent. In that case, individual witnesses may object to recording and be excluded from coverage. Local courts may also establish additional rules.
Federal courts in Pennsylvania, at both the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide.
Public Meetings
Recording devices are allowed in public meetings (i.e., meetings of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law) in Pennsylvania. Governmental bodies may adopt their own rules to maintain order at their meetings, but those rules may not include flat prohibitions on recording.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Pennsylvania.
Note: This page covers information specific to Tennessee. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Tennessee's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. Tennessee makes it a crime to intentionally intercept any wire, oral or "electronic communication" to overhear or record a phone call or conversation unless one party consents to the conversation. The law defines an "electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by the aid of wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-303. If you are operating in Tennessee, you should always get the consent of at least one party before recording an in-person conversation or telephone call. In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the Tennessee wiretapping statute can expose you to a civil lawsuit for actual damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorney's fees, by an injured party. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-603.
While you generally are permitted to photograph or record video of people without permission in most public places, it is illegal to photograph a person when that individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy if that photograph would "offend or embarass an ordinary person" or if the photograph was taken for the "purpose of sexual arousal or gratificaiton of the defendant." Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-605.
Consult The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Tennessee for more information on Illinois wiretapping lawyer.
Law on Recording Court Hearings and Public Meetings
Court HearingsTennessee law permits the use of still photography and audio and video recording devices in "any trial, hearing, argument on appeal, or other matter held in open court that the public is entittled to attend." Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 30(B)(3). Consent of the parties is not required except for juvenile court proceedings. A media request should be submitted two days before the proceeding and these requests are subject to limitations imposed by the presiding judge. One such limitation is that of "pooling" in which a single media representative is permitted into the court on behalf of a number of media organizations; in a "pooling" circumstance, the media will select its representative to act as a liason for the proceeding. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 30(F)(2).
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
Tennessee's open meeting laws require that all government meetings are open to the public at all times. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 8-44-102. While Tennessee does not have any provision related to the broadcasting of these meetings, the Tennessee law dictates that all minutes of a government meeting must be promptly and fully recorded. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-104.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Tennessee.
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Texas's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. Texas makes it a crime to intercept or record any "wire, oral, or electronic communication" unless one party to the conversation consents. Texas Penal Code § 16.02. Therefore, if you operate in Texas, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
The law does not cover oral communications when the speakers do not have an "expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." See Texas Crim. Proc. Code § 18.20. Therefore, you may be able to record in-person conversations occurring in a public place, such as a street or a restaurant, without consent.
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party. Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 123.002.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Texas for more information on Texas wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
Texas law permits sound and video recording of state appellate proceedings, if you submit a request five days before the proceeding. These requests are subject to limitations imposed by the presiding judge. In state trial courts, use of sound and video recording devices is permitted with the consent of the trial judge, the parties, and each witness to be recorded. Additionally, a number of local rules imposing additional or different limitations apply in particular courts.
Federal courts in Texas, at both the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide.
Public Meetings
Sound and video recording devices may be used at public meetings (i.e., meetings of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law) in Texas, although the agency or other governmental body holding the meeting may impose "reasonable rules to maintain order at a meeting." Texas Gov't Code § 551.023(b).
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Texas.
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Virginia's wiretapping law is a "one-party consent" law. Virginia makes it a crime to intercept or record any "wire, oral, or electronic communication" unless one party to the conversation consents. Virginia Code § 19.2-62. Therefore, if you operate in Virginia, you may record a conversation or phone call if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation in advance. That said, if you intend to record conversations involving people located in more than one state, you should abide by the recording law of the most restrictive state involved, or play it safe and get the consent of all parties.
The wiretapping law covers oral communications when the speakers have an "expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectations," Virginia Code § 19.2-61, But absent the speakers' justified expecation, the law does not apply. See Belmer v. Commonwealth. Therefore, you may be able to record in-person conversations occurring in a public place, such as a street or restaurant, without consent. However, you should seek the consent of one or all of the parties before recording any conversation that an ordinary person would deem private.
Violation of the Virginia law is a felony, punishable by imprisonment and fine. See Virginia Code § 18.2-10 for more details. In addition, while recording a telephone conversation with the consent of only one party is legal in Virginia, a lawyer’s recording of a telephone conversation without the consent of all parties was found to be unethical under the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct (United States v. Smallwood).
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the Virginia wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party. See Virginia Code § 19.2-69.
Court Hearings
Recording is allowed in Virginia state courtrooms at the sole discretion of the presiding judge. It is, however, flatly prohibited in certain types of sensitive cases (e.g., those involving juveniles or sexual offenses; however, a juvenile who is tried as an adult is excluded from the prohibition on recording. See Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373, 390-91 (1995)). Only two television cameras and one still photographer are allowed in a courtroom at any given time. For a complete list of the statutory guidelines, see Va. Code 19.2-266.
Federal courts in Virginia, at both the trial and appellate level, prohibit recording devices and cameras in the courtroom.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide.
Public Meetings
Virginia open meetings law provides that any person may "photograph, film, record or otherwise reproduce any portion of a meeting required to be open." However, the public body conducting the meeting "may adopt rules governing the placement and use of equipment necessary for broadcasting, photographing, filming or recording a meeting to prevent interference with the proceedings." Virginia Code § 2.2-3707(H). But the adopted rules may not "prohibit or otherwise prevent any person from photographing, filming, recording, or otherwise reproducing any portion of a meeting required to be open," and "[n]o public body shall conduct a meeting required to be open in any building or facility where such recording devices are prohibited." Virginia Code § 2.2-3707(H).
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Virginia.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. For general information concerning the use of recording devices see the Recording Phone Calls, Conversations, Meetings and Hearings section of this guide.
Washington's wiretapping law is a "two-party consent" law. Washington makes it a crime to intercept or record a private telephone call, in-person conversation, or electronic communication unless all parties to the communication consent. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030(1). Whether a conversation or other communications is "private" depends on a number of case-specific factors, such as the subjective intention of the parties, the reasonableness of their expectation that the conversation would be private, the location of the conversation, and whether third parties were present. State v. Townsend, 57 P.3d 255, 259 (Wash. 2002). You should always get the consent of all parties before recording any conversation that common sense tells you is private.
In Washington, you can satisfy the consent requirement by "announc[ing] to all other parties engaged in the communication or conversation, in any reasonably effective manner, that such communication or conversation is about to be recorded or transmitted," so long as this announcement is also recorded. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030(3). In addition, an employee of a "regularly published newspaper, magazine, wire service, radio station, or television station acting in the course of bona fide news gathering duties on a full-time or contractual or part-time basis" can establish the consent of the party recorded even without an announcement if he or she uses a recording or transmitting device that is "readily apparent or obvious to the speakers." Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030(4).
The language of this consent provision suggests that it probably does not apply to an employee of an online publication or a non-professional journalist who is not employed by a media outlet on a full-time, part-time, or contractual basis. This limitation may be of little importance, however, because Washington courts have held -- in a non-media context -- that a person will be deemed to have consented to having his or her communication recorded when he or she conveys a message knowing that it will be recorded. See In re Marriage of Farr, 940 P.2d 679 (Wash. App. 1997) (speaker consented when leaving a message on a telephone answering machine, the only function of which is to record messages); Townsend, 57 P.3d at 260 (person sending email consented to its recording because he "had to understand that computers are, among other things, a message recording device and that his e-mail messages would be recorded on the computer of the person to whom the message was sent").
In addition to subjecting you to criminal prosecution, violating the wiretapping law can expose you to a civil lawsuit for damages by an injured party. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.060.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Can We Tape?: Washington for more information on Washington wiretapping law.
Court Hearings
Washington state courts generally permit the use of recording devices in the courtroom, although the presiding judge must give express permission before recording and may impose limitations when it would be distracting to the participants or impair the dignity of the proceedings. In 1963, Washington State lawyers, judges, and members of the press formed the Bench-Bar-Press Committee, which seeks to foster better relationships between the bench and the press. The Committee publishes an annual report that may be of interest.
Federal courts in Washington are part of the Ninth Circuit. In Ninth Circuit appellate proceedings, cameras and recording devices are permitted at the discretion of the presiding panel of judges. To get permission, you need to file an Application for Permission to Photograph, Record, or Broadcast from the Courtroom three days in advance, although the panel can waive the advance notice requirement. Recording devices and cameras generally are prohibited in federal district courts in Washington.
For information on your right of access to court proceedings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of the guide.
Public Meetings
Washington law allows you to use sound and video recording devices at public meetings (i.e., meetings of a governmental body required to be open to the public by law), unless they disrupt the orderly conduct of the meeting.
For information on your right of access to public meetings, please consult the Access to Government Information section of this guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Washington.
Sometimes, you may want to acquire documents or other tangible property in order to develop a story or confirm the accuracy of facts learned from a source. This could include anything from a photograph to a computer hard drive to internal documents belonging to a company or government body. The following sections address some of the legal issues you could face in acquiring documents and other property:
Conversion is a tort that exposes you to liability for damages in a civil lawsuit. It applies when someone intentionally interferes with personal property belonging to another person. To make out a conversion claim, a plaintiff must establish four elements:
The most direct and obvious way to commit conversion is by taking personal property that belongs to someone else without permission. For example, if you take a framed photograph from the wall of a local restaurant or a document from someone's desk, you may be held liable for conversion, assuming you retain the property for a substantial period of time and thereby interfere with the rightful owner's use and possession of it. It does not matter whether you intend to publish the information, photos, or other content.
However, if you remove paperwork or photographs from someone's office or home temporarily in order to copy the information -- intending to return the documents to the owner -- you might not be liable for conversion because this temporary interference does not necessarily deprive the rightful owner of the possession or use of the property. See Harper & Row Pubs. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2nd Cir. 1983) ("Conversion requires not merely temporary interference with property rights, but the exercise of unauthorized dominion and control to the complete exclusion of the rightful possessor."). You should be aware that taking property from someone can also expose you to criminal liability under state laws.
You can also commit conversion by receiving and retaining property from someone who does not have the right to give the property away. This issue could come up when you receive documents from sources. For example, if a bank employee gives you checking account records for bank customers, you may both be liable for conversion because the employee likely does not have permission from his or her employer to turn over a customer's records. But the legal analysis is not that simple, and whether or not you could be held liable for conversion under these circumstances depends on whether the records you receive are originals or copies.
As a rule of thumb, you can generally receive and retain copies of documents that belong to someone else, but you may not receive and retain the originals of such documents. The reason is that "the possession of copies of documents -- as opposed to the documents themselves -- does not amount to an interference with the owner's property sufficient to constitute conversion." FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 1990). However, you may be held liable for conversion for receiving and retaining copies if the rightful owner no longer has either originals or copies of the documents in question. Even if you are held liable for conversion and must return the documents in question, you generally are entitled under the First Amendment to retain copies of the documents for yourself and to disseminate any information contained in them. See id. at 304-05.
If you receive classified documents or other information relating to national security from a government employee, you may subject yourself to criminal liability under federal espionage-related laws. See the section on Receiving Documents and Information from Government Sources for details.
If you receive documents or other information relating to national security from a government employee (or other person who is authorized to access government documents and information), you could be criminally prosecuted for conspiring with that government employee to violate the federal Espionage Act, located at 18 U.S.C. § 793, or for aiding and abetting that employee's violation of the Act.
In a recent and highly controversial case, the Department of Justice prosecuted two lobbyists for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for conspiring with a former government employee to transmit national defense information to those "not entitled to receive it" in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793. The indictment alleges that the two lobbyists cultivated a relationship with the former employee in order to gather national defense information relating to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and transmitted the information to members of the media, foreign policy analysts, and foreign officials. The indictment further charges one of the lobbyists for aiding and abetting the former employee's illegal disclosure of classified national security information by providing a fax machine on which to receive the employee's communications. The federal district court hearing the case held in 2006 that the prosecution did not violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp.2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006).
While the Department of Justice did not prosecute any members of the press in the AIPAC case, prosecutors could conceivably apply the same laws to journalists who receive sensitive government information through leaks from government insiders. This prospect is especially worrisome given the government's longstanding practice of making use of "controlled leaks" to get desired information out to the public.
Besides 18 U.S.C. § 793, other federal criminal statutes could apply to the receipt and publishing of sensitive government information from government insiders, including 18 U.S.C. § 794 (relating to dissemination of national defense information to an agent of a foreign government), 18 U.S.C. § 798 (relating to the dissemination of classified information about U.S. intelligence activities), the Atomic Energy Act (relating to the dissemination of information relating to nuclear weapons), the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (relating to identification of intelligence agents),and 18 U.S.C. § 649 (relating to the theft and receipt of government records and "thing[s] of value"). All of these statutes, including the Espionage Act, require the government to prove some level of bad intent on the part of the defendant. The government has not previously prosecuted journalists under these provisions, but there is some cause for concern in the future as online publishing blurs the line between journalism and more suspect (at least from the government's point of view) forms of information sharing.
There are a few simple things to keep in mind in order to minimize your risk of a lawsuit or criminal prosecution when acquiring documents and other property for newsgathering purposes:
The question of who is a journalist - and by extension, what is journalism -- has come into sharp relief in the context of citizen media coverage of public events, including access to and reporting at election events, court proceedings, conferences, sporting events, and breaking news.
A critical issue for citizen media coverage of these public events is, of course, access to the events in the first place. Citizen media's access, however, often implicates challenging legal questions. What credentials are necessary and legally appropriate? What protections does the First Amendment provide for "citizen newsgathering" activities in these contexts? Can non-professional journalists be excluded when professional journalists are permitted access? As live-blogging, twittering, and other technologies become more widespread, we expect to see the tension between citizen media creators and event organizers become more pronounced.
In this section of the guide we discuss your rights to access and document public proceedings and events.
Overview
The popularity of Twitter and live-blogging has introduced a new dimension into a journalist's coverage of court proceedings. The use of these real-time communications technologies has been met with a mixture of both acceptance and criticism from judges and lawyers.
Note that this section discusses coverage of court proceedings by observers who are not involved in the actual proceedings. Different rules apply to trial participants: in many situations, those involved in a court proceeding -- as a party, a lawyer, a court official, a juror or a witness -- may be prohibited from discussing the proceeding, or limited in what they can say about it, especially while it is pending. If you are involved in a court proceeding, make sure that you understand any restrictions that may apply.
For those not directly involved in a proceeding, various court rules may affect the ability of a journalist or member of the public to live-blog or tweet from the courtroom. In particular, a court's administrative or local rules may prohibit or limit the use of electronic devices within a courthouse or courtroom. In some jurisdictions, the local rules allow electronic devices only at the discretion of the presiding judge. Rules of civil or criminal procedure—such as Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure — have been interpreted as prohibiting or limiting live-blogging and tweeting from certain proceedings. Ultimately, the application of many of these rules rests in the judge's discretion, and they may not be applied evenly within a jurisdiction.
Many judges are concerned that live-blogging or tweeting from inside the courtroom may adversely impact the administration of justice. They believe access by witnesses to real-time posting about a trial may taint testimony and undermine the fairness of the trial. Clicking noises from keyboards and beeping from electronic devices may be unwanted physical distractions during proceedings. Certain types of sensitive subject matter, such as testimony from a minor during a custody proceeding, may also give a judge pause before consenting to real-time coverage.
Despite these concerns and potential legal limitations, many judges are slowly warming to the idea. Some even welcome the use of computers and cell phones in the courtroom as a way to make the judicial system more accessible and transparent to the public. For example, Judge Mark Bennet of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa said in an interview with the ABA Journal, "I thought the public's right to know what goes on in federal court and the transparency that would be given the proceedings by live-blogging outweighed any potential prejudice to the defendant. . . . I allowed it because of my belief that we are the most mysterious branch of federal government and we need to find ways to be more transparent." Similarly, Judge Thomas Marten of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas told the Associated Press (as reported in the New Mexico Independent), "[t]he more we can do to open the process to the public, the greater the public understanding—the more legitimacy the public system will have in the eyes of the public."
Below are guidelines to help you avoid legal trouble if you intend to provide live coverage of court proceedings through Twitter, live-blogging or other social media tools.
Guidelines for Tweeting and Live-Blogging From Court
Finding Information About Court Rules and Asking for Permission
1. Start by determining where the proceeding you are interested in covering will be held and which judge will be presiding.
2. Check the local rules of the courthouse and/or jurisdiction in question. You usually can find local rules on the courthouse's website. The local rules may list special provisions concerning the use of computers and other electronic devices in the courthouse or courtroom. For instance, the local rules might say that the general public cannot bring a computer or cellphone into the courthouse without the permission of a judge. Or, the rules might provide that electronic devices may not be used inside a courtroom without permission, but may be used in the hallways outside the courtrooms. Many variations exist.
3. Check the court's standing orders, free-standing electronic device policies, and the judge's individual preferences. Courthouse-wide standing orders and electronic device policies will be located on the courthouse's website, and an individual judge's standing orders and preferences will be on a page dedicated to that judge. These materials may provide additional information not addressed in the local rules, such as special limitations on the use of electronic devices in a particular judge's courtroom or information on how to get permission to use a device. For an example, see United States District Court for District of New Jersey Standing Orders.
4. If the local rules or standing orders do not include any information concerning the use of electronic devices, look for information on whom to contact with questions, and whether the court has a specific procedure for obtaining journalist credentials.
5. If you're confused about how the rules apply to live-blogging or tweeting, or about press credentials, try contacting the court's Public Information Officer (or "PIO"). The PIO generally responds to media inquiries and processes credential requests. You can find contact information for many court PIO's at the Conference of Court Public Information Officers website.
6. Lastly, try contacting the judge and/or the judge's staff. We say lastly only because the judge is generally very busy and often does not deal with media requests directly. As a result, your request may be overlooked, or you may anger the judge. Successful live-bloggers have told us that, unless you have an established relationship with a particular judge, you will have better success bringing the request to a bailiff, PIO, or other member of the judge's staff who can then bring the matter to the judge's attention.
Additional Tips When Asking for Permission
1. Give the judge or PIO a good reason to approve your request. Successful requests for permission have generally focused on:
2. Use your connections. Many of those bloggers and reporters who have previously obtained permission to live-blog a trial already had an established relationship with the judge, bailiff, or PIO. A friendly ear goes a long way. The Media Bloggers Association (MBA) has been advocating for the admittance of bloggers in courtrooms since 2004 and has established relationships with PIOs across the country. The MBA may be able to use its connections to help bloggers who have had trouble bringing their requests to the attention of a PIO or judge. You can contact the MBA for more information.
3. Search online to see if anyone else has live-blogged a trial in the courthouse in question or before the judge in question. If so, try contacting that blogger/journalist to learn what steps he or she took. Below is a list of some judges that have previously allowed live-blogging in their courtrooms. [Note: the fact that these judges have allowed live-blogging in the past does not guarantee that they will allow it in the future]:
4. Remember to conduct yourself in a professional and respectful manner. An overly aggressive request may not be given priority, especially in a busy courthouse.
5. Finally, where you have not been expressly forbidden from bringing a computer or phone into the courthouse, you may consider just showing up the day of the trial with your computer or smart phone and letting the chips fall where they may, but recognize that this approach may anger the judge, and could even result in confiscation of the electronic device or fines. Use your judgment, be cautious, and certainly do not ignore a judge's decision or a court rule directly on point.
To make the process of getting permission more concrete for you, we've created a page featuring input we received from bloggers and journalists about their experiences live-blogging or tweeting from court proceedings. See Live-Blogging and Tweeting from Court: Experiences From the Field.
In United States v. Shelnutt, 4:09-cr.-14 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2009), a federal district court in Georgia ruled that Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits tweeting from criminal proceedings in federal court and that Rule 53 does not unconstitutionally restrict the freedom of the press under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Rule 53 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom.
The court interpreted "broadcasting" in Rule 53 to include "sending electronic messages from a courtroom that contemporaneously describe the trial proceedings and are instantaneously available for public viewing."
This district court opinion has no precedential effect on other courts, and it remains to be seen whether other federal courts will adopt this interpretation of Rule 53. Regardless of how influential the Shelnutt case ends up being, Rule 53 only applies to criminal proceedings, and it only applies in federal—as opposed to state—courts.
In conjunction with our legal guide on live-blogging and tweeting from court, the CMLP staff conducted interviews with journalists and bloggers with experience live-blogging or tweeting from court.
The following accounts are summaries of the interviews and include individual experiences from journalists detailing: successful and unsucessful attempts, correspondence with judicial staff and courthouse officials, general observations, and other practical issues encountered.
Trish Mehaffey, The Cedar Rapids Gazette
Trish Mehaffey, the courts reporter for The Cedar Rapids Gazette, has had a number of successful experiences live-blogging proceedings in both federal and state court. Recently, District Judge Mark Bennett of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa permitted Mehaffey to live-blog a high-profile insurance fraud case. According to Mehaffey, Judge Bennett generally allows laptops in his courtroom, but permission is required in order to live-blog or tweet. (Northern District Local Rule 83.4(b) permits electronic devices in the courtroom if authorized by order of the court.)
Mehaffey asked Judge Bennett for permission to live-blog the proceedings prior to the trial. She contacted Judge Bennett via phone and email and explained her interests and proposed methods of coverage. She emphasized that the changes in the news business and explained that satisfying the demand for digital coverage in real-time is important to The Gazette’s business interests. Judge Bennett took several days to consider the request and eventually permitted it. Judge Bennett’s chief concern was physical distractions to the jury or attorneys from keyboard noise. In his correspondence, the judge noted that if noise became a problem during the trial, he would simply ask Mehaffey to stop typing or to move to a different area in the spectator gallery.
Mehaffey also was allowed to live-blog additional hearings in the same case before Chief Magistrate Judge Paul Zoss. In her email correspondence with Judge Zoss, Mehaffey reiterated that she would only be providing coverage in text and would not capture any audio or video of the proceedings. Judge Zoss granted the request under the same conditions as Judge Bennett.
In Mehaffey's experience, other judges in the Northern District of Iowa are not as amenable to live-blogging and tweeting. For instance, Mehaffy tells us that Chief District Judge Linda Reade does not allow laptops in the courtroom. When Mehaffey is covering proceedings before Chief Judge Reade, she leaves the courthouse and writes blog posts from her car.
You can find more information on Trish Mehaffey and her coverage of legal proceedings on The Gazette's website.
Ben Sheffner, Copyrights & Campaigns
Former journalist Ben Sheffner is a copyright, First Amendment, and entertainment law attorney. In addition to practicing law, Sheffner maintains the Copyrights & Campaigns blog and writes for Billboard; his work has also been featured on Ars Technica and Slate. In 2009, Sheffner covered two high-profile copyright infringement trials, Capitol Records, et al. v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset and Sony BMG Music Entertainment, et al. v. Joel Tenenbaum. He had different experiences covering each through Twitter and his blog.
The Thomas-Rasset trial was held in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The local rules in this district permit laptops and cell phones in the courthouse, but use of the devices is prohibited within the courtrooms. Sheffner tells us that Chief District Judge Michael Davis, who presided over the trial, clearly indicated the use of electronic devices within the courtroom was prohibited. Sheffner said a notice was posted directly outside the courtroom reiterating the prohibition. According to Sheffner, at one point during the trial, court room security officers caught an attorney, who was also observing the proceedings, using his BlackBerry in the courtroom. The security officers informed Judge Davis, who called the attorney to the well and publicly reprimanded him. Based on the rules and clear notice, Sheffner did not ask for permission to tweet or blog from the courtroom during the trial. Instead, Sheffner tweeted via BlackBerry from the hallway outside the courtroom and made use of a media room on another floor that had Internet access and desks for use by journalists.
In the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, Sheffner had a much different experience during the Tenenbaum trial. The District of Massachusetts' policy regarding electronic devices prohibits electronic devices in the courthouse except for attorneys and credentialed journalists. Sheffner noted that although he already qualified under the exception as a member of the California bar, he also acquired a Media Identification Card from the court's Administrative Office several weeks prior to the trial. The requirements for the Media Identification card included a short application form and two letters of reference from media organizations for which he had freelanced. Based on his previous work for Slate and Ars Technica, he did not have any difficulty obtaining press credentials. Sheffner cautioned, however, that it was not clear whether the court officials would grant credentials to individual bloggers, amateur journalists, or others who are not affiliated with established media organizations. Also, Sheffner noted that presiding District Judge Nancy Gertner announced early in the trial that the use of laptops and cellular devices in the courtroom was permissible and he did not need to ask for further permission.
Although the use of electronic devices was authorized during the Tenenbaum trial, and he was able to take notes on his laptop, Sheffner encountered a number of non-legal, practical problems when attempting to tweet the Tenenbaum trial. Sheffner explained that the courthouse had overall weak cellular reception and he was unable to actually send updates from his BlackBerry within the courtroom; nor was there wireless Internet service available in the courthouse. On the final day of the trial, Sheffner discovered that there was a wired ethernet jack available in the area where the trial attorneys were sitting. Sheffner was able to tweet by laptop after extending a cable into the jack from the spectators' gallery and paying for Internet access, but he noted it was very inconvenient and was not sure whether he would have had access to the ethernet jack during the substantive portions of the trial, when it was needed by the attorneys.
Sheffner's account of the Thomas-Rasset trial can be found on Copyrights & Campaigns, and his coverage of the Tenenbaum trial appears on Ars Technica.
Henry Lee, San Francisco Chronicle
Henry Lee, a staff writer for the San Francisco Chronicle, tells us the Superior Court of California, Alameda County, has a policy that prohibits laptops and cellular devices, such as BlackBerries, in the courtrooms. In the past, Lee had covered trials with paper notes by hand in the courtroom and took breaks or waited for the court to recess until typing his notes on a computer.While covering the Hans Reiser murder trial, Lee and a group of reporters approached Judge Larry Goodman and requested permission to use laptops and smart phones while covering the trial. According to Lee, Judge Goodman is very “media friendly” and permitted the request without any additional restrictions even though the request was not made before the trial began. Judge Goodman also allowed the sentencing to be filmed by a camera crew. The court bailiffs were notified of the accommodation due to its unusual character.
Lee also noted that, in his experience, the courts have not made any distinctions between members of the public or members of the press when it comes to the use of electronic devices during proceedings.
Lee’s account of the trial can be found on the San Francisco Chronicle’s website.
PLEASE NOTE: This page includes information current as of the November 2008 national elections; we are maintaining this page for archival purposes. Our guide for the November 2012 national elections is here.
In order to protect voters from interference and intimidation, state governments have enacted a complex array of election laws that regulate what activities are permitted at polling places on Election Day. These laws impact your ability to shoot video or take photographs at a polling place, even if your purpose is just to document your own voting experience. In the vast majority of states, these laws make a distinction between what you can do inside a polling place and what you can do outside a polling place. The laws are more restrictive when it comes to activities inside and within certain buffer zones around the entrance, which are typically 100 feet from the entrance or interior voting area. Outside of the polling place and these buffer zones, your ability to document your voting experience is much freer.
Because there is no single, national law regulating polling place activities, it is difficult to generalize about what you can and cannot do on Election Day. You must consult your state's law in order to make sure that your proposed activities are legal. Nevertheless, the following four general guidelines can help you stay within the law while documenting your vote.
If you want to take photographs or shoot video inside your polling place, you must be cautious to avoid violating the law. Election laws are serious business – you could be removed from the polling place and even subject to criminal penalties. Some states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Texas and West Virginia expressly prohibit the use of photographic and recording equipment inside polling places. In these states, you should respect the law and refrain from doing any recording or photographing inside. In other states, the election laws are not clear regarding the use of personal photographic and video equipment.
At the bottom of this page we've created a chart summarizing the law and on our State Law: Documenting Your Vote page you will find additional information and links to resources to help you determine where your state falls on this issue. If are unsure as to what is permitted, contact your local election officials or ask a poll worker.
2. Be Discreet
Even if you are permitted to take photographs or video inside, you should be discreet and sensitive to the concerns of poll workers and other voters. The smaller your equipment is, the better. You are more likely to get permission, and less likely to intimidate other voters, if you use a cell phone camera, rather than a bulky on-the-shoulder video camera or a fancy SLR with a huge telephoto lens. It will also help if you stick to documenting your own experience rather than documenting the activities of others. In addition, don’t linger inside the polling place after you’ve cast your vote. Do your civic duty and then proceed out of the building in an orderly fashion.
3. Don’t Interfere With Voters or Disrupt the Process
Keep in mind that all states prohibit activities that interfere with the voting process or intimidate voters, and poll workers and other voters might see your photographing or videotaping as disruptive or intimidating. You should never photograph or film someone else’s ballot or get too close to other voters with your camera. If a voter objects, stop filming that person immediately. Don’t try to interview other voters inside the polling place and avoid any appearance of trying to solicit or influence someone else’s vote. Leave your buttons, stickers, hats, and other party paraphernalia at home.
4. Respect the Buffer Zone Outside
You can do more outside of polling places. Still, there are some things to keep in mind. Many states have restricted buffer zones, typically 100 feet outside the entrance to the polling place. In these zones, you generally can’t loiter, interfere with voters, block the entrance, or engage in any campaigning activity. Although many state laws do not specifically mention filming in these zones, it’s probably safer to shoot outside of the buffer zone, unless you’ve confirmed that your state law allows it.
These buffer zones may be marked off with signs or a chalk line. Or you may be able to determine where the line is by looking for where other people are engaging in electioneering activity freely, or where members of the traditional media or exit pollsters are set up.
Outside the buffer zone, you can film freely, use a larger camera, and interview voters. You should still be courteous to others and make every effort not to interfere with anyone’s ability to get to the polls. When interviewing a voter, first get the voter's permission. If possible, get written permission or record verbal permission on video. Explain to the voter what you intend to do with the video (such as uploading it to the Internet) and get their permission to use their name and likeness for that purpose.
To help you better understand these guidelines, we've created this short video:
For specific resources for your state, including a list of election laws, websites, and contact information for election officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, see our State Law: Documenting Your Vote page or select one of the links below to go directly to that state's relevant information. (Note: this chart is a work-in-progress. If you have additional information on this topic, please contact us.)
State | State Law Expressly Prohibits All Recording Inside Polling Place | State Law Doesn't Expressly Prohibit All Recording Inside Polling Place * see below |
State Officials Take Position Recording Prohibited Inside Polling Place | Public Display of Own Marked Ballot Prohibited ** see below |
---|---|---|---|---|
Alabama | X | |||
Alaska | X | ? | ||
Arizona | X | X | ||
Arkansas | X | ? | ||
California | X | X | ||
Colorado | X | X | ||
Connecticut | X | ? | ||
Delaware | X | X | ||
District of Columbia | X | ? | ||
Florida | X | X | ||
Georgia | X | X | ||
Hawaii | X | X | ||
Idaho | X | ? | ||
Illinois | X | X | ||
Indiana | X | X | ||
Iowa | X | X | ||
Kansas | X | X | ||
Kentucky | X | X | ||
Louisiana | X | X | ||
Maine | X | X | ||
Maryland | X | ? | ||
Massachusetts | X | ? | ||
Michigan | X | X | ||
Minnesota | X | X | ||
Mississippi | X | X | ||
Missouri | X | X | ||
Montana | X | X | ||
Nebraska | X | X | ||
Nevada | X | X | ||
New Hampshire | X | X | ||
New Jersey | X | X | ||
New Mexico | X | X | ||
New York | X | X | ||
North Carolina | X | X | ||
North Dakota | X | |||
Ohio | X | ? | ||
Oklahoma | X | |||
Oregon | X | X | ||
Pennsylvania | X | |||
Rhode Island | X | |||
South Carolina | X | X | ||
South Dakota | X | X | ||
Tennessee | X | |||
Texas | X | X | ||
Utah | X | X | ||
Vermont | X | |||
Virginia | X | X | ||
Washington | X | X | ||
West Virginia | X | X | ||
Wisconsin | X | X | ||
Wyoming | X |
* Nearly all states prohibit conduct that intimidates voters, interferes with their exercise of the right to vote, or disrupts the voting process. Election officials may take the view that photography or videography runs afoul of these laws.
** "Public display of own marked ballot" refers to the practice of photographing or filming one's own vote at the time of voting and afterwards displaying the image on a publicly accessible platform like the Internet. Streaming live video of your own marked ballot may create legal problems in additional states. "?" means the law is unclear. Keep in mind that states have these laws to prevent vote buying and coercion, so you should be cautious of publicly posting your ballot.
PLEASE NOTE: This page includes information current as of the November 2008 national elections; we are maintaining this page for archival purposes. Our guide for the November 2012 national elections is here.
On this page, we provide a list of election laws, websites, and contact information for election officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Contacting your state election officials is a great way to get information about what your state allows in terms of documenting the vote.
You should also consult our chart summarizing the law in each state in order to determine whether your state allows recording inside polling places. For general guidelines on photography and videography in and around polling places, see the Documenting Your Vote page in this guide.
As Election Day approaches, we will continue to supplement the information on this page. Given the tight time schedule between now and the election, we'd love the help of our readers with this election law research. If you've got input on this topic, please contact us.
Select a state below to jump to its relevant information:
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
We have not analyzed Arizona's laws regulating polling place activities yet, but we received the following comment from a site user that went through poll worker training in Arizona:
In our pollworker training, we were told that it is illegal in AZ for any filming/photography to take place in the polling place while the polls are open. Photos can be taken after the polls close as long as the photographer does not interfere with the poll workers as they close out the polls. We were told to ask anyone with a camera to put it out of sight - either in a purse, pocket or return it to their car. If anyone does not wish to abide by our request, we are to call our Troubleshooter who will deal with the problem.
For general information regarding legal issues associated with documenting your vote, see the Documenting Your Vote section of this guide.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
We have not analyzed in detail the Arkansas laws regulating polling place activities yet, but we received the following communication from a staff attorney in the Arkansas Secretary of State's office:
No statute in Arkansas specifically prohibits cameras in polling places. The most relevant statute is 7-1-104(6) which provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to prevent or to interfere with any qualified elector from voting at any election or to attempt to prevent or interfere with any qualified elector from voting at any election, provided that this subdivision (a)(6) shall not prohibit good faith challenges of ballots or voters according to law by candidates, authorized representatives of candidates, political parties, or ballot issues[.]"
That said, many counties, at the discretion of the county's board of election commissioners, discourage presence in the polling place of people other than poll workers, electors, and other election officials due to the limited space and the realistic possibility of voters feeling less than comfortable casting their votes in front of a camera crew. It's the desire of the election officials that the polling places remain as neutral as possible so that people may vote without fear of scrutiny.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
The California law with most immediate relevance to citizen media creators who want to document the vote is California Elections Code § 18541. This statute makes it a crime for anyone, within 100 feet of a polling place, to "photograph, videotape, or otherwise record a voter entering or exiting a polling place" with "the intent of dissuading another person from voting." The 100-foot zone is measured from the interior voting area itself, not from the exterior of the building; so most of it will likely be inside the polling place.
Because section 18541 requires intent to dissuade someone from voting, it does not appear to ban outright the use of cameras and recording equipment in the 100-foot zone. But it does make such activity risky. Your intent is invisible. While you may not have any intention of dissuading anyone from voting, poll workers might see your conduct differently than you do. You could ultimately prevail before a court if the state chose to prosecute you, but you might still get kicked out of the polling place on Election Day and/or have to deal with some gigantic legal hassles.
Other statutory provisions may also affect your ability to document your own voting experience inside the polling place. First, California Elections Code § 14221 (scroll down to the relevant section) says that voters may only be in the voting area for certain specific purposes -- "receiving, preparing, or depositing their ballots." By implication, this statute may make it unlawful to carry out other activities -- like filming or photographing -- in the voting area. Second, if you're interested in photographing or videoing your own marked ballot, two provision may impact your ability to do so. California Elections Code § 14291 (scroll down) says that "[a]fter the ballot is marked, a voter shall not show it to any person in such a way as to reveal its contents." It's not clear whether this could apply to posting a photo or video of your ballot online after you've already cast it. In all likelihood, no one would bother to enforce the statute in that way. More pragmatically, California Elections Code § 14224 (scroll down) limits your time in the voting booth to 10 minutes, so don't get carried away in there.
Finally, you shouldn't try to interview anyone within 100 feet of the voting area, get too close to other voters with your camera (especially inside), or otherwise interfere with the voting process. California Elections Code § 18502 makes it a crime to "in any manner interfere[] . . . with voters exercising their rights of voting at an election," and California Elections Code § 18541, mentioned above, makes it a crime to "speak to a voter on the subject of marking his or her ballot" within 100 feet of the voting area with the intent to dissuade the voter from voting. Again, the intent requirement may take your newsgathering activity outside of section 18541, but it is certainly something to be aware of. Outside the 100-foot buffer zone, you're generally free to take photographs, film, and interview other voters (with their permission).
If you know of any other provisions of California law that might affect your ability to document the vote, or any cases interpreting California law on these issues, please let us know.
If you want to contact California election officials directly to clarify how any or all of these provisions may impact your Election Day activities, please use the contact information below:
Update: A reader provided us with a memo written by Cathy Mitchell, Chief of the Elections Division of the California Secretary of State's office, regarding the use of cameras and video equipment at polling places. The memo says that the Secretary of State "has historically taken the position that use of cameras or video equipment at polling places is prohibited, though there may be circumstances where election officials could permit such use." The memo gives an example: "[I]f a credentialed media organization wants to photograph or film a candidate voting at a polling place, this is something you may permit, provided you ensure such activity does not interfere with voting, is not intimidating to any voters or election workers, and that the privacy of voters is not compromised."
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
Colorado has no statutory provision that expressly prohibits the use of photographic or video equipment inside a polling place while you are voting. But, according to a lawyer in the Colorado Secretary of State's Office, "many county clerks have specific prohibitions against video or photography equipment in the polling place." Therefore, your safest bet is to contact your county clerk to find out if there is a complete ban on photography and videography in your polling location.
Even if your county allows you to use photographic or video equipment inside of the polling place, make sure that your activities do not interfere with the voting process or intimidate voters. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-13-711 prohibits interfering with another voter inside the immediate voting area, and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-13-713 prohibits voter intimidation, including impeding, preventing, or interfering with the voting process. Additionally, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-7-115 requires that voters "shall leave the immediate voting area as soon as voting is complete." It is unclear whether this statute is referring to the voting booth or the entire polling place. (Here is a link to the Colorado Revised Statutes.)
Beyond that, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-13-712(1) impacts your ability to photograph or video your own marked ballot and upload the image to the Internet. It states: "no voter shall show his ballot after it is prepared for voting to any person in such a way as to reveal its contents." The statute does not prohibit the act of photographing or videoing your marked ballot itself, but it does prohibit showing that image to anyone else. As our contact in the Secretary of State's Office wrote in an email to us: "There is no state statute that prohibits videoing or photographing one's ballot. However, it is illegal for one to then disclose how one has voted." So, if your county allows photography/videography, you could record your own vote for your own purposes, but you would violate the law if you uploaded the video to YouTube or showed it to your friends.
No state statute addresses the use of photographic or video equipment outside of Colorado polling places, but Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-5-105(1) bans any "election-related activity . . . within one hundred feet of any building in which a polling place is located." Although it is unlikely that "election-related activity" encompasses interviews for the purpose of newsgathering, we suggest that you stay at least 100 feet away from the building if you want to interview voters about the election.
Finally, 8 Colo. Code Regs. § 1505-1, Rule 8.12 allows "media observers" to observe and photograph "early voting, election day voting and the processing and counting of provisional, mail and mail-in ballots." However, a media observer must have "valid and current media credentials" and must have a certificate of appointment. Therefore, this privilege is likely not available to non-traditional journalists who do not work for media organizations.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
Section 102.031 of the Florida Statutes is the most important provision regulating polling place activities. First, section 102.031(5) prohibits "photography . . . in the polling room." The "polling room" means "the actual room in which ballots are cast on election day and during early voting." Fla. Stat. § 97.021(26). While the law does not expressly mention video, it is a good bet that a court would interpret the statute to prohibit video inside the polling room as well. In light of this statute, you should not attempt to use a camera or recording equipment inside the polling room in Florida. If lines gather inside the polling place building but outside the polling room itself, or if poll workers check in voters outside the polling room, then you may be able to use a camera in these locations, but caution is advised.
Second, section 102.031(4)(a) states that no person may "solicit" voters inside or within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place. "Solicit" means "seeking or attempting to seek any vote, fact, opinion, or contribution." Fla. Stat. § 102.031(4)(b). This provision prohibits interviewing other voters inside the polling place or outside as they enter or leave, if you are standing within 100 feet of the entrance. In addition to this, section 101.51 states that a voter may not speak with anyone when in the booth or compartment to cast his or her vote, and that the voter must leave the polling room immediately after voting.
In 2006, a federal district court ruled section 102.031(4) unconstitutional to the extent its ban on solicitation stops media organizations from engaging in exit polling within 100 feet of the entrance. See CBS Broad., Inc. v. Cobb, 470 F. Supp.2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2006). It is not clear how this ruling affects non-traditional media and activities other than exit polling. The Florida Department of State's Polling Place Procedures Manual states that "the media or others who are allowed to conduct exit-polling activities" are not subject to the 100-foot restriction on solicitation, but may only speak with voters after they have voted. The CMLP has been unable to determine who exactly qualifies as the "media" or how one gets to be "allowed" to conduct exit-polling activities. We suggest that you contact the Florida Division of Elections or your local board of elections for more information. As always, let us know what you find out!
Third, section 102.031(3) limits access to the polling room to poll workers, certain election officials, and voters (along with persons in the care of a voter, and persons caring for a voter). This means that members of the media, whether traditional or non-traditional, cannot enter the polling room except to vote.
If you are not inside or within 100 feet of the polling place, Florida law places fewer restrictions on your activities. You generally may take photographs and video and interview other voters (with permission). Despite this greater degree of freedom, you should take care not to make voters feel uncomfortable or interfere with the voting process in any way. Section 104.0515 makes it a crime to "intimidate . . . any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such other person to vote or not to vote as that person may choose." Similarly, section 104.0615 makes it a crime to "use . . . intimidation or any tactic of coercion or intimidation to induce or compel an individual" to carry out various voting-related activities. While you may not view your newsgathering activities as intimidating, poll workers and other voters might take a different view. This probably is less of a concern outisde the 100-foot zone established in section 102.031(4), but it is something to be aware of nonetheless.
If you know of any other provisions of Florida law that might affect your ability to document the vote, or any cases interpreting Florida law on these issues, please let us know.
If you want to contact Florida election officials directly to clarify how any or all of these provisions may impact your Election Day activities, please use the contact information below:
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
Georgia is one of the states that explicitly prohibits photography inside polling places. Section 21-2-413(e) of the Georgia Code states :
No elector shall use photographic or other electronic monitoring or recording devices or cellular telephones while such elector is within the enclosed space in a polling place.
This prohibition applies to the entire polling place, not just the
voting booth. Therefore, Georgia voters should not attempt to use a
video camera, still camera, or other recording device inside a polling
place.
Additionally, section 21-2-414(e)
specifically bans the use of a cell phone or other communications
device once a person has been issued a ballot or is inside the voting
booth. Taken together, these two sections indicate that you would be
violating the law if you attempted to record your own vote inside the
voting both.
Some media organizations in Georgia have specifically addressed the Video Your Vote project. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution recently wrote an article that you may find helpful. Additionally, Georgia Public Broadcasting has an insightful article
that includes an interview with an election official in Georgia.
According to that official, signs warning voters about the ban on
photography/videography will be posted at polling places, and poll
workers are aware of the prohibition.
Outside of the polling place, Georgia law does not expressly prohibit photography. But, section 21-2-414(a)
prohibits anyone from conducting "any exit poll or public opinion poll
with voters . . . within 150 feet of the outer edge of any building
within which a polling place is established." So, if you are planning
to interview voters, make sure that you are more than 150 feet away
from the building.
If you plan on interviewing other voters outside, you should also be aware of section 21-2-568(5). This provision makes it a misdemeanor to "[d]isclose[] to anyone how another elector voted, except when required to do so in any legal proceeding." Interpreted literally, this statute could make it illegal to ask a voter on camera how he or she voted or to otherwise publish online any information about how a specific voter voted, even if the voter tells you this information willingly and gives you permission to post the video or publish the information online. It is not clear whether Georgia election officials take the position that section 21-2-568(5) prohibits this conduct, but this is not outside the realm of possibility given how seriously they take ballot secrecy.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
Massachusetts has no statutory provision that specifically prohibits the use of photographic or video equipment inside a polling place while you are voting. There is, however, a Massachusetts statute that makes it a crime to "hinder[], delay[] or interfere[] with . . . a voter while on his way to [an] election, while within the guard rail, while marking his ballot or while voting or attempting to vote." Mass Gen. Laws ch. 56, § 29. If your photographing or videotaping obstructs the voting process or interferes with other voters, you could run into problems with this provision.But, if your activity is not disruptive, it appears to be legal (from the perspective of state law) for you to take photographs or record video inside a Massachusetts polling place. Local officials, however, may have the authority to prohibit or discourage photography and videography inside polling places. For instance, the Town Clerk of Stoneham, Massachusetts told us that he intends to post signs discouraging the use of cameras inside the polls.
Local control over this issue may explain why many Massachusetts voters were permitted to take photographs inside polling places during the 2008 primaries, while others were not. Forty-eight photos taken inside of Massachusetts polling places were posted on the New York Times Polling Place Project at the time of writing (no longer available). On the other hand, one poster to the project reported that she was not allowed to use a camera in her polling place in Cambridge. Different towns, and even different polling locations within those towns, could have different policies. You should consult with local election officials at your town clerk’s office to learn what they will allow in terms of photography and videography inside the polls.
Beyond that, Mass Gen. Laws ch. 56, § 25 potentially affects your ability to photograph or video your own marked ballot and upload the image to the Internet. In relevant part, the statutes says:
Whoever, at a primary, caucus or election, . . . allows the marking of his ballot to be seen by any person for any purpose not authorized by law . . . shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars.
Because of the limiting clause -- "at a primary, caucus or election" -- the statute may not apply to recording an image of one's marked ballot and later publicly displaying it on the Internet. We are not sure how election authorities will interpret this statute. In any event, it seems relatively clear that posting an image of your own unmarked ballot is probably lawful (putting aside local rules/policies against any photography whatsoever). Again, the New York Times Polling Place Project is instructive. We found several photos of unmarked ballots submitted by Massachusetts voters (no longer available).
Finally, Massachusetts law does not specifically restrict your ability to take photographs or shoot video outside of polling places. Nevertheless, you should make sure not to film anyone surreptitiously because Massachusetts has a strict wiretapping statute that authorities have interpreted as covering secret video recordings that capture sound, even those made in public locations. Getting express permission from anyone you want to interview or film is a good way of avoiding any problem.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
Michigan Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land issued a press release on October 29, 2008 warning voters that Michigan law prohibits the use of video cameras, still cameras, and other recording devices inside Michigan polling places on Election Day.
The release mentioned the Video Your Vote project by name, saying that the project "urging [voters] to record their Election Day experiences cannot be conducted in Michigan polling places." Land acknowledged that YouTube and PBS have cautioned voters that some states like Michigan prohibit the use of recording devices in the polls (for example, see our video), but expressed concern that "not everyone will be aware of the warning."
Michigan has no statute expressly prohibiting the use of cameras and recording equipment inside polling places, but the Secretary of State has taken the position since at least 2006 that voters may not use video and still cameras, including cell phones, inside the polls. (A February 2008 election inspector training manual takes the same position.) Credentialed members of the news media are excused from the ban, although some restrictions apply to their conduct as well.
The stated reasons for the camera ban are "to protect voters who may feel intimidated in the polling place by the presence of a camera" and to deter "those who may try to sell their vote." The press release also indicates that Michigan law prohibits displaying one's own marked ballot, relying on Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.738(2).
The Secretary of State's recent comments are silent on what voters can do outside the polls. But, the press release quotes Karole White, president and chief executive officer of the Michigan Association of Broadcasters, as saying: "By keeping recording devices out of the polling place, you can still tell your story while respecting the law and the rights of other voters." Whether she meant to imply that voters are free to film outside the polls is not entirely clear, but no Michigan statute expressly prohibits such conduct. (This may be cold comfort, seeing as no statute expressly bans filming inside either.)
Section 168.744 of the Michigan Compiled Laws prohibits campaigning and solicitation within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place, but nothing in its language suggests a ban on photography or videography in this zone. How it impacts your ability to conduct interviews outside is another question. The February 2008 training manual mentioned above states that exit pollsters must remain at least 20 feet from the entrance to the building and refrain from approaching voters entering the building, which seems like a good rule of thumb for ordinary interviews as well. In the end, you'll have to assess the situation outside for yourself and use your common sense. It may be best to hang back beyond the 100-foot zone altogether.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
Minnesota Statutes § 204C.06 regulates the activities you can engage in at a Minnesota polling place. Subsection (1) says:
An individual shall be allowed to go to and from the polling place for the purpose of voting without unlawful interference. No one except an election official or an individual who is waiting to register or to vote shall stand within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place. The entrance to a polling place is the doorway or point of entry leading into the room or area where voting is occurring.
If you're thinking of bringing a camera or video recorder to the polls in Minnesota to document your own voting experience or you're planning on interviewing fellow voters outside the polls, you should keep this statute in mind. Unless a recent legal challenge to the statute brought by large media organizations succeeds, you'll want to stay clear of the 100 foot zone except when you're in the process of voting or waiting in line to vote. So, if interviewing is your thing, definitely don't try to interview voters inside the polling place or right outside the polling place door. The statute also appears to prohibit taking photographs or shooting video within the 100 foot zone, if you're not in the process of voting (because it would require you to "stand" there).
In addition, Section 204.06(2) of the Minnesota Statutes may prohibit you from using a cell phone camera or other recording device within the polling place itself, even if your purpose is just to document your own voting experience. It says:
Except for these representatives, election judges, sergeants-at-arms, and challengers, an individual may remain inside the polling place during voting hours only while voting or registering to vote, providing proof of residence for an individual who is registering to vote, or assisting a disabled voter or a voter who is unable to read English. During voting hours no one except individuals receiving, marking, or depositing ballots shall approach within six feet of a voting booth, unless lawfully authorized to do so by an election judge.
This section doesn't expressly prohibit the use of a camera or recording device, but it also doesn't include it in the permissible activities for which an individual may remain inside the polling place (voting, registering, providing proof of residence, or assisting a disabled voter), or those activities for which an individual may go near the voting booths (receiving, marking, or depositing ballots).
We contacted the Minnesota Secretary of State's office regarding this question. A state official wrote the following in an email:
In addition, sections 204C.17 and 204C.18 of the Minnesota Statutes prohibit voters from showing their marked ballot to others. According to the same official, taking photographs or video of your own marked ballot could violate this prohibition.While there is no state or federal law that strictly prohibits the use of cameras or other video equipment in the polling place to record an individual's own voting experience, the Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State strongly discourages voters from using cameras or video recorders in the polling place for the following reasons:
Voters have a right to privacy-both as to how an individual has voted as well as whether or not an individual has voted. Either or both of these could be compromised by pictures or video. In addition, other voters' objections to being photographed could lead to disruptions within the polling place.
We are expecting record turnout this year, which means that there may be lines and polling places may be crowded. Voters have a right to take the time they need to vote, but should not take extra time to take pictures.
If you want to contact Minnesota election officials directly to clarify how any or all of these provisions may impact your Election Day activities, please use the contact information below:
Section 163-166.3(c) goes further. It expressly prohibits you from photographing, videoing, or otherwise recording "the image of a voted official ballot for any purpose not otherwise permitted under law." This means that you cannot photograph or video any one else's ballot, which is something to avoid in any state regardless of specific prohibition. But this also means you cannot film or photograph your own marked ballot. Note that that section 163-166.3 prohibits using cameras and video equipment inside polling places (absent permission under subsection (b)); it does not expressly prohibit bringing such devices (including cell phones) inside with you.
Outside of the polling place, North Carolina law does not expressly prohibit using a camera or video recorder. Section 163-166.4 creates a buffer zone (no less than 25 and no greater than 50 feet) around the polling place, in which it is unlawful to "hinder access, harass others, distribute campaign literature, place political advertising, solicit votes, or otherwise engage in election‑related activity." To be completely safe, you may want to take photographs or film outside the buffer zone, so as to avoid "harass[ing] others" or 'hinder[ing] access." However, the law probably permits you to photograph and film in this zone if your activity is not disruptive or intimidating. If you want to interview other voters, you should get their permission first and do your interview outside the buffer zone.
In April 2008, the North Carolina State Board of Elections issued a press release presenting guidelines for poll workers and media representatives regarding the use of cameras and recording equipment at polling places. In a telephone conversation, a state official told us that these guidelines should apply equally to members of the public who wish to engage in newsgathering activities at the polls in North Carolina. The guidelines are:
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
Ohio law does not expressly prohibit using a camera or video recorder inside a polling place while you are voting. Section 3501.35(B) of the Ohio Revised Code states that no person other than an election official, employee, observer, or police officer may enter a polling place "except for the purpose of voting or assisting another person to vote." This could mean that any activity other than voting is prohibited, but the language does not compel this result. Photos on the New York Times Polling Place Project (here, here, and here) suggest that Ohio poll workers allowed voters to take photographs inside of polling places during the 2008 Primaries.
Ohio law places stringent restrictions on other activities in and around the polling place. Sections 3501.30 and 3501.35 create a 100-foot buffer zone outside the polling place entrance, which also extends to within 10 feet of any voter in line, if the line extends beyond the 100-foot zone. Poll workers mark off the zone with small U.S. flags. In this area, no one may "loiter, congregate, or engage in any kind of election campaigning," "hinder or delay" a voter from reaching or leaving the polling place, or "[s]olicit or in any manner attempt to influence any elector in casting [their] vote," among other things. These broad provisions appear to prohibit talking with voters while they are entering or leaving the polling place or even standing inside the zone, except when waiting in line to vote.
Mainstream media companies have twice successfully challenged these statutes in court on First Amendment grounds. In ABC, Inc. v. Blackwell, a federal district court in Ohio held that Ohio election officials could not enforce them against media representatives engaging in exit polling within 100 feet of a polling place. In Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Blackwell, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ohio officials could not enforce these provisions to bar media access to polling places for purposes of newsgathering. The court ordered the Secretary of State to permit media representatives "to have reasonable access to any polling place for the purpose of news-gathering and reporting so long as [they] do not interfere with poll workers and voters as voters exercise their right to vote." 389 F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2004). In a February 2008 advisory opinion sent to county boards of elections, the Secretary of State interpreted this judicial opinion as requiring election officials to grant "representatives of the media access to polling locations," apparently including inside of the buildings.
Unfortunately, the Secretary of State has taken a restrictive view of who qualifies as a representative of the media. In the February 2008 advisory opinion, Jennifer Brunner advised poll workers to consider a number of factors in determining whether or not to grant access to someone for newsgathering purposes. First among these factors is "the credentials of the media representative, and whether the purported media representative is from an accredited media source as opposed to an internet writer." So, it looks like non-traditional journalists and especially online publishers may get second-class treatment come November.
What does this mean? Nothing too severe -- just that the 100-foot loitering/hindering/soliciting prohibition may still apply to many journalists and ordinary citizens who don't fit into the mainstream media mould. If you don't qualify as a media representative, then you should not try to interview voters inside the 100-foot zone; poll workers would likely read this as "hinder[ing] or delay[ing]" voters. On the other hand, it's not clear whether taking photographs or shooting video in an unobtrusive way inside the 100-foot zone would violate the law. Photographing and filming doesn't "hinder or delay" voters in any meaningful sense, and it doesn't obviously fall into the categories of "solicit[ing]" voters or "loiter[ing], congregat[ing], or engag[ing] in any kind of election campaigning." Ohio Rev. Code § 3501.30(A)(4), 3501.35(A)(1). In addition, regardless of your status, the law permits you to take photographs, shoot video, and interview voters (with permission) outside the 100-foot zone, as long as you are not on someone's private property.
That said, anyone engaging in newsgathering activities at the polls -- whether "media" or not, whether inside or outside the polling place -- should be careful not to interfere with, intimidate, or invade the privacy of other voters. Paralleling the language above, section 3599.24(5) makes it a crime to "loiter in or about a registration or polling place during registration or the casting and counting of ballots so as to hinder, delay, or interfere with the conduct of the registration or election." Section 3599.20 makes it a crime to "attempt to induce an elector to show how the elector marked the elector's ballot at an election." So, don't get too close to other voters inside the polling place if you're using a camera. (Incidentally, section 3599.20 also makes it a crime to "allow [your own] ballot to be seen by another" -- it is not clear whether this applies to photographing or videoing your own marked ballot and then posting it on the Internet.)
Finally, section 3501.33 gives election officials the authority to "enforce peace and good order" at the polls. It charges them with keeping the entrance "open and unobstructed" and preventing "any improper practices or attempts tending to obstruct, intimidate, or interfere with an elector in registering or voting." In support of this authority, they may order the arrest of anyone violating the laws discussed above. As a practical matter, it may be hard to challenge the discretion election officials have to decide what interferes with "peace and good order."
Update: An Ohio election official informed us that election officials could prohibit the use of cameras and video equipment as a means of enforcing "peace and good order" under section 3501.33. In addition, a reader informed us that, on Election Day, an election volunteer told him to refrain from using a camera in the polling place. The volunteer said something about a new law prohibiting the use of cameras, but we have not been able to confirm the existence of any such law.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
While Pennsylvania has no state statute expressly prohibiting the use of cameras or video equipment inside or outside of polling places, an attorney in the Pennsylvania Department of State informs us that county boards of elections may adopt rules banning the use of cameras and video equipment inside those polling places under their authority. Anyone interested in using a camera or video recorder at the Pennsylvania polls on November 4 should therefore contact the local county board of elections to see if there is an outright prohibition in place.
If you're interested in the legal basis for these local rules, section 2642(f) of Title 25 of Pennsylvania Statutes states that county boards of elections have the power to "make and issue such rules, regulations and instructions, not inconsistent with law, as they may deem necessary for the guidance of voting machine custodians, election officers, and electors." Putting aside First Amendment concerns that state officials probably do not share, a rule banning photography or filming isn't "inconsistent with law" and would arguably further county election officials' duty to "keep order in the voting room." 25 Pa. Stat. § 3060(f). Such a rule might also act as a prophylactic against violations of other election laws, discussed below. Local control over this issue may explain why some Pennsylvania voters were permitted to take photographs inside polling places during the 2008 primaries, while others were not (photos from New York Times Polling Place Project no longer available).
Besides local rules banning photography and videography, a number of state statutes also restrict activities at the polls and potentially limit your ability to use cameras and video equipment in and around polling places. As Albert Masland of the Pennsylvania Department of State put it in a recent email to YouTube, "While there is not a single [Pennsylvania] statute . . . that explicitly prohibits the use of electronic devices in the polling place, there is a web of statutes that makes it anything but clearly legal."
First, Pennsylvania law strives to maintain secrecy in voting, a requirement enshrined in Article VII, section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Reflecting this concern for secrecy, section 3530 of Title 25 of the Pennsylvania Statutes restricts activities that may reveal the contents of a voter's ballot. This provision makes it a misdemeanor for a voter to "allow his ballot or the face of the voting machine voted by him to be seen by any person with apparent intention of letting it be known how he is about to vote." This language does not cover posting an image of one's own marked ballot on the Internet after voting, but it would likely cover streaming live video at the time of voting. Section 3530 also prohibits "endeavor[ing] to induce any elector before depositing his ballot to show how he marks or has marked his ballot." This makes it unlawful to photograph or film other voters in such a way that might reveal the contents of their ballots.
Second, Pennsylvania law protects voters from intimidation and interference, and the relevant provisions could affect your ability to use cameras or video equipment inside a polling place. Section 3530, discussed above, also prohibits "interfer[ing] with any elector when inside the enclosed space or when marking his ballot, or preparing the voting machine for voting." In addition, section 3547 makes it a crime to "practice intimidation or coercion" to compel someone to vote or refrain from voting, or to "impede[], prevent[], or otherwise interfere[] with the free exercise of the elective franchise by any voter." You may not view your use of a camera or video recorder as intimidating, but other voters and election officials may well view it that way, and their discomfort is likely to be more acute if you film inside.
Third, Pennsylvania law strictly regulates activities in and around the polling place with a view towards maintaining order. For instance, section 3060(a) of Title 25 limits the number of voters inside the polling place to ten individuals, and section 3060(b) prohibits re-entry. Inside, section 3057 limits a voter's time in the voting compartment or booth to three minutes. Section 3060(d) prohibits anyone other than voters and certain officials from coming within 10 feet of the polling place. Unless you are in the process of voting, you should therefore steer clear of this area for any purpose. Outside this zone, the law permits you to film, take photographs, and interview other voters (with permission), as long as you are not on someone's private property, and subject to the prohibitions on voter intimidation and interference discussed above.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
We have not analyzed South Carolina's laws regulating polling place activities yet, but we received the following communication from a South Carolina State Election Commission official:
There is no statute explicitly prohibiting cameras in the polling place. However, there are statutes dealing with voter intimidation, ballot secrecy, and keeping order in the polling place. We do instruct poll managers to ask voters not to use cameras, cell phones, PDAs, etc in the polling places for several reasons:
- Out of courtesy to others. Voters may be distracted or annoyed by other voters using these items.
- To prevent intimidation. Voters can be intimidated by the use of a camera in a polling place.
- To protect the secrecy of the ballot.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
Texas is one of the states that expressly prohibit the use of all recording inside of polling places. Specifically, Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 61.014(b) bans the use of "any mechanical or electronic means of recording images or sound within 100 feet of a voting station." This includes video cameras, still cameras, and cell phones with recording capability. In addition, Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 61.014(a) prohibits the use of "any wireless communication device" in the same 100-foot zone, so even talking on your cell phone is not allowed.
The prohibition on all photography and video extends inside the voting booth as well, so you should not attempt to record an image of your own ballot (whether marked or unmarked). A Texas election official told us that signs will be posted in polling places warning voters about the ban. The official also stated that, despite the ban on the use of recording equipment and wireless communication devices, voters will be allowed to enter a polling place carrying a cell phone, as long as they don't use it.
If you are interested in interviewing other voters, you should do so outside of the polling place. Texas law makes it a crime for you to divulge information obtained in a polling place concerning another person's vote. See Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §61.006(a). Moreover, election officials are likely to view any attempt to conduct interviews inside as disruptive of the voting process.
Outside, Texas law creates a 100-foot zone from the entrance of the building, in which loitering and electioneering are prohibited. See Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 61.003(a). It is not clear whether conducting interviews could be viewed as electioneering under the statute, but loitering could potentially encompass even standing in the 100-foot zone unless waiting to vote. This could make conducting interviews and filming or taking photographs in the 100-foot zone risky.
If you are not inside or within 100 feet of the polling place, Texas law places fewer restrictions on your activities. You generally may take photographs and video and interview other voters (with permission). Despite this greater degree of freedom, you should take care not to make voters feel uncomfortable or interfere with the voting process in any way.
NOTE: The information on this page was current as of the 2008 presidential elections, and might not be accurate for later elections. We are retaining this page for historical purposes only. For information related to the 2012 election, visit our revised state-by-state guide.
If you're a Virginia voter thinking about documenting the big day, Virginia election law may affect your ability to use video or still photography in and around your polling place, as well as your ability to interview other voters at the polls. The following provisions may be important to you:
Prohibited Zone
Section 24.2-604(A) of the Virginia Code creates a 40-foot "Prohibited Area" around the entrance to the polling place. In this area, you may not (1) "loiter or congregate"; (2) engage in electioneering activities or otherwise attempt to influence any person in voting; or (3) "hinder or delay a qualified voter in entering or leaving a polling place." Given the restrictions on loitering and hindering or delaying a voter, you should not try to interview other voters in the Prohibited Area. Taking photographs and shooting video in this area does not appear to violate section 24.2-604, unless you hinder a voter or stand around long enough to be "loitering." Outside of this 40-foot zone, you are free to take photographs, shoot video, and interview voters (with permission), as long as you are not on someone's private property.
Inside the Polling Room
Section 24.2-604(D) regulates activities inside the polling room. It does not expressly prohibit the use of cameras or video recorders by voters. Instead, it prohibits activities similar to those outlawed in the Prohibited Area outside: (1) hindering or delaying a voter; (2) giving out campaign material; (3) soliciting or attempting to influence any person's vote; (4) hindering and delaying any officer of election; and (5) impeding the orderly conduct of the election. While the statute is not entirely clear, it looks like it permits you to take photographs or shoot video inside a Virginia polling place, so long as your conduct does not hinder or delay any other voter or otherwise interfere with the voting process. You should also avoid using your camera in any way that might reveal the contents of another voter's marked ballot. See Va. Code § 24.2-607 (making it a crime to "hinder, intimidate, or interfere with any qualified voter so as to prevent the voter from casting a secret ballot").
Photos from the New York Times Polling Place Project (no longer available) suggest that at least some Virginia poll workers allowed voters to take photographs inside of polling places during the 2008 Primaries.
Authority of County Officials to Prohibit Photography and/or Videography
When we spoke with a state election official, she informed us that, while there is no state statute expressly prohibiting the use of cameras or video recorders inside the polling place, county election officials may adopt rules/policies banning or discouraging the use of this equipment inside of a polling place in order to avoid interference with other voters or the process of voting. Therefore, you should check with your local officials before Election Day if you're interested in using a camera inside the polls.
Photographing or Videoing Your Own Marked Ballot
Section 24.2-1011 of the Virginia Code prohibits carrying "an official ballot or copy thereof beyond or away from the voting booth." A state election official informed us that this provision prohibits a voter from photographing or videoing his or her own ballot. One of our readers points out how enforcing this prohibition against photographing or videoing one's own vote might further the policy underlying the statutory language -- "If voters can carry away proof of how they voted, that could be used for vote buying."
Representatives of the News Media
Section 24.2-604(J) gives "representatives of the news media" express permission to "visit and film or photograph inside the polling place for a reasonable and limited period of time while the polls are open." It imposes four restrictions, however: the media (1) must comply with the other restrictions found in section 24.2-604 (relating to prohibited activities in the 40-foot zone and inside the polling room); (2) must not film or photograph any person who specifically asks not to be filmed or photographed; (3) must not film or photograph a voter or a ballot in such a way that divulges how any individual voter is voting; and (4) must not film or photograph the voter list or any other voter record or material at the precinct in such a way that it divulges the name or other information concerning any individual voter. Subsection J also states that "[a]ny interviews with voters, candidates or other persons, live broadcasts, or taping of reporters' remarks, shall be conducted outside of the polling place and the prohibited area."
The statute does not define "representatives of the news media," and the CMLP has not been able to determine whether non-traditional journalists and bloggers fit into this category. We suggest that you contact the Virginia State Board of Elections or your local board of elections for more information. There might be some sort of credentialing process. Regardless of your status, any voter who brings a camera or recorder inside the polling place would do well to honor the restrictions imposed on the media. So, don't get too close to other voters or their ballots with your camera and always honor a request to stop photographing or filming. If you want to do interviews, take it outside the 40-foot zone.
The 2009 Presidential Inauguration promises to be a historic series of events, and millions of people will converge on Washington D.C. to observe and participate in the festivities. Many attendees will want to document the events, whether for purposes of reporting on a blog or other website, or simply for purposes of creating a personal record of their own experiences.
During the Inauguration, heightened security measures will be in place across Washington, D.C., particularly in the areas where official events are taking place. These security measures, as well as tickets, permits, and credentialing requirements, will affect where you can go, what you can bring with you, and what you can do to document the Inauguration. Your location and what events are taking place there will influence what legal and other limitations you are subject to. The following information will help you understand and comply with security measures and other requirements while documenting the Inauguration.
Click here for a one-page, printable summary of this guide in pamphlet form (print double-sided).
The 2009 Presidential Inauguration is actually a series of events held over four days. The events start Sunday, January 18 with a "kick off" event at the Lincoln Memorial and conclude Wednesday, January 21 with a prayer service. A list of official events is available on the Presidential Inaugural Committee website, and a map of Washington, D.C. displaying where the various inaugural events will take place is available on The Washington Post's website.
Most people consider the swearing-in ceremony to be the main event. The swearing-in will take place on Tuesday, January 20, on the steps of the Capitol Building. Limited seating is available directly in front of the Capitol Building steps, and tickets are required to watch the swearing-in from that location. Information about tickets to this event can be found at the website of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies.
The National Mall, which is located just west of the Capitol Building where the swearing-in will take place, will be open to the public during the ceremony, and large screens will be set up there to allow for viewing of the swearing-in. Tickets are not required to watch the ceremony from the National Mall. But, attendees will need to undergo security screenings and comply with various restrictions, discussed below.
The Secret Service is the lead federal agency coordinating security for these events, but the D.C. Metropolitan Police, the U.S. Capitol Police and the National Park Service will all play active roles in maintaining security at the various inaugural events. More information about the security coordination, and what it will mean for attendees, is available on the Secret Service Presidential Inaugural webpage.
While documenting the Inauguration, you can go anywhere the general public can go, but certain areas will be off-limits to you without tickets or official press credentials.
Most inaugural events are open to the public, free of charge. Publicly accessible areas will be clearly marked, and security personnel will be present if you have questions about where you can and cannot go. Some events, like the ten official Inaugural Balls, will require a ticket to attend. The Presidential Inaugural Committee handles ticketing for official events other than the swearing-in ceremony. Please see their website for a schedule of events, and for more information about which events require tickets, and how tickets may be acquired.
"The Swearing-In": As noted above, tickets are needed to attend the January 20 swearing-in ceremony on the Capitol Building steps. Members of Congress and the Presidential Inaugural Committee are distributing these tickets. The most promising way to get a ticket is to contact your local member of Congress (keep in mind that the number of requests is likely to exceed the supply of tickets). For more information about tickets to the swearing-in ceremony, please visit the website of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies. This Inauguration map shows the locations of the swearing-in events at the Capitol Building and National Mall, and displays where ticketed and non-ticketed attendees may go.
Ticketed attendees of the Capitol Building swearing-in event must enter the Capitol Grounds through the entry point designated for their particular ticket section, as indicated on the Inauguration map. Security screening gates will open at 8:00 AM, music will begin at 9:00 AM, and the formal program will begin at 11:30 AM. Guests who have not made it to the screening points by 11:30 AM may not be permitted to enter. Security screening gates will also be in place at the National Mall swearing-in viewing event; it is likely that these gates will follow the same schedule.
Inaugural Parade: You will need tickets to sit in the bleacher seats along the January 20 Inaugural Parade route, but you do not need tickets to watch the Parade from the sidewalk. A map of the Parade route indicates which streets will be blocked off during the event. The Presidential Inaugural Committee will be selling tickets for the seats.
Youth Concert: You also need tickets to attend the youth concert at the Verizon Center on January 19. Tickets are free, and must be requested from the Presidential Inaugural Committee.
All other official Inauguration events, apart from the Inaugural Balls, are open to the public free of charge.
At both ticketed and non-ticketed events, press areas will be demarcated for members of the media who have applied for and been granted official press credentials. More information about press credentials is available at the website of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies and the Inauguration Press Credentials page in this guide. Note that the deadlines to apply for press credentials have already passed.
You should have no problem if you bring small, handheld equipment and carry it in a small bag (but not a backpack). At all inaugural events, attendees can bring still and video cameras. While we found nothing written that suggested any size limitations on cameras, officials told us in telephone conversations that small, handheld equipment is the safest bet, given that security screeners have discretion to prohibit any item "that may pose a threat to the security of the event." To the best of our knowledge, small microphones and other recording devices will be permitted as well.
Tripods, backpacks and large bags (exceeding 8"x6"x4"), including camera bags, are not permitted. A non-exhaustive list of additional prohibited items is available at the website of the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies and the Secret Service Presidential Inaugural webpage.
Please note that members of the media with official press credentials will be permitted to use some equipment, such as unipods, that members of the general public are not allowed to bring. See our Inauguration Press Credentials page for details.
You can take still photographs, record video, and interview other Inauguration attendees at all inaugural events, provided that you comply with security regulations about what to bring (above) and don't create a disruption or otherwise interfere with security efforts. There is one caveat regarding "commercial filming" on the National Mall, which we discuss below.
In the course of your filming and photographing, try not to get too close to other attendees with your equipment. This may help to avoid altercations, and it's also polite. In addition, before interviewing someone, get the person's permission. If possible, get written permission or record verbal permission on video. Explain to the individual what you intend to do with the video (such as uploading it to the Internet) and get their permission to use their name and likeness for that purpose.
Commercial Filming on the National Mall
The January 18 "kick off" event and the January 20 free public viewing of the swearing-in ceremony will take place on the National Mall, located just west of the Capitol Building. Because the National Mall is a national park, it is subject to the National Park Service's (NPS) permit requirements. NPS requires a permit (and fee) for "commercial filming" on national park land. It is unlikely, however, that taking photographs or recording video at these inaugural events qualify as "commercial filming," at least so long as you document the Inauguration for personal use or for purposes of reporting on the events.
Federal law, 16 U.S.C. § 460l-6d, allows the NPS to require permits for "commercial filming" on national park land, including the National Mall. An NPS agent we spoke with took a fairly aggressive view of what constitutes "commercial filming," suggesting that permits are necessary for filming and photography "whenever you are getting paid for your images." A reasonable reading of the statute, however, does not support this understanding.
The statute states that a permit for still photography is not required unless it takes place in a location where members of the public are not generally allowed, where additional administrative costs are likely, or where the photographer uses models or props that are not already located at the site. 16 U.S.C. § 460l-6d(c). None of these exceptions are likely to apply to photographers documenting the inaugural events at the National Mall.
Videographers are more likely than still photographers to be subject to the permit requirement, but only slightly more so. The statute does not define "commercial filming," but a Senate Report clarifies that "[p]ermits are not needed when filming for personal use, [or] for media and news events." S. Rep. No. 106-67, at 2 (1999). This means that most people interested in taking video footage of the inaugural events on the Mall are not subject to the permit requirement.
The only individuals who are likely to be subject to the NPS's permit requirement are those interested in filming an advertisement, feature film, or documentary. If you fit into these categories, you can get more information about obtaining a permit at these National Park Service webpages (here, and here). An NPS representative told us over the telephone that it could take a couple weeks to process a permit application. However, the application forms indicate that applications should be submitted at least four days before filming begins.
The great majority of attendees interested in documenting the Inauguration will be content to observe and participate in the official events. For these individuals, any unpleasant confrontation with the police or other security personnel is unlikely. Others, however, may be interested in documenting demonstrations or other acts of dissent. These activities bring with them a greater risk of confrontation with the police.
If you are interested in covering these types of activities, it is a good idea to avoid any appearance that you are participating in any protests or demonstrations, or engaging in disruptive behavior of any kind. To that end, the Student Press Law Center recommends that you avoid wearing insignia, carrying signs, or joining in chants with protest participants. You should also obey the orders of police and other security personnel. If you believe that these officials are acting unlawfully, try to document the names and titles of those involved, and the contact information of witnesses to the incident. If possible, photograph or videotape the misconduct.
The Student Press Law Center also recommends that journalists bring at least $50 cash and a cell phone programmed with phone numbers of emergency personnel and colleagues or friends you can call in case you encounter any problems while at the Inauguration events. If you run into any trouble, being able to quickly contact outside help is important. If you know other people attending the Inauguration, plan to check in with each other periodically.
Several organizations maintain hotlines that you may be able to call in case of trouble:
Journalists who get official press credentials gain access to otherwise restricted areas and permission to use equipment not permitted to the general public, notably "unipods" (which are one-legged stands for holding a camera). Separate credentials are available for each event, and two organizations- the Senate Media Galleries and the Presidential Inaugural Committee - oversee the granting of these credentials depending on the event. The deadline for submitting applications has already passed. Some details about credentials for the different events are provided below.
Individuals without official press credentials can still take photographs, record video, and otherwise document the inaugural events, albeit without access to special locations and use of a unipod.
Swearing-in ceremony on the Capitol Building steps - January 20 - Ticketed event
All other official events - January 18 - 21, 2009
The ability to protect your sources and newsgathering materials is often critical to your being able to gather information and inform the public. In the course of assembling information for an article, post, podcast, or other work, you may obtain information that, for a number of reasons, you do not wish to make available to the public.
Ironically, confidentiality may be an essential part of bringing
information to the public's attention because as a publisher, you may only be able to gather the information if you promise not to reveal the information's source. For example, reporting that involves the criticism of government and exposure of government and corporate wrongdoing often depends on the use of confidential sources.
Fortunately, the law provides tools with which to protect the information you obtain. Absent some kind of legal protection, a journalist or other individual gathering information for dissemination to the public may be compelled to identify his or her sources and produce documents in court and other governmental proceedings. Journalists and other citizens reporting the news have been asserting their right to keep their sources and materials confidential for longer than the United States has been an independent nation. In 1734, for example, John Peter Zenger refused to give the names of his sources when he was charged with seditiously libeling British Governor William Cosby of the New York Colony. Zenger, who was later tried and acquitted, was jailed for a month due to his refusal to identify his sources.
These legal protections are vital to the free flow of information in society. If reporters (and we use that term broadly here) are seen merely as an investigative arm of the government, individuals with information of great public concern may be afraid to share that information. As a result, the public may be deprived of information of critical importance to the proper functioning of our society and our democratic form of government.
The following sections address the legal challenges facing online publishers in maintaining the confidentiality of sources and source material and discusses the federal and state laws that may protect them from forced disclosure of this information.
What are the legal consequences if you promise confidentiality to a source? While your use of confidential sources should generally be the exception and not the rule (it’s almost always better to get something on the record and for attribution if you can), there are a number of reasons you might wish to promise a source confidentiality. For instance, some sources may only be willing to share information with you if you promise them confidentiality because they fear retaliation or other adverse consequences. In other situations, you may wish to promise your source confidentiality because in some places such a promise makes it harder for someone to require you to disclose the identity of your source in court.
Yet by promising your source confidentiality, you may incur legal obligations to your source. Keep in mind that promising a source confidentiality may make it difficult for you to change your mind later. For instance, you might decide that the source's identity is newsworthy and wish to report about it. While the law varies from state to state, some general guidance on this issue is possible.
First, consider carefully whether to promise your sources confidentiality. There are several potential benefits and drawbacks of promising confidentiality that you should consider:
Benefits of promising confidentiality:
Drawbacks of promising confidentiality:
In sum, promising confidentiality can provide benefits to you and your source, but you should only offer it after you have carefully weighed the benefits and drawbacks. If your source demands confidentiality, make sure you intend to maintain confidentiality if you agree. Also, no matter what you decide, it is a good idea to be clear with your source about what he or she should expect with respect to confidentiality. Agree with your source on exactly when and to whom, if anyone, you can reveal your source's identity.
Second, consider whether you will be able to keep the information secret. Once you have obtained information from a confidential source, you will need to keep the source's identity secret. Be careful of revealing any unpublished news you have received if you do not want the information to be public. It might be tempting to talk about a juicy piece of information you have discovered with your relatives, friends, or co-workers. Resist the temptation. There are a number of negative consequences that can occur if you reveal the identity of confidential sources or unpublished news to anyone.
In a number of states, if you reveal your source's identity to anyone, you can lose your ability to protect that information later. This means that even if you could have protected the information from a legal demand, you no longer will be able to do so. Even if you are still able to protect your information from a legal demand for it, the person who knows the information might not be able to do so. You might have a "journalistic privilege" to protect your sources' identities and unpublished information from a legal demand, but your friends and relatives and co-workers might not have such special protection. If a party to a lawsuit discovers that someone else has the information they want, they might ask a judge to require that person to reveal the information.
Beyond legal considerations, as a practical matter, the more people who know the information, the more likely it is to be revealed. People are not always good at keeping secrets, and you may not wish for the information to be revealed. If others do not know the identity of a source or a tidbit of unpublished news, they might not even realize it exists, so they may not ever know to seek it from you.
In general, by promising confidentiality to a source you might develop a legal obligation to your source in two ways, either by contract or through detrimental reliance. If you do not have a legal obligation to your source, typically he or she will not have any legal recourse against you if you break your promise of confidentiality.
First, you might have a legal obligation to your source if you have formed a contract with your source. Forming a contract does not require a formal, signed paper document. Contracts also do not require any "magic words." To the contrary, any exchange of promises can potentially represent a binding agreement.
Contracts can only be formed if you promise to do something (or refrain from doing something) in exchange for the other person promising to do something (or not do something). A one-way promise, with nothing expected in return, does not form a contract. Thus, an important question in determining whether you formed a contract when you promised a source confidentiality is: Was there an understanding that you would receive something in return? If you promised your source confidentiality with the understanding that you would receive information in return, that may represent a contract. On the other hand, if you promised the source confidentiality freely, with no promise of anything in return, you probably have not formed a contract.
Whether you and your source made an exchange of promises that constitutes a contract is based on a how a "reasonable person" would have interpreted your behavior. It is not based on how you or your source subjectively perceived the situation.
Even if you exchanged promises in a way that could represent a contract, some courts will hold that contracts formed based on a newsgatherer's promise of confidentiality are not valid. In other words, in some states, if a court deems you a newsgatherer, it will not punish you for revealing the identity of a confidential source to the public. Courts in these states hold that free speech interests, such as those embodied in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, prevent them from punishing you.
"Detrimental reliance" (also called "promissory estoppel") is a fancy legal term that essentially means relying on a promise in a costly way. It is a type of promise that is legally binding in many states. It applies when you make a promise to someone that you expect that person to act on, and then that person relies on that promise in a way that could hurt that person if you break your word. The key difference between "detrimental reliance" and a contract is that "detrimental reliance" does not require an exchange of promises -- it only requires a one-way promise, and the the person who has been promised something relying on that promise.
An example may help "detrimental reliance" seem more understandable. Imagine that a boss tells his employee that she can have a day off so she can visit her far-away relative, as she had been saying that she wanted to for a long time. The employee, relying on her boss's promise, buys an airplane ticket to see the relative. At this point, the employee may be able to enforce the boss's promise under the doctrine of "detrimental reliance." By promising his employee the day off, the boss knew that his employee would go to visit her relative. The boss knew that his employee would have to spend money to buy a plane ticket. The employee, by buying the plane ticket, relied to her expense on the boss's promise. If the boss were to break his word, it would cause her financial injury.
Here's how "detrimental reliance" can come up for you: Imagine that you promise a source confidentiality. You expect that by making this promise, your source will reveal confidential information to you. As you expect, the source reveals confidential information. You then publish the confidential information you received from your source. Later, you want to reveal your source's identity to the public. The source will say the doctrine of "detrimental reliance" binds you because the source only gave you the information because you promised confidentiality. This is similar to what happened in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663(1991), in which the Supreme Court held that it was okay to punish two reporters under the doctrine of "detrimental reliance" for breaking their promises.
Remember, your source can only take legal action against you if you promise your source confidentiality in such a way as to create a legally binding obligation. The two ways this can happen are detailed above.
Your source cannot prevent you from breaking a promise of confidentiality ahead of time. The First Amendment typically prevents any prior restraints against speaking. Your source also cannot take legal action against you if you are legally obligated to reveal your source's identity. For example, you might be legally obligated to reveal the information as the result of a valid court order. However, if you break your word of your own accord, your source can sue you after the fact.
If your source sues you for breaking your word and a court finds you had a legal obligation to keep your word, you may be ordered to pay your source compensatory damages. Generally, this means you must pay money to make up for anything your source has lost because you broke your word. Sometimes, this will not be much, but other times it could be a lot of money. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), the reporters had to pay $200,000 to their source.
There are several ways that others can attempt to acquire information about your newsgathering activities, including through a subpoena, search warrant, and discovery order in litigation. The most common of these approaches is through a subpoena. This section will detail when these methods may be used and their effects.
Subpoenas
A subpoena is a command to appear before a court. A subpoena can either require you to appear in person to provide testimony or information, or it can require you to provide specified documents, records, or other material. You can be subpoenaed in cases where you might not have realized you have relevant information.
Subpoenas are typically issued in the early stages of a case, when parties are trying to learn information relevant to their cases. In order to allow the parties in litigation to gather enough information, American judges tend to be generous in granting subpoenas.
If you receive a subpoena, you must think carefully about how to respond. You should not ignore it, since you can be punished for doing so. Refer to the section in this guide on Responding to Subpoenas for information on how to respond to a subpoena. If the subpoena relates to information you collected as part of your newsgathering or publishing activities, you might be able to defeat the subpoena and avoid having to appear or disclose information, see the Legal Protections for Sources and Source Material section for more information.
Search Warrants
Search warrants are orders by judges allowing police or other law-enforcement to search a location and take evidence. Search warrants are used in criminal cases. In most situations, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires police to obtain a search warrant before they can search private premises. To obtain a warrant, police must demonstrate to a judge that they have "probable cause" to believe that the search will yield evidence of a crime.
If police do not have a warrant and wish to conduct a search of your premises, you may say no. For most people, if police have a valid search warrant, the search they conduct pursuant to the warrant is legal.
If you receive a search warrant that relates to information you collected as part of your newsgathering or publishing activities, you may be able to get it withdrawn. The federal Privacy Protection Act prohibits the issuance of a search warrant directed at documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. Please see the Legal Protections for Sources and Source Material section for details.
Discovery Orders
When you are a party to litigation, the opposing parties may use discovery orders to obtain information from you. Discovery orders can take a number of forms. For instance, they may require you to provide documents, or they may require you to answer questions in a deposition. The purpose of discovery orders is to allow all parties to have information so that they can pursue their arguments in court.
In federal courts in the U.S., and in most state courts, judges allow parties to conduct broad discovery -- they are generally willing to allow parties to get the information they request. Discovery orders are legally binding, and you can be punished for ignoring them. If you wish to challenge a discovery order that requests something from you, you must do so by notifying the judge who issued the order. The exact reasons you can challenge an order vary by court and jurisdiction. In general, you might be able to object that the information requested is not relevant to the case for which it was requested, that too much information was requested and only some is relevant to the case, that the request is unduly burdensome, or that you should not have to reveal newsgathering information. To determine whether you can avoid revealing your newsgathering information and sources, see Legal Protections for Sources and Source Material.
Keep in mind, however, that if you are a defendant in a lawsuit, your newsgathering materials and source information may be relevant -- or even essential -- to your defense. For example, if you relied on a confidential source for a statement that the plaintiff claims is defamatory, you may be in a position where you need to identify your source in order to show that it was reasonable for you to rely on that source for the information you published. If you refuse to provide the requested information, you may lose your ability to fully defend yourself.
The use of subpoenas, search warrants, and discovery ordersin litigation that seek to acquire information about your confidentialsources or source material can place a substantial burden on yournewsgathering and online publishing activities, as well as on the freeflow of information in society.
Fortunately, you are not powerless when faced with a demandfor information obtained in the course of your newsgatheringactivities. Legal protections exist to protect those who gather newsfrom having to reveal the identity of their confidential sources andfrom having to disclose unpublished information collected in the courseof newsgathering. This section looks at the laws that provideprotection and outlines the character and scope of that protection.Keep in mind that the legal protections available to you differmarkedly from state to state. For information on state shield laws andother legal protections for sources and source material in the fifteenmost populous U.S. states and the District of Columbia, please see the state-specific pages.
There are a number of different sources of legal protection forsources and source material. These include state shield laws, federaland state constitutional provisions, federal statutes, and common lawprivileges. In some geographical locations, only one or two sources ofprotection are available. In others, you may be able to take advantageof several sources of legal protection.
More than thirty U.S. states currently have shield laws that providesome level of protection for journalists and others who gatherinformation for dissemination to the public. The first state shield lawwas enacted in Maryland on April 2, 1896, in response to theimprisonment of a Baltimore Sun reporter for refusing to reveala confidential source to a grand jury. Over the years, other stateshave followed suit, recognizing the importance of a reporter's shieldfor supporting the public's "right to know."
The scope of shield law protection varies from state to state.The primary differences revolve around the following three questions:
For a detailed examination of state shield laws, see the State Law: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material section of this guide.
There presently is no federal shield law. In its last session,Congress considered but did not pass a proposed federal shield law. Themost recent version of the bill, H.R. 2102,excluded from coverage those who do not receive "a substantial portionof [their] livelihood" or "substantial financial gain" from theirnewsgathering and publishing activities. This language would probablyexclude many non-traditional journalists and amateur online publishers,as well as freelance journalists who rely on other work to supplementtheir incomes. In any event, the Congress has not enacted the bill intolaw, so future revisions are possible.
Privacy Protection ActAn important federal law may protect you with regard to search warrants.Subject to certain exceptions, the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makesit "unlawful for a government officer or employee, in connection withthe investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to search foror seize" work product and documentary materials "possessed by a personin connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper,book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication." 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If the PPA applies to you, it protects you regardless of what state you live in.
The PPA covers a publisher's "work product" and "documentary materials."
"Work product" is defined as materials: (1) "prepared, produced,authored, or created, whether by the person in possession of thematerials or by any other person"; (2) "possessed for the purposes ofcommunicating such materials to the public"; and(3) "include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories ofthe person who prepared, produced, authored, or created such material."42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(b)(1).Work product thus includes things like your notes, drafts, andouttakes. Work product does not include contraband, "fruits" of crime,or materials intended to be or actually used in the commission of acrime.
"Documentary materials" are also defined broadly as "materialsupon which information is recorded, and includes, but is not limitedto, written or printed materials, photographs, motion picture films,negatives, video tapes, audio tapes, and other mechanically,magnetically or electronically recorded cards, tapes, or discs." Id. §2000aa-7(a). As with work product, the definition does not includecontraband, "fruits" of crime, or materials intended to be or actuallyused in the commission of a crime.
While the law on this point is not yet clear, the language ofthe PPA -- reaching "a person in connection with a purpose todisseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication" -- suggests that it may cover online publishers.
The PPA does not function like a shield law, which allows areporter to refuse to comply with a subpoena or other discovery order.Instead, the PPA allows you to file a civil lawsuit for damages afterthe search and/or seizure takes place, if you believe it violated thelaw.
There are a number of exceptions to the PPA. Most importantly,government officials can legally carry out a search and/or seizureotherwise covered by the PPA if there is "probable cause" to believethat the reporter (or other publisher) has evidence linking him or herto a crime. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b)(1).The government cannot invoke this exception, however, if the only"offense to which the materials relate consists of the receipt,possession, communication, or withholding of such materials or theinformation contained therein," unless the materials relate to thenational defense or classified information. Id. There is also anexception when authorities have reason to believe that death or seriousinjury will result if the search is delayed. Id. § 2000aa(b)(2).
For more information on the Privacy Protection Act and afantastic practical guide to dealing with newsroom searches, see theStudent Press Law Center's Student Media Guide to the Privacy Protection Act.
Federal Constitution
A number of state and federal courts have found that the FreeSpeech Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution creates a"reporter's privilege" against having to disclose the identity ofconfidential sources and/or turning over unpublished newsgatheringmaterials. While the law is not settled, online publishers may be ableto take advantage of this reporter's privilege. The constitutionalreporter's privilege is not, however, universally recognized.Furthermore, even when recognized, it only provides a "qualifiedprivilege," meaning that the person seeking information can overcome itwith a strong showing of need.
Courts that recognize a privilege based on the First Amendment often make reference to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg is the only case in which the U.S.Supreme Court has addressed the federal reporter's privilege.Unfortunately, it is also a famously confusing case. The majorityopinion, which typically is the legally controlling opinion, held thatthe First Amendment does not provide a reporter with a privilege fromtestifying before a grand jury about information obtained and eventswitnessed in the course of researching a story. However, Justice Powellwrote a concurring opinion in which he stated that demands forinformation from journalists should "be judged on [their] facts by thestriking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and theobligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony." Because JusticePowell was a necessary fifth vote to form a majority, many courts treathis opinion as the controlling opinion. These courts frequently readhis opinion as calling for a qualified privilege for reporters underthe First Amendment.
Courts in different states and federal circuits have differentviews about the character and scope of the federal reporter'sprivilege. For more detailed information on the contours of thisprivilege, see the state pages.
State Constitutions
Quite a few state courts have found that a privilege exists forjournalists under their respective state constitutions. Some states,like California,have explicit constitutional privileges for journalists, similar inform to a shield law. In other states, courts have derived a privilegefrom general state constitutional provisions, similar to the FirstAmendment.
For more information on state constitutional privileges, see the the state pages.Keep in mind that, even when a state recognizes a state constitutionalprivilege, its exact character and scope is often uncertain.
Some state and federal courts have created privileges fornewsgatherers under the common law (i.e., judge-made law). Common-lawprotections for confidential sources and source material differ greatlyin their scope and character. As with state and federal constitutionalprivileges, courts develop the common law of privilege on acase-by-case basis, and frequently the law is fraught with ambiguitiesand undefined "grey zones." For more information on common lawprivileges for confidential sources and source material, see the the state pages.
When you gather and publish information, it may be important to you to protect the confidentiality of your sources or source material. You may not wish for your sources' identities to be revealed, and you may not want all of the information you have gathered to be public. Here are some practical tips for you to consider when seeking to protect your newsgathering information:
Different states have different laws that may protect your confidential sources and source material. Different states base their protections on different sources of law. Who is protected, what information is protected, and the strength of protection varies greatly across the states.
The state-specific sections below provide
information about legal protections in the fifteen most populous U.S.
states and the District of Columbia. These sections also include
information about the law applied by federal courts in that state. For
a general overview of possible protections, see the section on Legal Protections for Sources and Source Material in this guide.
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
There are four potential legal bases for protecting your sources and source material in Arizona: the Arizona Press Shield Law, the Arizona Media Subpoena Law, the United States Constitution, and the federal Privacy Protection Act.
The Arizona Press Shield Law protects the identity of confidential sources of information obtained during the newsgathering process. Information that is not related to the identity of confidential sources is not covered by the Press Shield Law.
The Arizona Media Subpoena Law sets forth six requirements that must be met before a party can subpoena a journalist to testify or produce documentary evidence relating to her newsgathering activities in a civil or criminal trial. If the requirements of the Media Subpoena Law are not met, the journalist cannot be compelled to testify about matters related to her newsgathering activities or produce documentary evidence, regardless of whether that testimony or evidence involves confidential sources or not.
The U.S. Constitution may protect you from having to disclose the identity of sources or information collected during newsgathering. Federal and state courts in Arizona recognize a qualified reporter’s privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The reporter’s privilege applies to the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared in newsgathering, whether confidential or not (although protection is stronger for confidential information). Because it is qualified, the party seeking information from a reporter may overcome it upon a strong showing of need.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Arizona has no other sources of law that offer you protection from disclosing information.
The Arizona Press Shield Law is codified at A.R.S. § 12-2237. It provides:
A person engaged in newspaper, radio, television or reportorial work, or connected with or employed by a newspaper, radio or television station, shall not be compelled to testify or disclose in a legal proceeding or trial or any proceeding whatever, or before any jury, inquisitorial body or commission, or before a committee of the legislature, or elsewhere, the source of information procured or obtained by him for publication in a newspaper or for broadcasting over a radio or television station with which he was associated or by which he is employed.Who is Protected?
The Court of Appeals of Arizona has stated that Arizona’s Press Shield Law protects “members of the media.” Matera v. Superior Court, 170 Ariz. 446, 449 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). The court of appeals has expressly declined to expand the privilege beyond “‘journalists in the traditional sense of that term’” to “anyone who is engaged in gathering and publishing information which is of topical and widespread interest.” Id. at 450 (quoting von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 1987)). We are not aware of any decisions applying the Press Shield Law in an online context. The limitation of the statute to sources of information obtained for publication in a newspaper or on radio or TV makes application of the statute to online publications unlikely, unless the information is intended for publication in both online and traditional media. Nevertheless, whether journalists publishing news in online outlets would be considered “journalists in the traditional sense of that term” under the law is technically an open question.
What Information is Protected?The Arizona Press Shield Law protects journalists “from being compelled to testify about or otherwise disclose confidential sources utilized during the newsgathering process.” Matera, 170 Ariz. at 449. This protection is absolute.
The Court of Appeals of Arizona has specified that the Press Shield Law “does not protect all activities of would-be publishers or newsgatherers, nor does it protect any and all information gathered.” Id. at 449-50. Information that is not related to the identity of confidential sources is not covered by the Press Shield Law.
The Press Shield Law applies broadly, “in a legal proceeding or trial or any proceeding whatever, or before any jury, inquisitorial body or commission, or before a committee of the legislature, or elsewhere.” A.R.S. § 12-2237. By its terms, the statute does not distinguish between civil or criminal trials, grand jury proceedings, or other legal proceedings.
Waiver of the Press Shield LawArizona courts have not definitely determined whether the protections of the Press Shield Law can be waived. However, in one case, Flores v. Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., 218 Ariz. 52 (2008), the Court of Appeals of Arizona assumed without deciding that the protections of the Press Shield Law can be waived and elaborated on what may constitute a waiver.
The Court stated that situations in which the Press Shield Law may be waived will be construed narrowly. Id. at 59. If a media entity seeks to use the Press Shield Law as “both a sword and shield,” Arizona courts may find the privilege waived. Id. at 58. In other words, if a party seeks both affirmative relief and attempts to use the Press Shield Law to withhold privileged information, the privilege may be waived. Id. The Court has also specified, however, that seeking a declaratory judgment, as opposed to damages or an injunction, will not cause a waiver of the Press Shield Law protections. Id. In short, the Court has stated that waiver may occur “‘when the conduct . . . places the claimant in such a position, with reference to the evidence, that it would be unfair and inconsistent to permit the retention of the privilege.’” Id. (quoting Throop v. E.F. Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 158 (1963)).
The Arizona Court of Appeals has also held that the disclosure of partial information will not waive the privilege as to all information gathered on the same subject matter. Id. at 59. For example, identifying a confidential source as a “whistle blower” does not waive the privilege as to the actual identity of the source. Id.
Source and Text
The Arizona Media Subpoena Law is codified at A.R.S. § 12-2214. It provides:
Who is Protected?
The Media Subpoena Law applies to a “person engaged in the gathering, reporting, writing, editing, publishing or broadcasting news to the public.” A.R.S. § 12-2214.
The Court of Appeals of Arizona has held that the Media Subpoena Law applies only to those people “who gather and disseminate the news on an ongoing basis as part of the organized, traditional, mass media.” Matera, 170 Ariz. at 448. Specifically, the Court has held that it does not apply to authors of non fiction books, including non fiction books about newsworthy recent events. Id. at 447, 448.
What is Protected?
The Media Subpoena Law is not a shield law. The statute “was not designed to protect the information collected, but rather was designed to aid a specific class of persons – members of the media – in performing their jobs free from the inconvenience of being used as surrogate investigators for private litigants.” Matera, 170 Ariz. at 448.
As a result, the statute is not an absolute bar on subpoenaing journalists to testify or about matters related to their news gathering or requiring them to provide news gathering product, such as videotape or pictures. Instead, the person issuing the subpoena must fulfill several requirements. If those requirements are met, the Media Subpoena Law will not protect the journalist from testifying. However, if the requirements are not met, the subpoena will have no effect and cannot be used to compel a journalist to testify or produce documentary evidence for the court. A.R.S. § 12-2214(B).
How are the Requirements of the Media Subpoena Law Met?
The statute requires that the party seeking the information (i.e., the party requesting the subpoena) fulfill six requirements before the subpoena will be issued. He must show:
The initial burden is on the party seeking the information to show compliance with parts (A)(1) through (A)(6) of the Media Subpoena Law. Bartlett v. Superior Ct. in and for Pima Cty., 150 Ariz. 178, 183 (1986). However, he does not need to show a “compelling need” or that he “cannot make his case without the information.” Id. Instead, he must “identify in reasonable detail in his affidavit the information sought, the efforts to obtain it and from what sources.” Id. To meet the requirements of (A)(4) through (A)(6), all that is required is the “affiant’s avowal, unless controverted.” Id.
If the party resisting the subpoena (i.e., the journalist) disputes the affidavit submitted by the party requesting the subpoena, the court must hold a hearing and determine whether the required showing has been made. Id. Until the hearing is held and the court enters an order, enforcement of the subpoena will be postponed. A.R.S. § 12-2214(C).
After the party seeking the information has complied with the six requirements, “the burden shifts to the party opposing the subpoena to controvert the allegations of the affidavit and to set forth the bases therefore.” Id. The party opposing the subpoena must provide specific bases for controverting the affidavit. For example, if he wishes to argue that the information sought could be obtained elsewhere, he must set forth “the manner in which previous efforts were deficient or other specific sources from which the information is available.” Id.
If the party opposing the subpoena alleges generally that the information is available from other sources, the court is not necessarily required to examine and review every other possible source of the information. Instead, if the party seeking the information avows that he has examined the other possible sources of information and found that the information is not available from those sources, this avowal will be sufficient. Id. In other words, the court will accept the word of the party seeking the information. If the party opposing the subpoena believes the information is in fact available from other sources, it is up to that party to review the other sources and “point out to the court where equivalent information could be found.” Id. Thus, while the court will not independently search the record to determine if information is available from other sources, it will review specific evidence pointed to by the party opposing the subpoena to determine if the information is available elsewhere.
For more detailed information about the Arizona Press Shield Law and Media Subpoena Law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press’s Privilege Compendium: Arizona.
The Court of Appeals of Arizona has recognized the existence of the federal constitutional privilege created by Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), and its progeny. Matera, 170 Ariz. at 449. The Court has stated that the federal constitutional reporter’s privilege as created by Branzburg is limited to information regarding confidential sources or cases that “would seriously interfere with the news gathering and editorial process.” Bartlett, 150 Ariz. at 182.
The Court has also stated that the federal constitutional reporter’s privilege is the same as the privilege created by the Arizona Press Shield Law. According to the Court of Appeals of Arizona, “under Branzburg[,] the states and the federal courts have the freedom to create, expand, or restrict protection for publishers as they see fit.” Matera, 170 Ariz. at 449. Noting that Arizona’s Press Shield Law was enacted well before Branzburg, the Court has held that “[t]he constitutional privilege afforded to reporters in Arizona is codified at A.R.S. § 12-2237,” the Press Shield Law. Id. Accordingly, it is unlikely that you will be able to use the constitutional reporter's privilege as protection in the Arizona state courts if you are not covered by the Press Shield Law.
Federal courts in the Ninth Circuit, which encompasses Arizona, recognize a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. An important case indicates that the privilege should protect a broad category of people engaging in newsgathering, stating that "what makes journalism journalism is not its format but its content." Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993). Although the law is not clear on this point, the privilege appears to protect the identity of sources and unpublished information, whether confidential or not. Protection likely is stronger, however, for confidential information.
The courts have applied the privilege in both civil and criminal cases, although its protection is stronger in civil cases. The courts have not upheld the privilege with respect to subpoenas issued in grand jury proceedings. The privilege is qualified, which means that a court may order you to reveal information if the need of the person seeking the information outweighs the policies favoring a privilege. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
For additional information, see The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 9th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see Legal Protections for Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to California. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
There are three potential legal bases for protecting your sources and source material in California: the California shield law, the United States Constitution, and the federal Privacy Protection Act.
The shield law protects the identity of sources (whether promised confidentiality or not), information that might lead to the identity of sources, and unpublished information obtained or prepared in the course of newsgathering activities. A leading California case has found that the shield law protects some -- but not necessarily all -- online publishers and amateur journalists (more below). The level of protection offered by the shield law depends on whether the case is a civil or criminal case and whether the person from whom information is sought is a party to the case or not. It does not protect you from disclosing information when you are a party to a civil or criminal case.
The U.S. Constitution may protect you from having to disclose the identity of sources or information collected during newsgathering. Federal and state courts in California recognize a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The reporter's privilege applies to the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared in newsgathering, whether confidential or not (although protection is stronger for confidential information). Because it is qualified, the party seeking information from a reporter may overcome it upon a strong showing of need. Unlike the shield law, this privilege may apply even when you are a party to a civil lawsuit or criminal case.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
California has no other sources of law that offer you protection from disclosing information.
The California shield law is contained in the California Constitution, Cal. Const. art. I, § 2(b). An essentially identical shield law is also contained in California's Evidence Code, Cal. Evidence Code § 1070.
In relevant part, California's shield law states:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication . . . or any person who has been so connected or employed, shall not be adjudged in contempt [by a body with legal authority] for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured . . . or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public. . . .
As used in this subdivision, 'unpublished information' includes information not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought, whether or not related information has been disseminated and includes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a medium of communication, whether or not published information based upon or related to such material has been disseminated.Who is Covered?
California's shield law protects a person "connected with or employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication." In an important case, O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App.4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), a California appellate court held that the shield law applies to persons gathering news for dissemination to the public, regardless of whether the publication medium is print or online. In that case, Jason O'Grady operated an "online news magazine" about Apple Computers. He published confidential information he received about a new Apple product. Apple wished to sue the person who divulged the confidential information to O'Grady and subpoenaed him for information about the identity of his confidential source. The court applied the shield law, and O'Grady did not have to identify his source.
The O'Grady case does not mean that all online publishers will benefit from the protection of the California shield law. The court indicated that the shield law protects newsgatherers, like O'Grady, who engage in "open and deliberate publication on a news-oriented Web site of news gathered by that site's operators." On the other hand, the court said the shield law might not protect "the deposit of information, opinion, or fabrication by a casual visitor to an open forum such as a newsgroup, chatroom, bulletin board service, or discussion group." The court expressly declined to decide whether the shield law applies to bloggers because of the "rapidly evolving and currently amorphous meaning" of the word "blog." Thus, the exact reach of the California shield law is unclear, but it arguably protects online publishers who gather and disseminate news to the public. The exact definition of "news" is uncertain, and future cases will no doubt determine its contours more precisely.
What Information is Protected?California's shield law protects several types of information. First, it protects unpublished information obtained or prepared in the process of gathering information for communication to the public, including things like notes and outtakes. This unpublished information may be protected from disclosure regardless of whether you obtained it in confidence or not.
Second, it protects the identity of sources, whether confidential or not. The shield protects not only the identity of sources themselves, but also information that might lead to their identity.
Shield Law Protection in Different ContextsThe strength of protection offered by California's shield law varies based on the type of case and whether the person from whom information is sought is a party to the case:
For more detailed information about the California shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: California.
Even when California's shield law is inapplicable, a newsgatherer still may receive some protection based on the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As discussed above, California's shield law does not protect parties to civil and criminal cases. However, California's state courts have found that the First Amendment provides newsgatherers with a qualified privilege against disclosure of confidential sources and information provided by confidential sources, even when they are parties to the case in which information is sought. In applying the qualified privilege, a court will balance the need of the person seeking information and the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in an uninhibited press.
Before ordering disclosure of the identity of confidential sources or information provided by confidential sources, California state courts balance five factors: (1) whether the reporter is a party to the litigation; (2) the importance of the information to the case; (3) whether other sources for the information are available; (4) the importance of protecting confidentiality; and (5) the strength of the case of the party seeking disclosure. It is not clear whether California courts would extend this protection to those publishing news through non-traditional media.
Federal courts in the Ninth Circuit, which encompasses California, recognize a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. An important case indicates that the privilege should protect a broad category of people engaging in newsgathering, stating that "what makes journalism journalism is not its format but its content." Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993). Although the law is not clear on this point, the privilege appears to protect the identity of sources and unpublished information, whether confidential or not. Protection likely is stronger, however, for confidential information.
The courts have applied the privilege in both civil and criminal cases, although its protection is stronger in civil cases. The courts have not upheld the privilege with respect to subpoenas issued in grand jury proceedings. The privilege is qualified, which means that a court may order you to reveal information if the need of the person seeking the information outweighs the policies favoring a privilege. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
For additional information, see The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 9th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see Legal Protections for Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to the District of Columbia. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
The District of Columbia has a shield statute that may protect your newsgathering material from forced disclosure. The shield law protects both the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared in the newsgathering process, such as notes and outtakes. The protection for the identity of sources is "absolute," meaning there are no exceptions to the law's protection. On the other hand, protection for unpublished information is "qualified," meaning it will not provide protection in all circumstances. The shield protects those who are "employed by the news media" (definition below), so it may not protect some amateur journalists and others who publish informally and/or sporadically.
In addition, federal courts in the D.C. Circuit have recognized a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This qualified privilege protects a broad category of individuals collecting information for dissemination to the public, and it protects both the identity of sources and unpublished information.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
The District of Columbia has no other sources of law that offer you protection from disclosing information.
The District of Columbia has a shield law, titled the Free Flow of Information Act, D.C. Code § 4701-4704. You can see the four parts of D.C.'s shield law below, with excerpts of important text.
For the purpose of this chapter, the term "news media" means . . . [a]ny printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating news and information to the public.
Except as provided in section 16-4703, no [legal body] shall compel any person who is or has been employed by the news media in a news gathering or news disseminating capacity to disclose: (1) The source of any news or information procured by the person while employed by the news media and acting in an official news gathering capacity, whether or not the source has been promised confidentiality; or (2) Any news or information procured by the person while employed by the news media in the course of pursuing professional activities that is not itself communicated in the news media . . . .
(a) A court may compel disclosure of news or information otherwise protected from disclosure under section 16-4702(2) if the court finds . . . by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) The news or information is relevant to a significant legal issue . . .; (2) The news or information could not, with due diligence, be obtained by any alternative means; and (3) There is an overriding public interest in the disclosure.
(b) A court may not compel disclosure of the source of any information protected under section 16-4702.
The publication by the news media or the dissemination by a person employed by the news media of a source of news or information, or a portion of the news or information, procured while pursuing professional activities shall not constitute a waiver of the protection from compelled disclosure that is contained in section 16-4702.
The D.C. shield law applies to information obtained by any person "while employed by the news media." In addition to traditional news media formats like newspapers, magazines, and television, the term "news media" also covers the broader category of "any printed, photographic, mechanical, or electronic means of disseminating news and information to the public." So, the "news media" clearly encompasses those engaging in online publishing of news and information.
The key question for many online publishers, therefore, will be whether they are "employed" in online publishing. There is no law specifically addressing this point in the online or non-traditional journalism context. But generally the law does not seem to require traditional employment by an organization. For instance, one case, Prentice v. McPhilemy, Case No. 98-CA-0004309 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 5, 1999), held that an author working on his own to write a book was covered by the statute. However, the law may require some kind of income or payment in return for your activities. This "employment" requirement could present an obstacle to some amateur journalists and others who publish independently, informally and/or sporadically and who do not make money from their activities.
D.C.'s shield law protects two categories of information, which are protected to different degrees:
Identity of Sources: D.C.'s shield law protects "the source of any news or information." The shield protection is absolute -- under no circumstances can courts compel someone covered by the statute (above) to divulge the identity of a source. It protects you whether or not you promise confidentiality to the source in question. The shield applies equally in criminal and civil cases. It also applies whether or not the newsgatherer is a party to the case in which information is sought.
Unpublished information: D.C.'s shield law protects information gathered or prepared for a story, post, or other work, which is not ultimately published. The shield covers all types of materials, whether written, audio, video, or any other format. It applies in both criminal and civil cases, and it applies whether or not the newsgatherer is a party to the case in which information is sought.
The protection offered by the D.C. shield law to unpublished information is qualified, which means that a court may force you to reveal it under certain circumstances, even if you are covered by the statute (above). In order to compel disclosure of unpublished information, a court or other legal body must find that three conditions are met: (1) the news or information is relevant to a significant legal issue; (2) the news or information could not, with due diligence, be obtained by any alternative means; and (3) there is an overriding public interest in the disclosure. ("Due diligence" is a legal term that generally refers to a reasonable amount of effort.)
The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case. Courts may be particularly inclined to order disclosure when the person trying to protect information is a party to the lawsuit in question, or when a criminal defendant seeks information to mount a defense.
For more detailed information about the D.C. shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press' Privilege Compendium: D.C..
Federal courts in the D.C. Circuit have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This qualified privilege applies to the identity of sources and unpublished information collected during newsgathering.
Although the law is not entirely clear on who may take advantage of the federal reporter's privilege, federal courts in D.C. have taken a broad view of who qualifies as a "reporter" or "journalist."
In one case, a federal district court characterized the law as follows: "an individual successfully may assert the journalist's privilege if he is involved in activities associated with gathering and dissemination of news, even though he may not ordinarily be a member of the institutionalized press." Under this view, the party claiming the reporter's privilege must introduce competent evidence to show that he or she had an "intent to use material -- sought, gathered, or received -- to disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering process." Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 21, 50 (D.D.C. 1998).
In another case, a court upheld the claimed privilege of an individual who published his own biweekly newsletter on U.S. political and social movements. The court explained that "the privilege is not limited to the writers of large established newspapers and media enterprises but is equally applicable to the sole publisher of a newsletter or other writing or paper distributed to the public to inform, to comment, or to criticize." Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Rees, 111 F.R.D. 19, 20 (D.D.C. 1986). It would be possible to draw an analogy between this kind of newsletter and an independently published blog or website.
These cases provide strong support for the argument that a amateur and non-traditional journalists, including those who publish online, are protected by the federal reporter's privilege in D.C.
In D.C., the federal reporter's privilege protects both the identity of sources and unpublished information collected during newsgathering. With regard to sources, the privilege applies whether or not you promise confidentiality to a source. However, when you do not promise confidentiality to a source, the privilege may be weaker, and a court may be more willing to require disclosure.
In D.C., the federal reporter's privilege is qualified, meaning that a party seeking information can overcome it upon a proper showing of need. The federal courts are most likely to uphold the reporter's privilege in a civil case where the person invoking the privilege is not a party to the lawsuit. In contrast, courts are more likely to order disclosure of information in a criminal case where the criminal defendant is seeking information from a reporter to help mount his/her defense.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press' Privilege Compendium: D.C. Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Florida has a shield law that may protect your sources and newsgathering materials. It protects both the identity of sources and unpublished information acquired or prepared during newsgathering, such as notes and outtakes. However, the protection extends only to "professional journalists" and appears to be limited to traditional media formats.
Nevertheless, even if you do not qualify for Florida's shield law, you may still be able to protect your sources and source material. Both prior to and after the passage of the shield law, Florida courts have confirmed that a common law privilege protects the identity of a journalist's sources and source materials. This common law privilege may offer protection for amateur and non-traditional journalists.
In addition, federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit, which encompasses Florida, recognize a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, the scope of this privilege is uncertain.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Florida's shield law, located at Fla. Stat. § 90.5015, states in relevant part:
Florida's shield law applies only to "professional journalists." To qualify for the shield law's protection, you must be acting as an employee or independent contractor for "a newspaper, news journal, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television station, network, or news magazine." Book authors are specifically excluded from protection. The CMLP is not aware of any Florida cases addressing whether an employee or independent contractor for an online news publication is covered by the statute, but the language of the statute makes such coverage doubtful. In addition, the "professional journalist" requirement would likely exclude from coverage many types of amateur and non-traditional journalists who do not receive payment for their work.
Florida's shield law extends to both the identity of sources and unpublished information gathered and prepared in the course of newsgathering, such as notes and outtakes. The statute excludes from its protection physical evidence, eyewitness accounts, or recordings of crimes. The shield law protects the identity of a source whether or not you promise confidentiality to the source in question. Publication of some information on a topic does not constitute a waiver of the privilege with respect to that topic.
The shield law provides a qualified privilege, which means that a court may force you to reveal information in some circumstances, even if you are covered by the statute (above). In order to compel disclosure of the identity of an anonymous source or unpublished information, a court or other legal body must find that three conditions are met: (1) the information is relevant and material to unresolved issues in the case; (2) the information cannot be obtained from alternative sources; and (3) a compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the information. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
The same test applies in criminal and civil cases and whether or not you are a party to the lawsuit. As a practical matter, courts may be particularly inclined to order disclosure when the person trying to protect information is a party to the lawsuit in question or when a criminal defendant seeks information to mount a defense.
For more detailed information about the Florida shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: Florida.
The Florida common law (i.e., judge-made law) may protect you from having to disclose information even if the shield law does not. Unlike in some other states, where shield laws eliminated common law protections for newsgatherers, the Florida shield law explicitly preserves common law protections. Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court has continued to recognize a common law privilege after enactment of the shield law.
Florida courts have not indicated specifically who is protected by the common law privilege for newsgatherers. There are at least some indications that the common law will protect people that the shield law does not. For instance, while the shield does not protect book authors, a Florida court has held that the common law privilege covers them. Florida v. Trepal, 24 Media L. Rep. 2595, 2596 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1996). It is not clear how this precedent would translate into an online or amateur-journalism context.
The common law privilege applies to the identity of sources and information collected in the course of newsgathering, and it applies whether or not you promise confidentiality to a source. Like the shield law, the common law privilege does not apply to eyewitness observations or physical evidence of a crime.
The Florida common law privilege is a qualified privilege. If the you and your information fit within its scope, then a court will only order you to disclose information on if it finds: (i) the information is relevant and significant to unresolved issues in the case; (ii) the information cannot be obtained from other sources; and (iii) a compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case. Courts may be particularly inclined to order disclosure when the person trying to protect information is a party to the lawsuit in question or when a criminal defendant seeks information to mount a defense.
Federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit, which encompasses Florida, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It applies to the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared during newsgathering.
Unfortunately, courts in the Eleventh Circuit have not had many opportunities to define the scope of the privilege, so it is hard to say whether an amateur or non-traditional journalist could take advantage of it. When it applies, however, the privilege is qualified, meaning that a court must establish three things before ordering disclosure: (a) the information is highly relevant; (b) it is necessary to the proper presentation of the case; and (c) it is unavailable from other sources. Courts applying this test often also tend to weigh the public interest in disclosure of the information against the public interest in promoting a an uninhibited press. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 11th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Georgia has a shield law that protects the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared in the newsgathering process, such as notes and outtakes. The shield law creates a qualified privilege that may be overcome in certain circumstances, and it does not apply when you are a party to a lawsuit. The language of the shield law suggests that it may not apply to electronic media and online publishing, but the law is uncertain on this point.
In addition, federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit, which encompasses Georgia, recognize a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, the scope of this privilege is uncertain.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
There is no common law protection for sources or source material in Georgia.
Georgia's shield law, located at Ga. Code § 24-9-30, states in relevant part:
Any person . . . engaged in the gathering and dissemination of news for the public through a newspaper, book, magazine, or radio or television broadcast shall have a qualified privilege against disclosure of any information, document, or item obtained or prepared in the gathering or dissemination of news in any proceeding where the one asserting the privilege is not a party, unless it is shown that this privilege has been waived or that what is sought: (1) [i]s material and relevant; (2) [c]annot be reasonably obtained by alternative means; and (3) [i]s necessary to the proper preparation or presentation of the case of a party seeking the information, document, or item.
The Georgia shield law covers people engaging in "the gathering and dissemination of news for the public." Significantly, however, its coverage is limited to those disseminating news through a "newspaper, book, magazine, or radio or television broadcast." The language of the statute therefore seems to limit protection to traditional forms of media. That said, the CMLP is not aware of any Georgia cases interpreting this language in an online context, and it is possible that a court could construe this language to include websites and other online platforms for publishing information and commentary. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App.4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (interpreting similar statutory language in California shield law as covering online news website). The argument might be even stronger with respect to electronic analogs of the media listed, such as e-zines, web radio, podcasts, or videocasts.
Georgia's shield law is broad -- it covers "any information, document, or item obtained or prepared in the gathering or dissemination of news." It extends to the identity of a source, information that would lead to the identity of a source, and unpublished information collected or prepared in the course of newsgathering. The protection applies whether or not you promise a source confidentiality, and whether or not you share the identity of the source with a limited number of third parties. Publishing information eliminates protection for the information actually published, but it does not eliminate protection for non-published information gathered in preparing the published news.
The shield law provides a qualified privilege, which means that a court may force you to reveal information under certain circumstances. In order to compel disclosure of information that otherwise would be protected by the shield, a court or other legal body must find that three conditions are met: (1) the information is "material" (i.e., significant) and relevant to the case in question; (2) the information cannot be reasonably obtained by alternative means; and (3) the information is necessary to the proper preparation or presentation of the case of the party seeking the information.
The same test applies in criminal and civil cases. As a practical matter, however, courts may be particularly inclined to order disclosure when a criminal defendant seeks information to mount a defense.
The shield law does not protect you at all when you are a party to a lawsuit (for example, when you are suing or being sued, or when you are charged with a crime).
For more detailed information about the Georgia shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: Georgia.
Federal courts in the Eleventh Circuit, which encompasses Georgia, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It applies to the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared during newsgathering.
Unfortunately, courts in the Eleventh Circuit have not had many opportunities to define the scope of the privilege, so it is hard to say whether an amateur or non-traditional journalist could take advantage of it. When it applies, however, the privilege is qualified, meaning that a court must establish three things before ordering disclosure: (a) the information is highly relevant; (b) it is necessary to the proper presentation of the case; and (c) it is unavailable from other sources. Courts applying this test often also tend to weigh the public interest in disclosure of the information against the public interest in promoting a an uninhibited press. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 11th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Illinois has a shield law that may protect your sources and newsgathering materials. Whether the shield law covers you depends on whether the law deems you a "reporter," and on the medium in which you work. If the shield applies to you, it can protect both the identity of your sources and unpublished information collected during newsgathering. The shield law creates a qualified privilege -- in certain circumstances, a court may order you to disclose information even if you are covered by the statute.
Historically, federal courts in the Seventh Circuit, which encompasses Illinois, recognized a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, a recent case casts serious doubt on the continued validity of a federal reporter's privilege in Illinois.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
There is no common law protection for sources or source material in Illinois.
Illinois's shield law, located at 75 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-901 to 8-909, states in relevant part:
Sec. 8‑901. Source of information.
No court may compel any person to disclose the source of any information obtained by a reporter except as provided in [the other provisions of the shield law].
Sec. 8‑902. Definitions.
(a) "Reporter" means any person regularly engaged in the business of collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a news medium on a full‑time or part‑time basis . . . .
(b) "News medium" means any newspaper or other periodical issued at regular intervals whether in print or electronic format and having a general circulation; a news service whether in print or electronic format; a radio station; a television station; a television network; a community antenna television service; and any person or corporation engaged in the making of news reels or other motion picture news for public showing.
(c) "Source" means the person or means from or through which the news or information was obtained.
Sec. 8‑907. Court's findings.
An order [requiring the disclosure of protected information] shall be granted only if the court . . . finds . . . that all other available sources of information have been exhausted and, either, disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the public interest involved or, in libel or slander cases, the plaintiff's need for disclosure of the information sought outweighs the public interest in protecting the confidentiality of sources of information . . . .
To be protected by the Illinois reporter shield, you must meet two conditions: First, you must fit within the law's definition of "reporter." Second, the medium in which you publish must meet the law's definition of a "news medium."
Reporter: The statute defines a "reporter" as "any person regularly engaged in the business of collecting, writing or editing news for publication through a news medium on a full‑time or part‑time basis." The key term here is "regularly," so you may not be covered if your activities are sporadic or occasional. Illinois courts have not ruled on whether the statute covers amateur or hobbyist newsgatherers, but the language of the statute (terms like "business" and "full-time or part-time") indicates that it might not.
News medium: The law defines "news medium" to include electronic media in addition to traditional forms of news publication. However, Illinois courts have not had the opportunity to clarify the definition of "news medium" as it applies to non-traditional journalists and other online publishers, and several questions remain unanswered. For example, the definition includes electronic periodicals and electronic news services, but it is unclear whether a blog or message board would fit into those categories. Additionally, the definition includes people making "news reels and other motion picture news," but it is hard to say whether this includes documentary films, video-blogs, and other forms of online video production. It is also unclear whether the definition includes internet radio, internet television, and podcasts.
Illinois's shield law protects the "sources" of information. The law defines a "source" as "the person or means from or through which the news or information was obtained." The law applies to both human sources and documentary sources, including information obtained in the newsgathering process, whether confidential or non-confidential (i.e., information not obtained in return for a promise of confidentiality). In People v. Slover, 753 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), an Illinois court held that a reporter's unpublished photograph depicting police performing a search was a protected "source" within the meaning of the statute. You do not need to promise a human source confidentiality in order to take advantage of the shield's protection.
The Illinois shield law provides a qualified privilege, which means that a court may force you to reveal information in some circumstances. In order to compel disclosure of information that otherwise would be protected by the shield, a court or other legal body must find that "all other available sources of information have been exhausted" and that "disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the public interest involved." The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
This standard applies in both civil and criminal cases, although a slightly different standard applies in civil defamation actions. As a practical matter, courts may be particularly inclined to order disclosure when the person trying to protect information is a party to the lawsuit in question, or when a criminal defendant seeks information to mount a defense. One Illinois court has held that the shield does not apply to non-confidential information sought by a criminal defendant.
For more detailed information about the Illinois shield law, see the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: Illinois.
Until recently, it appeared that federal courts in the Seventh Circuit, which encompasses Illinois, recognized a qualified privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The courts recognizing this privilege applied it to both the identity of confidential sources and unpublished information (whether confidential or nonconfidential) collected during newsgathering. Before ordering disclosure of covered information, the courts applied a balancing test considering the media's interests in protecting the information, the relevance of the material sought, and whether the source was confidential.
A significant recent case, McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003), casts serious doubt on the continued validity of the reporter's privilege in the Seventh Circuit. Unfortunately, the decision was written in an enigmatic style that makes it difficult to know for sure whether future attempts to invoke the federal reporter's privilege are foreclosed in Illinois.
For additional information on the federal reporter's privilege in the Seventh Circuit before the McKevitt case, see the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 7th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Indiana has a shield law that may protect you from having to reveal the identity of your sources. However, the scope of the shield law is quite narrow: it applies only to sources, not documents and information collected during newsgathering, and it appears to cover only a small class of professional journalists working in traditional media. If the shield law applies to you, it provides an absolute privilege -- a court may not legally order you to reveal the identity of your source(s).
The Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Indiana Constitution creates a reporter's privilege when a reporter is subpoenaed for information in a criminal case. A previous Indiana case had ruled that a qualified "reporter's privilege" applied in civil cases, but the continued validity of this case is now in question.
Historically, federal courts in the Seventh Circuit, which encompasses Indiana, recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, a recent case casts serious doubt on the continued validity of a federal reporter's privilege in Indiana.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Indiana does not recognize any common law privilege for newsgatherers.
Indiana's shield law, located at Ind. Code § 34-46-1, -2, states:
The Indiana shield law only covers employees and owners of newspapers, periodicals, recognized press associations, and wire services, and owners, officials, and employees of licensed radio and television stations. The statute imposes an additional requirement that the person invoking the shield receive income in connection with his or her news-related activities. These limitations appear to exclude from the shield's coverage amateur journalists and professional journalists working in media others than the traditional forms listed in the statute. That said, the CMLP is not aware of any Indiana cases interpreting this language in an online context, and it is possible that a court could construe this language to include websites and other online platforms for publishing information and commentary. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App.4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (interpreting similar statutory language in California shield law as covering online news website). For audio and video content creators, the statutory language limiting protection to an employee, official, or owner of "a licensed radio or television station" may constitute a significant barrier to coverage. The "income" requirement would create a significant barrier for all kinds of amateur journalists and other online publishers who do not make money from their activities.
Indiana's shield law protects only the identity of a source. This protection applies whether information from the source is published or unpublished. The law is not clear on whether you must promise confidentiality to a source in order to obtain the protection of the shield law.
When the shield law covers you, its protection is absolute. In such a situation, a court or other legal body cannot force you to reveal the identity of your source. The shield applies equally in both civil and criminal cases, and at least one Indiana court has applied the shield when the person invoking the shield was a party to the lawsuit. See Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. App. 1984) (applying the shield to a reporter sued for libel).
For more detailed information about the Indiana shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: Indiana.
Indiana's shield law is not the only possible source of protection for your sources and newsgathering material. Courts in some states have interpreted the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and similar clauses in their state constitutions as creating a qualified privilege for reporters. The Indiana Supreme Court has ruled, however, that neither the U.S. Constitution nor the Indiana Constitution creates a reporter's privilege when a reporter is subpoenaed for information in a criminal case. In re WTHR-TV, 693 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1998). A previous Indiana case had ruled that a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution applied in a civil case when unpublished source material was sought from a non-party reporter. In re Stearns, 489 N.E.2d 146, 149-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). The court held that the person seeking source material had to establish three elements in order to overcome the privilege:
In light of the WTHR-TV case, however, the continued validity of the Stearns case, and the continued existence of a federal reporter's privilege in Indiana state courts, is in doubt. Therefore, at least in Indiana state court, you may not want to put much reliance on a constitutional reporter's privilege for sources or source material.
Until recently, it appeared that federal courts in the Seventh Circuit, which encompasses Indiana, recognized a qualified privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The courts recognizing this privilege applied it to both the identity of confidential sources and unpublished information (whether confidential or non-confidential) collected or prepared during newsgathering. Before ordering disclosure of covered information, the courts applied a balancing test considering the media's interests in protecting the information, the relevance of the material sought, and whether the source was confidential.
A significant recent case, McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003), casts serious doubt on the continued validity of the federal reporter's privilege in the Seventh Circuit. Unfortunately, the decision was written in an enigmatic style that makes it difficult to know for sure whether future attempts to invoke the federal reporter's privilege are foreclosed in Illinois. Therefore, you cannot rely on their being a constitutional reporter's privilege for your sources or source material in Indiana federal courts.
For additional information on the federal reporter's privilege in the Seventh Circuit before the McKevitt case, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 7th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
For additional information about engaging in journalism in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, please see our printable PDF guide Newsgathering in Massachusetts, co-produced with the Harvard Law School Cyberlaw Clinic.
Massachusetts does not have a shield law. The state legislature recently considered enacting a shield law, but failed to do so.
You may be able to protect your sources and unpublished information obtained in the course of newsgathering under Massachusetts "common law." "Common law" is judge-made law. Because common law is developed on a case-by-case basis by courts, rather than through legislative pronouncement of general rules, it often suffers from gaps, ambiguities, and uncertainties. This is the case with Massachusetts's common law privilege for reporters, which is not well defined.
In addition, federal courts in the First Circuit, which encompasses Massachusetts, recognize a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that protects the identity of sources and (potentially) unpublished information collected or prepared during newsgathering. However, the scope of this privilege is uncertain, and its protection depends on the circumstances of your particular case. Massachusetts state courts do not recognize any protections for reporters based on the U.S. Constitution or the Massachusetts Constitution.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Massachusetts courts recognize a common law privilege for reporters. It applies to sources and unpublished information. Its exact character and scope are uncertain, as is its application to online publishing and non-traditional journalism.
Massachusetts courts have not defined who exactly is covered by the common law reporter's privilege. However, a federal court interpreting Massachusetts law held that an investment analyst who wrote a report for his job was covered by the common law privilege for reporters even though he was not a part of the "organized press." Summit Technology, Inc. v. Healthcare Capital Group, Inc., 141 F.R.D. 381, 384 (D. Mass. 1992). However, this decision has no weight as precedent (i.e., it is not legally binding) in Massachusetts state courts. That means that future courts that reach the same issue could rule differently. Moreover, it is unclear how this case would apply in other cases, such as when the person seeking to protect information is an amateur or hobbyist. Nevertheless, it provides support for the argument that people outside the traditional news media are covered by the Massachusetts common law privilege as long as they are gathering information with an intent to disseminate it to the public.
The common law privilege protects unpublished information gathered or prepared in the course of newsgathering and the identity of sources. The law gives more protection to confidential information (i.e., information received in exchange for a promise of confidentiality) than non-confidential information.
The common law privilege is qualified, meaning that courts sometimes will order you to disclose information, even if you and your information qualify for protection. Courts in Massachusetts do not apply any set formula in determining whether information should be disclosed or not. Instead, they balance the "interests" of the newsgatherer and the party who wants the information. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
The same test applies in criminal and civil cases and whether or not you are a party to the lawsuit. As a practical matter, however, courts may be particularly inclined to order disclosure when you are a party to the lawsuit in question or when a criminal defendant seeks information to mount a defense. The protection is especially weak if someone sues you for defamation; however, a court might find that you are not required to reveal your sources if the plaintiff cannot "demonstrate an essential relationship between the identities of the sources and the plaintiffs' ability to establish an element of their claim." Wojcik v. Boston Herald, Inc., 60 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 517 n.17 (2004).
For more detailed information about Massachusetts's common law privilege, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: Massachusetts.
Federal courts in the First Circuit, which encompasses Massachusetts, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It applies to the identity of sources and (potentially) to unpublished information collected or prepared during newsgathering.
In interpreting the only Supreme Court case addressing reporter’s privilege, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has recognized some room for balancing First Amendment interests with countervailing governmental interests in reporters’ disclosure of sources. The majority opinion in Branzburg held that the First Amendment does not provide a reporter with a privilege from testifying before a grand jury about information obtained and events witnessed in the course of researching a story. However, Justice Powell’s fifth-vote concurring opinion is often considered controlling, establishing a qualified privilege subject to a balancing test “between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony.” The First Circuit has held that “[t]he Branzburg analysis, especially as to the strength of the governmental and public interest in not impeding criminal investigations, guides our outcome,” implicitly adopting some form of Justice Powell’s balancing. In re Dolours Price, 685 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1796 (U.S. 2013).
Federal courts in the First Circuit have extended the reporter's privilege to people other than traditional journalists, including research analysts and academics. In an important case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
[T]he medium an individual uses to provide his investigative reporting to the public does not make a dispositive difference in the degree of protection accorded to his work. . . . [T]he courts will make a measure of protection available to him as long as he intended "at the inception of the newsgathering process" to use the fruits of his research "to disseminate information to the public."
Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998). The court's statement indicates that the key factor in determining coverage is whether the person seeking protection collects information with the intent to spread it to the public. Many online publishers and non-traditional journalists could fit into this category.
The reporter's privilege protects the identity of your sources, as well as information that might lead to the identification of sources. You do not have to promise confidentiality to be covered by the privilege, but courts give greater protection when the source is confidential. In some circumstances, the reporter's privilege may also protect unpublished information obtained or prepared in the course of newsgathering.
The federal reporter's privilege is qualified. That means that, even if you are protected by the privilege, a court or other legal body may order disclosure of the information in question upon a sufficient showing of need by the party seeking the information. As part of this protection, a court may require the party seeking information from a reporter to try to get the information elsewhere first.
The reporter's privilege applies in both civil and criminal cases, but the privilege is weaker in criminal cases. In a decision dealing with government subpoenas directed at an oral history research project at Boston College (the "Belfast Project") in aid of a criminal investigation in the United Kingdom, the First Circuit interpreted Branzburg as holding that “the fact that disclosure of the materials sought by a subpoena in criminal proceedings would result in the breaking of a promise of confidentiality by reporters is not by itself a legally cognizable First Amendment or common law injury.” In re Dolours Price, F.3d at 16. In a subsequent decision in the same case, U.S. v. Trustees of Boston College, 12-1236, 2013 WL 2364165 (1st Cir. May 31, 2013), the First Circuit held that the Supreme Court's balancing of interests in Branzburg allowed the government to obtain production of materials relevant to the UK criminal investigation notwithstanding concerns about source confidentiality, while allowing judges to deny access to materials not deemed relevant. The First Circuit further held that Branzburg allowed for a different balancing of interests in civil cases and other situations factually distinct from the criminal investigation in Branzburg, including allowing a court to require the government to demonstrate a higher degree of "direct relevance" to obtain materials that would disclose source identities.
It is also available when you are a party to the lawsuit in question (i.e., you are suing someone or being sued), but the privilege is also weaker in these circumstances, and successful assertion of the privilege may make it difficult for you to make out your case.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 1st Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Michigan has two shield law statutes that may protect your sources and source material, but only in limited circumstances. The Michigan shield laws apply only when you receive a subpoena as part of a grand jury proceeding or as part of a criminal investigation. But they offer you no protection in civil cases (whether you are a party to the case or not), or when a criminal defendant seeks information from you.
Federal courts in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompasses Michigan, recognize a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, the scope of this privilege is uncertain because courts in the Sixth Circuit have only addressed the reporter's privilege in two cases.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Michigan's two shield laws apply when prosecutors seek information in criminal cases. The first shield law applies to grand jury proceedings. Grand jury proceedings occur when a prosecutor decides to charge someone with a crime. The prosecutor must ask the grand jury to indict the accused person before the person can be tried for the crime. In other words, grand juries decide preliminarily whether there is sufficient evidence for government to try the accused person. As part of this process, government prosecutors sometimes issue subpoenas to third parties (i.e., people not involved in the criminal case) who might have relevant information, including the press. The grand jury shield provides protection against these subpoenas.
The second Michigan shield law applies to subpoenas issued by prosecutors as part of a criminal investigation. The prosecutorial investigation shield may give you protection if you receive such a subpoena.
Michigan's shield laws do not apply when a criminal defendant seek information from you. They also do not apply in civil cases.
Michigan's grand jury shield can be found at MCL 767.5a. The state's prosecutorial investigation shield law can be found at MCL 767A.6(6).
Both laws cover "a reporter or other person who is involved in the gathering or preparation of news for broadcast or publication." Both laws protect "the identity of an informant, any unpublished information obtained from an informant, or any unpublished matter or documentation, in whatever manner recorded, relating to a communication with an informant."
The grand jury shield has this exception: it does not apply in "an inquiry for a crime punishable by imprisonment for life when it has been established that the information which is sought is essential to the purpose of the proceeding and that other available sources of the information have been exhausted."
The prosecutorial investigation shield has two exceptions: it does not cover published information, and it does not cover situations in which the newsgatherer is the subject of the investigation.
Both shield laws protect "a reporter or other person who is involved in the gathering or preparation of news for broadcast or publication." The shields appear to cover anyone who is involved in spreading "news" to the public, which should cover many online publishers and non-traditional journalists. However, Michigan courts have not had a chance to address the meaning of this statutory language and have not defined "news."
The second shield law, which covers investigations by prosecutors, excludes from coverage those who are the subject of a criminal investigation. Therefore, if you are the subject of a criminal investigation, you cannot rely on the prosecutorial investigation shield to refuse to disclose information.
Both shield laws protect three things. First, they protect the identity of "informants." Second, they protect any other unpublished information you have obtained from an "informant." Third, they protect any notes, recordings, and similar materials made in connection with your communications with an "informant." The shield laws do not define the term "informant," but it probably applies what is commonly called a "source." They do not distinguish between confidential and non-confidential information, as long as it is not published.
Remember, the shield laws only apply to investigations by prosecutors and grand jury proceedings. They do not protect you from inquiries by criminal defendants or parties in civil cases.
When the shields apply, they are, with one exception, "absolute." That means that if you and your information are protected by the shield, courts may never order you to reveal it.
The one exception is that the grand jury shield does not cover "an inquiry for a crime punishable by imprisonment for life when it has been established that the information which is sought is essential to the purpose of the proceeding and that other available sources of the information have been exhausted." In other words, to obtain your information in a grand jury proceeding, a prosecutor must show all of the following:
Note also that the prosecutorial investigation shield does not protect you when you are the subject of a criminal investigation.
For more detailed information about the Michigan shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: Michigan.
Federal courts in the Sixth Circuit, which encompasses Michigan, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. To date, courts have applied it to the identity of confidential sources only.
The scope of the federal reporter's privilege is uncertain in federal court in Michigan. Some lower federal courts in the Sixth Circuit have applied the privilege to individuals outside the traditional press, such as writers of a non-profit organization's newsletter and a freelance writer. These cases do not have weight as precedent, so it is uncertain whether other courts would follow them.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the reporter's privilege protects the identity of confidential sources. The Court of Appeals and lower courts have not yet decided whether the privilege protects other information or non-confidential sources.
The federal reporter's privilege is qualified. That means that, even if you are protected by the privilege, a court or other legal body may order disclosure of the information in question upon a strong showing of need by the party seeking the information.
Federal courts in the Sixth Circuit have not determined whether the reporter's privilege applies in cases where a criminal defendant or prosecutor in a criminal case is seeking information from a reporter. It does not apply when a grand jury issues a subpoena requesting information.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 6th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
New Jersey has a shield law that may protect your sources and newsgathering materials. When information is sought in connection with a civil case, the shield law provides "absolute" protection, meaning that it cannot be overcome. When information is sought in connection with a criminal case, the shield law provides a qualified privilege, meaning that a court sometimes may order you to disclose information even if you are covered by the statute.
In addition, federal courts in the Third Circuit, which encompasses New Jersey, recognize a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the common law. This privilege protects the identity of sources and unpublished information obtained or prepared in the newsgathering process, such as notes and outtakes. The strength of the privilege's protection depends on the circumstances of your particular case. New Jersey state courts do not recognize any protections for reporters based on the U.S. Constitution, the New Jersey Constitution, or the common law.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
New Jersey's shield law, located at N.J. Stat. §§ 2A:84A-21 to 21.8, states in relevant part:
N.J. Stat. § 2A:84A-21
[A] person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or employed by news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing or disseminating news for the general public or on whose behalf news is so gathered, procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or disseminated has a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any legal or quasilegal proceeding or before any investigative body, including, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury, administrative agency, the Legislature or legislative committee, or elsewhere
a. The source, author, means, agency or person from or through whom any information was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, gathered, transmitted, compiled, edited, disseminated, or delivered; and
b. Any news or information obtained in the course of pursuing his professional activities whether or not it is disseminated.
N.J. Stat. § 2A:84A-21a
a. "News media" means newspapers, magazines, press associations, news agencies, wire services, radio, television or other similar printed, photographic, mechanical or electronic means of disseminating news to the general public.
b. "News" means any written, oral or pictorial information gathered, procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or disseminated by, or on behalf of any person engaged in, engaged on, connected with or employed by a news media and so procured or obtained while suchrequired relationship is in effect.
. . .
h. "In the course of pursuing his professional activities" means any situation, including a social gathering, in which a reporter obtains information for the purpose of disseminating it to the public, but does not include any situation in which a reporter intentionally conceals from the source the fact that he is a reporter, and does not include any situation in which a reporter is an eyewitness to, or participant in, any act involving physical violence or property damage.
New Jersey's shield law uses a complicated series of definitions to describe who the law protects. Despite the complexity, a reasonable reading suggests that the law will protect most people who bring news to the public regularly, including amateur and non-traditional journalists publishing through online media.
First, to be covered, you must be a "person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or employed by news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing or disseminating news for the general public or on whose behalf news is so gathered. . . ." You may perform a variety of different roles. You need not be a writer -- any role in "gathering, producing, transmitting, compiling, editing, or disseminating" is sufficient for protection. You need not be a paid employee of a news source to be covered. However, you must somehow be "connected with" the "news media." Therefore, whether you are protected hinges on what "news media" means. That definition is discussed below.
What does "news media" mean? The law defines it to mean "newspapers, magazines, press associations, news agencies, wire services, radio, television or other similar printed, photographic, mechanical or electronic means of disseminating news to the general public." Importantly, "news media" is not limited to the institutional press or "mainstream media" -- as long as you have the requisite relationship with one of the mediums it lists, you are covered. The definition of "news media" encompasses a wide variety of media. Since it covers electronic sources that are similar to the traditional sources it lists, it should cover periodicals online, Web radio, regular podcasts, and the like. It may cover blogs, since they are analogous to electronic newspapers or magazines. However, the law may not cover electronic media that are not analogous to the traditional sources listed, such as bulletin boards and non-updated Web pages. Future cases will hopefully clarify the shield law's application to online publishing and non-traditional journalism.
New Jersey's shield law protects both the identity of your sources and unpublished information you gather in the process of obtaining news.
Identity of sources
The shield law protects not only the identity of a source, but also any information that would lead to identification. You do not have to promise a source confidentiality in order to protect his/her identity under the shield. Publishing some information provided by a source does not eliminate the law's protection of the source's identity.
Unpublished information
The shield law protects, with certain exceptions, information gathered for purposes of dissemination to the public. Publishing a story only eliminates protection for the information that is actually published. The shield law excludes from coverage your first-hand eyewitness accounts or your participation in physical violence or property damage.
The law protects information collected "in the course of pursuing [your] professional activities." The phrase "in the course of pursuing...professional activities" might seem to limit the law's protection to professional employees, but the law defines it considerably more broadly. It means "any situation, including a social gathering, in which a reporter obtains information for the purpose of disseminating it to the public." Thus, as mentioned above, the key is whether you obtain information for the purpose of disseminating it to the public.
The strength of the shield depends on the type of case:
Civil: When information is sought in connection with a civil case, the shield is "absolute." If a party in a civil case issues a subpoena demanding the identity of your source or unpublished information, you cannot be held in contempt for refusing to reveal that information. The absolute protection applies when you are a party to a civil case (e.g., you are suing or being sued), but asserting it could make it more difficult to make out your case.
Criminal When information is sought in connection with a criminal case, the shield is qualified -- courts sometimes may order you to disclose information even if you and the information are protected by the shield. Prosecutors generally cannot overcome the shield -- if a prosecutor seeks protected information from you, you ordinarily will not be forced to reveal information if you are covered by the shield law (above). On the other hand, criminal defendants can overcome the shield, if they can prove the following things to the court:
For more detailed information about the New Jersey shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: New Jersey.
Federal courts in the Third Circuit, which encompasses New Jersey, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the common law. It applies to the identity of sources, information that would lead to a source's identification, and unpublished materials collected or prepared during newsgathering.
Who is Covered?
To obtain the protection of the reporter's privilege, you must demonstrate that
Many online publishers and non-traditional journalists should be able to establish these three requirements. The "investigative reporting" requirement might present an obstacle for some, but in that case you wouldn't have any documents or sources to protect. It is hard to imagine a situation where you would have gathered sources and other information that would not fit the term "investigative reporting."
What Information is Protected?
Federal courts in the Third Circuit apply the reporter's privilege to the identity of sources, information leading to identification of a source, and unpublished information collected or prepared during newsgathering. While the source or information need not be confidential in order to receive protection, the qualified privilege is stronger when confidential information is at stake.
How Strong is the Protection?
The reporter's privilege is qualified, which means that courts may order you to disclose information if the requesting person's need for the information outweighs the policies favoring a privilege. To determine whether ordering disclosure is appropriate in a given situation, the courts apply a balancing test considering the media's interests in protecting the information, the relevance of the material sought, and whether the source was confidential. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
The courts are more inclined to order you to reveal information when it is sought in connection with a criminal case rather than in a civil case. They also are more likely to order you to reveal information when you are a party to the case in question.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 3rd Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
New York has a shield law that may protect your sources and newsgathering materials. If you qualify for its protection, you must be careful not to disclose information you obtain to people who do not work for the same organization as you, or you may lose the shield's protection.
New York state courts recognize a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the U.S. Constitution and the New York Constitution. The precise scope of these protections is uncertain. New York state courts do not recognize any common law privilege for newsgatherers.
Federal courts in the 2nd Circuit Court, which encompasses New York, recognize a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the common law. The level of protection depends on whether you obtained the information in question in exchange for a promise of confidentiality.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
New York's shield law is located at N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79-h. Because of the statute's complexity, we won't reproduce it here. Instead, we will explain its important aspects below.
New York's shield law covers only specific categories of people. In general, you must earn money in connection with work for a traditional news organization in order to be protected. Specifically, you must meet three conditions: (1) you must have the right kind of job; (2) you must work with what the law defines as "news"; and (3) you must work in one of the media listed by the statute. Meeting all three of these conditions likely will present a serious obstacle for many amateur and non-traditional journalists and other online publishers.
Each condition is detailed below.
Type of Job
To qualify for protection, you must either be a "professional journalist" or a "newscaster." You must earn money in your role to qualify for either.
The law defines "professional journalist" to mean:
one who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, collecting, writing, editing, filming, taping or photographing of news intended for a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association or wire service or other professional medium or agency which has as one of its regular functions the processing and researching of news intended for dissemination to the public; such person shall be someone performing said function either as a regular employee or as one otherwise professionally affiliated for gain or livelihood with such medium of communication.
In essence, you must be an employee or freelance worker performing a newsgathering or editing role for a professional medium of communication.
The law defines "newscaster" to mean someone who "for gain or livelihood, is engaged in analyzing, commenting on or broadcasting, news by radio or television transmission." In other words, you must earn money as a television or radio reporter.
News
To qualify for protection, you must work with "news." The law defines "news" to mean "written, oral, pictorial, photographic, or electronically recorded information or communication concerning local, national or worldwide events or other matters of public concern or public interest or affecting the public welfare." Some information, such as a profile of a person of no particular importance who has not been involved in a significant event of public importance, might not be included in this definition.
Medium
To be protected, you must work in one the media listed below:
The New York shield law protects the identity of sources and information collected in the course of newsgathering. You do not need to have spoken with the source or obtained the information in confidence to obtain protection, but the level of protection is higher if you did.
Disclosure of information has significant negative consequences for protection under the shield law. The impact depends on who discloses the information:
New York's shield law has two tiers of protection.
Tier One: If you promised your source confidentiality or obtained information in return for a promise of confidentiality, then the shield is absolute. In other words, courts may not order you to reveal it under any circumstances. The absolute protection applies equally whether the information is sought in a civil or criminal case. It applies even if you are a party to the case in which information is sought (e.g., you are suing or being sued).
Tier Two: If the information is not confidential, then the shield is qualified, which means that sometimes a court may order you to reveal the information. In order to order disclosure, courts must find all three of the following factors to be true:
These tests apply when information is sought in a civil case, in a criminal case, and when you are a party. As a practical matter, however, courts are more inclined to order you to reveal information if you are a party to the case. Courts also are more likely to order disclosure when the the party seeking the information is a criminal defendant.
For more detailed information about the New York shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: New York.
Even if the shield law does not apply to you, you may be able to protect your newsgathering information based on other legal protections. New York state courts recognize a qualified reporter's privilege based on the U.S. Constitution and the New York Constitution. It covers both confidential and non-confidential information. Beyond that, the exact scope of the protection is uncertain.
For additional details, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: New York.
Federal courts in the Second Circuit, which encompasses New York, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the common law. It applies to the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared during newsgathering.
Exactly who is covered by the reporter's privilege is unclear. Some cases suggest, however, that you do not need to receive payment for your work or be affiliated with a mainstream news publication.
The reporter's privilege extends to the identity of sources and unpublished information obtained or prepared during newsgathering. It protects both confidential and non-confidential information, but confidential information gets more protection (below). If you witness a crime, the privilege does not protect your observations.
There are two tiers of protection, depending on whether the information is confidential or not. Both levels of protection are qualified, meaning that a court may order you to reveal information under some circumstances.
Tier One: If you obtained the information in confidence (i.e., in exchange for a promise of confidentiality), then it gets more protection. A court can order you to disclose the information only if it finds that each of the following is true:
Tier Two: If you did not obtain the information in confidence, then it gets less protection. A court can order you to reveal non-confidential information if it find that each of the following is true:
These tests apply when the information is sought in a civil case, in a a criminal case, and when you are a party. As a practical matter, however, courts are more inclined to order you to reveal information if you are a party to the case, and the protection is especially weak if someone sues you for defamation. In addition, courts are more likely to order you to disclose information if a criminal defendant is seeking the information in order to mount a defense.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 2nd Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
North Carolina has a shield statute that may protect your sources and newsgathering materials. It protects both the identity of your sources and unpublished information collecting during newsgathering. The shield law provides only qualified protection, meaning that a court can order you to reveal information under certain circumstances, even if you qualify for the shield law's protection. North Carolina state courts do not recognize a state constitutional or common law privilege for reporters.
Federal courts in the Fourth Circuit, which encompasses North Carolina, recognize a qualified privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, the scope of this privilege is uncertain.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
North Carolina's shield law, located at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8‑53.11, states:
(a) Definitions. – The following definitions apply in this section:
(1) Journalist. – Any person, company, or entity, or the employees, independent contractors, or agents of that person, company, or entity, engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, writing, editing, photographing, recording, or processing information for dissemination via any news medium.
(2) Legal proceeding. – Any grand jury proceeding or grand jury investigation; any criminal prosecution, civil suit, or related proceeding in any court; and any judicial or quasi‑judicial proceeding before any administrative, legislative, or regulatory board, agency, or tribunal.
(3) News medium. – Any entity regularly engaged in the business of publication or distribution of news via print, broadcast, or other electronic means accessible to the general public.
(b) A journalist has a qualified privilege against disclosure in any legal proceeding of any confidential or nonconfidential information, document, or item obtained or prepared while acting as a journalist.
(c) In order to overcome the qualified privilege provided by subsection (b) of this section, any person seeking to compel a journalist to testify or produce information must establish by the greater weight of the evidence that the testimony or production sought:
(1) Is relevant and material to the proper administration of the legal proceeding for which the testimony or production is sought;
(2) Cannot be obtained from alternate sources; and
(3) Is essential to the maintenance of a claim or defense of the person on whose behalf the testimony or production is sought. Any order to compel any testimony or production as to which the qualified privilege has been asserted shall be issued only after notice to the journalist and a hearing and shall include clear and specific findings as to the showing made by the person seeking the testimony or production.
(d) Notwithstanding subsections (b) and (c) of this section, a journalist has no privilege against disclosure of any information, document, or item obtained as the result of the journalist's eyewitness observations of criminal or tortious conduct, including any physical evidence or visual or audio recording of the observed conduct.
North Carolina's shield law generally covers anyone who is involved with news on behalf of a medium that regularly provides news to the public. The key limitation is that your medium must be "regularly engaged in the business of publication or distribution of news." If you post information on a bulletin board that does not regularly distribute news, or on a static and unchanging website, you probably will not be protected. Moreover, to be protected, your medium must be "accessible to the general public."
To be covered, your involvement with news can be in the role of "gathering, compiling, writing, editing, photographing, recording, or processing information." This phrase seems to encompass most news-related roles. Your medium can be "print, broadcast, or other electronic means" -- essentially, any medium.
North Carolina's shield law protects, with an exception, any "confidential or nonconfidential information, document, or item" you obtain while acting in your role as a newsgatherer. The only exception is that the shield does not protect your eyewitness observations of any crimes or torts. The exception also includes any physical evidence and any recordings you make of a crime or tort.
The shield law provides qualified protection, meaning that a court can order you to reveal covered information under some circumstances. In order for a court in North Carolina to order disclosure of information that otherwise would be protected by the shield, the court must find all three of the following to be true:
North Carolina's shield applies equally in civil and criminal cases. As a practical matter, however, courts may be particularly inclined to order disclosure when a criminal defendant seeks information to mount a defense, or when you are a party to the case.
For more detailed information about the North Carolina shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: North Carolina.
Federal courts in the Fourth Circuit, which encompasses North Carolina, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The precise scope of the privilege is unclear.
Who is protected?
Federal courts in the Fourth Circuit have not expressly defined who is a "reporter" for purposes of the privilege, although they have applied the privilege to reporters and editors in traditional forms of media, including small and large newspapers. The CMLP is not aware of any Fourth Circuit cases applying the privilege in an online context. Therefore, whether amateur and non-traditional journalists publishing online can take advantage of the privilege is an open question.
What information is protected?
The Fourth Circuit has not defined with precision what information is protected by its privilege. As a general matter, it appears to cover the identity of sources and unpublished information, both confidential and non-confidential, but the privilege is stronger with regard to confidential information.
How strong is the privilege?
The reporter's privilege is qualified, which means that a court may order you to reveal information covered by the privilege if the requesting party's need for it outweighs the policies favoring a privilege. In civil cases, in order to order disclosure, a court must find each of the following to be true:
In criminal cases, the shield may only apply with regard to confidential information. As a practical matter, the courts are more inclined to order you to reveal information when it is sought in connection with a criminal case rather than in a civil case. They also are more likely to order you to reveal information when you are a party to the case in question.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 4th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Ohio has a shield law that may protect you from having to reveal the identity of your sources. However, the shield law only appears to cover those working for newspapers, press associations, and traditional radio and television broadcast stations. Ohio state courts do not recognize a "reporter's privilege" based on the U.S. Constitution or the Ohio Constitution. Nor do they recognize a common law privilege for reporters.
Federal courts in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which encompasses Ohio, recognize a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. However, the scope of this privilege is uncertain because courts in the Sixth Circuit have only addressed the reporter's privilege in two cases.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Ohio's shield law is made up of two provisions -- Ohio Rev. Code § 2739.04 (broadcast) and Ohio Rev. Code § 2739.12 (newspapers).
Ohio's shield law applies to
The shield law provisions also specify that the person seeking to protect the identity of a source must have obtained information from the source "in the course of . . . employment."
The statutory language is broad enough to cover owners, employees, and freelancers working for newspapers, press associations, and broadcasting stations in any news-related capacity, but does not appear to cover individuals working in other media. One federal court applying Ohio law found that Dunn Bradstreet, a provider of business information, could not take advantage of the shield because it did not fit into the category of "newspaper or . . . press association." Deltec, Inc. v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 187 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ohio 1960). The CMLP is not aware of any cases interpreting this statutory language in an online or non-traditional journalism context. A court could give this language an expansive interpretation, but, for now at least, online publishers should not expect to be covered by the Ohio shield law.
The Ohio shield law protects the identity of sources only. It does not protect any other information obtained during the newsgathering process. The identity of your source need not be confidential for you to be protected by the shield.
Ohio's shield law provides absolute protection in most cases. This means that, if you are covered by the shield law, a court generally cannot order you to reveal the identity of a source regardless of the need of the party requesting it. The protection may be weaker when a criminal defendant seeks information from you, because courts must protect the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial (including, the ability to mount a defense). In addition, some Ohoi courts have denied protection altogether when the person invoking the shield was a defendant in a libel case.
For more detailed information about the Ohio shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: Ohio.
Federal courts in the Sixth Circuit, which encompasses Ohio, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. To date, courts have applied it to the identity of confidential sources only.
The scope of the federal reporter's privilege is uncertain in federal court in Ohio. Some lower federal courts in the Sixth Circuit have applied the privilege to individuals outside the traditional press, such as writers of a non-profit organization's newsletter and a freelance writer. These cases do not have weight as precedent, so it is uncertain whether other courts would follow them.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the reporter's privilege protects the identity of confidential sources. The Court of Appeals and lower courts have not yet decided whether the privilege protects other information or non-confidential sources.
The federal reporter's privilege is qualified. That means that, even if you are protected by the privilege, a court or other legal body may order disclosure of the information in question upon a strong showing of need by the party seeking the information.
Federal courts in the Sixth Circuit have not determined whether the reporter's privilege applies in cases where a criminal defendant or prosecutor in a criminal case is seeking information from a reporter. It does not apply when a grand jury issues a subpoena requesting information.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 6th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Pennsylvania has a shield law that may protect the identity of your confidential sources. It applies to confidential sources and information that would lead to the identity of a confidential source. If the shield applies to you, its protection is absolute, meaning that a court may not order you to disclose the covered information regardless of need of the party seeking it and the competing interests at stake. However, the shield law may only cover individuals working in the traditional news media.
Federal and state courts in Pennsylvania recognize a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It applies to the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared during newsgathering, whether or not the information is confidential. The privilege is qualified, meaning the party seeking information can overcome the privilege upon a sufficient showing of need.
In addition, the Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Pennsylvania courts do not recognize any common law privilege for journalists.
Pennsylvania's shield law, located at 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5942 (scroll down to find § 5942), states in relevant part:
(a) General rule.--No person engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general circulation or any press association or any radio or television station, or any magazine of general circulation, for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing news, shall be required to disclose the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any government unit.
The Pennsylvania shield law applies to individuals working in a news-related capacity ("gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing") for a "any newspaper of general circulation or any press association or any radio or television station, or any magazine of general circulation." The law only applies to those working for a radio or television stations if they keep transcripts or exact recordings of their broadcasts going back one year.
The language of the statute suggests that it covers only those working in traditional media. That said, the CMLP is not aware of any Pennsylvania cases interpreting the language of the statute in an online context, and it is possible that a court could construe this language to include websites and other online platforms for publishing information and commentary. See, e.g., O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App.4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (interpreting similar statutory language in California shield law as covering online news website). One could argue that the listed media should encompass online analogs like news websites, e-zines, web radio, podcasts, and videocasts. The transcript requirement might apply to online analogs of radio and television.
There is no requirement that you earn money from your news-related activities in order to enjoy the protection of the shield law.
Pennsylvania's shield law protects the identity of confidential sources and information that might reasonably lead to the discovery of a confidential source's identity. It does not protect other unpublished information collected or prepared in the newsgathering process, such as notes and outtakes that would not reveal the identity of a confidential source.
Pennsylvania's shield is absolute, which means that, if the shield law covers you (above), then a court may not order you to reveal the identity of a confidential source or turn over material that would reveal a confidential source's identity, regardless of the requesting person's need for the information. The law applies equally in criminal and civil cases, and when you are a party to the case in question (e.g., you are suing someone or being sued).
For more detailed information about the Pennsylvania shield law, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: Pennsylvania.
Federal courts in the Third Circuit, which encompasses Pennsylvania, recognize a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Pennsylvania state courts have followed the federal courts in adopting the reporter's privilege and defining its character and scope. The reporter's privilege applies to the identity of sources, information that would lead to a source's identification, and unpublished materials collected or prepared during newsgathering.
Who is Covered?
To obtain the protection of the reporter's privilege, you must demonstrate that
Many online publishers and non-traditional journalists should be able to establish these three requirements. The "investigative reporting" requirement might present an obstacle for some, but in that case you wouldn't have any documents or sources to protect. It is hard to imagine a situation where you would have gathered sources and other information that would not fit the term "investigative reporting."
What Information is Protected?
The reporter's privilege protects the identity of sources, information leading to identification of a source, and unpublished information collected or prepared during newsgathering. While the source or information need not be confidential in order to receive protection, the privilege is stronger when confidential information is at stake.
How Strong is the Protection?
The reporter's privilege is qualified, which means that courts may order you to disclose information if the requesting person's need for the information outweighs the policies favoring a privilege. To determine whether ordering disclosure is appropriate in a given situation, the courts apply a balancing test considering the media's interests in protecting the information, the relevance of the material sought, and whether the source was confidential. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
The courts are more inclined to order you to reveal information when it is sought in connection with a criminal case rather than in a civil case. They also are more likely to order you to reveal information when you are a party to the case in question.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Compendium for the 3rd Circuit and for Pennsylvania.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Texas enacted a reporters' shield law in May 2009 that might protect your sources as well as any information gathered through your reporting. The law provides for a qualified privilege, which means that a court may order you to reveal protected information, even if you qualify as a "journalist" under the shield law. The shield law privilege is strongest when information is sought in civil cases; the law offers less protection when information is sought in criminal cases.
Federal courts in the Fifth Circuit, which encompasses Texas, recognize a reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The reporter's privilege applies to the identity of confidential sources. It is a qualified privilege, meaning that a court may order you to reveal protected information under certain circumstances, even if you qualify as a "reporter" for purposes of the privilege.
In addition, the Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Statutory Text
Texas' shield law states in relevant part:
(2) "Journalist" means a person, including a parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliate of a person, who for a substantial portion of the person's livelihood or for substantial financial gain, gathers, compiles, prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, investigates, processes, or publishes news or information that is disseminated by a news medium or communication service provider . . .
(3) "News medium" means a newspaper, magazine or periodical . . . or Internet company or provider . . . that disseminates news or information to the public by any means, including: . . .
(F) electronic; and
(G) other means, known or unknown, that are accessible to the public. . .
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 22.021
(a) A judicial, legislative, administrative, or other body with the authority to issue a subpoena or other compulsory process may not compel a journalist to testify regarding or to produce or disclose in an official proceeding:
(1) [A]ny confidential or nonconfidential information, document, or item obtained or prepared while acting as a journalist or
(2) [T]he source of any information, document, or item described by Subdivision (1).
(b) A subpoena or other compulsory process may not compel the parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliate of a communication service provider or news medium to disclose the information, documents, or items or the source of any information, documents, or items that are privileged from disclosure under Subsection (a).
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 22.023 . (The shield law provision for criminal cases, which contains much of the language quoted above, is found at Tex. Crim. Proc. Code § 38.11.)
Who is Covered?
Texas' shield law protects journalists, including those who publish content online, but the law might not protect purely amateur reporters.
The statute defines "journalist" relatively broadly. In addition to writers, the statute also covers those who edit, compile, photograph, investigate or publish news or information that is disseminated by a "news medium." A "news medium" includes an "Internet company or provider . . . that disseminates news or information to the public by any means." This suggests that many online publishers might be protected under the statute even if not part of the "mainstream media."
However, one limitation on who is considered a journalist under the statute could leave many web-based reporters unprotected. The statute limits the term "journalist" to one who reports or gathers news "for a substantial portion" of his/her livelihood or for "substantial financial gain." Although the statute does not specify what constitutes substantial financial gain or a substantial portion of one's livelihood, it seems likely that casual bloggers and other amateur publishers who derive little or no income from their work would be excluded.
What Information is Protected?
Texas' shield law protects any confidential or nonconfidential information obtained or prepared while acting as a journalist, as well as the sources of any such information. In addition, publication of any privileged information is not a waiver of the journalist's privilege.
How Strong is the Protection?
Texas' shield law provides a qualified privilege, which means journalists may be compelled to reveal their sources or other information under certain circumstances. The strength of the privilege depends on the nature of the case:
Civil: In a civil case, the party attempting to compel the disclosure can overcome the privilege only by showing all of the following in court:
Criminal: In criminal cases, the privilege does not extend to published information. Journalists may be compelled to disclose or testify regarding unpublished information obtained or created while gathering news, if the person seeking the unpublished information shows that:
Furthermore, journalists can be compelled to reveal their confidential sources if the disclosure is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Disclosure may also be compelled if all other means of obtaining the source's identity have been exhausted and if the source:
Federal courts in the Fifth Circuit, which encompasses Texas, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It applies to the identity of confidential sources and possibly to non-confidential information collected during newsgathering.
The privilege clearly applies to traditional "reporters," like those working full or part-time for a newspaper or television news program, but the law is not clear on whether it applies to amateur and non-traditionalists journalists or others who publish information online. Texas courts have indicated that the privilege applies to freelance writers, but not to freelancers who publish only informally and sporadically.
The reporter's privilege clearly applies to the identity of confidential sources, but whether it protects other non-confidential information is less certain. When information is sought from a reporter in a criminal case, there is no privilege for non-confidential sources (i.e., sources who did not give information in return for a promise of confidentiality) or other non-confidential information collected during newsgathering. In civil cases, the privilege may apply to non-confidential information, but the law is not clear.
The reporter's privilege is qualified, meaning that a court may order you to reveal protected information if it finds that the need to reveal that information outweighs your interest in protecting it. As a practical matter, courts are more inclined to order disclosure when you are a party to the lawsuit in question, or when a criminal defendant seeks information in order to mount a defense.
For more information on the reporter's privilege in the Fifth Circuit, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 5th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Virginia does not have a shield law. Nevertheless, there may be other legal grounds for protecting your sources and source material in Virginia.
Federal and state courts in Virginia recognize a qualified "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It applies to the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared during newsgathering, whether or not the information is confidential. The privilege is qualified, meaning the party seeking information can overcome the privilege upon a sufficient showing of need.
In addition, the Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Virginia courts do not recognize a common law or state constitutional privilege for journalists.
Federal courts in the Fourth Circuit, which encompasses Virginia, have recognized a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Virginia state courts have followed the federal courts in adopting the reporter's privilege. The precise scope of the privilege is unclear.
Who is protected?
The courts have not expressly defined who is a "reporter" for purposes of the privilege, although they have applied the privilege to reporters and editors in traditional forms of media, including small and large newspapers. The CMLP is not aware of any federal or state cases in Virginia applying the privilege in an online context. Therefore, whether amateur and non-traditional journalists publishing online can take advantage of the privilege is an open question.
What information is protected?
The courts have not defined with precision what information is protected by the reporter's privilege. As a general matter, it appears to cover the identity of sources and unpublished information, both confidential and non-confidential, but the privilege is stronger with regard to confidential information.
How strong is the privilege?
The reporter's privilege is qualified, which means that a court may order you to reveal information covered by the privilege if the requesting party's need for it outweighs the policies favoring a privilege. In civil cases, in order to order disclosure, a court must find each of the following to be true:
In criminal cases, the shield may only apply with regard to confidential information. As a practical matter, the courts are more inclined to order you to reveal information when it is sought in connection with a criminal case rather than in a civil case. They also are more likely to order you to reveal information when you are a party to the case in question.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium for the 4th Circuit and for Virginia.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. See the section on Protecting Sources and Source Material for more general information.
Washington state has a shield law that protects the identity of confidential sources and other materials collected or prepared in the newsgathering process, such as notes and outtakes. The state legislature adopted the shield law in 2007, and no courts have applied it yet, so so many of its provisions are open to interpretation. However, some preliminary guidance is possible. First, the law protects anyone who runs or works in a news-related capacity for an "entity" (more below) that regularly provides news to the public, including through any kind of online media. Second, the shield's protection is qualified, meaning that a court may order you to disclose protected information if the information is unavailable elsewhere and there is a compelling public interest in disclosure.
Before the state legislature adopted the new shield law, Washington state courts recognized a common law (i.e., judge-made) privilege for reporters. Typically, when a legislature passes a specific law on a topic, such as a privilege for reporters, courts often say that the new statute takes the place of the common law on that topic and strips it of its force as law. While no court in Washington has said so, it seems unlikely that Washington courts will continue to recognize a common law privilege now that a shield law is in place. For more information on Washington's common law privilege, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: Washington.
Washington state courts do not universally recognize a "reporter's privilege" based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the Washington Constitution. One unpublished appellate court decision, issued prior to the passage of the shield law, hinted that a privilege under the First Amendment might exist. If Washington courts were to recognize a constitutional protection for reporters, that protection would exist in addition to the protections given by the shield law, and it probably would function like the reporter's privilege recognized by the federal courts in Washington.
Federal courts in the Ninth Circuit, which encompasses Washington, recognize a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The reporter's privilege applies to the identity of sources and unpublished information collected or prepared in newsgathering, whether confidential or not (although protection is stronger for confidential information). Because it is qualified, the party seeking information from a reporter may overcome it upon a strong showing of need.
The Privacy Protection Act may protect you against the search and/or seizure, in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution, of materials you possess in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. This federal statutory protection applies regardless of the state in which you live.
Washington's shield law, located at Wash. Rev. Code § 5.68.010, states in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, no judicial, legislative, administrative, or other body with the power to issue a subpoena or other compulsory process may compel the news media to testify, produce, or otherwise disclose:
(a) The identity of a source of any news or information or any information that would tend to identify the source where such source has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality; or
(b) Any news or information obtained or prepared by the news media in its capacity in gathering, receiving, or processing news or information for potential communication to the public, including, but not limited to, any notes, outtakes, photographs, video or sound tapes, film, or other data of whatever sort in any medium now known or hereafter devised. This does not include physical evidence of a crime.
(2) A court may compel disclosure of the news or information described in subsection (1)(b) of this section if the court finds that the party seeking such news or information established by clear and convincing evidence:
(a)(i) In a criminal investigation or prosecution, based on information other than that information being sought, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred; or (ii) In a civil action or proceeding, based on information other than that information being sought, that there is a prima facie cause of action; and
(b) In all matters, whether criminal or civil, that:
(i) The news or information is highly material and relevant;
(ii) The news or information is critical or necessary to the maintenance of a party's claim, defense, or proof of an issue material thereto;
(iii) The party seeking such news or information has exhausted all reasonable and available means to obtain it from alternative sources; and
(iv) There is a compelling public interest in the disclosure. A court may consider whether or not the news or information was obtained from a confidential source in evaluating the public interest in disclosure.
. . .
(5) The term "news media" means:
(a) Any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher, news agency, wire service, radio or television station or network, cable or satellite station or network, or audio or audiovisual production company, or any entity that is in the regular business of news gathering and disseminating news or information to the public by any means, including, but not limited to, print, broadcast, photographic, mechanical, internet, or electronic distribution;
(b) Any person who is or has been an employee, agent, or independent contractor of any entity listed in (a) of this subsection, who is or has been engaged in bona fide news gathering for such entity, and who obtained or prepared the news or information that is sought while serving in that capacity; or
(c) Any parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of the entities listed in (a) or (b) of this subsection to the extent that the subpoena or other compulsory process seeks news or information described in subsection (1) of this section.
The language of Washington's shield law is extremely broad. It covers the "news media," defined as
Any newspaper, magazine or other periodical, book publisher, news agency, wire service, radio or television station or network, cable or satellite station or network, or audio or audiovisual production company, or any entity that is in the regular business of news gathering and disseminating news or information to the public by any means, including, but not limited to, print, broadcast, photographic, mechanical, internet, or electronic distribution.
It also covers any "employee, agent, or independent contractor" who is working (or has worked) for one of these entities. While no Washington court has interpreted this language, it clearly applies to online publishing. This would cover owners, employees, freelancers, and (most likely) volunteers for one of these entities.
A harder question is whether your website or blog qualifies as an "entity" that distributes news or information on a regular basis. If you publish only sporadically, then you likely fall outside the protection of the statute. More troubling, the meaning of "entity" is uncertain. The statute does not specifically require the entity to be formally organized, like a like a corporation, LLC, or nonprofit organization. But whether a court might read in such a requirement is less clear. Arguably, "entity" could refer to any platform for disseminating news or information, including a solo blog or website. Nevertheless, if you are operating in Washington, one of the benefits of creating a formal business entity would be increased certainty about coverage under the shield law.
The Washington shield law protects confidential sources and any information collected "for potential communication to the public." This latter category would include unpublished materials, whether confidential or non-confidential, collected during your newsgathering activities.
By publishing information received from a confidential source or obtained during newsgathering, you do not waive (i.e., give up) the protection for the source or other, unpublished materials.
The shield law does not protect physical evidence of a crime.
Washington's shield law is qualified, which means that a court may order you to disclose information under certain circumstances, even when you are covered by the statute (above). Specifically, a court will order you to reveal protected information if the party seeking your information can prove the following things by clear and convincing evidence:
The same test applies in criminal and civil cases, and when the reporter is a party to the lawsuit in question. As a practical matter, however, the final factor ("compelling public interest in disclosure") will often weigh in favor of your disclosing information when the party seeking information is a criminal defendant trying to mount a defense. This factor will also weigh in favor of disclosure when your information is not confidential (i.e., not received in exchange for a promise of confidentiality).
Federal courts in the Ninth Circuit, which encompasses Washington, recognize a qualified reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. An important case indicates that the privilege should protect a broad category of people engaging in newsgathering, stating that "what makes journalism journalism is not its format but its content." Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993). Although the law is not clear on this point, the privilege appears to protect the identity of sources and unpublished information, whether confidential or not. Protection likely is stronger, however, for confidential information.
The courts have applied the privilege in both civil and criminal cases, although its protection is stronger in civil cases. The courts have not upheld the privilege with respect to subpoenas issued in grand jury proceedings. The privilege is qualified, which means that a court may order you to reveal information if the need of the person seeking the information outweighs the policies favoring a privilege. The results of this kind of balancing test would be different depending on the facts of the particular case.
For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Privilege Compendium: 9th Circuit.
The Privacy Protection Act (PPA) makes it unlawful for government officials to search for or seize work product or documentary materials possessed by a person in connection with a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication. 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a),(b). If you are covered by the PPA, it can protect you from both state and federal officials, regardless of what state you live in. To learn more about the PPA, see General: Legal Protections for Confidential Sources and Source Material.
This section of the legal guide outlines the wide-array of information available to you from government sources. These sources range from your local city council all the way up to the largest agencies in the federal government. In fact, you might be quite surprised at how much information is available to you. And the best part is that you generally don't need to hire a lawyer or file any complicated forms -- you can access most of this information simply by showing up or filing a relatively simple request. Moreover, you don't need to be a professional journalist to share what you find with others who are interested in these issues; with nothing more than an Internet connection, you can make the information available to anyone in the world. For an impressive example of how some people are using the power of new information technologies in conjunction with government information, check out Adrian Holovaty's Chicagocrime.org, a browsable database of crimes reported in Chicago.
Regardless of what you publish online, it is likely that at least one (if not many) of the information sources we discuss in this section will be valuable to you. For example, you might want to find out whether the drinking water coming out of your faucet contains pollutants (information that is likely contained in documents held by the Environmental Protection Agency or one of its state counterparts). Perhaps you'd like to know more about how your local school board makes decisions (information that you can get by attending school board meetings). Or perhaps you are concerned that a real estate developer may have been sued for fraud (information that is available by visiting the courthouse in person or accessing the court's electronic docketing system).
Information from these government sources will be especially useful to you if you want to take your publishing activities beyond merely commenting on material posted by others. These sources can help you move into original reporting and enable you to comment in an informed fashion on local and national debates. You might even do a periodic post or column on subjects of particular interest to your website or blog. For example, the Gotham Gazette, an independent news site that covers "New York City News and Policy," has an entire section focusing on city government, which is largely based on meetings of the New York City Council.
We should point out, however, that the information you gather from these government sources doesn't have to be limited to the actions of the government itself. Government bodies collect extensive information on individuals, corporations, and other organizations. Much of this information is available to the public. You just have to know where to look.
The first thing you will need to consider is which government entity likely has the information you are seeking. Public access to government information extends to a broad range of government sources, including federal and state agencies, Congress and state legislatures, government boards and committees, and the courts. In fact, it might be the case that the information you are interested in is located in more than one place. A little advanced research on your part can go a long way when dealing with the government. Because different laws apply to different government entities, you will want to review each section of this guide that might apply to your situation. If you are not sure whether the information you seek is associated with a federal, state, or local government body, refer to the page on Federal, State, and Local Government Bodies for some helpful information.
It is also worth bearing in mind that laws granting access to government information are only one of many important fact-finding tools in your information gathering toolbox. These laws can be very powerful, but their scope is limited to records and information available through government sources. For a broad overview of how you can investigate a full range of actors, including government, individuals, and corporations, see the Newsgathering section of this guide and check out the Center for Investigative Reporting's entertaining and inspirational guide, Raising Hell: A Citizens Guide to the Fine Art of Investigation.
Information Held by the Federal Government
The federal government is a sprawling and far reaching entity headquartered in Washington, D.C., but with agencies and offices in almost every part of the country. A number of important laws govern your access to information associated with the federal government.
The most well known of these laws is the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), which provides access to the public records of most departments, agencies, and offices of the federal government. But several lesser known laws are also important, including the Government in the Sunshine Act which gives you the right to attend the meetings of many federal agencies, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which allows you to attend the meetings of boards and committees that advise agencies of the federal government, and the Presidential Records Act, which sets out the procedures you must follow to request records from the president and his or her close advisers.
If you are seeking records held by a federal government agency, you should review the section on Access to Records from the Federal Government which describes FOIA and provides some practical advice on how to use the law to acquire government records. Keep in mind, however, that FOIA does not cover the President himself/herself, Congress, or the federal judiciary. For information on accessing information from these sources, see the Access to Presidential Records, Access to Congress, and Access to Courts and Court Records sections of this guide, respectively.
The federal government often acts through boards, committees, and other government "bodies." Examples include the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Housing Finance Board. A common feature of these agencies, boards, commissions, and other government bodies is that they meet as groups to deliberate or take action on public business. If you wish to attend these meetings, you will need to become familiar with a category of laws called open meetings laws. These important laws give anyone, including members of the traditional and non-traditional press, the ability to attend the meetings of many federal government bodies and to receive reasonable notice of those meetings. In many instances, they also entitle you to obtain copies of minutes, transcripts, or recordings at low cost. See the section on Access to Government Meetings for more information and practical advice.
There are basically two types of federal government meetings you may wish to attend and each is governed by a different set of legal requirements. Federal agency meetings are governed by the Government in the Sunshine Act which gives you the right to attend the meetings of many federal agencies, such as the Federal Election Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. Federal advisory committee meetings, which are a strange hybrid type of meeting involving outside advisers tasked with giving advice to the federal government, are governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Information Held by State and Local Governments
Just as with the federal government, a number of important laws govern your ability to access information associated with state and local governments.
Every state has some version of a "Freedom of Information" (FOI) law — sometimes called a "sunshine law" — that governs the public’s right to access state government records. These FOI laws help the public keep track of its government’s actions, from the expenditures of school boards to the governor's decision to pardon prison inmates. For example, in 2003, a parent of a student in Texas, Dianna Pharr, spurred by the financial crisis in her local school district, began filing requests under the Texas Public Information Act to investigate the district's spending and operations. She and other parent volunteers established an online repository for the documents and made them available on a local community website, Keep Eanes Informed. Pharr's efforts received coverage in the local press, and have enabled her community to make informed decisions when dealing with school board proposals.
If the information you are seeking is contained in records held by your state or local government, you will need to review the section on Access to Records from State Governments in order to understand how to make a request under the relevant state law. For example, the California Public Records Act and the New York Freedom of Information Law govern access to records in California and New York, respectively. In many states, local government records can also be requested under the state open records law. Unfortunately, public officials sometimes deny that they are required to turn over information, deny that the public has any right to information, or fail to provide information in a timely way. To ensure that you get the information you need, you should review the section on Practical Tips for Getting Government Records.
If you are interested in attending the meetings of state or local government bodies, you should review the section on Access to State and Local Government Meetings. The most familiar examples of these kinds of government bodies at the local level include school boards, city councils, boards of county commissioners, zoning and planning commissions, police review boards, and boards of library trustees. At the state level, examples include state environmental commissions, labor boards, housing boards, and tax commissions, to name a few.
Courts and Court Information
The court system is yet another resource-rich place for you to access information. Your right to access the court system stems from the First Amendment, and has been expanded to give you the ability to attend almost all court proceedings and inspect public court records. The law provides important tools that you can use to help you understand the intricacies of a particular case, or watch how the court system performs. For example, you can use court records to check whether a doctor has previously been sued for malpractice, or to find the outcome of a criminal case.
You should first determine whether you need to access the information at the state or federal level. Once you’re armed with that knowledge, visit the pages that discuss access to court proceedings in federal court or state court, for information on your right to attend trials and other court proceedings. If, on the other hand, you want to review court records, such as legal complaints, motions, and other filings, visit the page on Federal Court Records or State Court Records, which describes your right to access court records and provides information on why your request may be denied, and how to appeal a denial. While there is no guarantee that you will get every court record or attend every court proceeding you desire, we've put together some tips that will help ensure that you take full advantage of the wealth of information available through state and federal courts. See the page discussing Practical Tips for Accessing Courts and Court Records for more information.
You may also wish to talk with the individuals associated with a court case. Visit the page on Access to Jury and Trial Participants to understand your ability to contact those who participated in the court proceeding such as the judge, lawyers, parties, witnesses, and jurors.
Getting Started
If, after reviewing the information in this section, you are still not sure where to start, you can always just browse one of the topics listed below:
"Freedom of Information" ("FOI") is a general term for the laws — sometimes called "sunshine laws" — and principles that govern the public’s right to access government records. FOI helps the public keep track of its government’s actions, from the campaign expenditures of city commission candidates to federal agencies’ management of billions of dollars in tax revenues. Without FOI, information-seeking citizens would be left to the whims of individual government agencies, which often do not give up their records easily.
Using freedom of information laws is a simple, and potentially powerful, way of obtaining information about the activities of federal, state and many local governments. You don't need to hire a lawyer, and no complicated forms are involved—requests can be made in a simple letter. And you don't need to be a journalist to share what you find with others who are interested in these issues; with nothing more than an Internet connection, you can post the information and make it available to anyone in the world.
Your request can yield information that has a real impact on your community. For example, in 2003, a parent of a student in Texas, Dianna Pharr, spurred by the financial crisis in her local school district, began filing multiple requests under the Texas Public Information Act to investigate the district's spending and operations. She and other parent volunteers established an online repository for the documents she received and made them available on a local community website, Keep Eanes Informed. Pharr's efforts received coverage in the local press, and have enabled her community to make informed decisions when dealing with school board proposals. Similarly, in 2006, the nonprofit organization Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility used the Freedom of Information Act to get documents that revealed that genetically-modified crops had been sown on thousands of acres in a federal wildlife refuge. A coalition of nonprofits used this information to sue the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for violating federal environmental law. For other examples of the benefits of sunshine laws, see the National Security Archive's 40 Noteworthy Headlines Made Possible by FOIA, 2004-2006.
So now that we've convinced you of the value of acquiring government records, it's time to dig into the relevant sections that govern the information you are interested in. Before you start, however, you'll want to first determine whether the information you seek is held by a federal or state governmental body. This is important because different freedom of information laws apply to the federal government and various state government entities. If you are not quite sure whether you should review the federal or state sections of this guide, you might find the page on Identifying Federal, State, and Local Government Bodies helpful.
The following pages in this section will help you to understand and use freedom of information laws to acquire government records:
If you are seeking records held by the United States government, you will need to become familiar with the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), which was enacted in 1966. FOIA provides access to the public records of all departments, agencies, and offices of the Executive Branch of the federal government, including the Executive Office of the President. FOIA does not cover the sitting President, Congress, or the federal judiciary. For information on accessing information from these sources, see the Access to Presidential Records, Access to Congress, and Access to Courts and Court Records sections of this guide, respectively.
FOIA requires federal agencies to:
The heart of FOIA is a "FOIA request": a written notice to the FOIA officer of a federal agency stating which records you are seeking. You should be forewarned, however, that although FOIA is a powerful tool for getting government information, it involves a rather complicated set of procedures. Before you file a request, you should spend some time reviewing each of the sections listed below. Click on one of the following sections to get started:
The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") gives the right to request access to government records to any person for any reason, whether the person is a U.S. citizen or a foreign national. Requests can be made in the name of an individual or an organization (including a corporation, partnership, or public interest group). Individuals have the same access rights as professional journalists, though journalists who work for established media organizations sometimes receive better treatment from records-keepers. Individuals probably won’t qualify for some of the perks afforded to media professionals, such as fee waivers and expedited processing, but they are just as capable of using records requests to reveal information that is important to the public. In fact, according to one study, more FOIA requests come from ordinary citizens than from professional media organizations.
Filing a request under FOIA may seem daunting at first, and it often is not easy to figure out how and where to get the information you seek. However, this legal guide should help you navigate FOIA so you can gather valuable government information that you can use to inform your fellow citizens and the world at large.
FOIA covers records from all federal regulatory agencies, cabinet and military departments, offices, commissions, government-controlled corporations, the Executive Office of the President, and other organizations of the Executive Branch of the federal government. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f). For example, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Food and Drug Administration are all covered by FOIA. To browse a list of executive agencies, visit the U.S. Government Manual or the LSU Libraries Federal Agency Directory. Links to a number of federal agencies' FOIA websites are available here.
FOIA does NOT apply to the President, Congress (or members of Congress), or the federal courts and federal judiciary. For information on accessing information from these sources, see the Access to Presidential Records, Access to Congress, and Access to Courts and Court Records sections of this guide, respectively. Some federally funded organizations may not be covered by FOIA if the government does not control or regulate their operation. However, any of those organizations’ records that are filed with federal agencies may be covered. No private persons or organizations are covered by FOIA.
State and local governments are not covered by FOIA, including federally-funded state agencies, but all states and some local governments have passed freedom of information laws. Requests for information from a state or local governments must be made under that jurisdiction's freedom of information legislation. For more information on selected states, see the Access to Records from State Governments section of this guide.
All non-exempt electronic and physical records held by federal agencies must be disclosed under FOIA. Federal agencies covered by FOIA are permitted to withhold documents, or redact portions of documents, if the records (or information in the records) are covered by one of the nine exemptions established by FOIA. One of the most common exemptions relied on the exemption for national security.
The following section set out the essential information you need to know about the kinds of documents you can access using FOIA, so that you can tailor your request or, if your request is denied, to consider whether and how to this decision might be challenged.
There are a number of ways that you can receive government records. The easiest method is to access an agency's online “reading room” which provides free access to certain government documents. If you can't get what you want through a reading room, you should carefully consider how (and in what form) you want the responding agency to provide the documents to you.
Before you jump into filing a FOIA request, however, you should spend some time researching which agency or agencies have the records you want. There is no central depository for federal government information, and each agency has its own office for handling FOIA requests. This can make your search rather difficult, but there are a number of resources that may help you in determining which federal entities are likely to have the information you seek:
Online Reading Rooms
FOIA requires that all federal agencies maintain online reading rooms that provide electronic versions of their regulations, policy statements, and records. Reading rooms are the easiest method of obtaining certain types of government information, because accessing them requires only a few clicks on an agency’s website. Therefore, you should always start by checking to see if the records you are seeking are already available in the reading room. This will save you the time, energy and money of making a FOIA request or otherwise attempting to get information. The type and amount of information available in the reading rooms vary greatly by agency, but many include a number of useful records.
If you can't find the agency's online reading room from their homepage, try searching for “(agency name) reading room” (most agency web sites have a section labeled specifically as a “reading room,” so you should be able to find it with a simple online search). It can also be helpful to run the same search at FirstGovSearch.gov, the U.S. Government Printing Office’s online directory of government information.
Here is a list of online reading rooms for some of the government’s most visible agencies and offices:
Other Means of Getting Records
If you can't find the records you are seeking in the agency's reading room, then you will need to request the records informally or file a FOIA request. See the section on Requesting Records Under FOIA in this guide for more information.
In your request you can ask to receive either an electronic copy or a physical copy of the records. If the records already exist in the form that you request them in, then the agency must generally provide the records in your preferred form. However, if you request an electronic copy of records that only exist in paper form, then the agency must only provide you with an electronic copy if it is reasonably able to do so, meaning that the record is "readily reproducible" in the alternate format. If you would prefer a certain type of electronic format, the agency need only provide the records in that specific format if it is reasonably able to do so. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(B).
Depending on the agency, physical copies of records may usually be mailed or faxed to you, while electronic copies of records may either be e-mailed to you or sent to you on a CD-ROM or other disk drive. Because of the various ways you can receive the records, it is very important that you specify your preferred method when you initially file your request.
Any records created, possessed, or controlled by a federal regulatory agency, cabinet and military departments, offices, commissions, government-controlled corporations, the Executive Office of the President, and other organizations of the Executive Branch of the federal government must be disclosed unless the information contained in the records is covered by a specific FOIA exemption. FOIA only extends to existing records; you cannot compel an agency to create or search for information that is not already in its records. Nor can you use FOIA to compel agencies to answer your general questions under FOIA. However, you sometimes can agree to accept information in an abbreviated form rather than the actual documents.
Agencies are required to make the following records available for public inspection and copying without a formal FOIA request via the Federal Register:
If you are interested in records that don't fall into one of these categories, you will need to file a FOIA request. See the section on How to Request Records Under FOIA in this guide for more information.
Physical Records
Physical records of any description can be requested under FOIA. Traditional typed documents, as well as maps, diagrams, charts, index cards, printouts and other kinds of paper records can be requested. Moreover, access under FOIA is not restricted to information recorded on paper. Information recorded in electronic media (see further below), audio tapes, film, and any other medium can be requested. The Society of Professional Journalists' A-Z list of covered documents is a great place to start if you aren’t sure if the record you want is covered by FOIA.
Electronic Records
The increasing availability of electronic versions of government records is one of the most important developments in public access to government information. “E-records,” as these records are sometimes called, generally are simpler and quicker to obtain, easier to analyze, and otherwise better suited to citizen use. With the invention of online reading rooms and FOIA sections of agency websites, many records take no more effort to access than personal e-mail. Information from e-records can be organized into databases, searched, and plugged into tables and charts, making it possible to perform in-depth analysis in much less time—which opens up new possibilities for public use of government information.
Besides quicker access and (possibly) cheaper reproduction costs, electronic records have several advantages over their paper-based counterparts. E-records can be compiled into databases for easy searching and comparison. They are easier to sort through quickly, possibly making it easier to find patterns and discrepancies. This can make the information-gathering process significantly simpler and more efficient, which is a great help to those who don’t have the time and resources to mount in-depth investigations. For more information on ways to use electronic records, the Poynter Institute has an online bibliography of computer-assisted reporting (CAR) primers and other sources of information.
Electronic records are becoming more and more prevalent as the government continues to expand its use of technology. Because of this, any record you seek could be available in electronic format. Whether you’re talking directly to a records-keeper or filing an official FOIA request, you should consider asking for electronic copies of the records you are requesting. Depending on the agency, you may be able to specify whether you receive e-records by e-mail attachment, CD, or other medium. Some states, for instance, allow the requester to receive records in the format of their choice. An agency must make requested records available in electronic format at the request of a person if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in electronic format (§ 552(a)(3)(B)).
Congress extended the Freedom of Information Act to electronic records by enacting the Government Printing Office Electronic Information Enhancement Act of 1993 ("Electronic Information Act") and the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996 ("E-FOIA"). The Electronic Information Act requires government to maintain an online directory of Federal electronic information, including the Congressional Record, the official record of Congress’ proceedings and debates, as well as the Federal Register, which contains agencies’ regulations and policy statements. E-FOIA requires that government agencies:
While the records you've requested might be covered by FOIA, the information contained in the records may relate to certain subject areas that are exempt from disclosure under FOIA. FOIA contains nine exemptions that might impact your request:
It is beyond the scope of this guide to describe each exemption in exhaustive detail. Suffice it to say, most FOIA disputes involve disagreements over the scope and application of these exemptions. For more information on each exemption, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's excellent booklet on How to Use the Federal FOI Act.
Other than exemption number 3 -- which relates to information exempt under other federal law -- these exemptions are permissive, not mandatory. This means that FOIA allows an agency to refuse to disclose otherwise covered records, or to redact portions of documents, but it does not compel the agency to do so. For more on the discretionary nature of these exemptions, see the U.S. Department of Justice's FOIA Guide.
An agency must state which exemption it is relying on when it withholds documents or redacts information. In addition, agencies are required to disclosure all non-exempt information, even if it is contained in a record that contains other information that is exempt from disclosure. In other words, if an exemption only applies to a portion of a record, the agency must release the remainder of the document after the exempt material has been redacted.
If you believe an agency has improperly used one of these exemptions to deny your request, see the section of this guide on What Are Your Remedies Under FOIA which describes the courses of action you can take to enforce your rights under FOIA.
Before making a FOIA request, you should first try to obtain information by quicker, less formal means. You can access many records without going throught the formal FOIA request process. The easiest way to access some records is via the Internet, through the Federal Register or agencies’ online reading rooms.
FOIA requires agencies to publish the following information in the Federal Register:
Reading rooms are typically accessible from the agency’s website. For more information on reading rooms, refer to the legal guide’s section on Finding and Getting the Records You Seek. Agencies also maintain physical reading rooms, which could be useful if you are able to visit their offices.
If the information is not available online, you can try simply asking for it. Agencies are required to make the following records available for public inspection and copying without a formal FOIA request:
Explain what records you’re seeking and that you’re prepared to file an official request if necessary. A record-keeper familiar with FOIA might honor a request made in-person or via telephone, saving both you and the agency time and (possibly) money. If that doesn’t work, you can try speaking to the agency’s FOIA officer.
If you cannot access the records through these informal means, you then will need to file a formal FOIA request. Click on one of the links below to get started:
Written requests are the only way to legally assert your FOIA rights. These should be mailed, faxed, e-mailed, or hand-delivered to the relevant agency’s offices, depending on which methods the agency allows. A quick online search of the "agency's name" and "FOIA" should provide you with specific information about how the particular agency accepts FOIA requests. If you can't find the information through an online search, check the Federal Register, which should include this information.
A FOIA request should be addressed to the agency's FOIA officer or the head of the agency. It must include:
In addition to the required elements listed above, you might want to include some of the following additional information in your request:
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and the The U.S. Department of State both offer forms that will automatically generate a FOIA request for you. These can be an excellent way to get started.
Where to Send Your Request
Your FOIA request should be addressed to the relevant agency's FOIA officer or the head of the agency. The U.S. Department of Justice has a fairly comprehensive list of FOIA contacts at federal agencies. If the agency you want isn't listed there, you can usually find the information easily by conducting a quick web search; just type in "agency's name" and "FOIA contact."
If you are unsure of which agency to send your request to, the US Government Manual may be of assistance. You will likely receive a faster response if you make your request in accordance with the agency's own FOIA regulations (these can be viewed in the Code of Federal Regulations), but the above minimum requirements are sufficient to make a valid FOIA request.
Technically, government organizations must respond to a FOIA request with a denial or grant of access within 20 business days. Note that the agency must only respond within 20 days; it does not have to deliver the records within the 20-day time period. The time period does not begin until the proper agency or office actually receives your request. Furthermore, under the new 2007 FOIA amendments, the agency may exceed the 20-day time limit if it needs to request more information from you in order to process your request.
Agencies may extend this time limit by up to 10 additional working days (they must informing you they are doing so) if one of the following "exceptional circumstances" exists: the record-keeper must search an extraordinary amount of records; the search involves records from multiple offices; or the search involves records from multiple organizations. See the FOIA Guide's section on time limits for a more detailed explanation. If your request cannot be fulfilled within these time periods, the agency may ask you to reasonably modify your request or allow for an alternative time frame.
Realistically, many agencies do not comply with these time limits. Some agencies may have a large backlog of requests, and they are usually permitted to treat requests on a "first come, first served" basis as long as they devote a reasonable amount of staff to responding to the requests. These agencies generally have a processing system that allows simpler requests to be handled quickly so that these requests do not have to "wait in line" behind more complex requests.
However, as of December 1, 2008, FOIA will be amended to require that agencies waive all search and duplication fees if they fail to comply with time limits and none of the "exceptional circumstances" listed above exist. It is yet to be seen if this will speed up agencies' response times.
Expedited processing
FOIA provides for requests to receive “expedited review” if the request meets certain requirements. Generally speaking, you will be entitled to expedited treatment if health and safety are at issue or if there is an urgent public interest in the government activity at issue.
If you think there is a compelling reason why you need the information sooner than the normal period under FOIA, you should clearly explain your reasons in your initial FOIA request. Agencies must decide whether or not to grant expedited processing within 10 calendar days of the request. Aside from these specific circumstances listed above, agencies may use their discretion in deciding whether or not to grant expedited review. So, it doesn’t hurt to ask even if you don’t meet the requirements.
You should also check the individual agency's requirements to see if they allow other types of requests to receive expedited treatment. The Department of Justice, for instance, offers expedited review “for requests concerning issues of government integrity that have already become the object of widespread national media interest” or “if delay might cause the loss of substantial due process rights,” (see the DOJ reference guide section on expedited processing).
Checking the Status of Your Request
Under the 2007 FOIA amendments, the agency must provide you with a tracking number if your request will take longer than 10 days to process. Then, if you haven't heard back from an agency or are unsure about the status of your request, you can use the tracking number to find out more information. Each agency is required to have at least one "FOIA Requester Service Center" that can give information about the status of pending FOIA requests. The agency must tell you the date that it received your request and must give an estimated date that it will complete your request. The centers can generally be contacted by mail, e-mail, or telephone.
If the deadlines have passed and you haven't been able to get any information from the agency about the status of your request, you should review this guide's section entitled What Are Your Remedies Under FOIA to see what your options are.
Federal agencies are allowed to charge “reasonable” costs for responding to your FOIA request. This typically includes fees for the time the record-keeper spends searching for the correct documents as well as the cost of duplicating those documents. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(A).
FOIA breaks down requesters into three categories for determining fees:
Note that this means that small requests should always be free as long as the information is not intended for commercial purposes. Also, you should always be as specific as possible when describing the documents in your initial FOIA request. This will reduce the amount of time that the record-keeper must spend searching for the documents, which will potentially save you money.
Non-traditional journalists generally will fall into the last category -- and thus may be on the hook for search fees -- even if they intend to publish the information in blogs, websites, or other media. If you are not associated with professional media, you can always request that you should be considered under the second category because of your intent to publish. The New FOIA Reform Act, which goes into effect in December 2008, seems to broaden the scope of the "professional media" category. Under the new amendment, a person can be considered part of the news media if he or she gathers information that is of public interest, creates a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience. However, the Reform Act cautions that this is not an all-inclusive category, so it remains to be seen if bloggers and other citizen journalists will be able to benefit from fee waivers generally only reserved for "professional" media. We've been following this issue in our blog, and you can read more about the new definition here.
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's FOIA Guide breaks down some of the actual fees you can expect to pay:
Search fees generally range from $11 to $28 per hour, based on the salary and benefits of the employee doing the search. Fees for computer time, which are described in each agency’s FOI regulations, vary greatly. They may be as high as $270 per hour. Photocopying costs are normally between 3 and 25 cents per page.
If you think your request could involve a significant amount of search time or copying, make sure your FOIA request includes a limit on the fees you’re willing to pay. You may also want to ask in advance for an estimate of what the expected fees may be.
Here are some additional things to keep in mind when dealing with fee issues:
Fee waivers and fee reductions
Under the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, your FOIA requests could be eligible for total or partial waiver of fees if you can show that the disclosure of the information is in the public interest—even if you aren’t a professional journalist. This requires that you specifically request a waiver or reduction of fees and explain why you think the public has an interest in understanding the information. See the DOJ's FOIA Guide for more information about the "public interest" fee waiver. You also must explain any financial interest you have in the information, though a financial stake in publishing the information -- such as if you are paid to blog -- should not pose a problem.
Agencies consider fee waiver requests on a case-by-case basis. You can appeal fee or waiver decisions in the same way you appeal request denials. See the section on What Are Your Remedies Under FOIA in this guide for more information.
You have several options if your FOIA request is denied in whole or in part. First, you can attempt to resolve informally any disputes you have with the responding agency. If informal resolution fails, you should appeal the denial within the relevant agency before taking any other action. If your appeal is unsuccessful and the agency withheld the information because it is classified, you can apply to have the information declassified. If these options have failed to resolve the dispute, you can seek mediation through the newly authorized FOIA ombudsman or file a lawsuit in court to enforce your rights under FOIA.
Each of these options is described briefly in this section.
Informal Resolution
The simplest -- and often most effective -- remedy is to seek informal resolution of the dispute. Delays are frequently due to the overworked nature of most FOIA officers. Your offer to "revise" or "narrow" the scope of your request can go a long way toward getting faster, and better, treatment of your request. If you revise your request, be sure to make clear that you willingness to compromise is not considered a "new" request by the agency (a new request will start the FOIA clock running again). If the agency tells you that the records don't exist, ask them to describe their search methodology. Perhaps they aren't looking for the right things or in the right places. It might also help if you offer to resolve fee or fee waiver issues by paying a small amount.
While you engage in informal resolution be sure and keep records of all of your contacts with the agency. Track all time and response deadlines carefully.
Appealing within the Relevant Agency
If the agency denies your request or does not respond within the required time period, you can appeal to the agency's FOIA Appeals Officer. If the agency sent you a denial letter, it should set out the agency's appeal procedures. Take special note of the time limitation for appeals, which are usually around thirty days. If you haven't received any response from the agency (an excessive delay in complying with a request constitutes a denial under FOIA) you should send your appeal to the head of the agency.
Appeal letters can be used to challenge the agency's failure to respond in a timely fashion, a decision not to release records in whole or in part, the adequacy of the search used to locate responsive records, and the agency's refusal to grant you a fee waiver.
In your FOIA appeal letter you should:
Sample appeal letters can be found on the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press' website and at the National Security Archive.
Make sure you are familiar with the exemptions to FOIA so you can argue that the records you are seeking are not or should not be exempted. See the section on FOIA Exemptions in this guide for more information.
If the agency denies your appeal or does not respond within 20 days, you may file a lawsuit in federal court (see below).
Declassification
If the agency denied your request because the information is classified (i.e. the agency relied on the national security exemption), you can make a separate request for mandatory declassification review of the information. You can learn more about declassification review procedure by going to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press' FOIA Guide.
Mediation
Currently there is no mediation available for FOIA disputes. However, the Open Government Act of 2007, which amends FOIA, provides for the establishment of a new FOIA ombudsman, the Office of Government Information Services, to mediate such disputes. There is some uncertainty about whether the Office will be an organ of the more independent National Archives and Records Administration or the Department of Justice (which defends lawsuits against agencies that refuse to furnish requested documents) (see this Washington Post article and Senator Leahy's Senate address on the issue).
Once the situation is clarified, we will update this section with the procedures for instituting FOIA mediation.
Filing a Lawsuit
If your request is denied, and your internal appeal does not reverse this decision, you may sue the agency in the United State District Court in your state of residence, in the state where the records are located, or in the District of Columbia. It is generally recommended that you retain an attorney to bring such a suit. If your lawsuit is "substantially successful", the agency will be ordered to pay your attorney's fees. See the section in this guide on Finding Legal Help for help with hiring lawyer or getting other assistance.
However, you have the right to appear on your own behalf in court by filing a complaint pro se. If you decide to do this, you will find the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press' sample complaint for a FOI records denial and Public Citizen Litigation Group's Sample FOIA Litigation Documents very useful.
Obtaining records through legal action can be a costly and drawn-out process. Some lawsuits over FOIA denials can last more than a year. If you assert that there is a public interest in your timely access to the records, the court could speed up your case through “expeditious consideration.”
Lastly, keep in mind that if you file a lawsuit, you must do so within six years from the date of your initial FOIA request, even if you receive no response or an incomplete response from the agency.
You can access a vast number of state government records by using your state's freedom of information law. All fifty states and the District of Columbia have freedom of information laws granting public access to state government records, most of which are based at least in part on the federal FOIA. However, the laws can vary widely from who can make the requests, to which government body is required to provide access to its records, to the formalities a request must meet.
Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on accessing each state's public records. (Note: This guide currently covers only the 15 most populous states and the District of Columbia. We hope to add additional states to the guide at a later date.)
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
Anyone can inspect or copy all records maintained by any Arizona public body during office hours, pursuant to Arizona law, §§ 39-101-39.161. Generally you don't have to give an explanation, unless the records are to be used for commercial purposes. If so, you will have to state that use and the Governor can, by executive order, prohibit their release.
If the records are released for a commercial purpose, then you may also be charged a portion of the cost for getting the copies, a fee for time, materials and personnel, and commercial market value of the reproduction, pursuant to 39-121.03.
If you have a commerical purpose and don't say so, you may have to pay damages up to three times the amount that would normally be charged, plus costs and attorney fees. So, if you have a commerical purpose for the records, make sure you say it when requesting the records!
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You should be able to request records from any any subdivision of the state, county, municipality, school district, or any committee or subdivision supported by or spending state money. Any person elected or appointed to any public body is subject to the open records law. Any records they maintain on their offical activities or any activities supported either by state money or a state political subdivision are considered public, under § 39-121.01.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested?
If records aren't available online and you aren't able to go to the office, you can request the records to be mailed to you. However, the record custodian may request advance payment for copying and postage, so be ready to pay up front.
As of 2010, you can now request budgets of charter schools, actions of the State Board of Dental Examiners, and records of any abortions and/or abortion complications performed at any medical facility in the state. You can also access any contract that involves state funds online.
Any expense reports by political parties concerning campaign expenses are now public.
Exemptions
Any agency that denies your request must furnish an index of records that have been withheld and the reason for each — but only if you ask for it. The department of public safety, the department of transportation motor vehicle division, the department of juvenile corrections and the state department of corrections are exempt from this requirement.
Certain records relating to "eligible persons" (peace officers, justices, judges, public defenders, prosecutors, probation officers, law enforcement, national guardsmen, and anyone protected by court order) are exempt from disclosure pursuant to § 39-123. You have no right of access to any of the following records, if it relates to an eligible person:
Any law enforcement agent who improperly discloses this information is guilty of a felony, so be wary if any officer gives you this information.
The law also exempts all archaeological discoveries and risk assessments of any energy, water or telecommunications infrastructures.
As of 2010, you no longer can access the names of any indivduals/firms who are applying for government contracts until the contract is complete. Also, all working papers and audits are exempted.
The Arizona Court of Appeals has indicated that trade secrets contained in public records may be protected by the confidentiality exemption to Arizona's public records laws. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Keegan, 35 P.3d 105, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
Making the request
The law doesn't require any specific way of requesting records, so long as you request them during normal office hours. If the custodian doesn't respond to you promptly or give you an index when you ask for one, the law deems your request "denied" and you may pursue other remedies.Payment
The custodian of the records may charge you for access, but the law doesn't specify any amount. The exception is records listed in §§ 39-122 through 39-127, related to records used in claims against the United States. If you are requesting records for that purpose, the custodian can't charge you.
Note: This page covers information specific to California. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of California's public records using the state's California Public Records Act (CPRA). See the text of the CPRA in sections 6250 and 6253 of the California Government Code (Cal. Gov't Code), which states that any individual, corporation, partnership, limited liability company, firm or association, both in and out of California, can inspect California public records.
You are not required to explain why you are making a request. However, if you request the disclosure of the address of any individual who has been arrested, or the current address of the victim of a crime, you must state whether the request is made for a journalistic, scholarly, political or governmental purpose, and declare that the information will not be used to sell a product or service. Cal. Gov't Code § 6254(f)(3).
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You can inspect the public records of California state offices, officers, departments, divisions, bureaus, boards and commissions, and other state bodies and agencies. You can also inspect the public records of local agencies, including counties, cities, schools districts, municipal corporations, districts, political subdivisions, local public agencies, and nonprofit entities that are legislative bodies of a local agency. However, you will not be able to access the records from the California state legislature or its committees, nor to the state courts under the CPRA. See Access to Government Meetings and Access to Court Records for more information.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of the government bodies subject to the CPRA. The term "public records" is broadly defined to include information relating to the conduct of the public's business that is prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of what medium it is stored in. See Cal. Gov't Code § 6252(e).
Note that public records do not extend to personal information
of public officers which are unrelated to the conduct of public
business (for example, a phone message taken by a public officer from a
colleague's wife about picking up the children), or computer software
developed by the government.
Exemptions
An agency may refuse to provide a record if, in a particular case, "the public interest served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record." [Cal. Gov't Code § 6255]. For more information, visit California First Amendment Coalition's FAQs on the general public interest exemption.
In addition to this general exemption, an agency is entitled (but not required) to refuse disclosure if one or more of the following narrowly construed statutory exemptions applies. The Act sets out a long list of specific exemptions (Cal. Gov't Code § 6254), including:
Making the request
You do not need to make a written request to receive the public documents you want to inspect. If you have a routine request, start by making an informal request for the records over the telephone before invoking the law. If the agency information officer you speak with cannot grant your request over the telephone, he should be able to provide you with the necessary steps for making a formal request.
Although you are not required to do so, setting your request out in a letter may help you to get the public records you want. The letter should be addressed to the public records officer of the agency, and should include the following information, as appropriate:
You can request either to view the records or to have copies made. Viewing records at the agency's office will probably be quicker, and might give you the opportunity to narrow down the list of documents you want copies of, and also reduces your copying expenses.
Fulfilling the Request
Agencies are required to provide prompt access to records. Once you make your request to inspect records, you should get immediate access to those records during the hours set by the agency for inspection of records. If you request copies, the agency must decide within ten days whether copies will be provided, except in unusual circumstances, where it may grant itself an extension of fourteen days. "Unusual circumstances" means an agency needs to:
Payment
A government agency can only charge you the "direct cost" of duplicating records unless it is authorized by statute to charge a reasonable flat fee. In the case of documents, "direct cost" means the cost of photocopying (approximately 10 to 25 cents per page). In the case electronic data, "direct cost" can mean the cost of producing a copy of the record in electronic format (the cost of the disk, as well as the cost of constructing the record, programming and computer services if this is required).
A statutory fee may be higher than the direct cost of duplicating a record, but cannot exceed what is reasonably necessary to provide the copy. In either case, staff time spent searching for and reviewing records cannot be recovered. Although there is no fee waiver in the CPRA, agencies have the discretion to waive or reduce fees.
You have several options open to you should your request be denied. First, try to work with the information officer you are dealing with. If the agency is relying on an exemption, ask the information officer if he will waive the exemption because exemptions are permissive, not mandatory. If that fails, you can also ask the information officer to release the nonexempt portions of the record with the exempt portions removed or redacted.
If you feel frustrated by your conversations with the information officer, you ask to speak to someone more senior within the agency and explain your case.
Look to see whether the agency has any process in place to appeal the denial. Some agencies have created a formal process for administrative appeal and some municipal agencies have adopted sunshine ordinances providing for administrative review of denials. If this option is available, pursue it before starting any court action.
If administrative appeals are not available, or if your request is denied after administrative review, you are entitled to seek court review of the denial (Cal. Gov't Code §§ 5258-5260). Refer to California First Amendment Project's Q&A on using legal action to enforce disclosure. Additionally, refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the agency.
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of Florida’s public records using the state's Public Records Act. See chapter 119, section 1 of the Florida Statutes (Fla. Stat.), which states that “all state, county, and municipal records are open for personal inspection and copying by any person.”
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You are entitled to view the records of all state, county, or municipal units of government, as well as any other public or private entity acting on behalf of one of these agencies. See Fla. Stat. § 119.01. See Access to Government Meetings in Florida and Access to Florida Court Records for more information on how to access records from those government entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You are entitled to inspect and copy "public records," including all documents, maps, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data processing software, or other material, made or received pursuant to law or in connection with the official business of any agency. Fla. Stat. § 119.011(11).
What Exemptions Might Apply
Unlike other states, where in most cases there are a limited number of exemptions, Florida has hundreds of general and agency-specific exemptions pursuant to which an agency can refuse to provide access to records. The Florida Public Records Act lists the following:
A summary of these can be found on the Florida First Amendment Foundation's website, and the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press provides a discussion of the exemptions as well. The Office of the Attorney General's Sunshine Manual also contains helpful summaries of what exemptions apply to law enforcement records, birth and death records, hospital and medical records, education records, and abuse records.
You can make a request over the telephone or in writing. While a telephone request may be a quicker way of submitting a routine request, a written request may be preferable if your request is detailed or complicated, or if you anticipate that the agency might deny your request. Having a written record of your request will aid an appeal, should you later decide to make one.
Your request should be addressed to the ‘’’custodian of public records’’’ (the government officer who controls or has access to public records) at the agency which has custody of the records you want to obtain. If you are unsure of which agency to contact, the alphabetical list of records and the agencies that keep them in the Florida Public Records Guide might be useful. The records you're looking for might even be available through a free online search (see Florida Public Records Directory).
There is no prescribed form for the letter, but your letter should contain the following elements, as appropriate:
Alternatively, you might find the Florida First Amendment Foundation's sample request letter a useful guide for writing your own letter.
The Florida Public Records Act does not compel agencies to respond to requests within a specific time limit, but the courts have held that an agency is required to respond within a "reasonable" time to locate the records and redact exempt portions. Fla. Stat. § 119.07(1)(a), (c).
An agency can charge you either a set fee prescribed by law, or if no fee is prescribed, no more than 15 cents per page or 20 cents per double-sided page. If you request a certified copy of a public record, then the agency is likely to charge up to $1 per page. If you make a request of a nature and volume that requires the agency to make extensive use of information technology and/or staff time, the agency is entitled to charge a reasonable service charge which reflects the actual cost incurred. Fla. Stat. § 119.07(4).
Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require a custodian of public records to create a record in response to your request (but she may do so at her discretion).
If an agency denies your request, or takes an unreasonably long time to respond, make sure that you have the denial in writing. If the agency has not cited the specific statutory provision under which it claims that the document is exempt, insist that it does so.
You have three options for seeking to have a denial reviewed:
Additionally, the Florida First Amendment Foundation invites members of the public to contact it when facing this decision.
If you wish to file a lawsuit to enforce compliance with your request, refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the agency. If you are successful in court, the court will issue an injunction requiring the agency to disclose the records. Additionally, if the court finds that the agency's refusal was unlawful, it is empowered to require the agency to pay your attorney's fees. See Fla. Stat. § 119.12.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
If you are a resident of Georgia, you have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of Georgia's public records using the state's Open Records Act (OPA). See Title 50, Chapter 18, Article 4, section 70(b) of the Georgia Annotated Code (Ga. Code Ann.). The Georgia Attorney General has issued an opinion that non-residents should also be given access, so it is worth making a request even if you are a not a citizen. See 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-27.
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You can inspect the public records of all state departments, agencies, boards, bureaus, commissions and authorities, as well as county and municipal government entities and regional authorities. The OPA also covers private entities performing a service for a public agency, as well as nonprofit organizations that receive more than one-third of their funding from tax funds. Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-70, Ga. Code Ann. § 50-14-1. See Access to Government Meetings in Georgia and Georgia State Court Records for more information on how to access records from those entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You have the right to inspect all public records of the government bodies subject to the OPA. The term "public records" is broadly defined to include all all written documents, maps, books, tapes, photographs, and electronic information, prepared and maintained or received in the course of the operation of a government body. Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-70(a).
Exemptions
A government body may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
Trade secrets, certain research projects, some testing materials, firearms licensing information, or information covered under the attorney-client privilege or material that is attorney work product are also exempt. See Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-72.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Georgia for more information on these exemptions.
If your request is straightforward, you may find it quickest and easiest to make an informal request over the telephone. If the public records officer is unable to fulfill your request over your phone, or if your request is complicated or potentially controversial, you should put your request in a letter.
There is no prescribed form or content for a public records request letter, but your letter should be addressed the public records officer of the agency and should contain the following information, as appropriate:
Alternatively, use Student Press Law Center's State Open Records Law Request Letter Generator to produce a request letter that complies with Georgia law. Additionally, the Georgia Press Association's Abbreviated Guide to Georgia's Open Meetings and Open Records Laws provides commentary on how to request records and also sets out a sample letter to use as a guide.
An agency must grant or deny your request within three working days. If the agency requires time to arrange the records for inspection, they must respond within that period with a description of the documents and a timetable for inspection and copying. Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-70(f).
If your request is routine, like requesting to view a zoning map, you should not be charged a search. However, if your request involves unusual cost or burden to the agency, it is entitled to charge a reasonable fee for the search, retrieval and other direct administrative costs incurred complying with your request. Agencies can charge up to 25 cents per page for duplication (unless a higher charge is specifically authorized by other legislation), or the cost of any disks or other electronic media used to transfer the information to you. Ga. Code Ann. § 50-18-71.
If your request is denied, make sure the agency has put the denial in writing, setting out the legal basis upon which they claim the denial is justified. From here, you have several options:
If you wish to file a lawsuit to enforce compliance with your request, refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the agency.
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of the Illinois' public records using the state's Freedom of Information Act (IL FOIA). See chapter 5, act 140 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes (Ill. Comp. Stat.). Additionally, you are not required to disclose your reasons for requesting the information.
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You are entitled to inspect and copy records of "public bodies", including legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of the State, State universities and colleges, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees, or commissions of this State. See 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 140/2. Note that Access to Government Meetings in Illinois and Illinois State Court Records has more information on how to access records from those government entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of the government bodies subject to the IL FOIA. The term "public records" is broadly defined to include all documents, books, maps, photographs, microfilms, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data processing records, recorded information prepared, used, received, possessed or under the control of any public body, regardless of whether medium or format. See 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 140/2(c).
Exemptions
A public body may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
A public body must provide any segregable non-exempt portions of otherwise exempt records. Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press' Open Government Guide: Illinois, to better understand the exemptions for the IL FOIA.
Under the IL FOIA, you are entitled to make a request in person or in writing, but the Illinois Attorney General recommends making requests in writing, because time limits and appeal processes are only activated upon the submission of a written request.
The Act does not stipulate what a written request must require, but the letter should be addressed to the freedom of information officer of the relevant agency and contain, as appropriate:
You may also find the Illinois Attorney General's sample FOIA request letter helpful in shaping your letter.
If your request is denied, make sure the agency has put the denial in writing, setting out the legal basis upon which they claim the denial is justified. From here, you have several options:
If you wish to file a lawsuit to enforce compliance with your request, refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the agency.
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of Indiana’s public records using the state's Access to Public Records Act (APRA). See title 4, article 14, section 3 of the Indiana Code, (Ind. Code). You do not have to tell the records-keeper why you are seeking the information, as you cannot be denied a request because of your reasons for wanting the information.
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You are entitled to inspect and copy records of "public agencies" under the APRA. The term "public agency" is defined broadly and includes townships, cities, schools, law enforcement agencies, and any boards, commissions, agencies, or offices that exercises administrative, judicial, or legislative power. The act also includes any entity that uses public funds or is subject to audit review by the state board of accounts. Because the list is so expansive, chances are good that most state entities fall within the act. For a full list of all entities that are covered, see Ind. Code § 5-14-3-2(l). Note that Access to Government Meetings in Indiana and Indiana State Court Records have more information on how to access records from those government entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of Indiana’s public agencies. The term "public record" refers to any writing, paper, report, study, map, photograph, book, card, tape recording, or other material that is created, received, retained, maintained, or filed by or with a public agency. See Ind. Code § 5-14-3-2(m). Because the definition of "public record" is so broad, you should have access to nearly any document or recording that a public agency has in its possession, unless the records fall under an exemption.
Exemptions
A public agency will refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
A public agency has the discretion to refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
For more information about the exemptions as they appear in the statute, refer to Ind. Code §§ 5-14-3-4(a)(1)-(11) and Ind. Code §§ 5-14-3-4(b)(1)-(20). Additionally, consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press’ Open Government Guide: Indiana to better understand the exemptions under the Indiana APRA.
You can generally request the record via telephone, mail, or in person at the public agency's office. Be sure to describe the record as specifically as possible so the record-keeper can identify the particular record that you are seeking. Some agencies may require that all requests be written, and some public agencies have specific request forms that you may have to fill out. If you don't know which public agency to contact, the Office of the Public Access Counselor suggests that you contact your local library or the State Information Center for help.
The public agency must respond to your request within 24 hours if you made the request in person or via telephone. If you mailed or faxed your request, the agency must respond within seven calendar days. The agency's response may simply acknowledge your request or may inform you how and when it intends to produce the records. However, the APRA does not specify a timeframe in which the agency must produce the records once it has received your request. Public agencies must only produce the records in a reasonable period of time.
Once the public agency produces the records, you may either inspect them or have them copied. Agencies cannot charge you if you only want to inspect the records, but they may charge copying fees. State agencies may charge up to $.10 per page, and all other agencies may only charge the actual costs of copying. Agencies cannot charge fees for labor, overhead costs, searching, or review. Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require a records-keeper to create a record in response to your request.
If your request is denied, the agency must give you its legal basis for the denial. If you disagree with this response, you should contact the Office of the Public Access Counselor. You can contact the Office informally, or you can file a formal complaint. The Public Access Counselor will provide written advisory opinions in response to formal complaints.
If your request is still denied, you may ultimately file a civil lawsuit in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the denial was made. In such a lawsuit, the agency has the burden of proof, meaning that the agency must prove that it properly denied access to the record. Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the public agency.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
For additional information about engaging in journalism in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, please see our printable PDF guide Newsgathering in Massachusetts, co-produced with the Harvard Law School Cyberlaw Clinic.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of the Commonwealth's public records using the state's Public Records law. See Chapter 66, section 10(a) of the Massachusetts General Laws, ("Mass. Gen. Laws") which states that "anyone" can make a request for state public records in Massachusetts.
You are not required to explain to a records custodian (the government officer who controls or has access to public records) why you are making a request. 950 CMR 32.05(5). However, if you request records involving building and infrastructure plans, vulnerability assessments, security measures, or other such requests that may raise terrorism-related concerns, a records custodian may ask you to provide the purpose for your request. Although you are not required to answer, you may wish do to so as the records custodian is charged with using all the information available to reach a reasonable judgment on whether the disclosure will jeopardize public safety, and thus whether to grant your request. Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 4, § 7(26)(n).
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You can inspect the public records of any Commonwealth agency, executive office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or authority, or of any of their political subdivisions. You can also inspect the public records of any authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose. However, the Public Records Law does not apply to the Massachusetts state legislature or its committees, nor to the state courts. See Access to Government Meetings in Massachusetts and Massachusetts State Court Records for more information.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of the government bodies subject to the Public Records Law. The term "public records" is broadly defined to include all documents, including those in electronic form, generated or received by any government body. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 4, § 7(26).
Exemptions
A records custodian may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth's A Guide to Massachusetts Public Records Law for more information on these exemptions.
You may make either an oral or a written request to the records custodian for the government body whose public records you wish to inspect. (If you do not know who the records custodian is, call the government body and ask for the records custodian's contact information.)
The records custodian has ten days to refuse or comply with your request. Mass. Gen. Law, ch. 66, § 10(b). If you want a copy of the documents, you may need to pay a fee. The fee must be reasonable and may cover the time the records custodian spends searching, redacting, copying, and refiling a record. In some cases, a records custodian has the discretion to waive fees if disclosure is in the public interest. Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require a records custodian to create a record in response to your request (but he may do so at his discretion).
You have several options open to you should the records custodian deny your request. First, try to work with the records custodian. If the agency is relying on an exemption, ask the records custodian to release the nonexempt portions of the record with the exempt portions removed or redacted.
You may also petition the supervisor of public records. You will need to send a letter to the supervisor within 90 days of your original request (NOT from the date your request was denied) stating the reasons for your appeal. The letter must be accompanied by your original request and the written response, if any, you received from the custodian of the record. If the supervisor finds that the records are public, the supervisor can force the records custodian to comply. If, on the other hand, the supervisor of records issues a denial, you are entitled to seek court review of the denial. You can file a lawsuit with the Massachusetts supreme judicial and superior courts to enforce compliance with your request. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 66, § 10(b). Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the government entity.
You may want to familiarize yourself with the Public Records law and browse through chapter 66 and chapter 4, section 7, clause 26 of the Massachusetts General Laws for more information. Additionally, to better understand the intricacies of the law, refer to the Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth's terrific resource called A Guide to Massachusetts Public Records Law. If you are requesting information from police agencies, you may wish review this bulletin from the supervisor of public records, which addresses some of the more common reasons why Massachusetts police officials deny public records requests.
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect Michigan's public records using the state's Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), unless you are "incarcerated in state or local correctional facilities." See Section 15.231 of Michigan Compiled Laws ("Mich. Comp. Laws").
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You can inspect the public records of any Michigan agency, department, division, bureau, board, commission, or council in the executive and legislative branches of the state government. You can also inspect the records of bodies created by or funded primarily by state or local authorities. However, the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to the Michigan state legislature or its committees, nor to the state courts. Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.232. Refer to Access to Government Meetings in Michigan and Michigan State Court Records for more information on how to access records from the state legislature and the state courts.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of the government bodies subject to the Michigan FOIA. The term "public record" refers to any "writing prepared, owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body in the performance of an official function, from the time it is created," including computerized data, but not including software. Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.232.
Exemptions
A FOIA coordinator (the government officer who controls or has access to public records for a public body) may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
For more information about the exemptions as they appear in the statute, refer to Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.243. Additionally, you should also consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Michigan, and the Office of the Michigan Attorney General's helpful summary to better understand the exemptions for the Michigan FOIA.
You must make a written request and fax, email, or mail it to a public body's FOIA coordinator. The Student Press Law Center has a unique letter generator that can help you create your request. Additionally, the Michigan Attorney General's Office has a helpful summary of how to request records (scroll down to the sections titled "Availability of Public Records" and "Fees for Public Records"). Note that you may request a specific record, and also subscribe to public records that are created, issued or disseminated on a regular basis. Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.233.
The FOIA coordinator has five days to refuse or comply with your request. Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.235. If you want a copy of the records, you may need to pay a fee. The fee is limited to the cost of complying with the request, and may cover the time the FOIA custodian spends searching, redacting, and copying a record. Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.234. Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require a FOIA custodian to create a record in response to your request.
You have several options open to you should the FOIA coordinator deny your request. First, try to work with the FOIA coordinator. If the public body is relying on an exemption, ask the FOIA coordinator to release the nonexempt portions of the record with the exempt portions removed or redacted.
You may also petition the head of the public body. If she finds that the records are public, the FOIA coordinator will be forced to comply with your request. If, on the other hand, the head of the public body issues a denial, you are entitled to seek court review of the denial. You have 180 days to file a lawsuit with the Michigan state court to enforce compliance with your request. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.240. If the court finds that the requested records are public, the court can not only compel the public body to comply with the request, but may also award attorneys' fees and costs, as well as damages, which may include punitive damages. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.240(6)-(7). Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the government entity.
See also the Attorney General's Summary of the Michigan FOIA (scroll down to the "Denial of a Record," "Enforcement," and "Penalties for Violation of the Act" sections).
You may want to familiarize yourself with the Michigan Legislature's The Michigan Open Meetings Act and Freedom of Information Act.
Note: This page covers information specific to Missouri. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
Missouri combines its public records and public meetings laws into one statute. It defines public records very broadly and has no limitations on who can request records. You do not have to state a purpose to access records.What Government Bodies Are Covered
Any "public governmental body" is subject to the public records law. A public governmental body is defined under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.010.4(4) as any "legislative, administrative or governmental entity" that includes any agency, council, committee, any governing body of any public institution of higher education, departments or divisions of the state, any quasi-public body (meaning any person or business whose primary purpose is to contract with public bodies or perform a public function, such as tax abatement) and legislative/administrative bodies with the power to make rules or hear and decide cases.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested?
Public records, defined in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.010.6(6), include any written or electronic report, survey, memorandum or any other document retained by or prepared for a public body. Internal memoranda prepared for a public body with advice, opinions and recommendations are excluded unless they are retained by the body or presented at a public meeting.Exemptions
Reports of any ongoing investigation are closed. Arrest reports of people who are not charged within 30 days of arrest are also closed, however the disposition portion of the record may be open.
Police can redact any portion of a record that would pose a "clear and present danger" to a victim, witness, undercover officer or other person, would jeopardize an investigation, or would disclose the identity of a confidential informant.
The following records are also exempt under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.021:
Making the request
The public body must respond "as soon as possible" but no later than 3 days after receiving your request. If you're not granted immediate access, the public body must provide you a written statement explaining the delay. If you are denied access, they must give you a written statement explaining denial.Payment
The public body may not charge you more than ten cents per page for copies, if the copy is smaller than a 9 X 14 sheet of paper. In addition to this copying fee, under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.026 they can charge you the hourly rate of pay of clerical staff for the time they spend duplicating the records. If research time is needed, you may be charged for that.
If your request involves copies larger than 9 X 14 copies and/or involves tapes, disks, films, maps, graphs or digital records, you may also be charged for accessing these records, even if you don't make copies. The amount can't exceed the hourly rate of the staff. If the staff must copy disks, then you can be be charged the costs of disks.
The public body can request advance payment.
You may file suit if you believe that your request was improperly denied. If you can prove that a record was supposed to be open and you were denied access, then the public body must show that it was complying with the law or else you win your case.
If you can also show that the public body violated the open meetings law, the court must award you damages, up to $1,000. In calculating your award, the court must consider the size of the jurisdiction, the seriousness of the offense, and whether the body has previously violated the law. The court may give you costs and attorney fees. The statute doesn't define a "knowing" violation, but in Wright v. City of Salisbury, No. 2:07CV00056 AGF, 2010 WL2947709 (E.D.Mo. 2010), the federal district court in the Eastern District of Missouri, applying state law, held that a "knowing" violation referred to evidence that the public body knew that they were violating the law.
If you can show that the body purposely violated the law, the court must give you damages, up to $5,000, as well as court costs and attorney fees. In calculating your award, the court must consider the size of the jurisdiction, the seriousness of the offense, and whether the body has previously violated the law. Again, the statute doesn't define "purposely", but in Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a purposeful violation is one that shows a conscious plan to violate the law.
You can also sue to open an otherwise lawfully closed law enforcement record. The court must weigh the public interest in opening the record with the harm to anyone involved in the incident in deciding whether to open it. You may have to bear the costs and attorney fees for both yourself and the law enforcement body if you do this, unless the court finds that the reason for withholding an investigative report was substantially unjustified in your specific circumstances.
The courts also have the power to enforce public records and public meetings provisions through injunctions under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.030.
If you sue a public body for a closed record violation, make sure you do within one year pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.027.5(5).
Note: This page covers information specific to Nevada. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
Under the Nevada Public Records Law, all public books and records of any government entity that have not been declared confidential must be made available to members of the public upon request. Nev. R. Stat. Ch. 239. The law does not put any limitations on who may make the request to inspect the public records, and any exception or exemption to the public records law must be construed narrowly. Nev. R. Stat. 239.001.
A "governmental entity" for the purposes of the Nevada Public Records Law includes an elected or appointed officer of Nevada or of a political subdivision of the state; an institution, board, commission, bureau, council, department, division, authority, or other unit of government of Nevada or a political subdivision of Nevada; a university foundation (a nonprofit corporation, association, or institution or a charitable organization that's purpose is fundraising in support of a university, state college, or community college, which was formed pursuant to the laws of the state and is a 501(c)(3) organization); and educational foundations that are dedicated to the assistance of public schools. The law also includes private entities under contract with the government to provide services to the public that are "substantially similar" to the services provided by the government and are in lieu of services otherwise authorized or required to be provided by the government.
All books and records, except those exempted by statute, must be made available for inspection during normal business hours. Any privatization contract, which authorizes private entities to provide certain public services, is also public record.
Records are confidential if the record contains the name, address, telephone number, or other potentially personal identifying information of a person and the person whose information appears in the record provided the information to the public entity for the purpose of 1) registering with the entity for the purpose of using a recreational facility or a portion of the facility or 2) on his own behalf or on behalf of a child, registering, enrolling, or applying to participate in a recreational or instructional activity that is conducted by, sponsored, or conducted by a public entity. Nev. R. Stat. 239.0105. Additionally, any public library records
that identify a user with the property used are not public records under this statute. Nev. R. Stat. 239.013.
The statute does not specifically define what is public record. Generally, what qualifies as public record is determined by case law. According to the Legislative findings, the government entities and courts must apply a balancing of interests test, although this is also not specifically defined. The most commonly used test is laid out in Donrey of Nevada v. Bradshaw, 106 Nev. 630, 798
P.2d 144 (1990). In the Donrey test, the court must balance the public's right to know the information being requested with the individual's right to privacy. However, the test was intended to be applied very narrowly to criminal investigative records, although it is often cited by entities in refusals to comply with records requests. Generally, in order to challenge a refusal in which the entity cites Donrey, the person making the request must appeal to the district court in the county where the record is located.
If the public entity denies the request because all or part of the record is confidential, it must provide notice of that fact in writing and cite to the statute or legal authority that makes the information confidential. Nev. R. Stat. 239.0107(d).
A government entity may charge a fee for providing copies of a public record, but that fee must not exceed the actual cost of making a copy of the record, unless a statute or regulation sets a fee for a copy. Nev. R. Stat. 239.052. If a statute specifies that an entity must not charge for a copy, then there is no charge. The fees must be posted in a conspicuous place at each office where the public record may be obtained.
Copies of transcripts of administrative or court proceedings shall have an additional per-page fee, which must also be posted in a conspicuous place. Nev. R. Stat. 239.053. Additional fees also apply if the information is obtained from a geographic information system, when it requires "an extraordinary use of personnel or resources," or if microfilm is used. Nev. R. Stat. 239.054-055;
239.070.
If the request is denied, the applicant may apply to the district court in the county where the record is located requesting an order to allow for the applicant to view the record. Nev. R. Stat. 239.011. The burden of proof the courts used when determining the confidentiality of a document is preponderance of the evidence. If the court grants the records request, the applicant may be able to recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs. Nev. R. Stat. 239.011.
The Citizen Media Law Project would like to thank the Randazza Legal Group for preparing this section. The contents of this page should not be considered to be legal advice.
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You must be a citizen of New Jersey in order to inspect the state's public records using New Jersey's Open Public Records Act (OPRA). See Section 47:1A-1 of New Jersey Statutes Annotated ("N.J. Stat. Ann."). There is an exception to this for convicts who are trying to access the personal information of a victim or family of a victim of their offense. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-2.2
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You can inspect the public records of any New Jersey agency which includes: any of the principal departments in the executive branch of state government, and any principal department's division, board, bureau, office, commission; the legislature and any office, board, bureau, or commission within or created by the legislative branch; and any independent state authority, commission, instrumentality, or agency. However, the OPRA does not apply to the New Jersey courts. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-1.1. Refer to Access to Government Meetings in New Jersey and New Jersey State Court Records for more information on attending open meetings at the state legislature and accessing records from the state courts.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of the government bodies subject to the New Jersey OPRA. The term "public record" refers to all government records that have "been made, maintained or kept on file in the course of . . . official business by any officer, commission, agency, or authority of the state." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-1.1.
Exemptions
A custodian of records (the government officer who controls or has access to public records for a public body) may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
For more information about the exemptions as they appear in the statute, refer to the New Jersey Open Public Records Act. Additionally, you should also consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: New Jersey, and the New Jersey Government Records Council's helpful summary Citizen's Guide to OPRA to better understand the exemptions for the Michigan FOIA.
You must make a written request and convey it to the public body's custodian of records. You can hand-deliver, mail, fax, or in some cases even email your request to the appropriate custodian (check with the public body to see whether they are capable of receiving email requests). Call the public agency and ask for a records request form use to request records under OPRA. Or, use the Student Press Law Center's unique letter generator that can help you create your request.
The custodian must reply to your request within seven business days. If you want a copy of the records, you may need to pay a fee. In general, the fee is limited to $0.75 per page for the first to tenth page, $0.50 per page for the eleventh page to twentieth page, and $0.25 per page for the twentieth page and on. Note that there may be special service charges in the case of exceptionally difficult requests. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 47:1A-5 (particularly the sections titled "Time period for responses by custodian," "Fees for copies," and "Special service charges") and the Citizen's Guide to OPRA. Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require a custodian to create a record in response to your request.
You have several options open to you should the custodian of records deny your request. First, try to work with the custodian. If the public body is relying on an exemption, ask the custodian to release the nonexempt portions of the record with the exempt portions removed or redacted.
If the custodian still does not apply and you want further review of your request, your three options are to:
According to the State of New Jersey Government Records Council's Citizen's Guide to OPRA, you may want to contact the Council for advice before filing a lawsuit or formal action. The Council's staff can try to mediate your dispute and bring about a successful resolution. However should the mediation fail, or should you should one of the other two options, you should refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential action against the government entity.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect New York's public records using the state's Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL"). See Sections 84 to 90 of the New York Public Officers Law ("N.Y. Pub. Off. Law") which contains no limitations on which members of the public can request records.
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You can inspect the public records of any New York agency. An agency is defined as any "state or municipal department, board, bureau, division, commission, committee, public authority, public corporation, council, office or other governmental entity." N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §§ 86(3)-87. If you want to access the records of the state judiciary or the state legislature, refer to Access to Government Meetings in New York and New York State Court Records for more information.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
In general, you can inspect the records of all New York agencies as defined above. The term "record" refers to "any information kept, held, filed, produced or reproduced by, with or for an agency . . . in any physical form." N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 86(4). Additionally, each agency is required to maintain: (1) records on agency member votes, (2) the name, public office address, title and salary of every officer or employee of the agency, and (3) a subject matter list that list details the subject categories under which records are kept. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 87(3).
Exemptions
A records access manager (the government officer who coordinates an agency's response to public requests for records) may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
For more information about the exemptions as they appear in the statute, refer to N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 87(2). Additionally, you should also consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: New York, and the New York Committee on Open Government's publication Your Right to Know to better understand the exemptions for the New York FOIL.
There is no uniform procedure for you to follow in requesting records from New York agencies because each agency has its own procedures for handling records requests. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §§ 87.1(b), 88.1. You are should contact the agency whose records you desire to find out what method they use for making a request. You also have two other resources to help you create your request: (1) the New York Committee on Open Government has placed a sample letter for a records request on its informational site Your Right to know, and (2) the Student Press Law Center has a unique letter generator that can help you generate an appropriate request.
The records access manager has five days to refuse or comply with your request. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 89.3(a). If you want a copy of the records, you may need to pay a fee. The agency may charge you a fee of $0.25 per page, unless otherwise prescribed by statute. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 87(1)(b)(iii). Fees for copies of records in other formats may be charged based upon the actual cost of reproduction. Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require a FOIA custodian to create a record in response to your request.
You have several options open to you should the records access manager deny your request. First, try to work with the records access manager. If the agency is relying on an exemption, ask the records access manager to release the nonexempt portions of the record with the exempt portions removed or redacted.
If you are unable to make headway with the records access manager and your records request remains denied, you have thirty days to appeal to the head of the agency. The agency has ten days to comply with your request, or explain their denial in writing. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 89.4(a). If you receive a denial at this point (including if the agency does not respond), you can file a lawsuit with the New York state court to enforce compliance with your request. In some cases the court may award you attorney's fees. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 89.4(b)-(c). Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the government entity.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of North Carolina’s public records using the state's Public Records law. See chapter 132, section 1(b) of the North Carolina General Statute, (N.C. Gen. Stat.) stating that public records are the property of the "the people."
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You are entitled to inspect and copy records of "public agencies" under the Public Records law. The term "public agency" is defined broadly and applies to any agency of North Carolina government or its subdivisions. This includes every public office, public officer, institution, board, commission, bureau, council, department, authority, or unit of the state government or a subdivision of government. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1. Consult Access to Government Meetings in North Carolina and North Carolina State Court Records for more information on how to access records from those government entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of North Carolina’s public agencies. The term "public record" refers to all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs, films, sound recordings, tapes, or electronic data made or received in connection with the transaction of public business by any agency of North Carolina. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1(a).
Exemptions
An agency may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
This list is not a complete list of the occasions when an agency may refuse disclosure. There are numerous narrow exceptions to North Carolina's public records law as well. Please refer to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press’ Open Government Guide: North Carolina for more information about the exemptions under the Public Records law.
You can generally request records via telephone, fax, mail, or in person. However, agencies may require that the requests be written. Although you may direct your request to any employee within the agency, the custodian of public records is officially in charge of access to public records N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-2. Therefore, you may want to contact the custodian directly if possible. Try to make your request as specific as possible so the custodian of public records can easily find the document you are seeking.
You may choose to simply inspect the records during the agency's business hours, or you may request that the agency provide you with copies of the records. If you want the records in a specific format (such as CD-ROM), make sure to specify the format in your request. The law requires that the agency provide the records "in any and all media in which the public agency is capable of providing them." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6.2. Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require the custodian of public records to create a record in response to your request.
The law does not specify a specific time period in which the agency must comply with your request. The agency must simply furnish copies "as promptly as possible" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-6.
The agency must provide the records "free or at a minimal cost." Minimal cost means the actual cost of reproducing the records. Agencies may not charge additional fees beyond the actual cost of copying N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1.
If your request is denied, you should first ask the custodian of public records to state the specific reason for the denial. If the custodian is relying on an exemption, ask her to release the nonexempt portions of the record with the exempt portions removed or redacted.
If you feel that the denial is not justified, you may file a civil action in court against the agency to compel disclosure. Actions brought under the Public Records law must be set down for immediate hearing and are given priority in the courts. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9. Unlike other states, there are no administrative appeals processes to exhaust before initiating a civil suit in court. However, in order for the court to have jurisdiction to issue an order compelling the production of public records, the requesting party must initiate mediation of the dispute through the court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-9(a); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A‑38.3E(b). The court need not wait until mediation has concluded to order that public records be produced. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A‑38.3E(h). Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the public agency.
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of Ohio’s public records using the state's public records law. See chapter 149, section 43 of the Ohio Revised Code, (Ohio Rev. Code).You do not have to reveal your identity or your intended use of the records, as the official is not permitted to deny your request on these grounds. See Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(B)(4).
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You are entitled to inspect and copy records of all "public offices" under Ohio’s public records law. The term "public office" is defined broadly and includes state, county, city, village, township, and school district units. See Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(A)(1). Consult Access to Government Meetings in Ohio and Ohio State Court Records for more information on how to access records from those government entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You should be able to request any document or file that the public office has prepared or possesses, unless the records fall under an exemption. See Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(A)(1), which states that you can request any "records" of any public office.
Exemptions
A public office may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
See Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(A)(1) for more information on the exemptions. Additionally, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press’ Open Government Guide: Ohio also discusses the exemptions under Ohio’s public records law.
You can make the request in any way you choose, such as via mail or in person. Make your request as specific as possible so the records keeper can find the record. You are not required to provide a written request, although you may want to do so to better clarify your request. If a written request would help the agency better identify and locate the records, the records keeper may ask that you write the request. However, the records keeper must inform you that a written request is not required by law. See Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(B)(5). Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require the agency to create a record in response to your request.
Time limits
Ohio law does not specify any exact time limits in which the agency must respond to your request. However, upon receipt of your request, the office must "promptly" prepare the records and make them available for inspection. If you have requested copies of the records, these copies shall be provided to you "within a reasonable period of time." See Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(B)(1).
Costs
The public records law is unclear about the specific fees you may be charged for copies of records. Upon request, the office must make copies "at cost," whch means that they cannot profit from your request. The office can charge for "the cost involved in providing the public record," and you may be required to pay the fee in advance. See Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(B)(6). The statute does not specify exact rates the agency may charge (such as a maximum cost per copy).
If the public office denies your request, the office must provide you with a legal explanation for the denial See Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(B)(3). If the public office is relying on an exemption, ask the records-keeper to release the nonexempt portions of the record with the exempt portions removed or redacted.
If you feel that the denial does not comply with the Public Records Act, your only remedy is to litigate the case. You can file an action for a writ of mandamus, which is an action asking the court to force the agency to comply with your request. If you prevail in court, you may be entitled to attorney's fees and/or a damage award. See Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(C)(1). Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the public office.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect Pennsylvania's public records using the state's RTK Law. See section 702. You do not have to tell the records-keeper why you are seeking the information as you cannot be denied a request because of your reasons for wanting the information.
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You can access records from all commonwealth agencies, local agencies, legislative agencies, and judicial agencies. This includes all executive or state offices, boards, authorities, and departments. It also includes state courts and legislative bodies. See section 102.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can access any record "that documents a transaction or activity of an agency and that is created, received or retained pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction, business or activity of the agency" as long as it is not otherwise exempt by the law. See section 102. The legislature has further defined a record to refer to information in any form, such as a document, paper, letter, map, book, tape, photograph, film or sound recording, information stored or maintained electronically and a data-processed or image- processed document.
Exemptions
A records-keeper may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
Read section 708(b) of the RTK Law for more information about the exemptions.
You may request a record verbally or in writing. However, if the agency denies you access to the record, you can only pursue remedies under the RTK Law if your original request was in writing. Consequently it may be in your best interests to provide the agency with a written request. Try to make your request as clear as possible so that the records-keeper can identify and find the records. Your request must be addressed to the agency's open-records officer and may be mailed, emailed, or faxed. Also, be sure to include the name and address to which you want the records or response sent. See chapter 7.
Time limits
The agency must respond within five business days after receiving your request. If the agency fails to respond within this time period, your request is deemed denied. If the agency needs more time to fulfill the request (perhaps because the records are stored in a remote location), it must notify you within five business days and give you a reasonable date that it expects to respond. If the agency estimates that it will take more than thirty days to respond, then the request is deemed denied unless you specifically agree in writing to the extension. This means that an agency cannot make you wait more than 35 business days without your written consent. See chapter 9 for more information.
Costs
The agency may charge fees for postage (if you want the records sent to you), copying, certification, and conversion to paper (if the record is only maintained electronically and you want a paper copy). Generally, these fees must be reasonable, and copying fees should be comparable to duplication fees charged by local businesses.
The agency may waive the fee if it is in the public interest to do so. Therefore, you may want to ask for a fee waiver if you think that you may meet this requirement. Hoewever, the agency has the discretion to determine whether a fee waiver is in the public interest. See section 1307 for more information.
If you think that the agency has wrongly denied your request, you can file an appeal with the Office of Open Records within fifteen business days. Your appeal should state why the record is a public record and the reasons the agency gave for denying the request. The Office of Open Records will assign the case to an appeals officer, who will make a final decision within 30 days. If you do not receive a response from the appeals officer within thirty days, the appeal is deemed denied. See chapter 11.
If the appeals officer denies the appeal, you can file a petition for review in court. If a local agency denied your request, then you must file a petition in the court of common pleas for the county where the local agency is located. If a commonwealth agency, legislative agency, or judicial agency denied your request, then you must filed a petition in the Commonwealth Court. After reviewing the evidence, the Court will issue an opinion on the matter. See chapter 13. Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the public agency. Keep in mind that the burden is on the agency to prove that the record is exempt. See section 708(a).
Note: This page covers information specific to Tennessee. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
See the note below regarding links to statutory provisions in this article.
Tennessee's public record law (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 10-7-101 to 10-7-702) has a very broad definition of what is "public," but under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(a)(2)(A) applies only to requests by "any citizen of this state." If you are not in Tennessee but need public records in the state, you should find someone in the state to make requests for you.
Tennessee also has an extensive list of "confidential" information that is exempt from disclosure, so before making a request, make sure you are not requesting something that is protected in order to save yourself time.
You do not have to declare your reason for wanting to access records, with the exception of certain records related to law enforcement (see below).
What Government Bodies Are Covered
The following departments are subject to the open records law: any legislative body; any common law, circuit, criminal or chancery court; register's books; surveyor's books; entry taker's books; any other records required by law to be maintained.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
Any document, paper, record or book of a government body, or any pleading or other paper filed in a court, is considered a public record.
Exemptions
Tennessee has numerous very specific exemptions from its open records, set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504. You should review the full list before requesting records. These exemptions are based upon confidentiality; therefore, the subject of the record can waive this confidentiality and release the record.
For example, the following records and information are exempt from disclosure:
Also, any personal information about current or former public employees (including law enforcement) is protected. That information includes:
Particular care is needed when requesting a law enforcement officer's personnel files. Such records are presumptively open, but special rules and procedures apply. You must provide your name, address, business telephone number and home telephone number, driver's license number or other identification when you request the record, and the date you inspected the records. The custodian must record this information and give it to the officer under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503(c)(1)-(3).
The statute also defines a special category of "personal information" of law enforcement officers that receives special protection. § 10-7-504(g). This personal information includes an officer's residential address, phone numbers and place of employment, as well as the names, work addresses, and phone numbers of the officer's immediate family, and name, location and phone number of any school or daycare where the officer's spouse or child is enrolled.
This personal information may ordinarily be redacted if the chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) or his designee determine, in their discretion, that there is a reason not to disclose. However, if the request is for a professional, business, or official purpose, the CLEO does not have unfettered discretion. Rather, he or she must consider the specific circumstances of the request, and follow a procedure detailed in the statute:
(1) If the CLEO does not find a reason to withhold personal information in response to a request for a professional, business, or official purpose, the CLEO must disclose that information, but may still withhold a narrower category of information that is confidential under § 10-7-504(f).
(2) If the CLEO does find a reason to withhold subsection personal information in response to a request for a professional, business, or official purpose, the CLEO may not automatically withhold that information; rather, the CLEO must notify the law enforcement officer in question of the request and give the officer an opportunity to be heard and to oppose the request. Presumably, if the officer does not oppose the release, the information must be disclosed.
Regardless of the foregoing, the CLEO may redact/withhold information that could be used to identify or to locate an officer working undercover.
It is not clear if newsgathering constitutes a "professional, business, or official purpose" because the statute does not define the phrase, and there is no case law clarifying the statute. However, one commentator has suggested that this phrase refers to inspection of the officer's personnel file for any "employment, business or professional purpose in connection with an official investigation."
If you are claiming a professional, business or official purpose, you must include in your open records request the following information: your business address, business phone number and e-mail address, along with the name, contact information and e-mail of a supervisor. If the CLEO denies the request, he or she must give a reason, in writing, within 2 business days. You have the right to judicial review of this denial
An otherwise public record may not be withheld in its entirety just because a portion of the information contained in the record is exempt from disclosure. Therefore, if an agency tells you that a portion of a record is confidential, you may have a right to request redaction of that portion and release of the remainder. The law also does not preclude any individual from giving consent to their confidential information being disclosed.
Making the request
The custodian of a record can ask that a records request be in writing, and can also require photo identification that includes the requester's address. Be ready to be asked for both. For certain law enforcement records, you will have to state if you have a professional, business or official purpose.Fulfilling the Request
You should be able to inspect all records during business hours pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503. However, if it is not practical for the record to be promptly available, the custodian must, within 7 business days, make it available or else deny access and give you a reason. If it will take longer than 7 days, he may provide a response with the time he needs to produce the record.A government entity does not have to sort through files to comply with a request. If you are requesting extensive records, be ready to go through them yourself.
No public official can be found liable for releasing records or for any damages that are caused as a result of release.
If you have questions about the state's open meetings law, you can use educational programs and materials that the Office of Open Records Counsel must make available to you.
Payment
The custodian cannot charge you for just viewing the records where they are kept. County officials may provide electronic access or remote access to records, but also may charge users a reasonable access fee.You have a right to copy the record, but the custodian can make reasonable rules regarding copying. The county records commission has the power to establish fees for making copies of records.
If you want a copy of a record that requires reproducing of a computer-generated map or some other geographic data that has some commercial value and was created with public funds, then under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-506, the agency can impose a reasonable fee for its reproduction, in addition to an "additional fee." "Additional fees" may include: labor costs; costs in design of the content contained in the record; development testing and training for whatever content is in the record; and costs necessary to ensure accuracy of the record. This additional fee is not to be levied on individuals who access the record for themselves. Newsgatherers can only be charged for the cost of copying.
The court has full injunctive remedies to secure the purposes and intentions of the open records law. The act is to be construed so as to give the "fullest possible public access."
If the court finds in your favor, it must make the records available unless the government appeals and the court certifies a substantial legal issue that an appellate court must resolve.
In addition, if the court finds that the agency willfully refused to disclose a public record, it may assess all reasonable costs, including attorney fees against the agency.
Additionally, refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of Texas’ public records using the state's Public Information Act. See chapter 552, section 21 of the Texas Government Code, (Texas Gov’t Code). However, the act does not require a governmental body to comply with requests from incarcerated individuals or their agents. See Texas Gov’t Code § 552.028.
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You are entitled to inspect and copy records of all government bodies under the Texas Public Information Act. The term “government body” is defined broadly and includes city governments, county governments, and agencies. The Act also covers certain non-profit organizations and private entities that spend or are supported by public funds. See Texas Gov’t Code § 552.003. However, the Public Records law does not apply to the Texas state legislature or to the state courts. Consult Access to Government Meetings in Texas and Texas State Court Records for more information on how to access records from those government entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of Texas’ government bodies, unless the records fall under an exemption (see below). The term "public record" refers to all information that is collected, assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by or for a government entity, regardless of the format of the information. See Texas Gov’t Code § 552.002.
Exemptions
A government body may refuse disclosure of the requested records if one or more of the following statutory exemptions applies:
Refer to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press’ Open Government Guide: Texas for more information about the exemptions under the Texas Public Information Act.
Your request must be in writing. The Freedom of Information Foundation of Texas provides a helpful sample request letter.
You may choose to mail, e-mail, or fax your request. Requests via mail do not need to be addressed to a certain person so long as you make it clear that you are submitting a request under the Public Information Act. However, requests via e-mail and fax must be addressed to the Officer of Public Information (the specific person at office who handles public records requests). If you are unsure who to address your e-mail or fax to, call the government body or search online for more information.
Time limits
The government body must respond to your request within a reasonable time. See Texas Gov’t Code § 552.228. However, if the agency believes that the record is exempt from disclosure, it must notify you within 10 days. If it fails to do so, then the record is presumed to be public and must be released See Texas Gov’t Code § 552.302. Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require the custodian of public records to create a record in response to your request.
Costs
Section 70 of the Texas Administrative Code provides detailed guidelines for when and how much an office may charge for copies of public information. If you just want to inspect the records, you should not be charged unless the information would take several hours to prepare and fills several boxes. See Rule 70.5. If you request paper copies of the records, you can be charged $.10 per page. You may be charged up to $15 per hour for search fees if your request is larger than 50 pages or if the documents are located separate facilities. You can also be charged labor costs if the records contain confidential information that must be redacted. See Rule 70.3.
If the officer at the government body believes that the record you have requested is exempt from disclosure, she must ask for a decision from the attorney general within 10 days of receiving the request. Within 10 days, the governmental body must also provide you (the requester) a written statement and a copy of its communications with the attorney general. See Texas Gov’t Code § 552.301. Any person may submit written comments to the attorney general stating reasons why the record should or should not be released. See Texas Gov’t Code § 552.304. Within 45 days, the attorney general must issue a ruling as to whether or not the record is exempt from disclosure. See Texas Gov’t Code § 552.306.
If the attorney general rules that the record is exempt from disclosure and you disagree with this decision, you may file a lawsuit for judicial review of the attorney general's decision. The suit must be filed in a district court for the county in which the main offices of the governmental body are located Texas Gov’t Code § 552.321. Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the public agency.
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
If you are a citizen of Virginia, you have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of Virginia’s public records using the state's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See title 2.2, chapter 37 of the Virginia Code, (Va. Code), stating that "all public records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizens of the Commonwealth . . ." You may be required to provide your name and address so the records-keeper can verify that you are a citizen of Virginia. Va. Code § 2.2-3704(A).
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You are entitled to inspect and copy records of "public bodies" under the state’s FOIA. The term "public body" is defined broadly and includes all cities, counties, school boards, planning commissions, legislative bodies, boards, bureaus, districts, or agencies of the Commonwealth. The statute also includes organizations, corporations, or agencies that are principally supported by public funds. Va. Code § 2.2-3701. You may wish to consult Access to Government Meetings in Virginia and Virginia State Court Records for more information on how to access records from those government entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of Virginia’s public bodies. The term "public record" refers to all writings and recordings that are prepared, owned by, or in the possession of a public body, regardless of physical form. Va. Code § 2.2-3701.
Exemptions
Virginia’s FOIA lists over 100 specific types of records that are exempt from public disclosure. These include:
Refer to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press’ Open Government Guide: Virginia for more information about the exemptions under Virginia’s FOIA.
According to the Virginia Coalition for Open Government, you can make your request in any medium the public body itself uses, including e-mail. The Virginia FOIA does not specify that the request be in writing, but it will probably help the public body better understand your request if you make it in writing. Try to be as specific as possible in your request so the public body can find the exact records you are seeking. The Coalition offers this useful request letter generator which may help you create your request.
Costs
The public body may make "reasonable charges" for accessing, duplicating, supplying or searching for the records. However, these costs may not exceed the actual costs incurred by the body. At your request, the public body must estimate any charges in advance. Va. Code § 2.2-3704(F). If the public body determines in advance that charges for producing the requested records are likely to exceed $200, the public body may require the requester to agree to payment of a deposit in the amount of the advance determination before continuing to process the request. Va. Code 2.2-3704(H).
Time limits
Within five working days, the public body must either provide you with the records or tell you why they cannot comply with your request. Va. Code § 2.2-3704(B). The public body can get an additional seven days to fulfill your request if necessary. If the public body needs more time to respond to your request because it needs to search an extraordinary amount of records, it should contact you and try to come to an agreement about the production of the records. If this fails, then the public body can petition the appropriate court for extra time to comply with the request. 2.2-3704(C). If the agency does not respond to your request within the five working days, it is considered a denial of the request and constitutes a violation of the Virginia FOIA. Va. Code § 2.2-3704(E).
If the public body denies your request or does not respond to your request, you should always first try to contact the body and resolve the issue. If the public office is relying on an exemption, ask the records-keeper to release the nonexempt portions of the record with the exempt portions removed or redacted.
If you are not satisfied with the public body's response, you may file a lawsuit asking the court to force the body to comply. In such cases, the public body bears the burden of proving that the exemption was justified. Va. Code § 2.2-3713. Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the public agency.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of Washington’s public records using the state's Public Records Act. See chapter 42, section 56 of the Revised Code of Washington, (Wash. Rev. Code). You are not required to tell the agency your purpose for requesting the reocrds, and the agency cannot "distinguish among persons requesting records." Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.080.
What Government Bodies Are Covered
You are entitled to inspect and copy records of all state and local agencies under the Public Records Act. The term "public agency" is defined broadly and includes every public office, agency, department, division, bureau, board, commission, county, city, town, and municipal corporation. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.010(1). However, the Public Records law does not apply to the Washington state legislature or to the state courts. Consult Access to Government Meetings in Washington and Washington State Court Records for more information on how to access records from those government entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You can inspect all "public records" of Washington’s agencies. The term "public record" refers to any writing relating to the conduct of government or the performance of any governmental function that is prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.010(2).
Exemptions
If another statute deems a record confidential or exempt from disclosure, then agencies cannot release the records. However, all exemptions listed in the Public Records Act are discretionary, which means that the agency can choose whether or not it wants to disclose the record. For a comprehensive explanation of all exemptions contained in the Act, see the attorney general's Open Government Manual.
Some general categories of exemptions are as follows:
Additionally, refer to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press’ Open Government Guide: Washington for more information about the exemptions under the state’s Public Records Act.
The Act does not specify that you have to make the request in any particular manner. However, it is always to your advantage to make you request as specific as possible. You may also want to provide a written request for clarity. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.080. The Student Press Law Center's State Open Records Law Request Letter Generator can help you create a request letter that complies with Washington law.
Time limits
Washington agencies are required to promptly reply to requests for records. Within five business days of receiving your request, the agency must respond in one of three ways: (1) by providing the record, (2) by acknowledging your request and providing a reasonable estimate of the additional time the agency will require to comply with the request, or (3) by denying the request. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.520.
Costs
The agency cannot charge you for inspection of records. However, if you would like copies of records, you may be charged a "reasonable" fee. The fee cannot exceed the agency's actual cost of copying the records. In general, the agency may not charge more than $.15 per page. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.120.
If your request is denied, the agency must give you its legal basis for the denial. If you disagree with this response, you have several options. You may:
If you choose the second option, the attorney general will provide her written opinion as to whether or not the record is exempt. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.530. If you choose the third option, refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the public agency. Keep in mind that the burden is on the agency to prove that the record is exempt. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.56.550.
Note: This page covers information specific to the District of Columbia. For general information concerning access to government records see the Access to Government Records section of this guide.
You have a statutory right to inspect a vast number of the District of Columbia’s public records using the Freedom of Information Act (D.C. FOIA). See section 2-532(a) of the District of Columbia's Annotated Code.
You are not required to explain to a Freedom of Information Officer (FOI Officer), the government officer who controls or has access to public records, why you are making a request. Although you do not need to provide a reason, you may wish to do so as it may be relevant to the agency's determination of whether to rely on an exemption (see below) and deny your request. For example, if you request records which might be exempted as private information, and state that you are seeking the information because it is vital to a pressing issue of public concern, your reasoning may weigh in favor of granting you access to the records.
What Government Bodies Are Covered
Under the DC FOI Act, you are entitled to view the public records of any D.C. "public body", including:
However, the D.C. FOIA does not apply to intergovernmental agencies (e.g. the Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Authority, which was created by interstate compact), D.C. courts, or bodies under the exclusive control of the court (e.g. the Child and Family Services Division of the Department of Human Services). See Access to Government Meetings in D.C. and Access to D.C. Court Records for more information on how to access records from those government entities.
What Types of Records Can Be Requested
You are entitled to any "public records", including "all books, papers, maps, photographs, cards, tapes, recordings or other documentary materials regardless of physical form characteristics prepared, owned or used in the possession of, or retained by a public body." See D.C. Code Ann. § 2-502(18). This includes records in hard copy or in electronic format.
The records need not necessarily be created by the public body, or in the public body's possession, as long as they are under the public body's physical and legal control. You can also request records produced by a private person for a public body under contract (i.e. a delegated duty). D.C. Code Ann. § 2-5376(a)(6).
What Exemptions Might Apply
An agency can refuse to provide access to records covered by any of the following specific exemptions:
See D.C. Code Ann. § 2-534(a).
The public body bears the burden of proving that the exemption applies. If the FOI Officer can segregate non-exempt portions of the record or redact sensitive information, he must to do and provide those non-exempt portions to you. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-534(b). Visit Open Government Guide's discussion of exemptions for more information about the exemptions.
You can make an oral or a written request to a public body for the records you wish to inspect. If the request is routine, call the agency and ask to speak with the FOI Officer to make your request. If the person you speak with cannot grant your request over the telephone, he should be able to provide you with guidance on the required written request.
Apart from stipulating that public bodies must comply with any request "reasonably describing any public record," the D.C. FOIA does not set out particular information required in a letter, but the following information should be included, as appropriate:
Alternatively, you can use the Student Press Law Center's State Open Records Law Request Letter Generator to produce a letter that complies with District of Columbia law.
The FOI Officer has fifteen days to refuse or comply with your request, except in "unusual circumstances," in which case an agency may extend the deadline up to ten working days. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-532(c), (d).
If you want a copy of the documents, you may need to pay a fee. The agency may charge you a fee that covers the actual costs of searching, reviewing and copying records. Note that you will be charged a lower fee (only the costs of duplication) if you can establish that your request is for a non-commercial purpose and that you are a representative of the news media. If the agency determines that furnishing the information is in the public interest, it may waive or reduce copying fees. You should state in your request why providing the requested records is primarily benefiting the general public and specifically request a waiver of fees as being in the public interest. See D.C. Code Ann. § 2-532(b).
Note that the law only applies to existing documents. The law does not require a FOI Officer to create a record in response to your request (but he may do so at his discretion).
Although not provided for in the D.C. FOIA, ask the FOI Officer to review his decision denying your request. If refusal is based on one of the exemptions, ask the officer to use his discretion to waive the exemption, or to provide the non-exempt portions of the record. If you have no success with the FOI Officer, you could try to appeal the decision to their seniors within the agency.
If you receive a formal denial letter, or no determination is made within the statutory time period, you are entitled to seek an administrative review. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-537(a).
An administrative review entails an appeal to the Mayor to overturn the agency’s decision. The Mayor has delegated this function to the Secretary of the District of Columbia. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-537(a). An overview of the procedure of appealing to the Mayor is set out in the Open Government Guide. Briefly, an appeal is instituted by sending an appeal letter to the Mayor, stating that it this is a "Freedom of Information Act Appeal", setting out legal arguments why disclosure should be granted and enclosing copies of the request and the denial. If the Mayor refuses to grant your appeal, or fails to respond within ten working days, you still have the option to file a lawsuit. D.C. Code Ann. § 2-537(a)(1).
If you wish to file a lawsuit to enforce compliance with your request, refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the government entity.
While we can't guaranteed that you will get every government record you desire, the following tips will help ensure that you take full advantage of the wealth of information available through state and federal freedom of information laws.
Federal, state, and local governments often act through agencies, boards, committees, and other government "bodies." The most familiar examples of these kinds of government bodies are found at the local level -- they include school boards, city councils, boards of county commissioners, zoning and planning commissions, police review boards, and boards of library trustees. At the state level, examples include state environmental commissions, labor boards, housing boards, and tax commissions, to name a few. The executive branch of the federal government carries out its business through a number of agencies, many of which are governed by multi-member boards of directors or commissioners. Examples include the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Election Commission, and the Federal Housing Finance Board. A common feature of these agencies, boards, commissions, and other government bodies is that they meet as groups to deliberate or take action on public business. For instance, town zoning boards pass new zoning regulations and approve site plans, and state labor boards adopt workplace safety rules.
Public access to these meetings is governed by a category of laws called open meetings laws. These important laws give anyone, including members of the traditional and non-traditional press, the ability to scrutinize and report first-hand on government meetings. They give you the right to attend the meetings of most federal, state, and local government bodies and to receive reasonable notice of those meetings. In many instances, they also entitle you to obtain copies of minutes, transcripts, or recordings at low cost. Open meetings laws thus open up a range of possibilities for fact-gathering and investigative reporting about the workings of government at every level. For example, they give you the right to attend the meeting in which the city council adopts its annual budget, the local school board discusses the curriculum, the state environmental board decides how to fight air pollution, or the FCC deliberates about network neutrality regulations. (You can multiply these examples hundred-fold.) And if you miss an important meeting, you can consult minutes or transcripts to catch up on what took place.
Open meetings laws will be especially useful to you if you want to take your publishing activities beyond commenting on material from other online sources. They can help you move into original reporting and enable you to comment in an informed fashion on local and national debates. You might even do a periodic post or column on meetings of particular interest to your website or blog. For example, the Gotham Gazette, an independent news site that covers "New York City News and Policy," has an entire section of its site focusing on city government, which is largely based on slated meetings of the New York City Council.
While both state and federal open meetings laws provide invaluable access to the actual workings of government, there are a number of challenges to effectively using these laws. For one thing, state open meetings laws are complex. They make use of complicated legal terminology to define what government bodies are covered and what kinds of gatherings qualify as a "meeting." Even more importantly, both federal and state open meetings laws provide specific exemptions that allow government bodies to close meetings or portions of meetings to the public when they deal with certain subject matters, like pending litigation, the purchase of real estate, and official misconduct. These exemptions generally allow government bodies to hold a closed session when they are dealing with private information about an individual, trade secrets, or other confidential documents. The specific definitions and exemptions that will apply in a particular situation, as well as the character of your rights, will depend on what state you are in and whether you are dealing with a federal or state government body. (Note: if you are not sure whether the meeting you would like to attend is part of a federal, state, or local governmental body, you might find the section on Identifying Federal, State, and Local Government Bodies helpful.)
You should also be aware that the open meetings laws discussed in this section do not give you unlimited access to all government meetings. For example, neither the Government in the Sunshine Act nor the Federal Advisory Committee Act provide a right of access to legislative meetings, court proceedings, or meetings of executive departments or the President's staff. Other laws, however, may provide you with access to these proceedings. To learn more about your ability to access Congress's legislative sessions, committee hearings, and documents see Access to Congress. To learn more about your ability to attend court proceedings and to obtain court documents, see Access to Courts and Court Records. No law gives you the right to attend federal executive department meetings, but note that the Federal Advisory Committee Act allows you to attend meetings of advisory committees that assist the President. Consult the Access to Presidential Records section for information about what presidential documents are available for public use.
The following pages in this section will help you to understand and use open meetings laws intelligently:
The Government in the Sunshine Act ("Sunshine Act") governs the right of access to federal agency meetings. Congress passed the Sunshine Act motivated by the idea that citizens have a right to know how the government makes decisions that affect the public interest. The Sunshine Act allows you to attend meetings in which federal agency heads deliberate on agency business. It requires all federal agencies governed by “collegial bodies” to hold open meetings and to provide sufficient notice to allow the public to attend those meetings. The term “collegial bodies” refers to groups of two or more decision-makers that act jointly, such as boards of directors or multiple commissioners. Agencies covered by the Sunshine Act include powerful and important bodies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), as well as lesser known agencies, such as the Marine Mammal Commission, the Railroad Retirement Board, and the Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting.
If a covered agency has improperly prevented you from attending a meeting, you may sue the agency in federal court. Among other things, you can obtain a court order prohibiting future violations of the Sunshine Act and a transcript of an improperly closed meeting.
The Government in the Sunshine Act entitles you to attend many government meetings, but it does not apply to every gathering of every government body. There are two important limitations: the law only applies to meetings of certain kinds of agencies, and it only applies to certain kinds of gatherings. Below we take up these issues in turn.
Which Agencies Are Covered?
The Sunshine Act applies to the meetings of federal agencies. An "agency" is a branch of government responsible for the oversight and administration of laws. For instance, the Department of Labor and the Federal Trade Commission are both agencies. Judiciary and legislative bodies, such as courts and congressional committees, are not agencies. For more examples of federal agencies, see Wikipedia's List of United States federal agencies. The Sunshine Act does not apply to any state or local agencies or private entities.
The Sunshine Act only requires certain kinds of agencies to hold open meetings. Some agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, are headed by a single individual, while other agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission, have more than one head who together run the agency. The Sunshine Act only covers requires the latter type of agency -- agencies headed by a collegial body of two or more members. Moreover, the Sunshine Act only applies to an agency when a majority of the members of its collegial governing body were appointed by the President of the United States and subject to confirmation by the Senate. If a majority of an agency's heads don't fit this description, the agency does not have to hold open meetings. As of 2005, the Sunshine Act required sixty-seven agencies to hold open meetings. Included are many important agencies, such as the SEC, the Federal Elections Commission, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. For a partial list, see Appendix A of the Florida Bar's Reporter's Handbook.
If the Sunshine Act applies to an agency, it also applies to certain subcommittees or "subdivisions" of that agency. Specifically, it applies to subcommittees that are "authorized to act on behalf of the agency" and that include at least one member of the collegial body that governs the agency. Therefore, to be covered a subcommittee must have official and formal powers to regulate, derived from a delegation of authority from the governing body of the agency. For example, if the Commissioners of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission created a subcommittee and authorized it to act for the agency with regard to regulation of corn futures, that subcommittee would be subject to the open-meetings requirements of the Sunshine Act.
Which Types of Meetings Are Covered?
The Sunshine Act only applies to certain kinds of meetings. First, at least the number of agency heads required to take action on behalf of the agency must attend the gathering in question. This is the "quorum" requirement. For instance, if an agency can only take legal action if three of its five heads are present, a meeting of two heads need not be open. In the case of an agency subcommittee, a quorum of subcommittee members must be present to constitute a "meeting," but this need not be a quorum of the whole collegial body that governs the agency.
Second, the agency heads must be acting "jointly." The quorum of agency heads in attendance must be involved in the decisionmaking or discussion being conducted. For example, a speech by one agency head, when the other heads are in the audience passively listening, will not constitute a meeting that must be open to the public under the Sunshine Act.
Third, the meeting must involve "deliberation" of agency business. The Sunshine Act does not define "deliberation," but legislative history indicates that Congress meant the term to apply to situations beyond those where agency heads take formal action and to include all significant discussions in which a quorum of members address agency business. On the other hand, the term does not apply to informal background discussions that clarify issues and expose varying views.
An emerging question is whether electronic communication can constitute a meeting that must be open to the public. For instance, if agency heads exchange views via email on a matter of agency business, is that a meeting that must be open to the public? Richard K. Berg, Stephen H. Klitzman, and Gary J. Edles, authors of the American Bar Association's Interpretive Guide to the Government in the Sunshine Act (2d ed. 2005), argue that the Sunshine Act is not limited to face-to-face communications. They note that Congress intended for telephone conference calls to be covered and argue that whether an electronic communication is a "meeting" depends on whether agency heads are communicating simultaneously. For example, a flurry of instant messages between agency heads might be covered because it takes place (relatively) simultaneously. On the other hand, an email exchange taking place over the course of several days would not be a meeting because of the lack of simultaneity. In any event, the law is unclear on this point, and it is unlikely that you will have knowledge of or occasion to challenge the email or instant messaging practices of federal agency heads.
Attendance
The Sunshine Act gives "the public" the right to attend covered meetings. The law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend. However, an agency may close a portion of a meeting to the public under certain circumstances, discussed below.
Notice
In order to attend a meeting, you need to know about it first. To address this, the Sunshine Act requires agencies to give notice of their meetings to the public at least one week in advance. The notice must state the time, place, and subject matter of the meeting, and whether the meeting will be open or closed to the public. The notice must also give the telephone number of an official who can answer questions about the meeting. If the agency changes the time, location, or agenda, it must announce the change as soon as possible.
The agency must publish notice in the Federal Register, which is a daily government publication containing routine notices. Since most people do not read the Federal Register, agencies must take additional steps to notify the public. Today, many agencies publish notice of meetings on their websites. Agencies might also post notice on public announcement boards, publish announcements in local newspapers, send announcements on a mailing list, or publish an online digest. Check the websites of the agencies you are interested in for details.
Recording
The Sunshine Act does not grant any right to record, photograph, or televise a meeting. As a result, agencies have discretion to permit these activities or not. As a matter of practice, a number of agencies do allow the use of recording devices at meetings. Nevertheless, the agencies that allow recording may put limits on what devices you can use. For instance, the FCC allows only audio recordings during meetings, as well as allowing still, non-flash photography prior to meetings. Some agencies, such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, require that you obtain permission in advance to record a meeting.
Participation
The Sunshine Act does not give you any right to participate in meetings. Although they are not obligated to do so, some agencies allow the public to participate, subject to limitations designed to maintain order. Agencies may prevent attendees from displaying disruptive posters and signs at public meetings. However, they may not discriminate against signs or other materials based on the viewpoints expressed.
An Exception: Closed Meetings
In certain circumstances, agencies may close portions of meetings to the public. Agencies may only close those portions of meetings that qualify for a statutory exception and must try to keep as much of a meeting open as possible. Agencies may close a portion of a meeting when that portion would:
Agencies are not obligated to close meetings in the above circumstances; they merely are permitted to do so. Moreover, the Sunshine Act says that an agency should take the public interest into account and should not close a meeting, even when it could, if it would be in the public interest for the meeting to be open.
Agencies may only close meetings by a majority vote of all agency heads. The agency's chief legal officer must write an official explanation of why the meeting has been closed. Agencies generally must maintain a transcript or electronic recording of closed meetings and make all non-exempt portions of the transcript or recording available to the public. Even for a closed meeting, an agency must provide public notice of when and where the meeting will occur and what the agency will discuss.
The Sunshine Act gives "any person" the right to file a lawsuit in federal district court for violations of its requirements. If you win a lawsuit of this kind, you can obtain an injunction against future violations by the agency -- that is, a court order to hold open meetings in the future. You can also obtain a transcript of an improperly closed meeting. You cannot obtain money damages or an order voiding agency action taken at an improperly closed meeting. Strict time limits apply. If you choose to file a lawsuit, you must do so within sixty days after the meeting giving rise to your complaint. If you bring a lawsuit and succeed, the court may award you reasonable litigation expenses and attorneys' fees. On the other hand, a court may order you to pay an agency's attorneys' fees, if it determines that you brought the lawsuit for frivolous reasons or to delay agency action. This would not happen unless your legal claim were utterly and obviously without any merit.
However, a lawsuit is often a slow and expensive solution, so it is generally better to resolve a dispute without going to court. In the event that you are denied access to a meeting, you should contact the agency in question and inform it that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the agency continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. Keep in mind the sixty-day time limit noted above. If you decide to sue, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA"), located at 5 U.S.C. App. 2, gives you a right of access to the meetings of federal advisory committees. Advisory committees are groups formed by the government to give advice or make recommendations to the the President of the United States or a federal agency. Their membership usually consists of a mix of government officials and private citizens with expertise relating to a specific issue of government concern. If an advisory committee improperly prevents you from attending or contributing to a meeting, or denies you access to documents prepared by or for committee members, you may sue the federal agency that supervises the committee in federal court. Among other things, you can obtain a court order prohibiting future violations of FACA and a transcript of an improperly closed meeting.
FACA entitles you to attend many government meetings, but it does not apply to every gathering of every government body. There are two important limitations: the law only applies to the meetings of certain types of committees, and it only applies to certain kinds of gatherings. Below we take up these issues in turn.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
FACA gives you rights with respect to the meetings of federal advisory committees. The term "advisory committee" means any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, which is created "in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies or officers of the Federal Government." 5 U.S.C. App. 2, § 3 (scroll down). To come under FACA, an advisory committee also must be
In addition, it must have at least one member who is not a government official.
There are over 1,000 federal advisory committees, dealing with topics large and small. It's somewhat hard to get your head around what an advisory committee is without some examples. The United States National Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is an advisory committee with members from federal, state, and local government as well as non-governmental organizations. It makes recommendations to the State Department on matters relating to international development and humanitarian aid. For another example, the Visiting Committee on Advanced Technology is an advisory committee with members mostly from private technology companies that advises the Department of Commerce on emerging technology issues. The U.S. Air Force Board of Visitors is an advisory committee created by an Act of Congress, which is made up of private citizens and members of Congress, and which acts like a board of trustees for the Air Force Academy. To explore the government's list of advisory committees, conduct a search at the FACA database. Click "Public Access" and then "Committees Search" to get started. There, you can search for advisory committees by name or area of interest.
A few advisory committees are exempt from the open meetings requirements. Advisory committees established by the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Public Administration, the CIA, and the Federal Reserve Board do not need to meet the open-meetings requirements discussed below.
What Is A "Meeting"?
A "committee meeting" means "any gathering of advisory committee members (whether in person or through electronic means) held with the approval of an agency for the purpose of deliberating on the substantive matters upon which the advisory committee provides advice or recommendations." 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.25 (emphasis added). The term "meeting" does not include situations where committee members get together solely to gather information, conduct research, or analyze relevant issues and facts in preparation of a meeting. It also does not include situations where committee members gather solely to discuss administrative matters of the advisory committee or to receive administrative information from a federal official or agency. See 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.160.
Attendance
FACA gives "the public" the right to attend advisory committee meetings. The law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend. However, the President may choose to close advisory committee meetings for reasons of national security, and an advisory committee may close portions of meetings to the public under certain circumstances, discussed below.
Participation
FACA also gives you a right to submit your views to an advisory committee, which means that you are entitled to appear before it or file statements with it. A committee may place reasonable limitations on this right of participation.
Notice
In order to attend a meeting, you need to know about it first. To address this, FACA requires advisory committees to give notice of their meetings to the public at least 15 days before the meeting. The notice must state the time, place, and purpose of the meeting, the name of the committee, and the topics to be discussed. The notice must also state whether all or part of the meeting will be closed to the public and give the telephone number of an official who can answer questions about the meeting. See 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.150.
An advisory committee must publish notice in the Federal Register, which is a daily government publication containing routine notices. Since most people do not read the Federal Register, committees generally take additional steps to notify the public of their meetings. You can find notices for upcoming advisory committee meetings using the FACA Database.
Recording
FACA does not grant you any right to record, photograph, or televise a meeting. As a result, it is up to the committee's discretion whether to allow you to do so.
Transcripts and Documents
FACA requires advisory committees and the agencies supervising them to provide transcripts of committee meetings to the public at the cost of duplication. The law also requires advisory committees to keep detailed minutes of their meetings.
Subject to certain exceptions, FACA also gives you the right to inspect the documents, reports, and other records made available to or prepared for or by an advisory committee (which includes minutes). You are entitled to inspect these documents before or at the time of the meetings to which they apply. You can also inspect these materials after the meeting in question by visiting the relevant agency or advisory committee headquarters, and you can get copies for a small fee. An agency or advisory committee may not require you to use Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) procedures in order to obtain access to these documents, but an agency or advisory committee may invoke the statutory exemptions to the disclosure of documents found in FOIA in order to deny access to them. For more information on FOIA procedures and exemptions, see the Access to Records from the Federal Government section.
An Exception: Closed Meetings
In certain circumstances, advisory committees may close portions of meetings to the public. Committees may only close those parts of meetings that qualify for a statutory exemption and must try to keep as much of a meeting open as possible. Advisory committees may close a portion of a meeting when that portion would:
The supervising agency's chief legal officer must write an official explanation of why the meeting has been closed. Committees generally must maintain a transcript or electronic recording of closed meetings and make all non-exempt portions of the transcript or recording available to the public. Even for a closed meeting, a committee must provide public notice of when and where the meeting will occur and what it will discuss.
In addition, as noted above, the President can close meetings for national security reasons.
FACA itself does not authorize a private citizen to bring a lawsuit for violation of its open-meetings and document-disclosure requirements. Whether a court would grant such a right to bring a lawsuit is uncertain, but doubtful. Nevertheless, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) may enable you to bring a lawsuit in federal court for violations of FACA. Under the APA, you can sue the federal agency that supervises the advisory committee and committee members who are federal agency officials. It does not look like the APA authorizes you to sue the advisory committee itself, or the President or Vice President, regardless of their role in creating or utilizing the advisory committee in question. If you win a lawsuit under the APA, you can obtain an injunction against future violations by the advisory committee -- that is, an order to hold open meetings or provide documents in the future. You also can obtain a transcript of an improperly closed meeting. You cannot, however, obtain money damages.
However, a lawsuit is often a slow and expensive solution, so it is generally better to resolve a dispute without going to court. In the event that you are denied access to a meeting, you should contact the advisory committee or supervising agency in question and indicate that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the advisory committee or agency continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. If you decide to sue, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted open meetings laws. These laws generally require state and local agencies, commissions, boards, and councils to provide advance notice to the public of their meetings, to permit any member of the public to attend them (although not necessarily to participate), and to provide minutes, transcripts or recordings of meetings upon request at little or no cost. While many of these laws are similar to the Government in the Sunshine Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act in certain respects, significant variation exists on a state-by-state basis.
Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on open meetings laws. (Note: This guide currently covers only the 15 most populous states and the District of Columbia. We hope to add additional states to the guide at a later date.)
Note: This page covers information specific to California. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
California law provides you with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level. There are two separate statutes providing the right of access to meetings: the Bagley-Keene Act (full text) and the Brown Act (full text). Together, these two Acts permit any member of the public to attend any meeting of a "state body" or a "legislative body of a local agency," subject to specific exceptions. They also entitle you to receive advance notice of the meetings and to inspect and copy meeting minutes.
The material below gives a broad outline of some important aspects of California open meetings laws. For more details, consult The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: California. In addition, the California Attorney General's office has published two useful guides on California open meetings laws: A Handy Guide to the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act and The Brown Act: Open Meetings for Local Legislative Bodies.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
One California open meetings law, the Bagley-Keene Act, applies at the state government level. Specifically, it applies to the meetings of a "state body." A "state body" refers to state boards, state commissions, and similar multi-member bodies of state government that are required to hold official meetings. These state bodies include executive agencies like the California State Board of Equalization. A comprehensive list of these agencies is available at California's State Agencies Directory. The term "state body" also applies to committees, boards, and commissions who exercise authority delegated to it by a "state body" (as defined above), and to advisory committees or groups if they are created by formal action of a state body and have more than three members. The term may also apply to a board, commission, or agency that appears to be private or non-governmental in nature, if it receives funds provided by a "state body" and includes a member of a state body serving in his or her official capacity.
The second California open meetings law, the Brown Act, applies at the local government level. Specifically, it applies to the meetings of a "legislative body of a local agency." The term "local agency" includes all cities, counties, school districts, municipal corporations, special districts, and all other local public entities. The term "legislative body" refers to the governing bodies of these local agencies, such as a county board of supervisors, the board of a public works agency, a city council, or a local school board. A number of other government and semi-private bodies may fit into the category of "legislative body of a local agency." Consult the Attorney General's guide for details.
The Bagley-Keene Act and the Brown Act do not apply to bodies of the California State Legislature. Another open meetings law governs the State Legislature and requires that meetings of either house and their committees be open to the public. The Bagley-Keene Act and the Brown Act do not apply to federal government bodies.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the open meetings laws, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute a "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public).
For state bodies, the Bagley-Keene Act defines a meeting as "any congregation of a majority of the members of a state body at the same time and place to hear, discuss or deliberate upon any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the state body to which it pertains." For legislative bodies of local agencies, the Brown Act defines a meeting as "any congregation of a majority of the members of a legislative body at the same time and place to hear, discuss or deliberate upon any item that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body or the local agency to which it pertains." Ordinarily, a meeting involves some sort of action taken by the public body (resolutions passed, decisions made, etc.), but the term "meeting" applies to deliberations and information-gathering or fact-finding sessions as well. These definitions of meeting are broad and include any gathering of a majority of members in order to discuss and carry out the body's public business. It would not include purely social and ceremonial gatherings, nor would it likely apply to an academic conference or similar event that a majority of members happened to attend.
A meeting may take place by teleconference (either audio only or both audio and video), but the meeting must (1) comply with all of the other requirements of the open meetings laws (e.g., notice requirements); (2) be audible to the public at the location specified in the notice of the open meeting; (3) have at least one member of the government body physically present at the location specified in the notice of the meeting.
The Brown Act specifically prohibits members of legislative bodies of local agencies from using the telephone, email, or other electronic communications to make group decisions without holding formal meetings (thereby circumventing the public right of access). While the Bagley-Keene Act has no similar provision, a court would likely find a violation of that Act as well, if a member of the public established that a state body was purposefully circumventing open meetings requirements by making decisions via email or other electronic means.
Attending Meetings
The California open meetings laws give you the right to attend the meetings of state bodies and the legislative bodies of local agencies, with an exception for closed meetings and sessions discussed below. California law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend a meeting that falls under the requirements of the Bagley-Keene Act and the Brown Act.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, California open meetings laws require covered government bodies to post notice of their regular meetings in a publicly accessible place and to mail notice to those persons who have specifically requested notice.
State bodies covered by the Bagley-Keene Act must post notice of their meetings on the Internet at least 10 days beforehand. They must also mail notice to anyone who has requested notice in writing (this appears to be free). The notice must give you the time, date, location of the meeting, and the name, address, and phone number of a person who can provide further information before the meeting. It also must contain a specific agenda for the meeting, including a brief description of items to be discussed.
Legislative bodies of local agencies covered by the Brown Act must post an agenda for their meetings in a place that is freely accessible to members of the public at least seventy-two hours beforehand. It also requires the legislative body to mail a copy of the agenda to anyone who has requested notice in writing. The body may charge a fee for mailing notice, but the fee cannot exceed the actual cost of the service.
The open meetings laws also provide for "special" and "emergency" meetings under specified circumstances. Different notice requirements apply to those kinds of meetings. For details, see the Open Government Guide: California.
Minutes, Recordings, and Documents
You have a right to obtain copies of the minutes of open meetings under the California Public Records Act. The governmental body from which you request minutes may charge a fee or deposit. Additionally, you are entitled to inspect any writing or document distributed to members during a meeting. If a document was prepared by the governmental body itself, you are entitled to inspect it at the time of the meeting. If a document was prepared by someone else, you are entitled to inspect it after the meeting.
Governmental bodies may, but need not, make audio recordings of their meetings. If the body chooses to record its meetings, those recordings are public records, just like ordinary minutes.
You are not entitled to copies of the minutes or recordings of closed sessions or meetings (discussed below), unless you can prove to a court that a closed session was held in violation of the open meetings laws or that discussion in a closed session strayed from the topics listed in the agenda.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see California Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that state bodies and legislative bodies of local agencies must hold their meetings open to the public. They may exclude members of the public from their meetings only if they identity a specific statutory exemption and meet other procedural requirements.
Under the Bagley-Keene Act, a state body may hold a closed session when it is dealing with one of twenty-eight subject-area exemptions listed in Cal. Gov't Code § 11126 (scroll down). If the state body is dealing with one of these enumerated subject areas, then it must also meet the following procedural requirements:
Under the Brown Act, a legislative body of a local agency may hold a closed session or meeting when it is dealing with one of thirteen subject-area exemptions found in Cal. Gov't Code §§ 54956.7 - 54957.8 (scroll down). If the legislative body is dealing with one of these enumerated subject areas, then it must also meet the following procedural requirements:
Note that these exemptions permit a government bodies to close a meeting; they do not require these bodies to do so. For more details on exemptions, be sure to check out the Open Government Guide: California, A Handy Guide to the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act, and The Brown Act: Open Meetings for Local Legislative Bodies.
In California, any member of the public may file a lawsuit in California state court for violations of the open records laws. If you win such a lawsuit, you can obtain a court order prohibiting a government body from violating the open meetings laws in the future. For example, a court might order a government body to allow you to attend meetings from which it had previously excluded you. You can also obtain a declaration that past government actions violated the open meetings laws and have the court invalidate past actions taken in violation of those laws. A court may award you attorneys' fees if you prevail in a lawsuit.
If you want to bring a lawsuit to invalidate the action of a local agency, you generally must make a written demand on that agency within ninety days of the meeting in question. You must do this within thirty days when the action you are complaining about took place in an open session but was not listed on the noticed agenda. If the local agency fails to cure the problem within thirty days of receiving your demand, then you may file suit. If you want to invalidate the action of a state body, you must file suit within ninety days of the decision or action you are challenging. Note: these time limits and the demand requirement only apply if you want to have past agency action invalidated; if you just want an order prohibiting future violations, you do not have to satisfy these requirements.
However, a lawsuit usually is a slow and expensive solution, so it is generally better to resolve a dispute without going to court. In the event that you are denied access to a meeting, you should contact the government body in question and indicate that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the governmental body continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
For additional details on your legal remedies under the California open meetings laws, see A Handy Guide to the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act and The Brown Act: Open Meetings for Local Legislative Bodies.
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The Florida Constitution and the Florida Sunshine Law (full text) provide the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level. The law entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. Florida's law relating to open meetings is unusually complex. You should consult the Florida Attorney General's Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Florida for detailed information.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The Florida Sunshine Law covers any "public collegial body." The law defines "public collegial body" as: "any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision." Fla. Stat. § 286.011. In addition, the Florida Constitution's open meetings provision applies to the meetings of "any collegial public body of the executive branch of state government or of any collegial public body of a county, municipality, school district, or special district." Fla. Const. art. I, § 24(b). The word "collegial" means having more than one member.
The coverage of these two provisions is extremely broad. According to an FAQ published by the Florida Attorney General, "[v]irtually all state and local collegial [i.e., multi-member] public bodies are covered by the open meetings requirements with the exception of the judiciary and the state Legislature which has its own constitutional provision relating to access." The State Commissions and Boards page on the Florida Government Information Locator lists many of the state boards and commissions covered by the law. On the local level, the Sunshine Act covers county and city commissions, school boards, and planning and zoning boards, among other things. It does not apply to federal government bodies.
For more information on what government agencies are covered, see the Open Government Guide: Florida and the Brechner Center's Citizen's Guide to Government in the Sunshine.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by Florida law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute an "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under the Florida Sunshine Law, a "meeting" is any gathering of two or more members of a public body to discuss or take action regarding official business or policy. The term also applies to information-gathering and fact-finding sessions called by the public body. According to the Attorney General, "[t]he law, in essence, is applicable to any gathering, whether formal or casual, of two or more members of the same board or commission to discuss some matter on which foreseeable action will be taken by the public board or commission."
Telephone conversations and email between members of a board, commission, or other multi-member public body may qualify as a "meeting" under the law. If members use telephonic or electronic communication simply to communicate factual information and do not exchange comments and views on subjects requiring group action, however, then the open meetings requirements do not apply. See Fla. Stat. § 286.011
Attending Meetings
The Florida Constitution and Sunshine Act give "the public" the right to attend the meetings of public collegial bodies, with exceptions for closed meetings discussed below. Florida law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend.
Florida law also recognizes a public right to comment during open meetings, but the public body holding the meeting may adopt reasonable rules and regulations to ensure the orderly conduct of meetings.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Florida law requires covered boards, commissions, and other multi-member public bodies to give "reasonable notice" of their meetings to the public and the press. The law does not set out a specific time in advance before which a public body must give notice. Any amount of time will do if it is reasonable under the circumstances. The notice generally should include the time and place of the meeting and an agenda of the items to be discussed. The appropriate method of giving notice depends on the circumstances. In some instances, posting notice on a website or issuing a press release may be sufficient, but publication in local newspapers of general circulation may be required for matters of great public concern. You should check the websites of the Florida public bodies that you are interested in for notices and contact them to see if you can sign up for a mailing list or other targeted mechanism for delivering notice.
Minutes and Recordings
The Florida Sunshine Act requires public collegial bodies to record minutes of their meetings and to make them available to the public for inspection and copying. They may, but need not, make audio recordings of their meetings. If a public body chooses to do so, however, the sound recording is a public record that you can access just like ordinary minutes.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Florida Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
Under Florida law, a public body may hold a closed meeting or session when it is dealing with certain subject areas, for which the State Legislature has provided exemptions to the open-meetings requirements. Some exceptions include meetings with a public body's attorney over pending litigation, strategy discussions between a government body and its chief executive officer prior to collective bargaining negotiations, certain hearings involving minors, and meetings involving probable cause determinations or considering confidential records. Unfortunately, the state legislature has passed over two-hundred exemptions and they are not located in one specific statutory provision. For more information on these exemptions, see the Citizen's Guide to Government in the Sunshine and the Government-in-the-Sunshine Manual.
If you know in advance that a meeting will be closed, and you believe that closure would violate the Florida Sunshine Law or Florida Constitution, you should make a written demand for access on the chairperson of the public body or its attorney. The demand should remind the public body of its obligations under the open meetings laws and ask it to identify the statutory exception it is relying on to close the meeting. If the public body refuses your demand for access, you can sue in state circuit court. If you are successful, a court may order the public body to make the meeting in question open to the public.
You may also sue to have a court invalidate past actions of public bodies taken in violation of the open meetings laws. The State Attorney's Office in the relevant judicial circuit can provide you some assistance if you choose to pursue litigation, although it will not handle your case. If you decide to sue, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation. If you win in a lawsuit against a public body for violation of the Sunshine Law, you can recover your attorneys' fees. On the other hand, if a court finds that your lawsuit is frivolous (i.e., has absolutely no legal merit) or was filed in bad faith, then it may force you to pay the attorneys' fees of the public body. This would not happen unless your legal claim were utterly and obviously without any merit.
If you show up at a meeting and the public body tries to exclude you from it, you do not have time to get a court order. On page twelve of its Citizen's Guide to Government in the Sunshine, the Brechner Center provides a useful script that may keep you from being excluded:
Florida Statute 286.011, the Government-in-the-Sunshine Law, requires that all meetings of state or local governmental boards or commissions be open to the public unless there is a specific statutory exemption. If I am ordered to leave (or forbidden to enter) this meeting, I ask that you advise me of the statutory authority for your action. Otherwise, I must insist on my right to attend this meeting.
If the public body in question still insists on excluding you, you have no choice but to leave in an orderly fashion. You may then consider filing a lawsuit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The Georgia Open Meetings Act provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in Georgia. The law entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. For more detailed information about Georgia open meetings law, please consult the Georgia Attorney General's Sunshine Law Citizen's Guide to Open Government and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Georgia.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The Georgia Open Meetings Act covers the meetings of "the governing body of an agency" and committees created by its members. The term “agency” includes the following:
Some examples of "governing bodies of agencies" covered by the Open Meetings Act include state boards and commissions (such as the State Board of Medical Examiners and the Soil and Water Conservation Commission), county commissions, regional development authorities, school boards, library boards, hospital authorities, planning commissions, zoning boards, boards of trustees of public universities, and non-profit corporations operating public hospitals. For additional details on government bodies covered by the Open Meetings Act, see the Open Government Guide: Georgia.
The Georgia Open Meetings Act does not apply to federal government bodies.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by Georgia law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute a "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under the Georgia Open Meetings Act, a "meeting" is any gathering of a quorum of members of a governing body of an agency (defined above) to discuss or take action regarding official business or policy. The term also applies to information-gathering and fact-finding sessions called by these bodies where a quorum of members are present and the session relates to the body's public business.
Governing bodies may hold meetings by by written, telephonic, electronic, wireless, or other virtual means. However, these electronic meetings must be open to the public and are subject to the notice requirements outlined below. While the law is not certain on this point, it appears that email communications between members of a governing body may constitute a "meeting."
Attending Meetings
The Georgia Open Meetings Act give "the public" the right to attend the meetings of governing bodies of agencies, with exceptions for closed meetings discussed below. Georgia law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend.
It is unclear whether your right to attend public meetings includes the right to participate or comment. As a matter of practice, however, some state and local agencies give the public an opportunity to speak at meetings.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Georgia law requires governing bodies of agencies to establish a set schedule of regular meetings and to post notice of this schedule at a conspicuous location at its regular meeting place. The posted notice for regularly scheduled meetings must include dates, times, and locations for the meetings. See Ga. Code § 50-14-1(d). Governing bodies are required to post agendas for regularly scheduled meetings as far in advance as possible, but not more than two weeks beforehand. See Ga. Code § 50-14-1(e).
Governing bodies of agencies may also hold meetings besides those regularly scheduled, but they must provide notice to the public at least twenty-four hours beforehand. A governing body must post this notice at the place of its regular meetings, and it must give written or oral notice to the local newspaper where notices of sheriff's sales are published or another newspaper with greater circulation in the area. See Ga. Code § 50-14-1(d).
Minutes and Recordings
The Georgia Open Meetings Act requires governing bodies to record minutes of their meetings and to make them available to the public for inspection. The minutes must contain, at a minimum, the names of the members present at the meeting, a description of each motion or other proposal made, and a record of all votes.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Georgia Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of governing bodies of agencies must be open to the public. A governing body may exclude the public from a portion of a meeting known as a "closed session" if it identifies a specific statutory exemption. Under Georgia Open Meetings Act, a governing body may hold a closed session when it is dealing with one of nine subject-area exemptions found in Ga. Code § 50-14-3. The nine exemptions are:
If a governing body is dealing with one of these exemptions, then it must also vote to close the meeting by a majority of members present and record the reason for the closure in the minutes. A governing body must keep separate minutes for closed sessions. These minutes are not made available to the public, except those portions reflecting the vote and purpose for closure. The chairperson or presiding official must also execute and file with the official minutes of the meeting a notarized affidavit stating under oath that the subject matter of the meeting or closed session was devoted to matters within the exceptions provided by law and identifying the specific relevant exception. Ga. Code § 50-14-4.
For more information on the exceptions to the open meetings requirement, see the Open Meetings section of the Attorney General's Sunshine Law Handbook and the Open Government Guide: Georgia.
If you know in advance that a meeting will be closed, and you believe that closure would violate the Georgia Open Meetings Act, you should make a written demand for access on the chairperson of the governing body or its attorney. The demand should remind the governing body of its obligations under the Open Meetings Act and ask it to identify the statutory exception it is relying on to close the meeting. If the governing body refuses your demand for access, you can sue in Georgia Superior Court. If you are successful, a court may order the governing body to make the meeting in question open to the public.
You may also sue to have a court invalidate past actions of governing bodies taken in violation of the Open Meetings Act (but only if you file suit within ninety days of the violation) or order the disclosure of minutes from an improperly closed meeting. If you decide to sue, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation. If you win in a lawsuit against a governing body for violation of the Open Meetings Act, a court may force the losing party to pay your attorneys' fees if it determines that the violation was "without substantial justification."
The state may also pursue criminal penalties against members of a governing body who violate the Open Meetings Act.
If you show up at a meeting and the governing body tries to exclude you from it, you do not have time to get a court order. You should remind the presiding officer (or whoever is denying you access) that Georgia Code § 50-14-1 requires that the meetings of the governing bodies of state or local agencies be open to the public unless there is a specific statutory exemption. You should insist on your right to attend unless the presiding officer can identify for you the statutory authority for closing the meeting. If the governing body still insists on excluding you, you have no choice but to leave in an orderly fashion. You may then consider filing a lawsuit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The Illinois Open Meetings Act provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level. The law also entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect meeting minutes. For more detailed information about Illinois open meetings law, please consult the Illinois Attorney General's Guide to the Illinois Open Meetings Act and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Illinois.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The Illinois Open Meetings Act covers all "public bodies." The term "public body" includes
all legislative, executive, administrative or advisory bodies of the State, counties, townships, cities, villages, incorporated towns, school districts and all other municipal corporations, boards, bureaus, committees or commissions of this State, and any subsidiary bodies of any of the foregoing including but not limited to committees and subcommittees which are supported in whole or in part by tax revenue, or which expend tax revenue, except the General Assembly and committees or commissions thereof.
5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 120/1.02. This definition is broad, bringing in nearly all publicly-created state and local decison-making bodies. "Public body" applies to state agencies in the executive branch of state government, political subdivisions (including all their constituent boards and commissions), and municipal authorities (such as city councils). The term applies to school boards and the boards of public colleges and universities. In addition, it applies to committees and subcommittees created by "public bodies" that are supported by or expend tax revenue, or that are authorized to act for the public body or give it advice or recommendations.
The Illinois Open Meetings Act does not apply to the Illinois Senate or House of Representatives or to legislative committees or commissions. However, the Illinois Constitution requires that sessions of each house of the General Assembly and meetings of committees, joint committees, and legislative commissions be open to the public unless members vote to close by a two-thirds majority. The Illinois Open Meetings Act does not apply to the federal government bodies.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the open meetings law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute a "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under the Illinois Open Meetings Law, a "meeting" is
any gathering, whether in person or by video or audio conference, telephone call, electronic means (such as, without limitation, electronic mail, electronic chat, and instant messaging), or other means of contemporaneous interactive communication, of a majority of a quorum of the members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business or, for a 5‑member public body, a quorum of the members of a public body held for the purpose of discussing public business.
5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 120/1.02. There are three key elements to the definition of meeting: (1) a gathering; (2) a majority of a quorum; and (3) a purpose to discuss public business.
First, a "gathering" can be conducted in-person, through a telephone conference call or video conference, or through electronic means, including email, chat, and instant messaging. Illinois is one of the first states to explicitly define a meeting to include electronic communications like email and chat. Despite this new definition, the most practical use of the Open Meetings Act for you will probably still be attending ordinary, in-person meetings.
Second, a "majority of a quorum" must be present to have a "meeting." This sounds complicated, but a "quorum" just means the number of members of a body or committee required to take formal action, which is always a majority of the entire membership of that body or committee. So, for a nine-member body, a quorum is five members, and a majority of those five members is three members. Therefore, a nine-member body can have a "meeting" when three or more members are present. For an eleven-member body, a quorum is six members, and a majority of a quorum is 4 members. Thus, an eleven-member body can have a "meeting" when 4 or more members are present. You can do the analysis for any size public body. There is one exception to this rule: for a five-member body, the full quorum of three or more members is required for a "meeting."
Third, a gathering must be held "the purpose of discussing public business" in order to be a "meeting." The "purpose" requirement means that social and ceremonial gatherings held for purposes unrelated to conducting public business generally are not covered by the Open Meetings Act. However, a social gathering may become a "meeting" if the requisite number of members start to discuss public business in a meaningful away. According to the Attorney General, the phrase "discussing public business" refers to "an exchange of views and ideas among public body members, on any item germane to the affairs of their public body." "It is not directed at casual remarks, but . . . at discussions that are deliberative in nature."
Attending Meetings
The Illinois Open Meetings Act give "the public" the right to attend the meetings of public bodies or their committees, with exceptions for closed meetings discussed below. Illinois law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend.
The Open Meetings Act does not create a right to comment or participate in public meetings. As a matter of practice, however, many public bodies allow for public comment, but require that an "intent to comment" form be filed with the secretary of the body.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Illinois law requires public bodies and their committees to give notice to the public of its meetings. At the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year, each body must give the public notice of the schedule of regular meetings for the year, including the dates, times, and places of the meetings. A public body must also post an agenda for each regular meeting at its principal office and at the location where the meeting is to be held at least forty-eight hours in advance. A public body with a regularly maintained website must also post the agenda of regular meetings on the site.
A public body may also hold "special meetings," which are meetings not on the regular schedule. In that event, the public body must post notice at least forty-eight hours in advance. This notice must include the agenda for the special meeting. If an emergency meeting is called for, a public body must give notice "as soon as practicable, but in any event prior to the holding of such meeting," to any news medium which has filed an annual request for notice. It is unclear whether a non-traditional journalist or other online publisher would qualify as a "news medium," but you may want to request notice in any event.
Minutes and Recordings
All public bodies and their committees must keep written minutes of open meetings and make them available to the public for inspection. If a public body has a website, it must post the minutes on the website as well. In addition, public bodies and their committees are required to keep a verbatim record of all their closed meetings in the form of an audio or video recording, but they generally do not have to make these available to the public.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Illinois Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of public bodies and their committees must be open to the public, but a public body may hold a closed meeting or session if it identifies a specific statutory exemption. Under the Illinois Open Meetings Act, a public body may hold a closed meeting or session when it addresses one of twenty-four subject-area exemptions found in 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 120/2(c), or when another state statute specifically authorizes closure. If a public body is dealing with one of these exemptions, it may hold a closed meeting or session. In order to do so, however, it must also meet the following procedural requirements:
For more detailed information on the exemptions to the open-meetings requirements in Illinois, see the Guide to the Illinois Open Meetings Act and the Open Government Guide: Illinois.
If you know in advance that a meeting will be closed, and you believe that closure would violate the Illinois Open Meetings Act, you should make a written demand for access on the presiding officer of the public body or its attorney. The demand should remind the public body of its obligations under the Open Meetings Act and ask it to identify the statutory exception it is relying on to close the meeting. If the public body refuses your demand for access, you can sue in Illinois state court. If you are successful, a court may order the public body to make the meeting in question open to the public.
You may also sue to have a court invalidate past actions of public bodies taken in violation of the Open Meetings Act or order disclosure of the verbatim record of an improperly closed meeting. To bring a lawsuit challenging past action of a public body, however, you must file a lawsuit within sixty days of the agency action in question (or within sixty days of discovery that a violation took place). If you decide to sue, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation. If you win in a lawsuit against a public body for violation of the Open Meetings Act, a court may force the losing party to pay your attorneys' fees. On the other hand, if you lose, a court may force you to pay the attorneys' fees of the public body if it finds that your lawsuit was "frivolous or malicious" in nature. This would not happen unless your legal claim were utterly and obviously without any merit.
The state may also pursue criminal penalties against members of a public body who violate the Open Meetings Act.
If you show up at a meeting and the public body tries to exclude you from it, you do not have time to get a court order. You should remind the presiding officer (or whoever is denying you access) that the Illinois Open Meetings Act (5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 120/2) requires that the meetings of state and local public bodies and their committees be open to the public unless there is a specific statutory exemption. You should insist on your right to attend unless the presiding officer can identify for you the statutory authority for closing the meeting. If the governing body still insists on excluding you, you have no choice but to leave in an orderly fashion. You may then consider filing a lawsuit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The Indiana Open Door Law provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government agencies at the state and local level. The law also entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting memoranda. For more detailed information about Indiana open meetings law, consult the Handbook on Indiana's Public Access Laws prepared by Indiana's Public Access Counselor and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Indiana.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The Indiana Open Door Law covers the governing bodies of public agencies. The legal definition of "governing bodies of public agencies" is exceedingly complex. See pages six and seven of the Public Access Counselor's Handbook on Indiana's Public Access Laws for a detailed explanation. At the risk of over-simplification, the Act covers multi-member boards, commissions, councils, and committees of state and local government that take action on public business. This includes the governing boards and commissions of departments and agencies in the executive branch of state government, county boards, city councils, school boards, and the boards of trustees of public colleges and universities, among other things. It also includes the Indiana General Assembly and its committees. The Open Door Law does not apply to the federal government bodies or private organizations.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute a "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under the Indiana Open Door Law, a "meeting" is a gathering of a majority of the members of a governing body of a public agency for the purpose of taking official action upon agency business. The word "official action means to receive information, deliberate, make recommendations, establish policy, make decisions, or take final action. There are several examples of what meetings are and what it means to take public action set forth on pages seven and eight of the Public Access Counselor's Handbook on Indiana's Public Access Laws.
The Open Door Law lists four types of gatherings that are not considered “meetings.” A meeting does not include: (1) any social or chance gathering not intended to avoid the requirements of the Open Door law; (2) any on-site inspection of a project or program; (3) traveling to and attending meetings of organizations devoted to the betterment of government; or (4) a caucus (defined as "a gathering of members of a political party or coalition which is held for purposes of planning political strategy and holding discussions designed to prepare the members for taking official action").
Attending Meetings
The Indiana Open Door Law gives "the public" the right to attend the meetings of governing bodies of public agencies, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. Indiana law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend.
Members of the public may "observe and record" meetings, but the statute gives the public no right to speak. As a matter of practice, however, governing bodies of public agencies often allow members of the public to speak at the end of public meetings.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Indiana law requires the governing bodies of public agencies to give the public advance notice of their meetings. Governing bodies must publish notice of their regularly scheduled meetings once a year no later than forty-eight hours prior to the first meeting. The notice must contain the dates, times and locations of all meetings. The notice must be posted at the principal office of the public agency holding the meeting or, if no such office exists, at the building where the meeting is to be held. The governing body must also deliver notice by mail, email, or fax to "all news media" that submit a written request for notice annually. It is not clear whether a non-traditional journalist or other online publisher would qualify as part of the "news media," but you may want to request notice in any event. If a governing body uses an agenda, it must post the agenda at the entrance to the meeting location prior to the meeting.
If a governing body reschedules a meeting, changes the location of a meeting, or decides to hold a closed session (below), it must post and deliver notice as described above at least forty-eight hours in advance. Different notice requirements apply in emergency situations. See the Open Government Guide: Indiana for details.
The Open Door Law exempts the Indiana General Assembly from its notice requirements.
Minutes and Recordings
Governing bodies must keep "memoranda" of meetings, which are functionally similar to minutes. The memoranda must include:
Governing bodies must make these memoranda available to the public for inspection and copying. If a governing body chooses to record minutes (it is not required to do so), it must also make these minutes available to the public for inspection and copying.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Indiana Public Records.
An Exception: Closed Sessions
The general rule is that the meetings of all governing bodies of public agencies meetings must be open to the public, but a governing body may hold a closed or "executive" session if it identifies a specific statutory exemption. Under the Indiana Open Door Law, a governing body may hold an executive session when it is dealing with one of thirteen subject-area exemptions found in Ind. Code § 5-14-1.5-6.1 (scroll down). The thirteen exemptions are for meetings:
If the governing body is dealing with one of these exemptions, then it may hold a closed session, but it is not required to do so. In order to hold a closed session, it must also meet the following procedural requirements:
For more information on the exceptions to the open meetings requirement, see the Handbook on Indiana's Public Access Laws and the Open Government Guide: Indiana.
If you know in advance that a meeting will be closed, and you believe that closure would violate the Indiana Open Door Law, you should make a written demand for access on the chairperson of the governing body or its attorney. The demand should remind the governing body of its obligations under the Open Door Law and ask it to identify the statutory exception it is relying on to close the meeting. If the governing body refuses your demand for access, you should contact the the Public Access Counselor, a state position created in order to provide advice and assistance to the public about Indiana's public access laws. The Access Counselor may provide you with informal advice or make a formal determination of whether the governing body in question is violating the open meetings law, but its advice and determinations are not binding on public agencies. You may also sue the governing body in Indiana state court. If you are successful, a court may order the governing body to make the meeting in question open to the public.
You may also sue to have a court invalidate past actions of a governing body taken in violation of the Open Door Law, but complicated time limits apply for those types of cases. See page eleven of the Handbook on Indiana's Public Access Laws for details. If you decide to sue, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation. If you win in a lawsuit against a governing body for violation of the Open Door Law, a court must award you reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses if you sought the advice of the Public Access Counselor prior to filing suit. On the other hand, if you lose, a court may force you to pay the attorneys' fees of the governing body if it finds that your lawsuit was "frivolous and vexatious" in nature. This would not happen unless your legal claim were utterly and obviously without any merit. Seeking the advice of the Public Access Counselor before filing a lawsuit would be a good way to avoid bringing a "frivolous and vexatious" case.
If you show up at a meeting and the governing body tries to exclude you from it, you do not have time to get a court order. You should remind the presiding officer (or whoever is denying you access) that Indiana Code § 5-14-1.5-3 requires that the meetings of the governing bodies of state or local agencies be open to the public unless there is a specific statutory exemption. You should insist on your right to attend unless the presiding officer can identify for you the statutory authority for closing the meeting. If the governing body still insists on excluding you, you have no choice but to leave in an orderly fashion. You should then contact the Public Access Counselor and consider filing a lawsuit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
For additional information about engaging in journalism in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, please see our printable PDF guide Newsgathering in Massachusetts, co-produced with the Harvard Law School Cyberlaw Clinic.
The Massachusetts Open Meeting Law, Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 30A, §§ 18-25, and accompanying regulations, 940 Code of Mass. Regs. 29.00, provide the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of public bodies at the state and local level. Massachusetts law also gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes and imposes notice requirements on public bodies. For more detailed information on the Massachusetts Open Meeting Law, see the Massachusetts Attorney General's Open Meeting Law website.
What Public Bodies Are Covered?
The Open Meeting Law applies to public bodies. This includes nearly all boards, commissions, committees, and other multi-member bodies that carry out a government function at the state, county, district, city, region, or town level in Massachusetts. However, the law specifically excludes the following things from the definition of "public body": (1) the judicial branch of state government; (2) the General Court (i.e., the state legislature) and its committees and subcommittees; (3) boards appointed by particular government officers soley to advise the officer; (4) the Board of Bank Incorporation; or (5) the Policyholders Protective Board. Covered groups include boards of selectmen, city councils, local school boards, and state boards and commissions like the Massachusetts Board of Elementary and Secondary Education and the State Ethics Committee. The law does not cover individual government officials such as a mayor or police chief. It also does not apply to federal public bodies or private organizations. See Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 30A, § 18.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what public bodies are covered by Massachusetts law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute an "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). The Open Meeting Law applies to every gathering of a quorum of a public body where attending members discuss or consider official business within the scope of their official authority. A "quorum" means a simple majority of members of the public body, unless provided otherwise for a particular public body by law or executive order. For example, if a city council has seven members, a "meeting" takes place whenever four or more council members congregate to deal with city council business.
The Open Meeting Law does not apply to:
(a) an on-site inspection of a project or program by members of a public body, so long as the members do not deliberate;
(b) attendance by a quorum of a public body at a public or private gathering, including a conference or training program or a media, social or other event, so long as the members do not deliberate;
(c) attendance by a quorum of a public body at a meeting of another public body that has complied with the notice requirements of the open meeting law, so long as the visiting members communicate only by open participation in the meeting on those matters under discussion by the host body and do not deliberate;
(d) a meeting of a quasi-judicial board or commission held for the sole purpose of making a decision required in an adjudicatory proceeding brought before it; or
(e) a session of a town meeting which would include the attendance by a quorum of a public body at any such session.
See Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 30A, § 18.
Attending Meetings
The Open Meeting Law states that "all meetings of a public body shall be open to the public," with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. Massachusetts law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend, including non-residents and non-voters.
The Open Meeting Law does not give the public a right to participate or comment during open meetings. As a matter of practice, however, public bodies often allow members of the public to comment during public meetings. No one may address a public meeting of a public body without permission of the presiding officer, and all persons must be silent upon request of the presiding officer. See Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 30A, § 20.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Massachusetts law requires public bodies to give notice to the public of its meetings. A public body must provide notice at least forty-eight hours in advance (excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays). The notice must contain the date, time, and place of the meeting. See Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 30A, § 20.
Notice of a meeting must be filed and posted in specific ways depending on whether the meeting is taking place at the local, regional, district, county, or state level. Specific methods of notice for each level of government are described in the Attorney General's regulations; see 940 Code of Mass. Regs. 29.03.
Minutes and Recordings
Public bodies must must record and maintain accurate minutes of their meetings, setting forth at a minimum the date, time, place, members present or absent, and action taken at each meeting. Public bodies must create and approve minutes in a timely fashion, and must make these minutes available to the public for inspection and copying within 10 days of a request by any person.
The minutes of any open session, the notes, recordings or other materials used in the preparation of such minutes and all documents and exhibits used at the session, are public records subject to the Massachusetts Public Records Law, except for (1) materials used in a performance evaluation of an individual bearing on his professional competence, provided they were not created by the members of the body for the purposes of the evaluation; and (2) materials used in deliberations about employment or appointment of individuals, including applications and supporting materials; provided, however, that any resume submitted by an applicant shall not be exempt.
An exception to the public right to access meeting minutes and related materials exist for closed meetings and sessions, as discussed below.
See Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 30A, § 22. For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Massachusetts Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of public bodies must be open to the public. If a public body wants to hold a closed session, called an "executive session," it must identity a specific statutory exception. Under the Massachusetts Open Meeting Law, a public body may hold an executive session when it is dealing with one of ten subject-area exemptions found in Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 30A, § 21. The ten exemptions are:
There are additional limitations on many of these exemptions, so if you believe that you have been excluded from a meeting regarding subject matter that might fall within one of the exemptions above, be sure to read the statute carefully.
Note also that these exemptions make it permissible for a public body to close a meeting, but they do not require the public body to do so. Assuming that a public body is dealing with one of these enumerated exceptions, then it may hold an executive session, but it must also meet the following procedural requirements:
If you believe that a public body is violating or has violated your right of access under the Open Meeting Law, you have two options under the law. See Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 30A, § 23.
Requesting help from the Attorney General:
First, you may ask the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to investigate and take action on violations of the Open Meetings Law. There is a specific procedure that you must follow to pursue this option:
The Attorney General attempts to resolve complaints within a reasonable period of time, generally 90 days. After reviewing your complaint, the Attorney General will determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the Open Meeting Law has been violated, and if so, whether to conduct a formal investigation. The Attorney General may request additional information from you about the alleged violation.
At the conclusion of its investigation, the Attorney General's office will make findings, and where a violation has occurred, may order remedial action. If the Open Meeting Law has been violated unintentionally, then the Attorney General will resolve the investigation by informal action or by formal ruling for more significant violations. The Attorney General may order remedial action by the public body directing immediate and future compliance with the law, attendance at a training session, release of records, or other appropriate action. If the Attorney General's office seeks to reinstate an employee or nullify the action of a public body as a remedy for the violation, it will ordinarily convene a hearing to take testimony from witnesses to determine the appropriate remedy. If the Attorney General's office has reasonable cause to believe that the Open Meeting Law has been violated intentionally, it may convene a hearing to determine whether the violation was intentional, whether the public body, one or more of its members, or both, were responsible, and whether to impose on the public body a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation.
Filing a lawsuit:
Instead of going through the Attorney General, you can file a lawsuit directly against the public body in state court, but you may do so only if you can organize three or more registered voters to act as plaintiffs. A lawsuit against a public body at the state level must be filed in Suffolk County Superior Court. Lawsuits against other public bodies must be filed in the superior court for the county in which the public body acts or meets.
Special provisions encourage the speedy determination of lawsuits over open meetings violations. In any such lawsuit, the burden is on the public body to prove that their conduct was in accordance with the Open Meetings Law, except that for a court to issue a civil penalty directed at an individual, you must provide proof that the action of the public body violated the law. A public body may also avoid liability by proving that it acted in good faith compliance with the advice of its attorney in taking the challenged action. If you sue and win, you can obtain the remedies mentioned above, including an order barring future violations, disclosure of meeting minutes from improperly closed meetings, invalidation of past actions, and/or a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 per intentional violation of the law.
If you decide to sue, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The Michigan Open Meetings Act provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in Michigan. The law entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. For more detailed information about the Michigan Open Meetings Act, consult the Michigan Legislature's helpful guide, The Michigan Open Meetings Act and Freedom of Information Act and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Michigan.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The Michigan Open Meetings Act covers the meetings of public bodies. The law defines a "public body" as:
any state or local legislative or governing body, including a board, commission, committee, subcommittee, authority, or council, that is empowered by state constitution, statute, charter, ordinance, resolution, or rule to exercise governmental or proprietary authority or perform a governmental or proprietary function; a lessee of such a body performing an essential public purpose and function pursuant to the lease agreement; or the board of a nonprofit corporation formed by a city under [Michigan law].
Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.262(a). This broad definition includes state boards and commissions within the executive branch of state government and the state legislature and its committees. On the local level, it includes the governing bodies of all cities, villages, townships, charter townships, and county government. It also covers local school districts, boards of trustees of public colleges and universities, and special boards and commissions created by law, such as public hospital authorities, road commissions, health boards, and zoning boards. The unifying requirement is that the public body must exercise governmental authority or perform a governmental function. For this reason, it is not clear whether advisory committees that do not take final action on public business are covered by the Open Meetings Act. The Act does not apply to federal government bodies or to the judiciary.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.263(7) exempts certain public bodies when they are deliberating on the merits of a case:
Consult the Open Government Guide: Michigan for additional information on what public bodies are covered.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by Michigan law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute an "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under the Michigan Open Meetings Act, a "meeting" is any gathering of a quorum of members of a governmental body to discuss or take action regarding official business or policy. A quorum is a just a simple majority of the members of the public body. The term "meeting" also applies to information-gathering and fact-finding sessions called by the governmental body where a quorum of members are present and the session relates to the body's public business. The Open Meetings Act excludes a gathering that is "a social or chance gathering or conference not designed to avoid this act." Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.263(10).
Governmental bodies may hold meetings by by written, telephonic, electronic, wireless, or other virtual means. However, an electronic meeting is still subject to the notice requirements and must be held at a designated place and time. While the law is not certain on this point, it appears that email communications between members of a governmental body may constitute a meeting if they involve deliberation on public business.
Attending Meetings
The Michigan Open Meetings Act gives "the public" the right to attend the meetings of public bodies, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. Michigan law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend. A public body may not put conditions on attendance, such as requiring you to give your name or other information. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.263(2)-(4).
The Open Meetings Act gives you the right to speak or comment during a meeting of a public body, subject to rules established by the public body for the maintenance of order. A public body may not exclude you from an open meeting except for breach of the peace committed at the meeting. The state legislature may set rules that limit the right of comment to prescribed times at hearings and committee meetings only. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.263(5),(6).
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Michigan law requires public bodies to give notice of their meetings. The Open Meetings Act requires public bodies to publish notice of their regularly scheduled meetings within ten days of the first meeting in each calendar or fiscal year. The notice must contain the dates, times, and places of the public body's regular meetings, as well as the name of the public body, its telephone number if one exists, and its address. The public body must post this notice at its principal office and any other location deemed appropriate. Publishing notice through cable television is permitted. If a public body does not have a principal office, the notice should be posted in the office of the county clerk for a local public body or the office of the Secretary of State for a state public body. If the public body amends its schedule, it must post notice of the change within three days. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.264; Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.265(1)-(3)
Public bodies may also hold "special" meetings, which are meetings not on the regular schedule. For these meetings, they must post notice at least 18 hours before the meeting. This requirement does not apply to the special meetings of subcommittees of a public body or conference committees of the state legislature. Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.265(4).
You can request that a public body notify you by mail in advance of all noticed meetings. The public body may charge you a reasonable fee for the cost of printing and mailing. Newspapers published in the state and radio and television stations located in the state may request notice by mail for no charge. It is not clear whether non-traditional journalists and online publishers could take advantage of this no-fee notice provision. You should renew your request for notice by mail yearly in order to ensure that you continue to receive notices. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.266.
Minutes and Recordings
The Michigan Open Meetings Act requires public bodies to record minutes of their meetings and to make them available to the public for inspection and copying for a reasonable fee. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.269. Public bodies must keep separate meetings for closed sessions (below), and these minutes are not open to the public, unless a court orders them to be made publicly available. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.267.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Michigan Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of public bodies must be open to the public. If a public body wants to hold a closed session, it must identify a specific statutory exemption. Under the Michigan Open Meetings Act, a public body may hold a closed session when it is dealing with one of ten subject-area exemptions found in Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.268. The ten exemptions are for meetings:
The exemptions make it permissible for a public body to close a meeting, they do not require the public body to do so. To close a session, a public body must identify the exemption justifying closure and vote to close the session by a two-thirds majority on the record during an open meeting. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 15.267.
For more information on the exceptions to the Michigan open-meetings requirement, see the The Michigan Open Meetings Act and Freedom of Information Act Guide and the Open Government Guide: Michigan.
If you know in advance that a meeting will be closed, and you believe that closure would violate the Michigan Open Meetings Act, you should make a written demand for access on the chairperson of the public body or its attorney. The demand should remind the public body of its obligations under the Open Meetings Act and ask it to identify the statutory exemption it is relying on to close the meeting. If the public body refuses your demand for access, you can sue in a Michigan circuit court. If you are successful, a court may order the public body to make the meeting in question (and other future meetings) open to the public. If you win such a lawsuit, the court must award you attorneys' fees and costs for the action.
You may also sue to have a court invalidate past actions of public bodies taken in violation of the Open Meetings Act, but only if you file suit within 60 days after the approved minutes for the meeting in question became available. You can also sue to obtain disclosure of the minutes of an improperly closed session and to get civil damages from members of the public body, but no sixty-day time limit applies to those kinds of cases. If you decide to sue, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
The state may pursue criminal penalties against members of a public body who violate the Open Meetings Act.
If you show up at a meeting and the public body tries to exclude you from it, you do not have time to get a court order. You should remind the presiding officer (or whoever is denying you access) that section 15.263 of the Michigan Compiled Laws requires that the meetings of public bodies be open to the public unless there is a specific statutory exemption. You should insist on your right to attend unless the presiding officer can identify for you the statutory authority for closing the meeting. If the public body still insists on excluding you, you have no choice but to leave in an orderly fashion. You may then consider filing a lawsuit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Missouri. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
Missouri combines its public records and public meetings laws into one statute. It defines the bodies subject to the public meetings law very broadly and has no limitations on who can request records. You do not have to state a purpose to attend meetings.What Government Bodies Are Covered?
Any "public governmental body" is subject to the public meetings law. A public governmental body is defined under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.010.4(4) as any "legislative, administrative or governmental entity" that includes any agency, council, committee, any governing body of any public institution of higher education, departments or divisions of the state, any quasi-public body (meaning any person or business whose primary purpose is to contract with public bodies or perform a public function, such as tax abatement) and legislative/administrative bodies with the power to make rules or hear and decide cases.What is a Meeting?
A public meeting, defined in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.010.5(5), includes any meeting where "public business is discussed, decided, or public policy formulated" and can be conducted either in person or by teleconferencing, Internet chat or message board. Anytime a majority of the members of the public body take a public vote, whether by electronic communication or otherwise, the vote is subject to the public meetings law.
The term does not include any informal gathering of members of the public body for ministerial or social purposes. The statute doesn't define an "informal gathering," but in Kansas City Star Co. v. Fulson, 859 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) the Missouri Court of Appeals held that any gathering with friends and associates that was not regularly prescribed or official would be an "informal gathering" and not subject to the public meetings law.
A quorum is needed for a public meeting. Statutes that create individual public bodies will define what constitutes a quorum for that body. The state constitution requires a majority of elected members of each house to constitute a quorum.
While a gathering of less than a quorum is not a meeting, a gathering may still violate the statute if the group in question is deliberately meeting in groups of less than a quorum to discuss public business with the intent of avoiding holding public meetings.
Attending Meetings
You have a right to record a meeting by audiotape, videotape or other electronic means. However, if you try to record a closed meeting without permission, you may be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Notice
Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.020, all public bodies must give notice of the time, date and place and agenda of a meeting in a way "reasonably calculated" to notify the public, and they must do no later than 24 hours before the meeting. If conducted electronically or by telephone, the mode for the meeting must be included along with a location where the public may observe.
"Reasonable notice" includes making copies available for any news media who request it and also posting it on a bulletin board at the public body's principal office, or if there is no principal office, then at the building where the meeting will be held.
The public body must hold meetings in a location accessible to the public and large enough to accommodate the expected crowd.
Minutes, Recordings, and Documents
The public body must keep a journal or minutes of the meeting which must include the date, time, place, members present and absent, and any votes taken. You can request these minutes through Missouri open records law.An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
A majority of a quorum of the public body may vote to close the meeting. The body must announce the reason for closing. The body is also required to give notice of the closed meeting, and can only close the portions of the meeting that concern the matters justifying closure.
Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.021, you don't have a right to attend meetings where the following are being discussed:
You can sue the public body for improperly holding closed meetings under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.027. If you can prove that a record was supposed to be public and you were denied access, then the public body must show that it was complying with the law or else you win your case. The court must void any action that the public body took in violation of the law if it finds that the public interest in enforcing the law outweighs the interest in sustaining whatever action the public body took.
If you can also show that the public body knowingly violated the public meetings law, the court must award you damages, up to $1,000. In calculating your award, the court must consider the size of the jurisdiction, the seriousness of the offense, and whether the body has previously violated the law. The court may give you costs and attorney fees. The statute doesn't define a "knowing" violation, but in Wright v. City of Salisbury, No. 2:07CV00056 AGF, 2010 WL2947709 (E.D.Mo. 2010), the federal district court in the Eastern District of Missouri, applying state law, held that a "knowing" violation referred to evidence that the public body knew that they were violating the public meetings law.
If you can show that the body purposely violated the law, the court must give you damages, up to $5,000 as well as costs and attorney fees. In calculating your award, the court must consider the size of the jurisdiction, the seriousness of the offense, and whether the body has previously violated the law. Again, the statute doesn't define "purposely", but in Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 982 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), the Missouri Court of Appeals held that a purposeful violation is one that shows a conscious plan to violate the law.
The courts also have the power to enforce public meetings provisions through injunctions under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.030.
If you sue a public body for a closed meeting violation, make sure you do within one year pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. § 610.027.5(5).
Note: This page covers information specific to Nevada. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
In 2011, the Nevada Legislature significantly changed the open meeting law, including expanding the law to apply to quasi judicial bodies; requiring that public bodies that have violated an opening meeting law publicize the opinion in its next agenda; enacting investigative subpoena authority; expanding the scope of the definition of "public body"; creating mandatory agenda notice requirements; removing the notice requirements for an applicant for employment; and enacting a monetary penalty of up to $500.00 against members of the public body who violate the open meeting law.
The material below contains a broad overview of the Nevada Open Meetings Law. The Nevada Attorney General has also provided a Nevada Open Meeting Law Manual.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
When determining whether the Open Meeting Law applies, the entity's manner of creation is taken into account. The Open Meeting Law applies to all "public bodies." Public bodies include an entity of more than two people that was created by the Nevada constitution, Nevada statute, city charter or ordinance, the Nevada Administrative Code, a resolution or formal designation by a public body, an executive order issued by the governor, or a resolution or an action by the governing body of a political subdivision of this state. Nev. R. Stat. 241.015(3). The definition also includes educational foundations defined in Nev. R. Stat. 388.750(3) and university foundations defined in Nev. R. Stat. 396.405(3). Also included are any board, commission, or committees consisting of at least two people who have been appointed by the governor or an officer acting on behalf of the governor, an entity in the executive department of the state government or an officer acting on behalf of the department. The Nevada Legislature is not included.Exceptions to the Open Meeting Law include instances when the entity is considering the character, alleged misconduct, professional competence, or physical and mental health of a person; is preparing, revising, administering or grading examinations conducted by or on behalf of the public body; or is considering an appeal of the results of an examination conducted on behalf of a public body. The exception for considering a person's character, misconduct and competence does not apply to those who are elected members of a public body or an appointed public officer who serves "at the pleasure of a public body as a chief executive or administrative officer." Nev. R. Stat. 241.031.
If a government body or agency establishes a civic organization, it may be considered a public body if it is intended to perform any administrative, advisory, executive or legislative function of a state or local government and it expends or disburses or is supported, in whole or in part, by tax revenue. A private, non-profit organization is a public body if it acts in an administrative, advisory, or executive capacity and is supported, at least in part, by tax revenue. Quasi-judicial bodies may also be subject to the open meeting law the proceedings have a judicial character and are performed by administrative agencies. Stockmeier v. Nev. Dep't of Corr. Psychological Review Panel, 122 Nev. 385, 390, 135 P.3d 220 (2006). Judicial character includes proceedings that are referred to as a trial, takes and weighs evidence, and makes findings of fact and law from which a party may appeal to a higher authority. Id. However, the Parole Board of Commissioners is exempt from the Open Meeting Law, despite being a quasi-judicial body.
What is a Meeting?
A meeting is defined as a gathering of members of a public body where a quorum (simple majority) is present, or a series of gatherings of members of a public body that meet three criteria: (1) individual gatherings where less than a quorum is present; (2) the members of the public body attending one or more of the gatherings collectively constitute a quorum; and (3) the series of gatherings was held specifically to avoid the provisions of the Open Meeting Law. Nev. R. Stat. 241.015. Social functions where members of a public body do not deliberate toward a decision or take action in any matter that the public body oversees or meetings where an attorney is meeting with the body to discuss potential or existing litigation are exempt. Nev. R. Stat. 241.015(2)(b). The Nevada Attorney General has stated that if a majority of members of a public body meet informally, to discuss any matter over which the body has control, that gathering must comply with the open meeting law.These meetings may be held telephonically or by video conference. However, these meetings must still comply with the notice requirements, and the public must be able to listen in on these meetings. Electronic communications must not be used in order to circumvent the requirements of the open meeting law.
Notice
Notice of all meetings must be posted in at least four places within the public body's jurisdiction and mailed at least three working days before the meeting is set to take place. The notice must be placed at the principal office of the public body, or, if that does not exist, in the building where the meeting will take place. The notice must also be placed in three separate "prominent" places. Nev. R. Stat. 241.020. If the public entity maintains a website, the public entity must also post the agenda to it, although the body is not required to create a website if it does not already have one.If someone has requested that he or she be mailed a notice of the meetings, the public entity must comply, and the mail must be postmarked before 9 a.m. on the third working day before the meeting. This request must be renewed every six months, and the recipient must be notified of that fact upon the first mailing. Additionally, if a person's character, misconduct, competence, or physical and mental health will be discussed, that person must also be notified of the meeting.
Nev. R. Stat. 241.020 sets forth notifications that must be provided on every agenda. These mandatory requirements include that the phrase "for possible action" must be placed next to the appropriate agenda item, and that the agenda clearly state that items may be taken out of order, may be combined for consideration by the public body, and items may be pulled or removed from the agenda at any time.
The notice must also include the time, place, and location of the meeting; a list of locations where the notice has been posted; a statement of the topics that will be discussed at the meeting and which items will be considered for action; public comment periods; indication that any portion of the meeting will be closed; the name of the person against whom administrative action will be taken, if applicable. Nev. R. Stat. 241.020.
When Meetings May Be Closed
Meetings may be closed for the following reasons:
Minutes, Recordings, and Documents
When requested, a public body must provide, at no charge, at least one copy of an agenda, the proposed ordinance or regulation that will be discussed, any other supporting materials provided to the members of the public body, except those subject to confidentiality or nondisclosure agreements, pertaining to closed portions of the meetings, or those documents that are confidential by law.
The Attorney General handles and investigates all potential open meeting violations, and may also bring a civil suit. Nev. R. Stat. 241.039. If the Attorney General finds that a violation has occurred, the public boy must include that information on its next agenda.
Each member of a public body who attends a meeting where a violation occurs, and who knows that the meeting is in violation of the Open Meeting Law, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Nev. R. Stat. 241.040. Anyone in violation of the Open Meeting Law also could be civilly liable in an amount not to exceed $500.
The Citizen Media Law Project would like to thank the Randazza Legal Group for preparing this section. The contents of this page should not be considered to be legal advice.Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The New Jersey Open Public Meetings Act provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in New Jersey. The law entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. For more detailed information about New Jersey open meetings law, please consult the New Jersey Foundation for Open Government's Open Public Meetings Act Summary and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: New Jersey.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The New Jersey Open Public Meetings Act applies to public bodies. The law defines a "public body" as "a commission, authority, board, council, committee or any group of two or more persons organized under the laws of this State and collectively empowered as a voting body to perform a public governmental function . . . or collectively authorized to spend public funds." N.J. Stat. § 10:4-8(a) (scroll down).
Public bodies can be part of state, county, or municipal government, and they share two salient features. First, they involve two or more persons acting jointly. The Open Public Meetings Act therefore does not apply to government officials who act in an individual capacity, like the governor or a mayor, when they meet with their subordinates. But the law might apply to these officials if they sit on a board, commission, or other multi-member body that makes decisions on public business. Second, to be covered by the Open Public Meetings Act, a body must vote on public matters or spend public funds. The law thus does not cover purely advisory boards or committees. It also does not cover any private group or body not created by a New Jersey statute, ordinance, or regulation, or federal government bodies.
The Open Public Meetings Act specifically exempts from coverage the judiciary, grand and petit juries, parole boards, the State Commission of Investigations, the Apportionment Committee, and any political party committee. Therefore, the meetings of these groups need not be open to the public.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: New Jersey for more information about what public bodies are covered.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the New Jersey Open Public Meetings Act, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute an "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). To be a "meeting" for purposes of the Open Public Meetings Act, a gathering must be: (1) open to all the public body’s members; (2) attended by a majority of the members of that public body; and (3) the members present must intend to discuss or act upon public business. "Public business" includes "all matters which relate in any way, directly or indirectly, to the performance of the public body's functions or the conduct of its business." N.J. Stat. § 10:4-8(c) (scroll down). Therefore, the term "meeting" applies to information-gathering and fact-finding sessions in addition to meetings where formal action is taken or discussed, so long as a majority of the public body's members are present. It does not apply to chance social or ceremonial gatherings.
Governmental bodies may hold meetings by by written, telephonic, electronic, wireless, or other virtual means. However, an electronic meeting is still subject to the notice requirements and must be held at a designated place and time. While the law is not certain on this point, it appears that email communications between members of a governmental body may constitute a meeting.
Attending Meetings
The Open Public Meetings Act gives all members of the public the right to attend the meetings of public bodies, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. New Jersey law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend. See N.J. Stat. § 10:4-12(a).
The right to attend a public meeting does not necessarily include a right to comment or participate. Most public bodies in New Jersey may decide for themselves whether to allow public participation and may impose rules limiting or regulating participation. The governing bodies of municipal government, however, must set aside a portion of every meeting, the length of which is determined by the municipal body, for public comment on any governmental issue that a member of the public "feels may be of concern to the residents of the municipality." N.J. Stat. § 10:4-12(a).
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, New Jersey law requires public bodies to give advance notice of their meetings. The Open Public Meetings Act requires that a public body create a schedule of its regular meetings for the year at the "annual reorganization" meetings or, if no reorganization meeting is held, by January 10 of each year. This schedule or "annual notice" must contain the time, place, and location of the public body's regularly scheduled meetings. See N.J. Stat. § 10:4-18.
Public bodies may also hold "special" meetings, which are meetings not on the regular schedule. For these meetings, they must provide notice at least forty-eight hours before the meeting. The notice must contain the time, date, location and the agenda of the meeting (to the extent known). N.J. Stat. § 10:4-8.
Both the annual notice and the special meeting notice must be (1) prominently posted in at least one public place reserved for such announcements; (2) transmitted to two newspapers designated as "official newspapers" of the public body; (3) filed with appropriate municipal or county clerk, or with the Secretary of State if the public body has statewide authority; and (4) mailed to "any person" who requests notice in writing and pays in advance a reasonable fee to cover the cost of providing notice. If you file a request for notice, you need to renew your request annually to ensure that you continue to receive notice.
Public bodies may also post notice of their meetings on the Internet, but this is in addition to the other notice requirements.
Special notice rules apply for emergency meetings. See the Open Government Guide: New Jersey for details
Minutes and Recordings
The Open Public Meetings Act requires public bodies to keep "reasonably comprehensible" minutes of their meetings and to make them available to the public for inspection and copying. The law requires public bodies to enter a statement into the minutes at the beginning of each meeting indicating that adequate notice was given and specifying how it was provided, or indicating that adequate notice was not provided and explaining the reason.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see New Jersey Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of governmental bodies must be open to the public. If a governmental body wants to hold a closed or "executive" session, it must identify a specific statutory exemption. Under the Open Public Meetings Act, a public body may hold a closed session when it is dealing with one of nine subject-area exemptions found in N.J.S.A. 10:4-12(b). The nine exemptions are for meetings where a public body will discuss:
These exemptions make it permissible for a public body to close a portion of a meeting; they do not require it to do so. To close a session, a public body must identify the exemption justifying closure and adopt a resolution at an open meeting for which public notice has been given.
Public bodies must keep minutes of their closed sessions, and these minutes are not open to the public. A public body must promptly make them available,however, once the necessity for maintaining confidentiality has passed.
For more information on the exemptions to the open meetings requirement, see the Open Government Guide: New Jersey.
Under the New Jersey Open Public Meetings Act, any person may file a lawsuit in New Jersey Superior Court for violations of the open-meetings requirements. If you succeed in a lawsuit, you can obtain a court order requiring that a meeting or meetings be made open to the public in the future, or requiring that an agency make public the minutes of an improperly closed meeting. You can also obtain a court order invalidating the actions of a public body taken in violation of the Open Public Meetings Act, but to do so you must file a lawsuit within within 45 days after the action you are challenging became public. The state may also pursue criminal penalties against members of a public body who violate the Open Public Meetings Act.
In the event that you are denied access to a meeting or class of meetings, you probably want to pursue an informal resolution before filing a lawsuit, which ordinarily is a costly and slow solution. You should contact the public body in question and inform it that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the public body continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The New York Open Meetings Law ("OML") provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in New York. The law entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. For more detailed information about New York open meetings law, please consult the New York Committee on Open Government's "Your Right to Know" Guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: New York.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The OML covers public bodies. The law defines a "public body" as "any entity, for which a quorum is required in order to conduct public business and which consists of two or more members, performing a governmental function for the state or for an agency or department thereof." N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 102(2). A "quorum" just means a majority of members of the body, which is the number needed to take formal action on a matter of public business.
A "public body" can be part of state, county, or municipal government, and the state legislature is covered. Public bodies share two salient features. First, they must be made of two or more members who act jointly on public business. Thus, the law does not cover government officials acting in an individual capacity, like the governor or a mayor, when they meet with subordinates. Second, a public body must perform a governmental function for the state or an agency of the state, such as cities, counties, towns, villages, and school districts. Examples of public bodies include state boards and commissions, city councils, town boards, village boards of trustees, and school boards. The law also applies to committees and subcommittees of these groups when they are made up solely of members of the public body. The OML does not apply to the judiciary or federal government bodies.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: New York for more information on what public bodies are covered.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by New York law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute an "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). The OML defines a "meeting" as "the official convening of a public body for the purpose of conducting public business, including the use of videoconferencing for attendance and participation by the members of the public body." N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 102(1). To have a meeting, there must be a "quorum" of members present. As noted above, a "quorum" is just a majority of the members of a public body. A gathering may constitute a "meeting" even if a public body takes no formal action -- it applies to any gathering where a quorum is present to discuss or deal with a matter of public business, regardless of what the gathering is called. The term applies to information-gathering and fact-finding sessions, as well as deliberations and debate about policy and proposed decisions. It does not apply to chance social or ceremonial gatherings.
The OML authorizes public bodies to use videoconferencing for conducting meetings, provided that the public body provides advance notice and allows the public to attend at any of the meeting locations. Public bodies may not use email or other electronic means to circumvent the requirement that meetings be open to public.
Attending Meetings
The OML gives the "general public" the right to attend the meetings of public bodies, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. New York law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend.
The right to attend meetings does not include a right to participate or comment. A public body may permit you to speak at open meetings, but does not have to do so.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, New York law requires public bodies to give advance notice of their meetings. If a meeting is scheduled at least one week ahead of time, the public body must post notice at least seventy-two hours in advance. The public body must post the notice in a public location (previously designated) and deliver notice to the "news media." It is not clear exactly what "news media" means and whether it could include non-traditional journalists and other online publishers. The notice must contain the time and place of the meeting, but need not contain an agenda. If the public body will hold the meeting via videoconference, the notice must indicate that videoconferencing will be used, identify the locations for the meeting, and state that the public has the right to attend the meeting at any of the locations. See N.Y Pub. Off. Law § 104.
When a meeting is scheduled less than one week in advance, the public body must give notice to the public and the news media at "a reasonable time" prior to the meeting. N.Y Pub. Off. Law § 104. What time period qualifies as a "reasonable time" in advance will vary based on the circumstances.
Minutes and Recordings
The OML requires public bodies to record minutes of their meetings and to make them available to the public for inspection and copying. Proposed minutes must be available for public inspection within two weeks of the meeting.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see New York Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of public bodies must be open to the public. If a public body wants to hold a closed or "executive" session, it must identify a specific statutory exemption. Under the OML, a public body may hold an executive session when it is dealing with one of eight subject-area exemptions found in N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 105. The eight exemptions are for meetings that will involve:
The exemptions make it permissible for a public body to close a portion of a meeting; they do not require the public body to do so. To close a session, a public body must identify the exemption justifying closure and follow these steps:
A public body must keep and make publicly available minutes of executive sessions, but they need only contain "a record or summary of the final determination" of action taken during executive session and "the date and vote thereon." N.Y Pub. Off. Law § 106. Therefore, if a public body takes no final action in executive session, it does not need to record minutes for that session.
For more information on the exemptions to the open-meetings requirements, see the "Your Right to Know" Guide and the Open Government Guide: New York.
Under New York law, any "aggrieved person" may file a lawsuit in New York state court for violations of the OML. Any member of the public probably could qualify as an "aggrieved person" because the OML grants rights of attendance, notice, and access to minutes to all members of the public. If you succeed in a lawsuit, you can obtain a court order requiring that a meeting or meetings be made open to the public in the future. You can also obtain a court order invalidating the actions of a public body taken in violation of the OML. If you go to court and win, the court may order the losing public body to pay your attorneys' fees, but the court is not required to do so. See N.Y Pub. Off. Law § 107.
In the event that you are denied access to a meeting or class of meetings, you probably want to pursue an informal resolution before filing a lawsuit, which ordinarily is a costly and slow solution. You should contact the public body in question and inform it that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the public body continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The North Carolina Open Meetings Law provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in North Carolina. The law entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. For more detailed information about North Carolina open meetings law, please consult the North Carolina Open Government Coalition's Open Meetings Law Guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: North Carolina.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The North Carolina Open Meetings Law covers public bodies. The law defines a "public body" as
any elected or appointed authority, board, commission, committee, council, or other body of the State, or of one or more counties, cities, school administrative units, constituent institutions of The University of North Carolina, or other political subdivisions or public corporations in the State that (i) is composed of two or more members and (ii) exercises or is authorized to exercise a legislative, policy-making, quasi-judicial, administrative, or advisory function.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.10(b).
Public bodies can be part of state, county, or municipal government, and they share two salient features. First, they involve two or more persons acting jointly. The Open Meetings Law thus do not apply to government officials who act in an individual capacity, like the governor or a mayor, when they meet with their subordinates. Second, to be covered by the Open Meetings Law, a body must exercise a legislative, policy-making, quasi-judicial, administrative, or advisory function. This sounds complicated, but it means that groups carrying out most government functions are covered, with the exception of courts carrying out their traditional judicial function. Examples of public bodies include state boards and commissions, city councils, school boards, and governing boards affiliated with The University of North Carolina. The law also applies to any committee or subcommittee that carries out activities on behalf of a public body or advises a public body. It does not apply to federal government bodies.
The Open Meetings Law also applies to the North Carolina General Assembly and most of its committees, but slightly different notice rules apply to these bodies. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.14A. The law specifically exempts from coverage certain government bodies, including grand juries, law enforcement agencies, the Judicial Standards Commission, and the Legislative Ethics Committee.
Consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: North Carolina for more information on what public bodies are covered.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the North Carolina Open Meetings Law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute an "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). The North Carolina Open Meetings Law requires that the official meetings of public bodies be open to the public. The law defines an "official meeting" as a gathering of a majority of members of a public body "for purposes of conducting hearings, participating in deliberations, or voting upon or otherwise transacting the public business" of the public body. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.10(d). The term "official meetings" applies beyond formal meetings called to take public action, and include gatherings to weighh and reflect on the reasons for possible decisions and information-gathering sessions.
The Open Meetings Law does not cover a gathering of the professional staff of a public body. It also does not cover a social or ceremonial gathering, so long as the public body does not use the gathering as an excuse for getting around the open-meetings requirements.
A public body may hold a meeting by telephone or videoconferencing, but it must provide a location and way for the public to listen to the meeting. The public body may charge each member of the public a fee (maximum of $25) to defray the cost of providing a location and equipment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.13(a). An email exchange or other electronic communications could constitute an "official meeting" if public body members used electronic communications to engage with each other simultaneously. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.10(d) (definition of "official meeting" includes "simultaneous communication by conference telephone or other electronic means").
Attending Meetings
The North Carolina Open Meetings Law gives "any person" the right to attend an official meeting of a public body, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. North Carolina law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend.
The right to attend official meetings does not include a right to comment or participate. As a matter of practice, however, public bodies may give the public an opportunity to speak at meetings. The presiding officer of a public body may direct a person to leave a meeting if he or she interrupts, disturbs, or disrupts an official meeting. If the person creating a disturbance refuses to leave, the state may charge him or her with a misdemeanor. See the North Carolina Department of Justice's Questions and Answers Guide.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, North Carolina law requires public bodies to give advance notice of their official meetings to the public. If a public body has a regular schedule of its meetings, it must file the schedule in the following places:
If the public body changes the schedule, it must file a revised schedule at least seven days before the first meeting held under the new schedule.
A public body may also hold "special" meetings, which are meetings not listed on the regular schedule. A public body must give notice of a special meeting at least forty-eight hours before the meeting. The public body must post the notice on its principal bulletin board or, if it has no bulletin board, at the door of its usual meeting room. The public body must also mail or deliver notice to any person who requests notice in writing. The public body may impose a fee of up to $10 per calendar year for ordinary individuals. It may not impose a fee on a "newspaper, wire service, radio station, and television station" that requests notice. It is not clear whether a non-traditional journalist or other online publisher could qualify for no-fee notice, but you should consider asking for a fee waiver. A public body may require persons requesting notice to renew their requests quarterly (four times a year). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.12(b)(2).
Different notice rules apply to emergency meetings. See the Open Government Guide: North Carolina for details.
Minutes, Recordings, and Documents
Every public body is required to keep full and accurate minutes of all official meetings, including closed sessions. Public bodies must make these minutes publicly available for inspection and copying, except for the minutes of closed sessions when public inspection would frustrate the purpose of the closed session. A public body may satisfy this requirement through sound or video recordings. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.10(e).
Under the North Carolina public records law, you are entitled to documents and other background material distributed to members at official meetings.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see North Carolina Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all official meetings of public bodies must be open to the public. If a public body wants to hold a closed or "executive" session, it must identify a specific statutory exemption. Under the North Carolina Open Meetings Law, a public body may hold a closed session when it is dealing with one of nine subject-area exemptions found in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.11(a). A public body may close a session for the following nine purposes:
The exemptions make it permissible for a public body to close a portion of a meeting; they do not require the public body to do so. To close a session, a public body must identify the exemption justifying closure and vote during a open meeting to hold a closed session. When voting, the public body must refer to the specific statutory exemption relied on to close the meeting. If the public body indicates that it will discuss confidential information, it must identify the law that makes the information in question confidential. If it indicates that it will discuss pending litigation, it must identify the parties to the litigation.
The minutes of closed sessions must give a general account of the closed session so that a person not in attendance would have a reasonable understanding of what took place. A public body may withhold the minutes if public inspection would frustrate the purpose of the closed session. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-318.10(e). When the reason for holding a closed session is no longer valid, a public body must make these minutes available to the public.
For more information on the exemptions to the open-meetings requirements, see the Open Government Guide: North Carolina.
Under North Carolina law, any person may file a lawsuit in North Carolina state court for violations of the Open Meetings Law. If you succeed in a lawsuit, you can obtain a court order requiring that a meeting or meetings be made open to the public in the future, or requiring that a public body satisfy its notice obligations. You can also obtain a court order invalidating the actions of a public body taken in violation of the Open Meetings Law, but to do so you must file a lawsuit within within 45 days after the action you are challenging became public. The law provides for expedited review of lawsuits brought for violations of the Open Meetings Law. If you go to court and win, the court may order the losing public body to pay your attorneys' fees, but the court is not required to do so.
In the event that you are denied access to a meeting or class of meetings, you probably want to pursue an informal resolution before filing a lawsuit, which ordinarily is a costly and slow solution. You should contact the public body in question and inform it that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the public body continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The Ohio Open Meetings Act provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in Ohio. The law entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. For more detailed information about Ohio's Open Meetings Act, please consult the Ohio Attorney General's excellent guide, the 2012 Sunshine Laws Manual. It has detailed yet understandable explanations of the most important aspects of the state's open meetings and open records laws. For additional information, see the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Ohio.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The Ohio Open Meetings Act does not apply to all government bodies in Ohio. It only covers "public bodies," a term with a specific legal definition. The law defines "public body" broadly to include most government bodies (i.e., entities made up of more than one member) that make decisions on matters of public business. At the state government level, the term "public body" means "any board, commission, committee, council, or similar decision-making body of a state agency, institution, or authority." Ohio Rev. Code § 121.22(B)(1)(a) (scroll down to version effective as of 2-12-2008). At the local government level, a "public body" is "any legislative authority or board, commission, committee, council, agency, authority, or similar decision-making body of any county, township, municipal corporation, school district, or other political subdivision or local public institution." Ohio Rev. Code § 121.22(B)(1)(a). At both the state and local government level, the term "public body" also includes any committee of one of the above-described public bodies. See Ohio Rev. Code § 121.22(B)(1)(b).
Some examples of public bodies include the Ohio Elections Commission, the Ohio State Board of Education and its committees, boards of county commissioners, county boards of elections, city councils, city and town zoning boards, and local school boards. The Open Meetings Act does not apply to a single government official acting in his or her individual capacity. It also does not apply to the state legislature (which has its own rules requiring that sessions be open to the public), the judiciary, or federal government bodies. The Open Meetings Act identifies certain public bodies and types of gatherings that are exempt from the requirements of the Open Meetings Act:
The Ohio Attorney General's guide, the 2012 Sunshine Laws Manual, has a great deal of additional information about what government bodies are covered by the Open Meetings Act.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the Ohio Open Meetings Act, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute an "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under Ohio law, a gathering is a "meeting" if it has three characteristics. First, it must be a prearranged gathering. Second, a majority of the members of the public body must attend. For example, if a school board has nine members, then five members would be required for a "meeting" to take place. If the school board created a finance committee with five members, then three members of the finance committee would be required for a "meeting" of the finance committee to take place. Third, the purpose of the meeting must be to conduct, transact, deliberate, or discuss public business. Thus, the Open Meetings Act would not apply to a social or ceremonial gathering. Nor would it cover a conference or similar event that a majority of members happened to attend, so long as they did not use the event as an excuse to deliberate or discuss public business without an open meeting.
Public bodies may not hold meetings through teleconferencing or videoconferencing. A member must be physically present to deliberate or vote on any matter of public business. Furthermore, the Attorney General indicates that members of a public body may not circumvent the open-meetings requirements by holding a conference call and claiming that there is no "meeting" because a majority of members is not present. One Ohio court has indicated that email communications are not covered by the Open Meetings Act. See Haverkos v. Nw. Local School Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 3237, at *7-8. (Ohio Ct. App. July 8, 2005).
Attending Meetings
The Ohio Open Meetings Act gives "any person" the right to attend the meetings of public bodies, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. Ohio law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend. The right to attend does not include a right to participate or comment. Moreover, if you act in a disruptive fashion, a public body may have you removed from a meeting. Sometimes, a public body will voluntarily provide time for public comment.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Ohio law requires public bodies to provide advance notice of their meetings to the public. Unlike most states, however, Ohio does not impose specific requirements for how far in advance notice must be given. Instead, the law provides that each public body will establish by rule "a reasonable method whereby any person may determine the time and place of all regularly scheduled meetings and the time, place, and purpose of all special meetings." Ohio Rev. Code § 121.11(F).
Public bodies must establish a notification rule for "regular meetings," which are meetings held at regularly scheduled intervals. A public body must give advance notice that lets the public know the time and place of these meetings. Whatever method a public body chooses, it must give notice to members of the news media and the public who have requested notification. A public body can satisfy this requirement, for example, by mailing an agenda to subscribers to a mailing list or mailing notices in self-addressed stamped envelopes provided by those requesting notification. If you haven't requested notice for the meetings of a public body, you should check its website for a posted schedule because many public bodies publish notice on their websites in addition to providing it to those who have specifically requested it.
A public body may also hold "special meetings," which are meetings not listed on the regular schedule. A public body must give notice of a special meeting at least twenty-four hours in advance of the meeting, and the notice must include the time, place, and a description of the purpose of the meeting. As with regular meetings, a public body must provide notice to members of the news media and the public who have requested notification, and may post notice in other locations, including the Internet.
In an emergency situation, a public body may call an "emergency meeting." A public body must give notice of an emergency meeting immediately after calling the meeting, and the notice must include the time, place, and a description of the purpose of the meeting. Again, a public body must deliver notice to members of the news media and the public who have requested notification, and may post notice in other locations, including the Internet.
Minutes and Recordings
Public bodies must keep full and accurate minutes of all meetings, including closed sessions. Generally, the minutes should provide sufficient information to permit the public to understand and appreciate the rationale behind the public body’s decisions. For closed sessions, the minutes need only give a general sense of the subject matter discussed. Public bodies must make all minutes available to the public for inspection and copying at a reasonable fee.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Ohio Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of public bodies must be open to the public. If a public body wants to hold a closed or "executive" session, it must identify a specific statutory exemption. Under the Ohio Open Meetings Act, a public body may hold a closed session when it is dealing with one of seven subject-area exemptions found in Ohio Rev. Code § 121.22(G). The seven exemptions are for meetings dealing with the following topics:
The exemptions make it permissible for a public body to close a portion of a meeting; they do not require it to do so. To close a session, a public body must identify the exemption justifying closure on the record during an open meeting, and a majority of members present must vote to hold a closed session. No formal action may be taken during a closed session.
A handful of public bodies may close their meetings to the public when dealing with additional topics, listed in Ohio Rev. Code § 121.22(E). To do so, however, the members must unanimously vote to close the meeting. See page 14 of the Attorney General's guide for details.
For more information on the exceptions to the open-meetings requirements, see the 2012 Sunshine Laws Manual and the Open Government Guide: Ohio.
If you believe that a public body has violated your rights, you can sue in state court. Under Ohio law, any person may file a lawsuit for violation of the Open Meetings Act in the court of common pleas for the county where the meeting in question took place. If you succeed in a lawsuit, you can obtain a court order requiring that a meeting or meetings be made open to the public in the future, that a public body satisfy its notice obligations, or that a public body provide access to minutes improperly withheld. In addition, if you go to court and win, the court must force the public body to pay you a $500 civil penalty, and it may order the public body to pay your attorneys' fees. However, if you go to court and lose, a court might order you to pay the winning public body's attorneys' fees, if it determines that your legal claim was frivolous. This would not happen unless your legal claim were utterly and obviously without any merit. If you want to file a lawsuit for violation of the Open Meetings Act, you must file your lawsuit within two years of the violation in question.
In the event that you are denied access to a meeting or class of meetings, you probably want to pursue an informal resolution before filing a lawsuit, which ordinarily is a costly and slow solution. You should contact the public body in question and inform it that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the public body continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The Pennsylvania Sunshine Act gives the public the right to attend the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in Pennsylvania. The law also entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. For more detailed information about Pennsylvania open meetings law, please consult the Open Meetings/Open Records Guide, prepared by the Pennsylvania Governor's Center for Local Government Services, and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Pennsylvania.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The Pennsylvania Sunshine Act covers all legislative and executive "agencies" at the state and local level. The term "agency," which is defined at 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 703(full text - scroll down), applies to multi-member bodies that perform an essential governmental function, exercise governmental authority, and take official action through the joint action of their members. This includes the Pennsylvania General Assembly and its committees, state agencies in the executive branch, political subdivisions (including all their constituent boards and commissions), and municipal authorities (such as city councils). The statute defines a "political subdivision" as "[a]ny county, city, borough, incorporated town, township, school district, intermediate unit, vocational school district or county institution district." In addition, the term "agency" includes school boards and the boards of public colleges and universities. Finally, the term also applies to committees created by the above-described agencies that are authorized to take official action or render advice on matters of agency business.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the Pennsylvania open meetings law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute a "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act, a gathering must have three characteristics in order to count as a "meeting." First, the meeting must be prearranged. Second, a quorum of agency members must attend. The term "quorum" just means a simple majority of agency members. For example, if a school board has nine members, then five members would be required for a "meeting" to take place. If the school board created a finance committee with five members, then three members of the finance committee would be required for a "meeting" of the finance committee to take place. Third, the purpose of the gathering must be to discuss or deliberate on agency business or take official action. The phrase "official action" means establishing agency policy, making a decision on a matter of agency business, and voting on any motion, proposal, resolution, regulation, ordinance, report or order. The Sunshine Act does not apply to a purely social or ceremonial event unrelated to the agency's business. Nor does it apply to a "conference," defined as "[a]ny training program or seminar, or any session arranged by State or Federal agencies for local agencies, organized and conducted for the sole purpose of providing information to agency members on matters directly related to their official responsibilities." 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 703.
Agency members may participate in a meeting by telephone or video conference, and remote members count towards a quorum. See Babac v. Penn. Milk Marketing Bd., 613 A.2d 551 (Pa. 1992). Email communications among agency members likely would constitute a meeting if they contained "deliberations" about agency business, but no case has addressed this issue yet.
There are special rules for what meetings of the Pennsylvania General Assembly are covered by the open-meetings requirements. The Sunshine Act covers:
The Pennsylvania open-meetings requirements do not apply to caucuses and meetings of any ethics committee created by Pennsylvania House or Senate rules. See 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 712.
Attending Meetings
The Pennsylvania Sunshine Act gives "the public" the right to attend the meetings of covered agencies, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. Pennsylvania law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend. In addition to the right to attend meetings, you also have a limited right to comment. Most local-level boards and councils must afford the public a right to comment before official action is taken. See 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 710.1. Agencies may adopt reasonable rules for the comment period to maintain an orderly process, including by imposing time limits.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Pennsylvania law requires agencies to give advance notice of their meetings. The Pennsylvania Sunshine Act distinguishes between two types of meetings: (1) regularly scheduled meetings; and (2) special meetings. A "special meeting" is defined as "a meeting scheduled by an agency after the agency's regular schedule of meetings has been established." 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 703. Agencies must publish notice of their regularly scheduled meetings once a year, at least three days before the first meeting. The notice must include the place, date, and time of the first meeting and the schedule for the remaining meetings. Agencies must publish the notice in a newspaper of general circulation and post it in a prominent location at the principal office of the agency or the building in which the meeting is to be held. In addition, agencies must provide copies of the notice to the news media and interested citizens who request a copy and provide the agency with a stamped, self-addressed envelope beforehand. 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 709(c). For special meetings, agencies must publish notice in a newspaper of general circulation and post notice (as described above) at least twenty-four hours before the meeting. Agencies may call emergency meetings without notice under limited circumstances.
Minutes and Recordings
The Pennsylvania Sunshine Act requires agencies to record minutes of their open meetings and to make them available to the public for inspection and copying. An audio or video recording of a meeting does not satisfy this requirement.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Pennsylvania Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all agency meetings must be open to the public. If an agency wants to hold a closed or "executive" session, it must identify a specific statutory exemption. Under the Pennsylvania Sunshine Act, an agency may hold a closed session when it addresses one of six subject-area exemptions found in 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 708(a) or when it is dealing with certain confidential or privileged deliberations or actions, as provided in 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 716. The six primary exemptions are for meetings dealing with the following topics:
These exemptions make it permissible for an agency to close a portion of a meeting; they do not require it to do so. If an agency chooses to hold a closed session, it must announce a specific reason for doing so on the record at an open meeting immediately prior or subsequent to the executive session. An agency may only take final action on matters discussed during an executive session at an open meeting.
For more information on the exceptions to the Pennsylvania open-meetings requirements, see the Open Meetings/Open Records Guide and the Open Government Guide: Pennsylvania.
If you believe that an agency has violated your rights, you can sue in Pennsylvania state court. Under Pennsylvania law, any person may file a lawsuit for violations of the Sunshine Act. If the matter involves a state-level agency, you must sue in the Commonwealth Court. If a matter involves local-level agencies, you must sue in the Court of Common Pleas. If you file a lawsuit and win, you can obtain a court order requiring that a meeting or meetings be made open to the public in the future, that an agency satisfy its notice obligations, or that it provide access to minutes improperly withheld. If you wish to challenge past agency action, you must file your lawsuit within thirty days of any violation that took place at an open meeting, or within thirty days of discovering an action that took place in an executive session (but in no circumstances after more than a year from the date of the session). If you go to court and win, the court may order the losing agency to pay your attorneys' fees if it finds that the agency willfully violated the Sunshine Act. On the other hand, if you go to court and lose, the court may order you to pay the agency's attorneys' fees if it finds that your lawsuit was frivolous. This would not happen unless your legal claim were utterly and obviously without any merit.
In the event that you are denied access to a meeting or class of meetings, you probably want to pursue an informal resolution before filing a lawsuit, which ordinarily is a costly and slow solution. You should contact the agency in question and inform it that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the agency continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
Note: This page covers information specific to Tennessee. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
See the note below regarding links to statutory provisions in this article.
You have a right under Tennessee public meetings law, Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-44-101 through § 8-44-111, to attend any meeting held by a governing body where a quorum of members is required to make a decision, except where otherwise provided in the state constitution.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
All public bodies are subject to the public meetings law. An agency is considered a public body if it has the power to decide policy or recommend actions to another entity that either decides policy or makes similar recommendations of its own. You also have a right to attend meetings of boards of nonprofits, if they:You also can attend meetings of telephone cooperatives as part of the Telephone Cooperative Transparency Act of 2011.
What is a Meeting?
A meeting is defined as a quorum of members gathering to make a decision. Statutes that govern the individual public body will define what constitutes a quorum for that body, although the law usually requires a majority of any governing board. For example, a quorum for any county governing body is defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 5-5-108 as a majority of the members of the county legislative body, and a quorum for city commissioners is defined as a majority of the members of the board of commissioners under Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-20-210.
Public agencies can communicate electronically, which includes posting in an online forum, but electronic communications posted in a forum will not substitute for a public meeting. If the agency communicates through a forum, you have a right to access that forum and to have notice of the use of a forum.
Members can participate electronically so long as there is a physical quorum present at the location mentioned in the meeting notice.
Attending Meetings
You have a right to get minutes of a meeting, to attend the meeting, and to have the public officials vote in public even if they have had discussions in executive session. You also have a right to hear everything at the meeting, so if the members don't have adequate microphones or sound, you should say something about it.
If you have questions about the state's open meetings law, you can use educational programs and materials that the Office of Open Records Counsel must make available to you.
Notice
If a public body has a meeting that is scheduled by law, then it has to give you notice that is "adequate" under § 8-44-103. "Adequacy" is not defined in the statute. However, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Memphis Publishing Co. v. City of Memphis, 513 S.W.2d 511 (1974) stated as a general rule that "adequate public notice" would be determined based on the totality of the circumstances — a phrase that refers to all the facts and circumstances in the specific situation. Notice could take the form of a web site announcement, a calendar posting, or some other form, so it would be wise to inquire how the particular public agency complies with this section.
Because what notice is sufficient will vary, you should check the web site of any public body frequently or consult with the agency to find out when mandated meetings are scheduled. The statute or charter creating the public body will likely provide a time frame for giving proper notice of meetings, so be sure to refer to this document.
If the public body has a special meeting, meaning one that is not previously scheduled by law (i.e., where the time of the meeting is set forth by statute, regulation or ordinance), the public body must still give "adequate" notice.
Minutes, Recordings, and Documents
You can inspect meeting minutes, which must be recorded and made available promptly after the meeting. The meetings must at least include a record of who attended the meeting and any motions, proposals and resolutions that were discussed, along with any votes.An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
You don't have a right to attend portions of meetings where the public body will discuss proprietary information or trade secrets. The constitution allows for state lawmakers to decide whether they should meet in secret (sometimes called an "executive session"). If the public body does meet in executive session, they must still vote in public.If a court forbids the agency from violating the act, the judge must order the agency to write to the court twice a year to show they are complying with the open meetings law. The court can void any action taken in violation of the act, except for action affecting the agency's public debt.
The statute says nothing about repaying costs or attorney fees if you file suit, so be ready to take on the expenses of filing a suit.
Additionally, refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to get legal assistance to help you assess the merits of a potential lawsuit against the agency.
NOTE: The Tennessee Code is currently published by LexisNexis; all hyperlinks to statutes in this article will direct you to the LexisNexis web site. Because the LexisNexis site does not permit linking to individual statutes, you will need to find the text of the statute you are looking for using the numbers assigned to the statute. The first number in the statute is the Title, the second number is the Chapter, and the third number is the specific Section (the first digit of the Section number also represents the "Part" of the statute, so Section 101 will be in Part 1). If you are interested, for example, in § 8-44-101 (that is, Title 8, Chapter 44, Section 101), after you click the link you can access the statute as follows:
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The Texas Open Meetings Act ("TOMA") provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in Texas. The law entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. For more detailed information about Texas open meetings law, please consult the Texas Attorney General's 2010 Open Meetings Act Handbook and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Texas.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
TOMA covers the meetings of "governmental bodies." Texas Gov't Code § 551.001(3) lists a number of state and local government entities that fit into this category:
As a general matter, governmental bodies are multi-member state and local bodies that exercise a government function, such as making rules and setting government policy. At the state level, these bodies must have "one or more elected or appointed members." The term also includes committees of the Texas state legislature. Beyond these generalities, figuring out exactly what bodies are governed by TOMA is a complex task -- consult the 2004 Open Meetings Act Handbook section on governmental bodies for additional details.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the Texas open meetings law, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute a "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under TOMA, a "meeting" is any gathering of a quorum of members of a governmental body in which they discuss public business or public policy within the body's supervision or control, or at which they consider or take any formal action. The term also applies to information-gathering and fact-finding sessions called by the governmental body where a quorum of members are present and the session relates to the body's public business. The term "quorum" just means a simple majority of members of the governmental body. For example, if a school board has nine members, then five members would be required for a "meeting" of the finance board to take place.
The term "meeting" does not apply to a purely social event unrelated to the governmental body's public business or a "a regional, state, or national convention or workshop, ceremonial event, or press conference, if formal action is not taken and any discussion of public business is incidental to the social function, convention, workshop, ceremonial event, or press conference." Texas Gov't Code § 551.001(4)(B)(iv).
Governmental bodies may not hold meetings by telephone or video conference except under limited circumstances. While the law is not certain on this point, it appears that email communications between members of a governmental body may constitute a meeting. See Opp. Att'y Gen. JC-0307 (deliberations covered by TOMA may include email).
Attending Meetings
TOMA gives "the public" the right to attend the meetings of governmental bodies, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. Texas law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend. The right to attend meetings does not include the right to participate or comment. As a matter of practice, however, a governmental body may give the public an opportunity to speak at a meeting. According to the Attorney General, if it does so, it "may set reasonable limits on the number, frequency and length of presentations before it, but it may not unfairly discriminate among speakers for or against a particular point of view."
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Texas law requires governmental bodies to give advance notice of their meetings. Unfortunately, Texas notice requirements are complex. One statutory provision states that governmental bodies must post notice of their meetings in a place readily accessible to the general public for at least seventy-two hours before the scheduled time of the meeting. Texas Gov't Code § 551.043(a). Another statutory provision requires the secretary of state to post notice on the Internet seven days in advance for meetings of a state board, commission, department or officer with statewide jurisdiction. Texas Gov't Code § 551.044(a). The notice must include the time, location, and subject matter to be discussed at the meeting. A complex array of rules governs where different kinds of government bodies must post notice. See the Notice Requirements section of the Attorney General's Handbook for details.
One notable requirement is that school districts must give notice of each meeting to any "news media" that has requested special notice and agreed to reimburse the district for the cost of providing notice. Texas Gov't Code § 551.052. The school district can give notice by telephone, fax, or email. It is not clear whether the term "news media" would cover non-traditional journalists and other online publishers, but you may want to request notice in any event. A school district will have little incentive to deny this simple request. If the school district accepts your request, you should renew it every year to ensure that you continue to receive notice.
Other notice rules apply for special and emergency meetings. See the Open Government Guide: Texas for details.
Minutes and Recordings
TOMA requires governmental bodies to record minutes of their meetings and to make them available to the public for inspection and copying. They may, but need not, make audio or video recordings of their meetings. If a governmental body chooses to do so, however, the recording is a public record that you can access just like ordinary minutes. A governmental body may also broadcast meetings over the Internet, but it is not required to do so.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Texas Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of governmental bodies must be open to the public. If a governmental body wants to hold a closed or "executive" session, it must identify a specific statutory exemption. Under TOMA, a governmental body may hold a closed session when it is dealing with one of fourteen subject-area exemptions found in Texas Gov't Code §§ 551.071 through 551.088. These exemptions make it permissible for a governmental body to close a portion of a meeting; they do not require it to do so. If a governmental body is dealing with one of these enumerated subject areas, then it may hold a closed session, but it must also convene the executive session as part of an open meeting, and the presiding officer must publicly identify the statutory exemption relied on to close the meeting. Governmental bodies must keep a certified agenda or make a tape recording of the executive session and retain it for at least two years. They do not have to make the agenda or recording public.
For more information on the exceptions to the open meetings requirement, see the Executive Session section of the Attorney General's Handbook and the Open Government Guide: Texas.
If you believe that a governmental body has violated your rights, you can sue in Texas state court. Under Texas law, an "interested person, including a member of the news media," may bring a lawsuit for violations of TOMA. See Texas Gov't Code § 551.142. The term "interested person" is broad -- courts have found that a government league, an environmental group, and a local homeowners' group fit the definition. They have also indicated that any individual living in an area affected by the governmental body's authority will qualify as "interested." The CMLP located no Texas case law addressing whether the term "news media" would encompass non-traditional journalists and other online publishers, but there is no reason to suppose that you could not take advantage of this statutory language.
If you file a lawsuit and win, you can obtain a court order requiring that a meeting or meetings be made open to the public in the future, that a governmental body satisfy its notice obligations, or that it provide access to minutes improperly withheld. Under some circumstances, a court may invalidate the past actions of a governmental body taken in violation of TOMA. If you are successful in court, the losing governmental body may have to pay your attorneys' fees and costs.
In the event that you are denied access to a meeting or class of meetings, you probably want to pursue an informal resolution before filing a lawsuit, which ordinarily is a costly and slow solution. You should contact the governmental body in question and inform it that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the agency continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The Virginia Freedom of Information Act, known as Virginia FOIA, provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in Virginia. The law entitles you to notice of these meetings and gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes. For more detailed information about Virginia open meetings law, please consult the Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory Council's Access to Public Meetings Guide and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Virginia.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
Virginia FOIA covers the meetings of "public bodies," defined as
any legislative body, authority, board, bureau, commission, district or agency of the Commonwealth or of any political subdivision of the Commonwealth, including cities, towns and counties, municipal councils, governing bodies of counties, school boards and planning commissions; boards of visitors of public institutions of higher education; and other organizations, corporations or agencies in the Commonwealth supported wholly or principally by public funds.
Va. Code § 2.2-3701. This definition encompasses a large number of state and local boards, commissions, and agencies, as well as the both houses of the Virginia General Assembly. It also includes committees created by a public body to perform delegated functions or to act in an advisory capacity, whether or not private individuals are members. At the state level, examples of public bodies include the State Board of Education, the State Air Pollution Control Board, the Innovative Technology Authority, and the Virginia Commission for the Arts. For a representative list of state-level public bodies, see the Commonwealth Calendar. At the local level, examples include local boards of education, city councils, and county zoning boards, among many other public bodies exercising local government authority.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by Virginia FOIA, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute a "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under Virginia FOIA, a "meeting" is any gathering of three or more members of a public body (or a quorum, if a quorum is less than three) to discuss or transact business of the public body. The law applies to all discussions, deliberations, and formal action. A gathering of employees of a public body, as opposed to members of the body, is not a meeting covered by Virginia FOIA.
A "meeting" does not include purely social and ceremonial gatherings, nor would it likely apply to an academic conference or similar event that members of a public body happened to attend. Virginia FOIA does not cover attendance of members of a public body at
Va. Code § 2.2-3707(G). Along these lines, the Virginia Supreme Court has ruled that no "meeting" took place when city council members attended a meeting organized by citizens to discuss traffic and safety issues, when the city council had no business pertaining to traffic control before it at the time and was unlikely to address such issues in the future. See Beck v. Shelton, 593 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 2004).
State-level public bodies may hold meetings by telephone or video conference as long as a majority of members are physically present in one location and the public has access to all communications, among other requirements. Local government bodies generally may not do so. The Virginia Supreme Court has held that email communications between members of a public body do not constitute meetings unless there is an element of simultaneity present that makes the exchange similar to a telephone conversation. See Beck v. Shelton, 593 S.E.2d 195 (Va. 2004).
Attending Meetings
Virginia FOIA gives the public the right to attend the meetings of public bodies, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. Virginia law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend. The right to attend meetings does not include the right to participate or comment.
Notice
The right to attend meetings is not necessarily meaningful without proper notice of those meetings. To address this issue, Virginia law requires public bodies to give notice of their meetings at least three working days before a meeting. The notice must contain the date, time, and location of the meeting, but an agenda is not required. If a state-level public body includes at least one member appointed by the Governor, the notice must also indicate whether or not public comment will be received at the meeting and, if so, the approximate point during the meeting when public comment will be received. Va. Code § 2.2-3707(C). Public bodies must post notice in "a prominent public location at which notices are regularly posted" and in the office of the clerk or chief administrator of the public body. State-level bodies must also post notice on their websites and the Commonwealth Calendar.
Public bodies must deliver notice directly to any person who files a written request for notification. When making a request for notification, you should provide the public body with your name, address, zip code, daytime telephone number, email address, and the name of your organization, if any. You need to renew the request annually. See Va. Code § 2.2-3707(E).
Other notice rules apply for special and emergency meetings. See the Open Government Guide: Virginia for details.
Minutes, Recordings, and Documents
Virginia FOIA requires public bodies, with a few exceptions discussed below, to record minutes of their meetings and to make them available to the public for inspection and copying. They may, but need not, make audio or video recordings of their meetings. If a public body chooses to do so, however, the recording is a public record that you can access just like ordinary minutes. State agencies in the executive branch that are subject to Virginia FOIA must post their minutes to the Commonwealth Calendar. See Va. Code § 2.2-3707.1.
Deliberations of the following public bodies need not be recorded in minutes: (1) committees of the General Assembly; (2) legislative interim study commissions and committees, including the Virginia Code Commission; (3) study committees or commissions appointed by the Governor; and (4) study commissions or study committees, or any other committees or subcommittees appointed by the governing body or school board of a county, city or town, except where the membership of the commission, committee or subcommittee includes a majority of the members of the governing body. See Va. Code § 2.2-3707(I).
In addition, the public is entitled to copies of agenda packets given to members at a meeting, and all other documents furnished to members. The public has a right to these documents at the same time they are furnished to members. See Va. Code § 2.2-3707(F).
Any person may photograph, film, record or otherwise reproduce any portion of a meeting required to be open. The public body conducting the meeting may adopt rules governing the placement and use of recording equipment to prevent interference with the proceedings, but may not prohibit or otherwise prevent any person from recording any portion of a meeting required to be open. In addition, public bodies are prohibited from conducting a meeting required to be open in any building or facility where such recording devices are prohibited. Va. Code § 2.2-3707(H). For additional information on your ability to use recording devices in Virginia, see Virginia Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of public bodies must be open to the public. If a public body wants to hold a closed or "executive" session, it must identify a specific statutory exemption. Under Virginia FOIA, a public body may hold a closed session when it is dealing with one of forty-four subject-area exemptions found in Va. Code § 2.2-3711. If a governing body is dealing with one of these enumerated subject areas, then it may hold a closed session, but it must also meet the following procedural requirements:
Public bodies are not required to record minutes for closed meetings.
For more information on the exemptions to the Virginia open-meetings requirements, see the Access to Public Meetings Guide and the Open Government Guide: Virginia.
If you believe that a public body has violated your rights, you can sue in state court. Under Virginia law, any person may file a lawsuit for violation of Virginia FOIA. If you succeed in a lawsuit, you can obtain a court order requiring that a meeting or meetings be made open to the public in the future, that a public body satisfy its notice obligations, or that a public body provide access to minutes improperly withheld. In addition, if you go to court and win, a court generally must award you reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Special rules about which district or circuit court you need to sue in are located in Va. Code § 2.2-3713(A)(1)-(3).
In the event that you are denied access to a meeting or class of meetings, you probably want to pursue an informal resolution before filing a lawsuit, which ordinarily is a costly and slow solution. You should contact the public body in question and inform it that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the public body continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
Washington's Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA) provides the public with a right of access to the meetings of a large number of government bodies at the state and local level in Washington. Washington law also gives you the ability to inspect and copy meeting minutes and imposes notice requirements on government agencies. You should consult the Washington Attorney General's Open Government Internet Manual: Chapter 3 and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's Open Government Guide: Washington for additional information on the OPMA. For detailed information about how the OPMA applies at the local level, see the Municipal Research and Services Center's The Open Public Meetings Act: How it Applies to Washington Cities and Counties.
What Government Bodies Are Covered?
The OPMA requires that meetings of "the governing body of a public agency" be open to the public. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.30.030. This covers multi-member bodies that govern state and local government agencies. At the state level, it includes boards and commissions, such as the Washington State Liquor Control Board, the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, the Washington State Transportation Commission, and the Public Employees' Retirement Board. At the local level, it applies to groups like boards of county commissioners, city councils, school boards, public utility district boards, planning commissions, civil service commissions, and boards of adjustment. It also applies to committees created by one of these governing bodies, if the committee acts on behalf of the governing body, conducts hearings, or takes testimony or public comment.
On the other hand, state and local agencies governed by individuals are not subject to the open meetings requirement. Some examples of individual-headed agencies include the Washington Department of Labor and Industries, the Washington Department of Licensing, the Department of Social and Health Services, the Washington State Patrol, and the Washington State Department of Employment Security.
What is a Meeting?
In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the OPMA, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute a "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under Washington law, a "meeting" takes place whenever a majority of a governing body's members congregate to deal in any way with their official business. This includes simply discussing some matter having to do with official business, taking public testimony, engaging in deliberations, reviews, or evaluations, and taking collective action on a motion, proposal, resolution, order, or ordinance. A "meeting" would not include purely social and ceremonial gatherings, nor would it likely apply to an academic conference or similar event that a majority of members happened to attend.
The OPMA can apply to email and/or telephonic communications between a majority of the members of a governing body depending on the circumstances. For instance, an exchange of emails constitutes a meeting if a majority of members "collectively intend to meet [by email] to transact the governing body's official business" and "communicate about issues that may or will come before [them] for a vote." Wood v. Battle Ground School District, 107 Wash. App. 550 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). Members do not engage in a meeting simply by receiving information by email or telephone about upcoming issues.
Attending Meetings
The OPMA gives "all persons" the right to attend the meetings of governing bodies of public agencies, with exceptions for closed sessions discussed below. Washington law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend. A governing body may not impose conditions on attendance, such as requiring you to register or complete a questionnaire. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.30.040.
The OPMA does not give the public a right to participate or comment during open meetings, but as a matter of practice the public sometimes participates in meetings. The governing body has authority to limit the time of speakers to a uniform amount or to not allow anyone to speak.
Notice
Washington has unusual and relatively weak notice requirements. The OPMA requires the governing bodies of public agencies to set a schedule of "regular meetings" by ordinance, resolution, bylaw, or other formal measure. A "regular meeting" is defined as a "recurring meeting[] held in accordance with a periodic schedule declared by statute or rule." Wash. Rev. Code § 42.30.075. State agencies must publish this schedule in January of every year in the Washington State Register, and they must publish notice at least twenty days in advance in the State Register if they change the schedule. Otherwise, there are no notice requirements for regular meetings, and governing bodies of state and local agencies need not provide the public with an agenda or other description of the items of business to be discussed at regular meetings.
A governing body may call a "special meeting" -- i.e., a meeting not scheduled by ordinance, resolution, bylaw, or other formal measure. In that event, the governing body must give written notice at least twenty-four hours in advance to the members of the governing body and to "each local newspaper of general circulation and to each local radio or television station which has on file with the governing body a written request to be notified of such special meeting or of all special meetings." Wash. Rev. Code § 42.30.080. Whether this provision entitles online and other non-traditional news publishers to request notice is not clear, but you may want to make a request for notice anyway. An agency will have little incentive to deny this simple request and potentially spark a lawsuit. If the governing body accepts your request, you should renew it every year to ensure that you continue to receive notice. The notice for special meetings, which can be delivered by mail, fax or email, must give the time and place of the meeting and a description of "the business to be transacted."
Minutes and Recordings
Governing bodies of public agencies must record minutes of their meetings and make them available to the public upon request. See Wash. Rev. Code § 42.32.030. Some agencies make audio recordings of their meetings. If they choose to do so, the recording is a public record that you can access just like ordinary minutes.
For information on your ability to use recording devices at public meetings, see Washington Recording Law.
An Exception: Closed Meetings or Sessions
The general rule is that all meetings of governing bodies of public agencies must be open to the public. If a governing body wants to hold a closed session, called an "executive session," it must identify a specific statutory exemption. Under the OPMA, a governing body may hold an executive session when it is dealing with one of thirteen subject-area exemptions found in Wash. Rev. Code § 42.30.110. The thirteen exemptions are for meetings dealing with the following topics:
These exemptions make it permissible for a governing body to close a portion of a meeting; they do not require it to do so. If a governing body is dealing with one of these enumerated subject areas, then it may hold a close session, but it also must meet the following procedural requirements:
A governing body need not make available the minutes or recording of an executive session. For more information on the exemptions to the open meetings requirement, see the Open Government Guide: Washington.
If you believe that a governing body of a public agency has violated your rights, you may sue in state court. Under Washington law, any person may file a lawsuit for violations of the OPMA. If you succeed in a lawsuit, you can obtain a court order requiring that a meeting or meetings be made open to the public in the future, that a governing body satisfy its notice obligations, or that it provide access to minutes improperly withheld. In addition, if you go to court and win, the losing agency generally will have to pay your attorneys' fees and costs.
In the event that you are denied access to a meeting or class of meetings, you probably want to pursue an informal resolution before filing a lawsuit, which ordinarily is a costly and slow solution. You should contact the governing body in question and inform it that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the governing body continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
Note: This page covers information specific to the District of Columbia. For general information concerning access to government meetings see the Access to Government Meetings section of this guide.
The District of Columbia Sunshine Act provides the public with a right of access to meetings of D.C. government bodies. It permits any member of the public to attend the meetings of "any department, agency, board or commission" of the District government. It also entitles you to inspect and copy transcripts of meetings, but it does not impose specific notice requirements on government bodies.
The meetings of any department, agency, board, or commission of the District government, including meetings of the Council of the District of Columbia, are covered by the Sunshine Act. See D.C. Code § 1-207.42(a). For a list of D.C. government departments, boards, and agencies, with contact information, see the Directory of Agencies and Services. Meetings of the federal government are not covered by the D.C. Sunshine Act.
What Is A Meeting?In addition to determining what government bodies are covered by the D.C. Sunshine Act, you'll need to figure out which of their gatherings or activities constitute an "meeting" for purposes of the law (and therefore must be open to the public). Under D.C. law, the term "meeting" applies to gatherings "at which official action of any kind is taken," including hearings. This broad definition includes most gatherings where a multi-member government body takes action on a public matter. But it probably does not cover informal gatherings of government officials to engage in deliberations, information-gathering, and administrative work. It also does not apply to purely social and ceremonial gatherings.
In addition, the D.C. Sunshine Act does not apply to a government body's deliberations when it is acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial function. This means that, when a government body is acting like a judge in deciding the rights and obligations of specific individuals or groups, it may conduct its deliberations (i.e., reviewing the evidence and discussing possible findings) in private, assuming that it hears testimony and arguments in public and makes transcripts of hearings available to the parties and any interested persons. For example, one D.C. court held that, when a District agency was reviewing the denial of a gun permit to a D.C. resident, it properly conducted its deliberations in private. Jordan v. District of Columbia, 362 A.2d 114, 117-19 (D.C. 1976).
The Sunshine Act does not specifically address whether telephone, email, and other electronic communications can constitute a "meeting" for purposes of the open-meetings requirements.
Attending Meetings
The D.C. Sunshine Act gives "the public" the right to attend the meetings of D.C. government bodies. D.C. law does not limit access to meetings to a specific category of people or a profession, such as "the traditional press." Anyone may attend the meetings covered by the Act.
Notice
The D.C. Sunshine Act does not impose on D.C. government bodies any obligation to give the public notice of their meetings. You should check the websites of the D.C. government bodies that you are interested in and contact them to see if you can sign up for a mailing list or other targeted mechanism for delivering notice.
Minutes and Recordings
D.C. government bodies must record and keep "written transcripts or transcriptions" of all open meetings. They must make these transcripts or transcriptions available to the public for inspection and copying at reasonable cost. See D.C. Code § 1-207.42(b) (link is to entire D.C. Code; click through to Title 1, Chapter 2, Subchapter VII, Part D, and then locate the specific provision).
Closed Meetings or Sessions
Unlike other federal and state open meetings laws, the D.C. Sunshine Act does not contain specific exemptions allowing a D.C. government body to close a meeting or session to the public.
Unfortunately, D.C. law is not clear on what you can do if you are denied access to a public meeting. The Sunshine Act does not say that members of the public may bring a lawsuit for violations of its requirements; it only says that resolutions, rules, acts, regulations, and other official actions won't be effective unless enacted at an open meeting. A court could conceivably grant you the right to bring a lawsuit to prevent a meeting from being closed, but this is not certain.
In any event, a lawsuit usually is a slow and expensive solution, so it is generally better to resolve a dispute without going to court. In the event that you are denied access to a meeting, you should contact the government body in question and indicate that you believe your rights have been violated and that you are willing to bring a legal action. You should submit your complaint in writing whenever possible. If the governmental body continues to deny your request for access, you should consider filing a lawsuit. There may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. Please see the Finding Legal Help section for details on finding legal representation.
When seeking government information, it is important for you to be able to distinguish between federal, state, and local government bodies. The situation is more complex than it might otherwise seem because of the U.S. system of federalism. The concept of federalism is complicated, but it essentially means that the U.S. federal government shares power with state and local governments that exercise political authority over particular geographical regions. Thus, there may be three (and sometimes even more) government bodies that exercise authority or regulate a particular activity. Fortunately, there are some simple steps you can take to determine whether you are dealing with a state, federal, or local government body:
Special Considerations for Courts
There are federal, state, and local court systems in every state. For example, if you are in New York City, there is a federal district court (the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York), a state trial court of general jurisdiction (the New York Supreme Court, New York County), and city courts (like the New York City Civil Court and the New York City Criminal Court). These different court systems may have different rules regarding access to court proceedings and court records. See the Access to Courts and Court Records section for details.
The federal court system is split into three levels: the U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Courts of Appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court.
The name of the court will usually tip you off to whether you are dealing with a federal court. The federal trial courts will have names including "The United States District Court for . . .," such as the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, or the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The federal appellate courts will have names including "The United States Courts of Appeals for the ___ Circuit," such as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and the States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Of course, you shouldn't have any trouble identifying the Supreme Court of the United States as a federal court. In addition, federal courts will be located in a courthouse bearing the name "United States Courthouse," such as the John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse in Boston, the Phillip Burton United States Courthouse in San Francisco, and the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse in New York. For additional information about the federal courts, see the U.S. Courts website.
If you are not dealing with a federal court, then in all likelihood you are dealing with a state court. There is great diversity in the names of the state courts, both at the trial and the appellate level. Luckily, an excellent Wikipedia article lists the names of and provides links to the trial, intermediate appellate, and highest courts of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories and protectorates. If you want to confirm the accuracy of this information, you could check it against State Court Sites from an organization called State and Local Government on the Net. (Incidentally, this website can help you find the websites of a huge number of federal, state, and local government bodies, in addition to courts.)
As noted, local courts exist in many counties, cities, and towns. You'll probably know them by their name ("county court," "city court," and the like) and by their location in the county courthouse or similar local building. You can always call the clerk of the court or contact a local lawyer for clarification.
If you are interested in information contained in records retained by the President of the United States or the U.S. Congress, you should be aware that neither Congress nor the President are covered by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Instead, both the President and Congress have their own set of rules for public access to their records and have traditionally allowed substantial public access to their proceedings and documents.
Choose one of the links below to get started:
Congress is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Nevertheless, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate have enacted their own rules and have allowed substantial public access to their proceedings and records. You can obtain access to congressional debates and other proceedings, but you need to obtain gallery passes from the office of your Senator or Representative. In addition, networks like C-Span televise and archive a large percentage of floor debates. You also may observe congressional committee meetings, notice of which is posted online. The congressional press galleries offer increased access and support services to members of the press who obtain the proper credentials, but the galleries place limitations on who can qualify for credentials. Finally, the U.S. government's own online portals provide congressional information and documents, and private organizations have developed fantastic tools for finding and organizing this information. We provide links to many of these resources below.
The galleries of the House and the Senate are open to the public whenever either body is in session, but gallery passes are required. You can obtain gallery passes from the office of your Senator or Representative (usually, any member can provide passes to both houses). There are three Senate office buildings and three House office buildings; to find the Senators and Representatives for your state, visit the Senate directory or the House directory.
Under limited circumstances, the galleries may be closed to the public. When the Senate discusses any business which, in the opinion of a Senator, require secrecy, the Presiding Officer must clear the galleries and keep the doors closed for the duration of the discussion. See Senate Rule XXI. The House galleries may be closed when the Speaker, a member, a delegate, or a resident commissioner indicates that he or she will deliver communications that ought to be kept secret, or when the President sends confidential communications to the House. See House Rule XVII, para. 9 (scroll down).
Public access to congressional committees is an important part of government transparency. Committee meetings and hearings generally are open to the public, but members of a committee may vote to close a hearing or meeting under limited circumstances. See Senate Rule XXVI(5)(b) and House Rule XI(g)(1)(2).
Senate Committees
As a general rule, Senate committee meetings are open to the public. Senate committees may close a meeting if the matter to be discussed would:
Senate committees must give public notice of their hearings at least one week in advance. The notice must give the date, place, and subject matter of the hearing. See Senate Rule XXVI(4)(a). The Senate Rules do not specify where committees must post this notice, but as a matter of practice they will do so on their websites and in the Congressional Record. For links to Senate committee websites, see the Senate Committee Portal.
Finally, Senate committees and subcommittees must make publicly available through the Internet a video recording, audio recording, or transcript of any meeting not later than twenty-one business days after the meeting occurs. See Senate Rule XXVI(5)(e)(2)(A).
House Committees
As a general rule, House committee hearings and meetings are open to the public. House committees may vote to close a meeting or hearing if disclosure of matters to be considered would endanger national security, would compromise sensitive law enforcement information, would tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person, or otherwise would violate a law or rule of the House. They must announce the date, place, and subject matter of hearings to the public at least a week in advance in the Daily Digest and on their websites. For links to House committee websites, see the House Committee Portal.
Additional Resources for Committees
Members of the media in possession of proper press credentials are allowed access to the press galleries. Each house administers three galleries, one for press (meaning newspapers), one for periodical press, and one for radio and television. These galleries provide increased access to lawmakers and their staffs, and include workspaces and telephones for press use. Gallery staff will assist reporters and answer phones to take messages for the press while congressional proceedings are going on. The press is also given access to official transcripts, notes, and logs of congressional proceedings, and when lawmakers want to issue press releases, copies are generally handed out to everyone in the press gallery.
Senate Galleries
The Senate's three galleries are:
House Galleries
The House of Representative's three galleries are:
Each has its own credentialing process. For example, the Senate Press Gallery requires that the reporter reside in Washington. The Senate Periodical Press Gallery requires that the periodical in question provide coverage of Washington issues on a continuing basis. A common requirement is that the reporter's organization not be engaged in lobbying activities. The House Press and Radio-Television Galleries advise applicants to go through their Senate counterparts for membership. In contrast, the House Periodical Press Gallery credentials its own members as well as its Senate counterpart, and maintains a list of recognized periodicals. See each gallery's web page for their particular applications and restrictions.
The Periodical Press Galleries may be the closest fit for most online publishers. The House application is available online and states that the process can take up to six months. See its Rules and Regulations for details.
The procedures for the Senate Periodical Press Gallery are a bit more ambiguous. It provides two similar but not identical "Rules" pages. One instructs applicants to apply through the House Periodical Press Gallery, and the other instructs applicants to apply through the Senate.
The Open House Project has an excellent entry that details the procedure bloggers and online journalists have gone through to obtain membership in the congressional press galleries. It also describes the battles that have been fought to secure the right of online media to gain access to Congress, including the story about WorldNetDaily's eventually successful fight for credentials.
Because Congress is not an agency, congressional documents are not subject to the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). For details on FOIA, see the Access to Records from the Federal Government section.
As a matter of practice, however, most documents generated by Congress are publicly available. On occasion, Congress and its committees may designate certain documents, reports, and transcripts confidential or classified. See Goldand v. Central Intelligence Agency, 607 F.2d 339, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1978), which affirms that "Congress has undoubted authority to keep its records secret, authority rooted in the Constitution, longstanding practice, and current congressional rules." For these documents, there is no established method for gaining access to them, and one must request declassification and release of the document from Congress directly.
The vast majority of congressional documents are readily available to the public online. There are a host of extremely useful online resources for accessing transcripts of floor debates, committee hearings, and voting records. Disclosures by members of Congress relating to funding and expenditures, drafts of proposed legislation, and congressional reports are also easily accessible online. Below is a list of some of these resources:
Government Resources
Resources From Private Organizations
If you are looking for information contained in presidential records, there are two main sources you can consult - the Federal Register for the public papers of the President and the Archivist of the United States for records available to the public through the Presidential Records Act.
The easiest way to get presidential records is through the Federal Register, which makes a collection of official presidential documents available to the public. Every six months the Federal Register publishes a compilation called the Public Papers of the President, which includes documents such as executive orders, proclamations, memoranda, messages to Congress, speeches and press conferences.
The Archivist of the United States makes presidential records available to the public through the Presidential Records Act. Although presidential records are not subject to public access requests during the President's term of office, the Presidential Records Act makes presidential records available to the public five years after the President leaves office. The Presidential Records Act established that presidents do not own their White House records as personal property but rather the U.S. Government has "ownership, possession and control" over the records. The Archivist of the United States has "an affirmative duty to make such records available to the public" through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) no later than five years after the President leaves office.
Who Can Request Records
What Records Are Covered
How to Request Records
What Are Your Remedies if You are Denied
Restrictions On Your Ability to Access Presidential Records
If you’re hunting for information, consider a visit to the courthouse, where you can sift through resource-rich court records or attend (sometimes colorful) court proceedings.
Courts are centers for dispute resolution. They are public forums in which societal norms and values, as reflected in laws, are used to address and correct wrongs. While a number of laws govern the court system, none is so deeply-ingrained as the presumption that court proceedings should be open to the public.
If you are wondering how attending court proceedings or combing through court records might be valuable to you, here are several great reasons to consider acquiring -- and publishing -- information available from the courts:
You’re interested in reporting on justice or the functioning of the court systemSome believe that courts dispense justice; others believe that the law is divorced from justice. One good way to explore this issue is by attending a trial. Non-traditional journalists have already had highly visible success in covering court proceedings, as seen in the 2007 trial of Lewis “Scooter” Libby. A blogger from Firedoglake.com gained press credentials, live-blogged the trial, and provided the public with what the New York Times described as the “fullest, fastest public report” that traditional reporters used to fact check their stories. Salon applauded Firedoglake for producing “insightful” and “superb” coverage “that simply never is, and perhaps cannot be, matched by even our largest national media outlets.” In this case press credentials were necessary due to the intense public interest, but usually they’re not needed for courtroom access.
If you are interested in reporting on justice or the functioning of the court system, you should review the sections on access to federal court and state court proceedings for guidance on how to attend court proceedings. You may want to consult court records to get a better understanding of what is happening in court. For details, see State Court Records and Federal Court Records.
You enjoy publishing a good storyAttorneys engage in storytelling to win the case for their clients. Conflicts are inherently interesting, and the stories presented at trial tend to offer different interpretations of the truth. Tensions run high, and you may find yourself caring deeply about a previously unknown issue. As a result, courtroom dramas can make compelling subjects for blog posts and other website content. You need merely look at the Citizen Media Law Project Blog for evidence of this and the many fascinating "stories" we cover in the Legal Threats Database.
If you enjoy publishing a good story, you should visit the page on Access to the Jury and Trial Participants to find out how to properly contact court participants such as judges, lawyers, parties, witnesses, and jurors to get the juicy details that will bring your story to life.
You have a pre-existing interest in one of the parties in a court proceedingIf a certain person or institution interests you, following their footprints in court often yields a wealth of information. For example, as part of their coverage of the 1972 election, the Washington Post sent a young journalist on a low level assignment to attend the arraignment of five men who had been arrested for breaking into the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters. As the journalist paid close attention to the proceedings, he quickly realized that there were more questions that needed investigating. If Bob Woodward hadn’t attended that seemingly minor court proceeding, the Watergate story might never have been broken.
Besides the obvious value of attending court proceedings, there is a wealth of information available in court records about individuals, corporations, and other organizations that can further aid your investigations. See the sections on access to federal and state court records for guidance on how to access this information.
You enjoy historical researchCourt records can be immensely helpful to historians in two major ways: specific court cases can illuminate a certain aspect of history, and court records in aggregate can show statistical trends that highlight social, cultural, or structural changes. For genealogists, court records can also reveal family relationships, places of residence, occupations, physical or personality descriptions, or naturalization dates. Refer to Genealogy.com and Ancestry.com for more information on how mine court records for information on your family.
If you enjoy historical research, you will find a wealth of information in court files, a growing percentage of which are now available electronically. The sections on access to federal and state court records should help you find the right place to look for the information you need.
Where to Begin
Now that we've whetted your interest in court proceedings and records, it's time to do some research so that you will be able to get access to what you need. Before you jump into the materials in this guide, however, you should first determine whether the documents and/or proceedings you are interested in are associated with the federal court system or a state court system. The the page on Identifying Federal, State, and Local Government Bodies should help, as will a preliminary visit to the courthouse.
Once you've figured out what information you want and where it is located, you should browse the following sections to get a full understanding of your right to access court records and court proceedings:
There are two ways in which you can get information from the federal court system, through attending court proceedings and through accessing court records. For more information, visit the following pages:
State courts have their own sets of rules and procedures. For more information, visit the following pages:
If you are considering providing live coverage of court proceedings through Twitter, live-blogging, or other social media tools, you will want to read the section on Live-Blogging and Tweeting from Court. Various court rules may affect your ability to provide real-time coverage of court proceedings. These pages provide practical advice on how to avoid legal trouble if you intend to provide live coverage from inside the courthouse, including interviews with journalists and bloggers who have navigated these waters.
Trial Proceedings
As a member of the public, you have a right to attend criminal trials. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980). This includes the preliminary hearings, the jury selection process, and sentencing and plea procedures.
However, like the general public, you may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury, or because a child is testifying, and the presence of the public would cause substantial psychological harm to the child or would result in the child’s inability to effectively communicate.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986).
However, you can speak with witnesses who appear before the grand jury, at least about their own testimony. See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1990). Note that witnesses are generally precluded from disclosing the testimony of other witnesses.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
In addition to grand jury proceedings, there are a few other court proceedings and conferences traditionally have been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between counsel and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You may be able to attend criminal juvenile proceedings in federal court. Federal juvenile proceedings, unlike those in many state courts, are not completely closed by law. The court weighs the interests of the juvenile and the public on a case-by-case basis. See United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (3d Cir. 1994). However, you should be aware that closure is still the norm in these cases.
You also have a right to attend civil trials. See Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984). Judges in civil courts may close the courtroom to the public only to serve specific interests that override the public's interest in access, and they only may do so if the closure is narrowly tailored to protect those interests. For example, you may be excluded from a courtroom if confidential commercial information, like a trade secret, would be revealed.
Additionally, some elements of the civil judicial system traditionally have been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between counsel and the judge, and settlement or other arbitration meetings between the parties. In addition, pretrial depositions are not public.
Bankruptcy Court
You should be able to attend most bankruptcy court proceedings. The judge may close the courtroom to the public only if a party seeking to close the proceeding has an overriding interest, such as the protection of trade secret information, that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest.
Court of International Trade
You should be able to attend trials on the merits. See Rule 77(b). Other proceedings may be conducted by the judge in his or her chambers; the public would normally be excluded from these proceedings.
You can inspect and copy judicial records and documents filed in federal court. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). However, your right of access is not absolute, and court documents may be sealed or the records may otherwise be restricted by the law (for example, to protect personal privacy or trade secrets).
Documents related to cases are generally collected in a case file. A case file includes the documents filed by the litigants or issued by the judge, a docket sheet that lists such filings, and transcripts of court proceedings. However, a case file does not include other documents associated with a case, such as materials uncovered through discovery but not filed with the court, trial exhibits that were not admitted into evidence, and notes written by the judge or other court personnel.
Online Access to Court RecordsYou can use Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), an electronic filing system, to access federal court documents. As a member of the public, you can access case and docket information from Federal Appellate, District, and Bankruptcy courts via the Internet. PACER has a relatively complicated, page-based fee system that is described in detail on Overview and FAQ pages.
Using PACER, you can access the following case file documents:
Although PACER allows you to access the above information from all federal courts, each court maintains its own database. If you have questions about the availability of certain documents, you will need to contact the specific federal court for more information.
Grounds for DenialYou may be denied access to a court record for a variety of reasons, including data availability, lack of specificity in your request, and the potential for invasion of privacy due to personal or highly sensitive information. Additionally, courts may seal criminal records when disclosure would threaten the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Your Remedies if You Are Denied AccessYou have several options available if your request for access to court records is denied. First, understand the specific grounds for denial. If the denial was based on insufficient information about the documents, restructure your request by including the information necessary to locate the records. If the denial was based on privacy issues, ask whether the records can be made available after personal data has been redacted.
If the denial was based on a judicial order sealing the records, you may contest the court order. In order to do so, you will need legal assistance in filing an opposition to the court's order and requesting a hearing to open the sealed records. Additionally, the First Amendment Project has a series of steps to follow when you are faced with closed records.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia allow public access to their court proceedings. As with federal courts, state court proceedings are presumed to be open to the public in most cases. However, some variation exists on a state-by-state basis. Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on accessing state court proceedings. (Note that this guide currently covers only the 15 most populous states and the District of Columbia. We hope to add additional states to the guide at a later date.)
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Arizona state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Arizona judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's Superior Courts, Courts of Appeal Division I and Division II, and Supreme Court. This page focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process, but might not include other pre-trial proceedings. The Arizona state constitution also provides a right of access to court proceedings. See Ariz. Const., art. 2, § 11 and art. 6, § 17; Ridenour v. Schwartz, 179 Ariz. 1, 3 (1994).
You may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.3 provides specifically that “[a]ll proceedings shall be open to the public, include representatives of the news media, unless the court finds, upon application of the defendant, that an open proceeding presents a clear and present danger to the defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.” See also Phoenix Newspapers v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557, 560 (1971). Rule 9.3 also requires that a “complete record” of any closed proceedings be kept and made available to the public following the completion of the case.
If the trial court closes a proceeding to which there is a First Amendment right of access, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. See A.R.S. § 13-2812.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
In general, you should be able to attend civil proceedings, which are presumptively open to the public, in Arizona state courts. See Lewis R. Pyle Memorial Hosp. v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 193, 197 (1986) (“There is no doubt that there exists a common law right of access to civil trials.”); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 43(f) (“In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules or the Arizona Rules of Evidence.”). A civil proceeding may only be closed if there is "a compelling governmental interest and [the closure is] narrowly tailored to serve that interest." Ridenour, 179 Ariz. at 3. But if the closure is only temporary, "it may be sustained if it is reasonable and neutral." Id.
You may be able to attend certain kinds of juvenile proceedings in Arizona.
Arizona Rule of Juvenile Procedure 19 provides that “[d]elinquency, incorrigibility, diversion involving delinquent acts and transfer proceedings shall be open to the public” unless the court makes a written finding that closure is necessary to protect the best interests of a victim, the juvenile, a witness, or the state, or that there is “a clear public interest in confidentiality.” Upon request of any person that the proceeding be closed, the court must hold a hearing prior to the proceeding to consider the positions of the parties. See Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.
A.R.S. § 8-525 provides that court proceedings relating to dependent children, permanent guardianship, termination of parental rights, and child abuse and neglect cases that have resulted in a fatality or near fatality are open to the public. However, “[f]or good cause shown,” the court may order any proceeding to be closed to the public. The court must consider a variety of factors, include the child’s best interests, the privacy rights of the parties or other individuals, the agreement of the parties, and the preferences of a child over 12. If a hearing is open, attendees are still prohibited from disclosing identifying information about the child, the child’s siblings, parents, and certain other individuals. See also Ariz. R. Juv. P. 41.
Finally, emancipation hearings are open to the public unless the court finds in writing that closing the hearing is necessary “to protect a party, or a clear public interest in confidentiality.” Ariz. R. Juv. P. 92.
Note: This page covers information specific to California. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in California state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. See the Courts page on the California Courts website for locations, phone numbers, and websites for the California Superior Courts, Courts of Appeal, and Supreme Court. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have the same First Amendment right to attend all stages of criminal trials as you do in federal court. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
As in federal court, you may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
As in federal court, you will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. Attempting to listen to or observe the proceedings of a grand jury is a misdemeanor. Cal. Penal Code 891.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
Your access to California juvenile proceedings is strictly limited. You will not be admitted to a juvenile court hearing unless either the minor and her parent/guardian requests that the hearing be public or the minor is accused of one of a listed group of serious felonies, such as murder, arson, or rape. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 676a.
Even if the minor and her parent consent or the minor is accused of one of those serious crimes, you will still be excluded if the minor is accused of one of several sexual assault-like crimes and the victim requests the hearing be closed, or if the victim was under 16 years old at the time of the offense. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 676b.
In general, you can attend civil trial proceedings because the general public has a First Amendment right of access to civil trials. See NBC Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 1178 (1999) (type in citation to retrieve opinion).
Judges may decide to close civil trials under certain conditions. If a judge contemplates closing the trial proceeding, she must provide notice to the public of the anticipated closure and hold a hearing to hear any arguments about the proposed closure. The judge can close the trial proceeding if she expressly finds after the hearing that (i) there exists an overriding interest supporting closure and/or sealing; (ii) there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced absent closure and/or sealing; (iii) the proposed closure and/or sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest; and (iv) there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest. Id., at 1181-1182.
Additionally, you may not be able to access portions of the trial proceeding. You will not have access to depositions, the “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between counsel and the judge, or settlement or other arbitration meetings between the parties. You will also likely not be able to attend mental competency hearings, unless one of the parties involved asks that the hearing be open. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code. 5118.
Family Court
You may be able to attend most court proceedings, however note that a judge may close a trial when she "considers it necessary in the interests of justice and the persons involved." Cal. Family Code 214.
Note: This page covers information specific to the District of Columbia. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in D.C. courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the District's courts. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have the same First Amendment right to attend all stages of criminal trials as you do in federal court. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980); see also Kleinbart v. United States, 388 A.2d 878 (D.C. 1978). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
As in federal court, you may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are
proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of
jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring
criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in
secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial
process. See District of Columbia Superior Court Rules for Criminal Procedure 6(d)(1).
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have
traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or
“in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and
plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
Juvenile proceedings in the District of Columbia are closed. D.C. Code § 16-2316(e). You may be able to attend if the judge finds that there is a "reasonable assurance that the admission of the press will be consistent with the protection of a juvenile respondent's anonymity." In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 75 (D.C. 1991). Thus, your attendance will be contingent on your agreement not to divulge information identifying the child or members of the child's family involved in the proceedings. D.C. Code § 16-2316(e)(3).
D.C. courts have not directly taken a position on the openness of civil proceedings, but seem to have assumed there is a presumptive First Amendment right of access. See Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C. 1988).
Family Court
You will be excluded from Family Court proceedings if either party requests the hearing be closed to the general public. The judge may also close the proceedings on her own initiative. D.C. Code § 16-2344.
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
This page focuses on your ability to access state court proceedings in Florida. You may wish to also familiarize yourself with the Florida Bar Association's Reporter's Handbook to better understand your rights of access to the Florida state court system.
Trial Proceedings
You have the same First Amendment right to attend all stages of criminal trials as you do in federal court. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980); See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1982). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
You may be denied access to the courtroom if there would otherwise be a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury. However, if the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the accused and closure must be an effective way to protect the accused's rights. There must be no alternative available other than change of venue. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 1982).
Grand Jury Proceedings
As in federal court, you will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. See Fla. Stat. 905.24.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You may be able to attend juvenile proceedings in Florida. Juvenile proceedings must be open to the public unless the judge determines the public interest and the welfare of the child are best served by closure. Fla. Stat. 985.035.
There is a "strong presumption of openness" for civil trials in Florida. Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, 531 So. 2d 113, 118-19 (Fla. 1988). A judge will only hold a closed civil trial in limited circumstances. For example, you may excluded from the trial to keep trade secrets safe, to protect national security, and to avoid substantial injury to innocent third parties, such as children in a divorce case. Moreover, the trial court will only close the proceedings if there is no reasonable alternative to closure and the closure is the least restrictive form necessary.
Family Court
You may be able to attend some Family Court proceedings. Custody and other dependency proceedings are presumptively open, unless the judge determines the public interest or the welfare of the child is best served by closing the hearing. Fla. Stat. 39.507(2). However, adoption proceedings in Florida are closed, Fla. Stat. 63.162, as are proceedings to terminate parental rights, Fla. Stat. 39.809(4).
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Georgia courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Georgia judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend all stages of criminal trials. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980); see also Rockdale Citizen Publishing Co., Inc. v. State, 463 S.E.2d 864, 866-67 (Ga. 1995). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
As in federal court, you may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury. If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have
traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or
“in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and
plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You will likely not be able to attend juvenile proceedings in Georgia, as they are presumptively closed. O.C.G.A. 15-11-78(1). However, you may able to attend if the juvenile is accused of certain serious offenses, such as arson, attempted murder, kidnapping, and trafficking in illegal drugs or if the juvenile has been found delinquent previously. You also have the right to challenge any denial of access by arguing that the state's or juveniles' interest in a closed hearing is overridden by the public's interest in a public hearing. See Florida Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 322 S.E.2d 233, 238 (Ga. 1984).
You will likely be able to attend civil trials in Georgia. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which includes Georgia, has ruled that there is a "presumption of openness to civil proceedings." Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985). If a trial court denies public access to the civil proceeding, the denial must be necessitated by a compelling interest and must be narrowly tailored to that interest.
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
This page focuses on your ability to access state court proceedings in Illinois. You may wish to also familiarize yourself with the Illinois State Bar Association's Media Law Handbook to better understand your rights of access to the Illinois state court system.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend all stages of criminal trials . See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
As in federal court, you may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury. You may also be excluded from a trial alleging certain sexually based offenses when a minor victim testifies. In Illinois, the judge has the ability to close the courtroom to everyone but the media during such testimony. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/115-11. Note that at least one judge has found that bloggers do not meet the definition of media in a similar context in juvenile proceedings, see the discussion on juvenile proceedings below.
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are
proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of
jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring
criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in
secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial
process. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/112-6.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have
traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or
“in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and
plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
It is not clear whether you will be able to attend juvenile procedures in Illinois. Although general public is excluded from all hearings in juvenile court, the members of the news media are allowed to attend. 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/1-5(6). However, at least one juvenile court judge has held that bloggers are not members of the news media for purposes of this law. See the Citizen Media Law Project's blog on Bloggers Are Not Journalists, Illinois Juvenile Court Judge Declares. Note that even if you are allowed to attend the proceeding, your attendance may be contingent on your agreement not to divulge information identifying the child.
You will likely be able to attend civil proceedings, which are "open to the public ... by force of tradition." A.P. v. M.E.E., 821 N.E.2d 1238, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Indiana state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Indiana judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's Trial Courts, Courts of Appeal, and Supreme Court. Additionally, the Indiana judiciary also has a terrific guide for the media on how best to use the court system.
Trial Proceedings
In Indiana, you have both a First Amendment, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980), and statutory, Ind. Code. Ann. 5-14-2, right to attend all stages of criminal trials. This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
You may be denied access to the courtroom only if there would otherwise be serious and imminent danger to the defendant's rights. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury. If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, there must be a substantial probability that the exclusion will be effective in protecting against the perceived harm, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. Ind. Code. Ann. 35-34-2-4.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You may attend juvenile court proceedings where the juvenile is accused of murder or another felony. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-32-6-3. However, you do not have a right to attend all juvenile court proceedings as the presiding judge has the discretion to close the proceedings to the general public. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-32-6-2.
You may be also be excluded from attending the testimony of a child witness or victim if the court finds that the allegation or defense involves matters of a sexual nature and that closing the proceeding protects the child's. In making its findings, the court should take into account the nature of the allegation or defense, the age of the child, the psychological maturity of the child, and the child's desire to testify in a closed proceeding. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 31-32-6-4, 31-32-6-5.
In general, you should be able to attend civil proceedings, which are presumptively open to the public, in Indiana state courts. A civil proceeding may only be closed when the denial of access “is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” See Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (1994) (internal citation omitted).
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
For additional information about engaging in journalism in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, please see our printable PDF guide Newsgathering in Massachusetts, co-produced with the Harvard Law School Cyberlaw Clinic.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Massachusetts courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Massachusetts judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. Additionally, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has published a useful set of Guidelines on the Public's Right of Access to Judicial Proceedings and Records. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
You have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980) This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
You may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 277, § 5.
Other Proceedings and Conferences You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings You will not be able to attend most juvenile proceedings in Massachusetts. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 65. However, you may be able to attend the proceedings if the Commonwealth proceeds by indictment, which occurs if:
Mass. Gen. Laws 119, § 54. For example, if a juvenile is charged with murder, you will likely be able to attend.
You have a common law right of access to civil trials. See Boston Herald v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 658 N.E.2d 152, 155 n.7 (Mass. 1995). This right is not absolute but a judge must make every effort to arrive at a reasonable alternative to closure.
Child Welfare Proceedings
These proceedings, such as whether to take a child into the custody of the commonwealth, are closed to the general public. Mass Gen. Laws ch. 119, § 38.
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Michigan state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Michigan judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right and a statutory right to attend all stages of criminal trials in Michigan state courts. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia; 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980), Mich. Comp. Laws 600.1420. This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
However, there are times when you will not be able to attend a criminal trial proceeding. Under the Michigan statute, if you are a minor, you may not be able to attend court proceedings involving "scandal or immorality." Id. Additionally, you may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. See Mich. Comp. Laws 767.19f.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You should be able to attend juvenile proceedings in Michigan. However, you may be excluded during the testimony of a child witness or during the testimony of the victim if a party or the victim requests it. The court will consider the nature of the proceedings; the age, maturity, and preference of the witness; and, if the witness is a child, the preference of a parent, guardian, or legal custodian that the proceedings be open or closed. If the juvenile is accused of certain serious crimes, the court may not close the hearing during his testimony. Mich. Ct. R. 3.925.
You have a statutory right to attend civil proceedings in Michigan. Mich. Comp. Laws 600.1420. However, this right is not absolute. For example, the statute specifically exempts cases involving national security. When deciding whether to close the courtroom, a judge must at least "take testimony at a hearing open to all interested parties, explore the constitutional and statutory validity of any proffered justifications for excluding the public and press from any portion of the trial, and determine whether any alternative and less restrictive mechanisms exist." Detroit Free Press v. Macomb Circuit Judge, 275 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Mich. 1979).
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in New Jersey state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the New Jersey judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process. In addition, there is a strong presumption toward public trials under New Jersey court rules. N.J. Ct. R. 1:2-1.
You may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. N.J. Ct. R. 3:6-6, 3:6-7.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You must apply to be able to attend juvenile proceedings in New Jersey. The court may grant your application if it determines there is no substantial likelihood that specific harm to the juvenile would result. If you do not make such an application, the judge may allow you to attend if you agree not to record or disclose the names of anyone involved in the hearing without her authorization. However, you may be excluded if the juvenile, her attorney, or the juvenile's guardian objects. N.J. Ct. R. 5:19-2.
In general, you should be able to attend civil proceedings, which are presumptively open to the public, in New Jersey state courts. A civil proceeding may only be closed when the denial of access serves an important interest and that there is no less restrictive way to serve that interest. See N.J. Ct. R. 1:2-1; Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984).
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in New York state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the New York judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process. In addition, there is a strong presumption toward public trials under New York statutory law. N.Y. Jud. Law 4.
You may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 190.25(4)(a).
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You may be refused access to juvenile proceedings in New York. N.Y. Family Ct. Act 341.1. However, if the judge determines that the case warrants closure, you may be denied access. The judge will consider, among other factors, if you are causing or are likely to cause a disruption, if a party objects to your presence for a compelling reason, if the orderly and sound administration of justice requires your exclusion, and if less restrictive alternatives are available.
In general, you should be able to attend civil proceedings, which are presumptively open to the public, in New York state courts. N.Y. Jud. Law 4. However, your right to attend is not absolute; your access to civil proceeding may be restricted when there are compelling reasons for closure. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984).
Family Court
You should be able to attend family court proceedings in New York as there is a presumption that family court proceedings in New York are public. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, 205.4 (search for "22 NYCRR 205.4"). However, if the judge determines that the case warrants closure, you may be denied access. The judge will consider, among other factors, if you are causing or are likely to cause a disruption, if a party objects to your presence for a compelling reason, if the orderly and sound administration of justice requires your exclusion, and if less restrictive alternatives are available. For example, the judge may close the courtroom if he determines potential trauma to children would result from your presence.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in North Carolina state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the North Carolina judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
You may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-623.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
Juvenile proceedings in North Carolina are presumptively open. However, a judge may exclude you from a hearing or part of a hearing if there is good cause to close it. The judge will consider the nature of the allegations against the juvenile, the age and maturity of the juvenile, the benefit to the juvenile of confidentiality, the benefit to the public of an open hearing, and the extent to which the confidentiality of the juvenile's file will be compromised by an open hearing. Note that the hearing will remain open if the juvenile so requests. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2402.
You have a qualified constitutional right to attend civil court proceedings under the North Carolina State Constitution. N.C. Const. art. I, § 18. Your right of access may be limited when there is a compelling countervailing public interest and closure of the court proceedings or sealing of documents is required to protect such countervailing public interest. The court must consider alternatives before determining that closure is necessary. Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675, 693 (N.C. 1999).
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Ohio state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Ohio judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process. This right is also protected by the Ohio Constitution. Ohio Const. art. I, § 16; see also State v. Lane, 397 N.E.2d 1338 (Ohio 1979).
As in federal court, you may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. Ohio R. Crim. P. 6(e).
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You have a right to attend serious youthful offender proceedings are open to the public. A presiding judge, may in her discretion, excluded the general public from attending all other juvenile court proceeding. However, even if the general public is excluded, you may still be able to gain access if you can demonstrate your need for access is sufficient to outweigh the interest in keeping the hearing closed. Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.35; Ohio Juv. R. 27(1).
In general, you should be able to attend civil proceedings, which are presumptively open to the public, in Ohio state courts. However, the right is not absolute; a judge may choose to close the proceedings in certain situations, including those where certain privacy rights of participants or third parties are at stake, trade secrets could be revealed, or national security is involved. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-78 (6th Cir. 1983).
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Pennsylvania state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Pennsylvania judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized that the principle of openness is also derived from the common law and the state constitution. Pa. Const. art. 1, § 11; Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d 414, 417 (Pa. 1987).
As in federal court, you may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4549.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You will likely not be able to attend juvenile proceedings in Pennsylvania. However, if the juvenile is over 14 years old and accused of a felony, or is over 12 years old and accused of one of several serious felonies, the proceedings will be open to the public. If the attorney for the commonwealth and the juvenile agree to keep the hearing closed, it will not be open to the public even if those conditions are met. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6336.
In general, you should be able to attend civil proceedings, which are presumptively open to the public, in Pennsylvania state courts. A judge will only close a civil proceeding when: the denial of access serves an important interest, there is no less restrictive way to serve that interest, the material is of the kind that courts will protect, and public access will cause serious injury to the party seeing closure. See Storms v. O'Malley, 779 A.2d 548, 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); see generally Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984).
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Texas state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Texas judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's District Courts, Courts of Appeal, Supreme Court, and Court of Criminal Appeals. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have the same First Amendment right to attend all stages of criminal trials as you do in federal court. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process.
You may be denied access to the courtroom if there would otherwise be a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury. However, if the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the accused and closure must be an effective way to protect the accused's rights. There must be no alternative available other than change of venue. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
As in federal court, you will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.011, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 20.02.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You should be able to attend most juvenile hearings in Texas. Proceedings are public unless the court determines that there is good cause to close them. However, if the juvenile is under the age of 14, you will not be able to attend unless the court finds that the interests of the child or the interests of the public would be better served by opening the hearing. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.08.
In general, you should be able to attend civil proceedings, which are presumptively open to the public, in Texas state courts. A civil proceeding may only be closed when the denial of access serves an important interest and that there is no less restrictive way to serve that interest. See Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984).
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Virginia state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Virginia judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's Circuit Courts, Courts of Appeal, and Supreme Court. This page focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process. The Virginia state constitution also provides a right of access to court proceedings. Va. Const. art. I, § 12; see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 281 S.E.2d 915, 922 (Va. 1981).
You may be denied access to the courtroom if a party seeking to close the hearing has an overriding interest that is likely to prejudiced and the closure is narrowly tailored to protect that interest. For example, the court may exclude you if the media's presence will deprive the defendant of her right to a fair trial because media coverage will influence the jury.
If the trial court closes the proceeding, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect the interest of the party asserting the need for closure. The court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-192.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
You will not be able to attend most juvenile proceedings in Virginia because they are closed under state law. However, proceedings involving juveniles over the age of 14 who are charged with an offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult are presumptively open. Those proceedings may only be closed upon good cause and the court must state its reasons in writing. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-302(C). The juvenile also has the right to a public trial if he so requests. Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-302(D).
In general, you should be able to attend civil proceedings, which are presumptively open to the public, in Virginia state courts. A civil proceeding may only be closed when the denial of access serves an important interest and that there is no less restrictive way to serve that interest. See Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984).
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. For general information concerning access to and use of court proceedings see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to attend most court proceedings in Washington state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court can restrict your access under certain circumstances. If you are interested in attending a court proceeding, visit the Washington judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. This pages focuses on your ability to access certain types of proceedings.
Trial Proceedings
You have a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580(1980). This includes the preliminary hearing and the jury selection process. The Washington state constitution also provides a right of access to court proceedings. Wash. Const. art. I, § 10.
However, your right to attend criminal trial proceedings is not absolute. A judge will close a criminal trial proceeding when: 1)the proponent of closure has shown a need for closure; 2) members of the public who are present at the time closure is requested are given an opportunity to object; 3) the closure is "both the least restrictive means available and effective in protecting the interests threatened"; 4) the judge has weighed competing interests and has considered all alternative methods; and, 5) the closure order is "no broader in its application or duration than necessary." Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 719-721 (Wash. 1982); see generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Grand Jury Proceedings
You will not be able to attend grand jury proceedings. These are proceedings in which the prosecutor presents evidence before a group of jurors who will determine if there is a sufficient basis to bring criminal charges against a person. Grand jury proceedings are held in secret and are not considered to be a part of the criminal trial process. See Wash. Rev. Code § 10.27.080.
Other Proceedings and Conferences
You will not be able to access a few other hearings that have traditionally been closed to the public. These include “side-bar” or “in-chambers” conferences between the lawyers and the judge, and plea-bargaining sessions between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Juvenile Court Proceedings
In general, you will be able to attend juvenile proceedings involving criminal offenses. However, although such proceedings are presumptively open, a judge may close a particular hearing for good cause. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.140(6). See below for information about other proceedings in juvenile court.
You have a right to attend civil proceedings. Wash. Const. art. I, § 10; Cohen v. Everett City Council, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (Wash. 1975). However, this right is not absolute. As in criminal cases, the court looks at the five Ishikawa factors, discussed above, to try to balance the presumption of openness with other interests. See Dreiling v. Jain, 93 P.3d 861, 869-870 (Wash. 2004).
Mental Illness Proceedings You will likely not be able to attend mental illness proceedings. They are closed to the public unless the person who is the subject of the hearing makes a written request for them to be open. Wash. Sup. Ct. Mental Proceedings R. 1.3.
Juvenile Court - Dependency Proceedings
You will probably be able to attend dependency and termination of parent-child relationship hearings. They are presumptively open unless the judge decides holding a closed proceeding is in the best interests of the child. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.115. Even if the hearing is closed, you may still be able to attend if the parent so requests unless the judge determines that it is not in the best interests of the child to open the proceedings to the general public.
All fifty states and the District of Columbia allow public access to their court records. While many of these state laws are similar to the law governing Federal Court Records, some variation exists on a state-by-state basis. Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on accessing court records. (Note that this guide currently covers only the 15 most populous states and the District of Columbia. We hope to add additional states to the guide at a later date.)
Note: This page covers information specific to California. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in California state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may seal records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). See the Courts page on the California Courts website for locations, phone numbers, and websites for the California Superior Courts, Courts of Appeal, and Supreme Court. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings. Other types of records that you can access include executed search and arrest warrants, probation officer reports, written victim statements, settlement agreements filed in court, and grand jury testimony resulting in an indictment, once that indictment has been handed down.
Certain categories of records are generally not open to the public:
Beyond that, a court may seal a record or records in a criminal case if it determines that disclosure would threaten the defendant's right to a fair trial. In a civil case, a court may seal documents if it determines that one or both of the parties have a legitimate interest in keeping the documents confidential and that interest outweighs the public interest in accessing the documents. Parties to a civil lawsuit may agree or "stipulate" to the sealing of documents, but this does not remove the court's obligation to determine whether the parties' interest in confidentiality overrides the public interest.
A court must issue an order to seal documents. If you are denied access to court records, ask the clerk for the order sealing the documents. If such an order exists, you may consider moving to intervene in the case to challenge the court's decision. The First Amendment Project has a great script to follow when parties to a lawsuit stipulate to seal documents or you are denied access to court records. If you wish to challenge an order sealing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
For additional information on access to court records in California, see the First Amendment Project's Guide to Access to Courts and Court Records in California.
Note: This page covers information specific to the District of Columbia. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in D.C. courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may seal records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). See the information page on District of Columbia Courts website for locations, phone numbers, websites, and other information about courts operating in the District. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings. On the other hand, you generally cannot access juvenile court records. In addition, you do not have a right to access documents and materials exchanged between parties to a civil lawsuit in pretrial discovery but never filed with the court or introduced into evidence. Moreover, the court has discretion to seal records that contain trade secrets, national security information, and information the disclosure of which would invade someone's privacy or promote libel or scandal. Beyond that, the court may seal documents when doing so is necessary to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial, to obtain the cooperation of witnesses and other sources of information, and to protect parties or witnesses who have acted in reliance on confidentiality. In each case, the court must determine that the specific interests favoring secrecy outweigh the public interest in access.
A court must issue an order to seal documents. If you are denied access to court records, ask the clerk for the order sealing the documents. If such an order exists, you may consider moving to intervene in the case to challenge the court's decision. If you wish to challenge an order sealing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Florida state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may order that records be made confidential under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). See the Florida State Courts page for links to the websites of the Florida County Courts, Circuit Courts, District Courts of Appeal, and Supreme Court. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.420 covers the details of public access to Florida court records. Under the law, the public has a presumptive right of access to all court records in the custody of the court clerk, including case dockets, transcripts, motions filed by the parties to a lawsuit, exhibits filed with the court as evidence, and records of depositions filed with the court. Florida courts have also found a presumptive public right of access to many pretrial and post-trial records, including juror interviews, jury misconduct hearings, records of sentencing proceedings, and civil settlement agreements.
Court records that would otherwise be public may be closed (i.e., made confidential) if:
Courts must give the public "reasonable notice" of an order to close judicial records and an opportunity to be heard on the issue, although the court may give notice and opportunity to be heard after it has closed the record. If you wish to challenge an order closing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed. The Judicial Access chapter of the Florida Bar's Reporter's Handbook includes a great section (III.B) on what to do when you are denied access to court records.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Georgia state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may limit access to records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). See the information page on the Judicial Branch of Georgia website for links to locations and phone numbers of the state courts operating in Georgia. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
Georgia law presumes that all court records must be open to the public. As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, trial transcripts, official recordings of the judge's remarks made in open court, and records of pre- and post-trial hearings. Judges have more discretion to make records of juvenile proceedings confidential, and many juvenile proceedings are closed to the public. However, some juvenile court proceedings are open to the public, such as child support hearings and proceedings involving a juvenile charged with a felony.
In order to deny access to court records, a court must determine that there is a compelling need for secrecy that outweighs the public interest in access. The court cannot simply state that the harm from disclosure outweighs the public interest; it must make specific findings of fact to support its decision to close records. With regard to closure because of a claimed privacy interest, the court must distinguish the privacy interest in that particular case from the general desire to avoid embarrassment that would otherwise lead all parties to a lawsuit to ask for closed records.
A court must issue an order to limit access to court documents. If you are denied access to court records, ask the clerk for the order sealing the documents. If such an order exists, you may consider moving to intervene in the case to challenge the court's decision. If you wish to challenge an order sealing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed. Rule 21.4 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules gives you the ability to appeal a court order denying you access to a court record to the Georgia Supreme Court.
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Illinois courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may limit access to court records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). State websites provide locations and phone numbers for the Illinois Circuit Courts, Appellate Courts, and Supreme Court. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
Illinois courts recognize both a common law and a First Amendment right of access to court records, and the state legislature enacted a statute making all records filed with the clerk of a Circuit Court presumptively open to the public. See 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/16. As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings. On the other hand, you generally cannot access juvenile court records. In addition, you do not have a right to access documents and materials exchanged between parties but never filed with the court. For instance, the parties to a case might enter into a settlement agreement but not submit the agreement to the court. In that case, you could not gain access to the settlement agreement.
A party to a lawsuit or criminal case may ask a court to seal otherwise public court records for a variety of reasons, including to protect their private information and trade secrets. The party seeking closure of court records must give a compelling reason, and the court must support closure with specific factual findings demonstrating why it is justified and craft its order as narrowly as possible. In the past, courts have sealed documents relating to medical and personal financial information. Mere potential for embarrassment is not sufficient.
A court must issue an order to seal documents. If you are denied access to court records, ask the clerk for the order sealing the documents. If such an order exists, you may consider moving to intervene in the case to challenge the court's decision. If you wish to challenge an order sealing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy many records and documents filed in Indiana courts. However, your right of access is not absolute. Indiana law exempts certain categories of information from disclosure, and a court may limit access to court records on its own initiative and at the request of a party to a lawsuit or criminal case. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). State websites provide locations and phone numbers for the Indiana Circuit and Superior Courts, Courts of Appeals, Supreme Court, Tax Court, and Limited Jurisdiction Courts. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
Under Indiana Administrative Rule 9, there is a strong presumption in favor of public access to all court records. As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings, among other items found in a case file. However, Administrative Rule 9(G) lists many categories of information that are not open to the public. For example, you will not be able to view most adoption records, records of juvenile proceedings, many medical, mental health, and tax records, records revealing the personal information of various persons, and the judges' personal notes and email. See Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G) and pages 11-13 of the Indian Supreme Court's Public Access to Court Records Handbook for details.
A judge may order that a court record containing any information listed in Rule 9(G) be closed to the public. In addition, any person who would be affected by the release of information contained in a court record may petition the court to prohibit access to it. In order to prohibit access to a court record, the person seeking closure must prove to the court by clear and convincing evidence that
In deciding whether or not to prohibit access to a court record, the court is supposed to balance the interest in public access against the grounds the person presents. See Rule 9(H). If the court prohibits access, it must state its reason for doing so and use the least restrictive method for blocking access to the information in question. For further details see pages 14 and 15 of the Public Access to Court Records Handbook.
If you are denied access to a court record, you may file a petition with the court having jurisdiction over the record. To obtain access to a court record sealed under Rule 9(G) or at the request of the person affected by disclosure, you must demonstrate that
Given the complexity of Indiana law on this topic, you should seek legal assistance if you plan on challenging a denial of access to court records.
For additional information, see page 16 of the Public Access to Court Records Handbook.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
For additional information about engaging in journalism in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, please see our printable PDF guide Newsgathering in Massachusetts, co-produced with the Harvard Law School Cyberlaw Clinic.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Massachusetts state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may seal records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). Refer to the Massachusetts judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. Additionally, see the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's useful set of Guidelines on the Public's Right of Access to Judicial Proceedings and Records (SJC Guidelines).
As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings. Other types of records that you can access include the index of the parties in both pending and closed civil and criminal cases, case fields, certain juvenile records, documents filed with the court in connection with a settlement, search warrants once returned to the court, and names and addresses of jurors and jury questionnaires.
Neither law nor court policy require records be placed online. The Supreme Judicial Court has determined that, at least for now, less information should be available online than at a courthouse. See Policy Statement by the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court Concerning Publication of Court Case Information on the Web. However, the Court also recommends that "some information about every case" should be available such as case captions, party names (though not the names of criminal defendants), docket numbers, assigned judges, case types, attorney information, and some docket entries to be placed online. The website of Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court of Massachusetts features those courts' opinions, docket information including the briefs filed by the parties, court calendars, and webcasts of the oral arguments. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
Certain categories of records are generally not open to the public including grand jury records, records of dismissed controlled substance cases, records from care and protection cases, and certain financial statements. Other records may or may not be available, such as commitment records, the names of sexual assault victims, and adoption records. You can find a complete listing of which records are open, closed, or left to the discretion of the court in the SJC Guidelines.
Beyond that, the court may impound documents if it finds good cause to do so, after considering "the nature of the parties and the controversy, the type of information and the privacy interests involved, the extent of community interest, and the reason(s) for the request." SJC Guidelines.
A court must issue an order to impound records. If you are denied access to court records, ask the clerk for the order sealing the documents. If such an order exists, you may consider moving to terminate or modify the impoundment to challenge the court's decision. See Uniform Rule on Impoundment Procedure 10. You may also seek review by a single justice of an appellate court. See Uniform Rule on Impoundment Procedure 12. You may also be able to argue you have a First Amendment right to access the record in question. See SJC Guidelines. If you wish to challenge an order impounding court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy many records and documents filed in Michigan courts. However, your right of access is not absolute. Michigan statutes and court rules exempt certain categories of information from disclosure, and a court may limit access to court records at the request of a party to a lawsuit or criminal case. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). State websites provide locations and phone numbers for the Michigan Trial Courts (Circuit, Probate, and District Courts), Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
Under Michigan Court Rule 8.119(E), there is a strong presumption in favor of public access to court records. You should be able to access any file or document, and the information contained within, unless your access is restricted by statute or a court rule, or has been sealed by the court. However, you will not be able to access, among other things, many files related to mediation, jury questionnaires, grand jury information, drug court participation records, crime victim addresses and telephone numbers, infectious disease testing results, and search warrants at least until 65 days after issuance, adoption records, waivers of parental consent for abortions, and wills filed for safekeeping. The Michigan Court System's website contains a chart which lists categories of non-public and limited access records. You should be aware that if you ask about a record to which access is restricted, court personnel will respond with the statement that "No public record exists."
A judge may order that a court record be closed to the public if:
The judge must consider both the interests of the parties and the interest of the public in deciding whether to seal a record, and must provide all interested persons the opportunity to be heard. See Michigan Court Rule 8.119(F). The judge may not seal court orders or opinions.
If you are denied access to a sealed court record, you may file a motion objecting to the judge's decision. Michigan Court Rule 8.119(F))(6). For access to non-public and restricted records, the Michigan Court System's website's chart includes information on how you may obtain access to each category of records. If you wish to challenge an order closing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
Note: This page covers information specific to Missouri. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Missouri state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may seal records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). See the Missouri Courts website for locations, phone numbers, websites, and other information about courts operating in Missouri. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online at Case.net, the state's automated case management system. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings. However, some records are generally not open to the public, such as juvenile court records, trade secret information, and mental health evaluations. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 211.321, 630.14. Also, though the vast majority of public court records are made available on Case.net, not all records that are available in person are made available online. For example, in criminal cases, a prosecuting attorney may request the case record be temporarily removed from Internet access if a warrant has been requested and there is a high risk of injury to officers or others should the defendant become aware of the issuance of the warrant. See Court Operating Rule 2.04.
In addition, a court has the discretion to seal a record when there is a compelling justification. "Given the presumption in favor of open records, an abuse of discretion is present when trial court orders inexplicably seal court records, do not articulate specific reasons for closure, or do not otherwise demonstrate a recognition of the presumptive right of access." Transit Casualty Co. ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Transit Casualty Co. ex rel. Intervening Employees, 43 S.W.3d 293, 300 (Mo. 2001). A court must issue an order to seal documents. In this order, the court must "identify specific and tangible threats to important values." Transit Casualty at 302. If you are denied access to court records, ask the clerk for the order sealing the documents. If such an order exists, you may consider moving to intervene in the case to challenge the court's decision. If you wish to challenge an order sealing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy many records and documents filed in New Jersey courts. However, your right of access is not absolute. New Jersey statutes and court rules exempt certain categories of information from disclosure, and a court may limit access to court records in certain situations. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). State websites provide locations and phone numbers for the Municipal Courts, Local and County Courts, Tax Court, Appellate Division of the Superior Court, and Supreme Court. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
New Jersey Court Rule 1.38 covers the details of public access to New Jersey court records. Under the rule, the public has a presumptive right of access to all court records made, maintained or kept on file by any court, with some limited exceptions. These exceptions include jury questionnaires, civil commitment records, records relating to child sexual abuse victims, search warrants, records about grand jury proceedings, and most records of the family division. More information about non-public records is available in a set of guidelines recently prepared for court employees.
A court may seal records at its discretion if it finds that good cause exists to do so. To determine if good cause exists, the court must determine whether the need for secrecy substantially outweighs the presumption of access, and the need for secrecy must be demonstrated for each document. Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-Laroche, 662 A.2d 546, 559 (N.J. 1995).
If you seek to access sealed records, the party attempting to keep them closed must demonstrate that closure is still currently necessary. Id. If you wish to challenge an order closing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy many records and documents filed in New York courts. However, your right of access is not absolute. New York statutes and court rules exempt certain categories of information from disclosure, and a court may limit access to court records in certain situations. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). State websites provide locations and phone numbers for the Trial Courts, the Supreme Court Appellate Division, and the Court of Appeals (the state's highest court). Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
There is a strong presumption of open access to court records in New York. See New York Jud. Law 255 to 255-B (select individual sections). However, there are numerous exceptions to this presumption. For example, you will likely not be able to access family court records, certain matrimonial records, criminal records when the defendant is found not guilty, adoption records, and civil commitment records. A recent report by the Commission on Public Access to Court Records contains some more examples.
A court may also seal its records upon finding there is good cause to do so. See 22 NYCRR § 216.1 (search for "sealing of court records"). Courts generally first require the person seeking to seal the records to demonstrate good cause to seal the record exists, and then balance that reason for closure against the public's interest in access. While this rule only directly applies to civil cases, criminal courts sometimes use it for guidance.
To obtain access to a sealed record, you can make a motion to vacate the sealing order. See In re Crain Communications, Inc. v. Hughes, 539 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (N.Y. 1989). You may also make a direct appeal if the trial judge failed to give a reason for sealing the records. See In re Conservatorship of Brownstone, 594 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (App. Div. 1993). If you wish to challenge an order sealing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in North Carolina state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may limit access to records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). See the list of courthouses by county on the North Carolina Court System website for directions and telephone numbers for the state courts operating in North Carolina. Information for the state's Court of Appeals and Supreme Court are available on their sites. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records.
Under N.C. Const. art. I, § 18, there is a qualified right of public access to court records, at least in civil cases. See Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675, 693 (N.C. 1999). North Carolina law provides a right of access to all court records, both civil and criminal, in both the general public records law, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1, and a specific statute about court records, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-109(a). The court records statute requires that all records be open to public inspection, except as prohibited by law. Some court records are specifically named in another statue as being public unless sealed by the court: "arrest and search warrants that have been returned by law enforcement agencies, indictments, criminal summons, and nontestimonial identification orders." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 132-1.4(k). You will likely not have access to certain documents, however, such as civil commitment materials, juvenile delinquency records, and information from child abuse or neglect cases.
A court may deny access to records "when its use is required in the interest of the proper and fair administration of justice or where, for reasons of public policy, the openness ordinarily required of our government will be more harmful than beneficial." Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675, 685 (N.C. 1999). If you wish to challenge an order closing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed. North Carolina law explicitly grants you the ability to assert your right of access to records from a civil proceeding and to immediately appeal if your request is denied. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-72.1.
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Ohio state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may seal records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). Refer to the Ohio judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts.
Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. The Ohio Supreme Court has a large number of court documents on-line, including documents filed by the parties. However, not all documents are on-line for each case, although the on-line search engine will show that they were filed. Ohio Appellate Courts have on-line access to opinions. Local courts have decided whether to put records on-line on a county-by-county basis and can be accessed through individual county websites. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings, among other items found in a case file. However, there are a number of broad categories of records that are not available to the public including adoption records, records relating to juveniles seeking permission for an abortion, and probation and parole records, as well as other sensitive information such as HIV test results and the identity of victims of child sexual abuse.
Beyond that, a party to a court case has the right to request that public access to information in the court record be restricted. The court may restrict the information at its discretion after considering: (1) risk of injury to individuals; (2) individual privacy rights and interests; (3) proprietary business information; and (4) public safety. If you wish to challenge an order closing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
For more information about access to Ohio Court Records, download section 15 of Ohio State Bar Association's The Legal Handbook for Ohio Journalists on Media Access to Courts, Meetings and Public Records.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Pennsylvania state courts. This right is rooted in the commmonlaw, see Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1983), and starting January 1, 2009, will be codified in the newly revised Right-To-Know Law. Refer to the section on Access to Public Records in Pennsylvania to better understand what types of records you can access and the mechanisms for doing so under the new law.
Despite the presumption of openness, your right of access is not absolute. A court may seal records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). Refer to the Pennsylvania judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts.
Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. Some Pennsylvania state court records are online, although this access is by no means comprehensive. For example, docket sheets and court calendars and Supreme Court and appellate opinions are available online, while filed court documents (e.g., motions and briefs) are not usually accessible over the internet. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
At the courthouse you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings, among other items found in a case file. However, there are records that are highly sensitive in nature which you will not be able to access, such as those involving divorce cases, adoption proceedings, and juvenile proceedings. Beyond that, a court may seal a record or records when good cause exists. Good cause exists where disclosure will result in clearly defined and serious injury to the party requesting closure. For example, in a criminal case, a court will seal the necessary records if it determines that disclosure would threaten the defendant's right to a fair trial, or jeopardize the safety of informants or the integrity of an ongoing investigation.
A court must issue an order to seal documents. If you are denied access to court records, ask the clerk for the order sealing the documents. If such an order exists, you may consider moving to intervene in the case to challenge the court's decision. If you wish to challenge an order closing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Texas state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may seal records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). Refer to the Texas judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings, among other items found in a case file. However, there are certain types of court records that you will not be able to inspect. For example, you will not have access to juvenile records where the individual has not committed a felony or a Class A or B misdemeanor between the ages of 17 and 21.
Beyond that, the court may seal court records where the significant privacy interest in sealing the records outweigh the presumptive right of public access. The court must also find that there is no less restrictive means to protect the significant privacy interest.
You may appeal a court's denial of access to records by filing a petition for review with the Administrative Director of the Office of Court Administration. That petition has to be filed within 30 days of the denial, and must include:
The petition will then be referred to a special committee consisting of no fewer than five judges. The committee will consider the case for and against granting the request and issue a written decision within 60 days. See Texas Rule of Judicial Adjudication 12.9. If you're frustrated by the the committee's decision, you may file a writ of mandamus with the court. Refer to our section on Finding Legal Help for more information on how to proceed with a court action.
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Virginia state courts. Va. Code § 17.1-208 provides that, with certain exceptions, any records or papers of any circuit court that are maintained by the clerk of the circuit court “shall be open to inspection by any person.” The Supreme Court of Virginia has interpreted this provision to create “a statutory presumption of openness to the public.” Perreault v. The Free Lance Star, 666 S.E.2d 352, 358 (2008). However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may seal records under certain circumstances.
If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). Refer to the Virginia judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts. Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings, among other items found in a case file. Virginia courts have also ruled that unsealed mental health evaluations admitted into evidence at a hearing, Lotz v. Commonwealth, 672 S.E.2d 833, 837 (2009), and unsealed petitions for approval of settlements in wrongful death suits, Perreult, 666 S.E.2d at 359, are subject to disclosure, notwithstanding other statutes providing for confidentiality. However, you will not be able to access other documents associated with a case, such as materials uncovered through discovery but not filed with the court, see Shenandoah Publ'g House, Inc. v. Fanning, 368 S.E.2d 253, 257 (1988), trial exhibits that were not admitted into evidence, and notes written by the judge or other court personnel.
Additionally, Virgina law does exclude certain categories of court records from being made available. One major exclusion is criminal records that may interfere with an ongoing investigation, compromise the privacy of a juvenile, or reveal the identity of a witness that has been promised anonymity. See Va. Code § 2.2-3706. The identity of victims of sexual assault may also not be disclosed in most circumstances. See Va. Code § 19.2-11.2.
Beyond that, a court may seal a record or records in a criminal case if it determines that disclosure would threaten the defendant's right to a fair trial. To overcome the presumption of public access, the party requesting the seal “bears the burden of establishing an interest so compelling that it cannot be protected reasonably by some measure other than” sealing the documents. Lotz, 672 S.E.2d at 837 (internal quotation omitted). In a civil case, a court may seal documents if it determines that one or both of the parties have an interest in keeping the documents confidential and that interest outweighs the presumptive right of the public in accessing the documents. The interest must be specific; the risk of damage to professional reputation, emotional damage, or financial harm, in the abstract is not sufficient to seal a record. Shiembob v. Shiembob, 685 S.E.2d 192, 197 (2009).
A court must issue an order to seal documents. If you are denied access to court records, ask the clerk for the order sealing the documents. If such an order exists, you may consider moving to intervene in the case to challenge the court's decision. The Virginia Supreme Court has issued conflicting decisions on whether a writ of mandamus – an order by a higher court commanding a lower court to perform some mandatory duty – is an appropriate remedy for challenging the sealing of a document. See Smith v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 540 S.E.2d 878 (2001); Hertz v. Times-World Corp., 528 S.E.2d 458 (2000). If you wish to challenge an order sealing court records, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. For general information concerning access to and use of court records see the Access to Courts and Court Records section of this guide.
You have a right to inspect and copy most records and documents filed in Washington state courts. However, your right of access is not absolute, and a court may seal records under certain circumstances. If you are interested in obtaining court records, you should go to the courthouse where the case is taking place and request the records in writing from the clerk of the court (there will usually be a request form). Refer to the Washington judiciary's website to find the locations, phone numbers, and websites for the state's courts.
Alternatively, you may be able to access court records online. Refer to a local court's website and check to see if the court provides online access. Courts with online access usually provide access to docket sheets, however, documents filed with the court rarely are accessible. For more information, please consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's state-by-state guide to access to court records and proceedings.
As a general matter, you may access docket information, the pleadings and motions of the parties to a lawsuit, decisions and orders of the court, evidence introduced in court by either side, and transcripts of hearings, among other items found in a case file. The procedure for requesting these records varies from court to court; each court can provide access only to its own records. However, you will not be able to access court records that contain highly sensitive material, such as adoption records, mental illness commitment records, and alcohol and drug treatment commitment records. Other types of records, such as those concerning family law cases, are restricted; in order to get access you must file a Motion and Declaration to Allow Access to Records Under GR 22(h)(2) with the court.
You may be denied access to a court record for a variety of reasons including: (a) data availability; (b) a lack of specificity in your request; (c) potential invasion of privacy created by release of records containing personal or highly sensitive information; and (d) potential disruption to the business of the courts. In order to make sure that the court's denial is not based on the lack of specificity in your request, make sure that you comply with the Judicial Information System Committee Rules. Under Rule 15, you must include a statement of the intended use and distribution, the type of information needed, and identifying information about the applicant in your written request.
Keep in mind that Washington courts will consider several factors in deciding to allow or deny a request for documents containing highly sensitive information, however there are limits on who can request this information. Court rules specify that "a public purpose agency may request court records not publicly accessible for scholarly, governmental, or research purposes where the identification of specific individuals is ancillary to the purpose of the inquiry." GR31(f). A "public purpose agency" for this purpose includes nonprofit organizations, and thus may be applicable to you. The court will then balance the possible benefits to the operation of the judiciary and the risks created by permitting access, and will also consider whether access will fulfill a legislative mandate.
If the balancing test comes out in your favor, you must sign a dissemination contract before accessing the restricted records. The dissemination contract obligates you to protect confidential information, including the identity of individuals. It also prohibits you from making copies of the records.
You can appeal a denial of a request for information maintained at the state level to the Judicial Information System Committee, which consists of a number of state judges as well as three members outside of the judiciary. If you want to challenge the Committee's decision, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
In addition to observing court proceedings and obtaining court records, you may contact and interview many of the participants in a civil lawsuit or criminal case. Bear in mind that the participants may not want to talk with you about the case, and that you cannot compel them to do so. We address some of the details below.
Jury Selection
You have a First Amendment right to observe the jury selection process, called voir dire in legal terminology. This process takes place in court, and generally involves lawyers asking questions to determine whether prospective jurors could make a fair decision. If the lawyers or the court asks the jurors to fill out questionnaires or other paperwork, you usually have a right to inspect these materials as well. You may find these rights valuable in identifying jurors and gathering background information about them.
A court may limit your right of access to the juror selection process and juror questionnaires in limited circumstances: to protect a party's right to a fair trial, to protect a juror's legitimate privacy interest, or to otherwise further the interests of justice. Note that in criminal cases, federal courts do not disclose documents containing identifying information about jurors or potential jurors to the public. For more information, refer to Federal Judiciary's Privacy Policy, and read the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press' article on secret juries.
In rare cases, a judge may deny access to all identifying information about jurors when there is a serious threat to the jurors' welfare. For example, in the 1977 trial of Leroy Barnes, who charged with violating multiple federal narcotics and firearms laws, a federal district court withheld jurors' names and addresses after the judge determined that the case presented an unusual risk to the jurors. See U.S. v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (1979). For more information about this issue, read the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press' article on anonymous juries.
Jury Deliberations
You do not have a right to view or obtain information about a jury’s deliberations during the course of those deliberations. Once a jury has been empaneled, the judge will instruct the jury not to discuss the case with anyone or use the media to learn more about the case for the duration of the trial. This rule reflects a concern that discussion with outsiders may improperly influence the jury's process of deliberation and affect the jury's independence.
Generally, you may contact jurors after the trial has ended and discuss the deliberation process, once the threat of tainting the jury's deliberations has passed. Not all jurors will want to talk with you. While judges cannot prohibit the media from talking with jurors after the trial without a compelling reason, many judges advise jurors not to talk about the deliberations process and to keep jury room discussions confidential.
Witnesses and Parties
In general, you may speak with the witnesses and parties involved in a case. A court may limit your ability to do so, however, if it issues a gag order, which is discussed below.
Lawyers
You may speak with the lawyers involved in a case, but they may not be able to answer all of your questions. Lawyers may discuss freely certain aspects of a case, such as the claims, offenses, or defenses involved, whether the case is in progress, and other information that is a matter of public record (i.e., reflected in the court files). But legal ethics rules prevent lawyers from talking to the press about other matters that might improperly influence the court or jury. For example, Rule 3.6 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires that a lawyer "not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter." Note that prosecutors have an additional responsibility under the Model Rules not to make statements outside the courtroom that would tend to heighten public condemnation of the accused. See Rule 3.8.
A court may limit your ability to speak with the lawyers in a case, however, if it issues a gag order, which is discussed below.
Judges
In all likelihood, judges will be unwilling to speak with you about a case pending before them. Judicial ethics rules prohibit judges from speaking with the public about the substantive aspects of cases they are overseeing. For example, an ethical rule requires federal judges to "avoid public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action" until the completion of all appeals in the case. Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3A(6). Another ethical rule requires judges to refrain from making, during a pending case, any statement "that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness." American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(9). Judges take these obligations extremely seriously.
Gag Orders
If a judge issues a gag order, the lawyers, witnesses, and parties in a case may not speak with you. A court may only issue a gag order under limited circumstances, when it determines that the release of information will have an improper affect on the proceedings.
If you wish to challenge a gag order, you should get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed. The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has a good description of the process for challenging a gag order, and a list of the cases in which gag orders have been denied.
You have a right to challenge a court's closure of a proceeding that you wish to attend. How you go about challenging such a closure will depend on whether you are present in the courtroom at the time the judge orders closure or whether you find out about it after the fact.
Responding to Closure Orders on the Spot
You may be in attendance when a judge orders everyone to leave the courtroom unless they are associated with the case. Ask for the judge's permission to speak. If the judge allows you to speak, you should politely object to the closure and ask that your objection be noted on the record. Ask the judge for an opportunity present your arguments against closure, and time to prepare your arguments and/or get legal representation.
If the judge will not allow you to speak, leave the courtroom. Do not raise your voice and make a scene; disturbing the decorum of a courtroom will very likely have negative consequences. Once you're out of the courtroom, you should quickly draft a letter to the judge informing her that you object to the closure and that you plan on filing a motion in opposition to the closure. Ask court personnel to deliver the note to the judge. You will need to find legal assistance immediately in order to determine how best to proceed.
The First Amendment Project provide a good set of steps to handle closures in person. Although the steps are geared specifically toward California courts, most of the information applies to courts nationwide (you should research relevant cases or legislation in your jurisdiction, if necessary).
Responding to Closure Orders After the Fact
Alternatively, you may find out after the fact that a court closed a proceeding. If this is the case, go to the clerk's office and ask whether the judge explained her reasons for closure. You will likely need legal assistance in finding the correct laws to support your argument that the proceeding should never have been closed in the first place. If you believe that the proceeding was improperly closed, you can try to get a copy of the transcript from the proceeding. Get legal assistance to determine how best to proceed.
For more information, consult the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, which has a useful guide on how to proceed in these cases.
While we can't guarantee that you will get every court record or attend every court proceeding you desire, the following tips will help ensure that you take full advantage of the wealth of information available through state and federal courts.
Bear in mind that accessing court records is only one of many important fact-finding tools in your information gathering toolbox. For a broad overview of how you can investigate the actions of a full range of actors, including government, individuals, and corporations, see the Newsgathering section of this guide and check out the Center for Investigative Reporting's entertaining and inspirational guide, Raising Hell: A Citizens Guide to the Fine Art of Investigation.
Intellectual property is a blanket term for multiple areas of law that govern the ownership and rights to "products of the mind." Many, but not all, intellectual property laws seek to encourage innovation and creativity, with an ultimate aim of promoting a general benefit to society. They typically do so by granting a bundle of rights to the originator of the work or creation. Intellectual property encompasses four areas of law, each of which governs creations of different types and promotes different policies:
Copyright:
Copyright law protects the fruits of creative efforts, called "original
works of authorship" in legal terminology. A copyright owner enjoys the
exclusive right to reproduce the work, distribute it, display or
perform it, and to create derivative works from it, as well as the
ability to transfer any or all of these rights. Copyright protection
generally lasts for seventy years beyond the death of the original
author. Copyright's purpose is to stimulate the production of creative works by giving authors a financial incentive to create
new works. Examples of copyrightable works include blog posts, photographs, videos,
podcasts, news articles, musical
compositions, and computer software. See the Copyright section in this guide for more information.
Trademark: Trademark law creates usage rights in words, phrases, symbols, and other indicators that identify the source or sponsorship of goods or services. The owner of a valid trademark can stop others from using its trademark or a similar mark in connection with similar goods and services. The owner of a famous trademark may also stop others from using it in connection with dissimilar goods or services. The main purpose of trademark law is to protect consumers from confusion about the source of a particular good or service, and a secondary purpose is to protect companies that have spent time, effort, and money to create a positive association between their trademarks and their goods and services. Examples of trademarks include the word "Cheerios" for breakfast cereal, the Apple logo for computers, and YouTube's slogan "Broadcast Yourself" for video-hosting services. Website domain names can also, in certain circumstances, be trademarks. See the Trademark section in this guide for more information.
Trade Secrets: Trade secrets law protects secret information that a company or other organization creates or compiles to give it an economic advantage over its competitors. A trade secret owner can stop others from acquiring its trade secret through improper means, such as theft, trespass, hacking, or breach of a confidentiality agreement, or from disclosing it to others under certain circumstances. Trade secrets law is aimed at encouraging research and innovation and maintaining high standards of commercial morality. Examples of trade secrets include the technical specs of an unreleased product, confidential customer lists, and manufacturing processes and formulas. See the Trade Secrets section in this guide for more information.
Patent: Patent law provides ownership rights and protection for unique processes, procedures, methods, inventions, and discoveries. It gives the patent owner the exclusive right to exploit (i.e. create, use, sell, distribute) the invention for a limited period of time (typically twenty years from the time of a patent application filing). Patent law's purpose is to spur innovation by giving inventors a financial incentive to invent. We do not cover patent law in this guide. For general information, see the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's General Information Concerning Patents.
A basic understanding of copyright principles is essential for any blogger, researcher, reporter, photographer, or anyone who publishes their creative works. It’s important for two reasons. First, you should understand how you can properly make use of someone else’s work – quoting from it, reprinting it, summarizing it, even satirizing it. And second, you should understand how you can protect your own legal rights in what you create, so that others don’t take unfair (even unlawful) advantage of it.
Like any area of the law, copyright can get complex at its outer limits. However, a working knowledge of copyright law is not hard to acquire and will guide you through nearly all the situations you are likely to face in your day to day work.
What Copyright Covers
Let’s start with some of the building blocks. First, all copyright law is federal law and therefore uniform across the country (in theory). States have no role, because the Constitution gives Congress the sole "power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Congress first exercised this power to establish copyrights (and patents) in its first meeting in 1791, and it has regularly revised and updated the law ever since. Though the last comprehensive copyright revision was enacted in 1976, Congress has passed many new copyright laws and amended others – sometimes after highly contentious lobbying and debate – in the digital era.
Second, copyright law covers an extraordinarily broad range of creative work. The law calls them "works of authorship" but copyright protects almost all creative work that can be written down or otherwise captured in a tangible medium:
For more information on works protected under copyright law, see the section in this guide on Copyrightable Subject Matter.
Copyright Ownership
Owning a copyright gives you the exclusive right to publish, copy or otherwise reproduce the work; to distribute the work publicly (or not so publicly); and to perform or display the work, if it is a work of performance or visual art. Owning a copyright also gives you the exclusive right to prepare "derivative works," which are the original works in new forms – for example, a translation into another language, or a movie made from a novel, or a revised or expanded edition of an existing work. Someone who does these things without your permission is infringing your copyright, and the law provides recourse to you. For more details on the exclusive rights granted to a copyright owner, see the section on Rights Granted Under Copyright.
Copyright is extraordinarily easy to acquire. In fact, you really need do nothing at all – the law provides that copyright springs to life and protects an author’s work from the time the work is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression…from which [it] can be perceived reproduced, or otherwise communicated . . . .” So when words are put on paper, or paint to canvas, or sights to a videotape, digital camera or cellphone, or even when any of the above are stored in a computer’s memory – they’re copyrighted. That’s it. They don’t have to be published. There is no requirement to put a copyright notice on it (though that is often helpful). There is no requirement that it be registered with the Copyright Office in the Library of Congress, although commercial publishers routinely do that, to show up in the database of copyrighted works; registration can also grant you certain additional rights. If you are interested in registering your work with the Copyright Office, consult the section on Copyright Registration and Notice.
The law requires only that copyrightable works of authorship be "original" – but that is an easy hurdle to clear. Unlike the patent laws, there is no requirement that a work be innovative, meritorious, or even particularly bright or interesting. A work of authorship just can't be a copy of anyone else's work, and it must have some modest degree of creativity to it. In 1991, the Supreme Court ruled that an ordinary white-pages telephone book was not sufficiently creative to be copyrighted, but that gives you an idea of how low the barrier is. Any "work of authorship" that you create in the honest application of your own skills will likely be sufficiently "original" to be protected by copyright.
So what is the catch? None, really, but there are two cardinal principles of copyright that – fortunately – limit its reach. First, copyright protects the form in which ideas are expressed (the essay, the novel, the news story in the paper or on the blog) but it does not protect the ideas themselves. Nobody owns ideas. You might write the most insightful, original, and brilliant blog post on how to achieve peace in the Middle East or reduce carbon emissions, but from the moment you publish the post anyone may seize upon that idea to expand upon it, analyze it, criticize it, or discuss it in any way they like. What they can’t do is reprint your expression of the idea, without your permission. (And, at least in academia and among reputable publications, they ought not to present the idea as their own, or even to discuss it without first acknowledging that it is your idea. However, because copyright does not protect ideas, the law does not punish plagiarism of ideas. For more information on the distinction, refer to the section on Copyright Infringement.)
Second, copyright does not protect facts. No matter how long and hard you work to uncover and report facts, no matter how significant the impact of your reporting, you don’t own those facts. Anyone can repeat them, so long as they do not copy your story itself. By the same token, of course, you can appropriate facts that someone else has reported, without copyright concerns. (You ordinarily have an ethical obligation to credit the source of your facts, but it’s not a copyright obligation.) For more information on the types of works not covered by copyright, consult the section on Works Not Covered by Copyright.
As these principles suggest, copyright in its classic formulation is an effort to balance two often-conflicting goals. We want to encourage people to report the news, create art, publish works of history and science, and generally advance knowledge. The law provides the creators the exclusive ownership of their works for a limited time so that they can make money from them. On the other hand, we want to encourage a free flow of ideas, discussion, and intellectual synergy. Facts and ideas are put into the public domain at the moment of birth. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market…. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution." Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Using the Work of Others and Licensing Your Work
This effort to achieve balance naturally produces conflict. How can you challenge a blog post proposing a new way to reduce carbon emissions unless you can quote from the copyrighted post itself? Requiring you to get the original author’s permission would certainly inhibit the free flow of ideas and would come very close to giving that author control over the idea. To ease this conflict, the law recognizes a principle known as "fair use," which is simply the freedom to use another’s copyrighted work in the course of creating your own copyrighted work.
There have always been unspecific but sensible limits to this principle – you generally can't, for example, “quote” another’s work by reprinting it in its entirety, even if you threw in a few new words of your own (on the other hand, if the original work was only a few paragraphs long, you might even be able to do that in some circumstances). Generally, courts recognize that if the borrowing is not excessive, that if it advances the creation of a new work, and if it does not undercut the market for the original work, the use is fair. The section on Fair Use in this guide provides more information on the fair use doctrine.
In the digital era, "fair use" has become a battleground. No one challenges the original principles, but instant reproduction and worldwide distribution of any digital work is within everyone’s reach. Some creators of copyrighted works – record labels and movie distributors most prominently – have imposed electronic lockdowns, known as digital rights management, on their works. This has led some to claim that these lockdowns extinguish their fair use rights.
There is another aspect to this political battle. The Constitution authorizes Congress to protect writings and discoveries for "limited times." In the 19th century, a "limited time" meant no more than 28 years after publication. For most of the 20th century, it meant up to 56 years. But since 1998, it has meant for the life of the author and for an additional 70 years. So, if a 25-year old author creates a work in 2008 and lives another 60 years, that work is protected by copyright until 2138, an extraordinary 130 years. By that measure, most of the works of Henry James and Mark Twain would still be copyrighted today. Many critics of the current copyright structure point to this lengthy protection as an unwarranted distortion of “limited time,” but the Supreme Court upheld the law in 2003. (As a rule of thumb, any work published before 1923 is probably now in the public domain; any work published since then probably is not, but there are exceptions to both those guidelines.)
Because a copyright is intangible property (hence, "intellectual property," a field that also includes patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and now URLs and domain names), it can be bought, sold, given away, bequeathed at death, and licensed to others. Indeed, licensing is an active field in copyright law. An author’s contract with a publisher is a license; while the author may retain the copyright, the publisher shares the revenue and edits, prints, and distributes the work. Works may also be sold outright, as newspapers often require freelancers to do. Ownership may also vest in the employer from the outset, if creating copyrighted works is part of one’s employment. For more information, visit the sections on Licensing Your Content and Getting Permission to Use the Work of Others to use someone else's work.
There are other aspects to copyright law that can be useful to know. For example, works of the US Government are never copyrighted and hence can be reproduced without payment or permission. Copyrighted works such as music, movies, and drama may be performed or displayed (but not copied) without permission in the course of face-to-face teaching and distance learning in schools and universities. A library user is generally entitled to make a single copy of a copyrighted work for private study and scholarship.
In the sections that follow, we lay out further specifics about the principles described above. This guide is not a full treatise on copyright law, but it does provide what we hope is a good understanding of what you need to know, both to make intelligent use of others’ creative works and to protect your own.
Copyright law applies to any original works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and gives copyright owners certain rights to control the use and distribution of their work. The following two sections explain the two concepts in more detail:
If you are interested in information on who can own a copyright and how to use the copyrighted work of others, see the sections on Copyright Ownership and Using the Work of Others for discussion of these topics.
Copyright protection automatically applies to "original works of
authorship" that are "fixed in a tangible medium of expression." The
definition is less complicated than it sounds. If you create a blog
post, podcast, or article, your work is covered by copyright the
instant it is created in a tangible form, such as on paper, in a blog
post, email, or video. You do not need to do anything more, such as
signing or filing any papers or provide specific notice to the world
that the work is covered by copyright. (You may however wish to provide
copyright notice and register your copyright; see the section on Copyright Registration and Notice
for more information.) Assuming it meets the requirements for
protection, a work is automatically copyrighted in the U.S. and in over
160 other countries from the moment of its creation.
Original Works of Authorship
The level of creativity required for a work to be "original" is extremely low. A work satisfies this requirement as long as it possesses some creative spark, "no matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be." Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (internal citations omitted). A work that originates from the author and contains any level of creative expression will satisfy the originality requirement. In the Feist case, the Supreme Court held that listing names alphabetically in a phone book is not creative; almost anything more creative than that probably qualifies.
Sometimes, a creative work will have both original and
unoriginal elements. In that case, the owner of the copyright to the
work may assert rights over the original elements, but not the
unoriginal elements. For example, a hip-hop music publisher recently
sued the famous rapper, 50 Cent, claiming that his popular song, "In Da
Club," infringed the publisher's copyright in a song called "It's Your
Birthday" (written by another hip-hop artist named Luther Campbell). Lil' Joe Wein Music, Inc. v. Jackson,
No. 06-16342 (11th Cir. 2007). The lyrics to "It's Your Birthday"
include the phrase "Go [name], it's your birthday" with various proper
names used in succession. 50 Cent's "In Da Club" also includes a
section where he sings "Go Shorty, it's your birthday." The court found
that the phrase "Go [name], it's your birthday" in Campbell's "It's
Your Birthday" was not original -- the evidence showed that Campbell
borrowed this phrase from chants popular at hip-hop nightclubs in the
early 90s. Although the rest of Campbell's "It's Your Birthday" was
protected original expression, the music publisher could not hold 50
Cent liable for infringement because he had only used the "birthday"
phrase, which was not original to Campbell.
Fixation in a Tangible Medium
A copyrightable work is considered "fixed in a tangible medium" if it can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for more than a transitory period. This includes any electronically readable formats (e.g., a blog post, email, or even storage in computer memory), audio recordings, and video. It does not matter whether the work has been "published" (i.e., made available to the world), as copyright protection is available to both published and unpublished works, so long as it is otherwise fixed in a tangible medium.
Some examples include:
This list is not exclusive. Copyright protection can apply to any work fixed in any tangible medium of expression, whether this medium is currently known about or is yet to be developed, so long as the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. See 17 U.S.C. Sec. 102.
Some works cannot be copyrighted; visit the section on Works Not Covered By Copyright for more information.
Copyright law grants you several exclusive rights to control the use and distribution of your copyrighted work. The rights include the exclusive power to:
See Section 106 of the Copyright Act.
As a copyright owner, you can transfer each of these rights to others, either individually (e.g., just the reproduction right or just the display right) or as a group (all of the rights listed above). Additionally, although the exclusive rights are broad, copyright law does not give you an attribution right (i.e., the right to require that your name be associated with the work). Thus, if you decide to transfer or license any or all six of the rights listed above and wish to have your name be associated with the work, make sure to provide for attribution through the contract or license. For information on how to transfer or license rights under copyright, visit the Copyright Licenses and Transfers section of this guide. Note that if you are a minor, although you retain ownership over your own copyrightable work, state laws may restrict your ability to conduct business transactions, such as licensing and transfer.
If someone else performs an action that violates one of these exclusive rights without your permission, you can sue that person or entity in federal court for copyright infringement. Bear in mind that certain prerequisites apply before you can file suit-- consult the Copyright Registration and Notice section of this guide for details.
You can exercise these six rights for the duration of the copyright term. For works created on or after January 1, 1978, this term will vary depending on who is the rightful copyright owner:
Because copyright rules changed significantly in 1978, the copyright terms for works created prior to 1978 follow different rules. For an explanation of the rules relating to copyright term for works created prior to 1978, see the U.S. Copyright Office's official website. You can also find more information on when works fall into the public domain in the Works Not Covered By Copyright section of this Guide.
Copyright ownership encompasses several important concepts beyond the simple question of who initially created the work at issue. As discussed below, the person who creates a work is not necessarily the copyright owner. Many mistakenly believe that the creator of a work automatically holds the copyright. While this is often the case, exceptions do occur when an employee creates a work in the course of his or her employment, or if an independent contractor creates a work "made for hire." Moreover, if more than one "creator" is involved, the copyright might be shared. Further complicating the picture, the original creator(s) may have transferred their copyright to another person or entity.
The following sections touch on each of these issues, as well as the advantages that come from registering a copyrighted work and providing copyright notice:
Copyright protection begins when an original work becomes fixed in a tangible medium of expression. (For more information on when a work is "fixed" and what qualifies for protection, see Copyrightable Subject Matter). As a general rule, the creator of the work (the author) owns the copyright.
You are the author of a work if you create something original, as opposed to merely copying the work of another. For instance, you are the author of a blog post when you put the story/idea/information into "expression" through words. In contrast, merely coming up with an idea does not make you the author because nothing has actually been expressed.
As the sole owner of a copyrighted work, you enjoy certain exclusive rights. However, if you collaborate with other authors to produce a final work, or if you allow another person to use copyrighted work in a collection of works, copyright law treats you differently.
When two or more authors materially contribute to a work, and each does so with the intent of creating a single work, the work is "jointly authored."
A "material contribution" must be independently copyrightable (i.e., original, fixed in a tangible medium of expression, not non-copyrightable material like facts or ideas). If you only contribute non-copyrightable elements, such as ideas and suggestions, then you're not an author.
For example, if a friend suggests a topic that you subsequently blog about, you alone own the copyright on the posting because your friend contributed nothing but non-copyrightable material (the idea).
As another example, let's say you work with a group of journalists and someone routinely edits your work. If the editor is only fixing facts or making minor grammatical changes, you are still the sole owner of the copyright. However, if the editor's changes are more substantial, such that he is contributing original content or points of view, the work might be jointly authored.
Finally, consider multiple individuals contributing to the creation of a website. One person does page layout, another handles graphics, and a third develops the underlying code. Copyright ownership will vest jointly in all of these contributors.
Your Legal Rights As a Joint Author
If you are a joint author, you hold an equal interest in the copyright with the other authors regardless of your actual contribution to the work.
Technically speaking, you hold an undivided ownership share in the copyright. An undivided ownership share provides nearly all the rights of individual ownership, while also sharing the value of those rights. As a joint author, you retain the right to reproduce the work, create derivative works, distribute copies of the work, and publicly display or perform the work without getting the permission of the other joint authors. Of course, this goes both ways, and the other joint authors may do the same. You can also transfer your undivided ownership share without seeking approval.
As a joint author, you cannot grant an exclusive license. Granting an exclusive license would directly harm the other joint authors, and thus you need their approval. See the section on Copyright Licenses and Transfers for more on the difference between exclusive and non-exclusive licenses.) However, you may grant non-exclusive licenses without approval from the other authors, which can lead to situations in which each author licenses the work to a different publisher.
Finally, as a joint author you share in the value created through performance, distribution, or licensing of the work. Because each joint author only has a share in the copyright, any value must be distributed equally to all joint authors.
What to Consider if You are Working with Other Authors
You don't have to be restricted by the rules of joint authorship detailed above. Instead, you and your co-authors can enter into a collaboration agreement (a contract) to alter your rights and obligations. A collaboration agreement defines the responsibilities, compensation, and control of each author. Collaboration agreements may also designate how credit will be presented (e.g. the list of authors) and may outline the approval process to license or transfer an author's rights. As an example of a collaborative agreement, see Hollywood Comics' template.
A collective work consists of smaller works that are independently copyright-protected. Whereas a work of joint authorship is a single copyrightable work with contributions that were not intended to stand alone, a collective work compiles constituent parts that do (and often were originally intended to) stand alone.
The person who assembles the collective work (the "collective author") owns the copyright to the selection and arrangement, but the owners of the copyrights to the underlying works retain their rights. See 17 U.S.C. 201(c), 17 U.S.C. 103(b).
Copyright law gives the collective author the right to reuse the underlying works in a subsequent publication if that subsequent publication is:
See 17 U.S.C. 201(c). If the collective author wants to include the underlying works in a different manner than the above three categories, she needs to get express permission from each copyright owner.
Some common examples of collective works are poetry anthologies, newspapers, magazines, and scholarly journals. In general, each discrete edition of the newspaper, magazine, or journal is a collective work made up of individual articles, some of which are written by freelancers. (For a discussion on the difference between the work created by a freelancer--or independent contractor--and an employee, see the section on Works Owned by Someone Else.) The freelancer owns the copyright to his individual contribution, and the publisher owns the copyright to the collective edition of the newspaper.
Generally, a publisher can reprint an article from one issue in a later issue of its newspaper or magazine ("a later collective work in the same series"). However, when publishers publish in new media, the legal issues get more complex. In one case, the New York Times digitized articles from its print edition, put them in a database, and made them individually available online. The Supreme Court held that because the online version of the articles were viewable individually, they violated the freelance writers' copyrights because they were were "disconnected from their original context" and did not replicate the original selection and arrangement. See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). On the other hand, the Court suggested that preserving the collective work through microfilm would be a permitted revision because the microfilm maintains the original organization, layout, and context of the collective work. Thus, a magazine publisher can distribute digital scans of their print magazines, since the resultant work uses the "almost identical 'selection, coordination, and arrangement' of the underlying works as used in the original collective works." See Faulkner v. National Geographic Enters., 409 F.3d 26, 38 (2nd Cir. 2005).
While most cases involve a collective work transitioning from print to digital publication, there is no reason to believe the same would not hold true in the opposite direction. Thus, if you created a web page of the most influential blog posts from 2001-2005, getting permission from each original poster to do so, you would need to retain the selection, coordination, and arrangement in order to also distribute a print version.
What This Means For You
When you allow someone else to use your work in their collective work, you are not giving the collective author the rights to do whatever she wants. If you are compiling a collective work, the permission an author gives you to use a work in your collective does not give you free reign to use that work as you please. You should pay particular attention to these points if you are publishing or distributing in multiple mediums. If you have a particular concern about how, where, and when works may be used, be proactive and ensure those details are finalized in a written contract. See the sections on Copyright Licenses and Transfers and Getting Permission to Use the Work of Others for more information.
In general, if you create a work, you are the copyright owner of the work. However, if you create a work for hire, copyright law recognizes the person who hires you as the owner of the work. Your work may be a work for hire if you create it as an employee or as an independent contractor (a freelancer). However, if you are an independent contractor, the law makes it harder for the hiring party to obtain the copyright ownership of your work. While we discuss the work for hire doctrine below, you may wish to also consult Keep Your Copyright's excellent resource on Works for Hire for more information.
Employee
Your work falls under the work for hire exception if you create it in a conventional employment setting. For example, if you write blog posts as part of your job responsibilities, your employer owns the copyright to those posts.
However, determining whether an employee creates a work in the
scope of employment is not always so straightforward. For example, if
you write a screenplay during your lunchtime, you own the copyright to
the screenplay. As another example, a university professors, despite
being an employee of the university, owns the copyright to her
textbooks, scholarly articles, and blog posts. (See Columbia
University's copyright policy and Trinity University's copyright policy as examples of how educational institutes are following this practice.)
Independent Contractor
Your work may also fall under the work for hire exception when you create it as a freelancer, if:
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The person who hired you as an independent contractor owns the copyright to the work only if these two conditions are met. Otherwise, copyright ownership remains with you. Therefore, as a freelancer, you own the copyright to your work unless you sign a contract explicitly designating it as a work for hire. This gives freelancers a considerable amount of bargaining power in negotiating the terms for a commissioned work.
Issues to Consider
The work for hire area is complex. Whether someone is an employee or independent contractor often turns on specific factual circumstances, and includes a discussion on factors outlined in the business section on Employee Versus Independent Contractor. Additionally, whether a work fits into one of the above nine categories hinges on sometimes difficult distinctions. You should safeguard against any future misunderstandings by being clear about your relationship in writing.
For example, if you're contemplating a situation in which the person hiring you will own the copyright to your work (which falls into one of the nine categories), not only should you add express language about the work being "made for hire", but you should also consider bargaining for additional compensation due to giving up your copyright ownership.
On the flip side, if you are commissioning someone to make a work "made for hire," make sure that the work fits into one of the nine categories listed above. If the work clearly does not fit into one of those categories, consider having the freelancer assign the copyright to the work to you as part of the agreement, or adjust the payment to reflect your lack of copyright ownership.
You may want to consult a lawyer before entering into an relationship where you will be creating works for someone else or hiring someone to create work for you. Refer to the section on finding legal help to explore your choices.
Although you do not need to use a copyright notice or register your work in order to hold a copyright in the work, notice and registration give you a number of benefits, which we discuss below. (For more information on the basic requirements of copyright ownership, see the section on Copyright Ownership in this guide.)
By putting a copyright notice on your work, you inform the public that your work is protected by copyright. Notice allows someone to contact you for permission to use your work. Notice also limits the ability of someone who infringes your work to claim they didn't know of the copyright's existence.
A copyright notice of must be affixed (or must exist in a place) so that it “give[s] reasonable notice of the claim of copyright.” A notice of copyright typically includes the copyright symbol, ©, the year of first publication, and the name of the owner of the copyright. For example, © 2008 Berkman Center for Internet & Society.
The copyright symbol may be replaced by the word “Copyright” or the abbreviation “Copr.” For example, Copyright 2008 Citizen Media Law Project and respective authors.
You do not need to register your work before putting notice on it. Note that if your work is a sound recording embodied in "phonorecords", you will need to complete a separate form for copyright notice.
Copyright registration is not a prerequisite to copyright protection. However, registering a copyright in your work with the U.S. Copyright Office provides the following advantages:
For more on why you might want to register your works, please see Sarah Bird's excellent post, Why You Should Go Through the Trouble of Registering Your Copyright When Everyone Tells You That Your Work Is Protected Automatically.
Bear in mind that when you register a work, the Copyright Office does not validate the accuracy of your copyright claim. Also, registration (and copyright law in general) does not protect against similar, independently created works. A person can create a work that is substantially similar to yours without legal ramifications, so long as that person created the work without any reliance on your work (i.e., never read, saw, heard about it, etc.).
Registering Online WorksOnline works (including web pages) provide a unique challenge for those wishing to register their work. Online works are typically updated frequently, with content changing regularly. Unfortunately, under copyright law, each substantially updated version (or, in legal terminology, derivative work) must be registered separately. For more details on the registration of online works, see the U.S. Copyright Office's Circular #66: Copyright Registration for Online Works.
The U.S. Copyright office does, in some instances, provide the ability to register copyrights in a group (i.e., a single registration covering multiple versions). Specifically, you can register an automated database, a serial (published weekly or less often), and a newsletter (published more often than weekly) to get protection for multiple versions. Some web sites have registered under these classifications, but it remains to be seen if/how the contents will be protected. For more details on these alternative types of registration, see the U.S. Copyright Office's Circular #62: Copyright Registration for Serials and Circular #62a: Group Registration of Newspapers and Newsletters on Form G/DN.
How to RegisterThe process of registering a copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office is relatively straightforward. Sarah Bird at Seomoz.org has a fantastic resource on Sample Forms and Strategies for Registering your Online Content.
There are four basic steps to the registration process:
1. Determine which form to use and fill it outNote: For compilations, use the form that best fits the majority of the work.
2: Determine how many copies are needed
As part of the Copyright Office's new "Electronic Copyright Office" ("eCO") system, certain works can now be uploaded instead of physically mailed when registered online. For more on this process, visit the eCO page.
Note: copies are non-returnable.
3. Pay the fee
4. Mail the package
The mailing address is:
Library of Congress Copyright Office
101 Independence Avenue, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20559-6000
A broad array of creative, expressive media are subject to copyright protection, including literature, photographs, music compositions and recordings, films, paintings and sculptures, and news articles – any “original work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102. For more information on copyright creation and ownership see the Copyright Ownership section of this legal guide.
If you are the copyright owner of a work (and you likely will be if you created the work), such as an article, a blog post, a photograph, or a video, you can authorize others to use it. You can do this by transferring to the person or entity that wants to use your work any or all of your rights as a copyright owner, or any subdivision of those rights. Alternatively, you can license any or all of those rights (or any subdivision of them) to that person or entity.
As the person granting the transfer or license, you have a
great deal of freedom in how to structure the transaction. How you
choose to do so can have a substantial impact on your ability to make
money from the work, the amount of control you retain over it, and the
costs associated with the transaction. Often, it will make sense to
hire a lawyer in order to deal with such a transaction because of the
complexity of the subject-matter, the potential flexibility of the
transaction, and the potentially high stakes. On the other hand, there
are three models or approaches that generally do not require the
assistance of a lawyer: an "all rights reserved" approach, using a
Creative Commons license, and a dedication to the public domain.
Whether one of these three approaches or some other approach is best
for you is a matter of personal preference. In the discussion that
follows, we go into more detail to give a sense of the issues involved
and to explain how you can effectively transfer or licensing your work.
The decision about whether and how to license or transfer your work
will depend on your own personal preference. There are a number of
factors that you may want to consider in reaching your decision,
including the potential for making money from the work, the extent of
control retained over the work, the costs involved in the
licensing/transfer transaction, and the permanence of the measure.
These and other issues are addressed below.
One obvious benefit to licensing/transfer is that people or businesses may be willing to pay you for use of your work. In some instances, this payment can be a significant source of income and may help support your project or website as well. In the How to Effectively Transfer or License Your Work section, we discuss three models for licensing/transferring your content: an "all rights reserved" model, using a Creative Commons (CC) license, and dedicating your work to the public domain. The most direct way of seeking revenue from exploitation of a work is to reserve all rights with respect to the public at large and then to pursue selective licensing or transfer deals in exchange for money. This is because granting a CC license to the public does not involve payment in return, although it does not rule out granting other licenses in exchange for money, and a public domain dedication obviously gives up all your rights to exploit the work. In contrast, if you are interested in contributing to, or gaining extra exposure in, an artistic, intellectual, business, or other community (perhaps with indirect financial benefits), a CC license or public domain dedication might be more appropriate.
One thing to keep in mind is that a full transfer of your rights will probably fetch more money in the short term than a non-exclusive license, but this comes with a corresponding sacrifice in terms of control of the work and personal exploitation.
Another thing to consider is whether your goals in relation to your work may change over time. Your aim now might be to gain exposure, but you might wish to commercialize your work down the line. Granting broad permission for others to freely use your work (through a CC license or similar) now may curtail your ability to commercialize the same work in the future.
Retaining control of your workRetaining control of your work is another significant issue. The important thing to remember in this regard is that you are not presented with an "all or nothing" scenario. You have significant freedom in how you structure your transfer or license, and the amount of control you retain is largely up to you. For details, please see the Which Rights Can Be Transferred or Licensed section.
For those seeking more control, an "all rights reserved" model combined with selective licensing transactions may be the best route, but this may necessitate the help of a lawyer specializing in intellectual property licensing. A CC license offers slightly less control (because the license is given to the public at large and generally allows sub-licensing on the same terms), but it is much lower cost because the entire process is automated on the CC website. That said, you still retain significant control with a CC license. For instance, you can grant the public a license to copy and distribute your work, but bar them from making derivative works (adaptations) of it or using it for commercial purposes. For more on what constitutes a "commercial use" and a "non commercial use," please see CC's Discussion Draft Noncommercial Guidelines.
Are there any costs involved?Different costs are involved based on which approach you take. For instance, granting a CC license to the public is free, but you will not make money directly from the license. Because a CC license is non-exclusive, you can still enter into one-on-one transactions for money, but these are more complex and likely require the assistance of a lawyer, which is expensive. Registering the transfer with the Copyright Office, an optional step which some copyright transferors take to protect their interests, also carries a fee (see Copyright Office Fees). Likewise, reserving your rights with regard to the public at large and transferring or licensing your rights in one-on-one transactions for money is likely to be expensive for the same reasons. You can dedicate your work to the public domain at no cost, but by doing so you give up all control and prospect of future remuneration.
If I transfer or license my work, is this permanent?Not necessarily. The length of time that a grant lasts will depend on the transfer or license arrangement you enter into. For instance, you can grant a transfer or license your rights in relation to your work for a specified duration of time (see the Which Rights Can Be Transferred or Licensed section). If you do not specify an end date in the executing document, or even if you if specify that the transfer or license is permanent and irrevocable, under the Copyright Act the grant is generally terminable by your (or your successors) within a five year window starting 35 years after the execution of a grant (see the Terminating a Transfer or License section).
It is also worth noting that if you grant a non-exclusive license to a person, and do not receive "consideration" (payment or some other kind of benefit in exchange for the grant) from them, this license is revocable (see the How to Effectively Transfer or License Your Work section).
How this all works with a CC license is not 100% clear. All varieties of CC license have a clause saying that the license grant is non-revocable. According to the CC FAQ:
This means that you cannot stop someone, who has obtained your work under a Creative Commons license, from using the work according to that license. You can stop distributing your work under a Creative Commons license at any time you wish; but this will not withdraw any copies of your work that already exist under a Creative Commons license from circulation, be they verbatim copies, copies included in collective works and/or adaptations of your work.
It is not entirely clear whether the contractual language purporting to make the license non-revocable would stand up to a legal challenge based on the automatic termination right granted by the U.S. copyright law or the argument that a CC license is a non-exclusive license made without consideration. In any event, it is probably safest to assume that a CC license is permanent, so you should think very carefully about whether or not you are happy with the public making use of your work in the way described in the license.
If I license or transfer my work, does it affect what I can do with the work?It depends. If you transfer all or one of your rights to someone else, then you may no longer exercise those rights. If you grant an exclusive license to someone with regard to a particular right or group of rights, then you are similarly prohibited from exercising those rights. But if you grant a non-exclusive license to someone else to exercise a right or group of your rights, then you are free to continue exercising the right or group of rights and authorizing others to do so. A CC license is a non-exclusive license, so granting the public a CC license does not affect your ability to use your work. For more information on what constitutes a "transfer," an "exclusive license," and a "non-exclusive license," please see the Understanding the Difference Between a Transfer and a License section.
Can others use my copyrighted work without being granted a license or transfer?Yes. United States copyright law allows others to make "fair use" of your work without permission. Under the fair use doctrine, third parties are permitted to use your copyrighted work without your permission for limited and "transformative" uses, including criticism, commentary, news reporting, parody, and teaching. For example, if a blogger quotes a paragraph from an article or post on your website and compares your opinion with that of other commentators, this is likely permitted by the fair use doctrine without a license. Nevertheless, fair use is a notoriously fact-sensitive defense to a copyright claim, and it is difficult to determine beforehand whether a particular use is a fair use. See the Fair Use section for more details. For this reason, many people may prefer to seek out a license before engaging in a use that might be a "borderline" fair use. When you grant someone permission to use your work via transfer or licensing, the idea is that you are permitting them to engage in a use that would not be "fair" under the law.
A transfer of copyright is a conveyance of ownership, much like the sale of personal property. When you transfer your entire interest in a copyrighted work, or one or more of your exclusive rights under copyright, you give up all claim to the right(s) you convey (except as explained in the Termination of a Transfer or a License section). The recipient of the transfered right(s) may:
A license is a grant of permission to exercise your rights under copyright. In copyright terminology, there are "non-exclusive" and "exclusive" licenses. When you give someone a non-exclusive license, you give the licensee permission to exercise the right in question, but you also reserve the right to continue exercising it yourself and to authorize others to do so. When you give someone an exclusive license, you promise that the licensee and only the licensee may exercise the right. This means that when you grant an exclusive license, even you may not exercise the granted right, nor may you authorize anyone else to do so.
Copyright law treats an exclusive license like a transfer. Therefore, the recipient of an exclusive license to a right or right(s) may:
The recipient of a non-exclusive license may exercise the right or rights licensed, but MAY NOT:
If you are the copyright owner of a work, you can transfer, or license others to exercise, some or all of the rights listed in Section 106 of the Copyright Act. These include:
For instance, say that you've uploaded an e-book that you have written to your website in PDF format. You could grant a user of your website permission to download and make copies of this book, but prohibit him or her from distributing your e-book to other people.
You can further limit the rights granted based on type of media, geographical effect, and time (among other possible criteria). Three illustrative examples follow.
The particular examples given above are not important, nor necessarily representative of all the possibilities. The point is that you have many options in how you choose to define the rights that you transfer or license. Because of this flexibility, crafting a license can be complex and may require the assistance of a lawyer to draft terms that reflect your specific preferences as to how other people use your work. On the other hand, a Creative Commons license gives you a great deal of flexibility in terms of choosing which rights to grant others and which to withhold, without the complexity of drafting your own agreement or the expense of hiring a lawyer.
Note: You can transfer (or grant an exclusive license to) all of the Section 106 rights together. By doing this, you transfer ownership of the "copyright" itself -- i.e., all rights in the work, except for the right of termination.
Below are three models or approaches to transferring or licensing your work that are relatively straightforward and therefore can be accomplished without the assistance of a lawyer. One caveat is that the first approach, the "all rights reserved" model, could be used in conjunction with sophisticated transfer/licensing transactions on a case-by-case basis, in which case the assistance of a lawyer would be more indispensable.
You might decide that, although you want to display your work online and/or distribute it to your users, you do not want to grant to those users any rights beyond those necessary for their personal consumption of your work. In that case, you could adopt the "all rights reserved" model. This approach is not really a transfer or a license -- rather it is an effort to limit the scope of the implied license you give to your users when you post and/or distribute your work.
All you need to do is affix the standard copyright notice to each page of your website (and/or to any other materials you distribute) and add a short statement indicating that you intend to reserve all your rights. For instance, you may affix to each page of your website the following statement: "Copyright © [Year], [your name or name of applicable entity], all rights reserved." If you are distributing a podcast, you might want to include a short statement at the beginning of the podcast indicating that you "reserve all rights" in it. As a general matter, you may want to alter the rights reservation statement on your site to indicate that you are reserving rights only in the content specifically created by you.
Displaying an "all rights reserved" notice will not prevent fair use of your work.
Note: the concept of an "all rights reserved" model is adapted from the Podcasting Legal Guide © 2006 Colette Vogele of Vogele & Associates, Mia Garlick of Creative Commons and the Berkman Center Clinical Program in Cyberlaw. This Guide was produced as part of the Non-Residential Fellowship Program of the Center for Internet & Society at Stanford Law School.
Creative Commons licenses give you the ability to allow some reuse and redistribution of your work by others without giving up all control. They are licenses that you grant to the public at large at no cost, and they specify to what uses the public may put your work. There are six main types of Creative Commons licenses to choose from, and they vary based on several factors, such as whether the licensee (the person to whom you give the license) can create derivative works (i.e., alter, remix, or build upon your work) and whether commercial redistribution of the work or its derivatives is permissible. They all require attribution - that is, the licensee must credit you as the author in the way you designate.
Note: the most recent 3.0 versions of these licenses are not specific about the form of attribution. As a matter of best practices, you may want to require that the attribution include the name of your site and/or organization and a link back to your site.
The process of choosing the license that fits your needs is automated on the CC website. Once you choose a CC license, applying it to your online work is simple. According to the CC FAQ:
Once you have selected your license, and if you are applying it to an online work, follow the instructions to include the html code in your work. This code will automatically generate the "Some Rights Reserved" button and a statement that your work is licensed under a Creative Commons license, or a "No Rights Reserved" button if you choose to dedicate your work to the public domain. The button is designed to act as a notice to people who come in contact with your work that your work is licensed under the applicable Creative Commons license. The html code will also be include the metadata that enables your work to found via Creative Commons-enabled search engines.
For an example of how this works, the Citizen Media Law Project (CMLP) has licensed the content of its website under a CC Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License, a notice about which is displayed at the bottom of every page of our website as a footer. It allows users to copy, distribute, and remix the CMLP's original content, so long as (1) it is attributed to the CMLP in the manner specified; (2) it is not used for a commercial purpose; and (3) adaptations are distributed under the same or similar license.
Before you apply a Creative Commons license to your website, you need to consider whether or not you are the copyright owner of the materials that appear on your website. You can only apply a CC license to materials that you have created or for which you have express permission of the copyright owner(s) to license under a CC license. If everything appearing on your website does not fit this criteria, you might consider applying a CC license to only some elements of your website, such as your text and photographic images, while not applying the license to other elements to which you may have a limited license, such as photographs taken by a colleague or ad-related material. In that case, it is critical that you identify which elements of your website are subject to a CC license and which parts are not. For a great page that discusses issues you need to think about before applying a CC license to your website or other copyrighted material, see CC's Things to Think About page.
One side benefit of using a CC license is that you can incorporate Creative Commons metadata into your website, allowing users to find your work through customized Creative Commons searches via Google or other search engines.
Licensing your work under a CC license does not preclude you from entering into a separate license agreement with someone else, for instance for using your work for commercial purposes. The details of such a license, including whether or not you could grant the licensee exclusive rights to distribute the work commercially, would depend upon what type of CC license you initially select. There are services such as Lisensa designed to work in tandem with CC licenses to display commercial license terms and automatically collect license fees. Lisensa, however, takes a 10% cut of all royalties and is also fairly limited in scope at the present time. You may want to consult a lawyer when dealing with the sometimes complicated intersection between CC licenses and commercial licenses.
For more detail on what constitutes a "commercial use" and a "non commercial use," please see CC's Discussion Draft Noncommercial Guidelines.
You may wish to dedicate all of your rights of copyright ownership in a work to the public. The public domain model could also be described as a "no rights reserved" model. You can do this by simply be putting a dedication notice on the work with language like "This work to which I own copyright is hereby released into the public domain" or "Everything on this site to which I/we own copyright is hereby released into the public domain." Alternatively, you can use a Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication.
The two sections listed below are mostly of academic interest if you choose one of the three models mentioned above, but they may be of more assistance if you choose to pursue transfer or licensing deals on a case-by-case basis. They give details about the formal requirements for a valid transfer or licensing contract, as well as information about the circumstances under which a copyright owner is entitled to terminate a transfer or license. These summaries of the law necessarily reduce some of the complexities involved, and readers are advised to consult with a lawyer when presented with issues of formal validity, consideration, and termination/revocation.
Transfers and Exclusive Licenses
A transfer or exclusive license of any or all rights under copyright must be in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed (or the owner's duly authorized agent). The writing should describe the nature of the rights conveyed. As a copyright owner, you should specifically carve out any rights that you wish to retain in the work, especially with regard to exploitation of the work in new media or technological formats developed in the future. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 204(a).
The U.S. Copyright Office does not have any special forms for the contract through which you transfer right(s). Copyright law provides for the recordation of transfers of copyright ownership in the Copyright Office. Although recordation is not required to make a valid transfer between the parties, it provides certain legal advantages, and may be required to validate the transfer as against third parties. For more information on recordation of transfers and other documents related to copyright, see the Copyright Office's Circular 12: Recordation of Transfers and Other Documents.
Writing is not required for a non-exclusive license, because by defining a "transfer of copyright ownership" to exclude non-exclusive licenses, 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101 relieves non-exclusive license from the operation of U.S.C. Sec. 204(a). The grant of a non-exclusive license can be oral or inferred from conduct.
No writing is required for transfers of copyright "by operation of law." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 204(a). The Act does not specify what is meant by "by operation of law", but in general a copyright is conveyed "by operation of law":
Copyright is a personal property right, and it is subject to the various state laws and regulations that govern the ownership, inheritance, or transfer of personal property, as well as terms of contracts or conduct of business. For information about relevant state laws, consult an attorney.
Non-exclusive Licenses
Non-exclusive licenses do not require a writing in order to be valid, and the existence of a licensing arrangement can even be implied from conduct (an "implied license"). Your conduct may give rise to an implied license when it indicates that you intend to extend a license to those using your work, but you never agree to specific terms for the license. The user of your work acquires some right to use it, but only to the extent that you would have agreed to, had you negotiated an agreement.
Generally, the custom and practice of the relevant community or industry determine the scope of an implied license. For example, if you send a letter to a newspaper editor entitled "Dear Editor," under customary practice, the editor of the newspaper has an implied license to publish your letter in the newspaper. For more information about and examples of implied licenses in the Internet context, see Cyberspace Law for Non-Lawyers, Lesson 7 - Copyright 6.
Implied licenses may be important in situations where you hire a freelancer to create a work for you. Imagine, for example, that you hire a website designer to design your website. Neither of you knows much about copyright law, and you fail to agree (even orally) about who owns copyright to the designer's work. You would not own the copyright as a work made for hire because there is no written agreement (please see the Work Made for Hire section of the guide), but a court might still rule that you have an implied license to exploit the work for those uses reasonably within the contemplation of the designer at the time you both entered into the freelance arrangement (probably the right to reproduce and display the website, perhaps the right to create adaptations). Note that in this example, the web designer is the creator (and thus the owner) of the copyrighted work, and you are the person taking advantage of the implied license.
For another example, imagine that you prepare a weekly email newsletter that highlights your best postings for the week. This newsletter contains your copyrighted work (text, images, maybe video). If you email this to your subscribers, a court might find that you have granted them an implied license to share the newsletter with friends and colleagues through email forwarding.
As a general matter, it is a good idea to reduce a non-exclusive license arrangement to writing, just like an exclusive license or transfer. It helps you better protect your rights to the work, and allows you to structure your arrangement with licensees with greater clarity and precision. On the other hand, you might not want to bother users with a written license notice in the case like that of the email newsletter, so long as your subscribers' foreseeable uses don't particularly bother you.
Do I Have to Give or Receive Anything of Value to Make a Transfer or License Valid?In general contract law, the parties to a contract each have to give the other "consideration" in order to make the contract legally binding. "Consideration" is something that each party to a contract gives to the other party in exchange for that other party's promise or performance of the contract.
Transfers of rights under copyright, including exclusive licenses, do not require consideration in order to be valid. Therefore, while it is common for the transferee (the party obtaining the right or rights under copyright) to pay the copyright owner for the grant of rights, payment or other benefit is not required.
Nonexclusive licenses also do not require consideration in order to be valid. However, nonexclusive licenses are revocable (meaning the copyright owner can revoke the license at any time) in the absence of consideration. This means that, whether or not you set a fixed time limit for the duration of the non-exclusive license in the licensing agreement, you (as the copyright owner) can revoke the license at any point if you do not receive consideration for it. Conversely, if you (as the copyright owner) receive consideration in return for the grant of the license, then you cannot revoke the license unless you provide for revocation in the license agreement.
Note, however, that consideration for the grant of a license does not have to be something valuable, and it certainly does not have to be equivalent to the market value of the grant. Consideration is mostly a symbolic gesture. If the licensee gives up anything in exchange for the grant of the license, then that likely would qualify as consideration.
For works created after 1978, section 203 of the Copyright Act provides that the creator (or "author" in copyright terminology) of a work may terminate a transfer, exclusive, or non-exclusive license of any or all rights under copyright for that work during the five-year period:
To terminate a grant or license, you must serve notice of termination upon the grantee (the recipient of the transfer or license) or the grantee's successor in title (meaning the person or entity to whom the original grantee transfered his interest). The notice must be in writing and state the date of termination, which must fall within the five-year period outlined immediately above. You are required to serve the notice not less than two, nor more than ten, years before the termination date designated in the notice. Additionally, you need to file a copy of the notice with the Copyright Office prior to the termination date.
To be valid, a termination notice must comply with the form, content, and manner of service set out in the Copyright Regulations. You can find these regulations at 37 C.F.R. 201.10.
Joint Works, Works Made for Hire, and Deceased Authors
In case of a work of joint authorship, a grant executed by two or more joint authors may be terminated, pursuant to the section 203 of the Copyright Act, only if a majority of the joint authors who executed it agree to the termination. For more on works of joint authorship, see the Joint Authorship section.
When the creator of the work is deceased at the time of the five-year statutory period for termination discussed above, her successors in interest (surviving spouse and/or children; the executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee in case there is no spouse or surviving children) may exercise the right of termination. The rules governing who owns what share of the termination interest and who must agree in order to effect termination are complex, and a lawyer's help will usually be necessary under these circumstances.
Works that qualify as works made for hire are not subject to termination by the employee or freelancer. For more on works made for hire, please see the Works for Hire section.
Note: Non-exclusive licenses granted without consideration can also be revoked at will, but it may be difficult to determine whether valid consideration has been granted. See the Creating a Written Contract to Transfer or License Rights Under Copyright section for details.
When you use someone else's work without their permission, you face the prospect of a lawsuit for copyright infringement. Luckily, this unappealing outcome is not inevitable. Some awareness about copyright law, a little investigation, and a bit of flexibility can help you avoid claims of infringement.
First, you should consider whether the material you plan to use is protected by copyright. Many things are not copyrightable, such as facts and ideas, and therefore you can use them without worrying about infringement. Additionally, even works that qualify for copyright protection will eventually fall into the public domain after a certain period of time. For more information on this topic, refer to the section on Works Not Covered By Copyright.
Second, if you've determined that the material you wish to use is protected by copyright, you should consider seeking the copyright owner's permission to use the work. You will first need to identify the copyright owner, and then request permission for your specific use. If you are told that you cannot use the copyrighted work, this doesn't necessarily preclude you from using the work. You will not lose the ability to assert that your use is a "fair use" even if the copyright owner refuses to give you permission to use his work. See the section on Getting Permission to Use the Work of Others for guidance on how to do this.
Third, the doctrine of fair use may make it legally permissible for you to use a copyrighted work without permission for purposes such as commentary, criticism, parody, news reporting, and scholarship. Whether or not your use is lawful usually depends upon how different or "transformative" your use is from the original. Refer to the section on Fair Use for more information.
Fourth, rather than directly copy the work itself, you may decide to link to the material, if it is available online, is sufficient and thus avoid potential copyright infringment claims entirely. The section on Linking to Copyrighted Materials explores the legal issues that might arise from linking to or using a link to embed other online works.
Another issue you may face occurs when the work is protected by digital rights management systems (DRM) or some other technology that controls access to the work. You cannot circumvent these access controls without the permission of the owner of the copyright, and no fair use defense is available to you. We address these issues in the Circumventing Copyright Controls subsection.
If you are dealing with a work that contains a DRM system, or if the work is not in the public domain and you do not believe that the doctrine of fair use covers your use of the work, you will need the express and specific permission of the person who owns copyright in that material. We will discuss the process of getting permission to use someone's work from making informal requests to seeking formal licenses.
Finally, the section on Copyright Infringement goes through the elements of a copyright infringement claim and also discusses the intersection of plagiarism and infringement.
You may want to use or incorporate someone else's work into your own. While the works of others may be protected by copyright, there are a class of works that fall outside the scope of copyright law. The following categories of work are not eligible for copyright protection, regardless of when they were created and whether or not they bear a copyright notice.
Additionally, even works that qualify for copyright protection fall into the public domain after a certain period of time.
You can use facts in your online work without the fear of liability because facts are not protected under copyright law. As we explain in the section on Copyrightable Subject Matter, copyright protection applies to "original works of authorship." Although the level of creativity required to be "original" is extremely low, facts do not have the requisite level of creativity. For example, baseball scores, telephone numbers, dates of birth, and the number of people at a protest are noncopyrightable facts.
However, there may be situations in which a compilation of facts may be protected if the creator of the original publication selected, coordinated, or arranged the facts in an original way. For example, a sports almanac may arrange baseball scores in a creative way, a genealogy chart may arrange birth dates in an original way, or a cookbook may arrange ingredients in a creative and original way as part of its recipes. In each of those instances, the creator of the work would have a copyright in the creative arrangement of the facts, but not the facts themselves.
You can use any work of the United States Government because copyright law does not cover such works. Works of the United States Government include:
However, note that copyright law may protect works created by others that the United States Government receives by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.
While federal copyright law does not expressly apply to the works of state governments, state laws are similarly uncopyrightable. See Tim Armstrong's analysis in Can States Copyright Their Statutes? for more information. However, be aware that Oregon recently asserted copyright ownership "in the arrangement and subject-matter compilation of Oregon statutory law, the prefatory and explanatory notes, the leadlines and numbering for each statutory section, the tables, index and annotations and such other incidents as are the work product of the Committee in the compilation and publication of Oregon law." See our blog post, Oregon Claims Copyright in Its Statutes -- Well, Sort Of, discussing the validity of Oregon's copyright claim.
Copyright protection only applies to "original works of authorship" that are "fixed in a tangible medium of expression." Consequently, if you attend an improvisational speech that has not been notated or recorded, you may publish the speech in your online work without fear of liability. (However, you should cite the speech in order to avoid the taint of plagiarism.)
Copyright does not cover ideas, concepts, and principles themselves, only the form in which they are expressed. For instance, merely coming up with an idea does not make you the copyright owner because you haven't actually expressed anything. You become the copyright owner only when you put that idea into "expression" through words (e.g., in a blog post) or other tangible form (e.g., in a video, a photograph, or a podcast).
For example, Einstein's theory of special relativity is not copyrightable because it is an idea (or concept or principle). However, Einstein's article, "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies," in which he explained and expressed the theory, was copyrightable.
If you come across an idea/concept/principle, you can use it in your online work with out fear of liability as long as you do not use the form in which it is expressed (which may be copyrightable). However, you should consider citing to the source in order to avoid a claim of plagiarism.
In general, copyright does not protect individual words, short phrases, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; or mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listings of ingredients or contents. (However, copyright protection may be available, if the artwork of the symbol or design contains sufficient creativity.)
While copyright protection may not apply, be aware that trademark law protects certain words, short phrases, slogans, symbols, and designs. For example, trademark law protects the word "Apple," the slogan "Got Milk?" and the Nike symbol of the "swoosh." See the Trademark section for more information on using a trademark protected word, phrase, symbol, or other indicator that identifies the source or sponsorship of goods or services.
You can use any work in the public domain without obtaining permission of the copyright owner. A work falls into the public domain when the copyright term expires or, in the case of works published between 1923 and 1989, if the work lost copyright protection because the copyright owner neglected to take the necessary steps under then-applicable copyright law. Additionally, a copyright owner can directly dedicate a work to the public domain. This is done expressly, through language such as "Everything on this site to which we own copyright is hereby released into the public domain," or by using the Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication.
Determining whether any particular work is in the public domain is a complex task, and the answer often depends upon when the work was published, whether it was published with notice, and whether the copyright holder subsequently registered the work. However, there are some rules of thumb that will help you with this analysis:
If you want to go beyond these rules of thumb to understand more of the specifics, Cornell Law School has an excellent chart that shows when different types of works (published, unpublished, published outside the US) will fall into the public domain based on an analysis of pre- and post-1978 copyright law. Additionally, the Creative Commons' Podcasting Legal Guide has a terrific discussion on how to determine whether a work is in the public domain.
A word of caution about using public domain works. You should check whether a public domain work has already been incorporated into another work. Although the public domain portions of that new work are not protected, the author's new expressive content and selection and arrangement of the public domain work may be protected by copyright. Creative Commons' Podcasting Legal Guide gives two examples that illustrates this potential issue:
The policy behind copyright law is not simply to protect the rights of those who produce content, but to "promote the progress of science and useful arts." U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Because allowing authors to enforce their copyrights in all cases would actually hamper this end, first the courts and then Congress have adopted the fair use doctrine in order to permit uses of copyrighted materials considered beneficial to society, many of which are also entitled to First Amendment protection. Fair use will not permit you to merely copy another’s work and profit from it, but when your use contributes to society by continuing the public discourse or creating a new work in the process, fair use may protect you.
Section 107 of the Copyright Act defines fair use as follows:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include --
- the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
- the nature of the copyrighted work;
- the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
- and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
Unfortunately, there is no clear formula that you can use to determine the boundaries of fair use. Instead, a court will weigh these four factors holistically in order to determine whether the use in question is a fair use. In order for you to assess whether your use of another's copyrighted work will be permitted, you will need an understanding of why fair use applies, and how courts interpret each part of the test.
1. Purpose and Character of Your Use
If you use another's copyrighted work for the purpose of criticism, news reporting, or commentary, this use will weigh in favor of fair use. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). Purposes such as these are often considered "in the public interest" and are favored by the courts over uses that merely seek to profit from another’s work. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004). When you put copyrighted material to new use, this furthers the goal of copyright to "promote the progress of science and useful arts."
In evaluating the purpose and character of your use, a court will look to whether the new work you've created is "transformative" and adds a new meaning or message. To be transformative, a use must add to the original "with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. Although transformative use is not absolutely necessary, the more transformative your use is, the less you will have to show on the remaining three factors.
A common misconception is that any for-profit use of someone else's work is not fair use and that any not-for-profit use is fair. In actuality, some for-profit uses are fair and some not-for-profit uses are not; the result depends on the circumstances. Courts originally presumed that if your use was commercial it was an unfair exploitation. They later abandoned that assumption because many of the possible fair uses of a work listed in section 107's preamble, such as uses for purposes of news reporting, are conducted for profit. Although courts still consider the commercial nature of the use as part of their analysis, they will not brand a transformative use unfair simply because it makes a profit. Accordingly, the presence of advertising on a website would not, in of itself, doom one’s claim to fair use.
If you merely reprint or repost a copyrighted work without anything more, however, it is less likely to qualify for protection under this prong. If you include additional text, audio, or video that comments or expands on the original material, this will enhance your claim of fair use. In addition, if you use the original work in order to create a parody this may qualify as fair use so long as the thrust of the parody is directed toward the original work or its creator.
Moreover, if the original work or your use of it has news value, this can also increase the likelihood that your use is a fair use. Although there is no particular legal doctrine specifying how this is weighed, several court opinions have cited the newsworthiness of the work in question when finding in favor of fair use. See, e.g., Diebold, 337 F. Supp. at 1203 (concluding "[i]t is hard to imagine a subject the discussion of which could be more in the public’s interest”), Norse v. Henry Holt & Co., 847 F. Supp. 142, 147 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting "the public benefits from the additional knowledge that Morgan provides about William Burroughs and other writers of the same era").
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
In examining this factor, a court will look to whether the material you have used is factual or creative, and whether it is published or unpublished. Although non-fiction works such as biographies and news articles are protected by copyright law, their factual nature means that one may rely more heavily on these items and still enjoy the protections of fair use. Unlike factual works, fictional works are typically given greater protection in a fair use analysis. So, for example, taking newsworthy quotes from a research report is more likely to be protected by fair use than quoting from a novel. However, this question is not determinative, and courts have found fair use of fictional works in some of the pivotal cases on the subject. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
The published or unpublished nature of the original work is only a determining factor in a narrow class of cases. In 1992, Congress amended the Copyright Act to add that fair use may apply to unpublished works. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. This distinction remains mostly to protect the secrecy of works that are on their way to publication. Therefore, the nature of the copyrighted work is often a small part of the fair use analysis, which is more often determined by looking at the remaining three factors.
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
Unfortunately, there is no single guide that definitively states how much of a copyrighted work you can use without copyright liability. Instead, courts look to how such excerpts were used and what their relation was to the whole work. If the excerpt in question diminishes the value of the original or embodies a substantial part of the efforts of the author, even an excerpt may constitute an infringing use.
If you limit your use of copyrighted text, video, or other materials to only the portion that is necessary to accomplish your purpose or convey your message, it will increase the likelihood that a court will find your use is a fair use.
Of course, if you are reviewing a book or movie, you may need to reprint portions of the copyrighted work in the course of reviewing it in order to make you points. Even substantial quotations may qualify as fair use in "a review of a published work or a news account of a speech that had been delivered to the public or disseminated to the press." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985). However, substantial quotations from non-public sources or unpublished works do not enjoy the same protections.
4. The Effect of Your Use Upon the Potential Market for the Copyrighted Work
In examining the fourth factor, which courts tend to view as the most important factor, a court will look to see how much the market value of the copyrighted work is affected by the use in question. This factor will weigh in favor of the copyright holder if “unrestricted and widespread” use similar to the one in question would have a “substantially adverse impact” on the potential market for the work.
Although the copyright holder need not have established a market for the work beforehand, he or she must demonstrate that the market is "traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed." Ringgold v. Black Entm't TV, 126 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 1997). An actual effect on the number of licensing requests need not be shown. The fact that the original work was distributed for free, however, may weigh against a finding that the work had publication value. See Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000). Likewise, the fact that the source is out of print or no longer sold will also weigh in favor of fair use.
The analysis under this factor will also depend on the nature of the original work; the author of a popular blog or website may argue that there was an established market since some such authors have been given contracts to turn their works into books. Therefore, a finding of fair use may hinge on the nature of the circulated work; simple e-mails such as those in the Diebold case (discussed in detail below) are unlikely to have a market, while blog posts and other creative content have potential to be turned into published books or otherwise sold. In addition, the author of a work not available online, or available only through a paid subscription, may argue that the use in question will hurt the potential market value of that work on the Internet.
Assessing the impact on a copyrighted work’s market value often overlaps with the third factor because the amount and importance of the portion used will often determine how much value the original loses. For instance, the publication of five lines from a 100 page epic poem will not hurt the market for the original in the same way as the publication of the entirety of a five-line poem.
This fourth factor is concerned only with economic harm caused by substitution for the original, not by criticism. That your use harms the copyright holder through negative publicity or by convincing people of your critical point of view is not part of the analysis. As the Supreme Court has stated:
[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. Because "parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, destroying it commercially as well as artistically," the role of the courts is to distinguish between '[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement[, which] usurps it.'"Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92 (citations omitted).
The fact that your use creates or improves the market for the original work will favor a finding for fair use on this factor. See Nunez, 235 F.3d at 25 (finding fair use when the publication of nude photos actually stirred the controversy that created their market value and there was no evidence that the market existed beforehand).
In summary, although courts will balance all four factors when assessing fair use, the fair use defense is most likely to apply when the infringing use involves criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. In addition, some general rules of thumb can be helpful in analyzing fair use:
Publishing the Contents of Private Letters and E-Mail (including letters from lawyers threatening legal action): Fair use may protect the publication of the content of private letters and email, including communications from lawyers threatening legal action. As mentioned above, unpublished materials sometimes enjoy greater protection than published documents. Although an author may argue that the "unpublished" nature of his or her correspondence warrants a finding against fair use, such an argument carries weight only when the use involves a heretofore secret work “on its way” to publication, which is never the case for lawyers' cease-and-desist letters. Recently, two students at Swarthmore college posted an archive of internal emails among Diebold employees; an online newspaper linked to the archive in an article critical of Diebold’s voting machines. A court held that although the emails were not published, publishing them was nonetheless protected by fair use. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203. The court found that the important fourth fair use factor weighed in favor of fair use because Diebold had no intention of selling the archive for profit and therefore it lost no value when the archive was published online. The court also noted the students and newspaper use was intended to support criticism of the company, which was a transformative use under the first factor.
Copyright as a Tool to Silence Criticism: Sometimes, copyright owners try to use copyright law as a weapon to squelch speech that is critical of them or their works of authorship. For example, in Savage v. CAIR, a conservative radio host has filed a copyright infringement lawsuit against the Council on American-Islamic Relations for using excerpts of his radio show in order to criticize his rabidly anti-Muslim views and to call for sponsors to withdraw their support from his program. CAIR's use of these audio excerpts, and similar uses of copyrighted material in order to criticize a copyright owner, are almost certainly protected by fair use. As EFF argues in its brief asking the court to dismiss Savage's lawsuit:
The fair use doctrine exists precisely to prevent copyright holders from doing what Savage attempts here -- abusing a limited monopoly granted to encourage creativity to punish dissenters and to chill speech aimed at criticizing copyrighted works. For all his ironic appeals to the First Amendment, Savage asks this Court to punish CAIR for publicly criticizing the offensive content of his radio program. That CAIR's criticism might result in Savage losing popularity (and advertisers) is of no moment to either a free speech or copyright infringement analysis and indeed, should be expected in the marketplace of ideas that the First Amendment and Copyright Act strongly protect.
For another case involving an attempted use of copyright to silence criticism, see our database entry, ABC v. Spocko.
While there is no definitive test for determining whether your use of another's copyrighted work is a fair use, there are several things you can do to minimize your risk of copyright liability:
If you publish your work online, you are already in the practice of using links to enhance your content. The Web's basic architecture relies heavily on the ability of webpages to link to other pages to allow natural navigation between related content. It is hard to imagine the smooth functioning (or even continued existence) of the Web without hypertext links that act as a reference system identifying and enabling quick access to other material. Fortunately, courts generally agree that linking to another website does not infringe the copyrights of that site, nor does it give rise to a likelihood of confusion necessary for a federal trademark infringement claim. However, different kinds of linking raise different legal issues, and the law is not entirely settled in all of these areas. Moreover, some linking activities may expose you to liability for contributory copyright infringement or trafficking in circumvention technology in violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
Deep Linking: The most straightforward case is so-called "deep linking," which refers to placing a link on your site that leads to a particular page within another site (i.e., other than its homepage). No court has ever found that deep linking to another website constitutes copyright or trademark infringement. Therefore, you can link to other websites without serious concerns about legal liability for the link itself, with the exception of activities that might be contributory copyright infringement or trafficking in circumvention technology (discussed below).
Inline linking: Inline linking involves placing a line of HTML on your site that so that your webpage displays content directly from another site. We now commonly refer to this practice as embedding. For example, many bloggers embed videos from YouTube on their blogs to illustrate a point or initiate discussion. While there is some uncertainty on this point, a recent case from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that inline linking does not directly infringe copyright because no copy is made on the site providing the link; the link is just HTML code pointing to the image or other material. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (2007). Other courts may or may not follow this reasoning. However, the Ninth Circuit's decision is consistent with the majority of copyright linking cases which have found that linking, whether simple, deep, or inline, does not give rise to liability for copyright infringement. For discussion of these cases, see The Internet Law Treatise. In addition, merely using an inline link should not create trademark liability, unless you do something affirmative to create the impression that you are somehow affiliated with or endorsed by the site to which you are linking. Thus, embedding media in your online work should not expose you to legal liability, with the possible exceptions discussed below.
Framing: Framing refers to the practice of dividing a web page into multiple sections that use HTML code to pull content from different sources. The law should treat framing much like inline linking for purposes of copyright infringement (see discussion immediately above), but no case has considered the issue of framing in the context of copyright law. Framing potentially raises trademark problems. Depending on how you design your page, a user might be confused into believing that all of the source material is yours. Some plaintiffs have sued websites for framing under trademark and related areas of law, but most cases have settled and the law remains unclear.
The situation changes when you knowingly link to works that clearly infringe somebody's copyright, like pirated music files or video clips of commercially distributed movies and music videos. In this situation, you might be liable for what is known as "contributory copyright infringement." Contributory copyright infringement occurs by "intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement" of a copyrighted work. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd, 545 U.S. 913, (2005). As long as you do not know that a work infringes someone's copyright, then you cannot be held liable for contributory infringement for directing users to that work. On the other hand, it is not necessarily safe to simply claim that you "didn't know" when the circumstances make it clear the material you link to is infringing. Use your common sense. Fred vonLohman gives the following rules of thumb to help avoid contributory copyright infringement (specifically with reference to embedding videos):"(1) don't embed videos that are obviously infringing, and (2) consider removing embedded videos once you've been notified by a copyright owner that they are infringing." Relatedly, you may be able to protect yourself against claims of contributory copyright infringement by complying with the notice-and-takedown procedures of the DMCA. For details, see Notice-and-Takedown.
Linking also raises legal issues in connection with the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. Section 1201 of the DMCA makes it illegal to traffic in technology that enables others to circumvent technological measures put in place by copyright holders to control access to or uses of their copyright work. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b). "Trafficking" means making, selling, giving away, or otherwise offering these devices or tools to the public. You can "traffic" in circumvention tools simply by posting them on your website or linking to other websites that host them. For example, in 1999 a Norwegian teenager created a software program called "DeCSS" that allowed users to circumvent CSS, the encryption technology used by movie studios to stop unlicensed playing and copying of commercially distributed DVDs. A number of websites posted the source and object code for DeCSS on the Internet, and other websites linked to them. The Second Circuit held that hosting and linking to the DeCSS code violated the DMCA's anti-trafficking provisions, and that this application of the DMCA did not violate the First Amendment. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). This decision is controversial, and it is not clear that other courts would necessarily follow its reasoning. For example, one court has held that linking itself is not enough, and liability requires some more direct tie between the offending websites, such as receiving compensation in exchange for linking. See Comcast v. Hightech Elecs., Inc., 2004 WL 1718522 (N.D.Ill. July 29, 2004).
Given the uncertain state of the law, it is best not to knowingly link to sites hosting circumvention software. To be on the safe side, you should also remove user-generated content that links to such postings. This cautious approach may put websites that depend upon high levels of user interactivity in an uncomfortable position, as illustrated by the Digg.com user "revolt" in May 2007.
At some point you may want to use someone else's work. You should first determine whether the work is protected by copyright. Is the work copyrightable? Is it in the public domain? Is your use of the work barred by another area of the law such as trademark law? Keep in mind that a work doesn't have to have a copyright notice affixed to it to be covered by copyright.
Once you've gone through the above analysis and determined that the material you wish to use is protected by copyright, you should seek the copyright owner's permission to use the work. You will first need to identify the copyright owner, and then request permission for your specific use. If you are told that you cannot use the copyrighted work, this doesn't necessarily preclude you from using the work. You will not lose the ability to assert that your use is a "fair use" even if the copyright owner refuses to give you permission to use his work. For more on fair use, see the section on Fair Use in this guide.
In many cases you will be able to quickly identify the copyright owner of the work. For some works, however, locating the copyright owner becomes an involved process. As you research, keep in mind that you may need to contact more than one person to get the necessary permission. For example, if the work you wish to use is the photograph of a person, you should seek permission from the copyright owner of the photograph as well as the person in the photograph if you will use the image of the person for commercial purposes, such as advertising. See the section on Rights of Publicity for more information on this issue.
You will likely find information about the copyright owner by searching several places:
As you conduct your research, refer to the Copyright Office's excellent resource on How to Investigate the Copyright Status of a Work.
Once you've identified the copyright owner, it is time to actually make your request. Often, an informal approach (by emailing or phoning the copyright owner) will work. If you opt for the informal route, be sure to follow up in writing. In many cases, misunderstandings arise over the scope of permission, and you can avoid such controversies by being explicit about how you wish to use the work.
Alternatively, you can go the formal route and send a letter to the copyright holder. In addition, if you need to contact a copyright collective to request a license, you should follow the procedures specific to their organization.
Your request should include:
For example, Jennifer Kyrnin at About.com, Indiana University-Purdue University's Copyright Management Center, and the University of Texas' Office of the General Counsel have sample letters that you can use to create your request.
If the copyright owner gives you permission to use her work, you are nearly done. Your last step should be to keep a record of how you found the owner, and a record of the permission that she gave you. As the Copyright Management Center at Indiana University notes: contact information will help you if you ever wish to get permission from the same owner in the future, and a record of the permission will assist you in the event that any future disagreements arise over the scope of the permission.
You should record:
If you cannot locate the copyright owner, or the copyright owner's response includes a large fee or a flat out denial, then your remaining options are:
You may come across digital works that contain copyright controls, such as digital rights management (DRM) technology or a software copy protection system. As a general matter, you should not circumvent these copyright controls, or you may face civil and criminal penalties under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).
Some copyright owners embed a form of DRM into their digital work in order to control its use and distribution. Typically, copyright controls come in two flavors:
The DMCA prohibits circumventing access-control measures. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). For example, if you cannot watch a particular copyrighted DVD on your laptop because of an encryption system, the DMCA makes it unlawful for you to bypass this access-control measure. Access-control measures may also be found on eBooks, Internet streaming platforms, and password-protected sections of websites, among other things. Note that there is no ban on the act of circumventing copy-control measures, but it is illegal for anyone to provide you with the technological tools to do so. In any event, some copyright holders merge access-control and copy-control measures in the same DRM system, making it impossible to circumvent copy-controls (which is not prohibited) without circumventing access-controls (which is prohibited).
The DMCA also prohibits trafficking in devices or tools that help other people circumvent access-control and copy-control measures. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b). "Trafficking" means making, selling, giving away, or otherwise offering these devices or tools to the public. Beware: you can "traffic" in circumvention tools simply by posting them on your website or linking to other websites that host them. For example, in 1999 a Norwegian teenager created a software program called "DeCSS" that allowed users to circumvent CSS, the encryption technology used by movie studios to stop unlicensed playing and copying of commercially distributed DVDs. A number of websites posted the source and object code for DeCSS on the Internet, and other websites linked to them. The Second Circuit held that hosting and linking to the DeCSS code violated the DMCA's anti-trafficking provisions, and that this application of the DMCA did not violate the First Amendment. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). This decision is controversial, and it is not clear that other courts would necessarily follow its reasoning. Nevertheless, it illustrates how risky it is to host or even link to devices or tools that enable others to break access- and copy-controls.
Fair use is not a defense to a prohibited act of circumvention or trafficking. It does not matter that you or someone else has to circumvent DRM in order to make fair use of a copyrighted work. This is one of the reasons that the DMCA is so controversial.
There are, however, several exemptions built into the DMCA that permit the circumvention of access- and copy-control measures for limited purposes or the limited distribution of circumvention tools in particular circumstances. In addition, the DMCA directs the Librarian of Congress, upon the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, to publish a list of classes of works to be exempted from the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. The Librarian makes the determination of which classes of works to exempt based on a determination, made pursuant to a complex rule-making process, that fair use of a particular class of works is likely to be adversely affected by the anti-circumvention provisions of the law. The best known current exemption is for "computer programs in the form of firmware that enable wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless telephone communication network, when circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone communication network." Memorandum of Librarian of Congress on 1201 Recommendations. This exemption apparently allows cell phone users to "unlock" their phones for use with other carriers, so long as this is the only motivation. The impact of the cell phone companies' user agreements on this exemption is still uncertain. For more on the story, see Wired's Legal or Not, IPhone Hacks Might Spur a Revolution.
The DMCA is complicated, and this page gives just a brief summary of the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions. For more detailed analysis, see the Chilling Effects FAQ about Anticircumvention and The Internet Law Treatise.
It is a widely held misconception that works on the Internet are not covered by copyright and thus can be used freely. This is not true. Copyright law applies to online material just as it does to offline material, assuming the prerequisites for copyright protection are met. Thus, if you use someone else's work, you could be liable for what is called "copyright infringement." Basically, copyright infringement exists if you exercise one or more of the exclusive rights held by a copyright owner. A copyright owner enjoys the following exclusive rights:
See Rights Granted Under Copyright for more discussion.
In order to bring a successful claim of copyright infringement in the context of copying on a blog or website, the plaintiff must generally prove:
If the defendant is found liable for copyright infringement, the copyright holder will be entitled to recover his or her actual damages (e.g., lost profits) or, if certain conditions are met, statutory damages between $750 to $30,000 per infringement. If the plaintiff can prove the infringement was willful, the statutory damages may be as high as $150,000 per infringement.
Defenses
There are three common defenses available to defendants who are faced with a copyright infringement claim:
Note that the infringing use of a copyrighted work cannot be cured by attribution (i.e. citing the copyrighted work). While citing to the original source is always a good idea, attribution will not protect you from a claim of copyright infringement.
Plagiarism is the act of using another's work and passing it off as your own. While such a use could open you up to a copyright infringement claim, there is no legal liability associated with the act of plagiarism.
Nevertheless, it is a good idea to avoid plagiarism. The best way to avoid plagiarism is to adequately cite your work. Depending on the nature of your online work, your citations can be informal in style, or adhere to the more formal citation conventions. See the University of Iowa's Guide to Citation Style Guides, and Yale College's guide to citing blogs for more information.
Since plagiarism and copyright infringement are similar concepts, a few examples may be helpful:
In 1998, Congress passed a controversial law known as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Through the DMCA, Congress attempted to adapt U.S. copyright law to the challenges posed by digital technologies and the online environment. Although the DMCA as a whole extended the reach of copyright law and is generally regarded as favoring the interests of copyright owners, it also created provisions limiting the liability of certain online actors. Section 512 of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512, contains the DMCA's "safe-harbor" provisions for online service providers. These safe harbor provisions shield online service providers, like ISPs, hosting providers, search engines, and website operators, from copyright infringement claims made against them based on the conduct of their customers or users. To take advantage of the safe-harbor provisions, online service providers need to implement "notice-and-takedown" procedures that call for expeditious removal of content upon receipt of a formally valid takedown notice from a copyright owner. The DMCA's notice-and-takedown procedures could impact your online publishing work in a variety of ways:
If you operate a website that hosts user content, you should consider implementing these procedures and taking the administrative steps required to enjoy safe-harbor protection. You are not legally required to do so, but it may help you avoid copyright infringement liability. The three main things you need to do to take advantage of the safe-harbor provisions are (1) designate a copyright agent to receive takedown notices; (2) adopt and communicate to users an effective "copyright infringement policy"; and (3) properly comply with takedown notices when received. For details, on please see Protecting Yourself Against Copyright Claims Based on User Content.
Alternatively, your content may be the target of a DMCA takedown notice sent to someone else. For example, a copyright owner might send a takedown notice to your hosting provider complaining that you are posting copyright infringing material and asking the hosting provider to remove or disable access to it. Or, a copyright owner might send a takedown notice to YouTube or another video-hosting service demanding that a video you uploaded be taken down. (Our database is filled with examples of this -- Universal Music Group v. Malkin, Creation Science Evangelism v. Rational Response Squad, U.S. Air Force v. Wired/Threat Level, to name but a few). Less commonly, you might even post something in user comments on another blog or website that elicits a takedown notice. The DMCA gives online service providers, like your hosting service, YouTube, and other website operators, an incentive to take down your material when someone sends a notice complaining about it, but it also enables you to send a "counter-notifice" to get your material put back up. Sending a counter-notice may result in the copyright owner suing you, so you will want to be sure that you are not infringing the complaining party's copyright before sending a counter-notice. For details on what to do if your content is the target of a takedown notice, see Responding to a DMCA Takedown Notice Targeting Your Content.
Finally, if you discover that someone else is copying or using your work in a way that doesn't look like fair use, such as by reprinting entire articles or posts without your permission, then you may want to consider sending a takedown notice of your own. For details on this and other strategies for protecting your work online, see Protecting Your Copyrighted Work Online.
If you publish or use the creative work of others, their trademarks, or certain confidential business information without the permission of the owner, you may be exposing yourself to legal liability for violations of intellectual property law. Fortunately, if you allow your site's user to post this type of content you can protect yourself from copyright infringement claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), as long as you establish effective "notice-and-takedown" procedures, promptly remove content when a copyright owner notifies you that it is infringing, and have no knowledge that the material in question is infringing. This page explains how this important law works.
Section 512 of the DMCA contains what are called the "safe-harbor" provisions for online service providers. These safe harbor provisions may shield you from liability for the copyright infringements of your site's users and for linking to copyright-infringing material from other online sources, as long as you establish effective "notice-and-takedown" procedures, promptly remove content when a copyright owner notifies you that it is infringing, and have no actual or effective knowledge that the material in question is infringing. Section 512 has a somewhat confusing structure; if you are interested in navigating the language of the statute, this paper from Fenwick & West LLP attempts to lay out the terms of section 512 in a more logical fashion.
You are not legally required to comply with the safe harbor provisions of section 512, but doing so may help you avoid copyright infringement liability. The sections below address those provisions of section 512 that may apply to you and discuss what you need to do in order to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions.
There are two safe-harbor provisions that potentially apply to your online publishing activities.
The first safe-harbor provision relates to materials posted to your blog or website at the direction of a user. This could include a file (e.g., a photograph, a film clip, an audio file) that a user posts to a comment section on your site or to a forum thread. (There are many other potential examples, the important thing is that the material is posted by another person, not you). This safe-harbor provision is found in section 512(c), and it states that, as the administrator of a website or other service, you will not be held liable for money damages for infringing content posted "at the direction of a user," as long as you
The second safe-harbor provision relates to links you post to other online material located elsewhere. This safe-harbor provision is found in section 512(d), and it states that an online service provider will not be held liable for money damages "for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link." (emphasis added). If you linked to material without knowing that it infringed copyright, the language of this section appears to relieve you of liability, as long as you
These safe harbor provisions could be valuable protections for you as a website operator, but in order to take advantage of them, you have to meet a few further administrative requirements.
Note: the existence of the safe-harbor provisions does not imply that you will be held liable for copyright infringement if you opt not to use the safe harbors. Rather, your liability will depend on the independent principles of direct and secondary infringement. For details, see the Chilling Effects FAQ about Copyright - What constitutes copyright infringement? and its FAQ about DMCA Safe Harbor Provisions - What is third-party liability, also known as secondary liability?
There are a few additional administrative steps that you need to take before you can enjoy the benefits of the safe-harbor provisions. These steps seem complicated at first, but in fact do not require a significant amount of effort or cost in order to comply with them. The steps are as follows.
1. Designate a Copyright Agent to Receive DMCA Takedown Notices
The U.S. Copyright Office maintains a list of designated agents to receive notices of claimed copyright infringement. This list enables copyright owners who believe that their work is being infringed to send complaints or "takedown notices" to internet service providers hosting or linking to the disputed material. You need to designate an agent, which can be you or someone else who agrees to do it, in order to take advantage of the DMCA safe-harbor provisions. To do this, you file an Interim Designation with the United States Copyright Office, along with an $105 filing fee.
2. Adopt and Communicate to Users a Copyright Infringement Policy
In order to qualify for the safe harbor protections, you must also publish a statement on your site giving notice to your users of your DMCA agent's contact information and your policies regarding copyright infringement and the consequences of repeated infringing activity. The notice can be a part of the website's terms of use or some other notice displayed prominently on the site. For more on terms of use, see the Terms of Use and Website Privacy section for details. The statement should explain that you respond expeditiously to notices of claimed copyright infringement andterminate users or account holders who are "repeat infringers." If you have no subscribers or account holders, your policy may state "If we become aware that one of our users is a repeat copyright infringer, it is our policy to take reasonable steps within our power to terminate that user."
You may want to include a statement detailing the proper form for a notice of claimed infringement, which must include:
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B) states that if a complaining party does not substantially comply with these requirements, its notice will not serve as "actual notice" for the purpose of Section 512. Your policy statement should also include a statement explaining the procedure for users of your site to make a counter-notification (discussed below).
3. Properly Comply with a Notice of Claimed Infringement When Received
You may from time to time receive a notice of claimed infringement from a copyright owner, alleging that content on your site infringes the holder's copyright. Such a notice must comply with the form outlined above. Once you verify that a copyright notification substantially meets these formal requirements, in order to qualify for the safe harbor, you are required to:
For information on the content of a proper counter-notice or if your content has been removed by your service provider as a result of a DMCA takedown notice, see Responding to a DMCA Takedown Notice Targeting Your Content.
The DMCA gets a great deal of attention in discussions of online speech, especially in technical circles. This attention is warranted, and vigorous debate about this controversial provision of the Copyright Act is necessary. But it is important to remember that other legal issues may also affect your online activities. The DMCA safe-harbor provisions apply only to claims of copyright infringement. They do not apply to trademark infringement claims, defamation claims, or claims alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, to name just a few of the possibilities. This means that you cannot insulate yourself from liability on one of these other claims simply by "expeditiously removing" the disputed content. In many situations, you may be protected by section 230 of the Communications Decency Act for publishing the statements of your users. See the Primer on Immunity -- and Liability -- For Third-Party Content under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act for details on this provision.
Website and blog operators get cease-and-desist letters based on non-copyright claims with some frequency. You should not assume that every threatening letter you receive is a DMCA takedown notice -- you need to look at the precise allegations and legal claims made in the letter and evaluate your next steps from there. It is not sufficient, for example, to conclude that a cease-and-desist letter relating to defamation or trade secrets law is somehow "defective" because it has not met the formal requirements for a notice of claimed copyright infringement under section 512. This will only muddle your thinking and could potentially exacerbate a delicate situation. For more on what to do if you receive a cease-and-desist letter, consult the Responding to Correspondence Threatening Legal Action section. For more on the confusion between other kinds of cease-and-desist letters and notices of claimed infringement, see our blog post, Not Every Cease-and-Desist Letter is a DMCA Takedown Notice.
This confusion may also work in reverse. There may be times when you receive a DMCA takedown notice for material that is technically not eligible for safe-harbor treatment, such as material you posted yourself. If it satisfies the complaining person that you take the material down, and you have no serious objection, you might want to do so.
It is becoming more and more common to embed videos from other online sources into an article or post in order to illustrate a point or get a laugh. This raises the question of whether you could be held liable for embedding an infringing video on your website or blog. The technical point to keep in mind is that an embedded video is just a link. So, there is no copy of the video being stored on your server, just the HTML code for the embed. Therefore, you may be able to claim the protection of the safe harbor found in 17 U.S.C. § 512(d), discussed above. For details see our blog post, Embedded Video and Copyright Infringement.
If your hosting service or other online service provider receives a DMCA takedown notice regarding your content, it ordinarily will respond by removing the complained-of material, and it will do this automatically without making any judgment about whether your content actually is infringing. However, the DMCA notice-and-takedown procedures provide you with protection from a wrongful claim of copyright infringement. The DMCA requires your service provider to notify you promptly when it removes any of your content because of a takedown notice, and you have the right to submit a counter-notice asking that the material be put back up. There is no specific time limit for submitting a counter-notice, but you should not delay unreasonably in doing so. If you send a counter-notice, your online service provider is required to replace the disputed content unless the complaining party sues you within fourteen business days of your sending the counter-notice. (Your service provider may replace the disputed material after ten business days if the complaining party has not filed a lawsuit, but it is required to replace it within fourteen business days.)
Before you send a counter-notice, you should consider carefully whether you are in fact infringing the complaining party's copyright. There are two reasons for you to consider this carefully. First, the counter-notice requires you to state, under penalty of perjury, that you have a good faith belief that your material was wrongly removed. You do not want to make this claim lightly because it might come back to haunt you. Second, if the complaining party has a good infringement claim, sending a counter-notice may trigger a lawsuit. If you are not prepared to stand up for your use of the copyright owner's work in a lawsuit, you should think twice about firing back a counter-notice. That said, copyright owners sometimes send bogus takedown notices that have no basis in law or fact, which are meant solely to intimidate the target. A prompt counter-notice can make these empty threats go away for good.
Some common bases for sending a counter-notice are that the complaining party does not own copyright in the work in question -- either because it is not covered by copyright or because someone else owns the copyright to it -- and that your use of the copyrighted work is a fair use. You should be extra careful when relying on a claim of fair use to justify sending a counter-notice. Determining whether something is a fair use often requires a complex, fact-specific analysis, and even lawyers have difficulty predicting what a court will say about fair use ahead of time. If you believe fair use might protect you, you should examine the four fair use factors carefully and consider contacting an intellectual property attorney.
To work effectively, your counter-notice must contain the following items:
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3). Chilling Effects has a great counter-notification generator to help you draft a valid counter-notice.
If you are not a U.S. resident, you must consent to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court in your counter-notice. If you never come to the United States and have no assets there, then this may not be a significant concession because a plaintiff would not be able to enforce a judgment against you in the U.S. Nevertheless, a plaintiff might be able to convince a court in your country to enforce a foreign (U.S.) judgment, and this proceeding might not give you the opportunity to make out your case. In any event, sending a counter-notice makes non-U.S. residents give up a powerful argument they would otherwise have -- namely, that a U.S. court does not have the authority to render a judgment against them. For these reasons, non-U.S. residents may not want to send a counter-notice unless they are willing to fight a copyright infringement claim in the U.S.
Section 512(f) of the DMCA creates liability for knowingly making false claims in a DMCA takedown notice or counter-notice. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). So, if you claim in a counter-notice that your content does not infringe the complaining party's copyrighted work while knowing this to be false, then the copyright owner can win damages from you, including court costs and attorneys' fees stemming from your wrongful counter-notice. Note, however, that this provision also works against a person or company sending a wrongful takedown notice. If someone claims in a takedown notice that you are infringing their copyrighted material while knowing this to be false, then you can win damages from them in a lawsuit. In recent years, the targets of wrongful takedowns have fought back and won damages and favorable settlements from individuals and companies sending bogus takedown notices. For instance, in Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004), two students and their ISP sued voting machine manufacturer Diebold after it tried to use DMCA takedown notices to disable access to Internet postings of the company's leaked internal email archive. The court granted summary judgment to the students and ISP on their claim, finding that portions of the email archive were so clearly subject to the fair use defense that "[n]o reasonable copyright holder could have believed that [they] were protected by copyright." According to the EFF, Diebold subsequently agreed to pay $125,000 in damages and fees to settle the lawsuit. For another example, see Crook v. 10 Zen Monkeys in our legal threats database. Someone who has sent a baseless takedown notice about your content may be more inclined to back off if you remind him or her about section 512(f) of the DMCA, in addition to sending a counter-notice.
Often, the best strategy for dealing with speech you do not like is through more speech, rather than resorting to threats of legal action. In some situations, however, more speech may do little good, such as when someone copies your work and publishes it on another website without permission. For instance, a recent post on MediaShift's Idea Lab blog asks "How Do We Deal With Stolen Content?". In that post, Gail Robinson, the editor-in-chief of Gotham Gazette, relates how the Gazette's technical director has found many sites reprinting the full text of Gazette articles without permission, often using them with little or no attribution and sometimes even making the articles look like original material. This post prompted us to think about strategies for citizen media creators to protect their online work from copyright infringement. The law provides you with several tools for protecting your work, including sending DMCA takedown notices to online service providers that host websites or blogs that copy your work. Despite the potential usefulness of these tools, it is important to use them judiciously to protect your rights without unduly chilling the speech of others.
We cover the basics of copyright law elsewhere in this guide -- see especially What Copyright Covers and Using the Works of Others -- but suffice it to say that copyright protects your articles, posts, photographs, videos, and other works of creative expression from the time that they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression (e.g., from the time you first type your words into your computer or save a photograph or video as a digital file). At the very least, other websites that post your articles or other work without permission are infringing your rights to reproduce (i.e., the right to make a copy) and distribute them. Before taking any action, however, you should consider carefully whether the other site's use of your work could be a fair use. Wholesale copying of your work will usually not be fair use, but selective quoting and paraphrasing may be permissible, especially if it is for purposes of commenting on or criticizing your work. For details, see the Fair Use section in this guide. You should also consider whether you have granted a license to the public to reproduce and distribute the work, such as through a Creative Commons license posted on your site. For details on licensing, see the Copyright Licenses and Transfers section and its subsections.
If you determine that someone is infringing your copyrighted work and that it likely is not a fair use, the most straightforward route is to look for contact information on the offending site or blog and write the person an email stating that the site or blog is infringing your work and asking for it to be taken down. Your email need not be long and complicated; you just need to state the basics facts (i.e., the website is using your copyrighted work without permission) and what you want done about it (i.e., take it down). The Chilling Effects Clearinghouse has thousands of copyright cease-and-desist letters in its database that you can use as models.
If contacting the infringing website operator does not work, you might have better luck with the company that hosts the website or blog. You can use a tool like Who is Hosting This? to help determine the identity of the host. A hosting service or other online service provider has an incentive to comply with a takedown notice because the DMCA safe-harbor provisions give it a defense to copyright liability if, upon receiving such a notice, it expeditiously removes infringing material posted at the direction of its clients. For details, see Protecting Yourself Against Copyright Claims Based on User Content. In order for a takedown notice to be effective, you must send it to the registered copyright agent of the host or other online service provider you want to contact. The U.S. Copyright Office maintains a directory of designated agents, and the provider's website will often list the designated agent in its "Copyright Infringement Policy," "DMCA Policy," or a like posting. In addition, a takedown notice must contain the following items in order to be valid:
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B). If your takedown notice meets these formal requirements, then the host or other online service provider has to expeditiously remove the complained-of material if it wants to maintain its immunity from copyright liability. After it does so, however, the person whose work has been taken down may send a counter-notice to the service provider. If this happens, the service provider will notify you about the counter-notice. From this point, you have fourteen business days to file a lawsuit and notify the service provider that you have done so, or else the service provider is obligated to put the disputed material back up. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2).
Note: If both the website operator and the hosting service are outside the United States, then you may not have luck via these routes.
Another strategy you can adopt to help protect your work online is to register your website content with the U.S. Copyright Office. Registration is most valuable, however, only if you would be willing to go through with filing a lawsuit. The good thing about registration is that, if you sue someone for infringement and win, then the court can award you statutory damages (damages that are set by statute, so you don't have to prove how you were actually injured, which can be hard) and attorneys' fees. In a sense, registering your work puts some teeth behind the letter-writing strategies discussed above. If you are interested in this route, please consult the Copyright Registration and Notice section of this guide and Sarah Bird's excellent posts about registering website content, Sample Forms and Strategies for Registering Your Online Content and Why You Should Go to the Trouble to Register Your Copyright When Everyone Tells You That Your Work Is Protected Automatically. Again, let me emphasize that registration really only helps if you are willing to sue, which many are not willing to do.
A trademark is a word, phrase, symbol or other indicator that identifies the source or sponsorship of goods or services. If an individual, business, or other organization uses a trademark to sell or promote its goods or services, then it can gain the right to exclude others from using the trademark in connection with similar goods or services. Owners of famous trademarks, like "Windows," "McDonald's," or "Google," may also stop others from using them in connection with even dissimilar goods or services. Trademark law is a branch of intellectual property law that is governed by both federal and state laws. By far the most important trademark law is the federal Lanham Act; because state laws generally follow the Lanham Act, this guide focuses on it exclusively.
A basic understanding of trademark law is important to your online activities for two reasons. First, as a provider of goods or services (e.g., online publishing, educating the public, newsreporting), you may want to use trademarks to identify your work to the consuming public. In that case, you'll want to understand how to protect your legal rights, so that others do not unfairly take advantage of your reputation and the positive association you've built up between your trademark(s) and your work. Second, you should understand how you can properly make use of someone else’s trademark for purposes of news reporting, commentary, and criticism. This overview page and the more detailed sections that follow will help you to understand both of these important aspects of trademark law.
Common examples of trademarks include "Yahoo!" in its characteristic red font, YouTube's slogan "Broadcast Yourself," and the venerable "New York Times."
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Many trademarks use a stylized font or logo, but a trademark can be as simple as plain text, such as "iPod," or a domain name, such as "hotels.com," so long as the trademark owner uses it to identify its products or services. Trademarks are not limited to traditional marks like text, images, or symbols, but can be anything that acts as a source-identifier for goods or services. Examples of such non-traditional trademarks are the color brown for a shipping company (a trademark of UPS), the sound of chimes for a television channel (a trademark of NBC), and the scent of plumeria for yarn. For more information about what can constitute a trademark, see the section on What Trademark Covers.
Not all trademarks receive the same degree of protection. They differ in strength according to their distinctiveness. Generally, the more unique or distinctive the mark is, the greater protection it receives. On a spectrum of decreasing distinctiveness, marks are classified as: (1) fanciful, (2) arbitrary, (3) suggestive, or (4) descriptive.
Fanciful marks (made-up words like "Kodak"), arbitrary marks (existing words used in a way unrelated to their common meaning, like "Apple" for computers), and suggestive marks (those that hint at a quality or aspect of the product or service, like "Coppertone") are considered inherently distinctive.
Descriptive marks, or marks that describe the product or service directly such as "The Container Store," are not inherently distinctive and require the showing of "secondary meaning" in order to be entitled to trademark protection. Secondary meaning is acquired when consumers associate a descriptive mark with a particular source. Marks that contain a person's name, such as "Dell Computers," or describe a geographic location, such as "Kentucky Fried Chicken," are also considered descriptive marks.
Lastly, a generic word can never receive trademark protection. A generic word is the common name for the product or service to which it attaches -- for example, calling an email service provider "email" would be a generic mark. For more information on the range of protectability of trademarks, see the section on Naming Your Business: Choosing a Name Capable of Trademark Protection.
There are two ways to acquire rights or "ownership" in a trademark. The first is by simply using the trademark in commerce in connection with your goods or services. Trademark rights acquired through use in commerce (so-called "common law" rights) are limited to the geographical area in which the trademark has been used or is reasonably expected to be used. This limitation does not typically arise when a trademark is used online because of its wide accessibility.
The second way to acquire rights in a trademark is through federal trademark registration. There are several benefits to federally registering your trademark. Perhaps most importantly, it puts others on constructive notice that you are using and claiming rights in the mark. This notice not only discourages others from using your mark, but also creates certain presumptions in your favor in the event of a lawsuit to enforce your trademark rights. Registration is fairly expensive, however, so you will want to consider whether the benefits of registration justify the expense. View our Trademark Ownership page for more information about obtaining trademark rights, registering a trademark, or protecting your rights once established. In addition, our section on Trademark Law and Naming Your Business provides specific information on choosing a name for your website, blog, or organization.
The primary goal of trademark law is to protect consumers from confusion about the source or sponsorship of goods and services. It does this by allowing a trademark owner to prevent others from using confusingly similar marks to attract customers. In other words, the law aims at helping consumers accurately identify the products and services that they want to buy and protects them from deceptive market practices. To illustrate, imagine a consumer - Sally. If Sally buys a new computer that is labeled with the distinctive Dell logo, she can be fairly sure that the computer was made by Dell, Inc. and nobody else. She can rely on Dell's reputation without worrying whether the computer was actually made by Dell or some knockoff, lower-quality company. Trademark law prohibits this kind of confusing commercial activity, and allows Dell to sue companies who engage in it for trademark infringement. In recent years, Congress has expanded the scope of trademark law to encompass harms other than consumer confusion, including dilution and cybersquatting, that we discuss below.
Federal trademark law protects against three distinct unlawful activities:
Although trademark law provides trademark owners with a powerful tool for protecting the integrity of their trademarks, the law does not permit them to silence legitimate reporting, commentary, criticism, and artistic expression. As one court put it: "Trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is communicating ideas or expressing points of view." L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,811 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1987). Because of the important role that trademarks play in our cultural vocabulary, "much useful social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, company or product by using its trademark." The New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992).
The good news for media creators is that the courts have careved out protections for the public's right to use the trademarks of others in criticism, commentary, news reporting and other forms of noncommercial expression. This point is of special importance not only to journalistic sites, but also to gripe sites that focus criticism on particular companies and often use the companies' trademarks in their domain names. However, while the law is solicitous of your rights of free expression, the legal doctrines in this area are complicated, and so it may be difficult to understand just how the law protects your use of a trademark in a particular act of reporting, commentary, criticism, and the like. If you want to make use of another's trademark in the course of these kinds of activities, you should consult the section on Using the Trademarks of Others.
Finally, if you host user-generated content, such as user comments, you'll want to consider whether trademark law will hold you responsible for materials posted on your website or blog by your users. Unfortunately, the protection provided by the "safe harbors" of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act generally do not protect you from trademark claims. For details, see Trademark: User-Generated Content.
This guide is not a full treatment of trademark law, but it does provide what we hope is a good understanding of how to deal with the legal issues surrounding trademarks. In the sections that follow, we lay out further specifics about the principles described above.
Trademark law applies to the use of words, phrases, symbols, slogans and other "marks" to identify the source or sponsorship of goods or services. The Lanham Act, which is the federal statute that covers trademark law, makes it unlawful for you to use a trademark in a manner that confuses consumers about the source or sponsorship of goods or services. Creating this kind of consumer confusion is called trademark infringement. Trademark law's primary purpose is to protect consumers from confusion in making purchasing decisions, and it does not protect against confusion generally. If you use a trademark in a way that does not create consumer confusion, you cannot be held liable for trademark infringement.
But, in 1996, Congress expanded federal trademark law so that it now covers some uses of trademarks that do not create consumer confusion. The federal dilution statute, found at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), gives the owner of a "famous" trademark the ability to bring a federal lawsuit against someone for trademark dilution. Trademark dilution occurs when someone other than the rightful owner of a famous mark uses it in a manner that diminishes its power to identify the trademark owner's goods or services regardless of consumer confusion about source or sponsorship. The dilution statute does not apply to noncommercial uses of a famous trademark, such as for news reporting, criticism, commentary, and parody.
The following sections go into greater detail to explain what kinds of things can serve as a trademark, and what activities qualify as trademark infringement and trademark dilution.
A "trademark" is an intellectual property right in a particular "mark" used to used to identify the source or sponsor of a good or service. (Don't be intimidated by the word "mark" -- it is just a generic term for the various things that can qualify as a trademark, which we are about to describe.) A number of things can serve as a trademark (from Chilling Effects):
Other types of trademarks are possible -- the key element is that the word, phrase, symbol, or design element act as a source-identifier for goods or services. You can think of it as very similar, if not identical, to the concept of branding. A trademark right is limited. It only applies to those goods or services actually identified with the trademark. A valid trademark entitles the trademark owner to stop others from selling similar goods or services using the trademark or confusingly similar trademarks; it does not entitle a trademark owner to completely lock up a word, phrase, or image and remove it from society's common vocabulary.
Common examples of trademarks include the word "Kodak" for cameras and the familiar Apple logo for computers, music-downloading services, iPhones (another trademark), and iPods (yet another). Other examples include the Nike "swoosh" for sneakers, the "golden arches" for fast food, the Starbucks mermaid for coffee, and slogans like "There are some things money can't buy -- for everything else there's MasterCard" and "Priceless" for credit-card services. A good example of trade dress is the the particular shape of a Coca-Cola glass soda bottle. On the Internet, trademark protection may apply to domain names, websites names, website logos, and the "total image" of a website, among other things. Again, the essential ingredient for trademark protection is that the name, phrase, symbol, or whatever serve to identify the source of a good or service. Some common Internet trademarks include the word "gmail" and domain "gmail.com" for email services, the domain "nytimes.com" for online news, the name "TechCrunch" for electronic publishing services, and the name "eBay" and its familiar logo for online auction services. In addition, website operators can protect the overall "look" of their websites as trade dress, if they can establish that consumers uniquely associate that "look" with their goods or services.
Not all words, phrases, symbols, and the like can serve as a trademark, however. The primary requirement for a valid trademark is that the mark be distinctive. For details on what kinds of words and phrases qualify as distinctive, see Naming Your Business: Choosing A Name Capable of Trademark Protection. Although the discussion focuses on names, the same points apply to other types of trademarks like symbols, words, and slogans.
For more information on registering and acquiring ownership of a trademark, please see the Trademark Ownership section.
Trademark law gives trademark owners the ability to bring a lawsuit for trademark infringement and trademark dilution. These two distinct legal claims are discussed below. Trademark law also creates a legal claim for cybersquatting, which is discussed separately in the Cybersquatting section of this guide.
An owner of a valid trademark may sue an individual or company for trademark infringement when that individual or company uses an identical or confusingly similar mark in connection with goods or services. The Lanham Act contains two statutory provisions authorizing an infringement lawsuit. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 gives the owner of a registered trademark the right to sue for infringement of that trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) gives the owner of an unregistered trademark the right to sue for infringement of that trademark. For details on how trademark ownership arises via registration and otherwise, see Trademark Ownership. A trademark owner that wins a trademark infringement lawsuit can recover money damages and get an injunction barring the defendant from continuing its infringement. A court may also force a losing defendant to pay the trademark owner's attorneys' fees under "exceptional circumstances" -- basically, when the court determines that the defendant willfully or intentionally infringed the trademark.
The key to an infringement claim is a likelihood of confusion between the defendant's use of a mark and the trademark owner's use of its trademark. While different courts use slightly different standards to make this comparison, the factors most commonly used to determine the likelihood of confusion are as follows:
The more similar the marks used, the more likely that consumers will be confused. In addition, confusion tends to arise when the plaintiff's and the defendant's goods or services are similar and they use similar marketing channels. The rationale is that, if the parties' goods or services are dissimilar, the ordinary consumer will not be confused about whether the goods or services come from the same source. For example, given the existence of Pepsi brand soda, someone selling soft drinks under a slightly different brand name, such as "Pipsi" or "Peps," would almost certainly lose a trademark infringement lawsuit. On the other hand, a company selling pet grooming services under the "Pipsi" or "Peps" brand name would be more likely to successfully defend against an infringement suit because ordinary consumers would probably not assume that Pepsi had moved into the pet grooming business. Needless to say, this example is a simplification of what you might see in a real case. The multi-factor test can result in complex line drawing, and it is often difficult to tell whether a certain use of a trademark will or will not infringe a trademark owner's rights. This is one of the primary reasons why trademark lawsuits are expensive to defend.
When it comes to online publishing, there are a few points to remember. First, a plaintiff cannot win an infringement lawsuit without proving that the defendant used a confusingly similar mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services. If you operate a purely noncommercial website (i.e., you do not sell any goods or services, and you don't host advertising or solicit donations in connection with your services), then you may be able to defeat a lawsuit without even getting to the likelihood of confusion question. We discuss this issue and other possible defenses to an infringement lawsuit in the Using the Trademarks of Others section.
Second, even if you do sell advertising or solicit donations, you primarily need to worry only about trademarks used by businesses or individuals doing work that is similar to yours. Before adopting a trademark (whether a domain name, a title for your blog, a logo, or whatever), you should look around at other websites doing work similar to yours to see if they are using the same or similar trademark. When you consider whether something is "work similar to yours," take a broad view. This could be anything from a journalism site, a blog, some kind of interactive web service, something tech-y with a heavy online presence, etc. Keep in mind that there is little certainty in this area, and you will just have to do your best in making the call. There is one important caveat. As discussed below, owners of famous trademarks can protect their trademarks with a dilution claim, even if there is no likelihood of confusion. So you may want to avoid using famous trademarks altogether.
Third, if you use a trademark owner's trademark in the process of criticizing, commenting, or reporting on the trademark owner, its activities, or its goods or services, you will have a good argument that no reasonable consumer would be confused into thinking that the trademark owner is the source or sponsor of your work. Take news reporting, it stretches credulity to imagine that consumers get confused about source or sponsorship when the New York Times reports on Wal-Mart's most recent earnings release or Ford's new hybrid car. The lack of confusion should be even more clear when it comes to criticism. For example, in Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005), the United States Court of Appeals held that there was no likelihood of confusion between a website criticizing the religious and social views of Reverend Jerry Falwell and the Reverend's own services, even when the website made use of the domain name "www.fallwell.com." The court noted, in relevant part: "After even a quick glance at the content of the website at www.fallwell.com, no one seeking Reverend Falwell's guidance would be misled by the domain name-www.fallwell.com-into believing Reverend Falwell authorized the content of that website. No one would believe that Reverend Falwell sponsored a site criticizing himself, his positions, and his interpretations of the Bible."
An owner of a famous trademark may sue an individual or company for trademark dilution when that company or individual uses its trademark in connection with goods or services in a way that is likely to dilute it. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). A trademark owner that wins a trademark dilution lawsuit can get an injunction barring the defendant from continuing its dilution, and in rare circumstances it can obtain money damages and attorneys' fees. To make out its case, the trademark owner need not show that the defendant's use of its trademark causes a likelihood of consumer confusion. The parties to the lawsuit need not be in competition, and the goods or services in question need not be similar. Importantly, the trademark in question must be "famous," which means pretty much what it sounds like. If an ordinary person would recognize a trademark as a household name, then it probably qualifies as famous.
There are two distinct types of dilution, blurring and tarnishment. Blurring refers to the loss of uniqueness of a trademark because of an association with goods or services other than those of the trademark owner. When Congress passed the statute, it indicated that the law would apply to the sale or advertisement of goods like hypothetical "Kodak Pianos," "Buick Aspirin," and "Dupont Shoes." Note that blurring can occur even if no reasonable consumer would believe that Kodak had started making pianos or that Buick had started making aspirin. Blurring is an extremely expansive concept -- it could encompass almost any unauthorized use of a famous trademark, so long as the defendant used the mark to identify its own goods or services, rather than to engage in commentary, criticism, news reporting, and like activities. Tarnishment occurs when the defendant's use of the famous trademark harms its image in the minds of consumes, such as by associating it with immoral or scandalous goods or services. For example, the lingerie seller Victoria's Secret sued a sex shop called "Victor's Little Secret" for tarnishing its famous trademark.
Because of the potential breadth of trademark dilution, Congress wanted to ensure that trademark owners could not use the law to silence speech protected by the First Amendment. To this end, Congress created specific exceptions to the dilution statute for the following uses of a trademark:
These exclusions provide a good deal of protection for citizen media creators, but the courts have yet to provide exact or consistent meanings for many of these terms, such as "fair use", "news reporting," and "noncommercial use." In the most favorable cases, courts have determined that the dilution law does not apply to any speech that does more than propose a commercial transaction. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.2d 894, 906-07 (9th Cir. 2002); Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. 1:06-cv-526-TCB, slip op., at 81-83 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 20, 2008). Under this view, you could not be held liable for using a famous mark in nearly all forms of criticism, commentary, parody, and news reporting. But not all courts have embraced this view. We take up these issues and other defenses to trademark infringement and dilution in the Using the Trademarks of Others section.
There are three ways to secure your rights in your trademark: (1) use the mark in commerce in connection with a good or service; (2) register the trademark with your state; or (3) register the trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO").
Once you use a trademark in commerce in connection with a good or service, you begin to acquire what are called "common law" rights in the mark, so long as it is not confusingly similiar to or dilutive of another's mark. The common law rights you gain in a trademark through use are limited to the geographic area in which you have actually used the mark, or those areas into which you have demonstrable plans to expand your use (the so-called "zone of natural expansion"). This limitation is less important for online ventures, however, as availability of your services over the Internet gives rise to a presumption of national trademark rights. It is important to note that if someone else is already using a confusingly similiar mark, you will be unabale to obtain rights in your mark and could potentially be liable for trademark infringement or dilution. If you intend to obtain rights in a trademark through simple use in commerce, then you must be sure to do an effective search of existing trademarks before you begin using it in connection with your good or service. Please see our section on Naming Your Business: Searching for the Trademarks of Others for details. For more information on how to acquire trademark rights, see Sarah Bird's excellent post, Trademark Basics: Be First in Your Market, Be Distinctive, and Don't Confuse the Consumer.
You may also choose to register your trademark with your state or with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, but you are not required to do so in order to bring a lawsuit to protect it against infringement or dilution. State registration is likely to be both cheaper and easier than federal registration, but is probably not the best option for online activities, which by definition have a national and international scope. However, if you would like to find out more about your state's registration process, you can contact your state authority responsible for trademark matters.
Registering a trademark with the USPTO puts the country on notice that you are using a certain mark, and also provides additional protections and procedural benefits if you need to litigate your rights. However, this process is fairly long (usually taking a year or more) and potentially expensive (the fees start at $275). We provide more information about the federal registration process below.
Benefits of Federal Registration
As noted above, federal trademark registration is not required for you to protect your trademark. However, registration provides some advantages. Specifically, registering a trademark with the USPTO provides the following benefits:
Because federal registration is expensive, you'll want to weigh these benefits against the out-of-pocket costs of obtaining a registration.
How to Register
Once you have decided to federally register your trademark, you can file the necessary forms to apply for federal trademark registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office online. The cost is between $275-375 per mark for each International Class in which you seek registration, depending upon the filing method you chose.
The USPTO estimates that filling out the form should take about 15-20 minutes, although first time filers are likely to take longer. A federal application must contain at least four things, in addition to the filing fee: (1) the owner's name and address, (2) a clear drawing of the mark (which can be automatically generated from text if you do not have a logo); (3) a description of the goods or services for which the mark is or will be used and the corresponding International Class number(s); and (4) the filing basis.
You can register your trademark for use in connection with more than one set of goods or services, but you will have to pay an additional filing fee if the goods and services you list fall into more than one International Class. The USPTO has available a searchable index of identifications for goods and services that they recommend you use for your application, but you can also type in something else if your product or service does not fit into one of these categories. If your business does not clearly fall within one category of goods or services, you may want to consider filing in more than one class, as this will would give you the greatest protection and flexibility. The downside to seeking registration in more than one class, aside from the additional filing fees, is that you are more likely to encounter a conflict with someone else who is using the mark or a similar one in another field or industry. Furthermore, if you do expand in the future, you can apply for a new registration at that time (unless someone else has already registered the mark in that area).
There are two different filing bases for a new trademark application: use based, or intent-to-use. If you have already begun using the trademark in interstate commerce, you should file a use based application. To do so, in addition to filling out the application, you must supply the USPTO with a specimen showing the mark as it is used in connection with your goods or services, as well as the date(s) on which you first used the mark anywhere and in interstate commerce. If you have not yet begun using the trademark, you should file an intent-to-use application. You will be required to submit a specimen and date of first use later in the application process before your mark is allowed to register.
If this process sounds too complicated for you, you can hire an attorney to do it. Trademark registration is usually fairly straightforward for attorneys who specialize in it, so it is relatively inexpensive.
Within about 3-6 months after you file the registration forms an attorney with the USPTO will examine and research your application. There are several categories of marks that the USPTO will refuse to register, including "immoral, deceptive, or scandalous" marks (such as those including foul language), those that disparage or falsely imply a connection to other people or entities, and marks that are confusingly similar to others that are already registered.
The USPTO attorney may contact you to resolve any issues in your application, by issuing what's called an "Office Action." If you receive an Office Action, you will have six months in which to respond to any issues raised by the examining attorney. If the issues raised in the Office Action are too complex, you may want to hire an attorney to draft your response.
If the USPTO approves your application, it will publish your trademark in the Official Gazette, and anyone who believes that they would be damaged by its registration (such as a senior user of a confusingly similar mark) will have thirty days in which to oppose registration of the mark. If no one opposes (or requests an extension of time to oppose) within those thirty days, the USPTO will either approve your mark for registration (if you have already submitted an acceptable specimen of use) or issue a Notice of Allowance (if your application is still based on an intent-to-use). If the USPTO issues a Notice of Allowance, you will have six months from the date on which it was issued to either submit an acceptable specimen, or request an additional extension of time in which to do so. You can request up to five 6-month extensions of time in which to submit a specimine of use. All told, the registration process can easily take 1-2 years, but once it is approved your rights date back to the day on which you filed your application.
For additional details on registering a trademark, see the Chilling Effects FAQ on Trademark.
Trademark rights can last indefinitely so long as the trademark owner continues to use the mark in commerce to identify goods or services. The term of a federal trademark registration is 10 years, with 10-year renewal terms upon filing an affidavit of continued use, along with a specimen of use. In addition, between the fifth and sixth years after the date of initial registration, the registrant must file an additional affidavit confirming that the mark is still in use in commerce in order to maintain the registration. If no affidavit is filed, the registration is canceled. At this time, if the mark has been in continuous use in interestate commerce for five years following the date of registration, the owner can file an affidavit of incontestibility that, if accepted by the USPTO, will significantly narrow the grounds upon which a third party can seek to have the registration cancelled.
In addition to renewing your registration (should you choose to register), you need to take some additional steps to make sure that you do not lose your trademark rights:
You can choose to include a trademark notice next to your trademark, but you are not required to do so in order to protect the mark. A trademark notice indicates to others that you claim ownership of the trademark in connection with the goods or services in question, warning them against possible infringement. Any time you believe you have a rightful claim to a mark you may designate the mark with a TM (for goods) or SM (for services). You do not have to register the mark to use these notices. In addition, if you choose to seek federal registration of your trademark, you can use these notices during the registration process. If you obtain a federal registration, you will probably want to use the more powerful ® notice, which can only be used after a successful registration with the USPTO. Even then, you can only use the ® notice in connection with the goods or services listed in your application for registration.
An important question for bloggers, citizen media creators, and other online publishers is whether trademark law limits their ability to engage in reporting, commentary, criticism, and other forms of political, social, and artistic expression. There is a threat, should trademark law become too robust, that companies and other trademark holders might use it to silence commentary, criticism, and unfavorable reporting. Such a "right to control language" would offend the First Amendment and seriously undermine the quality of public debate on issues of fundamental importance. The good news is that courts have consistently protected the public's right to use the trademarks of others in order to engage in criticism, commentary, news reporting and other forms of noncommercial expression. As long as what you're doing is really commentary, criticism, or reporting (etc.), and not a surreptitious attempt to sell goods or services, or to deceptively attract customers or readers you otherwise would not have had, you should be able to defeat a trademark claim brought against you. The bad news is that the law relating to this intersection of trademark law and free expression is complex and confusing. Neither Congress nor the courts have developed a simple and clear rule that protects your rights to use the trademarks of others for free speech purposes; instead they've developed a complex array of defenses to trademark claims that even lawyers find difficult to untangle. This makes it hard for a defendant to get a trademark lawsuit dismissed quickly with little expense, and it leaves bloggers and citizen media creators vulnerable to intimidation through the unscrupulous use of cease-and-desist letters. (The ideas here are based on William McGeveran's excellent article, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law.)
The following sections briefly explain the legal protections available to you and apply them to some of the common situations you might face in the course of your online activities.
As discussed in detail in What Trademark Covers, the main purpose of trademark law is to avoid consumer confusion, and the fundamental question in any trademark infringement lawsuit is whether the defendant's use of a trademark creates a likelihood of confusion between the defendant's goods or services and the plaintiff's. Therefore, an obvious first line of defense in any trademark infringement lawsuit is that there is no likelihood of confusion. As a general matter, if you are reporting on, commenting on, or criticizing a trademark owner, most ordinary consumers will not be confused about whether the company or organization is the source or sponsor of your work. You can reduce the likelihood of confusion further by avoiding a website design that looks like the trademark owner's site or resembles its product packaging, and you should never festoon your website with a company's logo (but isolated use when relevant to a discussion is OK). You might also place a disclaimer on your site saying that you are not affiliated with the company in question and providing a link to its official site, but this usually isn't necessary unless you operate a gripe site or fan site focusing on the trademark owner. (If you are just writing a post about Company X, there is no need provide a disclaimer just because you use the words "Company X.")
If someone threatens you with a lawsuit or sues you for trademark dilution, then a lack of consumer confusion will not help you. Here, one obvious line of defense is to argue that there is no likelihood of dilution. Federal and state dilution law protects a trademark owner against the whittling away of the distinctiveness of its famous trademark by association with other goods or services; it does not give a trademark owner the right to shut down all unflattering speech about it. If you do not associate a famous trademark with your own goods or services, then there can be no dilution (or at least that's how your argument goes). A court might agree that, by definition, using a trademark for purely expressive purposes (e.g., criticism, commentary, reporting, parody) is not a use in connection with a good or service and thus cannot cause dilution. Your argument on this point is especially strong if you do not host advertisements on your website and do not link to other websites selling goods or services (especially to your own commercial websites). But you might win this point even if you sell advertising, so long as you use the trademark in criticism, commentary, reporting, or other purely expressive activities, and not in advertising or other promotion of your site. This argument overlaps with one of the defenses discussed below -- noncommercial use.
In addition to these general arguments against infringement and dilution, there are a host of other free expression defenses to a trademark claim. This is where the legal terrain gets complicated and the terminology gets a bit arcane. If the explanations below make your eyes glaze over, feel free to skip down to the next section, Some Free Expression Uses of Trademarks, where we explain how these defenses work in practical situations. The important free expression defenses are as follows:
So how does all this apply in the real world? This section gives some guidance on how the free expression defenses may apply to your activities.
News Reporting
Trademark law does not let a trademark owner exert its trademark rights to stop news reporting about it or its products or services. You see proof of this everyday on the front pages of newspapers, the homepages of news websites, and countless blogs. Mainstream reporters and non-traditional journalists routinely report on earnings announcements, job lay-offs, and accounting scandals without worrying that they are infringing or diluting the trademarks of the companies and organizations they report on. There are several legal bases for this result: there is no risk of confusion between the news source and the trademark owner; nominative fair use protects this use of the trademark owner's mark; and the federal dilution statute expressly exempts "news reporting and news commentary" from a dilution claim. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(B). As noted above, one court has held that a blogger's critical commentary on a company qualified as "news reporting and news commentary." See BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, 2007 WL 3119445 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007). This is just one case, however, and it remains to be seen how the courts will define "news reporting and news commentary" in the face of different kinds of new media that blur the distinction between reporter and consumer of news.
There is a wrinkle. It is a common practice for bloggers to use the logo of a company when they post about it. For example, TechCrunch often does this:
Although the practice is widespread, it is beginning to draw fire from trademark owners. As noted above, late last year a representative of Avis requested that law blogger Eric Turkewitz cease-and-desist from using its logo in a post about a lawsuit involving the company (see Turkewitz's post). The law is not entirely clear on this point. The nominative fair use defense may not apply because using the logo is not strictly necessary for describing the trademark owner or its products or services. Nevertheless, courts would probably find that use of a logo in the process of news reporting is not likely to confuse consumers. Without confusion, there is no trademark infringement. And, as noted above, there is a categorical exemption from dilution claims for news reporting. So, it looks like using logos for illustration and visual stimulation during news reporting is OK. The one possible weakness is that the logo is not necessarily relevant to the substance of the news reporting, so a court might view its use as outside the news reporting function. Still, confusion and dilution seem highly unlikely in this context.
Commentary and Criticism
Trademark law does not permit a trademark owner to use its trademark rights to silence commentary and criticism. As with news reporting, courts recognize the important First Amendment values at stake and usually deny efforts by trademark owners to encroach on legitimate commentary and criticism. There are several legal bases for this result: there is no risk of confusion between the commentator and the trademark owner, and nominative fair use may protect this use of the trademark owner's mark. Additionally, courts are likely to find that your use of a trademark in commentary or criticism is "not in connection with a good or service" and "noncommercial" (the argument is especially strong for the latter category). But note that some courts may find your use of a trademark for criticism and commentary to be commercial if you host advertising or link to commercial websites. In any event, to defeat a trademark dilution claim, you do not even need to show that your use is noncommercial. The federal dilution statute creates a categorical exemption for "criticizing . . . or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).
The issue of logos comes up with commentary and criticism as well. As with news reporting, using a logo to illustrate or liven up criticism or commentary is probably OK from a trademark perspective. See above for details.
Domain Names
Using someone else's trademark in your domain name is a risky proposition because courts do not necessarily extend the same protections to domain names as they do to commentary, criticism, and news reporting. Early on in the development of Internet law, many cases held that websites could not use a company or organization's trademark in a confusingly similar domain name, even if the website accessible under that domain name criticized the trademark owner, and its content made clear that it was not sponsored by or affiliated with the trademark owner. The reasoning was that a critic has no free speech right to confuse Internet users into thinking that they are entering someone else's website in order to expose them to a critical message.
However, there is a new trend in the cases towards allowing "gripers" and other critics to use domain names that are nearly identical to the trademark owner's trademark, so long as the underlying website does not confuse Internet users into thinking it is affiliated with the trademark owner and it does not engage in commercial activity. For example, in Falwell v. Lamparello, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a trademark infringement claim based on the defendant's use of the domain name "fallwell.com" in connection with a website criticizing the social and religious views of the Reverend Jerry Falwell. The court held that it "must look not only to the allegedly infringing domain name, but also to the underlying content of the website" and concluded that, when viewed in this context, the defendant's use of the domain name created no likelihood of confusion. In TMI Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a trademark dilution claim based on the defendant's use of a developer's trademarked name in her gripe site's domain name. The court determined that the defendant's site was noncommercial because it was dedicated to critical consumer commentary and did not host advertising or links to commercial sites. The court did not treat the domain name as separate from the underlying website, and so it dismissed the entire dilution claim.
It is still not clear which view of the law will prevail. One way to help yourself avoid trademark liability is to include something in the domain name itself that makes it clear that you are criticizing or commenting on the trademark owner, such as a "sucks" designation. This brings the domain name back within the category of commentary and criticism and makes your First Amendment arguments more persuasive. For example, in Taubman v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770 (6th Cir. 2003), the court held that the defendant's use of the domain name "taubmansucks.com" was "purely an exhibition of Free Speech, and [federal trademark law] is not invoked." Similarly, in Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation v. Faber, 29 F. Supp.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998), the court held that the defendant's use of "ballysucks" in a sub-domain for a website engaging in critical commentary did not constitute trademark infringement or dilution.
Domain name disputes often involve cybersquatting claims under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. For details, see the Cybersquatting section.
Gripe Sites and Fan Sites
The two sections immediately above outline most of the legal issues related to running a gripe site. Your use of a trademark owner's trademark in commentary and criticism on the website itself is largely protected because there is little likelihood of confusion, because use of the trademark may be nominative fair use, and because there is a statutory exemption from dilution claims for "criticizing . . . or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner." You can help your case by including a prominent disclaimer on your website, making clear that your site is not "official" and providing a link to the trademark owner's site. Such disclaimers are not foolproof, but they go a long way towards reducing consumer confusion. Use of the trademark owner's mark in a domain name is more risky, but you may reduce this risk by including some critical remark like "sucks" in the domain itself. This may make it harder for you to gain the attention of Internet users trying to find the trademark owner's official website, but this may be the price you have to pay for more security from a trademark claim. In addition, if you refrain from hosting advertising and linking to commercial websites, including the websites of companies that compete with the trademark owner, your case is even better. Gripe site cases often involve cybersquatting claims, so you will want to look at the Cybersquatting section of this guide for additional information.
The legal issues surrounding fan sites are more uncertain. In some cases, you may be able to characterize the content of your fan site as "news reporting," if what you are doing is following the activities or new products and services of the trademark owner. In that case, all the protections for news reporting discussed above would apply. Also, you may have a case that your fan site's use of the trademark owner's trademark is a nominative fair use, so long as the appearance of your site does not create confusion about whether or not you are sponsored by or affiliated with the trademark owner. Again, a prominent disclaimer making clear that your site is not "official" and providing a link to the trademark owner's site may help your case, but is not necessarily foolproof. When registering a domain name, you may want to include some term that makes clear that you are running a fan site, such as a "fans," or you may want to avoid the trademark altogether. See the Cybersquatting section for additional details on domain names. As always, if you refrain from hosting advertisements and linking to commercial websites, you have a better chance of defending against a trademark lawsuit.
Fan sites often raise other legal issues, such as copyright infringement and right of publicity claims. For additional information, consult the copyright section and our forthcoming section on rights of publicity and misappropriation.
Parody
Courts generally recognize that parody is entitled to First Amendment protection in a trademark infringement lawsuit, and the federal dilution statute expressly exempts parody from dilution claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). In addition, a number of courts have held that parodies are "noncommercial" uses exempted by the federal dilution statute. However, simply labeling your work "parody" will not be enough to defeat an otherwise legitimate claim of trademark infringement or dilution. The courts take a relatively narrow view of what qualifies as a "successful" parody. A parody must walk the fine line between evoking the original (i.e., the trademark) and making clear that it is not the original (i.e., it is something new commenting on or criticizing the trademark owner). Moreover, the parody must be aimed at the trademark owner or its goods or services, not at an unrelated third party or issue. In the final analysis, if your parody confuses consumers, and they believe that the trademark owner is the source or sponsor of the parody, then you may be liable for infringement or dilution.
Putting your parody in a commercial context -- like using it in an advertisement or fake advertisement, or selling merchandise like coffee mugs or t-shirts emblazoned with the parody -- may make it harder for you to defend against a trademark lawsuit. But this is not necessarily the case. For example, in MasterCard International Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Committee, Inc., 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004), the court upheld Ralph Nader's use of MasterCard trademarks in a parody political advertisement, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion and that his use of the marks were political speech and thus "noncommercial." In another case, Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.2d 894, 906-07 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the band Aqua's use of Mattel's "Barbie" trademark in the parodic song "Barbie Girl" was protected by the First Amendment and "noncommercial," even though the band sold the song for money. The court found that Aqua's parody successfully lampooned the Barbie image and commented humorously on the cultural values the doll represents, and therefore was protected by the First Amendment. Finally, in Smith v. Wal-Mart, 537 F. Supp.2d 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008), the defendant created a series of parodies using Wal-Mart's logos and slogans, in which he likened the retail giant to Al-Qaeda and the Nazis. He not only posted these parodies on his websites, but sold CafePress t-shirts and other merchandise containing the designs. The court held that the defendant's designs were successful parodies of Wal-Mart's trademarks, that there was no likelihood of confusion between his websites or goods and Wal-Mart's, and that his use of the trademark was "noncommercial," even though he sold the designs to the public on t-shirts and other merchandise.
The term "cybersquatting" refers to registering, using, or selling a domain name with a bad faith intent to profit from someone else's trademark. In the 1990s, when many companies were just beginning to realize the significance of the Internet, cybersquatters would register domain names using trademarks in the hopes of later selling the domain names to trademark holders at exorbitant prices. Congress cracked down on this problem in 1999 when it passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). The ACPA gives a trademark holder the ability to bring a federal lawsuit against someone for cybersquatting. A cybersquatting claim is related to trademark infringement and trademark dilution, discussed in What Trademark Covers, but it is a separate legal claim with its own requirements.
Although not many citizen media creators speculate on domain names for profit, an online publisher may have other reasons to worry about a potential cybersquatting lawsuit. A website operator or blogger might want to register a domain name that includes a company's or individual's trademark in order to criticize, comment, or report on the activities of the trademark owner. For instance, gripe sites like fallwell.com and lowes-sucks.com, as well as fan sites like MarianoRivera.com, have been sued or threatened with suit because of their domain names. Similarly, in 2007 the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences sued the academy awards-related website, Oscarwatch.com (now operating as Awards Daily), for violation of the ACPA, among other trademark claims. The case settled without a court determining the merit of the Academy's claim.
In most cases, if the trademark is relevant to the content of your website or blog, and you use the mark to engage in legitimate commentary, criticism, or reporting, there is a good chance that a court would not hold you liable for cybersquatting. This is not a sure thing, however, and it does not mean that a trademark owner will not threaten you with a lawsuit or file a lawsuit against you. If you are faced with such a situation, it is important to understand what the ACPA prohibits and what it does not. Below we provide more detailed information on the basics of a cybersquatting claim.
Under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, a plaintiff needs to show that the defendant registered, used, or sold a domain name containing language that is identical or similar to the trademark owner's trademark with a bad faith intent to profit from the domain name. A trademark owner that wins a cybersquatting lawsuit can recover money damages (including maximum statutory damages of $100,000 per act of cybersquatting) and get an order canceling the defendant's registration of the offending domain name or transferring it to trademark owner. A court may also award attorneys' fees to a winning trademark owner under "exceptional circumstances" -- basically, when the court determines that the defendant willfully or intentionally engaged in cybersquatting.
The key question in a cybersquatting case is whether the person registering, using, or selling a domain name has a bad faith intent to profit. Courts consider nine factors in determining whether a defendant has such a bad faith intent:
While the courts have applied these factors in different ways, and the result of a multi-factor test like this is hard to predict in advance, a few significant points are worth mentioning:
Noncommercial use rarely amounts to bad faith. Courts often give great weight to the fourth factor -- a bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the trademark in a site accessible under the domain name. The legislative history of the ACPA makes clear that a "noncommercial use" includes "comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, [and similar activities]." S Rep. No. 106-140, at *9. If you use your website to engage in these activities and do not offer goods or services for sale or include links to commercial websites, you are more likely to succeed against a cybersquatting claim. For example, in Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005), the court found that a website operator did not have a bad faith intent to profit when he used the website in question to criticize the social and religious views of the Reverend Jerry Falwell. Similarly, in TMI Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004), and Lucas Nursery & Landscaping v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2004), the courts found that the defendants did not have a bad faith intent to profit and focused on the fact that the defendants were using their websites to engage in consumer commentary and criticism rather than for commercial gain. On the other hand, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 3821 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2004), the court held that an anti-abortion activist violated the ACPA, despite the plainly religious and political character of his speech, because his websites solicited monetary contributions and sold merchandise. Note too that the activist registered domain names like "drinkcoke.org" and "mymcdonalds.com," which had no relation to his anti-abortion message.
Do not register multiple domain names or offer to sell a domain name to the trademark owner. Courts are aware that Congress passed the ACPA to fight the practice of cybersquatters registering multiple domain names in an effort to sell them to the legitimate owners of the trademarks. If you register more than one domain name, your activities look more like the harm that Congress meant to prevent. If you offer to sell the domain name in question, even after a trademark owner has threatened you with a lawsuit, it may look like your real purpose for registering the domain name was to extort money, not to engage in legitimate criticism, commentary, or reporting. Along these same lines, be sure never to give false contact information to the domain registrar when registering a domain name. When a court sees a website operator exercising his or her free speech rights and not engaging in these types of abusive behavior, it will likely conclude that no bad faith intent to profit is present. See for example Lamparello, Lucas Nursery, and Maxwell, and compare with the result in Purdy, where the defendant registered multiple domain names and offered to turn over one domain name in return for space on the editorial page of a trademark owner's newspaper.
Make it clear that you are not affiliated with the trademark owner. Courts also consider whether the defendant intentionally confuses Internet users as to the affiliation of the website. If you include a prominent disclaimer and a link to the trademark owner's official website, this may help show that you have no bad faith intent to profit. This is especially important if you are trying to make your site a parody of the trademark owner's site. In addition, you may have better luck on all types of trademark claims if you include something in the domain name itself that makes it clear that you are criticizing or commenting on the trademark owner, such as a "sucks" designation.
If you would like additional details about the ACPA and what constitutes a bad faith intent to profit, consult the Chilling Effects FAQ about ACPA.
Besides bringing a lawsuit in federal court, a trademark owner who believes that someone else is violating his or her trademark rights through cybersquatting can use the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). The UDRP is an online dispute resolution mechanism administered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Under the UDRP, ICANN can cancel an improperly registered domain name or order a losing party to transfer the domain name to the winning party. The purpose of UDRP is to provide a cheaper and more efficient mechanism for resolving cybersquatting disputes. If you believe that someone is cybersquatting on a domain name that rightfully should be yours, bringing an action under the UDRP may be a cheap and easy alternative to a lawsuit. Note, however, that a losing party in a UDRP proceeding may sue in federal court to reverse the outcome. Importantly, if a court determines that the person initiating a UDRP proceeding knowingly misrepresented that the challenged domain name was "identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of [his or her] mark," then it may award the other party damages and attorneys' fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iv).
For more details on the UDRP, see the Chilling Effects FAQ about UDRP.
If you host user-generated content, such as user comments, you should be aware of your potential liability for that content under trademark law. For instance, a website user could post another blog's logo in a comment, eliciting a cease-and-desist letter from the competing blogger. While you would have a good argument that inclusion of a logo in a single comment does not create a likelihood of confusion between your two sites, you might consider whether you are responsible at all for material posted by a user. Unfortunately, while the so-called "safe harbor" provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and section 230 of the Communications Decency Act protect you from liability for user-generated content in a number of situations, they do not protect you against trademark claims, with one possible exception discussed below. The same point holds for third-party content you host on your site through news feeds or other aggregation mechanisms.
DMCA Safe Habors
Section 512 of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512, contains the DMCA's "safe-harbor" provisions for online service providers. These safe harbor provisions may shield you from liability for the copyright infringements of your site's users and for linking to copyright infringing material from other online sources, so long as you establish effective "notice-and-takedown" procedures, promptly remove content when a copyright owner notifies you that it is infringing, and have no actual or effective knowledge that the material in question is infringing. For details, please see Protecting Yourself Against Copyright Claims Based On User Content.
The DMCA safe harbor provisions only apply to claims of copyright infringement. Therefore, they do not provide any protection against trademark claims, whether for trademark infringement, trademark dilution, or cybersquatting. There may be times when you receive a DMCA takedown notice for material that is technically not eligible for safe-harbor treatment, like an allegedly infringing use of a trademark. If it satisfies the complaining person that you take the material down, and you have no serious objection, you might want to do so.
For information on the difference between copyright and trademark, see the Chilling Effects FAQ on Trademark.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA 230) protects website owners from many claims based on user comments and other third-party content, but it does not apply to "intellectual property" claims. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). Courts consider federal trademark claims to be "intellectual property" claims, so CDA 230 will not stop a federal trademark lawsuit based on user-generated or other third-party content.
A closer question is whether trademark claims under state law are "intellectual property" claims. One court has held that only federal intellectual property claims are outside the protection of CDA 230. See Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). Under this view, CDA 230 gives you a defense against state trademark claims based on user-generated content. More recently, another court held that CDA 230 does not bar state intellectual property claims. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 2008 WL 803947 (D.N.H. Mar. 27, 2008). Under this view, CDA 230 does not give you a defense against state trademark claims based on user-generated content.
For details on CDA 230, please see our Primer on Immunity and Liability for Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
A trade secret is a form of intellectual property
that applies to business secrets. If a company or other organization
creates or compiles information that gives it an economic advantage
over its competitors, it can protect that information as a trade secret
-- in a sense becoming the "owner" of the trade secret. To do so,
however, a business must take reasonable precautions to keep the
information secret, and it loses its property right when competitors or
the public at large uncover the secret. Trade secrets law is governed
by state law. However, most U.S. states have adopted their own slightly modified version of the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA), so there is a good deal of uniformity among state laws on the subject. For state-specific information, please see the State Law: Trade Secrets section of this guide.
The main goal of trade secrets law is to provide a way for businesses to capitalize on their unique practices or knowledge created through their time and effort. Unlike copyright, trade secrets law protects ideas and facts, rather than just the form in which they are expressed. A trade secret can be any kind of information relating to a business -- formulas, plans, designs, patterns, supplier lists, customer lists, financial data, personnel information, physical devices, processes, computer software, and a catch-all category of "know-how." The most "well known" trade secret is the "secret formula" for Coca-Cola, which has been kept under wraps for more than 100 years.
By definition, trade secrets are not
disclosed to the public. In this way, they are different from
inventions and creative works that are copyrighted or patented. And, in
contrast to copyrighted or patented information, trade secrets are not
time-limited -- they last as long as the company manages to keep them
secret. The company that creates them has the sole ability to exploit
the secret as long as it manages to keep it from becoming public
knowledge. The catch is that trade secrets can disappear without
warning or any specific period of time passing. Once disclosed, they're
gone. In addition, trade secrets law provides no protection against
someone independently developing the owner's trade secret information
or reverse engineering it from a finished product.
For the most part, trade secrets law is directed against industrial espionage and ex-employees sharing their former employers' proprietary information with new employers. You might justifiably ask, then, what all this has to do with citizen media and online publishing? Trade secrets law prohibits publishing someone else's trade secrets under certain circumstances, and businesses and other organizations sometimes look to trade secrets law as a way of stopping the traditional and non-traditional media from publishing valuable, sensitive, or damaging information. Many readers may recall Apple's dispute with Think Secret, AppleInsider, and O'Grady's PowerPage over leaks of confidential information about unreleased Apple products before MacWorld 2005. Apple turned to trade secrets law to make out its case. Ultimately, the courts never decided the merits of Apple's trade secrets claims because Think Secret settled and ceased operations, and Apple voluntarily withdrew its lawsuit against the other sites after a California court upheld the website operators' right to protect the identity of their sources under the California shield law. For additional details on the lawsuits, see our database entries, Apple v. DePlume and Apple v. Does. Going back to 1999, Ford sued a website operator named Robert Lane for posting its confidential documents and photographs on his site. Current and former Ford employees had provided Lane with secret materials in violation of their confidentiality agreements with the auto giant. The court found that Lane had likely violated the Michigan Trade Secrets Act, but held that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution did not permit the court to order Lane to remove the photographs and documents from the Internet. See Ford Motor Company v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999), for details.
If, like many people, your online activities are limited to synthesizing and commenting on materials you find online, then trade secrets law will not have any real impact on you. For a business to protect information under trade secrets law, the information must be secret. If you can find a piece of information by searching the Internet, then in all likelihood so can the company's competitors, and that information is not a trade secret. If, on the other hand, you engage in investigative reporting or regularly rely on confidential sources, you should familiarize yourself with trade secrets law in order to avoid potential liability and to stand up for yourself should someone send you a cease-and-desist letter. There are two scenarios where trade secrets problems are likely to come up; in legal terminology, this is when a court could find that you have "misappropriated" a trade secret.
Scenario One: You personally acquire a trade secret by improper means, such as theft, trespass, hacking, or breach of your own employment contract, even if you do not publish the trade secret. This type of conduct is outside the scope of this guide. If you are accused of engaging in such activities, we suggest that you seek immediate legal assistance. See the section on Finding Legal Help for some suggestions.
Scenario Two: You publish secret information received from a source and you know that the source acquired it through theft, hacking, or some other improper means, or breached a duty of confidentiality by giving it to you. This later situation could easily come up if you rely on employee sources for information about a company. If you want to rely on insider sources or are simply curious about what qualifies as a trade secret and what activities may cause trade secret liability, please see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If you are considering publishing information that might be considered a trade secret, don't be intimidated. Not every company document is a trade secret, and a business ordinarily cannot stop you from publishing embarrassing -- but not secret or economically valuable -- information. Even if you publish a bona fide trade secret, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution may protect you from having to take it down and even from paying damages, especially if you publish the trade secret in order to report or comment on a matter of public concern. To illustrate both points, imagine that a source inside the XYZ Tire Company provides you with a secret company memorandum revealing a hazardous defect in the company's tires; you may have a host of legal arguments why publishing that information is lawful, including that the information in the memorandum is not a trade secret and that the First Amendment protects your activity. Keep in mind, however, that the law is not clear in this area. If you are interested in the legal protections the law may offer your publishing activities, consult the Publishing Trade Secrets section.
In the sections that follow, we lay out further specifics about the principles described above. This guide is not a full treatment of trade secrets law, but it does provide what we hope is a good understanding of the legal risks surrounding trade secrets.
If you obtain or publish a company's trade secrets, the company may have a legal claim against you for trade secret misappropriation. Generally speaking, a "trade secret" is secret information that confers a competitive business advantage on its owner by virtue of not being known to its competitors. The trade secret owner must exert reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of this information, or it ceases to be a trade secret. When a person obtains a trade secret improperly (such as by theft, bribery, or breach of a confidentiality agreement) or publishes it, knowing that someone else acquired it improperly, he or she has "misappropriated" the trade secret. This is the legal wrong against which trade secrets law protects. Possible defenses against a misappropriation claim are discussed in the Publishing Trade Secrets section.
State law governs trade secrets. Most U.S. states have adopted their own slightly modified version of the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA), so there is a good deal of uniformity among state laws on the subject. The discussion below is based on the UTSA. For state-specific information, please see the state pages.
Under the UTSA, a trade secret has three basic characteristics:
Trade secrets can take many forms. They can be formulas, plans, designs, patterns, supplier lists, customer lists, financial data, personnel information, physical devices, processes, computer software, and a catch-all category of "know-how" -- just about any kind of secret information that relates to a business. Even a compilation of generally known facts can be a trade secret, if the compilation confers a competitive edge to whomever has access to it and is kept secret. The Chilling Effects FAQ on Trade Secrets has additional information on what companies can protect as a trade secret. Below we discuss the three elements of a trade secret, listed above.
(1) The information is secret
For information to be "secret," it must not be generally known by or readily ascertainable to competitors. A trade secret loses its "secret" status if a competitor of the owner knows about it; the public at large need not know about it for it to cease being secret. Take for example the formula for Coca-Cola -- right now, virtually no one knows what it is, so it is secret. If one of the Coca-Cola Company's competitors somehow obtained the formula, the formula would lose its "secret" status under the law, even if the competitor did not disclose it to the public at large. On the other hand, if an individual or small group of individuals gained knowledge of the formula, but the Coca-Cola Company stopped them from communicating it to the company's competitors, the formula would not lose its "secret" status.
As we discuss more fully in Publishing Trade Secrets, if a company's information is widely available on the Internet, it probably isn't "secret" because the entire public, including competitors, has access to it.
(2) The information confers a competitive advantage
The information must also give its owner an economic advantage over its competitors. To determine this, courts look at a number of factors: (a) the value the information has to the owner and its competitors; (b) how much effort or money the owner put into developing the information; (c) how seriously the owner tried to keep the information secret; (d) how hard it would be for others to properly acquire or duplicate the information; and (e) the degree to which other people have placed this information in the public domain or made the information readily ascertainable by applying for a patent or marketing.
To use Coke as an example again, the factors point towards the conclusion that the formula confers a competitive advantage. Most importantly, the industry perceives Coke's formula as so valuable that several people tried to sell it to PepsiCo for $1.5 million in 2006. In addition, the Coca-Cola Company makes serious efforts to keep the information secret -- keeping the original formula in a bank vault and supposedly letting only two executives know the formula at the same time. It is not clear how easy it would be for others to acquire this information -- many people claim to have reverse engineered it, but it has never been proven. The information plainly is not in the public domain.
(3) The information is subject to reasonable efforts to keep it secret
Finally, the owner of a trade secret must make reasonable efforts to keep the information secret. What is reasonable is determined by a cost-benefit analysis that varies from case to case. For example, in Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991), the court considered a trade secrets claim by a printing press manufacturer which alleged that a competitor had misappropriated drawings of machine parts. The company had given the part drawings to a limited number of vendors and their own engineers. The court explained that it would not be reasonable to require the manufacturer to forbid any copying of the drawings, forcing all of the vendors and engineers to share a single copy, noting that "perfect security is not optimum security."
To use the Coke example one last time, the company certainly takes reasonable efforts to keep the formula secret. As noted above, it keeps the formula locked in a vault, and only a few executives know it. Such extreme measures won't be necessary or practical for many businesses, and courts will take a case-by-case look at the reasonableness of the measures taken.
The legal wrong that trade secrets law protects against is "misappropriation" of a trade secret. Section 1(2) of the UTSA provides the following definition for the term:
While this definition looks technical and complicated, citizen media creators and other online publishers will want to focus on two relatively straightforward points:
First, you commit misappropriation if you personally acquire a trade secret by improper means. "Improper means" include theft, fraud, bribery, industrial espionage, breaching a contractual duty to keep something confidential, or inducing others to breach that duty. For example, if you take home confidential information from your job in violation of your employment contract, that alone could be misappropriation. For another example, if you hack into a company's computer and make copies of confidential files you find there, that likely would qualify as misappropriation. To be clear, if you acquire the information yourself, you do not have to disclose or publish it in order to be liable for misappropriation. The act of acquisition is enough. That said, publishing or sharing information that you acquire improperly would also be misappropriation.
Second, you commit misappropriation if you publish a trade secret and you know that the person who gave you the information acquired it through improper means or under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use. Even if you don't actually know that the person who gave you the information acquired it in this way, you may be liable if you are aware of facts that suggest that this person acquired the information improperly. For example, if documents are stamped "Confidential," or "Secret," this might be enough give you reason to believe that your source acquired them improperly. This type of misappropriation would cover situations where you receive secret documents or information from a source inside the company about which you want to publish. For instance, if your source has signed a confidentiality agreement with his or her employer, then simply giving you secret information would breach that agreement, and your publishing of the information would be misappropriation if you knew or had reason to know that your source was bound by such an agreement. Alternatively, if your source stole secret information or hacked into a company computer to get it, your publishing of the information would be misappropriation if you knew or had reason to know that he or she had done so.
One case has squarely addressed this kind of misappropriation in the citizen media context. In Ford Motor Company v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999), a blogger obtained confidential documents and photographs from current and former Ford employees. The court determined that the blogger had violate the Michigan Trade Secrets Act by publishing the documents and photographs because he had reason to know the employees who gave him the information had breached their duty to Ford not to reveal the information. As discussed in Publishing Trade Secrets, however, the court also held that the First Amendment did not permit it to order the blogger to stop publishing these materials.
Note that trade secrets laws in many states, such as California, state explicitly that reverse engineering is not an "improper means" of obtaining information and cannot be the basis for a misappropriation claim. In those states, if you or your source uses reverse engineering to obtain information that a company claims is a trade secret, you generally cannot be liable for misappropriation. However, you might still run into trouble if you or your source agreed not to engage in reverse engineering in a contract, such as an end-user licensing agreement.
If a court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The "statute of limitations" is a term used by courts to describe the maximum amount of time plaintiffs can wait before bringing a lawsuit after the events they are suing over took place. This time limit is typically set by state statute and is intended to promote fairness and keep old cases from clogging the courts. Section 6 of the UTSA sets the statute of limitations for trade secrets claims at three years. However, many states have amended this section of the UTSA, so the statute of limitations for trade secrets claims varies between three and five years depending on the state. See the state pages for the applicable term in your state.
Generally speaking, the limitations period for a trade secret claims runs from the time the plaintiff discovered the misappropriation or the time by which the plaintiff should have discovered it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
If you are thinking about publishing something that looks like a company's internal -- and possibly secret -- document or information, you need to think about the potential legal consequences under trade secrets law. As explained in Basics of a Trade Secret Claim, if a document or piece of information turns out to be a trade secret, then you might be liable for damages, and a court might order you to take down the material. But not every company document is a trade secret, and a company ordinarily cannot stop you from publishing embarrassing -- but not secret or economically valuable -- information. And even if you publish a bona fide trade secret, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution may protect you from having to take it down and even from paying damages, especially if you publish the trade secret in order to report or comment on a matter of public concern. Thus, if you get your hands on a secret document that shows that a steel plant is spewing pollutants into a local river, the U.S. Constitution may protect your decision to publish this document even if you are aware that your source acquired it through improper means (e.g., theft or breach of a confidentiality agreement). As described in more detail below, however, the law is not entirely clear on these points, and you ultimately will have to make a decision about what to do based on your own willingness to take risks.
The sections below speak in terms of "defenses" -- i.e., what you could argue to protect yourself assuming someone sued you for publishing a trade secret. The focus on defenses should not confuse you into thinking that this information is not valuable before a lawsuit happens. Knowing how you might defend yourself can help you evaluate whether your publishing activity is legally protected or whether you face a serious risk of unwanted legal consequences.
These defenses relate to the legal definition of a "trade secret" and the act of "misappropriation." For background, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
What You Published Was Not a Trade Secret
(1) Not Secret
Your surest defense to a trade secrets claim is to show that the information you published was not a secret when you published it because it was already "generally known." For example, you generally cannot be liable for trade secret misappropriation if you get the information in question from some published source, like a newspaper or book. Similarly, most material previously posted on the Internet is no longer secret. For example, in DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185 (Ct. App. 2004), a trade association claimed that a website operator had misappropriated its trade secret when he posted DeCSS -- a code for breaking its DVD encryption technology -- on his website. A California appellate court held that DeCSS was not a trade secret when the defendant posted it because hundreds of other websites had already done so. Similarly, several federal district courts have found that numerous Church of Scientology documents were not trade secrets because many websites published the documents before the defendant. See, e.g, Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcomm On-Line Commc'n Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256-57 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 266 (E.D. Va. 1995).
Note, however, that publication on the Internet does not always strip information of its trade secret status. For example, information that appears only on an obscure site or sites, and information that appears and quickly gets taken down may remain a trade secret, and you might be liable for publishing it if you have reason to know that it was acquired through improper means.
Even if information was secret when you first disclosed it online, if it becomes public knowledge by the time a plaintiff asks a court for an injunction against you (i.e., an order requiring you to take down the material and not publish it in the future), you may convince the court not to issue the order. The court may not issue an injunction without the plaintiff showing that it would be "irreparably harmed" absent the order requiring you not to publish the trade secret. But if the information is already publicly available, then you cannot harm the plaintiff by publishing what everyone already knows. Even if an injunction is improper, however, a plaintiff can still seek money damages from you.
(2) Generates No Economic Value
You may also avoid trade secret liability if the information you published could not give its owner an economic advantage over its competitors by remaining secret. You could use this defense if a company tries to use trade secrets law to shield embarrassing information that does not relate to its competitive position vis-a-vis its rivals. For example, in MicroStrategy Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396 (E.D. Va. 2004), a court determined that an email sent by a company's CEO to all employees about the the company's financial difficulties was not a trade secret. The email, while interesting to some, had no potential economic value and was about to be made public in a press release anyway.
In another case, Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 1996), the owners of the Old Country Buffet restaurant chain claimed another chain had stolen their trade secrets when it copied their recipes, but the court determined the recipes had no economic value. The court reasoned that "there was no demonstrated relationship between the lack of success of [the] competitors and the unavailability of the recipes" and, because, in fact, OCB's cooks had used simplified versions of the recipes in preparing their food, so it was unlikely the recipes themselves had conferred a benefit on OCB.
(3) No Reasonable Efforts to Maintain Secrecy
One other way you can defend yourself is the owner of the "secret" did not take reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy. The exact steps required will vary depending on the secret involved, but there is a good chance that information is not a trade secret if a company has failed to take any affirmative steps to protect it. For example, in Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Yoder, 950 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D. Ohio 1997), a federal district court found a company had failed to take sufficient to make a reasonable effort to ensure secrecy because it did not require its clinical investigators to sign confidentiality agreements, it failed to stamp documents "confidential" or "secret," it widely disseminated the information, and it did not use other controls like restricting access to the physical location of the secret, the use of safes, or discussing the importance of confidentiality with people who received the information. If you find documents or information online, you may have a decent argument that the owner did not maintain reasonable efforts to keep the material secret (in addition to the argument that the material is "not secret," as explained above).
You Did Not Commit Misappropriation
Another possible defense is that neither you nor your source(s) used improper means to obtain the information. The Supreme Court noted in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), that "discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering" is not misappropriation. Often, this argument would go hand and hand with the argument that the information in question was not secret. If the information is publicly available, then you generally do not need to rely on theft, deception, or breach of confidentiality in order to get a hold of it.
For example, in Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va. 1995), the Washington Post published Scientology documents it had obtained from a publicly available court file and the Internet. The district court determined that the Post had not misappropriated the Church of Scientology's trade secrets because the paper obtained the materials from legitimate, publicly available sources. The court further noted that "[a]lthough the person who originally posted a trade secret on the Internet may be liable for trade secret misappropriation, the party who merely downloads Internet information cannot be liable for misappropriation because there is no misconduct involved in interacting with the Internet." Similarly in DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003), the California Supreme Court considered a case where a programmer had reverse engineered DVD encryption software. While the majority of the court did not consider the issue, Justice Moreno, concurring, expressed serious doubt that reverse engineering was an improper act. In their versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, California, Illinois, and Oregon explicitly state that reverse engineering alone does not constitute misappropriation.
Even if you are dealing with a bona fide trade secret and you have reason to believe that your source acquired it improperly, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution may stop a court from ordering you not to publish it. You may be protected by something known as the "prior restraint" doctrine. The Supreme Court held in the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), that a plaintiff must make an extraordinary showing of harm in order to obtain a court order that stops the news media from publishing information on a matter of public concern. The United States government had sought an injunction to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing information from a classified study on the Vietnam War. Though the materials "pose[d] substantial dangers to national interests," the court was unwilling to stop the newspapers from printing them. As one district court found in Religious Technology Center v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Va. 1995), "If a threat to national security was insufficient to warrant a prior restraint ... the threat to plaintiff's ... trade secrets is woefully inadequate."
Although the law is not entirely certain on this point, a number of courts have extended the prior restraint doctrine to trade secret cases. In CBS v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice 1994), after CBS News shot the operations of a meatpacking company on an undercover camera, the company sought and obtained an injunction preventing CBS from broadcasting the video footage, claiming that the broadcast would disclose the company's trade secrets. Acting pursuant to a special procedure, Justice Blackmun of the Supreme Court stayed the injunction, ruling that the possibility of economic harm was not a sufficient justification for a prior restraint. (Note that this case does not have great value as precedent because the full Supreme Court did not decide the case.)
Courts have applied the prior restraint doctrine to Internet publishers as well as to the mainstream media. In Ford Motor Company v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999), the auto company sought a court order preventing a blogger from posting the company's internal documents online. The documents were provided to the blogger by anonymous sources (which the court believed were likely former and current Ford employees). Because Lane had reason to know that his sources had given him Ford's trade secrets in violation of their confidentiality agreements, the federal district court determined that the blogger was likely violating the Michigan Trade Secrets Act. Nevertheless, the court held that the prior restraint doctrine prevented it from issuing an injunction requiring Lane to take the confidential information off his blog. Protecting the company's vanity and commercial self-interest was not a sufficient ground to stop the blogger from publishing, the court noted. Another federal district court came to a similar conclusion in Religious Technology Center v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Colo. 1995)
In contrast, other courts have upheld the use of an injunction to bar publication of a trade secret, at least in some situations. In DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003), the California Supreme Court found that an injunction prohibiting the posting of DeCSS was not an invalid prior restraint. However, the court expressly limited its reasoning to publication of secret information that is not a matter of public concern. Therefore, publication of trade secrets for news reporting or news commentary would not fall under the Bunner case. In Garth v. Staktek Corp., 876 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App. 1994), a Texas appellate court upheld an injunction barring a company from selling a technology developed with misappropriated trade secrets and from revealing information about the technology to third parties.
Despite the protection offered by the prior restraint doctrine, you should be aware of two caveats. First, the prior restraint doctrine may not help you in a situation where you have personally signed an agreement promising to keep materials confidential. In Ford Motor Company v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999), the court noted that "use of trade secrets in violation of a confidentiality agreement or in breach of a fiduciary duty is not protected by the First Amendment." For example, if you agree in an employment contract not to disclose your employer's trade secrets and then post that information on your blog, the First Amendment may not protect you from an injunction. On the other hand, if you receive trade secrets from a source, the First Amendment may protect you, even if that source violated a confidentiality agreement or otherwise acted improperly. Second, the prior restraint doctrine only stops a court from ordering you not to publish information. It does not stop a court from holding you liable for civil damages or criminal penalties. As discussed immediately below, however, other First Amendment considerations may bar civil or criminal liability under certain circumstances.
Beyond protecting you against an injunction, the First Amendment may protect you from civil liability or criminal prosecution for publishing trade secrets. This potential protection stems from a case called Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). In that case, an unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between Bartnicki, a union negotiator, and the the president of the union. Then, the head of a local taxpayer's group received the tape in his mailbox without any indication of where it came from. The head of the taxpayer's group gave the tape to Vopper, a radio commentator, and he played it on the air. Bartnicki sued Vopper for publishing the contents of an illegal recording in violation of federal wiretapping law, knowing or having reason to know that it was illegally recorded. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c). Vopper argued his disclosure of the contents of the illegally recorded tape was protected by the First Amendment. Finding that "a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern," the Supreme Court refused to enforce federal wiretapping law against Vopper.
Although no court has yet applied Barnicki to block liability for publication of trade secrets, its reasoning could apply to a trade secret case where a publisher has reason to know that the information was acquired through improper means, but did not himself or herself engage in any misconduct or breach any agreement in order to get the information. The argument goes: Bartnicki protects you from liability when you publish trade secrets relevant to a matter of public concern, when you did not personally steal or breach a duty of confidentiality in order to obtain the information, but rather received it from a source who breached a duty of confidentiality or otherwise acted improperly.
Whether a court would actually accept this argument is far from certain. In Bartnicki, the Court explicitly noted it was not deciding whether the First Amendment would bar liability in a case involving trade secrets, on the assumption that trade secrets would be a matter of purely private concern. If you could show that a trade secret related to a matter of public concern, which it might well if you published it in the process of news reporting, commentary, or criticism, then the general reasoning of Bartnicki might apply to prohibit liability. For example, if you blog about secret documents that show a problem with a car company's emissions standards, then Bartnicki might protect you from liability if you did not yourself engage in improper conduct to get the documents.
Only one court so far has ruled on the application of Bartnicki to trade secrets: the California Supreme Court, in DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner. While the court found that the trade secrets in issue in Bunner were not protected by the First Amendment, its ruling was based on its belief that those trade secrets, since they were only technical information, did not "involve[] a matter of public concern [or] implicate[] the core purpose of the First Amendment." So even in California, if you published trade secrets more directly involving a matter of public importance, you would still have a strong argument that your speech should be protected. For example, if you published secret information showing that a company's voting machines were not working properly, you could argue that the Bunner case should not apply.
You might be concerned that a user of your website or blog could post trade secrets there without your knowledge or understanding of the character of the information. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA 230) protects website owners from many claims based on user comments and other third-party content, but it does not apply to "intellectual property" claims. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). While the law is not settled yet, the term "intellectual property" may include state trade secrets claims. Thus, if a user posts trade secrets on your website or blog, the owner of those trade secrets may be able to sue you for your user's conduct.
For details on CDA 230, please see our Primer on Immunity and Liability for Third-Party Content Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
Each state has its own law relating to trade secrets. However, most U.S. states have adopted their own slightly modified version of the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA), so there is a good deal of uniformity among state laws on the subject. Choose your state from the list below for state-specific information on trade secrets law.
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The Arizona Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("AUTSA") is located at chapter 4 of title 44 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. AUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, AUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies.
A.R.S. § 44-401 defines the key terms of AUTSA:
Trade secret means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that both:
Only those secrets affording a demonstrable competitive advantage may be considered trade secrets, and value will be inferred if the owner can show that the information confers upon it an economic advantage over others in the industry. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke, 3 P.3d 1064, 1069-70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). The Arizona Court of Appeals has recognized as trade secrets both: a compilation of customer-service factors in managing a car-rental business; and financial records that the owner treated as secret, even if the information they contain is old or outdated. Id.
The Arizona Court of Appeals has indicated that trade secrets contained in public records may be protected by the confidentiality exception to Arizona's public records laws. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Keegan, 35 P.3d 105, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
Misappropriation means either:
Improper means includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy or espionage through electronic or other means. The Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled that use of secret documents legitimately obtained during employment after that employment has ended can constitute improper means. Ehmke, 3 P.3d at 1071.
Note that the First Amendment may protect you from civil liability or criminal prosecution for publishing trade secrets, provided you were not engaged in the improper conduct that led to the secrets' misappropriation. This potential protection stems from a case called Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). See Publishing Trade Secrets for more information about this case.
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Arizona is three years. See A.R.S. § 44-406.
Note: This page covers information specific to California. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The California Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("CUTSA") is located at sections 3426 to 3426.11 of the California Civil Code. CUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, CUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies. In addition, California law may impose criminal penalties for stealing trade secrets. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 499c, 502.
Cal. Civ. Code 3426.1 defines the key terms of CUTSA:
(a) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. Reverse engineering or independent derivation alone shall not be considered improper means.
(b) "Misappropriation" means:
(c) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(d) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If a court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in California is three years. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.6 (scroll down).
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("FUTSA") is located in chapter 688 of title XXXIX of the 2007 Florida Statutes. FUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, FUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies. In addition, Florida law may impose criminal penalties for stealing trade secrets. See Fla. Stat. § 812.081.
Fla. Stat. § 688.002 defines the key terms of FUTSA:
(1) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.
(2) "Misappropriation" means:
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Florida is three years. See Fla. Stat. § 688.007.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The Georgia Trade Secrets Act of 1990 ("GUTSA") is located at title 10, chapter 1, article 27 of the Georgia Code. GUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, GUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies. In addition, Florida law may impose criminal penalties for stealing trade secrets. See [Ga. Code § 16-8-13] (link is to entire code; you need to click through to title 16, chapter, 8, article 1, and then choose the specific provision).
Ga. Code § 10-1-761 (link is to entire code; you need to click through to title 10, chapter, 1, article 27, and then choose the specific provision) defines the key terms of GUTSA:
(1) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a confidential relationship or other duty to maintain secrecy or limit use, or espionage through electronic or other means. Reverse engineering of a trade secret not acquired by misappropriation or independent development shall not be considered improper means.
(2) "Misappropriation" means:
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other for profit or not for profit legal or commercial entity.
(4) "Trade secret" means information, without regard to form, including, but not limited to, technical or nontechnical data, a formula, a pattern, a compilation, a program, a device, a method, a technique, a drawing, a process, financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or available to the public and which information:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Georgia is five years. See Ga. Code § 10-1-766 (link is to entire code; you need to click through to title 10, chapter, 1, article 27, and then choose the specific provision).
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The Illinois Trade Secrets Act ("ITSA") is located at chapter 765 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. ITSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, ITSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies.
765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065/2 (scroll down) defines the key terms of ITSA:
(a) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a confidential relationship or other duty to maintain secrecy or limit use, or espionage through electronic or other means. Reverse engineering or independent development shall not be considered improper means.
(b) "Misappropriation" means:
(c) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other for‑profit or not‑for‑profit legal entity.
(d) "Trade secret" means information, including but not limited to, technical or non‑technical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers, that:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Illinois is five years. See 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065/7 (scroll down).
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The Indiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("IUTSA") is located at title 24, article 2, chapter 3 of the Indiana Code. IUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, IUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies.
Ind. Code § 24-2-3-2 (scroll down) defines the key terms of IUTSA:
"Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.
"Misappropriation" means:
"Person" means a natural person, limited liability company, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Indiana is three years. Ind. Code § 24-2-3- (scroll down).
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
Massachusetts has not adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which is discussed in the Basics of a Trade Secret Claim. Like the UTSA, however, Massachusetts law creates civil liability for acquisition of trade secrets through improper means. In addition, Massachusetts is one of the few states that imposes criminal liability for improper acquisition of trade secrets - unlawfully taking a trade secret is included in the definition of the crime of larceny and can result in imprisonment.
Massachusetts law defines a trade secret as "anything tangible or intangible or electronically kept or stored, which constitutes, represents, evidences or records a secret scientific, technical, merchandising, production or management information, design, process, procedure, formula, invention or improvement." Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 266, § 30. From a practical perspective, this definition of "trade secret" is similar to that discussed in Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
Unlike the Uniform Trade Secret Act, Massachusetts law does not use the word "misappropriation." Instead, it lists a number of activities that trigger civil liability:
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 42. It is not clear whether Massachusetts law prohibits publishing a trade secret while knowing that it was acquired by a source through improper means. Undoubtedly, you could be liable for publishing a trade secret if you personally obtained it through any of the improper means listed above.
The Massachusetts criminal statute relating to trade secrets prohibits the following activities:
Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 266, § 30. It does not look like the law makes it a crime to publish a trade secret, so long as you do not personally obtain it through any of the improper means listed above.
If a court finds that a defendant has unlawfully taken a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following penalties and remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Massachusetts is three years. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A .
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("MUTSA") is located in chapter 445 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. MUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, MUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1902 defines the key terms of MUTSA:
(a) “Improper means” includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach, or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy or espionage through electronic or any other means.
(b) “Misappropriation” means either of the following:
(c) “Person” means an individual, corporation, partnership, association, governmental entity, or any other legal entity.
(d) “Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that is both of the following:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Michigan is three years. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1907.
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
New Jersey has not adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which is discussed in the Basics of a Trade Secret Claim. In fact, New Jersey does not have a statute governing trade secrets law. Instead, it is based solely on the common law, which is the compilation of prior court decisions in the state. Like the UTSA, however, New Jersey law creates civil liability for "misappropriation" of someone else's trade secret(s). New Jersey's criminal laws relating to theft may also impose criminal liability for stealing trade secrets.
New Jersey courts have adopted the definition of trade secret from Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts: "A trade secret consists of a formula, process, device, or compilation which one uses in his business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." The Restatement of Torts explains further that a trade secret differs from other secret information in a business in that it is not simply information about single or ephemeral events, but rather a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. From a practical perspective, this definition of "trade secret" is similar to that discussed in Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
The general meaning of "misappropriation" under New Jersey law is not entirely clear because many of the cases focus on situations where former employees passed secrets to a competitor, but it looks like misappropriation can happen in two ways, discussed in detail in the Basics of a Trade Secret Claim. First, you commit misappropriation if you personally acquire a trade secret by improper means. "Improper means" includes criminal acts, such as theft, fraud, breaking and entering, trespass, and bribing and swindling, as well as acts taken to overcome measures put in place to maintain secrecy of the trade secret information, such as fraud, interference with contractual obligations, and breach of a contract in obtaining or using the trade secret. Reverse engineering and independent development are not "improper means." Second, you commit misappropriation if you publish a trade secret while knowing that the person who gave you the information acquired it through improper means or under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.
If a court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following penalties and remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in New Jersey is six years.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
New York has not adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which is discussed in the Basics of a Trade Secret Claim. In fact, New York does not have a statute governing trade secrets law. Instead, it is based solely on the common law, which is the compilation of prior court decisions in the state. Like the UTSA, however, New York law creates civil liability for "misappropriation" of someone else's trade secret(s). New York's criminal larceny statute may also impose criminal liability for stealing trade secrets.
New York courts have adopted the definition of trade secret from Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts: "A trade secret consists of a formula, process, device, or compilation which one uses in his business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." The Restatement of Torts explains further that a trade secret differs from other secret information in a business in that it is not simply information about single or ephemeral events, but rather a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. From a practical perspective, this definition of "trade secret" is similar to that discussed in Basics of a Trade Secret Claim. New York courts have adopted the definition of trade secret from Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts.
Under New York law, misappropriation consists of use or disclosure of a trade secret that was acquired through a relationship of trust (such as employment), or through fraud or other improper means, such as theft, bribery, or hacking. This definition appears to include publishing a trade secret while knowing that your source obtained it through improper means or in breach of a confidentiality agreement.
If a court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following penalties and remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in New York is three years.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act is located in chapter 66, article 24 of the North Carolina General Statutes. This Act is similar to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, The North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-152 defines the key terms of the Act:
(1)"Misappropriation" means acquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied authority or consent, unless such trade secret was arrived at by independent development, reverse engineering, or was obtained from another person with a right to disclose the trade secret.
(2)"Person" means an individual, corporation, government, governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(3)"Trade secret" means business or technical information, including but not limited to a formula, pattern, program, device, compilation of information, method, technique, or process that:
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("OUTSA") is located at chapter 1333 of title 13 of the Ohio Revised Code. OUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, OUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies.
Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.61 defines the key terms of OUTSA:
(A) “Improper means” includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.
(B) “Misappropriation” means any of the following:
(C) “Person” has the same meaning as in division (C) of section 1.59 of the Revised Code and includes governmental entities.
(D) “Trade secret” means information, including the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or improvement, or any business information or plans, financial information, or listing of names, addresses, or telephone numbers, that satisfies both of the following:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Ohio is four years. See Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.66.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
Enacted in 2004, the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("PUTSA") is located at chapter 53 of title 12 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. PUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, PUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies. In addition, Pennsylvania law may impose criminal penalties for stealing trade secrets. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3930 (link is to the entire code; you need to choose title 18, part II, article C, chapter 39, subchapter B, and then choose the specific provision).
12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5302 (link is to the entire code; you need to choose title 12, part V, chapter 53, and then choose the specific provision) defines the key terms of PUTSA:
"Improper means." Includes, but is not limited to, theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy or espionage through electronic or other means.
"Misappropriation." Includes:
"Person." A natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency or any other legal or commercial entity.
"Trade secret." Information, including a formula, drawing, pattern, compilation including a customer list, program, device, method, technique or process that:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Pennsylvania is three years. See 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5307 (link is to the entire code; you need to choose title 12, part V, chapter 53, and then choose the specific provision).
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
Texas has not adopted a version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which is discussed in the Basics of a Trade Secret Claim. In fact, Texas does not have a statute governing trade secrets law. Instead, it is based solely on the common law, which is the compilation of prior court decisions in the state. Like the UTSA, however, Texas law creates civil liability for "misappropriation" of someone else's trade secret(s). In addition, Texas law may impose criminal penalties for stealing trade secrets. See Texas Penal Code § 31.05.
Texas courts have largely adopted the definition of trade secret from Section 757 of the Restatement of Torts: "A trade secret consists of a formula, process, device, or compilation which one uses in his business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." The Restatement of Torts explains further that a trade secret differs from other secret information in a business in that it is not simply information about single or ephemeral events, but rather a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business. From a practical perspective, this definition of "trade secret" is similar to that discussed in Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
Under Texas law, misappropriation consists of use or disclosure of a trade secret that was acquired through a relationship of trust (such as employment), or through fraud or other improper means, such as theft, bribery, or hacking. This definition appears to include publishing a trade secret while knowing that your source obtained it through improper means or in breach of a confidentiality agreement.
If a court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a civil trade secret claim in Texas is three years. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.010.
As stated above, Texas also makes it a crime to steal trade secrets. Theft of a trade secret is a felony of the third degree. Third degree felony convictions in Texas carry a punishment of two to ten years in prison and a fine up to $10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.34.
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("VUTSA") is located at chapter 26 of title 59.1 of the Virginia Code. VUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, VUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies.
Va. Code § 59.1-336 defines the key terms of VUTSA:
Trade secret means information, including but not limited to, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
Misappropriation means:
Improper means includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, use of a computer or computer network without authority, breach of a duty or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.
Note that the First Amendment may protect you from civil liability or criminal prosecution for publishing trade secrets, provided you were not engaged in the improper conduct that led to the secrets' misappropriation. This potential protection stems from a case called Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). See Publishing Trade Secrets for more information about this case.
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Virginia is three years. See Va. Code § 59.340.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The Washington Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("WUTSA") is located at chapter 108 of title 19 of the Revised Code of Washington. WUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, WUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies.
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.108.010 defines the key terms of WUTSA:
(1) "Improper means" includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means;
(2) "Misappropriation" means:
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in Washington is three years. See Wash. Rev. Code § 19.108.060.
Note: This page covers information specific to the District of Columbia. See the Trade Secrets overview for more general information.
The District of Columbia Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("DUTSA") is located in chapter 4 of title 36 of the District of Columbia Official Code. DUTSA is largely identical to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For generally applicable information on trade secrets claims and defenses, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim and Publishing Trade Secrets.
Like the Uniform Trade Secret Act, DUTSA prohibits "misappropriation" of trade secrets and provides certain remedies.
D.C. Code § 36-401 defines the key terms of the Act:
(1) "Improper means" means theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.
(2) "Misappropriation" means:
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
For generally applicable information on how a trade secrets claim works, see Basics of a Trade Secret Claim.
If the court finds that a defendant has misappropriated a plaintiff's trade secret(s), it may impose the following remedies:
The statute of limitations for a trade secret claim in the District of Columbia is three years. See D.C. Code § 36-406.
Every time you publish something online, whether it's a news article, blog post, podcast, video, or even a user comment, you open yourself up to potential legal liability. This shouldn't come as too much of a surprise because the Internet, after all, is available to anyone who wishes to connect to the network, and even the smallest blog or most obscure discussion forum has the potential to reach hundreds of millions of people throughout the world.
Often the legal risks are small, but not always. The risks you could face when you publish online can take a number of forms, depending on what and how you publish. The sections that follow are not intended to make you an expert on media law, but merely to help you identify potential "red flags" so that when you publish something that might result in liability, you will know to be extra careful and will take the necessary steps to minimize your potential legal risks.
Let's start with the more obvious risks.
First, if you publish information that harms the reputation of another person, group, or organization, or inflicts emotional distress upon another person, you may be liable for "defamation" or "false light." Defamation is the term for a legal claim involving injury to reputation caused by false statements of fact and includes both libel (typically written or recorded statements) and slander (typically spoken statements). False light, which is similar to defamation, generally involves untrue factual implications about the subject that, although they might not hold the subject up to scorn or ridicule, nevertheless cause emotional distress. The crux of both of these claims is falsity; with very rare exceptions, truthful statements and implications that harm another's reputation will not create liability, although they may open you up to other forms of liability if the information you publish is of a personal or highly private nature. We explain the details of defamation and false light and provide some practical tips for avoiding defamation and false light claims in the section on Publishing Information that Harms Reputation.
Second, if you publish private or personal information about someone without their permission, you potentially expose yourself to legal liability even if your portrayal is factually accurate. For example, in most states you can be sued for publishing private facts about another person, even if those facts are true. The term "private facts" refers to information about someone's personal life that has not previously been revealed to the public, that is not of legitimate public concern, and the publication of which would be offensive to a reasonable person. This could include such things as writing about a person's medical condition, sexual activities, or financial troubles.
If you use someone else's name, likeness, or other personal attributes without their permission for an exploitative purpose you could also face liability for misappropriation or violation of the right of publicity. Usually, people run into trouble in this area when they use someone's name or photograph in a commercial setting, such as in advertising or other promotional activities. But, some states also prohibit use of another person's identity for the user's own personal benefit, whether or not the purpose is strictly commercial. We discuss the details of misappropriation/right of publicity and private facts claims and provide some practical tips for avoiding these claims in the section on Publishing Personal and Private Information.
Third, if you have web forums, allow reader comments, host guest bloggers on your site, or if you repost information that you receive from RSS feeds, section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA 230”) will likely shield you from liability for certain kinds of problematic statements made by your users, guests and other third-parties on your site. This important federal law protects you from tort liability for statements contained in these materials – and any other user-submitted content – you publish on your site. You will not lose this immunity even if you moderate or edit this content, whether for accuracy or civility, so long as your edits do not substantially alter the meaning of the original statements. Keep in mind that CDA 230 will only protect you if a third-party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website. It does not shield you from liability for your own statements. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Fourth, if you publish or use the creative work of others, their trademarks, or certain confidential business information without the permission of the owner, you may be exposing yourself to legal liability for violations of intellectual property law. Fortunately, if you allow your site's user to post this type of content you can protect yourself from copyright infringement claims (but not trademark or other intellectual property claims) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In order to take advantage of the DMCA, you must register an agent with the Copyright Office to receive notices of infringement, establish effective "notice-and-takedown" procedures, promptly remove content when a copyright owner notifies you that it is infringing, and have no knowledge that the material in question is infringing. We cover liability associated with copyright, trademark, and trade secrets, as well as the procedures you should follow under the DMCA, in the section on Intellectual Property.
Fifth, if you are a blogger or social media user who reviews or otherwise writes about products and services, the Federal Trade Commission has issued "Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising" that may impose disclosure requirements on you. These guidelines require that you disclose "material connections" you may have with a company whose products or services you "endorse." Without the legal jargon, this means that bloggers and social media users must disclose their relationship with a company when they are being paid or otherwise compensated by the company to comment favorably on its products or services. We cover these requirements in the section on Publishing Product or Service Endorsements.
Lastly, as you publish your work online you may want to correct things you have previously published. Your willingness to fix past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable and will likely diminish your liability for defamation and other potential legal claims. We explain the benefits of correcting your errors and provide some practical tips for handling requests to correct or remove material in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication.
When you publish online, whether it's on a blog, in a podcast, in a video you upload to YouTube, or simply in a comment on another's website, you might say or do something that harms the reputation of another person, group, or organization. Fortunately, not everything you publish that harms the reputation of others will open you up to legal liability. For example, you won't generally face legal liability if you simply state your opinion, even if your opinion is harsh, critical, or wildly off-base.
Nevertheless, if you find yourself about to publish something that could harm another's reputation, you should spend some time familiarizing yourself with the various laws that protect reputation. The sections that follow are not intended to make you an expert on libel law, but merely to help you identify potential "red flags" so that when you publish something that might negatively impact the reputation of another person, group, or organization, you will know to be extra careful and will take the necessary steps to minimize your potential legal liability.
First, ask yourself whether what you intend to publish would UPSET YOU if someone else were to publish the information about you. This simple test won't tell you for sure whether you will be liable if the information you publish turns out to be false, but it will get you focused on the statements that should be of greatest concern. Moreover, putting aside the legal implications of what you publish, statements that upset others are more likely to draw their ire and result in a lawsuit, even when they don't actually have a viable legal claim. Depending on what you say and how you say it, you will likely need to be concerned with two different, but related, legal doctrines that aim to protect against reputational harm:
Keep in mind that the republication of someone else's words can itself be defamatory. In other words, you won't be immune simply because you are quoting another person making the defamatory statement, even if you properly attribute the statement to it's source. For example, if you quote a witness to a traffic accident who says the driver was drunk when he ran the red light and it turns out the driver wasn't drunk and he had a green light, you can't hide behind the fact that you were merely republishing the witness' statement (which would likely be defamatory).
However, there is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect YOU if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
So, what should you do if you are facing the prospect of a lawsuit for defamation or false light?
First, familiarize yourself with the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability Associated with Harms to Reputation. While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when publishing online, there are a number of ways you can minimize the likelihood of your being on the receiving end of a defamation or false light lawsuit.
Second, if you think you've been improperly sued in retaliation for your speaking out on a public issue or controversy, you may be able to get the case dismissed or file a counter claim under your state's law protecting against Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP). If you are sued in a state that has an anti-SLAPP law, you may be able to end the lawsuit quickly and recover your costs and attorneys' fees.
Defamation is the general term for a legal claim involving injury to one's reputation caused by a false statement of fact and includes both libel (defamation in written or fixed form) and slander (spoken defamation). The crux of a defamation claim is falsity. Truthful statements that harm another's reputation will not create liability for defamation (although they may open you up to other forms of liability if the information you publish is of a personal or highly private nature).
Defamation in the United States is governed by state law. While the U.S. Constitution sets some limits on what states can do in the context of free speech, the specific elements of a defamation claim can -- and often do -- vary from state to state. Accordingly, you should consult your state's law in the State Law: Defamation section of this guide for specific information.
Generally speaking, a person who brings a defamation lawsuit must prove the following:
In cases involving public officials, public figures or matters of public concern, a plaintiff must prove that the statement was false. In cases involving matters of purely private concern, in many states the burden of proving truth is on the defendant. This is not to say that every detail you publish must be perfectly accurate to avoid liability. If you get a few minor details wrong, this will not necessarily negate the truth of what you say so long as the statement at issue is substantially true. See the section on Substantial Truth for more information.
Statements of pure opinion, which cannot be proven true or false, cannot form the basis of a defamation claim (e.g., a statement that Bill is a jerk, is clearly a statement of opinion).
Keep in mind that the republication of someone else's defamatory statement can itself be defamatory. In other words, you won't be immune simply because you are quoting another person making the defamatory statement, even if you properly attribute the statement to it's source. For example, if you quote a witness to a traffic accident who says the driver was drunk when he ran the red light and it turns out the driver wasn't drunk and he had a green light, you can't hide behind the fact that you were merely republishing the witness' statement (which would likely be defamatory).
On the other hand, if you repeat what someone else said or wrote in an official hearing or official document, there’s an important privilege that may protect you provided you attribute the information you gathered and are accurate in your reporting. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for information on this, and other, privileges.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect YOU if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Damages for Defamation
In most states, the plaintiff must also prove that the defamatory statement caused him or her actual damage. Actual damages include such things as the loss of a job because of the defamatory statement, but can also include mental anguish or suffering associated with the defamation. Some jurisdictions also recognize "per se" defamation, where damage is presumed if the defamatory statement relates to one of the following subjects:
See the State Law: Defamation section of this guide for specific information on what each state recognizes.
If a plaintiff succeeds in proving defamation, he or she is entitled to recover what is called compensatory damage, which is the payment of money to compensate the plaintiff for the wrong that has been done. This includes not only out-of-pocket expenses (e.g., doctor's bills), but also personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering, and lost wages and benefits if the defamation caused the plaintiff to lose employment. In limited circumstances, a plaintiff may also be able to recover punitive damages, which are awarded in addition to compensatory damages and are intended to punish the defendant.
Note that some states require that a plaintiff must first ask the defendant to correct or remove the defamatory statement in order to be entitled to certain types of damages. See the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication for more information.
Parallel Legal Claims Based on Allegedly False Statements
It is common for defamation plaintiffs to assert not only a claim for defamation, but also claims for infliction of emotional distress, interference with business relationships, etc., arising out of the same allegedly false statements. These parallel claims will ordinarily be subject to the same limitations, privileges and defenses as the main defamation claim. For more information, see our section on Other Falsity-Based Legal Claims.
As discussed elsewhere in this guide, there are substantial privileges and defenses available to defendants in defamation actions. The First Amendment and related state law doctrines that protect speech often present insurmountable obstacles for defamation plaintiffs. In response, plaintiffs often attempt to evade rather than overcome these obstacles by relabeling their defamation claims as another form of legal claim.
In lawsuits based upon allegedly false speech, it is common for plaintiffs to include a wide variety of ancillary claims in addition to their main defamation claim. Common additional claims include:
Each of these claims has its own elements and defenses, which an attorney can assist you to understand (see especially our section on "false light" claims). However, a number of courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have raised additional concerns when such claims are premised upon allegations that the defendant published a false statement that damaged the plaintiff's reputation -- i.e., the classic defamation lawsuit fact pattern.
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court considered claims brought against Hustler Magazine by high-profile preacher and pundit Jerry Falwell arising out of a parody ad that ran in the magazine. The claims based on the parody ad included defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress; a jury decided in Hustler's favor on the defamation claim, but awarded damages to Falwell on the emotional distress claim. The Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict for Falwell on the emotional distress claim, invoking constitutional standards applied in defamation cases to do so. Rejecting as irrelevant the distinction that emotional distress cases are concerned with an intent to injure feelings rather than reputation, id. at 52-53, the Court held that the First Amendment standards stated in the defamation case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan were equally applicable to Falwell's emotional distress claims as an essential protection for free speech. Id. at 53-56. Because Falwell had failed to prove "a false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice,'" the Court held that he was not entitled to recover damages for emotional distress. Id. at 56-57.
Subsequently, other courts have held that plaintiffs cannot evade constitutional and state law privileges and defenses for speech by recasting their defamation claims as different theories of tort. See, e.g., Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[A] plaintiff cannot evade the protections of the fair report privilege merely by re-labeling his claim."); Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) ("To evade the constitutional limitations on defamation suits by charging the alleged defamer with participation in a conspiracy, which is to say just by relabeling the tort, cannot be permitted."); Chaiken v. VV Pub. Corp., 119 F.3d 1018, 1034 (2nd Cir. 1997) ("[T]he Chaikens cannot avoid the obstacles involved in a defamation claim by simply relabeling it as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress."); Brown v. Hearst Corp., 54 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1995) ("it is not imaginable that [a false light claim] could escape the same constitutional constraint as [a] defamation claim"); Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 655, 39 F.3d 191, 196 (8th Cir. 1994) ([T]he malice standard required for actionable defamation claims during labor disputes must equally be met for a tortious interference claim based on the same conduct or statements. This is only logical as a plaintiff may not avoid the protection afforded by the Constitution ... merely by the use of creative pleading."); see also Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 324 (1991) ("A privilege which protected an individual from liability for defamation would be of little value if the individual were subject to liability under a different theory of tort.").
Therefore, if a plaintiff brings a variety of claims against you based upon allegedly false statements, you might be able to rely upon both defenses to the particular claims asserted as well as First Amendment and state law defenses to defamation (whether or not the plaintiff actually includes a specific defamation claim in his complaint).
On the other hand, it is unlikely that defamation defenses would apply to claims based upon true speech, such as publication of private facts, or intellectual property claims, such as trademark infringement or violations of the right of publicity. However, these claims are not related to injury to personal reputation; rather, they involve revelation of private information (for a private facts claim), damage to a brand or business (for a trademark claim), or misappropriation of the commercial value of one's name (for a right of publicity claim). If it appears that a plaintiff is attempting to use one of these theories of liability to sue you for damage to his or her individual reputation from an allegedly false statement, you probably would have a strong argument that such theories are simply inapplicable. Rather, the plaintiff would have to proceed instead on a defamation claim (with all of the burdens placed upon the plaintiff in such a case).
In order to be actionable, a defamatory statement must be "of and concerning" the plaintiff. This means that a defamation plaintiff must show that a reasonable person would understand that the statement was referring to him or her. Of course, if a blog post or online article identifies the plaintiff by name, this requirement will be easily met. The plaintiff need not be specifically named, however, if there are enough identifying facts that any (but not necessarily every) person reading or hearing it would reasonably understand it to refer to the plaintiff. For example, a statement that "a local policeman who recently had an auto accident had been seen drinking alcohol while on duty" would likely be actionable because the policeman could be identified based on his recent accident.
Group Libel
Accordingly, defamatory statements about a group or class of people generally are not actionable by individual members of that group or class. There are two exceptions to this general rule that exist when:
See Restatement (2d) of Torts, § 564A (1977).
As to the first exception -- statements about a small group -- courts have often held that an individual group member can bring a claim for defamation for statements directed at a group of 25 or fewer people. The 25-person line is not a hard-and-fast rule, but rather the way courts commonly distinguish between a group small enough for statements about the whole group to be imputed to individual members and one that is too large to support such an imputation.
The case of Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), provides a good illustration of this general rule. In that case, the defendants wrote that "most of the [Neiman-Marcus] sales staff are fairies" and that some of the company's saleswomen were "call girls." Fifteen of the 25 salesmen and 30 of the 382 saleswomen at the store brought suit for defamation. Applying New York and Texas law, the court held that the salesmen had a valid cause of action, but the saleswomen did not. Even though the statement referred to "most of" the salesmen, without naming names or specifying further, the statement could be understood to refer to any individual member of this small group. The group of saleswomen, however, was so large that a statement that some of them were "call girls" would not be understood as referring to any individual member of the group.
As to the second exception to the rule against group libel -- when circumstances point to a particular individual -- courts have allowed defamation claims where the statement is facially broad, but the context makes it clear that it referred to the plaintiff. For example, Bill Blogger may be able to claim defamation based on the statement "all bloggers who attended the most recent city council meeting payed bribes to the mayor," where Bill is the only blogger who attended the meeting and readers will therefore understand the statement as being a thinly veiled indictment of him.
A company or organization can be a defamation plaintiff. In fact, the largest jury verdict every awarded in a libel case came in a case brought by a business plaintiff.
Note that each state decides what is required to establish defamation, so you should review your state's specific law in the State Law: Defamation section of this guide for more information.
Fictional Works
A person may claim defamation by a literary or dramatic work intended as fictional if the characters in the work resemble actual persons so closely that it is reasonable for readers or viewers to believe that the character is intended to portray the person in question. A disclaimer that the work is fiction and does not depict any persons living or dead will not automatically foreclose a defamation claim, but it is still a good idea and may be used as evidence as to whether readers or viewers would be reasonable in concluding that it is a depiction of the plaintiff.
A defamatory statement is a false statement of fact that exposes a person to hatred, ridicule, or contempt, causes him to be shunned, or injures him in his business or trade. Statements that are merely offensive are not defamatory (e.g., a statement that Bill smells badly would not be sufficient (and would likely be an opinion anyway)). Courts generally examine the full context of a statement's publication when making this determination.
In rare cases, a plaintiff can be “libel-proof”, meaning he or she has a reputation so tarnished that it couldn’t be brought any lower, even by the publication of false statements of fact. In most jurisdictions, as a matter of law, a dead person has no legally-protected reputation and cannot be defamed.
Defamatory statements that disparage a company's goods or services are called trade libel. Trade libel protects property rights, not reputations. While you can't damage a company’s "reputation," you can damage the company by disparaging its goods or services.
Because a statement must be false to be defamatory, a statement of opinion cannot form the basis of a defamation claim because it cannot be proven true or false. For example, the statement that Bill is a short-tempered jerk, is clearly a statement of opinion because it cannot be proven to be true or false. Again, courts will look at the context of the statement as well as its substance to determine whether it is opinion or a factual assertion. Adding the words "in my opinion" generally will not be sufficient to transform a factual statement to a protected opinion. For example, there is no legal difference between the following two statements, both of which could be defamatory if false:
For more information on the difference between statements of fact and opinion, see the section on Opinion and Fair Comment Privileges.
Defamation Per Se
Some statements of fact are so egregious that they will always be considered defamatory. Such statements are typically referred to as defamation "per se." These types of statements are assumed to harm the plaintiff's reputation, without further need to prove that harm. Statements are defamatory per se where they falsely impute to the plaintiff one or more of the following things:
See Restatement (2d) of Torts, §§ 570-574. Keep in mind that each state decides what is required to establish defamation and what defenses are available, so you should review your state's specific law in the State Law: Defamation section of this guide for more information.
It is important to remember that truth is an absolute defense to defamation, including per se defamation. If the statement is true, it cannot be defamatory. For more information see the section on Substantial Truth.
Unlike other countries that hold a publisher liable for every defamatory statement regardless of what steps he or she took prior to publication, under U.S. law a plaintiff must prove that the defendant was at fault when she published the defamatory statement. In other words, the plaintiff must prove that the publisher failed to do something she was required to do. Depending on the circumstances, the plaintiff will either need to prove that the defendant acted negligently, if the plaintiff is a private figure, or with actual malice, if the plaintiff is a public figure or official.
Celebrities, politicians, high-ranking or powerful government officials, and others with power in society are generally considered public figures/officials and are required to prove actual malice. Unlike these well-known and powerful individuals, your shy neighbor is likely to be a private figure who is only required to prove negligence if you publish something defamatory about her. Determining who is a public or private figure is not always easy. In some instances, the categories may overlap. For example, a blogger who is a well-known authority on clinical research involving autism may be considered a public figure for purposes of controversies involving autism, but not for other purposes.
We discuss both of these standards and when they apply in this section.
In a legal sense, "actual malice" has nothing to do with ill will or disliking someone and wishing him harm. Rather, courts have defined "actual malice" in the defamation context as publishing a statement while either
It should be noted that the actual malice standard focuses on the defendant's actual state of mind at the time of publication. Unlike the negligence standard discussed later in this section, the actual malice standard is not measured by what a reasonable person would have published or investigated prior to publication. Instead, the plaintiff must produce clear and convincing evidence that the defendant actually knew the information was false or entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. In making this determination, a court will look for evidence of the defendant's state of mind at the time of publication and will likely examine the steps he took in researching, editing, and fact checking his work. It is generally not sufficient, however, for a plaintiff to merely show that the defendant didn't like her, failed to contact her for comment, knew she had denied the information, relied on a single biased source, or failed to correct the statement after publication.
Not surprisingly, this is a very difficult standard for a plaintiff to establish. Indeed, in only a handful of cases over the last decades have plaintiffs been successful in establishing the requisite actual malice to prove defamation.
The actual malice standard applies when a defamatory statement concerns three general categories of individuals: public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures. Private figures, which are discussed later in this section, do not need to prove actual malice.
The "public officials" category includes politicians and high-ranking governmental figures, but also extends to government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs. Courts have interpreted these criteria broadly, extending the public figure classification to civil servants far down the government hierarchy. For example, the supervisor of a county recreational ski center was held to be a "public official" for purposes of defamation law. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). Some courts have even extended the protection to all individuals engaged in matters of public health, such as hospital staff, given the importance of health issues for the general public. See Hall v. Piedmont Publishing Co., 46 N.C. App. 760, 763 (1980).
In general, if an individual is classified as a public official, defamatory statements relating to any aspects of their lives must meet the actual malice standard of fault for there to be liability. Moreover, even after passage of time or leaving office, public officials must still meet the actual malice standard because the public has a continued interest in the misdeeds of its leaders.
There are two types of "public figures" recognized under defamation law: "all-purpose" public figures and "limited-purpose" public figures.
All-purpose public figures are private individuals who occupy "positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figure for all purposes. . . . They invite attention and comment." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1972). For these individuals, the actual malice standard extends to virtually all aspects of their lives.
This category includes movie stars, elite professional athletes, and the heads of major corporations. Tom Cruise is one; that character actor you recognize instantly but can't quite name is probably not an all-purpose public figure.
As with public officials, the passage of time does not cause this class of individuals to lose their public figure status as long as the original source of their fame is of continued interest to the public.
Limited-Purpose Public Figures
The second category of public figures is called "limited-purpose" public figures. These are individuals who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974). They are the individuals who deliberately shape debate on particular public issues, especially those who use the media to influence that debate.
This category also includes individuals who have distinguished themselves in a particular field, making them "public figures" regarding only those specific activities. These limited-purpose public figures are not the Kobe Bryants, who are regarded as all-purpose public figures, but rather the journeymen basketball players of the league.
For limited-purpose public figures, the actual malice standard extends only as far as defamatory statements involve matters related to the topics about which they are considered public figures. To return to our basketball example, the actual malice standard would extend to statements involving the player's basketball career; however, it would not extend to the details of his marriage.
As regards figures who become prominent through involvement in a current controversy, the law is unfortunately rather murky. In general, emphasis is placed not on whether the controversy is a subject of public interest, but rather:
Keeping in mind the difficulty of making the determination of who is a limited-purpose public figure, we've collected the following cases which might be helpful. Courts have found the following individuals to be limited-purpose public figures:
Courts have found the following individuals not to be limited-purpose public figures (and therefore private figures):
Individuals who are considered to be limited-purpose public figures remain so as long as the public has an "independent" interest in the underlying controversy. Unlike all-purpose public figures, it is relatively easy for a limited-purpose public figure to lose his status if the controversy in which he is involved has been largely forgotten. But most will still maintain their status. For example, a woman who had publicly dated Elvis Presley over a decade earlier, but who had since married and returned to "private" life, was found to remain a public figure for stories related to her relationship with Presley. See Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d. 1238 (5th Cir. 1980).
Evaluating Public Officials, Public Figures, and Limited-Purpose Public Figures
A public official is a person who holds a position of authority in the government and would be of interest to the public even if the controversy in question had not occurred.
See this Chart of Public vs Private Individuals for additional examples.
Defining who is a public figure for purposes of First Amendment protections is a question of federal constitutional law, and therefore the federal courts say on the matter is decisive and binding on state courts. Accordingly, state courts cannot remove public-figure status from those who have been deemed public figures by the federal courts, but states can broaden the scope of the the classification. For example, while the Supreme Court has not spoken on the status of educators, most states have recognized teachers as a class of public figures. But some states, for example California, have not done so. Consult your State Law: Defamation section for specific guidelines on your jurisdiction.
Those who are not classified as public figures are considered private figures. To support a claim for defamation, in most states a private figure need only show negligence by the publisher, a much lower standard than "actual malice." Some states, however, impose a higher standard on private figures, especially if the statement concerns a matter of public importance. You should review your state's specific law in the State Law: Defamation section of this guide for more information.
A plaintiff can establish negligence on the part of the defendant by showing that the defendant did not act with a reasonable level of care in publishing the statement at issue. This basically turns on whether the defendant did everything reasonably necessary to determine whether the statement was true, including the steps the defendant took in researching, editing, and fact checking his work. Some factors that the court might consider include:
While you can't reduce your legal risks entirely, if you follow good journalistic practices you will greatly reduce the likelihood that you will be found negligent when publishing a defamatory statement. Review the sections in this guide on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability Associated with Harms to Reputation and Journalism Skills and Principles for helpful suggestions.
Review this list of examples to help understand the difference between public figures/officials, limited-purpose public figures, and private figures for purposes of defamation law.
Name | Type |
Town
Mayor
|
Public Official (A mayor is an elected official and therefore is a public official for purposes of defamation law.)
|
George
W. Bush
|
Public Official (The President of the United States is an elected official and therefore is a public official for purposes of defamation law.)
|
Laura
Bush
|
Public Figure (The President’s wife is a person who has pervasive power and influence in society and is therefore a public figure for purposes of defamation law.)
|
Paris
Hilton
|
Public Figure (Well-known celebrities have pervasive power and influence in society and are therefore public figures for purposes of defamation law.)
|
Bill
Gates
|
Public Figure (As the head of a major corporation and one of the richest men in the world, Bill Gates is a public figure for purposes of defamation law.)
|
Roger
Clemens
|
Public Figure or Limited-Purpose Public Figure (Roger Clemens is a well-known athlete and likely to be considered a public figure; at a minimum, he would be a limited-purpose public figure as to issues involving sports.)
|
Local
expert on teen suicide
|
Limited-Purpose Public Figure (The expert would be a limited-purpose public figure because she has distinguished herself in this particular field.)
|
Church
pastor who decries abortion
|
Limited-Purpose Public Figure (The pastor would be a limited-purpose public figure because he thrust himself to the forefront of a particular controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issue.)
|
Local
grocery store manager
|
Private Figure (Individuals who do not qualify as public officials/figures or limited-purpose public figures are private figures.)
|
Your shy neighbor
|
Private figure (Individuals who do not qualify as public officials/figures or limited-purpose public figures are private figures.) |
As a general rule, if you follow good journalistic practices and standards -- being thorough, fair, and accurate in what you publish, carefully attributing your sources and quotes, and not phrasing statements in such a way as to create implications that you do not intend or do not have the evidence to support -- this will minimize the likelihood that you will be successfully sued for defamation (honing these good habits has other benefits as well, as they will make your work more accurate and credible).
There are times, however, when even the most careful publisher can be sued for defamation. In such a situation, a number of defenses may be available to you depending on what you published and the source(s) you relied on for the information. The most important defense is "truth." If the statement at issue is substantially true, a defamation claim cannot succeed because you have a right to publish truthful information even if it injures another's reputation. But truth is not the only defense that may be available. For example, if you publish a defamatory allegation made by a party in a lawsuit, even if it turns out that the allegation is false, a defamation claim against you cannot succeed because you have a right to report on allegations made in court regardless of whether they are true. Similarly, statements by legislators on the floor of the legislature, or by judges while sitting on the bench are typically privileged and cannot support a cause of action for defamation, even if they turn out to be false.
Sometimes the reliance on these sources may result in the publication of defamatory falsehoods, but in publishing the information you are performing the vital civic function of making information available to the public and of playing a watchdog role with regard to the government and other interests in society. To deal with the tension between the possibility of defaming individuals and the importance of reporting the news and information in a timely manner, courts have developed a number of defenses which often called "privileges" by lawyers. Keep in mind, however, the privileges described below are not available in all circumstances or in every state, so you should also review your state's specific law in the State Law: Defamation section of this guide.
Possible privileges and defenses include:
"Truth" is an absolute defense against defamation. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 411 (1967). Consequently, a plaintiff has to provide convincing evidence of a defamatory statement's falsity in order to prove defamation.
The law does not require that a statement must be perfectly accurate in every conceivable way to be considered "true." Courts have said that some false statements must be protected for the wider purpose of allowing the dissemination of truthful speech. The resulting doctrine is known as "substantial truth." Under the substantial truth doctrine, minor factual inaccuracies will be ignored so long as the inaccuracies do not materially alter the substance or impact of what is being communicated. In other words, only the "gist" or "sting" of a statement must be correct.
The substantial truth defense is particularly powerful because a judge will often grant summary judgment in favor of a defendant (thus disposing of the case before it goes to trial) if the defendant can show that the statement the plaintiff is complaining about is substantially true, making the defense a quick and relatively easy way to get out of a long (and potentially expensive) defamation case.
Substantial truth can also be a flashpoint for libel cases involving public figures and officials who must show actual malice by the defendant in order to recover. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991), the plaintiff tried to argue that inaccurate quotations were evidence of actual malice. The Supreme Court refused to adopt such a stringent rule, noting the difficulty of taking notes and translating from recordings and the need to edit a speaker's comments into a coherent statement. The Court stated:
We conclude that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement. (citations omitted)
The Court went on to note the use of quotation marks to directly attribute inaccurate statements to the speaker "bears in a most important way on [this] inquiry, but it is not dispositive in every case." Generally speaking, a publisher is given more leeway for inaccuracies when he is interpreting his sources than when he is purporting to be providing a "direct account of events that speak for themselves." Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
Some examples of statements that courts have found to be "substantially true":
The right to speak guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution includes the right to voice opinions, criticize others, and comment on matters of public interest. It also protects the use of hyperbole and extreme statements when it is clear these are rhetorical ploys. Accordingly, you can safely state your opinion that others are inept, stupid, jerks, failures, etc. even though these statements might hurt the subject's feelings or diminish their reputations. Such terms represent what is called "pure opinions" because they can't be proven true or false. As a result, they cannot form the basis for a defamation claim.
This is not to say that every statement of opinion is protected. If a statement implies some false underlying facts, it could be defamatory. For example, stating that "in my opinion, the mayor killed her husband" is not likely to be a protected opinion. Couching false statements of fact as opinion or within quotes from other sources generally won’t protect you either. Nor will trying to cover yourself by saying that a politician “allegedly” is a drug dealer, or that your neighbor said the politician “is a drug dealer,” or that in your opinion, the politician is a drug dealer. A reader may well assume you have unstated facts to base your conclusion on, and it would be a defamatory statement if the implied facts turn out to be false.
All opinions that rely on underlying facts, however, are not necessarily outside the opinion privilege. If you state the facts on which you are basing your opinion, and the opinion you state could be reasonably drawn from those truthful facts, you will be protected even if your opinion turns out to be incorrect. For example, if you were to say "In my opinion, Danielle is failing out of school" it would likely lead your readers to assume that there are some unstated facts you relied on to draw your conclusion. Such a statement would not be protected, as the privilege does not protect back door entry of facts as "opinion" through innuendo. On the other hand, if you state "In my opinion, Danielle is failing out of school because she is a blond and the only thing I ever see her do at the library is check Facebook," this provides the reader with the information you are basing the opinion on, and allows the reader to come to his own conclusion.
Compare the following two statements:
The first example states true, non-defamatory facts upon which a reasonable conclusion (that Carol is an alcoholic) is based, and also emphasizes the limits of your knowledge (that you only saw Carol five times). It would be protected as a statement of opinion. Under the second example, readers would likely assume that there are unstated, defamatory facts upon which your conclusion is based. Therefore it would likely fall outside of the privilege.
Keep in mind that even if you state the facts you are relying on for your opinion, but those facts turn out to be false, the privilege will not apply. For example, if you say that "In my opinion, Danielle is failing out of school because she failed biology," the privilege would not apply if she got a C in biology.
To determine whether a statement is an opinion or a fact, courts will generally look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement and its publication to determine how a reasonable person would view the statement. Under this test, the difference between an opinion and a fact often comes down to a case-by-case analysis of the publication's context.
Distinguishing Between Statements of Fact and Opinion
In general, facts are statements that can be proven true or false; by contrast, opinions are matters of belief or ideas that cannot be proven one way or the other. For example, "Chris is a thief" can be proven false by showing that throughout his entire life Chris never stole anything. Compare that statement with "Chris is a complete moron." The latter is an opinion (or, technically, "a pure opinion"), as what constitutes a moron is a subjective view that varies with the person: one person's moron is not necessarily the next person's moron. Put another way, there would be no way to prove that Chris is not a moron. If a statement is a "pure opinion," it cannot be the basis for a defamation claim.
Of course, it is not always easy to determine whether a statement is a pure opinion. As we noted above, opinions that imply false underlying facts will not be protected. For example, stating that "Chris is insane" could be both a fact and an opinion. It could mean Chris has been diagnosed with psychosis and needs to be hospitalized in a mental institution; this could be proven false. It could also mean that Chris has wacky ideas that one doesn't agree with, which is an opinion. In determining which meaning the statement should be given, courts often rely on context and common-sense logic (or to phrase it in legalese, the "totality of circumstances" of the publication). For example, if one called Chris insane in a forum post as part of a heated argument over politics, the statement would likely be interpreted as an opinion.
Some examples of protected opinions include the following:
Keep in mind, however, that you can't make a statement an opinion merely by prefacing it with "in my opinion." Saying that "in my opinion, Alex stole ten dollars from the church collection basket" would lead most listeners to conclude you had evidence that Alex had indeed stolen the money, and that you intend the statement as one of fact rather than opinion. The courts do not give protection to false factual connotations disguised as opinions.
Context and the Totality of the Circumstances
In general, courts will look at the context and medium in which the alleged defamation occurred. For example, a statement is more likely to be regarded as an opinion rather than a fact if it occurs in an editorial blog as opposed to a piece of investigative journalism. The wider context may also provide a framework for the court: during the McCarthy-era witch hunts of the 1950s, for example, courts routinely held that referring to someone as a "Communist" was defamatory; in the present day, "communist" has taken on a more generalized (if still often derogatory) political meaning, and courts would almost certainly find use of the word to be a protected opinion.
The Internet presents particular issues for the courts, as it is a medium where the lack of face-to-face contact can often make judging the actual meaning and context of a publication difficult. Courts are likely to take into account the particular social conventions of the Internet forum at issue in evaluating a statement's context.
But much remains to be determined, such as how the courts would handle the nature of many discussion forums. A 2001 case that dealt with the opinion privilege is worth quoting at length as an indication of the approach courts may well take in determining whether an online posting is a statement of opinion or fact. In regards to a post on a financial bulletin board site the court noted:
Here, the general tenor, the setting and the format of [the] statements strongly suggest that the postings are opinion. The statements were posted anonymously in the general cacophony of an Internet chat-room in which about 1,000 messages a week are posted about [the particular company]. The postings at issue were anonymous as are all the other postings in the chat-room. They were part of an on-going, free-wheeling and highly animated exchange about [the particular company] and its turbulent history. . . . Importantly, the postings are full of hyperbole, invective, short-hand phrases and language not generally found in fact-based documents, such as corporate press releases or SEC filings. Global Telemedia International, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1267 (C.D.Cal., 2001).
In short, the court concluded that "the general tone and context of these messages strongly suggest that they are the opinions of the posters." Id. at 1267. It is likely that other courts will take a similarly broad view regarding Internet forums for purposes of the opinion privilege.
To summarize, the factors courts often use to determine whether a statement is a protected opinion are:
Note that each state decides what is required to establish defamation and what defenses are available, so you should review your state's specific law in the State Law: Defamation section of this guide to determine how the opinion privilege operates in your jurisdiction.
The fair report privilege may protect you from liability -- even if you publish something that is defamatory -- if you relied upon a official public document or statement by a public official for the false information, made clear that the document or statement was your source, and fairly and accurately used the source. This privilege enables you to freely report, for example, about what people say during a council meeting or from the witness stand during a trial or to quote from public records.
The fair report privilege's historic rationale has been to encourage public scrutiny of governmental activities through fair and accurate reporting of governmental proceedings. The defense allows you to report on government activity without bearing the overwhelming burden of first proving the truth of everything said in government documents and proceedings.
Keep in mind that not all states recognize the fair report privilege, so check your state's defamation section to confirm that you are covered. In those states that do recognize the privilege, it will generally apply where:
Sources Covered By the Fair Report Privilege
While each state can decide for itself what sources are covered by the fair report privilege, it generally applies to publicly available government records, official government reports, and statements made by government officials. Interim and unfinished government records and reports generally are not covered.
Examples where the fair report privilege would probably apply include:
The privilege would probably not apply to:
Many sources may fall into gray areas. In general, the privilege is more likely to apply if the statement or fact comes from a public figure acting in his official capacity or a final, public report. It is less likely to apply where the figure is more private or is acting outside of his official scope of duties, or where the report is more preliminary or is inaccessible to the public.
Further, each state defines the scope of the privilege differently. For example, some states extend the privilege to more private settings such as a meeting of a corporation's share holders. Please consult your state's defamation section for specifics.
Ensuring That Your Use of Sources is "Fair and Accurate"
Whether the statement is true or not does not matter for purposes of the fair report privilege: even if the witness whose testimony you relied on is later convicted of perjury, the privilege still applies if you accurately reported and attributed the testimony he provided in the first place. It would apply even if you had knowledge that the witness was lying in his testimony. The purpose of the privilege is to protect statements or facts from public sources that are newsworthy in and of themselves, regardless of their veracity.
Generally, courts will follow rules of accuracy that echo the "gist" and "sting" rule developed to test for "substantial truth." See the section on Substantial Truth for more information.
But what is critical is that you accurately report (or abridge fairly) the information: reporting that the witness said the defendant deliberately burned down the house when the witness had only said that the defendant accidentally dropped a match would not be protected by the fair report privilege. Be particularly careful when you are "translating" complex legalese. Further, be careful not to use quotations selectively. For example, if a witness in her testimony said she saw the defendant rob the store, then corrects herself thirty minutes later in the same testimony to indicate that she had really not seen the robbery, quoting only the first part would likely fall outside the fair report privilege.
In general, courts will look at whether you acted in "good faith," looking far more favorably at an honest mistake that was made in condensing a long, complex statement or document than at selective quotation that may be perceived as maliciously intending to portray the subject in the least favorable light possible. Not every fact must be included, but many courts will find the privilege lost if the overall reporting is too one-sided.
Where the court draws the line on fairness and accuracy varies by jurisdiction. Consult your state guide for specifics.
Although not widely adopted, the neutral reportage privilege is designed to protect the interests of the press in reporting on matters of public interest, which can often only be done by reporting accusations made by one public figure about another. Without a neutral reportage privilege, if you publish what another person has said or written and that statement turns out to be defamatory, you may be liable for defamation even if you stated that you believed the allegation was untrue. In other words, with limited exceptions, you step into the shoes of those whom you quote or republish on your site.
Keep in mind that not all states recognize the neutral reportage privilege or apply it to non-traditional publishers, so check your state's defamation section to confirm that you are covered. In those states that do recognize the privilege, it will generally apply where:
Edwards v. National Audubon Soc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977).
The privilege was first recognized in a 1977 case involving the New York Times, which reported accusations made by the National Audubon Society that a group of scientists were behaving as "paid liars" on the issue of whether DDT was harming bird populations. The story posed a dilemma. The reporter had a good sense that the Audubon Society had little or no evidence to back up its claims and that due to republisher liability he might well be liable for defamation if he published the story. But he also recognized that in his hands was a newsworthy story about an accusation made by a prominent organization. The court responded by recognizing a new form of First Amendment protection:
What is newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made. We do not believe that the press may be required under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy statements merely because it has serious doubts regarding their truth. Nor must the press take up cudgels against dubious charges in order to publish them without fear of liability for defamation. . . . The public interest in being fully informed about controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges without assuming responsibility for them.
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. The court explicitly stated that the reporter's knowledge of factual inaccuracies in the story was immaterial to whether or not the privilege applied.
Examples of the Neutral Reportage Privilege
Examples of instances where courts have applied the neutral reportage privilege include:
Differing State Approaches to the Neutral Reportage Privilege
Although the neutral reportage privilege has been adopted in some jurisdictions, few states have clear state-wide rulings on what the privilege entails. Even in those states that recognize the privilege, it can vary in important ways:
If you republish a news item from a "reputable news service," you may be covered by a privilege called the "wire service defense." This defense to a defamation claim is distinct from the immunity provisions in the section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (commonly referred to as CDA 230 immunity), which may also cover if you republish content from a third-party. See the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others for more information.
Generally speaking, in states that recognize the wire service defense, it will apply if:
In the Internet context, it is not clear how wide a net is cast by the term "reputable news agency." Traditional wire services such as the Associated Press and United Press International would likely be covered, but courts have not yet looked at the wire-service defense in light of RSS feeds and similar distribution tools.
Keep in mind that rewriting news items in a blog format will limit your ability to invoke the wire service defense. When you choose to modify and comment on the material, you will likely lose the ability to assert this defense.
Not all states recognize the wire service defense, so you should consult your state defamation section of this legal guide for more information.
"Statute of Limitations" is a term used by courts to describe the maximum amount of time plaintiffs can wait before bringing a lawsuit after the events they are suing over have occurred. This time limit is typically set by state statute and is intended to promote fairness and keep old cases from clogging the courts.
Each state sets it own time limits for bringing a lawsuit and a court will typically apply the appropriate statute of limitations of the state in which the suit is filed. A relatively short limitations period is an acknowledgment of the importance of free speech principles, since a short time period reduces the potential chilling effects of speech-challenging lawsuits.
Because each state has its own statute of limitations for defamation claims, which vary between one and three years, you should refer to the State Law: Defamation section to find out what the specific statute of limitations is in your state.
Determining When the Statute of Limitations Period Begins
Generally speaking, the limitations period begins to run when a defamatory statement is "published" (i.e., communicated to someone other than the plaintiff).
This rule is relatively easy to apply when a defamatory statement is spoken to a third person. But what about situations where publication is to a mass audience, such as on the Internet? In these situations, could the statute of limitations begin anew at the time of each publication, such that the statute of limitations could restart every time someone reads a blog post or finds an archive copy of a newspaper in a library, even if the original material was published years ago?
Single Publication Rule
Most states have adopted the so-called "single publication rule," which states that the statute of limitations period begins to run when a defamatory statement is first published. For example, if a magazine is distributed to thousands of news stands, only "one publication" is deemed to have occurred for purposes of the statute of limitations. As a result, the limitations period begins when the magazine was initially made available, not when an extra copy of it left over on the news stand is sold two weeks later.
However, the single publication rule is not absolute. If the purported defamatory content is re-published to a substantially different audience or is altered in a substantial way, a new statute of limitations period may begin to run. For example, if the material in a magazine is incorporated into a book, a new statute of limitations period will likely begin when the book is published.
Most states have applied the single publication rule to the Internet. Generally, the statute of limitation period begins when a defamatory statement is first made available online. Courts will likely find re-publication has started a new statute of limitations period only when online material is altered in a significant way: be careful to consider this if you are thinking of substantially editing or rewriting old material. See your individual state section for information on whether the state recognizes the single publication rule.
Choose a state from the list below for state-specific information on defamation law. For general information on defamation and false light, see the section on Publishing Information that Harms Another's Reputation.
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
In Arizona, the elements of a defamation claim are:
Morris v. Warner, 160 Ariz. 55, 62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
To be “defamatory,” a statement must be false and bring the defamed person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or impeach her honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation. Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 162 Ariz. 335, 341 (Ariz. 1989).
These elements of a defamation claim in Arizona are similar to the elements discussed in the general Defamation Law section, with the following exceptions:
Defamation Per Se
Arizona distinguishes between statements that constitute libel per se and libel per quod. Libel per se are written communications which “on their face and without the aid of any extrinsic matter” tend to “bring any person into disrepute, contempt or ridicule” or “impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation.” Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 220‑21 (Ariz. 1941). In contrast, libel per quod consists of written communications which “on their face do not fall within the definition [of defamation] but which by reason of special extraneous circumstances actually do.” Id. at 221.
Arizona also distinguishes between statements that constitute slander per se and slander per quod. In Arizona, a statement that does any of the following is slander per se:
Modla v. Parker, 495 P.2d 494, 4 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972). Slander per quod are “all slanderous utterances which are not slanderous per se.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 1, 6 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) approved as supplemented by Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9 (Ariz. 1986).
The distinction between libel per se and per quod and slander per se and per quod matters because it effects the type of damages a plaintiff must allege to prevail. To recover for libel or slander per quod, a plaintiff must allege special damages, i.e., lost profits or other "pecuniary loss." Boswell, 152 Ariz. 1, 6 n.4. In contrast, to recover for libel or slander per se, a plaintiff does not have to allege special damages and may instead allege non-pecuniary damages, such as damage to his reputation. Moreover, in cases of libel or slander per se, damages may be presumed if:
Public Officials
Arizona courts have considered whether certain lower-level government employees qualify as public officials. They have held that the following individuals, among others, are public officials:
Public Figures and Limited-Purpose Public Figures
In Arizona, to classify a person as a public figure, the person must have achieved “‘such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.” Dombey, 150 Ariz. at 480 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).
The Arizona Supreme Court has recognized that an individual may become a limited-purpose public figure for a certain event or controversy when he “‘voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy. . . .’” Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
In determining whether a person is a limited-purpose public figure, Arizona courts will consider whether the person has “‘thrust[] himself or his views into public controversy to influence others’” and whether the person’s “‘position with respect to matters of public concern gives him access to the media on a regular and continuing basis.’” Id. at 483 (quoting Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979).
The Arizona Supreme Court has held that a person “‘is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention.’” Id. (quoting Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). Rather, the person must voluntarily assume a position that invites attention. Id. at 485 (quoting McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 950 (3rd Cir. 1985). In that regard, the Court has stated that “doing business with the government, being swept up in a controversy over an issue of public interest or concern, being named in articles creating a public controversy, and defending oneself against charges leveled in the media are all insufficient to automatically transform a private individual into a public figure.” Id. at 484.
Arizona courts and the 9th Circuit have held the following individuals, among others, to be limited-purpose public figures:
On the other hand, Arizona courts have found the following individuals and organizations, among others, to be private figures:
Actual Malice and Negligence
Arizona courts apply a negligence standard to defamation claims brought by private figures seeking compensatory damages. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 315 (Ariz. 1977).
Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on the standards and terminology mentioned in this subsection.
Arizona courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and the fair report privilege.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Fair Comment PrivilegeIn Arizona, the fair comment privilege “is limited to discussions of matters which are of legitimate concern to the community as a whole because they materially affect the interests of all the community.” Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church, 103 Ariz. 582, 595 (Ariz. 1968). If actual malice is shown, however, the privilege is defeated. Id.
The fair comment privilege protects both media and non-media defendants when the plaintiff is a public official. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that regardless of the defendant's media status, "when the plaintiff is a public official and the speech is of public concern, [then] the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that a statement is provably false before an action for defamation can lie." Turner v. Devlin, 174 Ariz. 201, 205 (1993).
The Arizona Supreme Court in the past has also explicitly recognized pure opinion as protected speech. MacConnell v. Mitten, 131 Ariz. 22, 25 (1981) (finding a statement "was pure opinion and not actionable"). It is unclear whether this recognition survived Turner and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1993), however.
Fair Report Privilege
In Arizona, the precise scope of the fair report privilege, also known as the public records privilege, is not clear because there is only one case in which the Arizona courts have applied the privilege.
In Sallomi v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 160 Ariz. 144, 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals of Arizona held that the “public records privilege” applied to articles which were “a fair and accurate abridgment of the public records used.” In that case, the Arizona Republic published articles about the apprehension of a hitman at a local restaurant, which it described as a “hangout for narcotics dealers and users” owned by a man being investigated for fraud and attempted extortion. Id. at 145. The owners of the restaurant filed suit for defamation. The information in the articles was obtained from interviews with police officers, affidavits submitted to support searches of various locations, a grand jury indictment, and a booking slip on file at the Phoenix Police Department. Id. at 145‑46. The Court reviewed the articles, the search warrant affidavits, grand jury indictment, and booking slip and concluded that although the newspaper may have relied on interviews with police officers, which are not a public record, because the information obtained was available in the affidavits, indictment, and booking slip, the privilege applied. Id. at 146‑47.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The CMLP has not identified any cases in Arizona concerning the neutral reportage privilege. If you are aware of any, please contact us. The 9th Circuit has mentioned the adoption of the neutral reportage privilege in other jurisdictions but does not appear to have specifically adopted it itself. See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2002).
Wire Service Defense
A federal district court in Arizona has applied the wire service defense in at least one case. In In re Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Ariz. 1996), the court held that the defense applied to an ABC-affiliate in Phoenix that broadcast an edition of “Prime Time Live” but played no part in the planning, reporting, production, or editing of the broadcast.
Retraction or CorrectionBy statute in Arizona, the type of damages a plaintiff may recover from a newspaper, magazine, or radio or television broadcaster can be limited by the publication of a retraction. A.R.S. § 12‑653.02 provides:
In an action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper or magazine, or of a slander by radio or television broadcast, the plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages [i.e. damages with respect to the plaintiff’s property, business, trade, profession or occupation] unless a correction is demanded and not published or broadcast, unless the plaintiff shall prove the publication or broadcast was made with actual malice. The plaintiff shall serve upon the publisher at the place of publication, or broadcaster at the place of broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected. The notice and demand shall be served within twenty days after actual knowledge of the plaintiff of the publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous.
If a correction is demanded within the time period prescribed by A.R.S. § 12‑653.02 and a correction is not published or broadcast within three weeks, the plaintiff may recover damages for loss of reputation and punitive damages if she can prove actual malice. A.R.S. § 12‑653.03.
The applicability of the retraction statute in all cases in questionable because the Arizona Supreme Court has held that the retraction statute violates art. 18, § 6 of the Arizona constitution to the extent that it eliminates “general damages for both loss of reputation and emotional harm, preventing those damaged by defamation from recovering general damages for actual injury.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 19 (Ariz. 1986).
The retraction statute also does not apply not apply “to any publication or broadcast made within thirty days preceding any election, if such publication or broadcast is designed to in any way influence the results of such election.” A.R.S. § 12‑653.05.
At least one federal court in Arizona has stated that the retraction statute applies only to “libel actions based on newspaper or magazine articles” and does not apply to comments made on an online forum. Dealer Comp. Servs. v. Fullers’ White Mt. Motors, Inc., No. CV07-00748-PCT-JAT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83311 at *19 (D. Ariz. Oct. 16, 2008).
Other Statutory Protections for Periodicals and BroadcastersA.R.S. § 12‑653 provides:
An action for damages shall not lie against the editor, publisher, or proprietor of a newspaper or periodical for publication of a report, proceedings or other matter published at the instance of a public officer acting in compliance with law.
A.R.S. § 12‑652 provides:
- The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and the agents or employees of the owner, licensee or operator, shall not be liable for damages for a defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast by one other than the owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless it is alleged and proved by the complaining party that the owner, licensee, operator or agent or employee has failed to exercise due care to prevent publication or utterance of the statement in the broadcast. The exercise of due care shall be construed to include a bona fide compliance with federal law or regulations of a federal regulatory agency.
- An owner, licensee or operator, or the agents or employees of such owner, licensee or operator of a station or network of stations shall not be liable for damages for defamatory statements published or uttered over the facilities of such station or network by or on behalf of a candidate for public office.
- In an action for damages for a defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, the complaining party shall be allowed only the actual damages alleged and proved.
CMLP has not identified any Arizona cases in which these statutes have been applied. If you are aware of any, please contact us.
The statute of limitations for defamation is one (1) year. See A.R.S. § 12‑541. The Court of Appeals of Arizona has stated that the general rule is that the statute of limitations begins to run upon publication; however, the Court has also created an exception to the general rule and held that the statute of limitations may instead begin to run upon discovery “in those situations in which the defamation is published in a manner in which it is peculiarly likely to be concealed from the plaintiff, such as in a confidential memorandum or a credit report.” Clark v. Airesearch Mfg. Co. of Ariz., Inc., 138 Ariz. 240, 242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
By statute, the single publication rule applies in Arizona. See A.R.S. § 12-651. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section of this guide.
The CMLP is not aware of any cases in Arizona that apply the single publication rule in the context of a statement published on the Internet. If you are aware of any Arizona cases that acknowledge the single publication rule in the Internet context, please notify us.
Note: This page covers information specific to California. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
Defamation, which consists of both libel and slander, is defined by case law and statute in California. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 44, 45a, and 46.
The elements of a defamation claim are:
Publication, which may be written or oral, means communication to a third person who understands the defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the person to whom reference is made. Publication need not be to the “public” at large; communication to a single individual other than the plaintiff is sufficient. Republishing a defamatory statement made by another is generally not protected.
*As a matter of law, in cases involving public figures or matters of public concern, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove falsity in a defamation action. Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland, 47 Cal. App. 4th 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). In cases involving matters of purely private concern, the burden of proving truth is on the defendant. Smith v. Maldonado, 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 646 & n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). A reader further points out that, even when the burden is technically on the plaintiff to prove falsity, the plaintiff can easily shift the burden to the defendant simply by testifying that the statements at issue are false.
Defamation Per Se
A plaintiff need not show special damages (e.g., damages to the plaintiff's property, business, trade, profession or occupation, including expenditures that resulted from the defamation) if the statement is defamation per se. A statement is defamation per se if it defames the plaintiff on its face, that is, without the need for extrinsic evidence to explain the statement's defamatory nature. See Cal. Civ. Code § 45a; Yow v. National Enquirer, Inc. 550 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
For example, an allegation that the plaintiff is guilty of a crime is defamatory on its face pursuant to Cal. Civil Code § 45a. In one case, a non-profit organization (NPO) that advocates for the rights of low-income migrant workers posted flyers claiming a national retailer of women's clothing engaged in illegal business practices by contracting with manufacturers that did not pay minimum wage or overtime. The retailer brought a defamation suit against the NPO. Although the statements would have qualified as defamation per se, the court concluded the retailer failed to establish the statements in the flyers were false, and therefore the statements could not be considered defamatory. See Fashion 21 v. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rights of L.A., 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
Public Officials
In California, public officials are those who have, or appear to the to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs. For example, the following persons have been considered public officials in California:
Public Figures
In California, to classify a person as a public figure, the person must have achieved such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. Someone who voluntarily seeks to influence resolution of public issues may also be considered a public figure in California. For example, the following persons have been considered public figures in California:
Limited-Purpose Public Figures
A limited-purpose public figure is a person who voluntarily injects herself or is drawn into a particular public controversy. It is not necessary to show that she actually achieves prominence in public debate; her attempts to thrust herself in front of the public is sufficient. Copp v. Paxton, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 831, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). As with all limited-purpose public figures, the alleged defamation must be relevant to the plaintiff's voluntary participation in the public controversy (if the issue requires expertise or specialized knowledge, the plaintiff's credentials as an expert would be relevant).
In California, the following persons have been considered limited-purpose public figures:
Actual Malice and Negligence
In California, a private figure plaintiff bringing a defamation lawsuit must prove that the defendant was at least negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements. Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on the standards and terminology mentioned in this subsection.
California courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including the fair report privilege, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and substantial truth.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Fair Report Privilege
California courts have codified the fair report privilege in Cal. Civil Code §47(d) and (e). The privilege generally applies to publicly available government records, official government reports, and statements made by government officials.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The California Supreme Court has not formally recognized the neutral reportage privilege. Nevertheless, several federal courts have applied the neutral report privilege in cases involved California law and there are relatively strong indications that state courts in California would apply the privilege if faced with the proper fact pattern.
The California Supreme Court indicated a possible willingness to consider the neutral report privilege in the context of public figure defamation. In that case, which involved an allegation that the plaintiff, a private citizen, participated in the Robert Kennedy assassination when he was 21 years old, the California Supreme Court held that the neutral report privilege did not apply to cases where the plaintiff was a private figure. Khawar v. Globe International, 19 Cal. 4th 254, 271 (Cal. 1998). The court left open the question, however, whether the neutral report privilege would apply if the defamatory statement involved a public figure.
In addition, several lower California courts have expressed support for the privilege without directly ruling that the privilege applies. See Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 148 (1980); Grillo v. Smith, 144 Cal. App. 3d 868, 872 (1983); Stockton Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 3d 966, 981 (1988); Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 732-33 n.18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
Although their application of the privilege is not binding on California state courts, two federal courts in the state have applied the neutral reportage privilege in situations involving the following:
Wire Service Defense
The wire service defense generally is not recognized in California. However, one trial court in California did recognize the wire service defense in an unpublished decision. Peper v. Gannett Co., Inc., No. 2002061753, 2003 WL 22457121 at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2003). Since the decision was at the trial court level and unpublished, other California courts are free to disregard the court's decision to apply the wire service defense.
California's statute of limitations for defamation is one (1) year. See California Code of Civil Procedure 340(c).
California applies the single publication rule pursuant to California Civil Code 3425.1-3425.5. A California Court of Appeals recognized the single publication rule in the context of publications on the Internet. Traditional Cat Ass'n, Inc. v. Gilbreath, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 353, 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section of this guide.
Note: This page covers information specific to the District of Columbia. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
According to District of Columbia law, defamation claims have four elements:
See Jankovic v. International Crisis Group, 429 F.Supp.2d 165, 173-4 (D.D.C. 2006). The elements of a defamation claim in the District of Columbia are similar to the elements listed in the general Defamation Law section, with the following exceptions:
Defamation Per SeIn the District of Columbia, any written or printed statement that falsely accuses someone of committing a crime constitutes defamation per se. See Raboya v. Shrybman & Associates, 777 F.Supp. 58 (D.D.C. 1991). If a statement is defamation per se, the court will assume harm to the plaintiff's reputation, without further need to prove that harm.
The District no longer allows presumed damages for defamation per se directed at public figures, following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See El-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 496 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming unpublished lower court decision implying that presumed damages are no longer available for public figures). The court in El-Hadad noted that D.C. law provides for presumed damages for defamation per se directed at private figures.
Public FiguresFederal courts in D.C., applying D.C. law, have ruled that corporate plaintiffs are considered public figures as a matter of law in lawsuits against mass media defendants that involve "matters of legitimate public interest." See Oao Alfa Bank v. Center for Public Integrity, 387 F.Supp.2d 20, 48 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing other cases). The opinions of federal district courts are not definitive on the meaning of D.C. law, but other cases might choose to follow this rule. Should they decide to do so, then any corporation -- no matter how large -- would have to prove actual malice in order to prevail in such cases. There is no reason to believe this rule would not apply to lawsuits involving citizen media defendants because the underlying rationale focuses on the characteristics of corporations, not those of the defendant in the lawsuit.
Actual Malice and NegligenceIn the District, a private figure plaintiff bringing a defamation lawsuit must prove that the defendant was at least negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements. Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on these standards.
District of Columbia courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including the wire service defense, the fair report privilege, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and substantial truth.
It is not clear whether the D.C. courts recognize the neutral reportage privilege.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Fair Report Privilege
D.C. courts recognize the the fair report privilege. The privilege is applied broadly to statements made during proceedings before any court, agency, executive body, legislative body, and to reports of any official proceeding or action taken by a government officer or agency.
Wire Service Defense
D.C. recognizes the wire service defense, which precludes defamation liability for speakers who republish content from wire services. D.C. also recognizes the reverse of the standard wire service defense: wire services may rely on content from reputable newspapers without being held negligent. See Winn v. UPI, 938 F.Supp. 39 (D.D.C. 1996).
Neutral Reportage Privilege
District of Columbia courts have not ruled definitively on the availability of the neutral reportage privilege.
In White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that it had not yet recognized the neutral reportage privilege, although the court seemed to express a favorable view of it. At least one lower D.C. court has applied the privilege. See In re United Press Intern, 106 B.R. 323 (D.D.C. 1989) (news reports were immune from defamation liability under neutral reportage). In an earlier case, a federal district court held that the neutral report privilege would not apply to a case involving statements about a private figure. See Dressbach v. Doubleday & Co., 8 Media L. Rep. 1793 (D.D.C. 1982).
The District's statute of limitations for defamation is one (1) year. See D.C. Code Sec 12-301(4).
The District has adopted the single publication rule. See Jin v. Ministry of State Secretary, 254 F.Supp. 2d 61, 68 (D.D.C. 2003). For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section of this guide.
In Jankovic v. International Crisis Group, 494 F.3d 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2007), the D.C. Circuit held that the single publication rule applies to statements posted on the Internet, and that the statute of limitations runs from the date of first publication absent "republication" of the allegedly defamatory statement by updating it or taking steps to expand the audience for it. While the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has not ruled on the issue as a matter of state law, it is likely that other D.C. courts would apply this holding. Therefore, the statute of limitations in Internet cases should run from the date of first posting, absent some modification that triggers "republication."
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
Under Florida law, the elements of a defamation claim are:
Border Collie Rescue v. Ryan, 418 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1348 (M.D.Fla. 2006). A plaintiff must also prove that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence. The elements of a defamation claim in Florida are similar to the elements discussed in the general Defamation Law section, with the following exceptions:
Defamation Per SeIn Mid-Florida Television Co. v. Boyles, 467 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the state no longer recognizes presumed damages for defamation per se in lawsuits against media defendants. (Defamation "per se" refers to a legal doctrine which holds that some statements of fact are so egregious that a court will presume that they harmed the plaintiff's reputation.) The CMLP is not aware of any Florida cases deciding whether a blogger or non-traditional journalist is a "media defendant" for purposes of applying this rule. In cases involving matters of purely private concern, a Florida court could still presume damages based on defamation per se. In Florida, a statement amounts to defamation per se if it accuses the plaintiff of committing a crime or imputes to the plaintiff conduct, characteristics, or a condition incompatible with the proper exercise of his or her lawful business, trade, profession, or office.
Public and Private FiguresFlorida has a broad conception of public officials, a category of government actors who must prove actual malice in order to prevail on a defamation claim. The Florida Supreme Court found a police officer to be a public official where he was a "highly visible representative of government authority who has power over citizens and broad discretion in the exercise of that power." Smith v. Russell, 456 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1984). Florida courts have found that a corrections officer, an administrator of large public hospital, and even a harbormaster were public officials.
Criminal LibelUnlike most states, Florida still recognizes criminal libel. Chapter 836 of the Florida Statutes does not define the elements of criminal libel, but it does specifically prohibit false statements that harm a bank or other financial institution's reputation or accuse a female of being unchaste. To the extent that the statute remains valid, criminal libel is a first-degree misdemeanor. However, a Florida appeals court found Fla. Stat. § 836.11 -- which deals with anonymous defamation of individuals or religious groups -- to be unconstitutional. State v. Shank, 795 So.2d 1067 (Fla.Ct.App., 4th Dist. 2001).
Actual Malice and NegligenceIn Florida, a private figure plaintiff bringing a defamation lawsuit generally must prove that the defendant was at least negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements. Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on these standards.
Florida courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, the fair report privilege, and the wire service defense. The Florida Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized the neutral reportage privilege, but lower court cases have recognized it.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The Florida Supreme Court has not formally recognized the neutral reportage privilege, but there are indications that Florida would recognize it. Two lower court cases have endorsed the privilege. See Smith v. Taylor County Pub. Co., 443 So. 2d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Huszar v. Gross, 468 So. 2d 512, 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Both cases recognized the privilege even in instances where the plaintiff is a private figure. The Court of Appeals for Florida's Third District spoke favorably of these cases. See Brake & Alignment Supply Corp. v. Post-Newsweek Stations of Florida, Inc, 472 So. 2d 517, 518 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985).
Florida's statute of limitations for defamation is two (2) years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(g).
Florida applies the single publication rule. See Fla. Stat. § 770.07. For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
To our knowledge, Florida appellate courts have considered the application of the single publication rule to the Internet on only one occasion, in Rudloe v. Karl, No. 1D03-4651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2004). In that opinion, the District Court of Appeal for the First District wrote that the single publication rule applies to Internet content, and that the statute of limitations does not reset every time that a new user accesses allegedly defamatory material. However, after a rehearing, this opinion was withdrawn by the court and superseded by an opinion that did not address statute of limitations issues. Accordingly, while the original opinion might suggest the manner in which Florida courts would apply the single publication rule to online speech, the opinion itself has no precedential value and should not be cited in court. If you are aware of any additional Florida cases that address the single publication rule in the Internet context, please notify us.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
In Georgia, the elements of a defamation claim are:
These elements of a defamation claim in Georgia are similar to the elements listed in the general Defamation Law section, with the following exceptions:
Defamation Per Se
Georgia recognizes that certain statements constitute defamation per se. These statements are so egregious that they will always be considered defamatory and are assumed to harm the plaintiff's reputation, without further need to prove that harm. Under Georgia statutes, a statement is defamatory per se if it:
Georgia courts have interpreted defamation per se to include statements “that one is guilty of a crime, dishonesty or immorality,” Eidson v. Berry, 415 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), or that accuse one “of having sexual relations with any person other than his wife,” Baskin v. Rogers, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). The courts have narrowed the criteria for defamation of a business person by adopting the “single instance test.” A plaintiff has no grounds for a complaint if the alleged defamatory statement refers to only a single instance of mistake or ignorance on the part of a business or professional person. See Crown Andersen, Inc. v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 554 S.E.2d 518, 521 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
Who Can Sue For Defamation
Georgia recognizes no “right of action for defamation of a deceased person.” Saari v. Gillett Communications of Atlanta, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 736, 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). However, if a defamation plaintiff dies after suit is filed, the representative of the deceased plaintiff's estate may continue the lawsuit. Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 13 S.E. 250, 252 (Ga. 1891).
Limited-Purpose Public Figures
Georgia follows Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), in defining public figures. The Georgia Court of Appeals refined its test for limited-purpose public figures in the well-known case of Richard Jewell, the security guard during the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta who was first hailed as a hero for discovering a knapsack bomb in Centennial Olympic Park, but later was investigated by the FBI as a possible suspect in placing the bomb. In the court's view, by granting a series of media interviews in which he attempted to influence public perception of security at the park, Jewell became a voluntary limited-purpose public figure for purposes of his libel suit against an Atlanta newspaper. See Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
The Georgia Court of Appeals adopted a three-part test for determining who is a limited-purpose public figure: “the court must [1] isolate the public controversy, [2] examine the plaintiff's involvement in the controversy, and [3] determine whether the alleged defamation was germane to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy.” Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d at 183.
Actual Malice and Negligence
In Georgia, a private figure plaintiff bringing a defamation lawsuit must prove that the defendant was at least negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements. Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on these standards.
Georgia courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the fair report privilege, and the opinion and fair comment privileges. The CMLP has not identified any cases in Georgia concerning the wire service defense. It is unclear whether Georgia courts recognize the neutral reportage privilege.
Most of the privileges and defenses to defamation in Georgia can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Fair Report Privilege
Fair and accurate reports of legislative and court proceedings are among the privileged communications protected by statute in Georgia. See Ga. Code Ann. §51-5-7(5), (6). This privilege also extends to fair, accurate, and impartial reports about administrative agency proceedings. Morton v. Stewart, 266 S.E.2d 230, 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). Georgia courts have generally, but not universally, held that the fair report privilege is qualified and can be defeated by proof of actual malice. Ga. Code Ann. §51-5-7(8) also provides a qualified privilege for truthful reports of information received from arresting officers or police authorities.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
Georgia courts have mentioned the "neutral reportage privilege" a handful of times, but they sometimes appear to confuse it with the fair report privilege and the statutory privilege for reporting information received from arresting officers or police authorities. At other times, Georgia courts use the term "neutral reportage" to describe whether a report is "fair and honest" for purposes of the fair report privilege. Because of this confusion, it is difficult to say whether Georgia recognizes the privilege as it is usually understood.
Wire Service Defense
The CMLP has not identified any cases in Georgia concerning the wire service defense. If you are aware of any Georgia cases, please notify us.
The statute of limitations for defamation is one (1) year. Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33.
Georgia has adopted the single publication rule. See Carroll City/County Hosp. Auth. v. Cox Enters., 256 S.E.2d 443, 444 (Ga. 1979). For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
In McCandliss v. Cox Enterprises, 595 S.E.2d 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), a Georgia appeals court held that the single publication rule applied to the posting of news articles on a newspaper's website. If other Georgia courts follow the McCandliss decision, the statute of limitations in Internet cases would begin to run from the date of first posting, absent a modification that triggers "republication."
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
Under Illinois law, the elements of a defamation claim are:
The elements of a defamation claim in Illinois are for the most part similar to the elements listed in the general Defamation Law section, with the following exceptions:
Defamation Per Se
Illinois recognizes that certain statements constitute defamation per se. These statements are so egregious that they will always be considered defamatory and are assumed to harm the plaintiff's reputation, without further need to prove that harm. In Illinois, a statement that does any of the following things amounts to defamation per se:
Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Pub'g Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 839 (Ill. 2006).
Actual Malice and Negligence
Illinois courts apply a unique "reasonable grounds" standard of negligence in defamation cases brought by private figures. This standard requires that the defendant either knew the publication was false or believed the publication was true but "lacked reasonable grounds for that belief." Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.2d 1984, 299 (Ill. 1975). Thus, the Illinois negligence test resembles a slightly more lenient "actual malice" test. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on the terminology and standards referenced here.
Illinois courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including the fair report privilege, substantial truth, and the opinion and fair comment privileges. Illinois has neither recognized nor rejected the wire service defense and the neutral reportage privilege.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Most of the privileges and defenses to defamation can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice. The fair report privilege is the exception to this rule; it cannot be defeated by a showing of actual malice. See Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Pub'g Co., 852 N.E.2d 825 (Ill. 2006).
Fair Report Privilege
In Illinois, the fair report privilege covers reports of official government proceedings and information contained in public records. This includes court proceedings and matters contained in court documents, as well as police reports, verbal statements by governmental officials in their official capacities, and things like marriage and divorce records, birth and death records, and property records. The privilege protects you if your report fairly and accurately reflects the official information. As noted, the privilege is absolute, and cannot be defeated by a finding of malice or actual malice.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The Supreme Court of Illinois has not recognized or rejected the neutral reportage privilege. Lower courts in Illinois do not agree on whether Illinois law recognizes the privilege. Therefore, its status remains uncertain.
Wire Service Defense
Illinois has only addressed the wire service defense in one case, Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Productions, Inc., 30 Media L. Rep. 1786 (N.D.Ill. 2002), but that case is not binding legal authority because it involved a federal court. It is worth noting, however, that the Illinois federal court recognized and applied the defense in that case and Illinois state courts may decide to follow suit.
The statute of limitations for defamation in Illinois is one (1) year. See 735 ILCS 5/13-201
Illinois has adopted the single publication rule by statute. See 740 ILCS 165/1. For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
The CMLP could not locate any cases in Illinois that apply the single publication rule in the context of a statement published on the Internet. If you are aware of any Illinois cases that acknowledge the single publication rule in the Internet context, please notify us.
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation section of this guide.
Under Indiana law, the elements of defamation claim are:
Bochenek v. Walgreen Co., 18 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D.Ind. 1998). A plaintiff must also prove that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence. These elements of a defamation claim in Indiana are for the most part similar to the elements listed in the general Defamation section, with the following exceptions.
Defamation Per Se
In Indiana, a communication constitutes defamation per se if it imputes:
Branham v. Celadon Trucking Services, Inc., 744 N.E.2d 514 (Ind.App.2001). In an Indiana claim involving defamation per se, the plaintiff does not need to prove actual damages.
Private Figures
Indiana applies the "actual malice" standard of fault in defamation claims involving private figures if the disputed statements are newsworthy or involve matters of public concern. Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido's, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 130 (Ind. 2006). Most states apply a negligence standard in defamation claims involving public figures. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on this standard.
Indiana courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and the fair report privilege. Indiana has not recognized or rejected the neutral reportage privilege and has not yet considered the wire service defense.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
Indiana has not explicitly recognized or rejected the neutral reportage privilege. The sole case law on the issue is a 7th Circuit decision that upheld an unpublished Indiana federal court judgment but declined to address the issue of neutral reportage. Woods v. Evansville Press Co., 791 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1986). The federal trial court had recognized and applied the privilege, but the 7th Circuit affirmed on other grounds.
Wire Service Defense
It appears that no Indiana case has considered the wire service defense. If you are aware of any Indiana cases, please notify us.
The statute of limitations for defamation in Indiana is two (2) years. See Indiana Code sec. 34-11-2-4.
Indiana is unusual in that its courts have held that the statute of limitations begins when the "damage" of the statement is "susceptible of ascertainment," rather than when the statement was published. Wehling v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840 (Ind. 1992). The Wehling court determined that this means the statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff knew about the harm caused by the disputed statements or would have known about the harm if she had exercised due diligence.
Indiana has no case law on whether or not the single publication rule applies. If you are aware of any Indiana cases that acknowledge the single publication rule in the Internet context, please notify us. For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation section of this guide.
In Massachusetts, the elements of a defamation claim are:
Carmack v. National R.R. Passenger Corp, 486 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.Mass 2007). A plaintiff must also prove that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence. These elements of a defamation claim in Massachusetts are similar to the elements listed in the general Defamation section, with the following exceptions:
Defamation Per Se
Massachusetts has abolished the separate category of defamation per se at least in part. Under state common law, any libel is actionable per se. Sharratt v. Housing Innovations, Inc., 365 Mass. 141 (Mass. 1974). This means that plaintiffs do not need to plead or prove economic losses in order to prevail on libel claims.
However, Massachusetts courts have continued to discuss defamation per se. It appears the state might still recognize libel per se when determining whether a statement "could damage the plaintiff's reputation in the community" -- which is part of the consideration of whether the statement is defamatory. Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.Mass. 2004); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849 (Mass. 1975). Libel per se in this context seems to encompass statements that charge the plaintiff with a crime, that allege the plaintiff has certain diseases, or that may prejudice the plaintiff's profession or business. Morton, 321 F. Supp. at note 3.
It also appears that Massachusetts still recognizes defamation per se in cases involving slander rather than libel. Ravnikar v. Bogojavlensky, 438 Mass. 627 (Mass. 2003). However, this is unlikely to arise in an Internet-based defamation action because online defamation almost always involves libel law.
Public Officials
In Massachusetts, any elected official holding public office is considered a public official for the purposes of defamation. Lane v. MPG Newspapers, 438 Mass. 476, 482-484 (Mass. 2003. This means that any elected official in public office -- no matter how small the scope of her duties -- must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice in order to prevail on a defamation claim. The Lane court found that an elected town representative was a public official though the representative's duties were limited to meeting with the rest of a 104-member committee once a year to vote on various town issues.
Criminal Libel
Massachusetts recognizes criminal libel as a common law offense, though it does not have a criminal libel statute. Commonwealth v. Clapp, 4 Mass. 163 (Mass. 1808). However, there does not appear to be any Massachusetts criminal libel case law since the Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Ashton v. Kentucky, which invalidated the Kentucky common law crime of criminal libel as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966). Following the Court's decision in Ashton, many states have repealed their criminal libel statutes or ceased to recognize the common law crime.
Massachusetts courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, the wire service defense, and the fair report privilege. Massachusetts has neither recognized nor rejected the neutral reportage privilege.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect YOU if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Substantial Truth
As a general matter, if a statement is substantially true, it cannot be actionable as defamation. See Milgroom v. News Group Boston, 412 Mass. 9, 12-13 (1992). Under Massachusetts statutory law, however, "truth shall be a justification unless actual malice is proved." M.G.L. c. 231 Section 92. This potential limitation on the truth defense is unlikely to be constitutional and, indeed, Massachusetts courts have held that it does not apply to cases involving public-figure or public-official plaintiffs or cases brought against media defendants that deal with matters of public concern. Materia v. Huff, 394 Mass. 328, 333 n.6 (1985); Shaari v. Harvard Student Agencies, Inc., 427 Mass. 129, 134 (1998). No court has applied the statute in a case brought by a private plaintiff that involves issues not of public concern.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
Massachusetts has not recognized or rejected the neutral reportage privilege. Reilly v. Associated Press, 797 N.E.2d 1204 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003).
The statute of limitations for defamation in Massachusetts is three (3) years. See M.G.L. c. 260 sec 4.
Massachusetts has adopted the single publication rule, defining publication as the time when a work is "first made widely available to the public". See Abate v. Maine Antique Digest, 17 Mass. L. Rep. 288 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004). The Abate court also explicitly extended the single publication rule to statements published on the Internet. For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
In Michigan, the elements of a defamation claim are:
These elements of a defamation claim in Michigan are similar to the elements listed in the general Defamation section, with the following exceptions:
Defamation Per Se
Defamation per se exists if the communication is false and imputes a criminal offense or lack of chastity. Unlike in many other states, defamation regarding one's business or profession is not defamation per se in Michigan. See George v. Senate Democratic Fund, 2005 WL 102717 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Pierson v. Ahern, 2005 WL 1685103 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
Public Figures and Officials
Under Michigan law, a public official is a person whose position is of such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in his qualifications or performance "beyond the general public interest in the qualification and performance of government employees." Peterfish v. Frantz, 168 Mich. App. 43, 52 (1988). A plaintiff must prove actual malice to recover for any subject matter that touches upon the official's fitness for office. A public figure is "a person who by his accomplishments, fame or mode of living, or by adopting a calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his activities, affairs, and character, has become a public personage." Arber v. Sahlin, 382 Mich. 300, 305 n.4 (1969).
In Michigan, the following persons have been considered public officials or figures:
Limited-Purpose Public Figure
A limited-purpose public figure is a person who voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy. However, a private person is not automatically transformed into a limited-purpose public figure merely by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention. A court will look to the nature and extent of the individual's participation in the controversy. New Franklin Enterprises v. Sabo, 480 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Mich. App. 1991).
In Michigan, the following persons have been considered limited-purpose public figures:
Michigan courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, opinion and fair comment privileges, wire service defense and the fair report privilege. Michigan has declined to adopt the neutral reportage privilege.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Fair Report Privilege
In Michigan, the fair report privilege has been codified in Mich. Comp. Law § 600.2911(3) (1961), which provides an absolute privilege against liability for fair and true reports of public and official proceedings. A report is fair and true if the "gist" is substantially true.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The neutral reportage privilege is not recognized in Michigan. The Michigan Court of Appeals declined to adopt the privilege stating "the press is adequately protected by the burden of proof" that the publication of a statement was made with actual malice, that is, knowing that it is false or acting with a reckless disregard for the statement's truth or falsity. Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). Michigan's Supreme Court has made only passing reference to neutral reportage, referring to the doctrine as "undefined." Rouch v. Enquirer & News, 487 N.W.2d 205, 208 n.3 (Mich. 1992).
Wire Service Defense
Michigan recognizes the wire service defense. See Howe v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 738 (Mich. App. Ct. 1996). The court in Howe offers a nice definition of the wire service defense in Michigan: "when a local media organization receives a wire service release, it has a duty to read the release to ensure that the face of the story itself does not contain any inconsistencies. The local media organization also has a duty to refrain from publishing the news story if the news organization knows the story is false or if the release itself contains unexplained inconsistencies. The local media organization does not have a duty, however, to independently verify the accuracy of the wire service release." Howe, 555 N.W.2d at 740-41.
The statute of limitations for defamation in Michigan is one (1) year. Mich. Comp. Law § 600.5805(7) (1961).
Each publication typically amounts to a separate cause of action in Michigan. See Grist v. Upjohn, 2 Mich. App. 72 (1965); Celley v. Stevens, 2004 WL 134000 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). Michigan courts have not decided whether the single publication rule applies in Michigan. For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation page.
Note: This page covers information specific to Missouri. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation section of this guide.
1. publication
2. of a defamatory statement
3. that identifies the plaintiff
4. that is false
5. that is published with the requisite degree of fault, and
6. damages the plaintiff's reputation
Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
The publication requirement is simply the communication of defamatory matter to a third person. An exception to the publication requirement exists for slander actions in Missouri where a person who utters defamatory matters intends, or has reason to suppose, that in the ordinary course of events the matter will come to knowledge of some third person. Mauzy v. Mex. Sch. Dist., 878 F. Supp. 153, 157 (E.D. Mo. 1995), citing Neighbors v. Kirksville College, 694 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). One who republishes defamatory facts is liable for that publication. Mortiz v. Kan. City Star Co., 258 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. 1953). There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party - not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction - posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
These elements of a defamation claim in Missouri are similar to the elements listed in the general Defamation section, with the following exceptions:
Defamation Per Se/Per Quod
The Missouri Supreme Court case of Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) eliminates the defamation per se/per quod distinction. In that case, the court abandoned the classifications of defamation per se and per quod, holding that "plaintiffs need not concern themselves with whether the defamation was per se or per quod, nor with whether special damages exist, but must prove actual damages in all cases." Id. at 313.
Defamatory Meaning
By statute, it is actionable to publish falsely and maliciously, in any manner whatsoever, that any person has been guilty of fornication or adultery. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.110 (2011).
In 1993, a false allegation of homosexuality was held to be defamatory. Nazeri at 312. It is not clear whether this would still be actionable now.
In order to find that a publication is defamatory, it must "be unequivocally so" and the words "should be construed in their most innocent sense." Walker v. Kan. City Star Co., 406 S.W. 44, 51 (Mo. 1966). In Ampleman v. Schweppe, 972 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), the court stated that "if a statement is capable of two meanings (one defamatory and one nondefamatory), and can reasonably be construed in an innocent sense, the court must hold the statement nonactionable as a matter of law." Id. at 333.
Of and Concerning the Plaintiff
Even if the plaintiff is readily identifiable in a particular publication, the plaintiff cannot sue for defamation unless the libelous portion of the publication is directed at him. May v. Greater Kansas City Dental, 863 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
Actual Malice
In order to recover for defamation, a public official/figure is required to show that the defendant acted with actual malice. Actual malice requires a showing that the libelous statements were published with actual knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard as to whether the statement as true or not. The Missouri Supreme Court has equated recklessness with disregard of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Glover v. Herald Co. 549 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
Application of the actual malice standard in defamation cases in Missouri is not limited to statements regarding public officials' performance of official acts. A public figure's private conduct is, in some cases, a matter of public concern. Westhouse v. Biondo, 990 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
Missouri cases have applied constitutional fault principles to statements made by non-media defendants, as well as those made by media defendants. Ramacciotti v. Zinn, 550 S.W.2d 217, 224 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); McQuoid v. Springfield Newspapers, Inc., 502 F. Supp 1050, 1054 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on the standards and terminology mentioned in this subsection.
Private Figure Standard
In Missouri, a private figure must show libelous statements were published by a defendant "at fault." The Missouri Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., as stating that the requisite degree of fault in a private figure defamation case is negligence. Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W. 3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
Damages
In a ruling rejecting the distinction between defamation per se and per quod (see above), the Missouri Supreme Court seems to have abandoned the doctrine of presumed damages. Nazeri v. Misssouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 313 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). "By allowing presumed damages for certain words but precluding actual damages for other words without the additional proof of special damages, we believe this rule of the past creates unjustifiable inequities for plaintiffs and defendants alike. We hold that in defamation cases the old rules of per se and per quod do not apply and plaintiff need only to plead and prove the unified defamation elements set out in MAI [i.e., the "Missouri Approved Instructions," the standard jury instructions used in Missouri courts] 23.01(1) and 23.01(2)." Nazeri at 313. See also Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Mo. 2003); Bauer v. Ribaudo, 975 S.W.2d 180, 182-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
Recent Missouri legislation says that punitive damages in any tort case may not exceed $500,000 or five times the net amount of any judgement awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant, whichever is greater. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 510.265 (2011).
The Missouri Supreme Court has held that a defamation plaintiff must prove impairment to reputation in order to recover any damages for defamation and that emotional distress alone will not suffice. Kenney v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 809, 814 (Mo. 2003).
Other Issues
Missouri has no criminal libel statute.
Missouri has not adopted the neutral reportage doctrine officially, although some cases show some recognition of a more limited privilege. Englezos v. Newspress & Gazette Co. 981 S.W.2d 25, 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). The Eighth Circuit has suggested adherence to the neutral reportage doctrine. Price v. Viking Penguin Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1434, 1444 (8th Cir. 1989).
Substantial Truth
At common law, truth was considered a complete defense to libel (i.e., the defendant would have the burden to prove truth). Mortiz v. Kan. City Star Co., 258 S.W.2d 583 (Mo. 1953); Bartulica v. Pasculdo, 411 F. Supp 392, 397 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
Now falsity must be proven by the plaintiff, at least in cases where the defendant is a member of the media. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). "Under the controlling constiutional standards, public officials, public figures and private persons using media defendants [for libel] must establish that the defendant published a false statement of fact." Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial if the defamatory charge is true in substance. Brown v. Biggs, 569 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
Wire Service Defense
Missouri recognizes that a newspaper has the right to reply upon and to republish information obtained from "reputable and properly-regarded-as reliable news services" where (1) the matters republished are of public significance and occur many miles away and (2) the reporter did not act with actual malice. Walker v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 271 F.Supp. 364 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1968).
Fair Reportage Privilege
Missouri has adopted this privilege in the exact language provided in the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 611:
The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report or an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.
"Actual malice" is irrelevant under the Section 611 privilege. The privilege fails only when the report is not a fair and accurate account of the proceedings. Williams v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 706 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
Opinion
The Missouri Supreme Court, considering the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990),rejected a blanket defense for protected opinion and established instead the following test:
"The test to be applied to ostensible 'opinion' is whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statement implies an assertion of objective fact. ...The issue of falsity relates to the defamatory facts implied by a statement -- in other words, whether the underlying statement about the plaintiff is demonstrably false... But neither 'imaginative expression' nor 'rhetorical hyperbole' is actionable as defamation."
Nazeri at 314 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, a Missouri appellate court has since held that generally any statement preceded by a phrase such as "it is my position" or "it is my belief" or other cautionary phrases are, as a matter of law, opinion. Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). "Put plainly, it is impossible to interpret statements preceded by such cautionary lanugage as positing a verifiable proposition, and verifiability is the crux of the fact/opinion distinction in defamation law." Pape at 380-81. The Pape court also held that "[a] statement must be verifiable at the time it is issued in order to be one of fact." Id. at 381.
In State ex. rel. Diehl v. Kintz, 162 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005), the Missouri Court of Appeals, while recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court "has rejected the notion that there is a wholesale defamation exception for anything that might be labeled opinion" as a matter of federal constitutional law, held that "a statement may only suggest to the ordinary reader that the defendant disagrees with the plaintiff's conduct and used pejorative statements or vituperative language to express this disapproval. ... 'Courts should also examine the statements themselves to determine whether they are too imprecise.'" Id. at 155, quoting Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 789 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
See the general page on fair comment and opinion for details on the standards and terminology mentioned in this subsection.
Other PrivilegesMissouri follows the "witness immunity" rule that witness statements made in litigation are absolutely privileged from defamation actions. Mershon v. Beasley, 994 F.2d 449, 454 (8th Cir. 1993).
There is also an "intra-corporate immunity" rule in Missouri where "communications between officers or employees of a corporation in the regular course of business, or between different offices of the same corporation" are not publications for defamation purposes. Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Mo. 1963); see also Perez v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 788 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). Communication by a corporation's officers or supervisors to non-supervisory employees constitute a publication for purposes of a defamation. Snodgrass v. Headco Indus. Inc., 640 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). However the intra-corporate immunity rule does not appear to be applicable to communications outside of the corporate context, for example partnerships.
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
In New Jersey, the elements of a defamation claim are:
See DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1267-68 (N.J. 2004). These elements of a defamation claim in New Jersey are similar to the elements listed in the general Defamation Law section, with the following exceptions:
Public and Private Figures
New Jersey follows the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), in determining who is a public official for purposes of defamation law. Under this test, the public official designation applies to "those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.” Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 643 A.2d 1012, 1021 (N.J. 1994) (quoting Baer). Reading this test expansively, New Jersey courts have consistently held that police officers are public officials. Other examples of public officials include a former school district athletic director, a tax assessor, a building inspector, an incumbent mayor.
New Jersey courts have a two-part test for deciding who is a limited-purpose public figure. First, the defamatory statement must involve a public controversy, namely a real dispute with an outcome that “affects the general public or some segment of it.” See McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 948 (3d Cir. 1985). Second, the court must consider “the nature and extent of plaintiff's involvement in that controversy.” See McDowell, 769 F.2d at 948. The following individuals, among others, have been held to be limited-purpose public figures in New Jersey:
Actual Malice and Negligence
When a private figure plaintiff sues for defamation over statements of purely private concern (i.e., not related to a matter of legitimate public concern), New Jersey courts require the plaintiff to show that the defendant was at least negligent. In cases involving matters of legitimate public concern, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures also must prove actual malice. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on the standards and terminology mentioned in this subsection.
New Jersey courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the fair report privilege, and the opinion and fair comment privileges.
In addition, New Jersey statutes recognize a privilege for cable television broadcasters who complying with their obligations under any State or Federal law, regulation, or policy requiring that broadcast services be made available to members of the public. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 48:5A-50.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Fair Report Privilege
The fair report privilege protects republishing “reports of defamatory statements made in judicial and other official proceedings,” in the interest that information from official proceedings be made available to the public. Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 643 A.2d 1012, 1018 (N.J. 1994). The report need not be “exact in every immaterial detail”, only “substantially correct.” However, a publisher who omits exculpatory language from the official report and thereby conveys an erroneous impression will lose the privilege.
For example, the privilege will cover the publication of official statements regarding police investigations, issued by police department heads and county prosecutors, unless the plaintiff can prove actual malice in the publication. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:43-1.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
New Jersey courts do not recognize a neutral reportage privilege. However, the extensive protections available under the New Jersey fair report privilege are analogous to a neutral reportage privilege. See Costello, 643 A.2d at 1028 (N.J. 1994) (O'Hern, J., concurring).
Wire Service Defense
The CMLP has not identified any cases in New Jersey concerning the wire service defense.
New Jersey has a one (1) year statute of limitations for defamation. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-3.
New Jersey courts have adopted the single publication rule. Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 378 A.2d 1148, 1151 (N.J. 1977). For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
A New Jersey Superior Court has held that the single publication rule applies to Internet publications. See Churchill v. State, 876 A.2d 311, 319 (N.J. Super. Ct. App .Div. 2005). If other New Jersey courts follow the Churchill case, the statute of limitations should run from the date of first posting, unless more than merely technical changes are made to the website, triggering “republication.”
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
Under New York law, the elements of a defamation claim are:
See Dillon v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 34, 38 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1999). These elements of a defamation claim in New York are similar to the elements discussed in the general Defamation Law section, with the following exceptions:
Public and Private FiguresNew York courts rely heavily on the "vortex" notion of a limited-purpose public figure. See James v. Gannett Co., Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 415 (N.Y. 1976) ("The essential element underlying the category of public figures is that the publicized person has taken an affirmative step to attract public attention."). The definition of a limited-purpose public figure is covered in the general Actual Malice and Negligence section of this guide under the limited-purpose public figures discussion (scroll down to the topic heading "limited-purpose public figures"). The guide states a person becomes a limited-purpose public figure only if he voluntarily "draw[s] attention to himself" or uses his position in the controversy "as a fulcrum to create public discussion." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979). He must, therefore, "thrust himself into the vortex of [the] public issue [and] engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974). In New York, such figures have included candidates for public office, restaurants (for the purpose of food reviews), and religious groups.
Actual Malice and NegligenceWhen the plaintiff in a defamation lawsuit is a private figure and the allegedly defamatory statements relate to a matter of legitimate public concern, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted "in a grossly irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties." Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, 38 N.Y.S.2d 196, 199 (N.Y. 1975). This standard, which is a higher bar than negligence but lower than actual malice, focuses on an objective evaluation of the defendant's actions rather than looking at the defendant's state of mind at the time of publication.
At least one court has found that the same standard of fault applies to citizen or non-media defendants where the allegedly defamatory statements relate to a matter of legitimate public concern. See Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers, 107 A.D.2d 10 (N.Y.A.D. 2d Dep't 1985), aff'd 67 N.Y.2d 778 (N.Y. 1986) (no liability for letter to the editor unless writer was "grossly irresponsible").
In cases brought by private figure plaintiffs involving statements not related to a matter of legitimate public concern, New York courts apply a negligence standard.
To determine whether statements relate to a matter of legitimate public concern, New York courts view the allegedly defamatory statements in context of the writing as a whole. They ask whether the matter can be "fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern of the community" and distinguish this broad category of newsworthy matters from "mere gossip and prurient interest." Overall, the test is deferential to the reporter's judgment about whether a matter is of legitimate public concern. See Huggins v. Moore, 94 N.Y.2d 296, 302-03 (N.Y. 1999).
New York courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including the fair report privilege, the opinion and fair comment privileges, substantial truth, and the wire service defense. New York has not explicitly recognized or rejected the neutral reportage privilege.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Most of the privileges and defenses to defamation can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice. The fair report privilege is the exception to this rule; it cannot be defeated by a showing of actual malice.
Fair Report Privilege
New York has codified the fair report privilege into law. N.Y. Civ. Rights § 74. Under the statute, speakers cannot be held liable for giving a "fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other official proceeding." A report is "fair and true" if it is substantially accurate.
Wire Service Defense
New York recognizes a privilege that is similar to the wire service defense but explicitly extends protection to content originating from other sources in addition to wire services. Jewell v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 23 F.Supp.2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Under the privilege, courts will not hold republishers liable for reproducing defamatory content unless the republisher had or should have had "substantial reasons" to question the content's accuracy or the original speaker's good faith and reporting practices. See Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 531 (N.Y. 1980). Because courts applying these principles have dealt exclusively with traditional media entities such as newspapers and book publishers -- both as publishers and republishers -- it is not clear whether this privilege would apply to online speakers such as bloggers and citizen media websites.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The status of the neutral reportage privilege in New York is not settled. The New York Court of Appeals has neither recognized nor rejected the privilege, and the lower courts disagree on whether it is part of New York law.
The statute of limitations for defamation in New York in one (1) year. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 215(3).
New York has adopted the single publication rule. See Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 298 N.Y. 119 (1948). For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
The single publication rule applies to the Internet in New York, with the statute of limitations running from the time the defamatory content first appears online. "Republication" of the allegedly defamatory content will restart the statute of limitations. A "republication" occurs upon "a separate aggregate publication from the original, on a different occasion, which is not merely 'a delayed circulation of the original edition.'" Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. 2002). The New York Court of appeals has indicated that altering the allegedly defamatory content may trigger republication, and a lower court has held that moving web content to a different web address triggered republication. See Firth v. State, 306 A.D.2d 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
Defamation Per Se
North Carolina has a broad definition of libel per se. This term refers to statements so egregious that they will always be considered defamatory and are assumed to harm the plaintiff's reputation, without further need to prove that harm. In North Carolina, a statement that does any of the following things amounts to libel per se:
This last category of libel per se is quite broad and is not recognized by most other states.
Actual Malice and Negligence
In North Carolina, a private figure plaintiff bringing a defamation lawsuit must prove that the defendant was at least negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements. Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on the standards and terminology mentioned in this subsection.
North Carolina courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and the fair report privilege. The status of the wire service defense and the the neutral reportage privilege is unsettled.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Most of the privileges and defenses to defamation can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice. This does not apply to immunity under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. It is not clear whether actual malice defeats the fair report privilege in North Carolina.
Fair Report Privilege
In North Carolina, the fair report privilege protects accurate reports of government proceedings and public records. Among other things, the privilege applies to court proceedings and information contained in court documents. It also extends to reports of arrests and the charges upon which the arrests were based. See LaComb v. Jacksonville Daily News, 543 S.E.2d 219, 221 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). To take advantage of the privilege, your report must be a "substantially accurate acount." It is not clear whether a plaintiff can defeat the fair report privilege by proving that the defendant acted with actual malice.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The CMLP located no North Carolina cases addressing the neutral reportage privilege. If you know of any cases, please contact us.
Wire Service Defense
One North Carolina appeals court has recognized the wire service defense, but did not elaborate on its scope. See McKinney v. Avery Journal, Inc., 393 S.E.2d 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
The statue of limitations for defamation in North Carolina is one (1) year. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-54.
The CMLP has identified no North Carolina cases addressing whether the state follows the single publication rule, either online or off. For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section. If you are aware of any North Carolina cases that acknowledge the single publication rule in the Internet context, please notify us.
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
Defamation Per Se
Ohio recognizes that certain statements constitute defamation per se. These statements are so egregious that they will always be considered defamatory and are assumed to harm the plaintiff's reputation, without further need to prove that harm. Ohio has a broad definition of defamation per se. In contrast to most states, which limit defamation per se to three or four specific categories of statements, Ohio defines the term as any statement that "reflects upon the character of [the plaintiff] by bringing him into ridicule, hatred, or contempt, or affects him injuriously in his trade or profession.” Becker v. Toulmin, 138 N.E.2d 391, 395 (Ohio 1956). A statement can constitute defamation per se only if it conveys its negative meaning directly, not by innuendo or implication.
Public and Private Figures
A public official is a government employee or official whose position has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees. See Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ohio 1986). Ohio courts have found law enforcement officials to be public officials, including a sheriff, a deputy sheriff, a university police officer, a bailiff, a chief probation officer, and the chief of the criminal section of a city law department. Other examples of public officials include a county treasurer, a county engineer, a municipal law director, a city council member, and members of the Board of Education.
In defining all-purpose and limited-purpose public figures, Ohio courts follow Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1972). All-purpose public figures are those who have achieved pervasive fame and influence. Examples include celebrities, professional athletes, and similarly famous people.
A limited-purpose public figure is someone who injects himself or herself into a particular public controversy. The determination of whether a particular individual qualifies as a limited-purpose public figure depends on the (1) plaintiff's access to the media; and (2) the extent to which the plaintiff, by virtue of his or her position in the community or involvement in a matter of public concern, can be said to invite public comment or attention. Examples of individuals and organizations deemed limited-purpose public figures by Ohio courts include:
Actual Malice and Negligence
In defamation suits brought by private figure plaintiffs, Ohio courts require a plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant "failed to act reasonably in attempting to discover the truth or falsity or defamatory character of the publication." Landsdowne v. Beacon Journal Publ'g, 512 N.E.2d 979, 984 (Ohio 1987). The Ohio test is similar to an ordinary negligence standard, but the "clear and convincing evidence" standard requires the plaintiff to put forward strong evidence of negligence.
Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on the standards and terminology mentioned in this subsection.
Ohio courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and the fair report privilege.
The Ohio Supreme Court has declined to recognize the neutral reportage privilege. The CMLP could identify no Ohio cases concerning the wire service defense.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party -– not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction –- posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Fair Report Privilege
Ohio recognizes the fair report privilege, which is codified in two statutes, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2317.04 and 2317.05.
To take advantage of the fair report privilege, you do not need to quote the official record verbatim, but it must be a substantially accurate report, which means the report conveys the essence of the official record.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The Ohio Supreme Court has declined to recognize the neutral reportage privilege. See Young v. Morning Journal, 669 N.E.2d 1136, 1138 (Ohio 1996).
Wire Service Defense
The CMLP could not identify any cases concerning the wire service defense in Ohio. If you are aware of any cases, please contact us.
The statute of limitations for defamation in Ohio is one (1) year. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.11 (1981).
The status of the single publication rule in Ohio is not settled. For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation page.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
Although Pennsylvania courts invoke a complicated statutory definition found in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8341-8345 (see especially § 8343), in practice the elements of a defamation claim are similar to the elements discussed in the general Defamation Law section. However, Pennsylvania law has some characteristics that differ slightly from the general section's description of defamation law:
Public and Private Figures
Pennsylvania defines when a plaintiff is a public official, all-purpose public figure, and limited-purpose public figure in more-or-less the way described in the Actual Malice and Negligence section. Some examples of individuals deemed to be public officials or all-purpose public figures by Pennsylvania courts include:
Some examples of individuals deemed to be limited-purpose public figures by Pennsylvania courts include:
Some examples of individuals deemed to be private figures by Pennsylvania courts include:
Actual Malice and Negligence
In Pennsylvania, a private figure plaintiff bringing a defamation lawsuit must prove that the defendant was at least negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements. Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on these standards.
Pennsylvania courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and the fair report privilege.
Pennsylvania does not recognize the the neutral reportage privilege. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has neither recognized or rejected the wire service defense, but lower courts have consistently refused to recognize this defense.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Most of the privileges and defenses to defamation can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice. This does not apply to immunity under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
The Fair Report Privilege
Pennsylvania recognizes the fair report privilege. The privilege applies to reports and summaries of information contained in government reports or discussed in government proceedings. This includes court proceedings, court records, and open meetings. It also applies to government press releases, including police press releases.
The privilege applies to "fair and accurate" accounts of the underlying documents or proceedings. A report is fair and accurate if it is "substantially accurate." A plaintiff may overcome the fair report privilege by showing that the defendant acted with actual malice.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressly rejected the neutral reportage privilege. See Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48 (Pa. 2004).
Wire Service Defense
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has neither recognized or rejected the wire service defense, but lower courts have consistently refused to recognize this defense.
Pennsylvania has a one (1) year statute of limitations for defamation. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5523(1).
The state has adopted the single publication rule. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8341. For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
The CMLP could not locate any cases in Pennsylvania that apply the single publication rule in the context of a statement published on the Internet. If you are aware of any Pennsylvania cases that acknowledge the single publication rule in the Internet context, please notify us.
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. For general information concerning defamation, see the Defamation Law section of this guide.
In Texas, the elements of a defamation claim are
WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998). The elements of a defamation claim are for the most part similar to the elements discussed in the general Defamation Law section, with the following clarifications:
Public and Private Figures
Texas law defines when a plaintiff is a public official, all-purpose public figure, and limited-purpose public figure in more-or-less the way described in the general Actual Malice and Negligence section. Some examples of individuals deemed to be public officials or all-purpose public figures by Texas courts include:
Some examples of individuals deemed to be limited-purpose public figures by Texas courts include:
Actual Malice and Negligence
In Texas, a private figure plaintiff bringing a defamation lawsuit must prove that the defendant was at least negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statement. Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statement was false or recklessly disregarding its falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on these standards.
Texas courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and the fair report privilege. Although the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, many lower courts in Texas have recognized a privilege similar to the neutral reportage privilege.
The CMLP has not identified any cases in Texas that recognize the wire service defense.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect YOU if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Most of the privileges and defenses to defamation can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice. This does not apply to immunity under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.
Fair Report Privilege
In Texas, the fair report privilege protects a "fair, true, and impartial account" of various official proceedings and meetings, including:
One court has applied the fair report privilege to reporting based on a police department press release. See Freedom Commc'n v. Sotelo, 2006 WL 1644602 (Tex. App. June 15, 2006).
A plaintiff may overcome the fair report privilege by showing that the defendant acted with actual malice.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
The Texas Supreme Court has neither recognized or rejected the neutral reportage privilege. Many lower courts have recognized a similar privilege, without calling it "neutral reportage." Under the rule set forth in these cases, when the media reports on an accusation made by a third party, it can defend itself by showing that the accusation was in fact made and under investigation, rather than by showing that the underlying allegation was substantially true. See Dolcefino v. Turner, 987 S.W.2d 100, 109 (Tex. App. 1998). This privilege extends to investigations and accusations made by government and non-government actors and organizations. Proof of actual malice defeats this privilege.
Wire Service Defense
The CMLP has not identified any cases in Texas that recognize the wire service defense. If you are aware of any cases, please notify us.
Texas has a one (1) year statute of limitations for defamation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code sec. 16.002.
Texas has adopted the single publication rule. For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
Texas state courts have not yet considered whether the single publication rule applies to postings on the Internet, but a federal appeals court applying Texas law recently adopted it in the Internet context. See Nationwide Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2007). See also Hamad v. Center for the Study of Popular Culture, No. A-06-CA-285-SS (W.D. Tex. June 26, 2006) (adopting single pubication rule for Internet publications).
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. For general information concerning defamation, see the general Defamation Law section of this guide.
In Virginia, the elements of a defamation claim are
Defamation Per Se
Virginia recognizes that certain statements constitute defamation per se. These statements are so egregious that they will always be considered defamatory and are assumed to harm the plaintiff's reputation, without further need to prove that harm. In Virginia, a statement that does any of the following things amounts to defamation per se:
Fleming v. Moore, 221 Va. 884, 899 (1981).
Public and Private Figures
The Virginia courts generally require a high level of public activity before a plaintiff becomes a limited-purpose public figure. The definition of a limited-purpose public figure is covered in the general Actual Malice and Negligence section of this guide under the limited-purpose public figures discussion (scroll down to the topic heading "limited-purpose public figures"). In Virginia, courts look at the following factors in determining whether a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure:
Carr v. Forbes, Inc., 259 F.3d 273, 280 (2001)
In Virginia, the courts have found the following individuals, among others, to be limited-purpose public figures:
On the other hand, the courts have found the following individuals and organizations, among others, to be private figures:
Actual Malice and Negligence
Virginia courts apply a negligence standard to defamation claims brought by private figures seeking compensatory damages when the allegedly defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent. In cases brought by private figures where substantial danger to reputation is not apparent, the actual malice standard applies. The Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 725 (Va. 1985).
Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on the standards and terminology mentioned in this subsection.
Virginia courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and the fair report privilege.
CMLP has not identified any Virginia cases that recognize or refuse to recognize the neutral reportage privilege or the wire service defense. See Chapin v. Knight‑Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1097 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[w]e have never adopted or rejected the ‘neutral reportage' privilege . . . .")
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect YOU if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Fair Report Privilege
In Virginia, the precise scope of the fair report privilege is not clear because all of the cases interpreting it have involved reports of court proceedings. The privilege covers reports of court proceedings, including matters stated in court documents, when the report is made in good faith and substantially accurate.
In Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 93 S.E.2d 274, 279 (Va. 1956), the Virginia Supreme Court stated that "[t]he publication of public records to which everyone has a right of access is privileged, if the publication is a fair and substantially correct statement of the transcript of the record." Because the case involved court proceedings not other government records, this statement would not necessarily bind later courts, but it is likely that Virginia courts would apply the privilege to government records open to the public. In that case, you would be privileged to report on information contained in marriage and divorce records, birth and death records, and property records, among other things, in addition to matters reflected in court records and proceedings.
A few federal courts interpreting Virginia law have applied the fair report privilege to "governmental actions," like the unofficial public remarks of a member of Congress, Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1097, and an official letter of reprimand leaked to the press, Reuber, 925 F.2d at 713.
Neutral Reportage Privilege
CMLP has not identified any cases in Virginia concerning the neutral reportage privilege. If you are aware of any, please contact us.
Wire Service Defense
CMLP has not identified any cases in Virginia concerning the wire service defense. If you are aware of any, please contact us.
The statute of limitations for defamation is one (1) year. See Va. Code Ann. Sec. 8.01-247.1.
The Virginia Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the single publication rule applies in the state, although several Virginia circuit courts have cited the single publication rule favorably. See Armstrong v. Bank of Am., 61 Va. Cir. 131, 132 (2003) (noting circuit courts in Fairfax and Richmond, Virginia, that have cited the single publication rule favorably). For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section. One federal appeals court applying Virginia law upheld application of the single publication rule, reasoning that a great majority of states now follow it. Morrissey v. William Morrow & Co., Inc., 739 F.2d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1984).
The CMLP could not locate any cases in Virginia that apply the single publication rule in the context of a statement published on the Internet. If you are aware of any Virginia cases that acknowledge the single publication rule in the Internet context, please notify us.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. For general information concerning defamation, see the general Defamation Law section of this guide.
According to Washington law, defamation claims have four elements:
These elements of a defamation claim in Washington are for the most part similar to the elements listed in the general Defamation Law section. However, in Washington, the elements of a defamation claim have two characteristics that differ slightly from the general section's description of defamation law.
Public and Private FiguresWashington courts rely heavily on the "vortex" notion of a limited-purpose public figure. See Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 723 P.2d 863 (Wash. 1986). The definition of a limited-purpose public figure is covered in the general Actual Malice and Negligence section of this guide under the limited-purpose public figures discussion (scroll down to the topic heading "limited-purpose public figures"). The guide states a person becomes a limited-purpose public figure only if he voluntarily "draw[s] attention to himself" or uses his position in the controversy "as a fulcrum to create public discussion." Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979). He must, therefore, "thrust himself into the vortex of [the] public issue [and] engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
For example, a businessman who was involved in a commercial real-estate development project was considered a limited-purpose public figure in a defamation lawsuit against a newspaper which had printed articles about the development project that stated he was a tax felon. The court reasoned the businessman was a limited-purpose public figure because he “thrust himself into the vortex of [the] public issue” when he sent letters to residents of the real-estate development area telling the residents about the development project and advising them he would be updating them on its progress. Clardy v. Cowles Pub. Co., 912 P.2d 1078 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
Actual Malice and NegligenceWashington courts apply a negligence standard to defamation claims brought by private figures seeking compensatory damages when the allegedly defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.
Public officials, all-purpose public figures, and limited-purpose public figures must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice, i.e., knowing that the statements were false or recklessly disregarding their falsity. See the general page on actual malice and negligence for details on the standards and terminology mentioned in this subsection.
Failure to investigate is not sufficient to prove actual malice. You should be aware that when you do investigate and facts come to light that either do not support or rebut your factual assertion, the jury may infer recklessness and thus find actual malice if you go ahead and publish the information and it turns out to be false and defamatory. See Herron v. KING Broad. Co., 776 P.2d 98, 106 (Wash. App. Ct. 1989).
Washington courts recognize a number of privileges and defenses in the context of defamation actions, including substantial truth, the opinion and fair comment privileges, and the fair report privilege.
The status of the neutral reportage privilege is unclear and CMLP has not identified any cases in Washington concerning the wire service defense.
There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that may protect you if a third party – not you or your employee or someone acting under your direction – posts something on your blog or website that is defamatory. We cover this protection in more detail in the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others.
Most of the privileges and defenses to defamation can be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice. The fair report privilege is the exception to this rule; it cannot be defeated by a showing of actual malice. Alpine Indus. Computers, Inc. v. Cowles Pub. Co., 57 P.3d 1178, 1188 (Wash. App. Ct. 2002).
Fair Report Privilege
Washington recognizes the fair report privilege. The privilege extends to accurate reports of court proceedings, as well as documents filed in those proceedings. See Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1981). A plaintiff cannot defeat the fair report privilege by a showing othat the defendant acted with actual malice. Alpine Indus. Computers, Inc. v. Cowles Pub. Co., 57 P.3d 1178, 1188 (Wash. App. Ct. 2002).
Neutral Reportage Privilege
It is unclear whether the neutral reportage privilege exists in Washington.
The Washington Supreme Court noted the existence of the neutral reportage doctrine and that there was a "modern" trend towards rejecting it, but declined to rule on the privilege as neither party had raised the issue. Herron v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 736 P.2d 249, 260 (Wash. 1987).
However, at least one lower court recognized the neutral reportage privilege in a case involving a newspaper publishing defamatory allegations concerning a businessman made by anonymous union sources. Senear v. Daily Journal American, 8 Media L. Rep. 2489, 2492-93 (Wash. Super Ct. 1982).
Wire Service Defense
CMLP has not identified any cases in Washington concerning the wire service defense. If you are aware of any cases, please contact us.
The statute of limitations for defamation in Washington is two (2) years. See Wash. Rev. Code sec. 4.16.100.
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted the single publication rule. Herron v. KING Broad. Co., 746 P.2d 295 (Wash. 1987). For a definition of the "single publication rule," see the Statute of Limitations for Defamation section.
The CMLP could not locate any cases in Washington that apply the single publication rule in the context of a statement published on the Internet. If you are aware of any Washington cases that acknowledge the single publication rule in the Internet context, please notify us.
False light is one of the four categories of "privacy torts" (the others being misappropriation, intrusion, and publication of private facts). While the nature of false light claims vary by state, they generally protect people from offensive and false facts stated about them to the public.
Not all states recognize claims for false light. In the states that do recognize a cause of action for false light, the specific requirements to raise a claim vary. Accordingly, you should review your individual state section listed at the bottom of this page for specific information about your state.
Generally speaking, a false light claim requires the following:
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E.
Distinguishing Between False Light and Defamation Claims
False light is similar to defamation. Most states that allow false light claims recognize some differences between false light and defamation, but there is still a great deal of overlap. In fact, a number of states do not recognize false light claims at all because of the overlap with defamation and because the vague nature of the tort might chill free speech.
Several states that allow both false light claims and defamation claims differentiate the two by saying they protect people against different harms flowing from false statements. These states indicate that defamation protects a person's public reputation while false light remedies the victim of a false statement for his or her emotional distress.
Some states, including California, hold that unlike defamation, false light concerns untrue implications rather than directly false statements. For instance, an article about sex offenders illustrated with a stock photograph of an individual who is not, in fact, a sex offender could give rise to a false light claim, even if the article and photo caption never make the explicit false statement (i.e., identifying the person in the photo as a sex offender) that would support a defamation claim.
Several states view false light as more narrow than defamation in certain respects -- that is, someone might be able to sue for defamation but not false light. For instance, false light requires broad publication to many people, while a defamatory statement could be made to only a few people. Some states note that false light requires the statement in question to be highly offensive to a reasonable person, while defamation does not require offensiveness so long as the statement actually harmed the reputation of the plaintiff. Finally, a number of states require the plaintiff to make a stronger showing that the defendant is at fault for false light than for defamation.
Avoiding False Light Claims
False light lawsuits often arise on the margins of stories, rather then at their core. For example, one might use a stock photo of a particular street to illustrate a story on local prostitution, and inadvertently create the impression that a person caught at random in the photo was frequenting the prostitutes. Be careful in what you use to illustrate your work.
Always be careful to check all your facts. Document the support you have for all of the information you publish. Statements that seem innocuous or harmless to you may offend a reader and could give rise to a lawsuit if they are also false.
When working online, be particularly mindful of the formatting of your site. Be sure that your website doesn't get reformatted in such a way as to create an unwitting juxtaposition of images and stories that creates a connotation that you had not intended.
While you can't reduce your risks entirely, we provide a number of helpful suggestions in the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Liability Associated with Harms to Reputation.
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
Arizona recognizes the tort of “false light” as one of the four “invasion of privacy” torts. Plaintiffs can sue for false light when offensive and false information or innuendo about them is spread publicly. The specific elements a plaintiff must prove are listed below under Elements of a False Light Claim.
While false light in Arizona is similar to defamation, there are several differences.
Elements of a False Light Claim
Arizona has adopted the formulation of the tort of false light found in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E. Godbehere, 783 P.2d at 786‑87. To establish a false light claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made statements about the plaintiff (2) to the public that are (3) “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and (4) the defendant “had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the [plaintiff] would be placed.” Hart, 947 P.2d at 854. Each of these requirements is described in greater detail below.
Identification of Plaintiff
CMLP is not aware of any Arizona case law discussing how specifically a statement must identify the plaintiff to create an actionable claim for false light.
Public Disclosure
False light, as well as the other invasion of privacy torts recognized in Arizona “‘depends upon publicity given to the private life of the individual.’” Hart, 947 P.2d at 854 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D). To make out a claim for false light, a plaintiff must show that “‘the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded substantially certain to become public knowledge.’” Id., (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D). The form of communication (oral, written, etc.) does not matter as long as the communication “‘reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.’” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D).
To prove publicity, the plaintiff must provide more than an “unsubstantiated allegation” that information has been communicated publicly. Id. at 855. In Hart, the court provided a list of illustrative examples of “the kinds of evidence” a plaintiff might use to help prove publication, including “affidavits from persons in the community who had heard the rumors; affidavits by [the plaintiff] denying that they discussed [the information], thereby starting the rumors themselves; or any direct allegation of actual publication (e.g. via newspaper, public announcement, etc.) by [the defendant].” Id. at 855 n.18.
Offensiveness
The statement must be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Godbehere, 783 P.2d at 786 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E); Hart, 947 P.2d at 854. “Thus, the plaintiff’s subjective threshold of sensibility is not the measure, and ‘trivial indignities’ are not actionable.” Godbehere, 783 at 786. In other words, it is not enough that the plaintiff is offended; it must be reasonable to take offense.
Falsehood
To prove false light, a plaintiff must show “‘a major misrepresentation of [the plaintiff’s] character, history, activities or beliefs,’ not merely minor or unimportant inaccuracies.” Godbehere, 783 P.2d at 787 (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement § 652E (Second) of Torts cmmt c).
“A false light cause of action may arise when something untrue has been published about an individual, or when the publication of true information creates a false implication about the individual.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Thus, false light protects against not only outright falsehoods, but also against false innuendo, and “[a] plaintiff may bring a false light invasion of privacy action . . . even though the actual facts stated are true.” Id.
As an example of this type of statement, the court in Godbehere cited Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), in which the plaintiff successfully sued for false light invasion of privacy when photographs for which she had posed nude and consented to publication in Playboy magazine were actually published in Hustler magazine, “a publication of much lower standing in the journalistic community.” Id. at 787 n.2.
Fault
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant was at fault when he or she caused the false implication. In Arizona, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted “with knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.” Godbehere, 162 Ariz. at 786, 788. This language echoes the “actual malice” standard in public figure defamation cases.
While the Supreme Court of Arizona has specified that the “actual malice” standard applies to false light claims made by public figures, id. at 788‑89, it has left open the question of whether a non‑public figure may recover under a false light claim where he shows negligence but not actual malice, id. at 789 n.6.
Privileges and Defenses
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses. For instance, opinions are constitutionally protected; a false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. There is also an important common law protection that may be protect you when you comment on issues of public concern:
Issues of Public Concern Related to Public Officials
The Supreme Court of Arizona has specified that “there can be no false light invasion of privacy action for matters involving official acts or duties of public officers” because of public officials’ more limited privacy rights. Godbehere, 783 P.2d at 789. As a result, “a plaintiff cannot sue for false light invasion of privacy if he or she is a public official and the publication relates to performance of his or her public life or duties.” Id. Unlike in some other states, Arizona has not limited this protection to only media defendants.
Note: This page covers information specific to California. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
California recognizes "false light" claims. A person can sue for false light when something highly offensive is implied to be true about them that is actually false.
False light in California is different from defamation. While defamation concerns statements that are actually false, false light is about false implications. The difference between defamation and false light can be illustrated by Gill v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952), the case that established false light in California. In Gill, the "Ladies Home Journal" published an article criticizing "love at first sight" as being based on nothing more than sexual attraction. The author said such love was "wrong" and would lead to divorce. The article featured a photo of a couple, with the caption, "[p]ublicized as glamorous, desirable, 'love at first sight' is a bad risk." The couple, who did not know the photo had been taken, sued. Although the journal did not actually say the couple was engaged in the "wrong" kind of love, the implication was clearly there. The couple won by proving the magazine created a false impression of them.
Falsehood
First, in order to prove a false light claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant implied something false. For instance, in Gill, discussed above, the photograph created the false impression that the couple was behaving wrongly in love. Similarly, in Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002), the court found that having an actor's photo on the cover of Playgirl magazine, in combination with the magazine's headlines, could create the false impression that nude photos of the actor appeared inside.
On the other hand, when there is no false implication of fact, the claim will not succeed. True statements are not actionable. Moreover, when the context shows that the writer is using "rhetorical hyperbole" and "imaginative expression" that "cannot be read to imply the assertion of an objective fact," the plaintiff's claim will fail. See Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 1995).
It is important to distinguish the types of falsehoods appropriate for a false light claim versus a defamation claim. As discussed above, defamation concerns false statements of fact, while false light concerns false implications. Plaintiffs generally cannot sue for both at the same time about the same statement. When a plaintiff sues for both defamation and false light, and the suit basically concerns a false statement of fact, the court will dismiss the false light claim as superfluous. See, e.g., McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 3d 961, 13 Media L. Rep. 2281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); see also "Single Publilcation Rule," Cal. Civil. Code. § 3425.3 (prohibiting more than one cause of action concerning a false statement for the same publication).
Offensiveness
For the plaintiff to win, the statement must do more than create a false impression. The false impression that is created must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Fellow v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 32 Cal. 3d 234, 238, 13 Media L. Rep. 1305 (Cal. 1986) (quoting Restatement 2d of Torts § 652E). In other words, it is not enough that the plaintiff is offended; it must be reasonable to take offense.
Identification of Plaintiff
The falsehood in question must sufficiently identify the plaintiff. California courts generally do not require the plaintiff to be identified by name. For instance, cases such as Gill, discussed above, concern photographs of plaintiffs.
Public Disclosure
A plaintiff must show that the defendant publicly disclosed the falsehood concerning them. While this basic requirement is clear, its application is not -- courts go back and forth on how many people must receive the information for it to be "publicly disclosed." It is safe to say that publishing on the Internet for the whole world to see is public disclosure, and it probably safe to say that privately telling one person is not public disclosure; but it is hard to define the requirement any further.
Fault
A plaintiff must also show that the false implication occurred due to the defendant's fault. If the plaintiff is a public figure, then the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with "actual malice." See Readers's Digest Ass'n v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 265 (Cal. 1984); Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2002). Although the California Supreme Court has not decided the level of fault plaintiffs who are not public figures must show, lower California courts indicate that plaintiffs must show that defendants acted "negligently." See, e.g., M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal. App. 4th 623, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). For more information on possible levels of fault in claims for published falsehoods, see the section on Actual Malice and Negligence in this guide.
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses.
Opinion
A false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. Opinions are constitutionally protected, and you will not be held liable under a false light claim for a negative opinion. Of course, distinguishing facts and opinions can be difficult. For more information on how courts distinguish between facts and opinions, see the section on Opinion and Fair Comment Privileges, which discusses the issue in the context of defamation.
Parody
You will not be held liable for casting a plaintiff in a false light if the false statement of fact in question is in a context the average reader would understand is a parody. See San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. App. 4th 655, 21 Media L. Rep. 1791 (1993). In San Francisco Bay Guardian, the court held that a newspaper would not be held liable for statements in its April Fool's Day section suggesting that a landlord gave his tenants electroshock therapy because a reasonable reader would understand them as parody.
Note: This page covers information specific to the District of Columbia. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
The District of Columbia recognizes the tort of "false light." Plaintiffs can sue for false light when a false and offensive statement is made about them to the public and causes them distress. The specific things a plaintiff must prove are listed below under "Elements of a False Light Claim."
False light in the District of Columbia overlaps significantly with Defamation. In D.C., defamation and false light both protect against the same wrongs -- offensive false statements. The key difference between defamation and false light is that they protect against different harms flowing from such statements. "The false light . . . action differs from an action for defamation because a defamation tort redresses damage to reputation while a false light privacy tort redresses mental distress from having been exposed to public view." White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In other words, defamation protects a person's public reputation, while false light protects a person's internal mental tranquility.
Despite this difference in protected interests, "[t]here is a great deal of overlap between the causes of action for defamation and false light." Moldea v. New York Times Co.,15 F.3d 1137, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As the Moldea court noted, "[p]ublicity that is actionable in a false light claim generally will be actionable in defamation as well." Id. Courts often treat the two as analytically similar.
Because false light and defamation overlap so greatly, plaintiffs may only recover on one or the other theory concerning the same publication. Modea, 15 F.3d at 1151. The defenses, privileges, and burdens of proof that protect defendants in defamation cases are equally applicable to false light cases.
Because of the overlap between defamation and false light, you should review the section on District of Columbia Defamation Law as well.
If a plaintiff files a false light claim, he or she must show that there was
See Klayman v. Segal, 783 A.2d 607, 613 (D.C. 2002). Moreover, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is at fault.
The recent case of Benz v. Washington Newspaper Publ'g Co., 34 Media L. Rep. 2368 (D.D.C. 2006), illustrates how false light works in DC. In that case, a producer from CNN claimed that the Washington Enquirer had stated that she had been "been linked romantically with power players" and that she had "hooked up" with a "porn king." Id. at n.5. The court found that the newspaper's statements were "highly offensive."
Falsehood
First, in order to prove a false light claim, a plaintiff must show that something false was stated. The falsehood can be implied or directly stated. See White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Offensiveness
For the plaintiff to win, the statement must do more than state a false fact. The false fact stated must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." S. Air Transp., Inc. v. ABC,, 670 F. Suppp. 2d. 38, 42 (D.D.C. 1987) (quoting Restatement 2d of Torts § 652E). It is not enough that the plaintiff is offended; it must be reasonable to take offense.
Identification of Plaintiff
The falsehood in question must identify the plaintiff somehow. The plaintiff does not need to be named, as long as he or she can be identified. See Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 223 F. Supp. 2d 25, 47-48 (D.D.C. 2002).
Public Disclosure
While District of Columbia courts require the false statement to be disclosed to the public, they have not ruled on what exactly that means. It is safe to say that publishing on the Internet for the whole world to see is public disclosure.
Fault
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant was at fault when he or she caused the false implication. If the defendant is a public figure, then the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with "actual malice." See White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 524-25 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). At least one D.C. court has held that plaintiffs who are not public figures must merely show that defendants acted "negligently." See Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 512 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (D.D.C. 1981). For more information on possible levels of fault, see the Actual Malice and Negligence section of this guide.
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses.
No Suits by Corporations
False light in the District of Columbia compensates the plaintiff for mental distress and anguish. One federal district court in D.C. held that because corporations cannot be offended, they cannot sue for false light. See S. Air Transp., Inc. v. ABC, 670 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D.D.C. 1987).
Opinion
A false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. Opinions are constitutionally protected, and you will not be held liable under a false light claim for an opinion that offends others. Of course, distinguishing facts and opinions can be difficult. For more information on how courts distinguish between facts and opinions, see Opinion and Fair Comment Privileges, which discusses the issue in the context of defamation.
Fair Comment
One court in D.C. has held that the fair comment privilege, which applies to defamation claims, also protects defendants in false light claims. In Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141, 150 (D.D.C. 1995), the court described the privilege as protecting a writer when he offers his views on a situation where "the reader is aware of the factual foundation for" the author's statement. In such a situation, the reader can "judge independently whether the comment is reasonable." Id. The court noted that "the fair comment privilege can be invoked even if the underlying facts are not included with the comment." Id.
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
Florida false light law is in flux. While some Florida appellate courts have recognized false light claims, the Florida Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the tort applies in Florida. It has indicated, however, that an invasion of privacy action may be used to remedy what it described as “false light in the public eye--publication of facts which place a person in a false light even though the facts themselves may not be defamatory.” See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So.2d 1239, 1252 (Fla. 1996).
On March 6, 2008, the Florida Supreme Court heard oral argument in the appeal of Gannett Co. v. Anderson, 947 So.2d 1. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). Anderson claimed that a Gannett news article, while factually true, raised the false implication that he had murdered his wife with a 12-gauge shotgun because the article waited two sentences to mention that the shooting had been declared accidental. Gannett, 947 So.2d at 3. The court’s decision in that case is expected to resolve whether false light invasion of privacy is distinct from defamation in Florida.
Florida appellate courts that have recognized false light have applied the elements discussed in the general False Light section, with the following exceptions and clarifications:
Offensiveness
The statement must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" to constitute false light invasion of privacy. See See Straub v. Scarpa, 967 So.2d 437, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E). For example, a letter to a homeowners’ association stating that the association budget “will no doubt contain very expensive items that have nothing to do with the operation of our community,” did not cast a director of the association in a false light because no reasonable person would be highly offended by the letter. Straub, 967 So.2d at 439.
Falsehood
Florida courts have not required falsehood. For example, a Florida appellate court held that a man could claim false light invasion of privacy when a 60 Minutes television segment included interview footage of his former wife in the midst of “stories and pictures of women who had been abused, battered, and killed by their domestic partners.” See Heekin, 789 So.2d at 358. False light was an actionable claim because the broadcast created the impression that the plaintiff had battered his wife, even though the entire broadcast was truthful. According to the court, “neither knowledge of the falsity of the information nor reckless disregard for its truth is an element of a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy.” See Heekin, 789 So.2d at 359.
Fault
Florida courts have required that the “defendant must have acted either knowingly or in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized material and the false light in which it would be placed.” Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC, 242 F.Supp.2d 1205, 1221 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
Georgia recognizes the tort of "false light." Plaintiffs can sue for false light when false information is spread about them that depicts them in an untruthful and highly offensive manner. The specific things a plaintiff must prove to establish false light are listed below under "Elements of a False Light Claim."
False light in Georgia is essentially the same as defamation. No reported decision in Georgia state courts has found a defendant liable for false light without also finding the defendant liable for defamation. But see Maples v. Nat'l Enquirer, 763 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (finding that under Georgia law, statements can constitute false light without being defamatory). Georgia courts readily acknowledge that "[t]he interest protected [by the tort of false light] is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation." Association Servs. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
What the overlap means is that if you are sued for false light, you will probably also be sued for defamation (and vice versa). If you are concerned about false light, you should also review Georgia Defamation Law. Notably, "absolute privileges" that completely shield someone from liability for defamation also apply to claims for false light. See Rothstein v. L.F. Still & Co., 351 S.E.2d 513, 514-15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
To establish a claim of false light in Georgia, a plaintiff must establish the existence of false publicity that depicts the plaintiff as something or someone which she is not. Next, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the false light in which she was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Association Servs., 351 S.E.2d at 459.
Falsehood
First, in order to prove a false light claim, the plaintiff must show that he or she has been depicted as something he or she is not. In other words, the plaintiff must show that a falsehood about him or her was stated. True statements cannot form the basis of a lawsuit.
Offensiveness
For the plaintiff to win, the statement must do more than create a false impression. The false impression that is created must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77, 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting, via other cases, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E). Georgia courts emphasize that they do not protect "hypersensitive" people. Thomason v. Times-Journal, Inc., 379 S.E.2d 551, 604 (1989) (finding no liability for the wrong name being accidentally used in an obituary).
Identification of Plaintiff
The falsehood in question must identify the plaintiff in particular. See, e.g., Collins v. Creative Loafing Savannah, Inc., 592 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
Public Disclosure
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant publicly disclosed the falsehood concerning them. While this basic requirement is clear, it can be difficult to determine in particular situations whether telling a limited number of people in a certain setting constitutes "the public." It is safe to say that publishing on the Internet is public disclosure.
Fault
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant's fault caused the false implication. If the defendant is a public figure, then the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with "actual malice." See Brewer v. Rogers, 439 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). In most other situations, courts require the plaintiff merely to show that the defendant has been "negligent." For more information on possible levels of fault in claims for published falsehoods, see the section on Actual Malice and Negligence.
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses.
Opinion
A false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. Opinions are constitutionally protected, and you will not be held liable under a false light claim for a negative opinion. See S&W Seafoods Co. v. Jacor Broad., 390 S.E.2d 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). Of course, distinguishing facts and opinions can be difficult. For more information on how courts distinguish between facts and opinions, see Opinion and Fair Comment Privileges, which discusses the issue in the context of defamation.
Issues of Public Concern
Georgia courts have held that you cannot be sued for false light when you comment on an issue of public interest. See Wilson v. Thurman, 445 S.E.2d 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that defendant police officers could not be held liable for false light after allegedly wrongfully investigating plaintiff for and charging him with sodomy (at that time a crime in Georgia) because the investigation focused on a matter of public concern).
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
Illinois recognizes the tort of "false light." A person can sue for false light when a false and offensive statement is made about them to the public and causes them distress. The specific things a plaintiff must prove are listed below under "Elements of a False Light Claim."
False light in Illinois overlaps significantly with defamation. In Illinois, defamation and false light both protect against the same wrongs -- offensive false statements. The key difference between defamation and false light is that they protect against different harms flowing from such statements. Defamation protects a person's public reputation, while false light protects a person's internal mental tranquility. See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Kupcinet, 1988 WL 93945 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1988).
False light in Illinois is broader than defamation. While everything that is defamation is also false light, false light reaches some things that defamation does not. See Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987 (Ill. 1989). For instance, in Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), a woman who had posed nude in Playboy sued Hustler because it published nude photos of her without her consent. The court stated that she had a right to sue for false light because Hustler insinuated that she was willing to appear nude in a "degrading setting."
Despite their overlap, a plaintiff can sue for both false light and defamation and potentially recover damages based on both claims. See, e.g., Lovgren, 534 N.E.2d at 987.
If a plaintiff files a false light claim, he or she must show that the defendant, acting with reckless disregard, placed him or her before the public in a false light in a manner that was highly offensive to a reasonable person. Lovgren, 534 N.E.2d at 989 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(E)).
The case of Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. 1992) provides a good illustration of how false light works in Illinois. In that case, a man alleged that he was working to promote a cartoon festival to benefit victims of neurofibromatosis (sometimes called 'Elephant Man's disease'). The man, whose wife and son suffered from the disease, appeared on a morning radio talk show to promote the festival. The DJs allegedly mocked the man's wife and child, implying (falsely) that they had abnormally large heads. The court held that based on his allegations, the man would be able to sue the radio station for false light.
Falsehood
First, in order to prove a false light claim, a plaintiff must show that something false was stated. You cannot be sued for "strong criticism" that is neither true nor false, but merely opinion. See, e.g., Raveling v. HarperCollins Publishers, 2004 WL 422538, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2004).
Offensiveness
For the plaintiff to win, the statement must do more than state a false fact. The false fact stated must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Lovgren, 534 N.E.2d at 989 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(E) (1977)). It is not enough that the plaintiff is offended; it must be reasonable to take offense. In the Kolegas case discussed above, the Illinois Supreme Court held that it would be reasonable to take offense at the allegation that a man's wife and child had abnormally large heads due to disease.
Identification of Plaintiff
The falsehood in question must identify the plaintiff somehow. The plaintiff does not need to be named, as long as he or she can be identified.
Public Disclosure
Illinois courts require the false statement to be disclosed to the public. See Lovgren, 534 N.E.2d at 989. For instance, in Lovgren the court found that an advertisement published in a local newspaper and handbills distributed in public were sufficient to constitute public disclosure. It is safe to say that publishing on the Internet for the whole world to see is public disclosure.
Fault
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant was at fault when he or she caused the false implication. In Illinois, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with "actual malice." See Lovgren, 432 N.E.2d at 989-991. For more information on possible levels of fault, see the Actual Malice and Negligence section of this guide.
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses.
Opinion
A false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. Opinions are constitutionally protected, and you will not be held liable under a false light claim for an opinion that offends others. As mentioned in the Raveling case, you cannot be sued for "strong criticism" alone, unless false statements of fact are involved.
Of course, distinguishing facts and opinions can be difficult. For more information on how courts distinguish between facts and opinions, see Opinion and Fair Comment Privileges, which discusses the issue in the context of defamation.
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
Indiana recognizes the tort of "false light." Plaintiffs can sue for false light in certain circumstances when false information about them has been spread to others. Because Indiana courts have not heard many cases raising false light, it is unclear when exactly someone can sue for being placed in a false light.
The case of Mavity v. Tyndall, 66 N.E.2d 755 (Ind. 1946) established false light in Indiana. In that case, the police took a mug shot of a man they were investigating for a crime. Charges against him were eventually dropped. However, the police maintained a photo of the man in their "rouges' gallery." The man sued and was able to have his photo removed because the police were casting him in a false light, implying that he was guilty of a crime.
The exact elements of a false light claim -- that is, what must be proven for a plaintiff to win -- have not been established in Indiana. See St. John v. Town of Ellettsville, 46 F. Supp. 2d 834, 851 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
Some limited aspects of what must be proven for a false light claim are clear. It is clear that the plaintiff must prove, at least, that you have said something false. See Near E. Side Cmty. Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324, 1335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). It is also clear that the false statement must identify the plaintiff. For instance, in Furno v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 590 N.E.2d 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), a statement about chiropractors in general was held not to specifically identify a particular chiropractor who was upset by the statement.
Other states require plaintiffs suing for false light to prove that the statement was offensive and that the statement was disclosed to the public. It is not clear if Indiana will employ these requirements as well. Many states also require plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice", at least for more famous or prominent public figures. Again, Indiana courts have not yet said the level of fault they will require.
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses.
For instance, opinions are constitutionally protected; a false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. Other defenses may be available, but Indiana courts have not yet said what they are.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
Massachusetts courts do not recognize a claim for false light. See ELM Medical Lab, Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675, 681 (Mass. 1989); Jones v. Taibbi, 512 N.E.2d 260, 270 (Mass. 1987); Brown v. Hearst Corp., 54 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1995).
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
Michigan recognizes the tort of "false light." Plaintiffs can sue for false light when false information is spread about them that is humiliating. The specific things a plaintiff must prove are listed below under "Elements of a False Light Claim."
False light in Michigan is similar to defamation. See, e.g., Morganroth v. Whitall, 411 N.W.2d 859, 863-64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). Both involve false statements that harm someone's public image. You can be sued for both defamation and false light for the same statements. However, a plaintiff can only obtain money for one or the other violation based on the same statements.
To win on a false light claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made statements that create unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity, attributing to the plaintiff characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false, and that the defendant presented these statements to the public. Morganroth, 411 N.W.2d at 863-64. Each of these requirements is described in greater detail below:
Identification of Plaintiff
The statement in question must identify the plaintiff in particular. For example, criticizing all doctors will not allow any particular doctor to sue you.
Offensiveness
The statement must be "unreasonable and highly objectionable." Morganroth, 411 N.W.2d at 863-64 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. b). The material must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Early Detection Ctr., P.C. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Restatement 2d of Torts § 652E). In other words, it is not enough that the plaintiff is offended; it must be reasonable to take offense.
Falsehood
A plaintiff must show that something false has been said about him or her. The falsehood could misrepresent the plaintiff's characteristics, conduct, or beliefs. If the publication is true, then the plaintiff cannot win. For instance, in Morganroth v. Whitall, a writer for the Detroit News published a story about a hairdresser, describing how she used the unusual technique of blowtorching her client's hair. 411 N.W.2d at 859-61. She sued and lost because the facts in the story describing her hairdressing method were true.
Public Disclosure
For a plaintiff to win, he or she must show that the defendant made the statement in question to the public in general or to a large number of people. Reed v. Ponton, 166 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Mich. Ct. App. Mich. 1968). For instance, the plaintiff in one case complained that being fired cast her in a false light, but she lost because she did not claim that the reasons for her firing had been publicized by her employer. Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 529 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
Fault
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant was at fault when he or she caused the false implication. Michigan courts have not yet stated what level of fault is required. Most states require that the plaintiff prove the defendant acted with "actual malice", at least when the matter discussed is one of public concern or the plaintiff is an important or prominent public figure. Other states merely require that the defendant was "negligent" in publishing the statement in question. For more information on possible levels of fault, see the Actual Malice and Negligence section of this guide.
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses.
For instance, opinions are constitutionally protected; a false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. Other defenses may be available, but Michigan courts have not yet said what they are.
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
New Jersey recognizes the tort of "false light." Plaintiffs can sue for "false light" when false information is spread about them that is false and offensive. The specific things a plaintiff must prove are listed below under "Elements of a False Light Claim."
False light in New Jersey is similar to defamation. Both protect against the same wrongs -- offensive false statements. The key difference between defamation and false light is that they protect against different harms flowing from such statements. Defamation protects a person's public reputation, while false light protects a person's internal mental tranquility. See Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 290 (N.J. 1988)
To establish false light a plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) made statements about the plaintiff (2) to the public that are (3) offensive and (4) false. Each of these requirements is described in greater detail below.
Identification of Plaintiff
The statement in question must identify the plaintiff in particular. For example, falsely criticizing all doctors will not allow any particular doctor to sue you.
Public Disclosure
For a plaintiff to win, he or she must show that the statement in question was publicized. While New Jersey courts require the false statement to be disclosed to the public, they have not ruled on what exactly that means. It is safe to say that publishing on the Internet for the whole world to see is public disclosure.
Offensiveness
The statement must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Romaine, 537 A.2d at 290 (quoting Restatement 2d of Torts § 652E). In other words, it is not enough that the plaintiff is offended; it must be reasonable to take offense.. For instance, in Salek v. Passaic Collegiate School, a high school yearbook featured a photo in its "Funny Pages" of a male and a female teacher, with a caption (falsely) implying that the teachers were in a romantic relationship. 605 A.2d 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992). One of the teachers sued, but the court held she could not recover because the yearbook caption was not offensive to a reasonable person.
Falsehood
In order to prove a false light claim, the plaintiff must show that the information was false. The falsehood could misrepresent the plaintiff's characteristics, conduct, or beliefs. If the publication is true, then the plaintiff cannot win.
Fault
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant was at fault when he or she caused the false implication. If the defendant is a public figure, then the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with "actual malice." See Miele v. Rosenblum, 603 A.2d 43, 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). New Jersey courts have not decided what level of fault must be shown when the plaintiff is a private figure. They could either require the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with actual malice, as for public figures, or could require the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted "negligently." For more information on possible levels of fault, see the Actual Malice and Negligence section of this guide.
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses. For instance, opinions are constitutionally protected; a false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. Other defenses may be available, but New Jersey courts have not yet said what they are.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
The tort of "false light" is not recognized in New York; you cannot sue or be sued on such a claim. See, e.g., Costanza v. Seinfeld, 27 Media L. Rep. 2177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999), aff'd, 719 N.Y.S.2d 29 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Howell v. New York Post Co., 21 Media L. Rep. 1273 (N.Y. 1993).
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
The tort of "false light" is not recognized in North Carolina; you cannot sue or be sued on such a claim. See Renwick v. News & Observer, 312 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1984).
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
Ohio's Supreme Court recently recognized the tort of "false light" in June 2007. In that case, Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051 (Ohio 2007), a woman, Lauri Weinfeld, opened up a facility for outdoor banquets and weddings next to the home of Robert and Katherine Welling and their children. The neighbors came into conflict, and eventually Weinfeld found a window in her banquet facility broken. She put up a number of posters offering a $500 reward for information about the incident at the workplace of Mr. Welling and at the workplaces and schools of the family's children.
The Wellings and Lauri Weinfeld sued each other on various claims, including a claim by the Wellings that Weinfeld had through the posters cast them in a false light. In response, the Ohio Supreme Court announced for the first time that it would recognize the tort of false light: "In Ohio, one who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed." Welling, 866 N.E.2d 1051 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E).
Parsing the court's decision in Welling, there are several things a plaintiff prove to establish false light:
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses.
For instance, opinions are constitutionally protected; a false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. Other defenses may be available, but Ohio courts have not yet said what they are.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
Pennsylvania recognizes the tort of "false light." Plaintiffs can sue for false light when false information is spread about them that is offensive. The specific things a plaintiff must prove are listed below under Elements of a False Light Claim.
While false light in Pennsylvania is similar to defamation, there are several differences. First, statements need to be publicized more widely for false light than defamation. Second, defamation requires harm to reputation or other social consequences, while false light does not. Third, material must be offensive for false light, while it need not be for defamation.
To establish a false light claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made statements about the plaintiff (2) to the public that are (3) offensive and (4) false. Each of these requirements is described in greater detail below.
Identification of Plaintiff
The statement in question must identify the plaintiff in particular. For example, falsely criticizing all doctors will not allow any particular doctor to sue you.
Public Disclosure
For a plaintiff to win, he or she must show that the defendant made the statement to the public. The statement must be made either to the public at large (e.g., over the Internet) or to so great a number of people that it is "substantially certain to become . . . public knowledge." Curran v. Children's Serv. Ctr. Inc., 578 A.2d 8, 12 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D comm. a). In Curran, the plaintiff lost because a "pink slip" he personally received was not sufficient public disclosure for a false light claim.
Offensiveness
The statement must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." Larsen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 543 A.2d 1181, 1188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E). In other words, it is not enough that the plaintiff is offended; it must be reasonable to take offense. For instance, in Parano v. O'Connor, a court held that a plaintiff could not reasonably be offended by a newspaper article describing him as "uncooperative" and "adversarial." 641 A.2d 607, 608 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
Falsehood
A plaintiff must show that something false has been said about him or her. The falsehood could misrepresent the plaintiff's characteristics, conduct, or beliefs. If the publication is true, then the plaintiff cannot win.
Fault
A plaintiff must also show that the defendant was at fault when he or she caused the false implication. In Pennsylvania, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with "knowledge of" a statement's falsity or acted with "reckless disregard" of its falsity. Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). In other words, to be liable for false light, the defendant must make a statement he knows is false or must be very careless as to whether the statement is true of false.
If you are sued for false light, you may have several defenses that will protect you, even if the plaintiff has an otherwise winning case. See the section on Defamation Privileges and Defenses for a general discussion of potential defenses. For instance, opinions are constitutionally protected; a false light claim must be based on the implication of a false fact. There is also an important common law protection that may be protect you when you comment on issues of public concern:
Media Defendants
Under Pennsylvania law, the media is insulated from liability for false light when it reports on issues of public concern related to public officials. Neish v. Beaver Newspapers, Inc., 581 A.2d 619, 624-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). Courts deem public officials as having "relinquish[ed] . . . insulation of scrutiny of [their] public affairs." Id.
What kinds of media are protected? Neish concerned a reporter for a traditional newspaper. If you work in a non-traditional media setting, an important question is whether the media protection described above will protect you. Unfortunately, Pennsylvania courts have not yet said how far the protection for media defendants will extend.
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
The tort of "false light" is not recognized in Texas; you cannot sue or be sued on such a claim. See Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tex. 1994).
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia. For general information concerning false light see the general False Light section of this guide.
The tort of "false light" is not recognized in Virginia; you cannot sue or be sued on such a claim. See WJLA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 n.5 (Va. 2000).
Washington courts have not explicitly recognized the tort of "false light." However, unlike several other states, Washington has not explicitly rejected the tort of false light either. In one case, the Washington Supreme Court appeared skeptical about whether allowing false light claims would be a good idea due to its similarity to defamation. See Eastwood v. Cascade Broad. Co., 722 P.2d 1295, 1298-99 (Wash. 1986).
SLAPP stands for "Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation." It refers to a lawsuit filed in retaliation for speaking out on a public issue or controversy. You might be "SLAPPed" for actions such as posting a blog entry, posting a comment on another person's blog, writing a letter to the editor of a newspaper, testifying before the legislature, reporting official misconduct, or circulating a petition. Often, SLAPPs are brought by corporations, developers, or government officials against individuals or community organizations that oppose their actions.
Lawsuits targeting individuals who post anonymously on the Internet, usually because their posted messages criticize the actions of public figures or corporations, are sometimes called cyberSLAPPs. Like a regular SLAPP, a cyberSLAPP aims at chilling free speech by intimidating critics with the prospect of defending an expensive lawsuit. But it also often aims at uncovering the identity of the anonymous critic. For more information on the court procedures a lawyer or party can use to identify an anonymous Internet speaker, see Potential Legal Challenges to Anonymity.
Most SLAPPs ultimately would fail if litigated fully, but the SLAPP filer doesn't usually intend to do so. As previously mentioned, the point of a SLAPP is to intimidate and silence the target through the threat of an expensive lawsuit. Although the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of speech, the U.S. legal system generally gives the benefit of the doubt to a party bringing a lawsuit until the fact-finding stage, and a winning defendant is not usually entitled to recover attorneys' fees to cover the expense of legal defense (as in some other countries). This means that, even if the claim ultimately fails, the process of defending against a SLAPP through the legal system can be a daunting and expensive prospect for many individuals.
To guard against the chilling effect of SLAPPs, twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and one U.S. territory have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes. The U.S. jurisdictions with anti-SLAPP statutes are: Arizona; Arkansas; California; Delaware; District of Columbia; Florida; Guam; Georgia; Hawaii; Illinois; Indiana; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Minnesota; Missouri; Nebraska; Nevada; New Mexico; New York; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; and Washington.
Two other states, Colorado and West Virginia, do not have anti-SLAPP statutes, but their courts have recognized a defense to lawsuits that target activities aimed at petitioning the government for action on issues of public importance. These common law (i.e., judge-made) rules offer similar protections to those provided by some anti-SLAPP statutes.
If you get sued in a state with an anti-SLAPP law, you may be able to dismiss the lawsuit at an early stage of the proceeding and recover your costs and attorneys' fees. If you live in a state with an anti-SLAPP law but someone sues you in a state without one, you may be able to argue that the laws of your state should apply. For example, if you are a journalist in California (which has an anti-SLAPP statute) writing about the local community impact of the actions of a corporation based in Iowa (which does not have an anti-SLAPP law), you may be able to argue that California law should apply even if the corporation files a lawsuit in Iowa.
See the state pages for state-specific information on anti-SLAPP laws.
SLAPP suits come in many forms. Some of the common claims asserted in SLAPPs include:
Defamation: Defamation is the term for a legal claim involving injury to reputation caused by false statements of fact and includes both libel (typically written or recorded statements) and slander (typically spoken statements). Defamation is the most common basis for a SLAPP suit. An individual or organization might file a defamation lawsuit in reaction to criticism or negative commentary published on- or offline, such as in a blog post, news report, letter to the editor, or speech at a public meeting, just to name a few. For more information, see the Defamation section.
Interference with contract or economic advantage: This claim alleges that you intentionally interfered with a contract or other business relationship between the plaintiff and a third party that would have benefited the plaintiff economically. You also might see this claim referred to as "tortious interference with business relations," "tortious interference with contract," or some like-sounding phrase. In the publishing context, you often see this claim included along with a defamation claim. Like a defamation claim, individuals and organizations tend to bring this claim in response to criticism or negative commentary published on- or offline, or political activity that hampers the plaintiff's activities.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress: This claim alleges that the defendant intentionally or recklessly committed some outrageous act that caused the plaintiff extreme emotional distress. As above, in the publishing context, you often see this claim included along with a defamation claim, and it often comes in response to criticism or negative commentary published on- or offline.
Conspiracy: A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal act. A plaintiff might claim that you and someone else conspired to commit defamation, to interfere with a contract, or to intentionally inflict emotional distress. Often, the plaintiff will not even identify who you allegedly have conspired with, naming instead an unspecified number of "John Does" or "Jane Roes" in the complaint.
Keep in mind that, at least at the outset, calling a lawsuit a SLAPP is a subjective evaluation of the merit of its legal and factual claims. If someone sues you, the complaint will not identify itself as a SLAPP, and the person filing the lawsuit will vigorously deny characterization of it as a SLAPP. In the end, you cannot definitively establish that a lawsuit is a SLAPP until a court has ruled on the question.
Be aware that when you are speaking out on a matter of public controversy that involves significant private interests or the reputation of a government official, you may find yourself the target of a SLAPP. By being prepared, you can minimize your risk of being SLAPPed and continue to exercise your rights with confidence.
Know your rights
Under the Constitution, you have a right to free speech and to petition the government. Courts have interpreted these rights to form legal doctrines that protect the types of activities that attract SLAPPs. Note, however, that the Constitution generally does not protect defamatory, threatening, or harassing speech.
Tell the truth
Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim. You can protect yourself by not publishing rumors or scandalous innuendo, and you may want to avoid broad, sweeping generalizations or speculative rhetoric in favor of accurate, fact-based statements.
Diligent fact-checking will make you a harder target for a SLAPP suit. Always cite to legitimate sources. Public records are an excellent source of solid factual information. For more information on how to use the law to obtain government records, see Access to Government Information. If you use Internet sources, print out the website page in case the information there changes at a later date.
Even if what you publish ultimately turns out not to be true, you could still have a defense if the subject of your publication is a public figure, such as a celebrity, a government official, or someone who takes on an important role in the relevant debate or controversy. Public figures must prove that you made false statements about them with "actual malice" -- that is, you actually knew that your statements were false or recklessly disregarded their falsity.
In a defamation lawsuit, a court will not hold you liable for stating an opinion. But, be aware that simply adding the words "in my opinion" to the beginning of a sentence will not necessarily help you. For example, if you write, "In my opinion, Mayor Jones is taking bribes from local developers," you could be liable for defamation, unless the statement is true. In addition, if your opinion implies the existence of facts that can be proven true or false, then it is a statement of fact and not opinion for legal purposes, and you could be held liable for publishing it if the underlying facts turn out to be false.
For more information on how to protect yourself against a defamation claim, see the Defamation section.
Insurance
Insurance may be a good way to protect yourself from the expense of defending against a SLAPP. Your homeowners or renters insurance may cover damages and legal fees if someone sues you for defamation, invasion of privacy, or other legal claims. Most homeowners and renters policies, however, exclude coverage for "business pursuits," and a court might find that your online activities are a business pursuit if you earn advertising income from your site or blog or you collect money through other online means. The rules vary from state to state. If your state excludes coverage for business pursuits and you make sufficient money from your site to be excluded, media liability insurance might be a better option, although for many it is prohibitively expensive. See our Finding Insurance section for details on all these insurance-related issues.
If someone files a lawsuit against you, and you believe it is a SLAPP, you should seek legal assistance immediately. Be aware of the deadline for filing a response to the complaint; if you miss the deadline, the court may enter a judgment against you without hearing your side of the case.
As noted above, twenty-six states and one U.S. territory have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes to help protect citizens who speak out. These anti-SLAPP laws vary in effectiveness, and some have not yet been tested in a legal case. As a general matter, however, they attempt to shift some of the costs and burdens of litigation from you to the person filing the SLAPP suit. See State Law: SLAPPs for state-specific information.
Some common provisions of anti-SLAPP statutes include:
If you live in a state with an anti-SLAPP law, you will want to move quickly to get the case dismissed. It is a good idea to seek legal assistance in getting the case dismissed. Keep in mind that, although hiring legal help is expensive, you can recover your attorneys' fees if you win your motion. In addition, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. The First Amendment Center has an excellent list of organizations that can help. You'll want to find help as soon as you can because successfully filing and arguing a motion to dismiss can be complicated, and you and your lawyer need to move quickly to avoid missing important deadlines.
If your insurance company provides you with a lawyer who is not familiar with SLAPP cases, that lawyer may want to try to settle the case in order to minimize costs. This may sound like a good idea, but a settlement will likely include the condition that you do not discuss the matter in the future. With such a settlement, the SLAPP has been successful, because you cannot publicize the SLAPP filer's abuse of the legal system to chill public debate. Consider arranging to hire an attorney who is knowledgeable about SLAPP law.
In addition to getting the case dismissed, you may want to consider going on the offensive. Eight states have statutes allowing "SLAPPback" suits, which are filed as counterclaims against a SLAPP or in a separate lawsuit. These states are California, Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, and Utah. A SLAPPback is a lawsuit you can bring against the person who filed the SLAPP suit to recover compensatory and punitive damages for abuse of the legal process. Even if your state does not have a statute addressing SLAPPbacks, you may be able to sue your opponent for malicious prosecution or abuse of process under the common law of your state. However, you should not underestimate the considerable expense required to bring a SLAPPback, like any lawsuit, to a successful conclusion.
To guard against the chilling effect of SLAPPs, twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and one U.S. territory have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes. The U.S. jurisdictions with anti-SLAPP statutes are: Arizona; Arkansas; California; Delaware; District of Columbia; Florida; Guam; Georgia; Hawaii; Illinois; Indiana; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Minnesota; Missouri; Nebraska; Nevada; New Mexico; New York; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; and Washington. Some other states' courts (notably Colorado and West Virginia) have recognized anti-SLAPP-like protection as a matter of case law.
State laws vary with regard to the protection offered against SLAPP suits. Consult the state sections below to learn more about whether the states listed have an anti-SLAPP law and, if so, how it works in practice. (Note that the guide does not include every state at this time.)
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
A.R.S. § 12‑752 allows you to counter a SLAPP suit against you by filing a motion to dismiss. The statute also provides that the court shall grant the moving party costs and reasonable attorney fees, if the court grants the motion to dismiss.
The Arizona anti-SLAPP statute applies to legal actions involving “a party’s exercise of the right of petition.” A.R.S. § 12‑751 defines “exercise of the right of petition” as
any written or oral statement that falls within the constitutional protection of free speech and that is made as part of an initiative, referendum or recall effort or that is all of the following:
- Made before or submitted to a legislative or executive body or other governmental proceeding.
- Made in connection with an issue that is under consideration or review by a legislative or executive body or any other governmental proceeding.
- Made for the purpose of influencing a governmental action, decision or result.
The statute further defines “governmental proceeding” to include proceedings by an official, officer, or body of the state, political subdivision of the state, or federal government. Id. The definition excludes judicial proceedings. Id.
If your statement does not fall within the definition of “exercise of the right of petition,” it will not be covered by the Arizona anti‑SLAPP statute. See Tennenbaum v. Arizona City Sanitary District, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Ariz. 2011) (holding that the Arizona anti‑SLAPP statute does not apply to a letter sent by legal counsel for the city Board of Directors or presentation at an open forum of the Board defending actions of the Board to the public because they were not part of a “recall effort” or “made before . . . a governmental proceeding” or “made for the purpose of influencing a governmental action, decision, or result”); Varela v. Perez, No. CV‑08‑2356‑PHX‑FJM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116027 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 2009) (holding that the Arizona anti‑SLAPP statute does not apply to “the filing of a criminal complaint with law enforcement”).
The statute specifically provides that it does not:
A.R.S. § 12‑752(E).
The Arizona anti‑SLAPP statute gives you the ability to file a motion to dismiss within 90 days after service of the complaint or, in the court's discretion, at any later time on terms that the court deems proper. A.R.S. § 12‑752(C). (You may also have other bases to move to dismiss under other rules or statutes; you should consult an attorney as to whether deadlines for other motions are affected by the filing of a motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute.)
The statute provides that, "[w]hen possible," the court must give "calendar preference" to an action filed under the statute and that the court must conduct an expedited hearing after the motion is filed and notice of the motion has been served as provided by court rule. A.R.S. § 12‑752(A).
The court will grant the motion to dismiss unless the responding party shows that your exercise of the right of petition "did not contain any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law" and that your "acts caused actual compensable injury to the responding party." A.R.S. § 12‑752(B). "In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating facts on which the liability or defense is based." Id.
If you request it, the court will also make findings about "whether the lawsuit was brought to deter or prevent the moving party from exercising constitutional rights and is thereby brought for an improper purpose" such as to harass or delay or increase the cost of litigation. Id. If the court finds that the lawsuit was brought for these purposes, then the statute states that you are "encouraged" to pursue additional sanctions "as provided by court rule." Id.
If you prevail on your motion to dismiss, the statute provides that the court "shall" award you "costs and reasonable attorney fees, including those incurred for the motion." The statute states that "costs" means "all costs that are reasonably incurred in connection with a motion to dismiss pursuant to this section" including "filing fees, record preparation and document copying fees, documented time away from employment to confer with counsel or attend case related proceedings, expert witness fees, travel expenses and any other costs that the court deems appropriate."
However, if you do not prevail and the court finds that your motion to dismiss is "frivolous or solely intended to delay," the court "shall" award "costs and reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party on the motion." In determining whether the motion to dismiss is frivolous, the court may consider whether the case involves novel issues of law. See Tennenbaum, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP lawsuit in Arizona, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the original plaintiff. While Arizona does not have a special form of process for a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to California. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
You can use California's anti-SLAPP statute to counter a SLAPP suit filed against you. The statute allows you to file a special motion to strike a complaint filed against you based on an "act in furtherance of [your] right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16. If a court rules in your favor, it will dismiss the plaintiff's case early in the litigation and award you attorneys' fees and court costs. In addition, if a party to a SLAPP suit seeks your personal identifying information, California law allows you to make a motion to quash the discovery order, request, or subpoena.
Not every unwelcome lawsuit is a SLAPP. In California, the term applies to lawsuits brought primarily to discourage speech about issues of public significance or public participation in government proceedings. To challenge a lawsuit as a SLAPP, you need to show that the plaintiff is suing you for an "act in furtherance of [your] right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue." Although people often use terms like "free speech" and "petition the government" loosely in popular speech, the anti-SLAPP law gives this phrase a particular legal meaning, which includes four categories of activities:
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(1-4). As an online publisher, you are most likely to rely on the third category above, which applies to a written statement in a public forum on an issue of public interest.
Under California law, a publicly accessible website is considered a public forum. See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 n.4 (Cal. 2006). The website does not have to allow comments or other public participation, so long as it is publicly available over the Internet. See Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
Many different kinds of statements may relate to an issue of public interest. California courts look at factors such as whether the subject of the disputed statement was a person or entity in the public eye, whether the statement involved conduct that could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct participants, and whether the statement contributed to debate on a topic of widespread public interest. Certainly, statements educating the public about or taking a position on a controversial issue in local, state, national, or international politics would qualify. Some other examples include:
In contrast, California courts have found other statements to be unrelated to an issue of public interest, including:
Although the anti-SLAPP statute is meant to prevent lawsuits from chilling speech and discouraging public participation, you do not need to show that the SLAPP actually discouraged you from participating or speaking out. Nor do you need to show that the plaintiff bringing the SLAPP intended to restrict your free speech.
In addition to providing a motion to strike, California law also allows a person whose identifying information is sought in connection with a claim arising from act in exercise of anonymous free speech rights to file a motion to quash -- that is, to void or modify the subpoena seeking your personal identifying information so you do not have to provide that information. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1987.1.
The California anti-SLAPP statute gives you the ability to file a motion to strike (i.e., to dismiss) a complaint brought against you for engaging in protected speech or petition activity (discussed above). If you are served with a complaint that you believe to be a SLAPP, you should seek legal assistance immediately. Successfully filing and arguing a motion to strike can be complicated, and you and your lawyer need to move quickly to avoid missing important deadlines. You should file your motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute within sixty days of being served with the complaint. A court may allow you to file the motion after sixty days, but there is no guarantee that it will do so. Keep in mind that, although hiring legal help is expensive, you can recover your attorneys' fees if you win your motion.
One of the benefits of the anti-SLAPP statute is that it enables you to get the SLAPP suit dismissed quickly. When you file a motion to strike, the clerk of the court will schedule a hearing on your motion within thirty days after filing. Additionally, once you file your motion, the plaintiff generally cannot engage in "discovery" -- that is, the plaintiff generally may not ask you to produce documents, sit for a deposition, or answer formal written questions, at least not without first getting permission from the court.
In ruling on a motion to strike, a court will first consider whether you have established that the lawsuit arises out of a protected speech or petition activity (discussed above). Assuming you can show this, the court will then require the plaintiff to introduce evidence supporting the essential elements of its legal claim. Because a true SLAPP is not meant to succeed in court, but only to intimidate and harass, a plaintiff bringing such a lawsuit will not be able to make this showing, and the court will dismiss the case. On the other hand, if the plaintiff's case is strong, then the court will not grant your motion to strike, and the lawsuit will move ahead like any ordinary case.
If the court denies your motion to strike, you are entitled to appeal the decision immediately.
In addition to creating the motion to strike, the statute also allows a person whose personal identifying information is sought in connection with a claim arising from act in exercise of anonymous free speech rights to file a motion to quash -- that is, to void or terminate the subpoena, request, or discovery order seeking your personal identifying information so you do not have to provide that information.
When you make your motion to quash, the court "may" grant your request if it is "reasonably made." In reviewing your motion, the court will probably require the plaintiff to make a prima facie showing, meaning he or she must present evidence to support all of the elements of the underlying claim (or, at least, all of the elements within the plaintiff's control). See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1171 fn. 12 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. 2008). If the plaintiff cannot make that showing, the court will probably quash the subpoena and keep your identity secret.
If you are served with a SLAPP in California, you can report it to the California Anti-SLAPP Project and request assistance. The California Anti-SLAPP Project also has two excellent guides on dealing with a SLAPP suit in California, Survival Guide for SLAPP Victims and Defending Against A SLAPP. In addition, the First Amendment Project has an excellent step-by-step guide to the legal process of defending against a SLAPP in California.
If you prevail on a motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, the court will dismiss the lawsuit against you, and you will be entitled to recover your attorneys' fees and court costs. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c).
Additionally, if you win your motion to strike and believe that you can show that the plaintiff filed the lawsuit in order to harass or silence you rather than to resolve a legitimate legal claim, then consider filing a "SLAPPback" suit against your opponent. A "SLAPPback" is a lawsuit you can bring against the person who filed the SLAPP suit to recover compensatory and punitive damages for abuse of the legal process. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.18 (setting out certain procedural rules for "SLAPPback" suits). Section 425.18 contemplates bringing a SLAPPback in a subsequent lawsuit after the original SLAPP has been dismissed, but you might be able to bring a SLAPPback as a counterclaim in the original lawsuit. You should not underestimate the considerable expense required to bring a SLAPPback, like any lawsuit, to a successful conclusion.
If your successful motion to quash arises out of a lawsuit filed in a California court, the judge has discretion to award expenses incurred in making the motion. The court will award fees if the plaintiff opposed your motion "in bad faith or without substantial justification," or if at least one part of the subpoena was "oppressive." Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1987.2(a). But note that if you lose your motion to quash, and the court decides that your motion was made in bad faith, you may have to pay the plaintiff's costs of opposing the motion.
If you successfully quash a California identity-seeking subpoena that relates to a lawsuit filed in another state, the court "shall" award all reasonably expenses incurred in making your motion - including attorneys' fees - if the following conditions are met:
Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1987.2(b).
Note: This page covers information specific to Colorado. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
While Colorado has no dedicated anti-SLAPP statute, Colorado courts have developed procedures that may provide some relief if you believe you are facing a SLAPP suit. If the lawsuit against you is based on your exercise of your "First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances," the Colorado court will subject the plaintiff's claims against you to elevated scrutiny, making it easier for you to get those claims dismissed. Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. The District Court In and For the County of Jefferson, 677 P.2d 1361, 1368 (Colo. 1984) (a.k.a. "POME"; the special motion is generally referred to as a "POME motion," after the name of this case). With some possible exceptions, you will not be able to recover your attorneys' fees or court costs after a successful POME motion.
The POME decision on its face covers a very narrow range of conduct. Specifically, it protects the First Amendment right to petition the government for relief of legitimate grievances without fear of retaliation. In POME, an environmental activism group opposed a proposed real-estate development. The group brought a case against both the developer and the county board that had approved the project. The trial court and subsequent appellate court both ruled against the environmental group. The developer then sued the environmental group, claiming that the group had abused the legal process by challenging the proposed development.
The Colorado Supreme Court, in its decision on the developer's lawsuit against the environmental group, ruled that the First Amendment right to petition requires protection against this kind of lawsuit. Thus, in Colorado, if someone sues you because you previously filed a legitimate (non-frivolous) lawsuit, or otherwise petitioned the government for action, a POME motion might help you get the new lawsuit dismissed.
Subsequent cases have helped to clarify what sorts of "petitioning" are protected by POME. For example, attending public hearings to oppose a construction project is protected. Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Companies, Inc., 90 P.3d 859 (Colo. 2004). Repeated lawsuits in a contentious divorce are also within POME's purview. In re Foster, 2011 WL 2139136 (Colo., May 23, 2011). However, the outer limits of POME's protections remain unclear.
A 1986 Colorado Supreme Court decision suggests that at least some other lawsuits (like some libel claims) may require POME scrutiny as well. Concerned Members of Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n v. District Court, County of Jefferson, 713 P.2d 923 (Col0. 1986). See also James H. Moore & Associates Realty v. Arrowhead at Vail, 892 P.2d 367, 373 (Colo. App. 1994) (implying that POME may apply to other First Amendment rights). However, a May 2011 trial court ruling (which is not binding in other cases) states that POME only applies if you are being sued for "misuse or abuse of the administrative or judicial processes of the government." It is therefore an open question as to whether POME would apply to defamation claims or lawsuits that do not alleged abuse of governmental process.
If you are sued over conduct (like a past lawsuit) that you believe may be protected by POME, you can file a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), raising the defense that your past conduct was protected by the First Amendment. At that point, the person suing you will have to satisfy POME's three-part test:
Generally, you will NOT eligible for an award of attorneys' fees if you win a POME motion. Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Companies, Inc., 90 P.3d 859 (Colo. 2004). Colorado does have a statute through which a defendant can receive costs and fees, but only if the lawsuit is dismissed in response to a standard motion to dismiss under CRCP 12(b). For this reason, you may wish to pursue other defenses before turning to POME; if you can win a motion to dismiss without relying on POME, you may be able to recover your costs and fees. See CRSA § 13-17-201.1
If you are facing a SLAPP-suit that does not fall within POME's protections, you may consider filing an abuse of process claim in response. Such a claim would require you to show
See James H. Moore & Associates Realty, Inc. v. Arrowhead at Vail, 892 P.2d 367, 373 (Colo. App. 1994). Remember that pursuing any legal claim can be a long, expensive process. Note also that your abuse of process claim would itself be subject to POME's standard.
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
Florida has two narrow anti-SLAPP statutes, but neither is likely to protect bloggers and non-traditional journalists engaging in online publishing activities. Fla. Stat. § 768.295 protects against SLAPPs brought by government entities in retaliation for exercising one's right to petition the government. Fla. Stat. § 720.304 protects a homeowner's right to petition the government when acting to "address matters concerning [his or her] homeowners' association." It applies to SLAPPs brought by individuals, business associations, and government entities.
Fla. Stat. § 768.295 applies to SLAPPs brought by the government in response to the exercise of "the right to peacefully assemble, the right to instruct representatives, and the right to petition for redress of grievances before the various governmental entities" of Florida.
Fla. Stat. § 720.304 (4) applies only to homeowners in a homeowners' association. It protects a homeowner's exercise of "the right to instruct his or her representatives or the right to petition for redress of grievances before the various governmental entities" of Florida. The statute, which applies to SLAPPs brought by individuals, business associations, and government entities, further explains that it is aimed at protecting against lawsuits arising out of a homeowner's "appearance and presentation before a governmental entity on matters related to the homeowners' association."
The CMLP has not identified any relevant case law concerning how either of these statutes apply to online speech activities. Based on the language of the statute, however, it seems unlikely that either one would protect online activity that occurs outside of official government proceedings. On the other hand, these statutes might protect you if you made statements on a government-operated forum, or if you used your online platform to call on the government to address an issue of public concern (or, in the case of the latter statute, an issue related to a homeowners' association).
If you are served with a complaint that you believe to be a SLAPP (as described in the section above), you should seek legal assistance immediately. Under Florida's anti-SLAPP laws, you can file a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment under section 768.295 (5) in the case of a government SLAPP or section 720.304 (4)(c) in the case of a homeowner-related SLAPP. In either situation, after the party suing you has filed its response, the court will hear your motion "at the earliest possible time."
If you prevail on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment under the anti-SLAPP statutes, the court will dismiss the lawsuit against you, and you will be entitled to recover your attorneys' fees and court costs. In addition, the court may award you any damages sustained as a result of the lawsuit. Further, if the court rules for you under the homeowner anti-SLAPP law, it may award you treble damages (i.e., 3X your actual damages).
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP in Florida, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the SLAPP filer. While Florida does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
You can use Georgia's anti-SLAPP law to counter a SLAPP filed against you, but only in limited situations. Ga. Code Ann., § 9-11-11.1 allows a defendant to move to dismiss a SLAPP, provided that the exercise of free speech that prompted the lawsuit is about "an issue under consideration or review by a governmental body." If the court grants your anti-SLAPP motion, you may recover expenses and attorneys' fees from the SLAPP filer.
To challenge a lawsuit as a SLAPP in Georgia, you need to show that the plaintiff is suing you for an act "in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress of grievances under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Georgia in connection with an issue of public interest or concern." Ga. Code Ann., § 9-11-11.1(b). The statute further defines this as
Ga. Code Ann., § 9-11-11.1(c). This definition limits your protection under the anti-SLAPP statute to (1) statements made in an official government proceeding, (2) statements relating to an issue currently under consideration or review in an official government proceeding, and (3) statements calling for such official review or consideration.
Categories 2 and 3 are the most important for online publishers. It is important to note what is not included here: If someone sues you for making statements on your website or blog about a topic or issue of ordinary public interest that is not under government consideration or review, and you are not calling for such consideration or review, then you are not entitled to bring an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss under section 9-11-11.1.
For example, in Berryhill v. Georgia Community Support & Solutions, 281 Ga. 439 (2006), Shirley Berryhill allegedly made statements in web postings and emails complaining about the poor treatment and care provided to her handicapped son by a healthcare facility. The Georgia Supreme Court held that, although Ms. Berryhill's statements pertained to a matter of public concern, she could not invoke the anti-SLAPP statute because her statements did not relate to an existing official proceeding or request the initiation of an official investigation or proceeding.
When a plaintiff files a lawsuit against someone for an act which reasonably could be viewed as "in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress of grievances under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Georgia in connection with an issue of public interest or concern" (as defined above), the anti-SLAPP law requires the plaintiff and his or her attorney to file written verifications under oath certifying that the claim is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the modification of existing law. Ga. Code Ann., § 9-11-11.1(c).
If you are sued, and you believe that your speech fits the criteria outlined in the section above, you should bring this verification requirement to the attention of the plaintiff or his or her attorney. If the plaintiff fails to make the required verifications within ten days of being notified, the court must dismiss the case.
If the plaintiff submits the required verifications, you can file a motion to dismiss the case for improper verification in violation of Ga. Code Ann., § 9-11-11.1(b). Once you have made the motion, the court must hear it within thirty days, barring court emergencies. Additionally, once you file your motion, the plaintiff generally cannot engage in "discovery" -- that is, the plaintiff generally may not ask you to produce documents, sit for a deposition, or answer formal written questions, at least not without first getting permission from the court.
In deciding the motion, the court will first consider whether your speech fits the criteria described in the section above. If it finds that you are eligible to make the motion, the court will then examine the verifications and documents submitted by the plaintiff. After this review, if the court finds that the plaintiff or attorney either did not believe that the legal claim was legitimate or brought the lawsuit against you for an improper purpose, then the court will grant your motion to dismiss. Alternatively, the court will grant your motion to dismiss if the judge finds that your statements were made in good faith. See Atlanta Humane Society v. Harkins 278 Ga. 451, 455-56 (Ga. 2004). If the plaintiff's case is strong, however, then the court will not grant your motion to dismiss, and the lawsuit will move ahead like any ordinary case.
When faced with a lawsuit that you believe is a SLAPP, it is critically important that you seek legal assistance immediately. Successfully getting a SLAPP dismissed can be complicated, and you and your lawyer need to move quickly to avoid missing important deadlines. Keep in mind that, although hiring legal help is expensive, you may recover your attorneys' fees if you win your motion. In addition, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. The First Amendment Center has an excellent list of organizations that can help.
If you prevail on a motion to dismiss under Georgia's anti-SLAPP law, the court will dismiss the lawsuit against you, and you can ask the court to impose sanctions on the other side. These sanctions may include your expenses in defending against the suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
In addition, if you succeed in fending off a SLAPP in Georgia, you may be able to bring a claim for malicious prosecution or abuse of process against the SLAPP filer. While Georgia does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of these claims are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to Illinois. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
You can use Illinois's anti-SLAPP statute, known as the Citizen Participation Act (CPA), to counter a SLAPP suit filed against you. The statute allows you to file a special motion to strike or dismiss a complaint filed against you based on "[a]cts in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government." If a court rules in your favor, it will dismiss the plaintiff's case early in the litigation and award you attorneys' fees and court costs.
To challenge a lawsuit as a SLAPP, you need to show that the plaintiff is suing you for "any act or acts in furtherance of [your] rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government." 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 110/15 (scroll down). Such actions are "immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome."
The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted the CPA narrowly. According to the 2012 case Sandholm v. Kuecker, there are two scenarios in which the CPA does not provide relief:
The CMLP has not identified any further Illinois case law interpreting this language or applying it to online publishing activities. If you know about any relevant cases, please contact us.
The CPA gives you the ability to file a motion to strike or dismiss a complaint brought against you for exercise of the aforementioned rights. The court must hear the motion within ninety days of your filing it, and it must grant the motion unless it finds that the SLAPP filer has produced "clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the moving party are not immunized from, or are not in furtherance of acts immunized from, liability by this Act." 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 110/20 (scroll down).
While the motion is pending, your opponent generally cannot engage in "discovery" -- that is, the plaintiff generally may not ask you to produce documents, sit for a deposition, or answer formal written questions, at least not without first getting permission from the court.
The CPA also allows a party who believes it has been the subject of a SLAPP to get a speedy decision on its motion to dismiss and to file an expedited appeal if the court denies the motion. Section 20(a) of the CPA states:
On the filing of any motion as described in Section 15, a hearing and decision on the motion must occur within 90 days after notice of the motion is given to the respondent. An appellate court shall expedite any appeal or other writ, whether interlocutory or not, from a trial court order denying that motion or from a trial court's failure to rule on that motion within 90 days after that trial court order or failure to rule.
When faced with a lawsuit that you believe is a SLAPP, it is critically important that you seek legal assistance immediately. Successfully getting a SLAPP dismissed can be complicated, and you and your lawyer need to move quickly to avoid missing important deadlines. Keep in mind that, although hiring legal help is expensive, you may recover your attorneys' fees if you win your motion. In addition, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. The First Amendment Center has an excellent list of organizations that can help.
If you prevail on a motion to strike or dismiss under the CPA, the court will dismiss the lawsuit against you, and you will be entitled to recover your attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in connection with the motion. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 110/25 (scroll down).
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP in Illinois, you may be able to bring a claim for malicious prosecution against the SLAPP filer. While Illinois does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. Previously, an Illinois appeals court held that bringing a SLAPP does not amount to malicious prosecution under Illinois law, see Levin v. King, 648 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995), but that ruling occurred before the Illinois legislature enacted the CPA. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
You can use Indiana's anti-SLAPP statute to counter a SLAPP suit filed against you. The statute allows you to file a special motion to dismiss a complaint filed against you based on an "act in furtherance of [your] right of petition or free speech under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Indiana in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." Ind. Code § 34-7-7-1(a). If a court rules in your favor, it will dismiss the plaintiff's case early in the litigation and award you attorneys' fees and court costs.
To challenge a lawsuit as a SLAPP, you need to show that the plaintiff is suing you for an act or omission "in furtherance of [your] right of petition or free speech under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Indiana in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." Ind. Code § 34-7-7-5 (1). You also need to establish that your action was "taken in good faith and with a reasonable basis in law and fact." Ind. Code § 34-7-7-5 (2).
Indiana courts have interpreted the "right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest" to include media coverage of newsworthy events. "Newsworthiness" is a flexible concept, and it is sometimes difficult to predict what topics a court will deem to fit the definition. But, in all likelihood, news reports and even informal posts about current events and significant economic, political, and social issues would fit the bill.
In contrast, statements and postings of a more personal character are less likely to be "in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." For example, in Hamilton v. Prewett, 860 N.E.2d 1234, 1247 (Ind. App. 2007), an Indiana appeals court held that the anti-SLAPP law did not protect a website operator who parodied a local business man because the website did not address a "public issue."
To prevail on a motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, you will also need to show that your action was "lawful." See Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9 (d). Therefore, if your speech constitutes defamation, extortion, or some other unlawful act, the anti-SLAPP law does not protect you.
The Indiana anti-SLAPP statute gives you the ability to file a motion to dismiss a complaint brought against you for exercise of your right of petition or free speech (as defined above). The court must hear and rule on the motion within 180 days of your filing it.
When faced with a lawsuit that you believe is a SLAPP, it is critically important that you seek legal assistance immediately. Successfully getting a SLAPP dismissed can be complicated, and you and your lawyer need to move quickly to avoid missing important deadlines. Keep in mind that, although hiring legal help is expensive, you may recover your attorneys' fees if you win your motion. In addition, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. The First Amendment Center has an excellent list of organizations that can help.
When filing a motion to dismiss, you must specify the public issue that prompted your speech or petition activity. See Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9(b). You also need to provide evidence establishing that your act was taken in good faith and with a reasonable basis in law and fact. After the motion is filed, the court will establish a schedule for taking discovery relevant to the motion -- that is, exchanging documents, taking deposition, and answering written questions on the issue of whether your action was lawfully taken in furtherance of your right of petition or speech.
If you prevail on a motion to strike or dismiss under the Indiana anti-SLAPP statute, the court will dismiss the lawsuit against you, and you will be entitled to recover your attorneys' fees and court costs. See Ind. Code § 34-7-7-7.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP-type lawsuit in Indiana, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the original plaintiff. While Indiana does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
You can use Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP statute, found at M.G.L. c. 231, § 59H, to counter a SLAPP suit filed against you, at least under some circumstances. The statute allows you to file a special motion to dismiss a complaint filed against you based on your "exercise of [your] right of petition under the constitution of the United States or of the commonwealth." The statute, by its terms, does not apply to speech activity that is not connected to petitioning the government, but Massachusetts courts have interpreted petitioning activity to include some online publishing activities. If a court grants a motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute, it will dismiss the plaintiff's case early in the litigation and award you attorneys' fees and court costs.
To challenge a lawsuit as a SLAPP in Massachusetts, you need to show that the plaintiff is suing you for "exercise of [your] right of petition under the constitution of the United States or of the commonwealth." M.G.L. c. 231, § 59H. The statute defines "a party’s exercise of its right of petition” to include a written or oral statement that is:
To make use of Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP motion, you will need to show that your speech activity fits into one of these categories. You will also need to prove that your exercise of the right of petition was the the sole cause of the plaintiff's lawsuit against you. If the plaintiff's lawsuit involves other issues, such as contractual obligations, you likely will not succeed on an anti-SLAPP motion. See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 942 (Mass. 1998).
Be aware that the statute does not protect "free speech" in the abstract, but only statements that fit within the five categories outlined above. Nonetheless, a good deal of online speech could fit into these categories, especially if aimed at influencing government policy or building support for a campaign to influence government policy.
However, an important Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case suggests that reporters who publish objective, factual news accounts won't qualify for the protections of the anti-SLAPP law, even if those accounts relate to matters and issues under review by government bodies and are aimed at enlisting public participation around those issues. See Fustolo v. Hollander, SJC-10485 (Mass. Feb. 1, 2010). In Fustolo, a real estate developer sued a reporter for a community newspaper for defamation over articles reporting on his properties and community opposition to his development plans. The complaint alleged that the articles caused "[w]idespread opposition . . . in connection with [his] development plans and variance petition" and "[a]s a direct and proximate result, [h]e was compelled to withdraw the application for variances prior to a hearing scheduled to take place before the Boston Board of Appeal on July 25, 2006.
Despite this connection with government scrutiny of the plaintiff's development plans, the Massachusetts SJC held that the articles did not qualify as "petitioning activity" on the reporter's "own behalf." Among other factors, the court noted that the articles in question were objective and did not reflect the reporter's personal opinions. It also determined that the reporter's subjective personal interest in the development issues she wrote about was not relevant to determining whether the articles themselves were petitioning activity. The court noted, however, that merely receiving compensation for her work did not deprive the reporter of the protections of the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law.
Another potentially important case for website operators is MacDonald v. Paton, 782 N.E.2d 1089 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). In this case, Elsa Paton operated a website that reported on local affairs in Athol, Massachusetts and the surrounding community. The site functioned as an interactive public forum on issues relating to Athol town governance, including education funding and municipal use of tax dollars. It included information on education reform, a citizen letters section, cartoons, quotes, a link inviting public participation by email, and satirical articles. Mark MacDonald, a former Athol selectman, sued Paton and others after a local newspaper published an article referring to him as a "Gestapo agent," and Paton published a "dictionary entry" for the term "Nazi" that referenced MacDonald. A Massachusetts appeals court held that Paton's publication of the statement was "petitioning activity" within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statue because "the Web site served as a technological version of a meeting of citizens on the Town Green, a space where concerned individuals could come together to share information, express political opinions, and rally on town issues of concern to the community."
The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Fustolo v. Hollander, discussed above, casts substantial doubt on the continued validity of MacDonald v. Paton, at least to the extent it suggested that providing a forum for others to speak could be "petitioning activity" on one's "own behalf" under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law.
If you are sued in federal court in Massachusetts, you might not be able to invoke the anti-SLAPP statute. Some federal courts in Massachusetts have held that the anti-SLAPP statute is a procedural rule that is inapplicable in federal court. See, e.g., Stuborn Ltd. Partnership v. Bernstein, 245 F.Supp.2d 312, 316 (D. Mass. 2003). Other courts might disagree, however.
The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute gives you the ability to file a motion to dismiss a complaint brought against you for exercise of your right of petition.
If you are served with a complaint that you believe to be a SLAPP, you should seek legal assistance immediately. Successfully filing and arguing a motion to dismiss can be complicated, and you and your lawyer need to move quickly to avoid missing important deadlines. You should file your motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute within sixty days of being served with the complaint. A court may allow you to file the motion after sixty days, but there is no guarantee that it will do so. Keep in mind that, although hiring legal help is expensive, you can recover your attorneys' fees if you win your motion.
One of the benefits of the anti-SLAPP statute is that it enables you to get the SLAPP suit dismissed quickly. When you file a special motion to dismiss, the court must hear and rule on the motion "as expeditiously as possible." M.G.L. c. 231, § 59H. Additionally, once you file your motion, the plaintiff generally cannot engage in "discovery" -- that is, the plaintiff generally may not ask you to produce documents, sit for a deposition, or answer formal written questions, at least not without first getting permission from the court.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court will first consider whether you have established that the lawsuit arises solely out of your right to petition (defined above). Assuming you can show this, the court will then require the plaintiff to introduce evidence showing that the "exercise of [your] right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law" and that your acts caused actual injury. M.G.L. c. 231, § 59H. If the plaintiff cannot show this, the court must grant your motion to dismiss. On the other hand, if the plaintiff can make this showing, the court will not grant your motion to dismiss, and the lawsuit will move ahead like any ordinary case.
If you prevail on a motion to dismiss under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute, the court will dismiss the lawsuit against you, and you will be entitled to recover your attorneys' fees and court costs. M.G.L. c. 231, § 59H.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP in Massachusetts, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the SLAPP filer. While Massachusetts does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of these claims are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
If you file a special motion to dismiss under Massachusetts' anti-SLAPP law and the court denies the motion, you have an immediate right to appeal the denial. See Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517 (2002).
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
On August 19, 2010, the Michigan House of Representatives passed House Bill No. 5036 which provides that if a defendant in a lawsuit makes a motion to dismiss, the court shall dismiss the case if either of the following applies:
a. The action was based on the defendant's exercise of constitutionally protected right to petition the government and the communication was aimed at achieving some governmental or electoral action, result, or outcome, or
b. The action is based on the defendant's exercise of the constitutional right to free speech.
The plaintiff can avoid dismissal of the complaint if they can make a prima facie case that the purpose of the lawsuit is not to harass or intimidate or interfere with free speech and one or both of the following:
a. The defendant made a statement that was false with reckless disregard for the truth or knowing it was false, or
b. The defendant revealed something in the communication that they were prohibited by law from revealing.
As of February 2011, it does not appear that the state senate had passed the bill or that it has otherwise become law in Michigan. If you have information about the legislation, please contact us. You can find general information in the section on Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). If you receive a SLAPP, you should immediately get legal assistance. You also may want to refer to the section on Responding to Lawsuits for more information.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP-type lawsuit in Michigan,you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the original plaintiff. While Michigan does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to Nevada. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute is codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.635-70. There is little case law interpreting it. However, Nevada courts have held that Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute should be read similarly to California's, upon which it is based.
According to John v. Douglas County School District, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute bars claims from people who attempt to abuse other citizen's rights who attempt to petition the government and allows for claims against citizens who do not petition the government in good faith. The purpose is to prevent citizens from being the subject of costly litigation in an attempt to abridge their right to free speech under both the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions. John, 219 P.3d at 1282. A "good faith communication" includes:
The types of suits that have been successfully dismissed under Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute are:
Once filed, the special motion to dismiss is considered at the summary judgment standard, and all discovery will be stayed. A judge will rule on the motion within 30 days. However, if the motion is denied, you do not have the ability to file for an interlocutory appeal. See Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2012).
It is important to note that Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute is a "free from judgment" statute, not a "free from litigation" statute. The Ninth Circuit recently interpreted the statute in a similar way as California's statute, stating that those who prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion are immune from civil liability, but are not immune from a lawsuit. Metabolic Research, 693 F.3d at 802. Those defendants facing litigation can request fees and costs at the conclusion of the case. Id.
The Citizen Media Law Project would like to thank the Randazza Legal Group for preparing this section. The contents of this page should not be considered to be legal advice.Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
New Jersey does not have an anti-SLAPP statute. You can find general information in the section on Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). If you receive a SLAPP, you should immediately get legal assistance. You also may want to refer to the section on Responding to Lawsuits for more information.
Although New Jersey has no anti-SLAPP statute, New Jersey courts have shown concern about the impact of SLAPPs. As a result, they have allowed a defendant who successfully defeats a SLAPP-type suit to seek damages from the SLAPP filer on a claim of malicious use of process, akin to California's "SLAPPback" claim. Thus, if you successfully fend off a SLAPP-type suit in New Jersey, you may want to consider a malicious use of process claim. If you are interested in this route, you should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
New Jersey's malicious use of process claim consists of four elements that you must prove:
You could establish the first and third element by showing that you succeeded in getting a SLAPP-type suit dismissed, assuming that the court indicated in the process that the SLAPP filer's claim was lacking legal and/or factual bases. You could prove malice by showing that the SLAPP filer sued you in retaliation for your exercise of your right of petition or free speech. See LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 323 733 A.2d 516, 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). Lastly, New Jersey courts have ruled that being SLAPPed constitutes a "special grievance." See Baglini v. Lauletta, 768 A.2d 825, 836-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); LoBiondo, 733 A.2d at 534.
New Jersey courts have not yet applied the malicious use of process claim to SLAPPs brought against bloggers or non-traditional journalists. Given the language the courts have used in describing the threat of SLAPPs to citizens' rights of petition and free speech, however, it seems entirely possible that the courts would be willing to extend the claim to these types of SLAPPs.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
New York's anti-SLAPP laws, found at N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 70-a, 76-a and N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 3211(g), 3212(h), offer protection against SLAPPs brought by individuals or entities seeking permits or applications from a government body (like zoning permits) over efforts of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge, or oppose such application or permission. The statute does not protect "free speech" in the abstract; it only protects bloggers, non-traditional journalists, and other online publishers when they address this narrow class of issues (i.e., the granting or denial of a public permit or application).
To use New York's anti-SLAPP law, you must show two things. First, you must show that the plaintiff suing you is a "public applicant or permittee." Second, you must show that the plantiff's claim against you is an "action involving public petition and participation."
The statute defines a "public applicant or permittee" as an individual or entity that has obtained or is seeking "a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate or other entitlement for use or permission to act from any government body." The term could include real estate developers, mining companies, garment manufacturers, and private landowners looking to build new structures on their land, among others. In essence, to meet this requirement, you will have to show that the party suing you requires some sort of government license to operate or proceed with a project.
The statute defines an "action involving public petition and participation" as one that involves a public applicant or permittee (above) seeking damages from a defendant on the basis of the defendant's efforts "to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose" the application to the government. For example, the definition would include a garment manufacturer's lawsuit against a public interest organization campaigning to have the manufacturer's state registration revoked. For another, the definition would include a real estate developer's lawsuit against a blogger who reported on the developer's attempts to secure a building permit, or who called upon local citizens to oppose the application.
The New York anti-SLAPP statute gives you the ability to file a motion to dismiss a complaint brought against you by a public applicant or permittee over your efforts to report on, comment on, challenge, or oppose an application to the government.
If you are served with a complaint that you believe to be a SLAPP, you should seek legal assistance immediately. Successfully filing and arguing a motion to dismiss can be complicated, and you and your lawyer need to move quickly to avoid missing important deadlines. Keep in mind that, although hiring legal help is expensive, you may be able to recover your attorneys' fees if you win your motion. In addition, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. The First Amendment Center has an excellent list of organizations that can help.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP laws, a New York court will determine whether the plaintiff is a "public applicant or permittee" and whether the lawsuit is an "action involving public petition and participation," as described above. If you can establish these two things, then the court will require the plaintiff to demonstrate that its lawsuit "has a substantial basis in law." If the plaintiff fails to do so, then the court will grant your motion and dismiss the case. On the other hand, if the plaintiff's case is strong, then the court will not grant your motion to dismiss, and the lawsuit will move ahead like any ordinary case.
Note that, unlike in many states, New York's anti-SLAPP motion does not halt discovery (i.e., fact gathering for trial). Thus, you may incur additional litigation expenses while the court hears and decides your motion.
If you prevail on a motion to dismiss under the New York anti-SLAPP law, the court may award you one or more of the following kinds of damages: costs and attorneys' fees, other compensatory damages, and punitive damages. To receive costs and attorneys' fees, you must show that the plaintiff's lawsuit against you lacked a basis in fact and law. To get compensatory damages (i.e., damages that compensate you for any other harm you suffered as a result of the SLAPP), you must also show that the plaintiff was maliciously attempting to impair your right to free speech or petition. Further, if you can show that if that the attempt to impair your rights was the only reason the plaintiff sued you, you may be entitled to punitive damages.
Note that even if you are able to establish that you meet the requirements for any or all of the types of damages listed above, the court does not have to award those damages. All anti-SLAPP damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, are awarded at the court's discretion under New York law.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
The CMLP has not identified any relevant statues or cases concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) in North Carolina. If you know about an anti-SLAPP law in North Carolina, please contact us. You can find general information in the section on Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). If you receive a SLAPP, you should immediately get legal assistance. You also may want to refer to the section on Responding to Lawsuits for more information.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP-type lawsuit in North Carolina, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the original plaintiff. While North Carolina does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
The CMLP has not identified any relevant statues or cases concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) in Ohio. If you know about an anti-SLAPP law in Ohio, please contact us. You can find general information in the section on Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). If you receive a SLAPP, you should immediately get legal assistance. You also may want to refer to the section on Responding to Lawsuits for more information.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP-type lawsuit in Ohio, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the original plaintiff. While Ohio does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
Pennsylvania has a narrow anti-SLAPP statute, found at 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 7707, 8301-05, that only applies to those petitioning the government over environmental issues. While the statute does not protect "free speech" in the abstract, bloggers and non-traditional journalists who address environmental issues may be able to take advantage of it. The statute provides for a special motion and hearing to establish entitlement to immunity. If a court rules in your favor on this motion, it will dismiss the plaintiff's case early in the litigation and award you attorneys' fees and court costs.
To challenge a lawsuit as a SLAPP in Pennsylvania, you need to show that the plaintiff is suing you over an "an oral or written communication to a government agency relating to enforcement or implementation of an environmental law or regulation." The statement must also be "aimed at procuring favorable governmental action."
Pennsylvania courts have interpreted this language to encompass both direct communications with the government and statements to third parties that are ultimately aimed at procuring favorable government action on an environmental issue. Thus, statements calling government or public attention to any alleged environmental violation or seeking to influence the government in its consideration or review of an environmental issue are protected. Some examples of protected communications made to non-government actors include: "a letter to the editor of a local newspaper expressing concern about the possibility of contamination at a proposed development, a statement made to a newspaper reporter about the possibility of contamination at a proposed development, or a signboard which protests the development of a wetland." Penllyn Greene Associates, L.P. v. Clouser, 890 A.2d 424, 433 n.11 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2005).
There are, however, exceptions to this immunity, spelled out in 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8302 (b). You are not entitled to immunity if:
The Pennsylvania anti-SLAPP statute gives you the ability to file a special motion requesting a determination of immunity under the Act. After you file the motion, the court must hold a hearing to make this determination.
At the hearing, the court will inquire into whether the lawsuit is based on "a communication to a government agency relating to enforcement or implementation of an environmental law or regulation" (defined above). Assuming you can show this, the court will require the plaintiff to introduce evidence showing that your statements fall into one of the three exceptions outlined above. If the plaintiff cannot do this, the court will dismiss the lawsuit against you. On the other hand, if the plaintiff's case is strong, the court will deny your motion. If the court denies your motion, you may appeal the judge's ruling immediately, and the plaintiff will not be able to engage in "discovery" (i.e., fact gathering for trial) until after the appeals court decides the appeal.
When faced with a lawsuit that you believe is a SLAPP, it is critically important that you seek legal assistance immediately. Successfully getting a SLAPP dismissed can be complicated, and you and your lawyer need to move quickly to avoid missing important deadlines. Keep in mind that, although hiring legal help is expensive, you may recover your attorneys' fees if you win your motion. In addition, there may be public interest organizations that would be willing to take on your case for free or for a reduced rate. The First Amendment Center has an excellent list of organizations that can help.
If you prevail on your motion under the Pennsylvania anti-SLAPP statue, the court will dismiss the lawsuit against you, and you will be entitled to recover your attorneys' fees and court costs. If you are only partially successful, the court may award you either full or partial fees and costs, at its discretion. See 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7707.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP in Pennsylvania, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious use of civil process against the SLAPP filer. While Pennsylvania does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of this claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
The Texas Citizens Participation Act, H.B. No. 2973, allows you to counter a SLAPP suit against you based on your statements in exercise of your right of free speech, petition, or association. The statute provides for a special motion to dismiss, and allows (with some exceptions) for a stay of discovery proceedings while your motion is being considered. If your motion to dismiss is successful, the court will award you attorneys' fees, court costs, and possibly punitive damages against the party that filed the lawsuit.
The statute allows for dismissal of suits based on any type of communication, in any medium, that is: related to a "matter of public concern"; or pertaining to or in connection with any governmental proceeding or issue being considered by any governmental branch; or between individuals “who join together to collectively express, promote, pursue, or defend common interests."
To challenge a lawsuit under the Citizens Participation Act, you must show that it is based on your act or acts of "communication" (defined as the "making or submitting" of any "statement or document in any form or medium") in connection with your rights of association, petition, or free speech. The statute broadly defines these rights:
Although dependent on your subject matter, the right of free speech is the section of the statute that will most likely apply to statements made online. The statute defines a "matter of public concern" as as issue related to health or safety; environmental, economic, or community well-being; the government; a public figure or official; or a good, product or service in the marketplace. If a lawsuit against you involves online statements on any of these topics, the statute may provide you relief.
The Act specifically excludes any "enforcement actions," such as criminal prosecutions, brought in the name of the state of Texas, as well as any legal actions against people "primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services," if the statement at the heart of the lawsuit arises out of that sale and is directed at actual or potential customers. The Act further excludes lawsuits related to bodily injury and wrongful death claims.
You must file a special motion to dismiss under the Citizens Participation Act within 60 days of being served with the lawsuit. A court may also allow you to file the motion after sixty days, but there is no guarantee that it will do so. Upon learning of a lawsuit against you that you think may be a SLAPP, you should consult an attorney; while legal help is expensive, if your motion to dismiss succeeds the court will grant you attorneys' fees.
One of the benefits of the anti-SLAPP statute is that it enables you to get the SLAPP suit dismissed quickly. After receiving your motion to dismiss, the court must rule on your motion within thirty days, unless the court's docket is overbooked. Once your motion to dismiss is filed, discovery proceedings on the claim will be stayed, or postponed, until the court disposes of the motion – that is, the plaintiff generally may not ask you to produce documents, sit for a deposition, or answer formal written questions.
The court may allow some limited discovery as long as it is relevant to the motion to dismiss, but the allowance of such discovery does not extend the time for the court to rule on the motion. In the first appellate decision from Texas interpreting the Citizens Participation Act, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District held that when a trial court judge deferred ruling on anti-SLAPP motion for more than thirty days after it was filed in order to allow limited discovery to take place, the lower court constructively denied the motion and the defendant had an immediate right to appeal at the end of the thirty-day period. Avila v. Larrea, No. 05-11-01637-CV, slip op. at 11-12 (Tex. App. Dec. 18, 2012).
Texas courts follow a two-step process when deciding a motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP law. First, you (as the party looking to invoke the anti-SLAPP statute) must show “by a preponderance of the evidence” that the plaintiff's claim is "based on, relates to, or is in response to" your exercise of the speech/petition/association rights described above. Once you successfully show that your online writing involves the exercise of those rights, the burden shifts to the plaintiff for step two. The plaintiff must establish "by clear and specific evidence" a prima facie case for each part of his or her original claim; if the plaintiff fails to show this, the court will dismiss the claim.
Whoever loses the motion to strike (either you or the plaintiff) has the right to an immediate appeal.
If you prevail, in whole or in part, in your motion to dismiss under the Citizens Participation Act, the court "shall" award you "court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and other expenses. . . as justice and equity may require." The court "shall" further award you damages from the plaintiff "sufficient to deter the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar actions." In short, the court will tailor your total monetary award to suit both your costs and the specific attributes of the individual plaintiff.
Note that if the court finds that your motion to dismiss under the Act is "frivolous or solely intended to delay," the judge "may" award court costs and attorney's fees to the plaintiff; this is permissive, not required, and the plaintiff may not recover further punitive damages.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP lawsuit in Texas, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the original plaintiff. While Texas does not have a special form of process for a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
The CMLP has not identified any relevant statues or cases concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) in Virginia. If you know about an anti-SLAPP law in Virginia, please contact us. You can find general information in the section on Responding to Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). If you receive a SLAPP, you should immediately get legal assistance. You also may want to refer to the section on Responding to Lawsuits for more information.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP-type lawsuit in Virginia, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the original plaintiff. While Virginia does not explicitly recognize a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
You can use the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, found at Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525, to counter a SLAPP suit filed against you. The statute allows you to file a special motion to strike any claim against you that is based on your public statements about an issue of public concern. The anti-SLAPP law allows for a stay of all discovery, pending hearings, and motions, with certain exceptions. If a court rules in your favor, it will dismiss the plaintiff's case early in the litigation and award you attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and ten thousand dollars in damages.
To challenge a lawsuit under Washington's anti-SLAPP act, you must show that the claim(s) against you is based on your written or spoken acts "involving public participation and petition". Washington defines statements involving "public participation and petition" in 5 ways:
Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525 (4)(a-e). As an online publisher, you are most likely to rely on the fourth category above. It applies to written statements in a public forum on an issue of public concern.
Washington courts have not yet explicitly ruled on whether the Internet is a public forum; however, Washington's anti-SLAPP law is explicitly modeled on California's statute, and federal courts in Washington have looked to California law in interpreting Washington's statute. In California, a publicly accessible website is considered a public forum. While California law is not binding on Washington courts, it might be persuasive.
Many different kinds of statements may relate to an issue of public concern. The statute itself does not define "public concern," but courts in Washington have found that the national health care crisis, or internal happenings in a fire department qualify. Here too, California law can be persuasive to Washington courts; see CMLP's page on California's anti-SLAPP statute for more examples of protected, and unprotected, speech.
Washington's law explicitly does not apply to prosecutions brought by the state. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525 (3).
The Washington anti-SLAPP statute gives you the ability to file a motion to strike (i.e., to dismiss) a complaint brought against you for engaging in protected speech or petition activity (discussed above). If you are served with a complaint that you believe to be a SLAPP, you should seek legal assistance immediately. Successfully filing and arguing a motion to strike can be complicated, and you and your lawyer need to move quickly to avoid missing important deadlines. You should file your motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute within sixty days of being served with the complaint. (Note that if the plaintiff serves you with an amended complaint, the 60-day deadline will run from service of the amendment.) A court may also allow you to file the motion after sixty days, but there is no guarantee that it will do so. Keep in mind that, although hiring legal help is expensive, you can recover your attorneys' fees if you win your motion.
One of the benefits of the anti-SLAPP statute is that it enables you to get the SLAPP suit dismissed quickly. After receiving your motion to strike, the court must hold a hearing on your motion within thirty days, unless the court's docket is overbooked. Until your motion is decided, all discovery and other hearings will be stayed (unless the plaintiff can show good cause for continuing some discovery).
Washington courts follow a two-step process when deciding a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP law. First, you (as the party looking to invoke the anti-SLAPP statute) must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's claim is based on your speech protected as involving public participation. (See above.) Once you successfully show that your online writing involves public participation, the burden shifts to the plaintiff for step two. The plaintiff must clearly show “by clear and convincing evidence a probability” of winning the lawsuit; if the plaintiff fails to show this, the court will dismiss the claim.
Whoever loses the motion to strike (either you or the plaintiff) has the right to an immediate appeal.
If you win your motion to strike under Washington's anti-SLAPP statute, the court will dismiss the lawsuit (or the parts of the lawsuit found to be SLAPPs). You will also be entitled to receive your attorneys' fees, your court costs, and an automatic statutory damage award of $10,000. The court may also sanction the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney.
Normally, nothing happens if you lose your motion to strike (other than the lawsuit continuing against you). However, if the court finds that your motion under the anti-SLAPP law was entirely frivolous or solely intended to delay the lawsuit, the court can award attorneys' fees, court costs, and an automatic statutory damage award of $10,000 to the plaintiff.
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP lawsuit in Washington, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the original plaintiff. While Washington does not have a special form of process for a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
Note: This page covers information specific to The District of Columbia. For general information concerning Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), see the overview section of this guide.
The District of Columbia Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010, D.C. Code 16-5502, allows you to counter a SLAPP suit against you based on your statements involving matters of public concern by filing a special motion to dismiss. The Act also allows for the stay of discovery proceedings when the special motion to dismiss is pending, with certain exceptions. Finally, if a party to a SLAPP suit seeks your personal identifying information, the Act allows you to make a special motion to quash the discovery order, request, or subpoena.
The D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010 applies to suits based on written or oral statements regarding (1) an issue being considered by a governmental body; (2) governmental or official proceedings; or (3) issues of public interest made in a public forum. It also applies to suits concerning any expressive conduct involving petitioning the government or communicating with the public regarding issues of public interest. Certain commercial statements are specifically outside the protections of the Act.
The D.C. Anti-SLAPP statute has been invoked in several cases in the District of Columbia. If you know about any additional relevant cases, please contact us.
To challenge a lawsuit under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, you must show that it is based on your act or acts "in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest." It defines "an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest" as
(A) Any written or oral statement made:
(i) In connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; or(B) Any other expression or expressive conduct that involves petitioning the government or communicating views to members of the public in connection with an issue of public interest.
(ii) In a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; or
The Act defines an "issue of public interest" as "an issue related to health or safety; environmental, economic, or community well being; the District government; a public figure; or a good, product or service in the market place." The Act specifically excludes "private interests, such as statements directed primarily toward protecting the speaker's commercial interests rather than toward commenting on or sharing information about a matter of public significance" from the definition of an "issue of public interest."
Similarly, the D.C. Anti-SLAPP statute specifically does not apply to suits which are:
brought against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services, if the statement or conduct from which the claim arises is:
(1) A representation of fact made for the purpose of promoting, securing, or completing sales or leases of, or commercial transactions in, the person's goods or services; and
(2) The intended audience is an actual or potential buyer or customer.
Until judicial guidance is available, the scope of commercial statements excluded from the protection of the protection of the Act will remain subject to interpretation.
In addition to allowing a defendant in a SLAPP lawsuit to seek dismissal of the suit, the D.C. Anti SLAPP statute also provides some protections if your personal identifying information is sought, "pursuant to a discovery order, request, or subpoena, in connection with a claim arising from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest." On its face, this provision is not limited to parties to the lawsuit, and thus might potentially be used by witnesses or other targets of discovery that are not parties.
As used in this provision, "an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest," has the same definition as discussed above.
"Personal identifying information" includes information such as your name, address, and social security number. More specifically, the Act defines "personal identifying information" by reference to section 127a(3) of the District of Columbia Theft and White Collar Crimes Act of 1982 (D.C. Law 4-164, D.C. Code § 22-3227.01(3)). By this reference, "personal identifying information" also includes information such as financial account numbers, government identification numbers (like those on driver's licenses and passports), signatures, biometric data, and employment history.
The D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act of 2010 gives you the ability to file a special motion to dismiss within 45 days after service of the claim. (You may also have other bases to move to dismiss under other rules or statutes; you should consult an attorney as to whether deadlines for other motions are affected by the filing of a special motion to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP Act.) The Superior Court of the District of Columbia has denied at least one special motion to discuss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act for failing to file the motion in a timely manner, although the court noted that, in other cases, "the court might very well conclude that the ameliorative purpose of the Act requires a more flexible interpretation of the forty five day framework." Newmyer v. Sidwell Friends School, No. 2011 CA 003727 M (D.C. Super. May 22, 2012); see also Sherrod v. Breitbart, 843 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act in part because the motion to dismiss was filed more than forty five days after service of the claim).
The special motion to dismiss must make a prima facie showing that the claim at issue arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest, as defined above. If you make such a prima facie showing, the motion will be granted unless the plaintiff (the party responding to your motion) shows that the claim is likely to succeed on its merits. If the plaintiff shows that the claim is likely to succeed on its merits, the motion to dismiss will be denied.
The court must hold an "expedited hearing" on the special motion to dismiss and issue a ruling "as soon as practicable" after the hearing. If the special motion to dismiss is granted, dismissal shall be with prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff cannot refile her claim against you.
After you file your special motion to dismiss, the Act provides that discovery proceedings on the claim will be stayed, or postponed, until the court disposes of the motion -- that is, the plaintiff generally may not ask you to produce documents, sit for a deposition, or answer formal written questions. However, if it "appears likely" that targeted discovery will enable the plaintiff to defeat the special motion to dismiss and that the discovery will not be unduly burdensome, the court may order "specialized discovery." The court's order may be conditioned upon the plaintiff paying any expenses you incur in responding to such discovery.
In addition to creating the special motion to dismiss, the Act also allows a person whose personal identifying information is sought in connection with a claim arising from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest to file a special motion to quash -- that is, to void or terminate the subpoena, request, or discovery order seeking your personal identifying information so you do not have to provide that information.
To succeed in your motion to quash, you must make a prima facie showing that the underlying claim arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of public interest, as defined above. If you make such a prima facie showing, the motion to quash will be granted unless the plaintiff shows that the claim is likely to succeed on its merits. If the plaintiff shows that the claim is likely to succeed on its merits, the motion to quash will be denied.
If your special motion to dismiss is denied, you may want to appeal. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that immediate appeal is not available for denials of a special motion to dismiss under the D.C. Anti SLAPP statute. Newmyer v. Sidwell Friends School, No. 2011 CA 3727 (D.C. Dec. 5, 2012). That means that you cannot appeal the denial immediately when the denial order is entered, but rather must wait until the end of the entire trial to appeal the denial of your special motion to dismiss. The issue of whether immediate review is available to appeal denials of special motions to dismiss under the Act is at issue in a case pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Sherrod v. Breitbart, No. 11-7088.
At least one federal court has held that the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act does not apply retroactively to lawsuits filed before the effective date of the Act, March 31, 2011, although the case is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See Sherrod v. Breitbart, 843 F. Supp. 2d 83, 84 85 (D.D.C. 2012). However, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia has held in at least one case that the Act applies retroactively. Lehan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 2011 CA 004592 B, 2011 D.C. Super. LEXIS 14 (D.C. Super. Nov. 30, 2011).
If you prevail, in whole or in part, on your special motion to dismiss or special motion to quash, the Act provides that the court "may" award you "the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees." Note that the statutory language is permissive; while the court may award you these costs, it is not required to do so. The Act also restricts the court's ability to award the plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs if you do not prevail. In that case, the Act allows the court to award the plaintiff costs only if it finds that your motion is "frivolous" or "solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." The Superior Court of the District of Columbia has awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff in at least one case in which it found the special motion was frivolous, i.e. "‘wholly lacking in substance' and not ‘based upon even a faint hope of success on the legal merits.'" Newmyer, No. 2011 CA 003727 M (quoting In re Spikes, 881 A.2d 1118, 1125 (D.C. 2005)).
If you succeed in fending off a SLAPP lawsuit in the District of Columbia, you may be able to bring a claim of malicious prosecution against the original plaintiff. While the District of Columbia does not have a special form of process for a "SLAPPback" claim, the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are similar. You should consult an attorney to see whether such a claim may be viable in your case.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has issued conflicting opinions on whether the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act applies in federal court in lawsuits brought under the court's diversity jurisdiction. Cf. Farah v. Esquire Magazine, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 29, 36 n.10 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the D.C. Anti-SLAPP statute does apply to federal diversity cases); 3M Co. v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 111 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the D.C. Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal diversity cases); 3M Co. v. Boulter, No. 11-cv-1527 (RLW), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151231 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2012) (same). Several cases that may resolve this issue are currently pending on appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The Citizen Media Law Project would like to thank Caitlin Vogus for her contributions to this article, and for her extensive work on the Legal Guide over the past several years.
While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when publishing online, there are a number of ways you can minimize your risk of being on the receiving end of a defamation or false light lawsuit. Some suggestions include:
General Advice
Ensuring that the Opinion and Fair Comment Privileges Apply to Your Statements
Ensuring that the Fair Report Privilege Applies to Your Statements
Ensuring that the Neutral Report Privilege Applies to Your Statements
When you publish information about someone without permission, you potentially expose yourself to legal liability even if your portrayal is factually accurate. Most states have laws limiting your ability to publish private facts about someone and recognizing an individual's right to stop you from using his or her name, likeness, and other personal attributes for certain exploitative purposes, such as for advertising goods or services. These laws originally sprang from a policy objective of protecting personal privacy; the aim was to safeguard individuals from embarrassing disclosures about their private lives and from uses of their identities that are hurtful or disruptive of their lives. Over time, the law developed and also recognized the importance of protecting the commercial value of a person's identity -- namely, the ability to profit from authorizing others to use one's name, photograph, or other personal attributes in a commercial setting.
Specifically, there are two types of legal claims that relate to unauthorized publication of personal and private information:
While these laws can create pitfalls for citizen media creators, the risks are manageable and you can take certain steps to protect yourself. Most importantly, if you stick to reporting or commenting on matters of legitimate public interest and only portray people who have a reasonable relationship to your topic, then you generally can avoid liability. You should never use someone's name or photograph solely to drive traffic to your website, but you are free to cover the public and noteworthy activities of others, including celebrities. Finally, if you are worried about legal liability, you can get consent from the individual or individuals who might be offended by your particular disclosure or use. For additional information on what practical steps you can take to avoid liability, see the section on Practical Tips for Avoiding Private Facts, Misappropriation, and Right of Publicity Claims.
Finally, you should also be aware that the federal government, as well as many states, have statutes related to collecting personal data from those who visit your website. For instance, the California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 requires the operator of a commercial website that collects personal information about users to conspicuously post its privacy policy on its Web site. The federal government also puts some restrictions on data that websites can lawfully gather. Congress enacted the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act to set limits on the online collection of personal information from children under 13. The Act details what a website operator must include in its privacy policy, when and how to seek verifiable consent from a parent, and what responsibilities an operator has to protect children's privacy and safety online. For information on using a website privacy policy to minimize the legal risks associated with gathering private information, see the Privacy Policy section of our legal guide.
In most states, you can be sued for publishing private facts about another person, even if those facts are true. The term "private facts" refers to information about someone's personal life that has not previously been revealed to the public, that is not of legitimate public concern, and the publication of which would be offensive to a reasonable person. For example, writing about a person's HIV status, sexual orientation, or financial troubles could lead to liability for publication of private facts. However, the law protects you when you publish information that is newsworthy, regardless of whether someone else would like you to keep that information private. In addition, the law protects you if you publish information already exposed to the public eye and especially material obtained from publicly available court records. Despite the law's substantial protections for legitimate reporting on matters of public interest, it is a good practice to obtain consent before publishing sensitive private information about someone.
Only human beings, and not corporations or other organizations, can sue for publication of private facts. Publication of private facts is a type of invasion of privacy, and you cannot invade the privacy of a dead person. Therefore, an estate cannot sue you for publishing private facts about a dead person, unless your publication took place before the person in question died. Note, however, that members of a dead person's family may be able to sue in their own right if you disclose private facts that relate to them too.
A plaintiff must establish four elements to hold someone liable for publication of private facts:
1. Public Disclosure: The disclosure of facts must be public. Another way of saying this is that the defendant must "give publicity" to the fact or facts in question.
2. Private Fact: The fact or facts disclosed must be private, and not generally known.
3. Offensive to a Reasonable Person: Publication of the private facts in question must be offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.
4. Not Newsworthy: The facts disclosed must not be newsworthy. Stated differently, the facts disclosed must not be a matter of legitimate public concern.
Below, we address these elements in greater detail. Keep in mind that publication of private facts is a state-law legal claim, so there is some variation of the law in different states. For state-specific information, see State Law: Publication of Private Facts.
A plaintiff bringing a publication of private facts claim must show that the defendant made a public disclosure of the fact or facts in question. This means communication to the public at large, or to so many people that the matter must be regarded as likely to become public knowledge. As a general matter, publication of information on a website or blog (or any other publicly available platform on the Internet) will satisfy this element. On the other hand, it might not be a public disclosure if you simply convey private information about someone in an email to one or two other people, so long as it is understood that the information is not meant for further dissemination to the public.
A plaintiff bringing a publication of private facts claim must show that the defendant disclosed a private fact. This means pretty much what it sounds like. A private fact is an intimate detail of one's private life that is not generally known. Common examples of private facts include information about medical conditions, sexual orientation and history, and financial status. It may also include things like someone's social security or phone number, if that information is not ordinarily publicly available. A plaintiff has no privacy interest with respect to a matter that is already public. Thus, you cannot be held liable for discussing or republishing information about someone that is already publicly available (e.g., found on the Internet or in the newspaper). For instance, a few years ago, Robert Steinbuch, a former Congressional aide sued Jessica Cutler, another former Congressional aide, for publishing information about their private sexual relations on her blog, Washingtonienne. Steinbuch also sued Anna Marie Cox of Wonkette for calling attention to Cutler's blog and making the story spread around the Internet like wildfire. Steinbuch's claim against Cutler may have some merit because she disclosed on her blog embarrassing information about him that was not publicly available, but the case has yet to be decided. See our database entry, Steinbuch v. Cutler for details. On the other hand, the court dismissed Steinbuch's publication of private facts claim against Cox because she did nothing but blog about a matter that was already public. (Cox's lawyers do an excellent job of arguing the point in this brief.)
In addition, you cannot be held liable for giving publicity to a matter that the plaintiff leaves open to the public eye. For example, when the man who helped stop an assassination attempt on President Ford sued two newspapers for revealing that he was a homosexual, the court denied him relief, finding that his sexual orientation and participation in gay community activities was already widely known by hundreds of people in a variety of cities. The record showed that, prior to the publication in question, the plaintiff had frequented gay bars, participated in gay pride parades, and that his friendship with Harvey Milk (a prominent gay figure) was well-known and publicized in gay newspapers. This, in the court's view, was sufficient to establish that the plaintiff had left his sexual orientation open to the public eye. See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). In another case, a stripper sued ABC for publishing private facts about her when the television show 20/20 aired a program about the allegedly illegal activities of several persons associated with the strip bar where she worked. The plaintiff appeared in a few shots of the TV program dancing nude in the background. The court held that the plaintiff did not have a valid claim for publication of private facts because her stripping activity was open to the public eye; anyone who paid the $5.00 cover charge could see her performing her work. See Puckett v. American Broad. Co., 1990 WL 170425 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 1990). In a more recent case, several Navy SEALs sued the Associated Press for publishing photographs of them potentially abusing Iraqi captives. The court held that the images were not private because the plaintiffs were members of the military on active duty conducting wartime operations in full uniform and chose to allow their activities to be photographed and placed on the Internet. See Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (S.D. Cal. 2005).
As the latter two cases suggest, a person's photograph or image can be a "private fact," but generally not when it is captured in a public or semi-public place. Therefore, you can generally publish photographs of an individual or individuals taken in public places without liability for publication of private facts. For example, in Gilbert v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441(Cal. 1953), the court held that a newspaper was not liable for invasion of privacy through publication of private facts when it published a photograph of a couple kissing at the farmer's market in San Francisco. Note, however, that publishing photographs of other people, even if taken in public, may result in liability for unauthorized use of name or likeness. See Using the Name or Likeness of Another for details. And, if you intrude into a private place in order to photograph or record someone, you could be held liable for intrusion. See Gathering Private Information for details.
A plaintiff bringing a publication of private facts claim must show that, under the circumstances, publishing the facts in question would have been highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities. The question is not whether the plaintiff himself/herself found the public disclosure highly offensive, but whether an ordinary person reflecting community mores would find it so. Thus, the law does not give special solicitude to a plaintiff with a "thin skin." As the Restatement of Torts explains:
Complete privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert, and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part. Thus he must expect the more or less casual observation of his neighbors as to what he does, and that his comings and goings and his ordinary daily activities, will be described in the press as a matter of casual interest to others. The ordinary reasonable man does not take offense at a report in a newspaper that he has returned from a visit, gone camping in the woods or given a party at his house for his friends. Even minor and moderate annoyance, as for example through public disclosure of the fact that the plaintiff has clumsily fallen downstairs and broken his ankle, is not sufficient to give him a cause of action under the rule stated in this Section. It is only when the publicity given to him is such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it, that the cause of action arises.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 263D cmt. c. Some examples of activities found to be highly offensive include publishing a photograph of a woman nursing a child or posing nude in a bathtub, displaying a movie of a woman's caesarian operation, and disseminating a video showing two celebrities having sex. Some activities found not to be highly offensive include publishing an accurate account of a private wedding, publishing a photograph of a couple kissing in public, and publishing photographs of military personnel showing potential prisoner abuse.
Newsworthiness is ordinarily the most important issue in a publication of private facts case. In many states, a plaintiff bringing a publication of private facts claim must show affirmatively that the facts disclosed were not newsworthy -- i.e., they were not a matter of legitimate public concern. In other states, the defendant must raise newsworthiness as a defense. Many courts hold that publishers have a constitutional privilege to publish truthful information on a matter of legitimate public concern. In any event, you ordinarily cannot he held liable for disclosing private facts about someone so long as those facts are of legitimate public concern.
Defining what is a matter of legitimate public interest can be tricky. But, courts generally are reluctant to second-guess the media, and they therefore take a very broad view of newsworthiness. Courts have held that there is a legitimate public interest in nearly all recent events, as well as in the private lives of prominent figures such as movie stars, politicians, and professional athletes. Thus, newsworthy publications include those "concerning homicide and other crimes, arrests, police raids, suicides, marriages and divorces, accidents, fires, catastrophes of nature, a death from the use of narcotics, a rare disease, the birth of a child to a twelve-year-old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have been murdered years ago, a report to the police concerning the escape of a wild animal and many other similar matters of genuine, even if more or less deplorable, popular appeal." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 263D cmt. Moreover, the protection for newsworthy publications extends beyond the dissemination of "news" in the sense of current events or commentary upon public affairs. It extends also to "information concerning interesting phases of human activity and embraces all issues about which information is needed or appropriate so that individuals may cope with the exigencies of their period." Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980). Thus, courts have found to be newsworthy articles dealing with unique love relationships, an Indian rope trick, the whereabouts and living conditions of a former child prodigy, and the peculiar personal characteristics of Bush campaign volunteers.
Despite the broad scope of potentially newsworthy topics, you risk losing your protection from liability if you exceed the bounds of common decency: "The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern." Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975). The courts agree that most facts about public officials and celebrities are of legitimate public concern, but they also recognize that even famous public figures retain a zone of privacy relating to things like sexual activity and medical information. Ordinary people may become "involuntary public figures" when they take part in an event or occurrence of public significance, such as a crime, an accident, or a spontaneous act of heroism. When this happens, many facts about their lives become legitimately newsworthy, like their home addresses and information about their education, upbringing, and family. The media is allowed to use colorful facts about newsworthy individuals to create a thorough and compelling portrayal, so long as there is some logical connection between the facts disclosed and the matter of legitimate public interest. Accordingly, a court has held that information about a physician's psychiatric history and marital life was substantially relevant to the newsworthy topic of policing failures in the medical profession, when the physician in question had committed two acts of alleged malpractice. See Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981). Similarly, a court held that a newspaper could legitimately publish the name and address of the father of a person who was being questioned as a suspect in the rape of a young girl. See Strutner v. Dispatch Printing Co., 442 N.E.2d 129 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). In yet another example, a court held that a woman could not successfully sue over a photograph of her walking on the grounds of a private psychiatric hospital when she was walking next to a famous fellow patient whose "mental and physical rehabilitation was clearly newsworthy." Howell v. New York Post Co., 181 A.D.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
On the other hand, sometimes the connection between disclosed private facts and a topic of admitted public interest is too attenuated. In one case, a court held that the disclosed fact that a student political leader was a transsexual was not of legitimate public concern, even though the disclosure happened in connection with a series of newsworthy articles about the student leader (she was the first female student body president at the college in question). See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). The court reasoned that there was no connection between the plaintiff's gender status and her fitness for office or any other relevant issue, and that her position did not warrant opening up her entire private life to public inspection. Moreover, the court perceived that the reporter in question was making a joke at the plaintiff's expense, which did not help his case. In another case, a court held that a surfer could take his publication of private facts claim to trial where he established that a magazine published information about embarrassing incidents from his personal history. While the overall topic of the offending article (body surfing at a famous California beach) was newsworthy, the court ruled that a jury would be entitled to conclude that information about the plaintiff's non-surfing life was not newsworthy. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
The passage of time might also affect whether a private fact is newsworthy. Facts that might be considered newsworthy at the time of the event will not necessarily remain so months or years later. This sometimes comes up with information about past crimes. Some courts have held that information about an individual's commission of a crime in the remote past is not a matter of legitimate public concern when that individual has completely rehabilitated himself/herself. However, other courts have rejected this view, so long as there is some connection to a topic of continuing interest. Nevertheless, you may want to think twice about publishing private information about someone who used to be an important public figure, but who now has faded into obscurity.
In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits states from imposing a penalty on the press for publishing accurate information obtained from a public court record. As a result of this case, most states recognize an absolute privilege for publication of information found in a publicly available (i.e., not sealed) court record. While the case involved traditional media, there is no reason to believe that its reasoning and holding would not extend to non-traditional journalists and other online publishers. This means that you cannot be held liable for publishing accurate facts about someone that you find in a public court record, regardless of how embarrassing they are. Note that this privilege will protect you in publishing information about past crimes (discussed above), so long as you gather your information from publicly available court records, such as an indictment or trial transcript. For information on accessing court records, see Access to Courts and Court Records.
Many states have extended this protection from liability to the publication of information found in "public records" in addition to court records. The exact meaning of "public records" varies, but in some states it includes information obtained from government agencies through state freedom of information requests. See State Law: Publication of Private Facts for details on the scope of the First Amendment privilege and Access to Government Records for information on freedom of information requests.
Consent is a complete defense to a legal claim for publication of private facts. When you interview someone to gather information for later publication, it is a good practice to ask for consent to use the material on your website, blog, or other online platform. Make sure to get consent in writing whenever possible. You can use an interview release form. This release can help protect you against misappropriation and right of publicity claims in addition to publication of private facts claims. Some examples of interview releases can be found in Stanford's Copyright and Fair Use Guide, and at EmilioCorsetti.com and the University of Michigan Press. You can find additional samples by doing a basic Internet search for "interview release," and the book The Copyright Permission and Libel Handbook by Lloyd J. Jassin and Steven C. Schecter has two excellent examples. An interview release can take various forms; you will need to choose and customize one to suit your own purposes. Make sure to mention explicitly your intent to use information conveyed during the interview for publication on the Internet.
If you take photographs of someone for later publication, you should also consider getting a model release. A model release primarily protects you against claims of unlawful use of name or likeness, but it also may be helpful if you photograph an individual in a private setting or if a photograph otherwise reveals private information. You can find examples at Ourmedia, the American Society of Media Photographers (model release for adult, model release for minor child, simplified model release, and pocket release), and the New York Institute of Photography. As above, you will need to customize the release to fit your purposes and circumstances.
Children cannot consent on their own behalf. When using the name or likeness of a minor (generally someone under the age of eighteen), you should seek consent from the minor's parent. Some of the example release forms linked to above are geared toward getting the consent of minors. State laws may recognize other situations where individuals are not able to consent on their own behalf. For instance, imagine you come across the scene of an accident and find a half-conscious accident victim. You might seek the consent of that individual to take pictures and ride along with him or her in the ambulance on the way to the hospital. Depending on state law, a court might not recognize consent provided by such a half-conscious and obviously traumatized individual.
Keep in mind that people giving you consent can revoke (i.e., take back) that consent anytime before the use of their name or photograph takes place. Therefore, you should honor the decisions of consenting persons who suddenly change their minds, so long as publication hasn't already taken place.
The "statute of limitations" is a term used by courts to describe the maximum amount of time plaintiffs can wait before bringing a lawsuit after the events they are suing over took place. This time limit is set by state law and is intended to promote fairness and keep old cases from clogging the courts. In publication of private facts cases, the statute of limitations ordinarily runs from the date of first publication of the offending facts. The limitations period varies based on state law; usually it is between one and three years. See the state pages for the applicable term in your state.
Each state has its own definition of what constitutes invasion of privacy through the publication of private facts. Choose from the list below to determine whether your state recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts, and, if so, how it defines the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. (Note that the guide does not include every state at this time.)
It is not clear whether Arizona recognizes a claim for publication of private facts. Although the Court of Appeals of Arizona discussed possible elements of a publication of private facts claim in Rutledge v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 715 P.2d 1243 (Ariz. App. 1986), the Court noted that Arizona precedent regarding the existence of such a claim was not settled. Id. at 1246 n. 3; see also Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 460 P.2d 666, 669 (Ariz. App. 1969) (noting that Arizona "possibly" recognizes a claim for publication of private facts).
The only Arizona Supreme Court case to discuss the elements of a private facts claim indicated that "[a] person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others" might be held liable for invasion of privacy. Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 162 P.2d 133, 137 (Ariz. 1945). However, at least one court has indicated that this description of the claim is outdated. Rutledge, 715 P.2d at 1246 n.3. If Arizona were to recognize a claim for publication of private facts, the Arizona Supreme Court would likely follow the generally accepted elements for a such a claim.
The Arizona Supreme Court has recognized that privacy rights are absent or limited “in connection with the life of a person in whom the public has a rightful interest, [or] where the information would be of public benefit.” Accordingly, the Court has held in a related context that public servants have no right to privacy concerning the performance of their public lives or duties. Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 789 (Ariz. 1989) (claim for false light invasion of privacy).
The Arizona Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether liability for publication of private facts may be imposed for dissemination of information in the public record. However, in the context of a claim for false light invasion of privacy, at least one Arizona court has recognized a privilege against liability for reporting information from the public record as long as the report is a fair and accurate abridgment of the records used. Sallomi v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 771 P.2d 469, 472 (Ariz. App. 1989).
The Arizona Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question of whether the consent of the person whose information is published is a defense to a private facts claim. The Court has, however, recognized in another privacy-related context that that consent is a defense, and also that a plaintiff who has become a “public character” may be found to have waived his privacy rights. Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 162 P.2d 133, 138 (Ariz. 1945). It is not clear if a "public character" is the same as a "public figure" for the purposes of defamation law (scroll down).
The statute of limitations for any privacy claim in Arizona is 2 years. A.R.S. § 12-542.
In California, the elements of a publications of private facts claim are: (1) public disclosure; (2) of a private fact; (3) which would be offensive and objectionable to the reasonable person; and (4) which is not of legitimate public concern. California is notable for also requiring a plaintiff to show that the defendant published private facts "with reckless disregard for the fact that reasonable men would find the invasion highly offensive." Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (1971), overruled on other grounds by Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
This requirement gives you extra protection against a private facts claim. It means that a plaintiff must show more than that you were simply wrong in believing publication of the facts in question was not offensive; the plaintiff must show that you entertained serious doubts about its offensiveness and decided to publish the facts in question anyway. In a court, this would involve examination of your state of mind at the time of the publication.
Under California law, the plaintiff must affirmatively prove that the facts published were not a matter of legitimate public concern; otherwise, the claim fails. The courts consider three factors when deciding whether facts are of legitimate public concern: (1) the social value of the facts published; (2) the depth of the intrusion into ostensibly private affairs; and (3) the extent to which the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a position of public notoriety. Most facts about celebrities and public officials are considered matters of legitimate public concern. Private facts about ordinary people involved in events or occurrences of public significance are of legitimate public concern if they bear a reasonable relationship to the newsworthy topic. Courts applying California law have found the following information, among other things, to be newsworthy (i.e., of legitimate public concern):
In contrast, courts applying California law have found the following things, among others, to be potentially non-newsworthy:
For discussion of additional cases, see the Reporters Committee's Photographers' Guide to Privacy: California.
In California, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from government records that are open to public inspection. For example, in Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004), the California Supreme Court held that a news organization could not be held liable for broadcasting truthful information obtained from official court records about the plaintiff's past criminal history. So far, California courts have only applied this rule to information obtained from court records, but the protection could apply to other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
California recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. California courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should record try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in California is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations in California for publication of private facts claims is not entirely clear. A number of California court decisions applying California law have held that the one-year statute of limitations for libel actions applies to claims for invasion of privacy, which includes claims for publication of private facts. The statute of limitations for libel actions is found at Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.
Florida recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts. For the most part, the law in Florida is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of Florida law that are different from the general description.
In Florida, the elements of a publications of private facts claim are: (1) the publication; (2) of private facts; (3) that are offensive; and (4) are not of public concern.
Florida law does not impose liability for publication of facts that are of legitimate public concern. The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that this "newsworthiness" exception presents a "formidable obstacle" for a plaintiff bringing an invasion of privacy lawsuit. Hitchner v. Cape Publication, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (Fla. 1989). This exception to liability is very broad; without question, this covers things like current events of public significance and information about the actors who take part in them. It also covers "soft news" and other human interest portrayals and accounts.
The courts have recognized, however, that individuals maintain a zone of privacy relating to certain sensitive personal matters. As a general rule, private facts about public officials and celebrities are more likely of legitimate public interest than private facts about ordinary people who get involuntarily caught up in newsworthy events.
Courts applying Florida law have found the following things, among others, to be newsworthy (i.e., of legitimate public concern):
In contrast, one Florida court held that a plaintiff stated a cause of action for publication of private facts when she alleged that a TV program had broadcast an interview with her about her unfortunate plastic surgery experience without disguising her voice and concealing her face as promised. The court rejected the argument that the information disclosed in the interview was newsworthy, concluding that "while the topic of the broadcast was of legitimate public concern, the plaintiff's identity was not." Doe v. Univision Television Group, Inc., 717 So.2d 63, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
For additional information and discussion of Florida cases, see the Reporters Committee's Photographers' Guide to Privacy: Florida and the Florida Bar's Reporter's Handbook.
In Florida, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from government records that are open to public inspection. So far, Florida courts have applied this protection to information obtained from court records (and from proceedings in open court), but it could apply to other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
Florida recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. Florida courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should record try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Florida is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations for publication of private facts claims in Florida is four years. See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p).
Georgia recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts. For the most part, the law in Georgia is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of Georgia law that are different from the general description.
In Georgia, the elements of a publication of private facts claim are: (1) the disclosure of private facts must be a public disclosure; (2) the facts disclosed to the public must be private, secluded or secret facts and not public ones; and (3) the matter made public must be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities under the circumstances.
Georgia law does not impose liability for publication of information that is of legitimate public concern or newsworthy. Wilson v. Thurman, 445 S.E.2d 811, 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). Georgia courts have repeatedly affirmed that reporting about issues concerning crime and criminal investigations are matters of public interest and cannot support a claim of invasion of privacy.
For example, courts applying Georgia law have found the following things, among others, to be of legitimate public concern (i.e., newsworthy):
In contrast, a Georgia appellate court affirmed the award of damages to a plaintiff whose identity as an AIDS patient was disclosed in a television program about AIDS. The court cited legislative enactments that protected persons against the disclosure of confidential AIDS information and reasoned that in each prior case which had rejected a claim for publication of private facts based upon the public interest of the subject matter, the information disclosed concerned a “criminal incident or investigation.” Multimedia WMAZ v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494-95 (Ga. App. Ct. 1994).
For additional information and discussion of Georgia cases, see the Reporters Committee's Photographers' Guide to Privacy: Georgia.
In Georgia, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information obtained from government records open to public inspection. Courts have applied this protection to information obtained from court records and statements made before a public body, but it could apply to other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
Georgia recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. Georgia courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Georgia is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations for publication of private facts claims in Georgia is two years. See Ga. Code Ann. § 9-3-33 (2006).
Illinois recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts. For the most part, the law in Illinois is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of Illinois law that are different from the general description.
In Illinois, the elements of a publications of private facts claim are: (1) publicity was given to private facts; (2) the facts were private and not public facts; and (3) the matter made public would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Illinois law does not impose liability for invasion of privacy when the invasion is deemed newsworthy or is a matter of legitimate public concern. Persons performing official duties for the government have no right of privacy as to information concerning discharge of those duties. Cassidy v. Am. Broad. Cos., 377 N.E.2d 126, 132 (1st. Dist. 1978). In addition, courts applying Illinois law have found the following things, among others, to be newsworthy:
In contrast, an Illinois court has held that a jury reasonably could find that a photograph of a woman's dead son (killed by gunshot wound in a gang-related incident) and her statements to his expired corpse in a private hospital room were not of legitimate public concern, even though the general topic of gang violence was newsworthy. It reasoned that the jury could determine that the newspaper did not need the plaintiff's intimate statements to her son or his photograph to convey the human suffering behind gang violence. See Green v. Chicago Tribune, 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
In Illinois, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gleaned from public records which include, for example, criminal records and divorce decrees. The protection could apply to information obtained from other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
Illinois recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. Illinois courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should record try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Illinois is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s). See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations in Illinois for publication of private facts claim is one year. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-201.
Whether Indiana recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts is unsettled. Before 1997, Indiana's lower courts recognized a such a claim. But, in Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. 1997), two Justices of the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that Indiana law did not recognize a legal claim for publication of private facts, while three other Justices agreed with the result in the case but not with their reasoning. Later courts have disagreed on whether this claim still exists in Indiana.
To the extent that Indiana law still recognizes a publication of private facts claim, it is generally similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of Indiana law that are different from the general description.
If Indiana still recognizes a private facts claim, the elements are: (1) a public disclosure of private information concerning the plaintiff that would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities; (2) to persons who have no legitimate interest in the information; (3) in a manner that is coercive and oppressive.
Indiana law does not impose liability for publication of facts that are of legitimate public interest. Nobles v. Cartwright, 659 N.E.2d 1064, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Courts applying Indiana law have found the following things to be of legitimate public interest (i.e., newsworthy):
In Indiana, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from government records that are open to public inspection, but there is little case law on this subject. This protection applies most commonly to information obtained in court records, but it would likely apply to other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
Indiana recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. Indiana courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should record try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Indiana is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
Assuming that Indiana still recognizes a publication of private facts claim, the statute of limitations in Indiana is two years. See Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4.
Massachusetts recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts based on Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B, which proscribes "unreasonable, substantial or serious interference" with one's privacy. For the most part, the law in Massachusetts is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of Massachusetts law that are different from the general description.
In Massachusetts, a publication of private facts claim requires proof of a publication of facts of a "highly personal or intimate nature" which are "of no business of the public." In contrast to several other jurisdictions, the disclosure need not be made to the public at large and a disclosure to two people has been found sufficient to warrant relief under § 1B. Offensiveness to a reasonable person is not one of the statutory criteria under § 1B, but Massachusetts courts consider publication of private information "of no business to the public" to be "offensive." See Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). Massachusetts courts have rejected a number of invasion of privacy claims based on conduct taking place in public locations because the facts in question were not private. See the general description for more information on the elements of a private facts claim.
Massachusetts law does not impose liability for publication of information that is of legitimate public concern or newsworthy. Peckham v. Boston Herald, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 888, 892-94 (Mass App. Ct. 1999). For example, courts applying Massachusetts law have found the following things, among others, to be of legitimate public concern (i.e., newsworthy):
In contrast, Massachusetts courts have found that confidential medical information is not a matter of legitimate public concern and have upheld an invasion of privacy claim based on a report publishing unsubstantiated ten-year-old investigation material about the plaintiff, a public figure.
In Massachusetts, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from government records that are open to public inspection. So far, Massachusetts courts have applied this protection to information obtained from court records, but it would likely apply to other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
Massachusetts recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. Massachusetts courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Massachusetts is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s). See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations for publication of private facts claims in Massachusetts is three years. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A.
Michigan recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts. For the most part, the law in Michigan is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of Michigan law that are different from the general description.
In Michigan, a cause of action for public disclosure of private facts requires the disclosure of (1) private information that is not already a matter of public record or otherwise open to the public eye; (2) that is of no legitimate concern to the public; and (3) the publication of which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Michigan law does not impose liability for publishing facts that are of legitimate public concern or newsworthy. Courts applying Michigan law have found the following things to be of legitimate public concern (i.e., newsworthy):
In contrast, a Michigan appellate court held that, even though the topic of abortion is a matter of public interest, the identities of patients actually undergoing the procedure were not. See Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). Similarly, another court held that, while the general topic of a newspaper article -- unique love relationships -- was of legitimate public concern, the specific facts disclosed about the plaintiff -- including that she had several abortions, engaged in partner swapping, and was involved in a surrogate parenting relationship with her former husband and her maid of honor -- were not necessarily newsworthy. See Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
In Michigan, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from government records that are open to public inspection. This includes court records and other government records that place information before the public eye.
Michigan recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. Michigan courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should record try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Michigan is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
There is no statute of limitations for an invasion of privacy claim in Michigan, but a publication of private facts claim would likely be governed by the general three-year statute of limitations for negligence claims. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(8).
Missouri was one of the first states to recognize a legal claim for the publication of private facts. Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942). For the most part, the law in Missouri is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of Missouri law that are different from the general description.
In Missouri, a publication of private facts claim requires proof of: (1) publication or "publicity" (2) absent any waiver or privilege, (3) of private matters in which the public has no legitimate concern, (4) so as to bring shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities." Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
Missouri law defines "publicity" as a disclosure made to the general public or likely to reach the general public. Missouri courts have treated the oral disclosure of private facts in a public setting as sufficient "publicity" to give rise to potential liability. See Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959).
Missouri law recognizes a distinction between newsworthy events and "private matters" in which the public has no legitimate concern. While a topic might be newsworthy, however, this does not mean that every individual's connection or participation in that matter is newsworthy. For example, the Missouri Supreme Court held that while a plaintiff's unusual medical condition may have been a matter of public interest and thereby newsworthy, her identity was a private matter. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942). Likewise, the success of a hospital's in vitro fertilization program was newsworthy, but the identity of plaintiffs participating in the program was a private matter. See Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). Missouri courts have consistently ruled that medical conditions and hospital stays are private facts.
Where the police, public bodies, or legal institutions are involved, the matter will likely be one of public interest. Buller v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 684 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
Certain details about an individual's life may fall into the public interest through legal action, police activity, or the action of other public bodies (even if that individual had no intention of making them known to the public). In Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting Div. Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971), a man was filmed being put into a police car after he was arrested with five others. During a broadcast of the footage, commentary stated that three of the men would be charged in connection with a crime. Even though the plaintiff did not participate in a crime and was released without being charged, the court held that he did not have a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
If another media outlet has already disclosed information about an individual, that information will not be considered private for the purposes of a subsequent publication by another publisher. However, this does not apply to information not contained in the original publication. See Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
Missouri law requires plaintiffs to show that a publication shows a "serious, unreasonable, unwarranted and offensive invasion of private affiars" before damages can be awarded. Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942). Because of this requirement, a Missouri court noted that the state "places a heavier burden on the plaintiff than do many of the other jurisdictions." Williams v. KCMO Broad. Div. Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
In Missouri, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information that is a matter of public record. A federal court applying Missouri law held that a publication of private facts claim could not be based on information revealed in open court proceedings. See McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976). A Missouri court applied this protection to information revealed in an open meeting of a city council. See Boeke v. Williams, 721 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). It would likely apply to information obtained from other public government records as well.
Missouri appears to recognize waiver (or consent) as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. However, courts have not addressed this issue in depth.
Missouri does not provide a statute of limitations period specific to the filing of an invasion of privacy actions, but has a general statute of limitations of five years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120. This five-year statute of limitations likely applies to causes of action for the publication of private facts. In defamation cases, Missouri applies a statute of limitations of two years. Mo. Rev. § 516.140. Missouri courts have applied this two-year statute of limitations when plaintiffs have attempted to sue for false light or invasion of privacy, but the court determines that the plaintiff's claim is actually one for defamation. See Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1986).
New Jersey recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts. For the most part, the law in New Jersey is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of New Jersey law that are different from the general description.
In New Jersey, the elements of a publication of private facts claim are: (1) the matter or matters revealed were actually private; (2) dissemination of such facts would be offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) there is no legitimate public interest in being apprised of the facts publicized.
New Jersey law does not impose liability for publication of factually accurate information that is "newsworthy" or of legitimate public concern. Courts applying New Jersey law have found the following things, among others, to be of legitimate public concern (i.e., newsworthy):
For additional information and discussion of New Jersey cases, see the Reporters Committee's Photographers' Guide to Privacy: New Jersey.
In New Jersey, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from "public records." Not all government records will qualify as "public records," and the extent of the privilege is not clear. So far, New Jersey courts have applied this privilege to information obtained from court records (and from proceedings in open court), as well as to a claim for disability benefits filed with an administrative agency. In any event, information gathered from any kind of government record that is open to public inspection is unlikely to be a private fact because it is already exposed to the public eye.
New Jersey recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. New Jersey courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should record try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in New Jersey is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s). See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
New Jersey applies the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims to publication of private facts claims as well. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:14-3.
North Carolina does not recognize a legal claim for the publication of private facts. See Hall v. Salisbury Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988). However, the North Carolina Supreme Court has suggested that a plaintiff might be able to bring an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under some circumstances involving the publication of embarrassing private facts.
In Ohio, the elements of a publication of private facts claim are: (1) a public disclosure; (2) the facts disclosed must concern the private life of an individual, not his or her public life; (3) the matter disclosed must be one which would be highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities; (4) the disclosure must have been made intentionally, not negligently; and (5) the matter disclosed must not be of legitimate concern to the public.
Ohio law does not impose liability for publication of factually accurate information that is "newsworthy" or of legitimate public concern. Examples of things that Ohio courts have considered to be of legitimate public concern or newsworthy include:
For additional information and discussion of Ohio cases, see the Reporters Committee's Photographers' Guide to Privacy: Ohio.
In Ohio, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from government records that are open to public inspection. So far, Ohio courts have applied this protection to information obtained from court records, police personnel files, and Internal Affairs Department files, but it would likely apply to other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
Ohio recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. Ohio courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Ohio is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations for invasion of privacy claims in Ohio is four years. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.9(D).
Pennsylvania recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts. For the most part, the law in Pennsylvania is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of Pennsylvania law that are different from the general description.
In Pennsylvania, the elements of a publication of private facts claim are: (1) publicity given to (2) private facts, (3) which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (4) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Pennsylvania law does not impose liability for publication of factually accurate information that is "newsworthy" or of legitimate public concern. Pennsylvania courts consider information newsworthy when it concerns "relatively current events such as in the common experience are likely to be of public interest." Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958).
Courts applying Pennsylvania law have found the following things to be of legitimate public concern or newsworthy:
In contrast, one court held that a photograph of a woman in a bathtub was not newsworthy because many people engage in bathing on a daily basis and the media generally does not consider it worth reporting publicly. McCabe v. Vill. Voice, Inc., 550 F.Supp. 525, 530-31, n.10 (D.C.Pa. 1982).
For additional information and discussion of Pennsylvania cases, see the Reporters Committee's Photographers' Guide to Privacy: Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania law recognizes a constitutional privilege for publishing truthful facts contained in public records. So far, Pennsylvania courts have applied this protection to information obtained from court records, but it would likely apply to other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
Pennsylvania recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. Pennsylvania courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Pennsylvania is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations for a publication of private facts claims in Pennsylvania is one year. See Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5523(1).
Texas recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts. For the most part, the law in Texas is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. Here, we will address only those aspects of Texas law that are different from the general description.
In Texas, in order to recover for public disclosure of private facts, a plaintiff must show that (1) publicity was given to matters concerning his or her private life; (2) the publication of these facts would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities; and (3) the matter publicized was not of legitimate public concern.
Texas law does not impose liability for publication of information that is of legitimate public concern or newsworthy. A federal court applying Texas law has indicated that "reports of the investigation of crimes or matters pertaining to criminal activity have almost without exception been held to be newsworthy or matters of public interest as a matter of law." Lowe v. Hearst Communications, Inc., 487 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 2007)
Texas courts have found the following things, among others, to be of legitimate public concern or newsworthy:
In addition, a photograph that was published in a newspaper that accidentally revealed a high school soccer player's genitalia was protected because the photograph accurately depicted a public, newsworthy event. The court reasoned the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Constitution provided the newspaper with immunity from liability for damages. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex. App. 1991)
For additional information and discussion of Texas cases, see the Reporters Committee's Photographers' Guide to Privacy: Texas.
In Texas, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from government records that are open to public inspection. So far, Texas courts have applied this protection to information revealed in open court proceedings and contained in police records, but it would likely apply to other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
Texas recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. Texas courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Texas is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations for a publication of private facts claim in Texas is two years. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a).
Washington recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts. The law in Washington is likely similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts, but few Washington cases deal directly with this legal claim. This page addresses those aspects of Washington law, to the extent it is known, that are different from the general description.
In Washington, the elements of a publication of private facts claim are: (1) public disclosure (2) of a matter concerning the private life of another (3) that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (4) that is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Washington law does not impose liability for publication of information that is of legitimate public concern or newsworthy. In one case, a Washington court indicated that the circumstances of the death of a young woman found naked on the side of the road were a matter of "immediate public concern" even though neither the woman nor her parents were public figures. See Moloney v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 1179 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). Washington courts probably would follow the courts of other states in determining what is a matter of legitimate public concern. See the general description for a sense of what others courts have said about this issue.
In Washington, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from government records that are open to public inspection because such information is already exposed to the public eye. One case has refused to impose liability for publishing information contained in a police investigation report. See Moloney v. Tribune Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 1179 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
No Washington cases address whether consent is a defense to a publication of private facts claim, but the general trend in all states is to recognize such a defense. Washington courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in Washington is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations for a publication of private facts claim in Washington is not settled.
The District of Columbia recognizes a legal claim for publication of private facts. For the most part, the law in D.C. is similar to that described in the general page on publication of private facts. See that page for a full discussion of the elements of and defenses to a private facts claim. This page addresses only those aspects of D.C. law that are different from the general description.
In D.C., the elements of a publications of private facts claim are: (1) publication; (2) of private facts; (3) in which the public has no legitimate concern; and (4) the publication of which would cause suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
D.C. law does not impose liability for publication of facts that are "matters of legitimate public or general interest." Dresbach v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1287 (D.D.C. 1981). This "newsworthiness" exception is not limited to dissemination of news about current events or public affairs, but also protects "information concerning interesting phases of human activity and embraces all issues about which information is needed or appropriate so that individuals may cope with the exigencies of their period." Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's,492 A.2d 580, 589 (D.C. 1985).
Individuals retain a zone of privacy relating to their private lives, however, and the defense will not protect the disclosure of facts unless there is a "logical nexus" (i.e., reasonable relationship) between the disclosed facts and the topic of public interest. As a general rule, private facts about public officials and celebrities are more likely of legitimate public interest than private facts about ordinary people who get involuntarily caught up in newsworthy events.
Courts applying D.C. law have found the following things, among others, to be newsworthy (i.e., of legitimate public or general interest):
Courts applying D.C. law have found the following things to be potentially non-newsworthy:
For discussion of additional cases, see the Reporters Committee's Photographers' Guide to Privacy: District of Columbia.
In the District of Columbia, you generally cannot be held liable for publishing truthful information gathered from government records that are open to public inspection. In Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1221 (D.C. 1989), the D.C. Court of Appeals refused to impose liability on a defendant who published financial information gathered from "court files, tax ledgers, and agency records of this City and the federal government." The protection could apply to information obtained from other government records as well, both because of a potential constitutional privilege and because the information is already exposed to the public eye.
The District of Columbia recognizes consent as a defense to a publication of private facts claim. D.C. courts may recognize verbal or implied consent, but it is advisable to get it in writing whenever possible. If getting written consent is not practical, you should record try to record verbal consent using an audio or video recording device. The age of majority in D.C. is eighteen; if you interview or photograph someone under the age of eighteen, you should seek consent from the subject's parent(s) or guardian. See the general description for a more detailed discussion of release forms.
The statute of limitations in D.C. for publication of private facts claims is not entirely clear. A number of federal court decisions applying D.C. law have held that the one-year statute of limitations for defamation actions applies to claims for invasion of privacy, which includes claims for publication of private facts. D.C. Code § 12-301.
In most states, you can be sued for using someone else's name, likeness, or other personal attributes without permission for an exploitative purpose. Usually, people run into trouble in this area when they use someone's name or photograph in a commercial setting, such as in advertising or other promotional activities. But, some states also prohibit use of another person's identity for the user's own personal benefit, whether or not the purpose is strictly commercial. There are two distinct legal claims that potentially apply to these kinds of unauthorized uses: (1) invasion of privacy through misappropriation of name or likeness ("misappropriation"); and (2) violation of the right of publicity. (The "right of publicity" is the right of a person to control and make money from the commercial use of his or her identity.) Because of the similarities between misappropriation and right of publicity claims, courts and legal commentators often confuse them. We will not try to exhaustively explain the differences between these two legal claims here. It is mostly important for you to understand the legal principles that are common to both claims; we will point out relevant differences below and on the state pages when appropriate.
You might be familiar with the now-famous case of Alison Chang, which is a good example of a potentially unlawful use of someone's name or likeness. In September 2007, Chang's parents filed a lawsuit in state court in Texas against Virgin Mobile Australia and Creative Commons. Virgin Mobile Australia obtained a photograph of Chang from Flickr, where is was posted with a CC "Attribution" license, which gave Virgin Mobile permission from a copyright perspective to use the photograph in a commercial setting so long as it gave attribution to the photographer who took the photo. (For information on copyright licensing, see Copyright Licenses and Transfers.) Virgin Mobile used the photograph in an advertising campaign to promote its free text messaging and other mobile services without getting permission from Chang or her parents to use her name or likeness. Chang's parents sued Virgin Mobile for misappropriation of her likeness, and the facts would also have supported a claim for violation of her right of publicity. They brought other claims against Creative Commons, which they dismissed shortly after filing the lawsuit. The case, which was subsequently dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Virgin Mobile, is interesting because it highlights the fact that somebody seeking to use a photograph needs to worry not just about copyright law, but also misappropriation and rights of publicity.
The Chang case involved a clearly commercial use of her likeness. As a general matter, you should never use someone's name or photograph in advertising or promotion of your website or blog without permission. The same goes for creating merchandise that you plan to sell to the public which incorporates someone's name or photograph. With the limited exception for "incidental advertising use" discussed below, you need to get consent for commercial uses like these. But what about a casual reference to your neighbor in a blog post? Or what if you write an article about a local politician that features his photograph? Or what if you publish a photograph that you took of a famous actress walking down the red carpet at the Oscars? Fortunately, the law does not give individuals the right to stop all mention, discussion, or reporting on their lives or activities. The common law of most states creates an exception to liability for news reporting and commentary on matters of public interest, and many state statutes explicitly exempt news reporting and other expressive activities from liability. Despite these substantial protections, it is a good practice to obtain consent of the person depicted when you publish photographs or other personal information about someone on your blog, especially if your use might be construed as commercial or promotional.
Only human beings, and not corporations or other organizations, have rights of publicity and privacy interests that can be invaded by misappropriation of name or likeness. Thus, only individuals can sue for unlawful use of name or likeness, unless a human being has transferred his or her rights to an organization. Note that companies may sue you for trademark infringement and unfair competition if you exploit their brand names for commercial purposes. See the Trademark section for details.
In some states, celebrities cannot sue for misappropriation of name and likeness (on the theory that they have no privacy interest to protect), and non-celebrities may not sue for violation of the right of publicity (on the theory that their personalities have no commercial value). The growing trend, however, is to permit both celebrities and non-celebrities to sue for both misappropriation and violation of the right of publicity, as long as they can establish the relevant kind of harm.
You cannot invade the privacy of a dead person, so you generally cannot be sued for misappropriation of the name or likeness of a dead person, unless the misappropriation took place before the person in question died. However, in many states the right of publicity survives after death, so you could be sued for violating the publicity rights of a dead person. This is most likely to come up with dead celebrities.
A plaintiff must establish three elements to hold someone liable for unlawful use of name or likeness:
1. Use of a Protected Attribute: The plaintiff must show that the defendant used an aspect of his or her identity that is protected by the law. This ordinarily means a plaintiff's name or likeness, but the law protects certain other personal attributes as well.
2. For an Exploitative Purpose: The plaintiff must show that the defendant used his name, likeness, or other personal attributes for commercial or other exploitative purposes. Use of someone's name or likeness for news reporting and other expressive purposes is not exploitative, so long as there is a reasonable relationship between the use of the plaintiff's identity and a matter of legitimate public interest.
3. No Consent: The plaintiff must establish that he or she did not give permission for the offending use.
Below, we address these elements in greater detail. Keep in mind that misappropriation and right of publicity are state-law legal claims, so there is some variation of the law in different states. For state-specific information, see State Law: Right of Publicity and Misappropriation.
A plaintiff bringing a misappropriation or right of publicity claim must show that the defendant used attributes of his or her identity that are protected by the law. Usually, this means showing that the defendant used the plaintiff's name or likeness. With regard to use of a name, it does not have to be a full or formal name, just something that is sufficient to identify the plaintiff. Using a well-known nickname can suffice. For instance, in Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purday, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D. Minn. 2005), the court held that the defendant had misappropriated the plaintiff's name when he used the pseudonym that the plaintiff blogged under in the domain name for a website. "Likeness" refers to a visual image of the plaintiff, whether in a photograph, drawing, caricature, or other visual presentation. The visual image need not precisely reproduce the plaintiff's appearance, or even show his or her face, so long as it is enough to evoke the plaintiff's identity in the eyes of the public.
The law protects other personal attributes or aspects of identity from unauthorized use as well. For example, courts have held that use of a celebrity's voice can violate the right of publicity. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). One court held a defendant liable for using the slogan "Here's Johnny" as a brand name for portable toilets because it sufficiently evoked Johnny Carson's identity. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). In other examples, courts have held defendants liable for using a photograph of the plaintiff's race car in a television commercial, see Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), and creating a commercial featuring a robot decked out to resemble Vanna White and posing next to a Wheel of Fortune game board, see White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 917 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). In all of these cases, the common rationale was that the attribute in question was sufficient to identify the plaintiff and evoke their identity for the public.
Note also that the Supreme Court has recognized that state law may protect a celebrity's right of publicity in the content of his or her unique performance. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court held that Ohio could constitutionally recognize Hugo Zacchini's right of publicity in his "human canonball" performance.
Some state statutes limit liability to the unauthorized use of particular attributes. For example, the New York statute only covers "name, portrait, picture or voice," N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51, the California statute covers only "name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness," Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a), and the Massachusetts statute covers only "name, portrait, or picture," Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3A. Depending on state law, relief for the use of a wider array of personal attributes may be available under the common law (i.e., judge-made law). See State Law: Right of Publicity and Misappropriation for details.
A plaintiff bringing a misappropriation or right of publicity claim must show that the defendant used his or her name, likeness, or other personal attribute for an exploitative purpose. The meaning of "exploitative purpose" differs depending on whether we are dealing with a right of publicity or a misappropriation claim:
Exploitative Purpose: Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is the right of a person to control and make money from the commercial use of his or her identity. A plaintiff that sues you for interfering with that right generally must show that you used his or her name or likeness for a commercial purpose. This ordinarily means using the plaintiff's name or likeness in advertising or promoting your goods or services, or placing the plaintiff's name or likeness on or in products or services you sell to the public. Therefore, it is a bad idea to create an advertisement suggesting that a celebrity -- or anyone for that matter -- endorses your website or blog. It is equally unwise to use someone else's name as the title of your website or blog, especially if you host advertisements. You can be liable even without creating a false sense that the person in question endorses your product or service; the key is that you are exploiting the plaintiff's identity to drive traffic or obtain some other commercial benefit.
It may also be an exploitative commercial use to sell subscriptions to your site in return for access to content relating to a specific (usually famous) individual. For instance, one court held that a website operator violated Bret Michaels and Pamela Anderson's rights of publicity by providing website users access to a Michaels-Anderson sex video in return for a subscription fee. See Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, 5 F. Supp.2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998). In another example, a court issued an injunction prohibiting a website operator from violating Paris Hilton's right of publicity by selling subscriptions to a website providing access to photographs of her and other private materials belonging to her. See Hilton v. Persa, No. 07-cv-00667 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007), and our database entry on the case for additional details.
Exploitative Purpose: Misappropriation of Name or Likeness
Most lawsuits claiming invasion of privacy through misappropriation of name or likeness also involve commercial uses of the plaintiff's identity, such as in advertising or promoting products or services. For example, one of the first cases to recognize a legal claim for misappropriation sprang out of the defendant's use of the plaintiff's photograph in an advertisement for life insurance. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). You also may be held liable for some non-commercial uses of someone's name or likeness if you exploit the plaintiff's identity for your own benefit.
For example, one court has held that an anti-abortion activist who registered domain names incorporating the names and nicknames of his ideological rivals had misappropriated their names for his own benefit. See Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D. Minn. 2005). The court also held that the defendant had committed misappropriation through a form of sock puppetry -- namely, he posted comments on his own bulletin board pretending to be lawyers from a law firm that fought for abortion rights; in these comments, he expressed opinions and views that were favorable to his own position that abortion is immoral. See Faegre & Benson, LLP v. Purdy, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (D. Minn. 2006). In another case, a professor created non-commercial websites and email accounts containing portions of the names of several of his former colleagues. Using these email accounts, the professor then sent emails to a number of universities, pretending to nominate these former colleagues for university positions and directing readers back to his websites, which contained critical posts about the nominated individuals. When the University and his former colleagues sued, an Indiana state court found that he had committed misappropriation. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the professor had exploited the plaintiffs' names for his own benefit "in that [the misappropriation] enabled him to pursue a personal vendetta." Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 600 (Ind. 2001).
One court has held that posting a photograph of a real estate agent on a "gripe site" dedicated to criticizing him was not sufficiently exploitative to impose liability. The court reasoned that the defendant had not published the photo in order to "tak[e] advantage of [the real estate agent's] reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity," but only "as a part of a declaration of his opinion." McMann v. Doe, No. 06-11825-JLT (D. Mass. Oct. 31, 2006).
As a general matter, then, it is a good idea to avoid impersonating other individuals on the Internet for political or even personal reasons, because that may be sufficiently exploitative to result in liability for misappropriation. On the other hand, simply using someone's name or likeness in the process of expressing your opinion is probably safe, especially given the exception for news and commentary discussed below.
Consent is a complete defense to a legal claim for misappropriation of name or likeness or violation of the right of publicity. When you gather information from or take photographs of an individual, it is a good practice to ask for consent to use the material on your website, blog, or other online platform. Make sure to get consent in writing whenever possible.
When taking photographs or video of someone, you can use a model release form. Some examples of model releases can be found at the American Society of Media Photographers (model release for adult, model release for minor child, simplified model release, and pocket release), and the New York Institute of Photography. You can find additional samples by doing a basic Internet search for "model release." Note that you can choose between various types of model release, which are of varying complexity. You may be better off using one of the simpler forms, unless you are planning on using someone's name or likeness in advertising or an obviously commercial use. All of these sample releases need to be customized to your own particular circumstances and purposes. You should not use someone's photograph for a purpose or in a type of media not covered by the release because then the release will be ineffective.
For interviewing someone (with or without taking photographs), it is also good practice to obtain an interview release form. This release can protect you against publication of private facts claims in addition to misappropriation and right of publicity claims. Some examples of interview releases can be found in Stanford's Copyright and Fair Use Guide, and at EmilioCorsetti.com and the University of Michigan Press. You can find additional samples by doing a basic Internet search for "interview release," and the book The Copyright Permission and Libel Handbook by Lloyd J. Jassin and Steven C. Schecter has two excellent examples. There are a number of different kinds of interview release forms; you will need to choose and customize one to suit your own purposes. As above, you should not use someone's name or likeness for a purpose or in a type of media not covered by the release.
If, instead, you obtain photographs for use on your website or blog from a publicly available source on the Internet, it may be more difficult to obtain the consent of the persons depicted in those photographs, especially if they are celebrities. In close cases, where you are not sure whether your proposed use is commercial or otherwise exploitative, or where you are unsure whether your use fits within the protection for "news and commentary" (see below), you should do your best to obtain consent. If you cannot get it, then you should consider using a different image. When using photographs that you did not personally take, you need to worry about copyright law in addition to name or likeness issues. Getting permission from the person depicted in the photograph only stops a claim for misappropriation or violation of the right of publicity. You also need to get copyright permission from the person who took the photograph (or whoever owns the copyright). For details on getting permission to use a copyrighted work, see Copyright Licenses and Transfers.
Children cannot consent on their own behalf. When using the name or likeness of a minor (generally someone under the age of eighteen), you should seek consent from the minor's parent. Some of the example release forms linked to above are geared toward getting the consent of minors. Keep in mind that people giving you consent can revoke (i.e., take back) that consent anytime before the use of their name or photograph takes place. Therefore, you should honor the decisions of consenting persons who suddenly change their minds, so long as publication hasn't already taken place.
Fortunately, the law places important limitations on misappropriation and right of publicity claims, which help to protect your right of free expression and to safeguard the free flow of information in society. Below, we discuss these limitations in detail.
You generally cannot be held liable for using someone's name, likeness, or other personal attributes in connection with reporting or commenting on matters of public interest. Many courts view this as a constitutional privilege based on the First Amendment, and some states have statutes explicitly exempting news reporting and commentary on public issues from liability. It is not always easy to determine what will qualify as news or legitimate commentary, especially on the Internet. But the courts traditionally have taken an extremely broad view of "news" and "commentary" -- it encompasses any reporting or commenting on current events or social issues, "soft news" which is of primarily entertainment value, and conveyance of information on past events of interest. The exception is extremely broad, and would encompass almost anything that conveys information or comments on a topic of even arguable public interest. For example, courts have found that the following media uses qualified for the exception:
There are literally thousands of additional examples. While most of these cases involved the traditional print and broadcast media, there is no reason to believe that the exception for news and commentary will not apply to your online activities. One case, Stern v. Delphi Internet Services Corporation, 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), addressed this question directly and held that the news and commentary exception applied to the defendant's online bulletin board service.
Hosting advertisements on your site does not deprive you of the news and commentary exception. The courts have long recognized that for-profit news organizations that sell advertising space are entitled to protection. See, e.g., Arrington v. New York Times, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1322 (1982); Berkos v. National Broad. Co., 515 N.E.2d 668, 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). This principle should extend to online platforms that sell advertising space.
There are two important limitations on the exception for news and commentary:
First, if the plaintiff can show that your use of his or her name or likeness bears no reasonable relationship to the content of the news or commentary presented, then you may be liable for creating an "advertisement in disguise." This usually comes up with photographs used to illustrate otherwise newsworthy stories. As a general rule, it is never a good idea to illustrate an article or post with a completely unrelated photograph, especially if the purpose of the photograph is simply to catch the public's attention or draw traffic to your site.
Some courts have let media defendants get away with using photographs of people who are not actually discussed in the article in question. For instance, the New York Court of Appeals held that a magazine lawfully could use the photograph of a large family to illustrate its article on a research study about caffeine and fertility, even though the family did not participate in the study. The court ruled that the photograph of the family was reasonably related to the "theme" of fertility that ran throughout the article. See Finger v. Omni Publ'n Int'l Ltd., 566 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990). Other courts have rejected this view, holding that there is no reasonable relationship between the photograph and the subject matter of the article if the person in the photograph is not mentioned in the text. For instance, in Christianson v. Henry Holt & Company, 2007 WL 2680822 (C.D. Ill. June 29, 2007), the court ruled in favor of a woman whose photograph appeared on the cover of the book Nickel and Dimed. Although the book itself dealt with a newsworthy topic, the author and publisher could not use the woman's photograph on the cover because she was never mentioned in the book.
Using a photograph of a totally unrelated person to illustrate a story may also create liability for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. See Overview of Publishing Information That Harms Reputation for details on these two legal claims.
Second, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment does not protect the media when they appropriate a celebrity's entire performance without compensation, even in connection with a newsworthy story or program. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), a news reporter videotaped Hugo Zacchini's "human cannonball" act at a county fair without permission, and his employer broadcast the entire fifteen-second act on the evening news. The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent liability for violation of the right of publicity, even though the broadcast was newsworthy. Therefore, it is not a good idea to record and publish all or most of someone's performance (e.g., a live musical or dance performance) without permission, even if the performance is legitimately newsworthy.
The First Amendment and the laws of many states also protect your use of someone's name or likeness in creative works and other forms of entertainment. Included in this category are things like novels that include mention of real-life figures, historical fiction, movies based loosely on real-life events, "docudramas," works of art that incorporate an individual's photo or image, and acts of parody directed at an individual. Some state statutes explicitly exempt these kinds of work from liability for misappropriation or violation of the right of publicity. See, e.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(e)(2) (link is to entire code; you need to click through to title 42, part VII, chapter 83, subchapter A, and then choose the specific provision); Wash Rev. Code § 63.60.070(1). In other states, the courts look at the creative or artistic work in question and decide on a case-by-case basis whether the First Amendment values at stake trump the plaintiff's rights of privacy and publicity. See State Law: Right of Publicity and Misappropriation for details.
As a general matter, you will not be held liable for using someone's name or likeness in a creative, entertaining, or artistic work that is transformative, meaning that you add some substantial creative element over and above the mere depiction of the person. In other words, the First Amendment ordinarily protects you if you use someone's name or likeness to create something new that is recognizably your own, rather than something that just evokes and exploits the person's identity.
For instance, in one case an artist created and sold t-shirts that contained a realistic depiction of The Three Stooges, and the company which owns the publicity rights sued. The California Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment generally protects artistic and creative works, but found that the t-shirts in question were not sufficiently transformative because "the artist's skill and talent [was] manifestly subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to commercially exploit his or her fame." Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001). In another case, the artist Barbara Kruger created an untitled work that incorporated a photograph of Charlotte Dabny holding a large magnifying glass over her right eye (which itself was a famous photograph by German photographer Thomas Hoepker). Kruger cropped and enlarged the photographic image, transferred it to silkscreen and superimposed three large red blocks containing the sentence "It's a small world but not if you have to clean it." A New York court held that Dabny could not recover for misappropriation because Kruger's artistic work was protected by the First Amendment because Kruger had added sufficiently transformative elements. See Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp.2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
If you use someone's name or likeness in connection with news reporting, commentary, or a creative work protected by the First Amendment, then you can also use it in connection with truthful advertising of your own work. Courts refer to this as the "incidental use" doctrine. This doctrine permits TV news shows to use "teaser" ads including images of people reported on during the main program, and publishers to create book jackets and advertisements for unauthorized biographies containing the name or photograph of the book's subject.
One court has held that this doctrine applies to online activities as well. In Stern v. Delphi Internet Services Corporation, 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), an Internet service provider set up an on-line bulletin board dedicated to discussion of Howard Stern's candidacy for governor. To advertise its service, the company took out a full page advertisement in New York Magazine featuring a photograph of Stern in leather pants which exposed his buttocks. An accompanying caption read "Should this man be the next governor of New York?" The advertisement invited readers to purchase Internet access from the ISP and to join the online debate about Stern. The court held that, because the ISP could lawfully use Stern's name for its online bulletin board (i.e., it fit the news and commentary exception -- see above), it could also use his name and photo to advertise that service. The court noted that "New York courts have consistently held that the incidental advertising exception applies to all 'news disseminators,' not just newspapers and magazines." There is no reason to believe courts in other states would not reach a similar result.
So, for example, if you write an article about a celebrity, you should be able to use that celebrity's name and image sparingly for purposes of promoting the article.
Social Networking Sites
Operating a social networking site presents special problems relating to misappropriation and rights of publicity. Such sites obviously incorporate the names and likenesses of those people who join the network, and it is not yet clear from a legal perspective whether the type of information conveyed by a social networking site fits into the "news and commentary" exception to liability. Although the famous social networking sites have teams of well-paid lawyers, others interested in incorporating social networking functionality into their websites need to be aware of how using the name or likeness of another can lead to liability.
Because of the legal uncertainty surrounding this topic, people interested in using social networking functionality should seek consent from account holders in their terms of use. A clause like this, from Facebook's terms of use, may be helpful:
By posting User Content to any part of the Site, you automatically grant, and you represent and warrant that you have the right to grant, to the Company an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable, fully paid, worldwide license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, publicly perform, publicly display, reformat, translate, excerpt (in whole or in part) and distribute such User Content for any purpose, commercial, advertising, or otherwise, on or in connection with the Site or the promotion thereof, to prepare derivative works of, or incorporate into other works, such User Content, and to grant and authorize sublicenses of the foregoing.
This should help protect against misappropriation and right of publicity claims brought by users based on the photos and other materials they upload. Incidentally, having users agree to such a clause also gives you the permissions you need to avoid copyright claims brought by users.
A different problem arises when someone creates a false profile on a social networking site. In these cases, the person whose name or likeness is being used improperly is not an account holder and has not given consent. The law is not settled on this point yet, but it appears that a person whose name or likeness is posted to a false profile may have a valid legal claim for misappropriation and/or violation of the right of publicity. Beyond that, false profiles often lead to defamation claims against the person who posted the false profile. See Law.com's article, Fake Online Profiles Trigger Suits, for examples. From the perspective of the website operator, defamation claims based on fake profiles are not a serious legal threat because section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA 230) provides immunity from defamation claims based on third-party content. See Immunity under CDA 230 for details on immunity from liability for user-generated content.
In Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 2008 WL 803947 (D.N.H. Mar. 27, 2008), someone created a false profile of a real woman (we'll call her Jane Doe) on the social networking site "Adult Friendfinder." The false profile included biographical information about Jane, along with spurious statements about her sexual proclivities. The photograph posted to the profile was not Jane, but she alleged that the biographical information was sufficient to identify her to people in her community. The social networking site not only hosted the fake profile, but incorporated it into teaser advertisements that appeared on Internet search engines when users entered search terms matching some of the information in the profile, including true biographical information about Jane. The teaser ads also appeared on other "sexually related" websites. Jane sued the adult social networking site, bringing various state law claims including invasion of privacy and publicity rights. The court held that, under the circumstances, she had stated a valid claim for violation of her right of publicity. In addition, the court held that CDA 230, which immunizes website operators from many state law legal claims based on user-generated content, does not apply to right of publicity claims. Therefore, Jane's claim against the social networking site could go forward, despite the fact that a third-party created the profile.
To deal with the fake profile issue, you might want to include a clause in your terms of service that requires users not to post material that would violate a third-party's privacy or publicity rights. Technically, this might help you recover some of the costs if you are sued by someone for hosting a fake profile. In reality, it may be impossible to identify who posted the fake profile, and they may not have any money to pay you.
Your best defense against these types of lawsuits is to create a mechanism for aggrieved individuals to submit complaints and to respond expeditiously to complaints about fake profiles. In addition, you can help protect yourself by not using user profiles in any sort of advertising or site promotion.
Fan Sites
Fan sites pertaining to a celebrity, such as a sports figure, musician, or movie star, are potentially vulnerable to right of publicity and misappropriation claims because they rely so heavily on the name and likeness of their particular hero. In the last year, we've documented two examples of this problem. In July 2007, Patrick O'Keefe, the operator of the fan site MarianoRivera.com received a cease-and-desist letter from SFX Baseball Group, which represents Yankees baseball player, Mariano Rivera. The letter asserted that the site's use of the domain name, marianorivera.com, violated Mr. Rivera's right of publicity and federal trademark law. After discussions, an SFX representative told O'Keefe that he could continue to operate the website, but refused to give any assurances about the future. See our database entry, SFX Baseball Group v. MarianoRivera.com, for details. In another example, pop star Prince sent a number of cease-and-desist letters to Prince fan sites in November 2007, claiming right of publicity violations and copyright infringement. The letters asked the fan sites to remove all photographs, images, lyrics, album covers, and anything linked to Prince's likeness. After Prince got a lot of bad publicity, the parties entered into negotiations, which appear to be ongoing. See our database entry, Prince v. Prince Fan Sites, for details.
Whether fan sites like these actually violate the publicity or privacy rights of their idols is not clear under the law. The best legal arguments in favor of fan sites are probably that they provide "news" about the celebrity in question and that their use of the celebrity's name or likeness is not commercial or otherwise exploitative (this argument may be stronger if the site hosts no advertisements whatsoever). These sites should avoid selling merchandise, like t-shirts or coffee mugs, emblazoned with the name or likeness of their particular celebrity. In the end, we will have to await further guidance from the courts on these issues.
Fan sites also raise copyright and trademark issues; consult the Intellectual Property section for more information.
The "statute of limitations" is a term used by courts to describe the maximum amount of time plaintiffs can wait before bringing a lawsuit after the events they are suing over took place. This time limit is set by state law and is intended to promote fairness and keep old cases from clogging the courts. In misappropriation and right of publicity cases, the statute of limitations ordinarily runs from the date of first publication or exhibition of the offending use of the plaintiff's name or likeness. The limitations period varies based on state law; for misappropriation and right of publicity claims, it can be anywhere from one to six years. For specific information on limitations periods applicable to particular state law claims, see the State Law: Right of Publicity pages.
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Arizona. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Arizona state courts have not explicitly recognized a common law right of publicity, although at least one older state case recognized a claim for invasion of privacy based upon "mental pain and annoyance" caused by the unauthorized display of one's picture. Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 162 P.2d 133, 128 (Ariz. 1945). It is not clear whether this right of privacy survives in modern Arizona law. However, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona has held that there is "no reason why a claim for invasion of the right of publicity should not be recognized in Arizona." Pooley v. Nat'l Hole-In-One Ass'n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (D. Ariz. 2000).
Arizona has two statutes recognizing a right of publicity for soldiers, but no corresponding statute for civilians. A.R.S. §§ 12-761, 13-3726.
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
What the Common Law Right of Publicity Protects
Although the case law is sparse, the right of publicity in Arizona at least protects a “celebrity’s name and likeness.” Pooley at 1112. In Pooley, a promotional video depicted a professional golfer teeing off and walking across the golf course while a voice-over identified him by name. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that this was sufficient grounds for a cause of action.
What Constitutes a Common Law Violation
In Pooley, a professional golfer shot a hole-in-one for a million dollars. Years later, a marketing organization used video footage of his feat, without his permission, to advertise its own “Million Dollar Hole-in-One” promotional product. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona applied a four factor test to determine whether or not the plaintiff had a cause of action for infringement of his right of publicity: “(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to the defendant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.” Pooley at 1111–1112. The court held that the plaintiff could bring a claim for infringement of his right of publicity.
Certain “incidental” uses are exempt from right of publicity claims as they fail to convey a commercial advantage to a defendant. In particular, uses such as “news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses” is not considered “use for purposes of trade,” and therefore these uses are incidental. Pooley at 1112. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona has considered several factors in determining whether a use is incidental, such as:
(1) whether the use has a unique quality or value that would result in commercial profit to the defendant; (2) whether the use contributes something of significance; (3) the relationship between the reference to the plaintiff and the purpose and subject of the work; and (4) the duration, prominence or repetition of the name or likeness relative to the rest of the publication.
Pooley at 1112. In Pooley, defendants argued that the use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness was incidental because it only lasted for several seconds of an eight minute video. The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiff’s identity was “crucial” (italics in original) to the commercial, as it was necessary to show golfers and potential buyers of the defendant’s event that million dollar hole-in-one shots were possible. The court also explained that the commercial’s depiction and identification of an amateur golfer shooting a hole-in-one did not change their analysis, as the video did not explain that the amateur too had won a million dollars. Instead, the “plaintiff was specifically selected because of his distinction and his wide market appeal.”
If a plaintiff consents to the use of their image, then that use is exempt from a right of publicity claim. In Pooley and in Lemon v. Harlem Globetrotters Int'l, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1100 (D. Ariz. 2006), the federal district court in Arizona indicated that the plaintiff has the burden of proof to show lack of consent, rather than the burden being on the defendant to establish that consent was granted.
Transfer of rights by death or assignment
If Arizona’s early conception of the right to control one’s image as a subset of the general right of privacy remains good law, the right of publicity would likely not descend under Arizona law. A.R.S. § 14-3110 indicates that privacy rights do not survive the death of the person. Similarly, such rights would likely not be assignable, as Arizona courts have held that privacy claims cannot be assigned. Martinez v. Green, 131 P.3d 492, 495 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006). It is not clear whether a right of publicity would be descendible or assignable if Arizona has abandoned this concept.
Defenses
The First Amendment can protect speech that would otherwise infringe on a plaintiff’s right of publicity. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona draws a distinction between “commercial” and “communicative” speech, noting that only for the latter do a defendant’s First Amendment protections outweigh the plaintiff’s right of publicity. Pooley at 1113. In Pooley, the court explained that when the use of an identity is “strictly to advertise a product or service,” the First Amendment does not protect that use. In Pooley the court held that although the hole-in-one was a public event and news in its own right, the subsequent incorporation of the plaintiff’s identity into a promotional video was “strictly commercial.” Pooley at 1114. The court explained that the golfer’s identity was used in “the context of an advertisement,” and not “simply to communicate an idea.” Moreover, the court was concerned that the video suggested, inaccurately, that the plaintiff was associated with the defendant.
Note that consent, which in some other states is considered an affirmative defense in right of publicity cases, relates to the plaintiff’s brden of proof in Arizona – see above.
A common-law right of publicity claim in Arizona is likely to be subject to the state's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury cases. A.R.S. § 12-542.
Damages and other remedies
In Pooley, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona suggests that injunctive relief and damages are both available to a plaintiff bringing a claim for right of publicity. Pooley at 1111.
In Lemon, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona holds that “the plaintiff may recover the proportion of the defendant's net profits that is attributable to the unauthorized use,” and notes that is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate which sales are attributable to other factors and what expenses need be deducted from revenue. Lemon at 1103. However, the context implies that the court may view this as one way to calculate damages, and other techniques (such as the “fair market value” of a plaintiff’s identity) may be used as well. Lemon at 1103.
A group of plaintiffs bringing claims for infringement of their rights of publicity need to be able to show that they have each suffered individual damages. In Lemon, the court declared a report calculating damages “irrelevant” because it presented total damages in a manner that could not be accurately broken out for each plaintiff, but allowed the suit to proceed because other evidence provided a basis for determining what damages had been suffered by each plaintiff. Lemon at 1103-1107.
THE STATUTORY RIGHT
Arizona has two statutes recognizing a right of publicity for soldiers, but no corresponding statute for civilians. A.R.S. §§ 12-761, 13-3726. § 12-761 recognizes a civil cause of action for infringement of the right of publicity for any soldier, alive or deceased, and § 13-3726 makes it a class 1 misdemeanor to infringe the right of publicity of a deceased soldier.
There are several exceptions listed in the statutes which are not considered violations of a soldier's right of publicity:
1. The use of a soldier's name, portrait or picture in an attempt to portray, describe or impersonate that soldier in a live performance, a single and original work of fine art, a play, book, article, musical work or film or on radio, television or other audio or audiovisual work if the performance, musical work, play, book, article or film does not itself constitute a commercial advertisement for any goods, wares or merchandise.
2. The use of a soldier's name, portrait or picture for noncommercial purposes, including any news, public affairs or sports broadcast or account.
3. The use of a soldier's name in truthfully identifying the soldier as the author of a particular work or program or as the performer in a particular performance.
4. Any promotional materials, advertisements or commercial announcements for a use described in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of this subsection.
5. The use of photographs, video recordings and images by a person, firm or corporation practicing the profession of photography to exhibit, in or about the professional photographer's place of business or portfolio, specimens of the professional photographer's work, unless the exhibition is continued by the professional photographer after written notice objecting to the exhibition by the portrayed soldier or a person who may enforce the soldier's rights and remedies.
6. A soldier's picture or portrait that is not facially identifiable.
7. A photograph of a monument or a memorial that is placed on any goods, wares or merchandise.
Publishers concerned that their activities may infringe on a soldier’s right of publicity should read the statutes and also review Frazier v. Boomsma, 07-CV-8040-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 3982985 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2008). In Frazier, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona held that enforcing A.R.S. § 13-3726 against a man selling protest t-shirts with the names of dead soldiers would violate the First Amendment, and left open the possibility that the statute is unconstitutional on face.
A.R.S. § 12-761 states that a soldier’s right of publicity survives death and lists (in order) who may then enforce that right. A.R.S. § 13-3726, as stated above, applies only to deceased soldiers. Claims under A.R.S. § 12-761 must be brought within five years of the offending publication.
This page covers legal information specific to the State of California. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Generally speaking, the Right of Publicity in California protects against unauthorized uses of a person’s name or likeness for commercial and certain other exploitative purposes. California has two systems of Right of Publicity law: a statute, and a common law right.
THE STATUTORY RIGHT
What the Statutory Right of Publicity Protects
Generally speaking, the Right of Publicity protects a person's right in his or her name and likeness. California's statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 3344, protects a person's:
The term “voice” applies only to a person’s actual voice, not to imitations. See Midler v. Ford, 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988). However, as noted below, the common law right of publicity might apply to voice imitators.
The term “photograph” includes still or moving pictures, but the person in question must be “readily identifiable” (meaning someone could “reasonably determine” that the photo depicts the plaintiff). However, pictures of crowds, such as on public streets or at sporting events, do not run afoul of the statute as long as no people are “singled out as individuals” in the photo. § 3344(b)(3).
The term “likeness” is the most difficult of the five protected categories to precisely define. Courts have used the “readily identifiable” test to conclude that drawings, if sufficiently detailed, can constitute a “likeness.” Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1998). In another case, the court ruled that a robot, if sufficiently detailed, could be a “likeness.” Wendt v. Host Intern., Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1997). Less detailed robots, though, may fall short of the “likeness” mark. White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
What Constitutes a Statutory Violation
California's statute protects against uses of a person's likeness for advertising purposes. Specifically, the statute prohibits “knowing” use of a person’s name/likeness/etc.,
on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent[.] (Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a))
The mere fact that a person’s likeness is used in connection with a commercial product or service does not violate the statute. Rather, the statute focuses specifically on advertising uses of a person’s likeness:
[I]t shall be a question of fact whether or not the use of the person’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the paid advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is required[.] (Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(e))
Courts have thus interpreted the statute to impose a three-step test:
See, e.g., Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1998). If the answer to all three questions is “yes,” then there has been a violation of the statute.
The statute also contains an explicit exception for uses “in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign.” § 3344(d).
Rights of the Deceased
California has a separate statute protecting posthumous rights of publicity, found at Cal. Civ Code § 3344.1. The right lasts for 70 years after death, and is considered a freely transferable, licensable, descendible property right. The substance of the right is largely the same, with the following exceptions:
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
The Traditional Four-Step Test
Courts generally describe California’s common-law right as a four-step test, in which a plaintiff must allege:
See White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992).
What the Common Law Right Protects
Though the second prong of the standard four-step test mentions “name or likeness,” courts held that the common law right is actually much broader: the focus instead is on the term “identity.” See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors, 85 F.3d 407, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1996).
Courts have interpreted “identity” broadly, covering more uses than does the statutory right of publicity. For example, imitating someone’s voice is not a violation of the statute, but it may violate the common law right. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 1992). A picture of a distinctly-decorated race car can be a common-law violation, even if the driver himself is not visible. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974). A robot can constitute a common-law violation, even if not sufficiently detailed to violate the statute. White v. Samsung, 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir. 1992).
What Constitutes a Violation of the Common Law Right
Unlike the statute, the common law right is not explicitly limited to commercial uses of a plaintiff’s identity. However, the “less commercial” a use, the more that First Amendment concerns come into play. (See section on First Amendment Limitations below.) Purely commercial speech, such as advertising, does nothing more “than propose a commercial transaction”; if a defendant’s use falls outside the realm of the purely commercial, California’s common law right of publicity is less likely to apply.
DAMAGES
A plaintiff can simultaneously pursue claims for violations of both the common law and the statute. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(g). The statute entitles a victorious plaintiff to the “actual damages suffered,” as well any of the defendant’s profits that “are attributable to the use.” Punitive damages “may” be awarded under the statute; California law limits punitive damages to cases of “oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294. The winning side in a statutory case “shall” receive his/her attorney’s fees and costs.
Damages are not limited strictly to the financial harm suffered by a plaintiff. Courts may also take into account “injury to peace, happiness, and feelings,” as well as “injury to goodwill, professional standing, and future publicity value.” See Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1992).
LIMITATIONS ON BOTH THE STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW RIGHTS
Relationship with Copyright Law
A right of publicity claim (either statutory or under the common law) fails if it is too similar to a copyright claim; in such a case, the state right-of-publicity law is preempted by federal copyright law. For example, in Laws v. Sony Music, 294 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2003), Sony licensed one of the plaintiff’s songs and sampled it in a new recording. The plaintiff tried to bring a right of publicity claim, but the court ruled that Sony’s use of a licensed recording fell under copyright law, thus preempting the state claim. Generally speaking, if the allegedly-infringing use of a person’s identity primarily involves use of copyrighted work, there is a chance that the state-law claim will be preempted.
First Amendment Limitations
The First Amendment also limits the extent to which rights of publicity can limit speech about matters of public interest. As one case put it, “[u]nder the First Amendment, a cause of action for appropriation of another’s name and likeness may not be maintained against expressive works, whether factual or fictional.” Daly v. Viacom, 238 F. Supp. 2d. 1118, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
As mentioned above, the California statute contains exceptions for uses related to news, public affairs, sports, and politics. Courts often focus on this statutory safe harbor, instead of the First Amendment directly, when confronting statutory right-of-publicity claims. See, e.g., Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 415-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
The First Amendment is more often directly relevant in common law right of publicity cases, since there is no statutory safe harbor. But since cases often involve both common law and statutory claims, the First Amendment analyses often cover both the statute and the common law. For example, in Daly v. Viacom, the court ruled that use of the plaintiff’s likeness in advertisements for a television show, using footage from the show in which the plaintiff appeared, was protected as part of an expressive work. That case involved both common law and statutory claims.
The 9th Circuit has suggested that cases involving "noncommercial" uses (meaning, the use contains some expression and does not "simply advance a commercial message") receive heightened First Amendment scrutiny. If the plaintiff is a public figure, he/she "can recover damages for noncommercial speech from a media organization . . . only by proving 'actual malice' " in so far as the noncommercial use was "intended to create [a] false impression in the minds of [the] readers." Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2001). The full extent of the "actual malice" standard's applicability in right of publicity cases remains unclear, however.
Statute of Limitations
Both the statutory and common law right of publicity claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Christoff v. Nestle USA, Inc., 213 P.3d 132, 135 (Cal. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has held that, for material appearing on a website, the statute is not retriggered every time aspects of the website are amended or revised; rather, the statute is only retriggered if "the statement itself is substantively altered or added to, or the website is directed to a new audience." Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012).
Washington D.C. courts recognize a common law claim for misappropriation of another's name or likeness. D.C. courts do not distinguish between right of publicity and misappropriation but merge the two under a claim for misappropriation. D.C. has no corresponding statute.
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
What the Common Law Right Protects
Washington D.C. has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C for a claim of misappropriation/right of publicity, which provides that "[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy."
The required elements for a misappropriation claim are:
Evidence that the defendant profited from the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's name or likeness is insufficient to prove liability in a misappropriation action. Instead, the plaintiff must prove not only that the defendant derived a benefit from the plaintiff's identify but also that there is a public interest or other value in that name or likeness. If there is no recognizable value associated with the name or likeness of the plaintiff, a misappropriation claim will fail. In Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985), a plastic surgeon displayed "before and after" photographs of a patient's face. While the photos were on display for the public, the court held that a claim for misappropriation failed because the patient's identity was not revealed and because the patient did not prove that there was public interest or other value in her face or likeness.
However, a misappropriation claim may succeed even if the plaintiff's name or likeness does not have specific commercial value, if it nevertheless has some other kind of "value" that the defendant has turned to his own benefits and purposes. Tripp v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that plaintiff's notoreity might have "value" for certain purposes).
In Polsby v. Spruill, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11621 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1997), the plaintiff claimed that an author had based a main character in his novel on the plaintiff's life. The court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proof because she had presented no evidence that the defendant knew her or knew about her prior to outlining his novel and because there were more differences than similarities between the plaintiff's life and the novel's main character's life.
Damages
In D.C., there are no cases interpreting damages for a misappropriation claim. If D.C. considers a misappropriation claim to be based on a privacy interest, damages may resemble those awarded for public disclosure of private facts. These may include general damages, special damages, or punitive damages.
General damages may be available to a plaintiff who has suffered emotional distress or personal humiliation if his private life is given publicity. Vassialiades, 492 A.2d at 594. Such damages are available only if such distress or humiliation would normally occur after an invasion on that individual's privacy. The harm also has to be of a normal and reasonable extent.
Special damages for a claim of invasion of privacy may include harm to a plaintiff's commercial interests. In Black v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 529, 538 (D.D.C. 1975), the plaintiff successfully recovered special damages on a publication of private facts claim after the FBI electronically eavesdropped and passed information to the Department of Justice.
Punitive damages are meant to punish for an invasion of privacy when a person's conduct is "malicious, wanton, reckless, or in willful disregard for another's rights." Vassialiades, 492 A.2d at 593. Courts are reluctant to award punitive damages; a high burden is placed on the plaintiff to show that punitive damages are supported by "evidence of record and the law." Id. at 593.
Limitations and Defenses
There are two First Amendment defenses that the D.C. courts recognize to a misappropriation claim: the newsworthiness privilege and the incidental use privilege.
The newsworthiness privilege applies to "advertisements for books, films, and other publications concerning matters of public interest." Lane v. Random House, 985 F. Supp 141, 146 (D.D.C. 1995). If a person's identity or likeness has "no real relationship" to the publication at issue, the newsworthiness privilege will fail.
The incidental use privilege protects against liability when an individual's name or likeness is used in connection with that person's public activities. Under this privilege, a person's likeness "is not appropriated by mere mention of it, or by reference to it in connection with legitimate mention of his public activities." Lane, 985 F. Supp at 147 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C, comment d (1977)). Further, incidental use "for a purpose other than taking advantage of a person's reputation or the value associated with his name will not result in actionable appropriation." Vassiliades, 492 A.2d at 592. In Klein v. McGraw-Hill, 263 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1966). the plaintiff became a public figure by making advances in the field of photography; the defendant publisher used the plaintiff's name and photograph in a book sold for profit. The court held that such use was incidental in light of the plaintiff's public activities.
Statute of Limitations
Under D.C. Code § 12-301, there is no specific statute of limitations for a misappropriation claim. The general statute of limitations is 3 years. D.C. Code § 12-301(8). If misappropriation is asserted in connection with another claim based on the same facts for which there is a prescribed statute of limitations, the court will likely apply that statute of limitations to the misappropriation claim. Mittleman v. United States, 104 F.3d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Florida. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Generally speaking, the right of publicity in Florida protects against unauthorized uses of a person's name or likeness for commercial purposes. Florida has two systems of rights of publicity: a statute, and a common law right.
Florida codifies its statutory right of publicity, treated primarily as a property right, at Section 540.08, with which you should familiarize yourself. Florida also recognizes a common law right of publicity under a right of privacy.
THE STATUTORY RIGHT
What the Statutory Right of Publicity Protects
Florida's statutory right of publicity creates a property right held by an individual in his or her name and likeness. See Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Florida's statute, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08, protects a person's:
The term "photograph" includes still or moving pictures or reproductions of an individual. See Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002); see also Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005); Badillo v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 2006 WL 785707 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2006). The individual must be identifiable in the photograph, and not merely a member of the public who is unnamed and not otherwise identified in connection with the use of the photograph. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(4)(c).
This statute and its interpretations by Florida courts have not formally recognized the protection of an individual's voice, though it is possible that "likeness" would include this. See Neva, Inc. v. Christian Duplications Int'l, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (suggesting that an actor's voice in a recording might be within the scope of § 540.08).
What Constitutes a Statutory Violation
Florida's statute protects against unauthorized commercial uses of an individual's name or likeness. Specifically, the statute provides that,
"No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any natural person without ... express written or oral consent."
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(1).
In Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., the Florida Supreme Court held that to find a violation of the right of publicity statute, the use must be for the defendant's benefit and done to promote a product or service, not merely for expressive purposes. See Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005); see also Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2002); National Football League v. Alley, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
Simply using a person's likeness in connection with a commercial product or service does not violate the statute. Rather, the statute is designed to "prevent the unauthorized use of a name to directly promote the product or service of the publisher." Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 901 So.2d 802 (Fla. 2005); see also Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Inclusion in a product sold for profit is insufficient to constitute an unauthorized use under this statute, as there must be a demonstration the association of the name with the product is valuable and exploitative. See Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983); Fuentes v. Mega Media Holdings, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005); Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). The publication or printing of a product for advertising purposes has been found sufficient to constitute a statutory violation, even when there was no distribution. Weinstein Design Group, Inc. v. Fielder, 884 So. 2d 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
Florida's statute also contains exceptions for news media and prior consent, including:
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(4).
Florida has also recognized Section 47 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, finding exceptions for uses including "news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses." See Faulkner Press, L.L.C. v. Class Notes, L.L.C., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2002); Tyne v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005).
Rights of the Deceased
Florida provides that this right of publicity lasts for 40 years after the death of the individual, and is considered a freely transferable, licensable, descendible property right. The substance of the right is the same before and after death.
Any person, firm or corporation may be authorized in writing to license the commercial use of an individual's name or likeness. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(1). If no such entity is authorized in writing, then the right belongs to the individual's surviving spouse and children. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(1). An individual's spouse is determined by the domicile's law the time of the individual's death, regardless of the spouse's later remarriage. Children includes immediate offspring as well children legally adopted by the individual. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(6).
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
What the Common Law Right Protects
In Florida, the common law right of publicity, including the right not to have a person's name published without his or her consent, was first recognized as part of a right of privacy. See Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944); see also Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964).
The common law right of publicity extends to any individual whose name or likeness has been exploited through unauthorized use during his or her lifetime. See Gridiron.com v. National Football League Player's Ass'n, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944). The common law right is meant to protect the privacy and integrity of an individual's name and likeness, because "Nothing so exclusively belongs to a man or is so personal and valuable to him as his name, inasmuch as his reputation and the character he has built up are inseparably connected with it." Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964).
Like the statutory right, the common law right of publicity recognizes exceptions for news reporting and for authorized publishers and distributors of a work to use an individual's name to truthfully identify the work's creator. See Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978); Jacova v. Southern Radio and Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
What Constitutes a Violation of the Common Law Right
As with the statutory right of publicity, a violation of the common law right of publicity is found when an individual's name or likeness is used without his or her consent for the benefit its value would confer on the defendant. See Agency for Health Care Administration v. Associated Industries of Florida, Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996); see also Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009 (M.D. Fla. 1994).DAMAGES
As the right of publicity has been formally recognized by statute in Florida, decisions generally cite the statutory right over the common law right. See Facchina v. Mutual Benefits Corp., 735 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999). However, the statutory right does not displace common law rights, so a plaintiff can simultaneously pursue claims under both the statute and common law. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(6).
Under the common law right of publicity, a plaintiff may be awarded nominal damages for the unauthorized use of his or her name without proving actual harm or damage. See Zim v. Western Pub. Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir.1978); see also Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944).
Under Florida's right of publicity statute, a plaintiff may bring an action for an injunction and to recover damages to recover damages for any loss or injury sustained by reason thereof, including an amount which would have been a reasonable royalty, and punitive or exemplary damages." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08(2). A victorious plaintiff may receive prejudment interest on the damages awarded. See Bosem v. Musa Holdings, 46 So. 3d 42 (Fla. 2010).
LIMITATIONS AND DEFENSES
Both the common law and statutory rights of publicity recognize consent as a defense when the individual consents to the use of his or her name or likeness. See v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 348 F. App'x 547 (11th Cir. 2009); Lane v. MRA Holdings, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002); National Football League v. Alley, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944).
In addition, all right of publicity claims are limited by the First Amendment. See Valentine v. CBS, Inc. 698 F.2d 430 (11th Cir. 1983); Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). As discussed above, the statutory right of publicity includes a safe harbor for press coverage of legitimate public interest at § 540.08(4) and the common law recognizes similar protection of news reporters. See Jacova v. Southern Radio and Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
The common law and statutory rights of publicity are subject to a four-year statute of limitations under Florida's general statute for claims whose limitations period is not specifically enumerated in other statutes. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11.
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Georgia. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Georgia's courts have developed a common law right of publicity. The state has no corresponding statute. Various court decisions refer to the "right of publicity," "misappropriation of likeness," and similar terms. The Supreme Court of Georgia's 1982 decision in Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc. is a good place to begin; you should familiarize yourself with that case.
What is protected?
Georgia's right of publicity protects a person's name and likeness. A few relevant appellate court decisions help contextualize "name and likeness." In King v. Heritage Products, the Georgia Supreme Court held:
[T]he appropriation of another's name and likeness, whether such likeness be a photograph or sculpture, without consent and for financial gain of the appropriator is a tort in Georgia.
King, 296 S.E. 2d 697, 703 (citations removed). In King, the defendants were producing and selling plastic busts of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., without the consent of Dr. King's estate. The Georgia Supreme Court held that conduct was a violation of Dr. King's right of publicity, which could be enforced by his estate.
In an earlier case, Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E. 2d 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966), the Georgia Court of Appeals recognized the right of publicity as a part of the more general right to privacy. The Cabaniss court ruled that the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's photograph in an advertisement for the Atlanta Playboy Club violated the plaintiff's right of publicity, even if the photograph was published by mistake.
Most right of publicity cases in Georgia have involved photographs (as in Cabaniss) or obvious likenesses (as in the King busts). But as a common law doctrine, Georgia's right of publicity is not necessarily limited strictly to these categories. The state's courts could continue to expand the meaning of "name and likeness" in subsequent cases. In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (the federal judicial circuit in which Georgia is located) cited California's right of publicity law with approval in Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing, 572 F. 3d 1201, 1208 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009), so other states' right of publicity doctrine might be persuasive in Georgia courts.
Right of deceased persons
In King, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the right of publicity survives death, can be enforced by the deceased's estate, and is fully inheritable and devisable. The court did not specify the duration of the posthumous right of publicity, and to date no other court decision has dealt with the question of when (or if) the right expires.
What constitutes a violation?
Georgia's right of publicity protects against unauthorized uses of a person's identity "for financial gain." The King defendant's sale of plastic busts was considered commercial, as was the advertising use in Cabaniss. In Alonso v. Parfet, the Georgia Supreme Court further ruled that use of a person's name on "various forms and documents" used in the course of business could establish a violation. 325 S.E. 2d 152 (Ga. 1985).
But Georgia's right of publicity is limited by "newsworthiness." In the 1956 case Waters v. Fleetwood, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that
where an incident is a matter of public interest, or the subject matter of a public investigation, a publication in connection therewith can be a violation of no one's legal right of privacy.
91 S.E. 2d 344, 348. Though Waters focuses on the "right of privacy," courts have used the newsworthiness test in right of publicity cases. In Toffoloni, the Eleventh Circuit summarized the test as follows:
[W]here a publisher may be precluded by the right of publicity from publishing one's image for purely financial gain, as in an advertisement, where the publication is newsworthy, the right of publicity gives way to freedom of the press.
There is no clear test for determining what qualifies as "a matter of public interest," but with respect to this question the Eleventh Circuit has pointed to California case law as instructive, ruling that the use of the plaintiff's identity must be actually related to the incident or issue with which the public is concerned. Therefore, the Toffoloni defendants were held liable for publishing previously-taken nude photographs of a recent murder victim; the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the photographs "were in no conceivable way related" to the newsworthy event (the murder). In contrast, the Waters defendants were protected from liability when they published photographs of a murder victim's corpse, because those photographs were related to the matter of public interest. Therefore there must be some kind of reasonable connection between the newsworthy event and the use.
Remedies
Money damages are limited to "the value of the use of the appropriated publicity." Toffoloni, at 1206. Georgia treats the right of publicity as a "proprietary" right, meaning general damages for claims such as emotional distress are not available. (Other privacy-related torts, if applicable, might allow for collection of general damages.)
Injunctive relief is available to plaintiffs. Punitive damages may also be available, if there is evidence of "wrongdoing, fault, wrongful motive or state of mind" on the defendant's part. Cabaniss, at 508.
Statute of limitations
Georgia's right of publicity claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Rivell v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1284 (S.D. Ga. 2012) (citing O.C.G. § 9-3-33).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Illinois. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Illinois' right of publicity statute, the Right of Publicity Act, is codified at 765 ILCS 1075. You should familiarize yourself with the statute, especially sections 5 (which defines the key terms of the statute) and 35 (which lists the primary exceptions to the right of publicity). Illinois no longer recognizes a distinct common law right of publicity.
What is protected?
The Right of Publicity Act, at § 30, protects "an individual's identity."
Section 5 defines the key terms. An "individual" is defined as a "natural person," meaning that the Right of Publicity act does not protect the names of businesses or other legal entities.
The statute defines "identity" broadly:
"Identity" means any attribute of an individual that serves to identify that individual to an ordinary, reasonable viewer or listener, including but not limited to (i) name, (ii) signature, (iii) photograph, (iv) image, (v) likeness, or (vi) voice.
At least one federal district court has noted that the Act's definition of "identity" is broad and promotes "an expansive approach" when deciding what counts as identity. Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp, 2003 WL 22872117, at *6 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 3, 2003) (not reported). While there does not appear to be appellate case law on the subject, the statute's definition of "identity" suggests a two-step approach:
Section 5 of the Act also defines "name," one of the listed attributes that can constitute "identity." The statute protects an individual's "actual name," as well as any "other name by which an individual is known that is intended to identify that individual." This would appear to provide protection to assumed names, stage names, and the like, as long as the individual is sufficiently "known" by that name.
Rights of deceased persons
Section 30(b) of the Right of Publicity Act protects an individual's identity for 50 years after death, if the person died after the date the statute went into effect. The Right of Publicity Act went into effect on January 1, 1999. Illinois' earlier common law right of publicity did not provide protection after death. Carlson v. Del Pub. Co., 213 N.E. 2d 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965). Therefore, the identities of people who died before 1999 are unprotected in Illinois.
What constitutes a violation?
The Right of Publicity Act protects against unauthorized "commercial" uses of an individual's identity. Section 5 defines use for a "commercial purpose" as a "public use" for the purpose of: (i) offering the sale of products, services, etc. (ii) advertising or promoting products, services, etc.; or (iii) fundraising.
Use of a person's identity in private documents, even if used for a commercial purpose, is not "public" and is not a violation of the Act. See MetLife v. Seldman, 734 F. Supp. 2d 304, 311-12 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
Most of what qualifies as a "commercial" use is intuitive. Using a person's picture on product packaging, Leto v. RCA Corp., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (N.D.Ill. 2004), and using a person's image to falsely imply endorsement of a product, Trudeau v. Lanoue, 2006 WL 516579 (N.D. Ill. March 2, 2006) (not reported) have both been found to be "commercial." If the use is tied to advertising, it risks right-of-publicity liability.
One federal district court has noted the differences between protection for commercial and non-commercial speech under the First Amendment, in connection with the question of whether First Amendment protection for non-commercial speech would trump the Right of Publicity Act. Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 512584 (N.D. Ill. February 15, 2012). It is not clear from the decision, however, whether the judge connected the statutory definition of commercial use under the Right of Publicity Act to the constitutional concept of commercial speech.Exceptions and the First Amendment
The Right of Publicity Act contains a number of specified exceptions designed to protect First Amendment interests. Specifically, § 35(b) lists five exceptions:
Courts have described these various exceptions as important protections for First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Collier v. Murphy, 2003 WL 1606637 (N.D. Ill. March 26, 2003) (not reported). However, these exceptions do not define the limit of First Amendment protection; conduct that falls outside of the statutory exceptions may still be constitutionally protected. In Christianson v. Henry Holt and Co., 2007 WL 2680822 (C.D. Ill. June 29, 2007) (not reported), the defendants used a picture of the plaintiff on a book jacket, even though the plaintiff was not a subject of the book. The district court ruled that the defendants' conduct did not fall under the first or second exceptions listed above, because the plaintiff was not portrayed, or even mentioned, in the book. But the court then stated that "the fact that Plaintiff's claim does not fit within one of the elucidated exception[s] to the [Right of Publicity Act] does not end the inquiry," and went on to consider whether the use of the plaintiff's image was protected by the First Amendment as an expressive choice in the context of the book. Although the court eventually ruled against the defendants on this issue, finding no link between the subject of the book and the plaintiff's picture, the court's analysis indicates that a separate First Amendment defense may exist for some expressive uses of an individual's image.
Remedies
Section 40 of the Act provides from monetary relief. A victorious plaintiff can collect both their actual damages and the defendant's profits that result from the violation. The minimum monetary award is $1,000. A plaintiff can claim both "personal" damages and "commercial" damages. See Villalovos v. Sundance Associates, 31 Media L. Rep. 1274, 2003 WL 115243, at *5 (N.D. Ill. January 13, 2003). Punitive damages are also available for willful violations.
Section 50 allows courts to issue "appropriate" injunctive relief. The court can also, in its discretion, award the winning side attorney's fees and court costs. See § 55.
Statute of limitations
Right of publicity claims under the Illinois statute are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Blair v. Nevada Landing P'ship, 859 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 2006).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Indiana. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Indiana has two systems of right of publicity law: a statutory right protecting a property interest, and a common law privacy right.
Indiana codifies its statutory right of publicity in Ind. Code § 32-36-1. You should first familiarize yourself with the statute.
THE STATUTORY RIGHT
What the Statutory Right of Publicity Protects
Indiana’s statutory right of publicity is found under Indiana Code Title 32, Section 36-1. The statute defines “right of publicity” as a property interest belonging to a “personality.” Under the Indiana statute, a “personality” is a living or deceased natural person (not a corporation or other legal entity) who possesses specific qualities with commercial value. Specifically, the statute protects a personality’s:
Ind. Code § 32-36-1-6.
Indiana’s right of publicity statute protects against the use of these protected aspects “for a commercial purpose” during the personality’s lifetime and after death. The right of publicity lasts for 100 years after the death of the individual and applies to those who died before the statute’s enactment in 1994.
The statute defines “commercial purpose” as the use of an aspect of a personality’s right of publicity in any of the following ways:
Ind. Code § 32-36-1-2.
The term “name” means “the actual or assumed name of a living or deceased natural person that is intended to identify the person.” Ind. Code § 32-36-1-3. As a result, the statute would apply to performers’ stage names as well as their birth names.
Who Can Exercise the Statutory Right of Publicity?
As property rights, a personality’s rights of publicity recognized under Indiana’s statute are freely transferable and descendible, in whole or in part, by:
Ind. Code § 32-36-1-16. If, after death, a personality’s rights have not been transferred by one of the above means and he or she has no survivors, any rights that have not been vested are terminated. A personality or a person to whom the recognized rights of a personality have been transferred may bring action under the statute. Ind. Code § 32-36-1-17.
What Constitutes a Statutory Violation?
The statute only applies to “an act or event that occurs within Indiana, regardless of a personality's domicile, residence, or citizenship.” Ind. Code § 32-36-1-1. A claim for a violation can be asserted only if the alleged act or event of violation occurred after June 30, 1994. A person, partnership, firm, corporation or an unincorporated association violates Indiana’s right of publicity statute when it:
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
What the Common Law Right Protects
Indiana common law recognizes an invasion of privacy claim for misappropriation of an individual’s name or likeness, with the Indiana Supreme Court noting that the tort focuses on an individual’s right to be left alone. Doe v. Methodist Hospital, 690 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ind. 1997). A person’s name or likeness “embraces the concept of a person's character, which is legally protected against appropriation by another for his own use or benefit.” Felsher v. University of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 601 (Ind. 2001). For these reasons, a person can likely assert the common law right without evidence that their name, etc., has any particular commercial value.
In Doe, the Court defined the tort of invasion of privacy as the “unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality . . . in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilit[ies].” Doe, 690 N.E.2d at 685–6.
Although “an appropriation claim involves a privacy issue in the nature of a property right,” because the tort protects a right of privacy, this cause of action cannot be brought by a corporation. Felsher, 755 N.E.2d at 593–4.
What Constitutes a Violation of the Common Law Right?
Indiana courts have adopted the elements for misappropriation from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Therefore, “an appropriation and use of a plaintiff’s name or likeness occurs whenever the defendant ‘makes use of the plaintiff's name or likeness for his own purposes or benefit, even though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary one.’” Felsher v. University of Evansville, 727 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (rev’d on other grounds) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652I cmt. B (1977)).
In Felsher, the Indiana Supreme Court found that a professor had misappropriated the names and likenesses of the University of Evansville and university employees when he created websites and email addresses containing the plaintiffs’ names and used them “for the sole purpose of harming the [plaintiffs’] reputation[s].” 755 N.E.2d at 597. The Court held that the misappropriation was for the professor’s benefit because it “enabled him to pursue a personal vendetta.” Id. at 600. The Indiana Appeals Court has also noted that the unauthorized use of photographs of a person for commercial purposes is generally actionable as an invasion of privacy. Continental Optical Co v. Reed, 86 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1949).
DAMAGES
Statutory
For claims brought under Indiana’s statutory right of publicity, the statute provides for the following remedies, with some exceptions for news and entertainment media:
Indiana’s statute explicitly states that the above remedies are supplemental to any other remedies provided by law. Ind. Code § 32-36-1-20.
Common Law
Under Indiana law, damages for an invasion of privacy claim can include, but are not confined to, “compensation for the embarrassment, humiliation and mental pain [that] a person of ordinary sensibilities would have suffered under the circumstances.” Continental Optical, 86 N.E.2d at 309. Indiana law also allows for special damages that naturally flow from the tort as well as injunctive relief. Id. at 309–10; Felsher, 755 N.E.2d at 599–601.
LIMITATIONS AND DEFENSES
Statutory
Indiana’s right of publicity statute explicitly states that it “does not affect rights and privileges recognized under any other law that apply to a news reporting or an entertainment medium,” such as free speech privileges. The statute further states that its use prohibitions do not apply to uses in any of the following:
The statute also does not apply to the use of:
Ind. Code § 32-36-1-1.
Common Law
In Time, Inc. v. Sand Creek Partners, L.P., a federal district court stated that “[i]n general, when a person's picture is used to illustrate a non-commercial, newsworthy article, his interest in the use of his likeness or image must be evaluated in light of constitutional interests found in the First Amendment.” 825 F. Supp. 210, 212 (S.D. Ind. 1993). In Time, after broadly construing “newsworthiness,” the court held that the photographs of two widely known celebrities on their wedding way illustrated a newsworthy event of widespread public interest; therefore, the newsworthiness that the images depicted outweighed any privacy rights of the celebrities. Id. at 212–13.
The Indiana Appeals Court recognized that the right of privacy can be waived. Continental Optical, 86 N.E.2d at 309. In Continental Optical, the court noted that the right is waived by consent, either express or implied, and may also be relinquished by an individual who “enters a business or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his character, activities and affairs.” Id.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A common law claim for misappropriation is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (stating that an action for injury to person or character must be brought within two years); Johnson v. Blackwell, 885 N.E.2d 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (applying a two-year statute of limitations to an invasion of privacy claim). A two-year statute of limitations would also likely apply to statutory right of publicity claims. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4 (stating that an action for injury to personal property must be brought within two years).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Massachusetts. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Massachusetts codifies its Right of Publicity law at Chapter 214, § 3A of the General Laws. You should first familiarize yourself with that statute. Massachusetts does not recognize a separate common law right of publicity.
What is protected?
Section 3A protects a person's "name, portrait or picture". There is a paucity of cases specifying the precise limits of this phrase; in other contexts, however, courts have acknowledged that the Massachusetts statute is very similar to New York's. See, e.g., Old Colony Donuts, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 785, 788-89 (D. Mass. 1974). Thus, New York cases interpreting these terms may be persuasive to Massachusetts courts.
Rights of deceased persons
Massachusetts has no appellate case law on this point. However, at least one Massachusetts trial court has ruled that the right of publicity only applies to living persons. Hanna v. Ken's Foods, Inc., 2007 WL 1695311, at *1 n. 4 (Mass. App. Ct., June 12, 2007) (unpublished opinion) (noting that the trial court dismissed plaintiff's § 3A claim on living-persons ground that plaintiff was not a living person, and that the issue was not appealed).What constitutes a violation?
To violate § 3A, a use of a person's identity must be:
The statute focuses on a person's "interest in not having the commercial value of one's name, portrait or picture appropriated for the benefit of another." Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly Co., 379 Mass. 745, 749 (1980). Thus, courts applying § 3A look to whether the defendant's actions exploited the value of the plaintiff's identity.
Section 3A contains some specific exceptions. One gives added protection to professional photographers: photographers may exhibit their photographs at their "establishment," until the subject of the photograph provides written notice. If the photographer continues to display the subject's photograph after receiving such notice, the photographer may be liable for violating § 3A. Other statutory exceptions include the right to use an author's name in connection with her work, and the right to use a person's identity to sell goods, if that person uses her identity in connection with the manufacture or distribution of those goods.
In practice, the primary limit on the right of publicity is known as "incidental use." If the defendant's use of a person's identity is only incidental to other purposes, and not intended to profit off of the person's "reputation, prestige, or other value," there is no violation of § 3A. Id. In Tropeano, the seminal Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court case establishing the "incidental use" standard, the defendant magazine used a picture of several people (including the plaintiff) to illustrate a news story. The story was not an advertisement of any kind, and there was no evidence that the defendants intended to profit from the plaintiff's identity (notably, the plaintiff was not identified in the photograph). Thus, the use of the plaintiff's photo was "incidental," regardless of the magazine's profit-seeking motive.
A number of trial courts, both state and federal, have used Tropeano's incidental use test to dismiss claims that arise from various news stories and other non-advertising purposes. See, e.g., Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004), aff'd sub nom., Amrak Productions, Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005) (dismissing § 3A claim arising from photo & caption in book); Morrell v. Forbes, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Mass. 1985) (dismissing § 3A claim arising from photo in news magazine).
In deciding how broadly to construe the "advertising or trade" language, Massachusetts courts have been skeptical of analogies to New York case law. Massachusetts's statute does not apply to "peace of mind"-type privacy harms; the focus is strictly on the commercial value of a person's identity, and whether the defendant has appropriated that value. This is arguably distinct from New York's statute, which is codified under a broader "right of privacy." Tropeano, 379 Mass. at 748-49. Thus, while (as mentioned above) New York cases may be persuasive to Massachusetts courts in some circumstances (such as defining "name, portrait or picture"), New York analogies for interpreting "advertising or trade" may be less useful.
Damages
Section 3A provides for both injunctive relief and compensatory damages. A plaintiff can seek an injunction against continued use of her identity, and can recover monetary damages to compensate for the harm caused by past uses. If a plaintiff is able to show the necessary commercial use of her identity (see above), the damage award may include compensation for "mental distress." See Polich v. Rafferty, 1997 WL 89152, at *10 (Mass. Super. Ct., February 10, 1997) (unreported).
Section 3A also states that if the defendant "knowingly" used the plaintiff's protected identity, the trial court has discretion to award treble damages.
Statute of limitations
Right of publicity claims in Massachusetts are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Mass. Gen. Laws c. 260, § 2A.
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Michigan. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Although no state appellate court in Michigan has yet explicitly recognized a common law right of publicity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has opined that such a right would be recognized under Michigan law. In addition, Michigan's state appellate courts have recognized comparable protection in the nature of a property right under its "appropriation" tort. The state has no corresponding statute.
Publications and political organizations concerned about infringing on a plaintiff's right of publicity should note that state appellate courts have interpreted the First Amendment to protect a broad range of speech from appropriation claims. For more detail, consult the First Amendment section below.
What is protected?
The Sixth Circuit has suggested that Michigan would recognize a right of publicity to protect a person's ‘identity' in addition to their name and likeness. It would therefore be possible to violate Michigan's common law right of publicity without employing a person's photo or name. In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the use of an identifying catchphrase ("Here's Johnny") by a portable toilet company was enough to constitute an appropriation of Johnny Carson's identity under Michigan law. In fact, the court in Carson noted that the use of Johnny Carson's full name, John William Carson, would not have infringed on his right of publicity as it is distinct from his identity as celebrity.
In Battaglieri v. Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Policy, 261 Mich. App. 296 (2004), the Court of Appeals of Michigan explained that under Michigan's tort of appropriation, "any unauthorized use of a plaintiff's name or likeness, however inoffensive in itself, is actionable if that use results in a benefit to another."
What constitutes a violation of the common law right of publicity?
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has suggested that Michigan would use a two part test to determine whether or not a violation of the right of publicity has occurred, in which the plaintiff must demonstrate:
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003). In Parks, civil rights hero Rosa Parks brought suit against the rap group Outkast for using her name in a song title. The court held that her claim passed both prongs of the test, because she had used her name in the past for promotional purposes, and because Outkast used her name to sell records.
It is unclear how meaningful the requirement of the first prong is. Some cases suggest it may bar a non-celebrity from bringing suit. In Edwards v. Church of God in Christ, No. 220348, 2002 WL 393577 (Mich. App. 2002), the Court of Appeals of Michigan held that "no cognizable tort for negligent misappropriation of an unknown singer's voice exists in Michigan." The scope of this holding is ambiguous, but it at least raises the possibility that a plaintiff's fame may be a pre-requisite to recovery. In Carson, similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on Johnny Carson's status as a celebrity, and noted that it was the basis for the pecuniary value of his identity, explaining that "a celebrity's identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity."
On the other hand, the very act of commercial exploitation may be sufficient to prove a plaintiff's pecuniary interest in their identity, meaning that satisfying the second prong of the test satisfies the first. In Arnold v. Treadwell, No. 283093, 2009 WL 2136909 (Mich. App. 2009), a model sued a website for publishing her photo and sending it to a magazine without permission. The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the act of publishing and sending the photo indicated that the model's identity had value, although it also acknowledged that her history as a dancer and model further supported the contention.
Parks and Carson demonstrate that the second prong does not require the defendant to sell or license the name for profit. Simply attaching the name to a product can constitute commercial exploitation.
Rights of the Deceased
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognizes Michigan's right of publicity as a property right as opposed to a dignitary right, which means that the right survives the death of the person. Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 325 (6th Cir. 2001). In Herman Miller, furniture manufacturer Herman Miller partnered with famous design Charles Eames to create a line of distinctive chairs. After Eames died, the Eames estate contractually assigned Eames's right of publicity to Miller. A rival furniture company, Palazzetti, tried to use the Eames name to sell its own version of the chair, claiming that Eames's right of publicity vanished on his death. The court disagreed, and held that the right of publicity still existed even after the designer himself died.
The decision in Herman Miller cites cases from other jurisdictions noting that the right of publicity is assignable to others. The case does not specify how long the right of publicity extends after death, nor does it appear that subsequent cases in Michigan have addressed this question. One can waive the right of publicity by signing a release. Hauf v. Life Extension Found., 454 Fed. Appx. 425, 431 (6th Cir. 2011).
First Amendment Defenses
First Amendment defenses have been historically recognized in Michigan as a limitation on a plaintiff's ability to bring a claim for appropriation or right of publicity. In Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 33 N.W.2d 911 (Mich. 1948), an early case that does not specifically discuss rights of publicity, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a model had a cause of action against an advertiser for using her photograph without permission. Significantly, the Pallas opinion noted that the publication was for advertising and not news reporting, suggesting that the latter would not infringe on a right of publicity.
More recent state appellate cases suggest that a broad array of publications is thus protected from appropriation claims. In Battaglieri, a union leader claimed that a think tank had appropriated his identity by using his name and quote in its fundraising letters. The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the fundraising letters were protected by the First Amendment because they contained information about public policy, the leader's name was only mentioned in the context of such policy, and the quote itself was made at a press conference. In Bowens v. Aftermath Entm't, No. 250984, 2005 WL 900603 (Mich. App. 2005), a group of city officials sued a group of musicians for publishing footage of a meeting between the two parties, claiming appropriation. The footage, depicting a dispute about the content of a particular live performance, was released as an extra on a popular DVD anthologizing the tour. The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that because the dispute was reported in the media, and because the plaintiffs in their capacity as public officials had a "real relationship" to the dispute, the musicians were protected by the First Amendment. The defendant's commercial interest in the sales of DVD did not prevent them from asserting their rights under the First Amendment. In each case, the opinion is careful to tie the plaintiff's identity to the matter of public interest.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit similarly recognizes a First Amendment defense to right of publicity claims. In Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 267 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001), individuals depicted in a mini-series about the band The Temptations claimed that NBC had infringed on their right of publicity. The court held that "that the use of plaintiffs' fictionalized likenesses in a work protected by the First Amendment and the advertizing incidental to such uses" would be protected from claims for right of publicity.
However, such defenses are not always successful. In Parks the court explained that "we must conduct another balancing of interests -- Parks' property right in her own name versus the freedom of artistic expression." Ultimately the court held that the song title "Rosa Parks" did not necessarily merit First Amendment protection, as a jury could find that it was too far removed from the content of the song.
Remedies
Damages for right of publicity action can go up to a defendant's profits from the use of the name, plus costs. The court can also enjoin the defendant from further use of the name. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 810 F.2d 104, 105 (6th Cir. 1987). However, if the plaintiff does not present evidence of financial harm, they may not be able to recover damages, even if they can enjoin the defendant from future use of their identity. Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus., 426 F.3d 824, 831 (6th Cir. 2005).
A plaintiff cannot receive punitive damages in Michigan unless authorized by statute. Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 470 Mich. 749, 765 (2004). As there is no Michigan statute addressing a right of publicity or appropriation, punitive damages are not available for such claims.
Statute of limitations
Although no Michigan court has addressed the issue given the unsettled nature of the right of publicity in Michigan, it is likely that a right of publicity claim in Michigan would be subject to Michigan's general three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Mich. Comp. Laws 600.5805(10).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of New Jersey. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
New Jersey's state appellate courts recognize a common law right of publicity and a comparable protection on a privacy theory under the state's appropriation tort. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey has noted that both state and federal courts use the concepts of right of publicity and appropriation "interchangeably" when applying New Jersey's law. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761 (D.N.J. 2011). The state has no corresponding statute.What constitutes a violation of the common law right of publicity?
In Faber v. Condecor, Inc., 477 A.2d 1289, 195 N.J. Super. 81 (App.Div. 1984), the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the unauthorized use of a family photo to sell picture frames constituted use for trade purposes, and therefore gave rise to an appropriation claim. A recent unpublished opinion by the same court, Jeffries v. Whitney E. Houston Acad. P.T.A., A-1888-08T3, 2009 WL 2136174 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 20, 2009), interpreted Faber to require four elements for an appropriation claim:1) The defendant appropriated the plaintiff's likeness,
2) without the plaintiff's consent,
3) for the defendant's use or benefit, and
4) damage.
In general, unauthorized publication of an identity for promotional or commercial purposes constitutes appropriation under New Jersey law. Conversely, publication that does not convey such a commercial benefit is considered "incidental" to the publication and does not qualify as appropriation. In Jeffries, the court held that a parent teacher association's sale of a video of a large student performance was only an incidental use of an individual student's identity. Similarly, in Castro v. NYT Television, 851 A.2d 88, 370 N.J. Super. 282 (App.Div. 2004), the same court held that including footage of a group of hospital patients in a television docudrama did not constitute appropriation. In Castro, a group of patients sued various parties involved in the creation of a television show for commercially appropriating the patient's identities. The show, "Trauma: Life in the E.R.," included footage from interviews with the plaintiffs. The court held that because the footage was not used for "trade purposes," the plaintiffs could not bring the claim. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not "allege... that any videotape footage of them was used for any specific promotional purpose."
Note that analysis of whether a publication is incidental might also implicate First Amendment considerations (see First Amendment Defenses, below). In Faber, the court explained that a photo accompanying an article in a newspaper would be considered an "Incidental Use of Name or Likeness" and therefore would not give rise to a cause of action. A photo included as an advertisement, however, would not qualify as incidental.
One may consent to another's use of one's identity for commercial purposes. However, in Faber, the court held that waiver for a particular use of a photo does not constitute waiver for another use. The plaintiffs in Faber had consented to the use of their photo in an instructional guide. The court held that the plaintiffs could still bring a claim against a defendant who used the photo to sell picture frames.
The fourth element, damage, has rarely been addressed as a requirement for a claim in New Jersey's courts.
What is protected?
New Jersey has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which explains that "one who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy."It appears that a distinctive voice or performance would be protected. In Prima v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D.N.J. 2000), the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that imitating a singer's voice could infringe on his right of publicity under New Jersey common law. In Prima, the widow of a famous singer claimed the use of her late husband's identity in a restaurant commercial constituted an appropriation. The commercial featured a song that her late husband had made famous, sung by a performer who "unmistakably" copied her husband's voice and manner. Similarly, in Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981), the court held that an Elvis impersonator's show constituted an appropriation, though in that case the show also employed Elvis's name and likeness.
A plaintiff may be able to recover for appropriation of a fictional identity. In McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that an actor would be able to bring a claim under New Jersey law for the appropriation of the identity of his character, depending on the association between the actor and character.
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey has said that the right of publicity is "generally" for plaintiffs with public personas. Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 298 (D.N.J. 1993). However, a plaintiff need not be a celebrity to successfully claim damages. In Canessa v. J. I. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 97 N.J. Super. 327 (Law Div. 1967), the plaintiff, a veteran with eight children, enlisted the help of real estate agency to help him to find a home for his family. After purchasing a house, the plaintiff allowed a paper to publish a piece on him and his search. The real estate agency subsequently included the article in its promotional materials for its salesmen, which the plaintiff claimed was an unauthorized appropriation. The Law Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey agreed, explaining:
Entirely apart, however, from the metaphysical niceties, the reality of a case such as we have here is, in the court's opinion, simply this: plaintiffs' names and likenesses belong to them. As such they are property. They are things of value. Defendant has made them so, for it has taken them for its own commercial benefit.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that simply using one's name as "placeholder," such as "John Doe," does not give rise to a claim under New Jersey law by a person who shares that name. Botts v. N.Y. Times Co., 106 Fed. Appx. 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2004).
Transfer of rights by death or assignment
First Amendment Defenses
Some forms of speech, such political speech or news/entertainment, are protected by the First Amendment. Consider the following examples of protected speech.In Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, Inc., 452 A.2d 689, 186 N.J. Super. 335 (App.Div. 1982), a home-buyer claimed that publishing his name, photo, occupation, and information about the home that he had purchased constituted an appropriation. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey noted that the newspaper publishing the information had a "limited privilege" connected to the First Amendment to publish news articles. The court held that because the information about the transaction was already public, and because the paper's "minimally violative" disclosure of the home-buyer's job was "solely incidental to the news aspects of the sale," the plaintiff could not bring an appropriation claim. In its later ruling in Castro, the Appellate Division cited the decision in Bisbee and noted "it is irrelevant whether a videotape is broadcast in connection with a television story about important public events or a subject that provides only entertainment and amusement."
In G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 205 N.J. 275 (2011), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the inclusion of plaintiff's name and image in political paraphernalia was not a commercial use, and therefore a plaintiff could not bring an appropriation claim. In G.D., a political organization and its marketing partner distributed leaflets describing a politician's prior drug conviction. The court held that such campaign materials are "the type of speech that is at the heart of First Amendment," and that the financial interests of the marketing firm did not render the materials commercial.
For a good example of the limits of the scope of First Amendment defenses to appropriation claims, consider Tellado v. Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 904 (D.N.J. 1986). In Tellado, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that while the First Amendment would protect the publication of a soldier's photo in a book about the Vietnam War, it would not protect the publication of the photo in the marketing materials enclosed within the book. As the court explained, "the defendant's right of free expression is abridged only insofar as it is required to share some of its profits with the individual whose likeness is helping to stimulate those profits." Also consider Presley, in which the court drew an analogy between "creative comment precluding a right of publicity claim" and fair use. In Presley, the court held that the Elvis impersonator's show was mainly an exploitation and not sufficiently "creative" to qualify for protection.
Damages and other remedies
Damages are available for appropriation claims under New Jersey law. Faber at 1295. Whether or not one is a celebrity will affect the calculation of damages. Canessa at 350. Calculation of damages for an appropriation claim may be subject to the degree to which the plaintiff retains ownership of the identity. McFarland at 922. Canessa noted that "it seems to us that however little or much plaintiff's likeness and name may be worth, defendant, who has appropriated them for his commercial benefit, should be made to pay for what he has taken, whatever it may be worth." Canessa at 351.There are few opinions addressing the question of calculating damages under New Jersey law in appropriation cases. In a recent unpublished opinion, Leibholz v. Hariri, Civ. No. 05-5148 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2011), the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts in its calculation of damages for an appropriation claim. For privacy torts, the court explained, the Restatement looks to:
(a) the harm to (the plaintiff's) interest in privacy resulting from the invasion; (b) (the plaintiff's) mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind that normally results from such an invasion; and (c) special damage of which the invasion is a legal cause.
In Faber, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the plaintiff could claim damages for the "mental anguish" they suffered from the unauthorized publication of a family photo. On the other hand, in McFarland, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, under its interpretation of New Jersey law, "deprivation of property" and "lost earnings" could be considered under the right of publicity but suggested that psychological harm ought to be associated with an invasion of privacy claim. In this case, the federal court may have been drawing a distinction between right of publicity and appropriation, though again Hart indicates that both federal and state courts treat them "interchangeably."
New Jersey state courts have also issued injunctive relief for appropriation claims. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises, Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 96 N.J. Super. 72, 80 (Ch. Div. 1967). Federal courts interpreting New Jersey law have done the same, including issuing a preliminary injunction. Presley at 1382.
Statute of limitations
As a property right, at least one New Jersey court has held that New Jersey's right of publicity claim is subject to the six-year statute of limitations for invasion of property rights. Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J.Super. 327, 352 (Law Div. 1967).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of New York. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
New York has codified its right of publicity as part of its "Right of Privacy" statute, at Article 5 of the N.Y. Civil Rights Law. You should familiarize yourself with Sections 50 and 51, the primary statutory provisions for right of publicity actions. New York does not recognize a separate common law right of publicity.
Relationship between Sections 50 and 51
The two sections, 50 and 51, describe similar rights but provide for different enforcement mechanisms. Section 50 makes a right of publicity violation a misdemeanor, while Section 51 provides a private cause of action. Though right of publicity lawsuits in New York often reference both sections, Section 51 is the primary (and more detailed) provision for most purposes.
What is protected?
Section 51 provides protection for a person's:
Names: The right of publicity statute does not protect corporate or partnership names. Jaggard v. R.H. Macy, 26 N.Y.S. 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). New York courts have long recognized that "there are other remedies" for the unauthorized use of corporate names. Rosenwasser v. Ogoglia, 158 N.Y.S. 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916). This lack of protection for trade names has been held to bar a claim under Section 51 for misappropriation of assumed names, like "Dr. Seuss." Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 331, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); but see DeClemente v. Columbia Pictures, 860 F. Supp. 30, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (suggesting that a stage name might be protected if it is "closely and widely identified" with its user).
Portraits and Pictures: Courts have construed the portrait/picture provisions of the statute somewhat broadly, to include "any recognizable likeness, not just an actual photograph." Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). The statute covers a representation if it "conveys the essence and likeness of an individual," even if the representation is not completely photo-realistic. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, 472 N.Y.S. 2d 254, 261 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). Sculptures, mannequins, and other three-dimensional "likenesses" may be covered. Young v. Greneker Studios, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 357 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941).
Voice: "Voice" was added to § 51 (but not to § 50) in 1995. Thus, one must be cautious of pre-1995 cases like Maxwell v. N.W. Ayer, Inc, 605 N.Y.S.2d 174, which dismiss voice-related right of publicity claims.
Rights of deceased persons
New York does not recognize a posthumous right of publicity. Mirone v. MacMillan, 894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d Cir. 1990).
What constitutes a violation?
To violate § 51, a use of a person's identity must be:
The focus on advertising and trade means that a use designed to solicit sales of products or services is forbidden. But this category of advertising uses is somewhat narrow; § 51 contains a long list of exceptions to the right of publicity, which include protections for:
There is also a significant newsworthiness exception. A defendant is not liable for using a person's identity in connection with a "newsworthy" article, such as a newspaper article. New York courts have interpreted "newsworthy" broadly, to include "a wide variety of articles on matters of public interest," not just "hard news" articles. Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing, 94 N.Y. 2d 436, 441-42 (N.Y. 2000). Newsworthy uses of a person's identity do not violate the right of publicity statute, even though the publisher intends them to sell copies, attract advertising, or otherwise produce revenue.
Advertisements that promote an otherwise privileged use of a person's identity are also exempt from liability. So, for example, if a magazine legitimately publishes photographs of a model, it can use those pictures to attract subscribers. Lerman v. Flynt Distributing, 745 F.2d 123, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1984).
In some circumstances, the First Amendment "actual malice" doctrine may affect a case's outcome. Courts have held that defendants may forfeit the newsworthiness defense if the article in question contains a "severe" degree of falsity. Lerman v. Flynt Distributing, 745 F.2d 123, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1984) If the plaintiff is a public figure, though, the defendant can only be held liable if he published the falsehoods with actual malice. Id. at 135-38.
Damages
Section 51 provides for both injunctive relief and compensatory damages. A plaintiff can seek an injunction against continued use of her identity, and can recover monetary damages to compensate for the harm caused by past uses. The damage award primarily compensates for emotional distress. See Garis v. Uncut-RawTV, No. CV 06–5031, 2011 WL 4404035, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y, July 5, 2011).
Section 51 also provides for punitive or exemplary damages, if certain conditions are met. A plaintiff can recover exemplary damages if the defendant knew that the plaintiff had not consented to the use of her identity. Id. at 4-5. Courts may award exemplary damages if necessary to deter future violations of Section 51.
Statute of limitations
Claims under Section 51 of the Civil Rights Law are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & Rules, § 215(3).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of North Carolina. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
North Carolina does not provide a statutory basis for right of publicity claims. In 2009, the North Carolina legislature proposed, but did not enact, legislation that addressed the right of publicity.
North Carolina appellate courts have only applied the missapropriation branch of the invasion of privacy tort in two cases. The Supreme Court of North Carolina last addressed misappropriation of image in 1938.
In Flake v. Greensboro News, 212 N.C. 780 (1938), the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for the unauthorized use of one's photograph or likeness in connection with an advertisement or other commercial enterprise. In Flake, the plaintiff brought suit on the basis of an advertisement published in a local newspaper that featured a picture of her dressed in a bathing suit. She showed evidence that the photograph was published in this instance without her consent. The court held that the unauthorized use of a plaintiff's photograph in connection with an advertisement or other commercial enterprise would give rise to a cause of action, but that absent a showing of special damages, only nominal and injunctive relief could be granted.
It is not clear from the opinion in Flake whether the court treats the right of publicity as a property or privacy-based right. The court explicitly did not reach the question of whether First Amendment or newsworthiness defenses might apply to such a cause of action in other contexts.
In Barr v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 13 N.C. App. 388 (1972), a telephone company published a phone directory including an advertisement for the plaintiff's rug cleaning company; however, although the telephone company included the plaintiff's name, it used the likeness of an unrelated third party in connection with the plaintiff's name. The plaintiff had signed an agreement that allowed for the commercial use of his image; however, the appellate court held that the publication of plaintiff's name in connection with the mistaken image exceeded the scope of this consent, and might justify a finding of invasion of privacy. The decision implies that consent is a defense, but that if a publication exceeds the scope of consent, that the publication may be actionable.
A right of publicity claim in North Carolina is likey subject to the state's general three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Ohio. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Generally speaking, the right of publicity in Ohio protects against unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality. Ohio has two systems of right of publicity law: a statutory right as a property interest, and a common law right as a right of privacy.
Ohio codifies its statutory right of publicity in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741. You should first familiarize yourself with the statute.
Ohio recognizes the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality as an actionable invasion of privacy tort. Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340, 341 (Ohio 1956). Ohio's right of publicity statute explicitly states that a right of publicity is a property right. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.01(D).
At common law, Ohio has not distinguished the right of publicity from the tort of misappropriation; courts commonly refer to the tort as "appropriation of one's name or likeness." A federal court applying Ohio law said that the "right of publicity is a creature of state law, and its violation gives rise to a cause of action for the commercial tort of unfair competition." ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003).
THE STATUTORY RIGHT
What the Statutory Right of Publicity Protects
Ohio's statutory right of publicity is found under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741, "Right of Publicity in Individual's Persona." Ohio's right of publicity statute expressly states that its provisions are in addition to common law rights. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.08.
The statute defines "right of publicity" as "the property right in an individual's persona to use the individual's persona for a commercial purpose." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.01. The Ohio statute protects the following aspects of an individual's "persona," if those aspects have commercial value:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.01(A). The statute does not define the term "commercial value."
The statute defines "commercial purpose" as the use of an aspect of an individual's persona in any of the following ways:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.01.
Who Can Exercise the Statutory Right of Publicity
The Ohio right of publicity statute protects living and deceased natural persons for the duration of a person's lifetime plus 60 years. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.02. The statute applies to living individuals domiciled or residing in Ohio; it applies to deceased individuals only if (1) the individual died on or after January 1, 1998, and (2) the individual's domicile or residence was in Ohio at the time of death. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.03.
In addition to the 60-year post-mortem protection, the Ohio right of publicity statute specifically prohibits the unauthorized use of the persona of a deceased member of the Ohio National Guard or the U.S. armed forces for ten years after the date of death. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2741.02(A)(3) and 2741.99. The Ohio statute provides both civil remedies and criminal penalties for violations of the provisions. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.99.
Under the Ohio statute, the right of publicity is a property right and is freely transferable and descendible, in whole or in part, by:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.04.
The statute requires that any consent to use an individual's right of publicity for a commercial purpose be made in writing, which includes written, electronic, digital or any other verifiable means of authorization. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.05. Consent may be given by any person or persons (including the individual whose right of publicity is at issue) who (1) collectively own more than 50% of the right of publicity, or (2) is expressly authorized in writing to grant consent by the collective owner(s) of more than 50% of the right. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.05(A).
The following persons may bring a civil action to enforce the publicity rights set out in the Ohio statute: (1) a person or persons, including an individual whose right of publicity is at issue, who collectively own all of an individual's right of publicity, subject to any licenses regarding that right of publicity; (2) a person, including a licensee of an individual's right of publicity, who is expressly authorized in writing by the owner or owners of an individual's right of publicity to bring a civil action; (3) a person to whom ownership or any portion of ownership of an individual's right of publicity has been transferred. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.06(A).
Before bringing an civil action, a person who holds partial ownership of an individual's right of publicity must give notice to that person and to any other person to whom ownership has been transferred. That individual, and any other transferees of the right, may object to the proposed civil action within time frames set forth in the statute. If holders of more than fifty percent (50%) of the right of publicity object in a timely fashion, the action may not proceed. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2741.06(B), (C).
What Constitutes a Statutory Violation
The elements of a civil claim under the Ohio right of publicity statute are:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.02.
Mere incidental use of a person's name or likeness is not actionable. Vinci v. American Can Co., 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1990).
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
What the Common Law Right Protects
Ohio recognizes a common law cause of action for the unauthorized commercial use of a living person's name, likeness or identity as a right of privacy. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977). "The fundamental wrong is the appropriation for one's self of the benefits of another's name, likeness, or identity, and the wrong is the same whether or not that benfit is pecuniary." Id. at 458. That court held that the applicable principles of the tort were set out in the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 652C.
"The right of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin which is the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity." ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
Ohio's common law right of publicity protects natural persons, but does not extend to deceased persons. See Reeves v. United Artists, 765 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1983), Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has not expressly stated whether Ohio common law protection requires that the person's identity have commercial value. See Vinci v. Am. Can Co., 459 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ohio 1984). However, one court has stated that a plaintiff must plead that the misappropriated name or likeness has "intrinsic value, which was taken by defendant for its own benefit, commercial or otherwise." Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
What Constitutes a Violation of the Common Law Right
The elements of a common law claim of appropriation of a person's name or likeness are:
The use or benefit of a person's name does not have to be commercial. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ohio 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562 (1977): "The interest which the law protects is that of each individual to the exclusive use of his own identity, and that interest is entitled to protection from misuses whether the misuse is for commercial purposes or otherwise."
A defendant must have appropriated the reputation, prestige, social, or commerical standing, public interest, or other values of a person's name or likeness. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co., 727 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd, 999 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1015 (1993).
Statutory
Remedies under Ohio's right of publicity statute include:Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.07.
As noted above, the statutory remedies are supplemental to any other remedies provided by state or federal statute or common law. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.07.
In regards to statutory damages, a plaintiff may recover statutory damages in lieu of actual damages. The trier of fact has discretion to award statutory damages of (1) not less than $2,500, and (2) not more than $10,000. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.07(A)(1)(b). Factors to be considered in setting the amount of a statutory damage award include the:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.07(A)(1)(b).
Under the Ohio statute, a court may award treble damages against the owners or employees of any advertising medium in which an advertisement or solicitation is published or disseminated, is there is a finding that the owners or employees had knowledge of the unauthorized use of the persona. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2741.02(E) and 2741.07(B)(2).
Common Law
Civil remedies under Ohio common law include actual damages and injunctive relief. The court in James v. Bob Ross Buick, Inc., 855 N.E.2d 119, 124 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), held that a plaintiff need not establish actual damages to prevail on a misappropriation of name claim, and a may seek to recover nominal, compensatory, and if appropriate, punitive damages for claims of misappropriation.
LIMITATIONS AND DEFENSES
All right of publicity claims, whether under the statute or common law, are limited by the First Amendment's free speech defenses, such as those related to public figures and manners of public interest.
Statutory
The Ohio right of publicity statute specifically exempts use of an individual's persona in a literary work, dramatic work, fictional work, historical work, audiovisual work, or musical work regardless of the media in which the work appears or is transmitted, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt; material that has political or newsworthy value; original works of fine art; or an advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted in any of these works. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.09 (A)(1).
There are also newsworthy exemptions in the statute. For example, the statute specifically exempts use of:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.09 (A)(2),(3),(4), see also Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F.Supp.2d 914, 920 (N.D. Ohio 2004), injunction stayed pending appeal, 2004 WL 1093037 (6th Cir. 2004) (right of privacy under Ohio law does not prohibit the publication of matters of general or public interest, or the use of the name or picture of a person in connection with the publication of legitimate news.)
Other exemptions include use of:
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.09(5),(6).
The statute also permits use of a deceased individual's persona for a commercial purpose if the name of the individual was the name of a business entity or a trade name at the time of the individual's death. Ohio Rev. Code § 2741.02(B)(2).
Common LawIn Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., the Supreme Court held that there is no consitutional privilege immunizing television stations from damages for an alleged infringement of the right of publicity which a performer has in his particular commercial activity. 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
There is a legitimate public interest exception for the right of publicity. Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F.Supp.2d 914, 920 (N.D. Ohio 2004), injunction stayed pending appeal, 2004 WL 1093037 (6th Cir. 2004). There is no misappropriation when a person's name or likeness is used in contact of general news reporting. Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co., 737 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Statutory
An action must be brought within four years of a violation. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.07(C).Common Law
A four year statute of limitations applies to Ohio's common law right of publicity actions under the invasion of privacy tort. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.09(D).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Pennsylvania. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Generally speaking, the right of publicity in Pennsylvania protects against unauthorized uses of a person's name or likeness for commercial purposes. Pennsylvania has two systems of right of publicity law: a statutory right, and a common law right.
Pennsylvania codifies its statutory right of publicity in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316. You should first familiarize yourself with the statute.
At common law, Pennsylvania has distinguished the right of publicity from the tort of misappropriation (called "invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness"). However, it is unsettled in Pennsylvania if 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316 has absorbed the common law tort of invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness. Please see below for more information on these distinctions.
THE STATUTORY RIGHT
What the Statutory Right of Publicity Protects
Pennsylvania's statutory right of publicity is found under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316. The official title of the statute is "Unauthorized Use of Name or Likeness," but it is commonly referred to as the "Right of Publicity" statute. "Any natural person whose name or likeness has commercial value and is used for any commercial or advertising purpose" may bring an action for infringement. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316.
A "natural person," as defined by the statute, is "a living person or a deceased person who was domiciled within this Commonwealth at the time of such person's death." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(e).
The term "name" or "likeness" is defined in the statute as any attribute of a natural person that identifies him to an ordinary, reasonable viewer or listener. These attributes include:
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(e).
The term "commercial value" means a "valuable interest in a natural person's name or likeness that is developed through the investment of time, effort and money." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(e); see also Lewis v. Marriott Intern. Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2007)(arguing that revenue figure evidence show commercial success of plaintiff's wedding packages, and this supports the claim that plaintiff's investment of time, effort and money in promoting and selling wedding packages has "commercial value").
Who Can Exercise the Statutory Right of PublicityThough it does not expressly address transferability, the statute allows other parties, including individuals, firms and corporations, to bring an action on behalf of a person whose right of publicity has been violated. A party can act on behalf of a natural person if authorized in writing by that person to license the commercial or advertising purposes of his name or likeness. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(b)(4).
The statute also protects a deceased person if they were domiciled within Pennsylvania when they died. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(a),(e). The statute recognizes a thirty year post-mortem right of publicity. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(c); see also Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2008).
The statutory post-mortem right of publicity in Pennsylvania can be enforced by:
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(b)(3).
What Constitutes a Statutory Violation
The elements of a claim for violation of Pennsylvania's Right of Publicity statute are:
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(a).
Under Pennsylvania's Right of Publicity statute, a natural person's name or likeness can be identified by any attribute that identifies that natural person to an ordinary, reasonable viewer or listener. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(e).
The law does not apply when:
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(e)(2).
The statute grants immunity to any person, firm or corporation in the business of producing, manufacturing, publishing or disseminating material for commercial and advertising purposes, unless they had actual knowledge of unauthorized use. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(d).
Under the Pennsylvania Right of Publicity statute, an aggrieved person may bring an action (1) to enjoin the unauthorized use, and/or (2) to recover damages for any resulting loss or injury. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(a); see also Tillery v. Leonard & Sciolla, LLP, 437 F. Supp. 2d 312 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
What the Common Law Right ProtectsPennsylvania recognizes a common law right of publicity. "The right of publicity inures to an individual who seeks to protect and control the commercial value of his name or likeness." Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fashion Shop, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 856, 862 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The court in Eagle's Eye called the right a "misappropriation of right of publicity," and claimed it was derived from the right of privacy, though noted it was "entirely" different from the right of privacy. Eagle's Eye at 862; see also Lewis v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 422, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Rose v. Triple Crown Nutrition, Inc., No. 07-0056, 2007 WL 707348, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2007); World Wrestling Federation Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 413, 443 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
The common law right of publicity grants a person or a group the exclusive right to control the commercial value of his/their name and likeness. Eagle's Eye at 862. The right of publicity in Pennsylvania protects individuals and groups (e.g., musical groups) by giving them the right to control the commercial use of their inherently distinctive names and likenesses. See Brockum Co. v. Blaylock, 729 F. Supp 438, 445–46 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Button Master, P.C.P., Inc., No. 96-5470, 1998 WL 126935, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1998); Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. Supp. 341, 344–45 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314, 230 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1957) (finding violation of right of publicity, but calling it "unfair competition under another label).
The right only applies to natural persons. Fraternal Order of Police v. The Crucifucks, No. 96-2358, 1996 WL 426709, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 1996) However, in dicta, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in a case about blues singer Bessie Smith, implied (by considering who had the capacity to sue for violations after the right after Smith's death under Pennsylvania law) that there is a postmortem exclusive right to use an individual's name and likeness. See Gee v. CBS, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 600, 617 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("In short, far from being a hollow formality, the requirement that a qualified administrator or executor sue under the survival statute reflects the heart of the statute, which is that a cause of action survives in favor of the decedent's estate.")
A corporation can own an individual or group's right of publicity, as a corporate third-party licensee. Brockum Co. v. Blaylock, 729 F. Supp. 438, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1990). The licensee has the authority to enjoin the use of the licensor's name or likeness. Nice Man Merch., Inc. v. Logocraft Ltd., No. 91-7475, 1992 WL 59133, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 1992); see also Apple Corps Ltd., No 96-5470, 1998 WL 126935, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1998). Although Pennsylvania recognizes the right of publicity of a group of persons, courts have held that the common law right of publicity does not protect the trademarks and images of corporations, partnerships or similar institutions. See Apple Corps Ltd., No 96-5470, 1998 WL 126935 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 1998); Eagle's Eye, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 856.
What Constitutes a Violation of the Common Law Right
To establish a violation of the right of publicity, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant is appropriating the plaintiff's valuable name or likeness, without authorization, to defendant's commercial advantage. Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n, 821 F. Supp. at 349. In order to infringe a group's right of publicity, the name appropriated must have a secondary meaning. Id.
An allegation of commercial value may not be required, as courts apply a presumption of commercial value based on the act of a defendant's decision to use a person's identity. Rose v. Triple Crown Nutrition, Inc., No. 07-0056, 2007 WL 707348, at *3. "Inherent in the act of a defendant using a person's name ... in a commercially advantageous manner is the presumption that the identity has commercial value." Fanelle v. Lojack Co., No. 99-4292, 2000 WL 1801270, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2000).
Some courts conflate the right of publicity with the separate concept of misappropriation/invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness. One distinction between the torts is that violation of the right of publicity requires an element of commercial advantage, while invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness does not.
Right of Publicity vs. Invasion of Privacy by Appropriation of Name or Likeness
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has expressly recognized a cause of action for "invasion of privacy" by "appropriation of name or likeness." See Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 273 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1971), Vogel v. W. T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1974); Chan v. County of Lancaster, No. 10-cv-03424, 2011 WL 4478283 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2011). In addition, courts in Pennsylvania have relied upon § 652C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for cases involving invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness. AFL Phila. LLC v. Krause, 639 F. Supp. 2d 512, 529-30 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
Many courts in Pennsylvania conflate the right of publicity with misappropriation of name or likeness. But although the two torts are similar under Pennsylvania law, the "right of publicity" is not identical to "invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness." One distinction is that the invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness does not require the appropriation to be commercial. AFL Phila. LLC, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
In 2003, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316. Since then, at least one district court has stated that the cause of action for invasion of privacy by misappropriation of identity has been "subsumed" by § 8316. Facenda v. NFL Films, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 491, 513 (E.D. Pa.2007). However, in a later decision, the same court held that it was hesitant to rule, absent guidance from the legislature or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that this previously-recognized common law cause of action was subsumed by statute. Lewis v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 422, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2007). "[A]s a matter of statutory construction, 'statutes are not presumed to make changes in the rules and principles of common law or prior existing law beyond what is expressly declared in their provisions.'" Id. Therefore, it remains unsettled whether § 8316 has superceded the tort of invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness.
A federal court in Pennsylvaniahas stated that invasion of privacy by appropriation of name or likeness is a personal right created to protect one's privacy, while the right of publicity more closely resembles a property right created to protect commercial value. Rose v. Triple Crown Nutrition, Inc., No. 07-0056, 2007 WL 707348, at *3.
Statutory
Under the Pennsylvania Right of Publicity statute, an aggrieved person may bring an action to enjoin the unauthorized use and recover damages for any resulting loss or injury. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(a).
Common Law
We have not found any cases discussing damages or injunctive relief. There have been cases where injunctive and monetary relief has been granted, but in an award combined with awards on trademark or other claims. See Apple Corps Ltd., No 96-5470, 1998 WL 126935; Brockum Co., 729 F. Supp at 445–46.
"Damages...are intended to protect the property right of an individual to the exclusive use of his own identity, notoriety, or skill," Worthy v. Carroll, No. 02-6882, 2003 WL 25706359, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2003).
The court in Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 964 F.Supp. 918, 929-30 (E.D. Pa. 1997) predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 as its standard for the right of publicity. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 defines the right of publicity as follows: "One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for the purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49 [injunctive and monetary relief]." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46.
LIMITATIONS AND DEFENSES
All right of publicity claims, whether under the statute or common law, are limited by the First Amendment's free speech defenses, such as those related to public figures and manners of public interest.
Statutory
As noted above, the statute grants immunity to any person, firm or corporation in the business of producing, manufacturing, publishing or disseminating material for commercial and advertising purposes, unless they had actual knowledge of unauthorized use. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(d).
Pennsylvania's right of publicity statute is not preempted by federal copyright law because it requires a showing of commercial value, an additional element beyond a federal copyright infringement claim. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1027; see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(a),(e).
Common LawCourt have recognized several common law exceptions for the common law right of publicity, including First Amendment defenses and protection for publications about newsworthy public figures.
Federal courts have found that First Amendment considerations can outweigh enforcement of a publicity right. Seale, 949 F. Supp. at 337. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that "a public figure has no exclusive rights to his own life story" and others do not need consent or permission of the subject to write a biography of a celebrity. Corabi v. Curtis Pub. Co., 273 A.2d 899, 918 (Pa. 1971).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Statutory
Though not a statute of limitations per se, under Pennsylvania's right of publicity statute the right of publicity is descendible. However no action can be commenced more than thirty years after the death of the natural person who is the subject of the dispute. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8316(c).
Depending on whether the right of publicity is treated as a property right or privacy right, it could be subject to different limitations. For example, claims of privacy are governed by a one year statute of limitation. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5523(1). Property claims have a two year statute of limitations. For example, statutory trademark claims under the Lanham Act are subject to Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations. See Beauty Time, Inc. v. VU Skin Systems, Inc., 118 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 1997), Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. American Guardian Life Assur. Co., 943 F.Supp. 509, 517 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
Common Law
With respect to the common law right of publicity, the applicable statute of limitations has not been interpreted under Pennsylvania law.
There is a two year "catchall" statute of limitations that might govern the right of publicity. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7). Claims of misappropriation (invasion of privacy) are governed by a one-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5523(1).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Texas. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Generally speaking, the Right of Publicity in Texas protects against unauthorized uses of a person's name or likeness for commercial purposes. Texas has two systems of Right of Publicity law: a statutory posthumous right, and a common law right.
Texas codifies its statutory Right of Publicity at Title 4, Chapter 26 of the Property Code. You should first familiarize yourself with that statute. Texas has not distinguished its common law right of publicity from misappropriation, using those concepts interchangeably. See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F.Supp.2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999) ("The tort of misappropriation of one's name or likeness is generally referred to as the ‘Right of Publicity.'").
THE STATUTORY RIGHT
What the Statutory Right of Publicity Protects
Texas's statutory Right of Publicity is a property right that protects a person's right in his or her name and likeness after his or her death. The statute applies to anyone who died on or after January 1, 1937, whose identity has commercial value at or after the time of his or her death. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.003(2). The Right of Publicity lasts for 50 years after the death of the individual. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 26.003(1), 26.012(d).
Texas's statute, Texas Property Code, T. 4, Ch. 26, known as the "Buddy Holly Bill," protects a person's:
The term "name" applies only to the "actual or assumed name used by an individual which, when used in conjunction with other information, is intended to identify a particular person." Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.001.
The term "photograph" includes still or moving pictures or reproductions of an individual in which a viewer could "reasonably determine" the individual's identity with the naked eye. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.001; see also Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 607 F.Supp. 1341 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
The term likeness has not been explicitly defined, but this category includes pictures, drawings, and the use of a singer's voice. It does not include accounts of general incidents from one's life or one's life story, especially if they are fictionalized. See Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994); see also O'Grady v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 2003 WL 24174616 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2003).
Who Can Exercise the Statutory Right of Publicity
The Right of Publicity is a transferable, descendible property right. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 26.004-.005. Because the right is freely transferable in whole or part, only an individual who owns more than half may exercise that right and have standing to sue for infringement. Whitehurst v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 2009 WL 3052663 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009). The right can be transferred before or after death by contract, trust, or testamentary documents. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.004. If the Right of Publicity has not been transferred before or upon death, it vests in the individual's spouse and children or grandchildren. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.005. In addition, if the Right of Publicity does not vest by transfer or operation of law within a year of the individual's death, it is terminated. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.010.
As in California, to exercise this Right of Publicity within the first year of the individual's death, the holder must register the property right claim with Texas's Secretary of State. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 26.006-.008. After a year has passed, the owner may exercise the Right of Publicity whether or not the property right claim is registered. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.009. Registered claims constitute prima facie evidence of a "valid claim to a property right" that will generally prevail over a conflicting, unregistered claim. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.007.
What Constitutes a Statutory Violation
Under Texas's statute, a person may not, without the written consent of the property right holder, use a deceased individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, "in connection with products, merchandise, or goods; or for the purpose of advertising, selling, or soliciting the purchase of products, merchandise, goods, or services." Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.011.
The Texas statute does not provide for a specific test for identifying an unauthorized use associated with the Right of Publicity, though courts have often applied the common law test discussed below.
The Texas statute also provides an exception for media use including:
Tex Prop. Code Ann. § 26.012; see also Whitehurst v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 2009 WL 3052663 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009).
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
What the Common Law Right ProtectsTexas common law recognizes a right of publicity that protects the name or likeness of living persons (in contrast to the statutory right, which arises after death). Treated more as a privacy right than property right, this common law right of publicity has not been distinguished from misappropriation. See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F.Supp.2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999); see also Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2000); Express One Int'l, Inc. v. Steinbeck, 53 S.W.3d 895, 900 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001).
This right protects an individual's "name or likeness," which has been interpreted as an individual's "identity." See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F.Supp.2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999). Texas courts have interpreted this in a similar manner to the statutory right, with the same limitation on the use of one's life story. See Whitehurst v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 2009 WL 3052663 (E.D. Tex. 2009). Like the statute, the common law intends to protect the value associated with a name or identity rather than the name per se. See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F.Supp.2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
What Constitutes a Violation of the Common Law Right
Texas state courts and the Fifth Circuit have articulated a traditional three-prong test for misappropriation. These common law elements include:
See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994); Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F.Supp.2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999). If the answer to all three questions is yes, then there has been an unauthorized use of an individual's name or likeness.
It is sufficient to satisfy the third prong of this test if the defendant's use of the individual's name likely led to some benefit, commonly commercial, that the defendant would otherwise not have received. The plaintiff generally does not need to prove that the defendant actually made a profit from the use, though the benefit cannot be purely incidental. See Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F.Supp.2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Topheavy Studios, Inc. v. Doe, 33 Media L. Rep. 2192, 2005 WL 1940159 (Tex. App. Aug. 11, 2005).
DAMAGES
Statutory
For claims brought under Texas's statutory Right of Publicity, the statute provides for the following damages:
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 26.013.
Common Law
A plaintiff may recover general damages for a right of publicity/misappropriation claim, which may include claims for mental and physical pain and suffering. See National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee, 503 F.Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980). Special damages and punitive damages may be recovered in exemplary and/or intentional cases, such as when the plaintiff's endorsement has been sold on the open market rather than used without authorization by the defendant alone. See National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee, 503 F.Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980); see also Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F.Supp. 719 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
LIMITATIONS AND DEFENSES
All right of publicity claims, whether under the statute or common law, are limited by the First Amendment's free speech defenses, such as those related to public figures and manners of public interest. As mentioned above, the Texas statute also contains internal protections for speech by providing exceptions for art, books, uses of political or newsworthy value, and more. Tex Prop. Code Ann. § 26.012. Accordingly, courts often rely upon the statutory safe harbor rather than address the First Amendment defenses directly. See Whitehurst v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 2009 WL 3052663 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009).
The First Amendment is more often applied in common law right of publicity cases brought by living individuals, given the lack of statutory exemptions. For example, in Busch v. Viacom, the court ruled that a fake endorsement as part of a news satire program that made use of a video clip in the public domain was a protected use of the plaintiff's name and likeness under the First Amendment's protection of parody. Busch v. Viacom, 477 F. Supp. 2d 764 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
Texas's statute also provides for a defense to a Right of Publicity claim if the user "has acted in reliance on the results of a probate proceeding governing the estate of the deceased personality in question." Tex Prop. Code Ann. § 26.015; see also Whitehurst v. Showtime Networks, Inc., 2009 WL 3052663 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009); Mantle v. Upper Deck Co., 956 F.Supp. 719 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
In addition, the property right holder's consent to the use of an individual's name or likeness bars recovery, though this may depend on the scope and form of the consent. See King v. Ames, 1997 WL 86416 (N.D. Tex Feb. 18, 1997); Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). For example, one case was remanded to determine whether an athlete's consent to use of his name and likeness in an advertisement for a college football program extended to his likeness portrayed in a Coca-Cola advertisement included in that football program. See Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
The common law right of publicity claim is likely subject to Texas' general two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Whitehurst, 2009 WL 3052663 at *5 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code § 16.003(a)). Although no case has yet addressed the limitations period applicable to the statutory right, it is likely that it would also be subject to the limitations period in Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code § 16.003(a) as an injury to a property right.
This page covers legal information specific to the Commonwealth of Virginia. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Virginia law generally forbids unauthorized use of a person's name or likeness for commercial purposes. There is no common law right of action for misappropriation or right of publicity in Virginia, but Virginia law does provide a statutory right of action against misappropriation. Because the statute contradicts prior common law, courts have applied the statute very narrowly.
It is also a criminal offense to use a person's name or picture for a commercial purpose without authorization in Virginia. A violation of Title 18.2, Chapter 6, Article 8, Section 216.1 of the Code of Virginia is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than $50, and not more than $1000.
Virginia codifies its statutory right against misappropriation at Title 8.01, Chapter 3, Article 3, Section 8.01-40 of the Code of Virginia. You should first familiarize yourself with that statute.
THE STATUTORY RIGHT
What the Statutory Right Against Misappropriation Protects
The statute, as it has been narrowly construed, provides a cause of action only when a "person, firm, or corporation" uses an individual's "name, portrait, or picture." Other identifying traits, such as voice or personality, and identifying descriptions do not trigger the cause of action. The statute also likely does not provide any protection to businesses or other legal or corporate entities. While the Supreme Court of Virginia has not addressed that question, local and federal courts have found that, within the context of the statute, the term "person" refers to an individual.
What Constitutes a Statutory Violation
The statute only prohibits use of person's name or image for trade or advertising purposes. Use for advertising purposes and for purposes of trade are distinct concepts.
Unauthorized use of a name or likeness for advertising purposes "has almost uniformly been held actionable" in Virginia. Town & Country Props., Inc. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 395 (Va. 1995). A name or likeness is used for advertising purposes when "it appears in a publication which, taken in its entirety, was distributed for use in, or as part of, an advertisement or solicitation for patronage of a particular product or service." Id. This can include a personal publication. In Town & Country Properties, the Supreme Court of Virginia held a real estate broker liable for attempting to generate interest in a property by distributing fliers advertising that a professional football player had formerly lived there, without permission from the player. A local Virginia court has also held that use of a person's name as part of a commercial web address violates the statute. Crump v. Forbes, 52 Va. Cir. 52 (Warren County 2000).
It is much more difficult to invoke the statute against a party for improperly using a name or likeness for purposes of trade. While "purposes of trade" is not defined in the statute or case law, courts most often discuss it in juxtaposition to newsworthiness. Courts have expressed concern that interpreting ‘purposes of trade' too broadly would discourage the uninhibited dissemination of ideas. For instance, in Falwell v. Penthouse International, the Court found that a magazine interview with a prominent figure was not used for purposes of trade, even though, like "everything that appears in a magazine" it was placed there with the intention of increasing sales. 521 F.Supp 1204, 1210 (Va. 1981). However, in Arlington v. New York Times Co. (New York law is very similar to Virginia law in this area, and Virginia courts frequently look to New York law for guidance. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th Cir. 1986) rev'd on other grounds sub nom Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.), the New York Court of appeals found that, while a claim could not be sustained against a news publisher that used a citizen's image in conjunction with a news story, a claim could be brought against the photographer and agent who sold the picture to the newspaper. The court stated that a person "operating independently of [a] publisher" who engaged in "nonconsensual selling of [a] photograph" would have "commercialized the photograph in furtherance of his trade." 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982).
The statute does not apply to general newsgathering. A person's name or image may be used to promote a report on a newsworthy event or matter of public interest as long as there is a real relationship between the use of a person's name or image and the report, and the report is not an advertisement in disguise. In WJLA-TV v. Levin, the Court decided that a television station did not violate the statute when it used the image of a surgeon who had been accused of sexually assaulting his patients in promotional announcements for a news segment regarding the allegations. The Court conceded the station may have used the promotions partially to increase its ratings during sweeps week, but concluded that the station had not violated the statute, because "[i]t is a newsworthy event and a matter of public interest when a physician is accused by his patients of sexually assaulting them." WJLA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 395 (Va. 2002).
Who Can Exercise the Statutory Right Against Misappropriation?
The person whose name or image has been used without consent can bring an action against the offending party within five years of the offense. For twenty years following a person's death, his or her likeness may not be used without the written consent of that person's survivors. Survivors may bring an action for misappropriation under this statute up to twenty years after the death.
DAMAGES
Individuals have the right sue for injunctions preventing offending parties from misappropriating their names and images, as well as, in some circumstances, the right to sue for damages both to compensate for injuries caused by the misappropriation and to punish the offending party.
1. Injunctive Relief
Section 8.01-40 allows a person whose identity has been misappropriated to ask a court to prevent the offender from continuing to use the identity, or, where potential misappropriation is discovered before the name or image is used, to prevent the potential offender from using the identity without consent.
2. Compensatory Damages
A person whose name or image has been misappropriated may sue to recover damages to compensate for any injury he or she suffered as a result of that misappropriation. It is unclear what qualifies as an "injury" under the statute. A celebrity who would generally expect a fee in return for an endorsement can clearly sue to recover the amount of a reasonable fee. In Riggins, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the jury's decision to grant Riggins (a famous football player featured on a real estate flier without his consent) $25,000 in compensatory damages based on evidence that $25,000 would be a reasonable fee for use of his name and that Riggins had received fees for product endorsements running from $20,000 - $90,000.
While the Virginia courts frequently discuss the statute as protecting a property interest in a person's identity, which would indicate that a layperson could receive some minimal compensation for misappropriation of identity, the courts have not applied it in this way. Riggins is the only reported case awarding compensatory damages under this statute, and a Virginia circuit court has held that, under the plain language of the statute, a person can only recover compensatory damages if he or she can show that a quantifiable injury flowed from the misappropriation.
3. Punitive Damages
A jury may award punitive damages if the defendant knowingly used the plaintiff's name or likeness and the use violated the statute. The plaintiff does not need to prove that the defendant knew that he or she was engaging in illegal conduct or that that the defendant engaged in "wanton or malicious" conduct. Punitive damages cannot exceed $350,000. In Riggins, the court affirmed the jury's decision to grant Riggins an additional $25,000 in punitive damages (the court reduced the jury's award from $28,608, since that amount exceeded the amount of damages Riggins had requested).
LIMITATIONS AND DEFENSES
Constitutional
The Constitution prevents the publication of news from constituting a "purpose of trade" under the statute. As a U.S. District Court found in Falwell v. Penthouse International, if the "purposes of trade" requirement were construed to cover general newsgathering, it would "intrude on important constitutional freedoms, which guarantee the uninhibited dissemination of ideas." 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1210 (W.D. Va. 1981). In finding that a newspaper had not violated an assault victim's right to privacy under the statute by publishing her name as part of a news story, a Virginia circuit court held that, "[T]he right of the individual to privacy is limited by the public's right to have a free dissemination of news and information." Barker v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 14 Va. Cir. 421 (1973)
Common Law
The use of the plaintiff's name must be reasonably believable to fall within the statute's protection. If a name of image is used as part of a parody that is not reasonably believable, it is not used for advertising or trade purposes under the statute. In Falwell v. Flynt, the Fourth Circuit found that a comedic ad-parody was not reasonably believable when it featured the photo of a well-known reverend along with the text of a fictional interview in which he discussed an incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The add was not reasonably believable both because of its content and because it contained a disclaimer reading "ad parody-not to be taken seriously." 797 F.2d 1270.
The fact that the assertion made in the unauthorized material is true is not a defense to a claim under the statute. For example, in Riggins, the advertising fliers correctly stated that Riggins had lived in the house the real estate agent was selling. Yet the court decided that the right to print truthful information does not include the right to use that information for commercial purposes.
Statute of limitations
Claims under Virginia's statutory right of publicity are subject to a five-year statute of limitations as a claim for injury to property under Va. Code § 8.01-243(B). Lavery v. Automation Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 360 S.E.2d 336, 339 (Va. 1987).
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Washington. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
This page covers legal information specific to the State of Washington. For more general information, see the Legal Guide page on Using the Name or Likeness of Another; for other states, see State Law: Right of Publicity.
Washington's right of publicity statute, the Washington Personality Rights Act (WPRA), is codified at Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.60. You should familiarize yourself with the statute, but note that certain elements of the law addressing the geographic reach of Washington's post-mortem right of publicity have been held unconstitutional by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington (see Rights of the Deceased, below).
There is also a common law tort of appropriation in Washington. Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1113 (W.D. Wash. 2010). This tort appears to function comparably to the statutory right of publicity, but has been rarely addressed in courts applying Washington law.
THE STATUTORY RIGHT
What the Statutory Right of Publicity Protects
The statute states that "every individual or personality has a property right in the use of his or her name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness." § 63.60.010. Likeness includes depictions of "distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms." Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.60.020. "Photograph" includes both still photography and video that makes the individual "readily identifiable." § 63.60.020.
"Personalities" refers to individuals whose identities carry commercial value, such as celebrities. § 63.60.020. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington has noted the ambiguity of this definition, as any individual's identity can be said to have value. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1131 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
What Constitutes a Statutory Violation
Statutory standards for infringement are codified at Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.60.050. The unauthorized use of one's "name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness" on goods, or for advertising or fund-raising purposes, constitutes infringement. In Experience, the court noted that while the statute only applies to goods sold in Washington, as written it applies to advertising or fund-raising anywhere. Experience at 1135. The statute also applies to those distributing infringing advertising within the state. The statute explicitly applies to both profit and non-profit endeavors. An infringement has not occurred if the owner gives written, oral, express or implied consent to the use of their identity.
In Dale v. Coors Brewing Co., 113 Wash. App. 1017 (2002), the Court of Appeals of Washington held that held that a former employee of a beer company could not claim appropriation against her employer for using her likeness on a poster because she had consented to the use. It further held that because she did not demonstrate the value of her image, nor present evidence of her employer's financial gain from the infringement, "her claims would fail for lack of damages." However, in State v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86 (1924), an early case that did not discuss rights of publicity or the tort of appropriation in those terms, the court noted that the "law will presume" damage from the use of one's name.
Statutory Exemptions
Exemptions are codified at Wash. Rev. Code § 63.60.070. Publications related to "cultural, historical, political, religious, educational, newsworthy, or public interest, including, without limitation, comment, criticism, satire, and parody" do not qualify as infringement. Publications on these subjects are protected even if they are used in advertising, "if it is clear that the principal purpose of the advertisement is to comment on such matter."
In addition, the statute explicitly exempts certain uses, such as the following:
An owner or employee of a platform in which infringing content was published as advertising is not liable, "unless the advertisement or solicitation was intended to promote the medium itself."
Incorporating the use of multiple identities, as opposed to just one, is not a basis for exemption. However, the individuals who have been infringed upon cannot bring their claim as a class.
Rights of the Deceased
The right of publicity is freely assignable and descends to a deceased person's heirs as property. Wash. Rev. Code § 63.60.030.
The right of publicity survives for ten years after the death of the individual. For "personalities," meaning celebrities and others whose identities carry commercial value, the rights survive for 75 years after death. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.60.040. A property right exists regardless of whether the right was commercially exploited while the individual was alive. § 63.60.030.
While the statute suggests that its directives addressing survivability and assignability apply regardless of the deceased individual's home state (‘domicile'), this language has been held unconstitutional. In Experience, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington declared that the WPRA's choice of law provisions violated the Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and Commerce Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The court held that, as the statute would apply Washington law in situations where Washington lacked "significant contact" to the events and parties involved, the statute's choice-of-law provisions were "arbitrary and unfair," and therefore violated the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses. Moreover, as the choice-of-law provisions would allow Washington to apply its statutes to commercial transactions taking place outside of the state, they also violated the Commerce Clause. As a result, the court held that because Jimi Hendrix died while domiciled in New York, Washington law did not apply and ultimately his right of publicity did not descend to his heirs.
Damages and other remedies
Damages and other remedies are described in Wash. Rev. Code § 63.60.060. Courts can grant injunctive relief on "reasonable terms." Courts can also order the destruction of infringing products and elements of their creation process, such as molds or negatives.
Damages are calculated from the greater of $1,500 or the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, plus the infringer's profits. To calculate profits, plaintiffs are required to prove defendant's revenues and defendants to prove their own deductible expenses. Each infringing work constitutes a single instance of infringement, regardless of how many copies were made or how many times the plaintiffs appear within.
"Washington expressly prohibits punitive damages as a violation of public policy unless explicitly authorized by statute." Jongeward v. BNSF R. Co., 174 Wash. 2d 586, 594, 278 P.3d 157, 160 (2012). As the statute does not include a reference to punitive damages, they are not available.
The statute notes states that "the remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and are in addition to any others provided for by law," suggesting that incremental common law damages may be assessed independently.
THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
Only one recent case explicitly addresses a plaintiff's common law tort of appropriation. In Aronson, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington noted that while a common law cause of action existed for appropriation, it did not apply to "the publication of matters in the public interest" (see Defenses, below). Aronson at 1113.
In Dale, the plaintiff brought a WPRA claim and a claim for "common law invasion of privacy," presumably for appropriation, although the opinion does not specify. The Court of Appeals of Washington held that both claims failed as the plaintiff had consented to the use of her image.
These examples notwithstanding, there may be historical precedent for a successful common law right of publicity claim. In Hinkle, a case from 1924, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a political organization could not use the name of a politician against his will, and provided injunctive relief. The decision did not reference appropriation or a right of publicity by name.
DEFENSES TO THE STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW RIGHTS
In Aronson, a plaintiff depicted in a healthcare documentary claimed unauthorized misappropriation of his identity, citing both common law and the statute. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held that the documentary was both entitled to First Amendment Protection and exempted from the statute.
In Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992), the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington suggested that Washington law would protect the producers of a play that incorporated a recreation of a performance by a deceased blues singer, "especially given the fact that the Washington State Constitution places an even higher value upon the principle of free speech than the Federal Constitution." While the court did not apply a constitutional analysis, it did note "the clear direction in which constitutional law points," and cited a New York case holding that free speech considerations trumped the post-mortem right of publicity. Note that this decision was written prior to the enactment of the WPRA.
Although no Washington court has analyzed which statute of limitations applies to right of publicity claims in Washington, it is likely that the state's general three-year statute of limitations for injury to persons or property would apply. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080(2).
While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when publishing private information about individuals or using peoples' names and likenesses, there are a number of ways you can minimize your risk of being on the receiving end of a publication of private facts, misappropriation, or right of publicity lawsuit. Some suggestions include:
If you have web forums, allow reader comments, host guest bloggers on your site, or if you repost information that you receive from RSS feeds, you generally will be shielded from liability for defamatory statements made by your users and guests under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("Section 230"). This important federal law protects you from certain types of liability, including defamation, associated with the statements and other user-submitted content you publish on your site.
Section 230 grants interactive online services of all types, including blogs, forums, and listservs, broad immunity from liability so long as the information at issue is provided by a third-party. You will not lose this immunity even if you edit the content, whether for accuracy or civility, and you will be entitled to immunity so long as your edits do not substantially alter the meaning of the original statements. However, if you alter someone else's statement so that it becomes defamatory (e.g., changing the statement “Bob is not a murderer” to “Bob is a murderer”), you would be responsible for the content of the edited statement; and if it turns out to be untrue, you could be liable for defamation. In addition, if you add your own commentary along with the user-submitted content, you will only be shielded from liability for the material created by your user, not for your own statements. For more on this important protection, see the section on Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act.
Note that Section 230 does not shield you from liability for copyright infringement claims and other intellectual property claims. If you publish or use the creative work of others, their trademarks, or certain confidential business information without the permission of the owner, you may be exposing yourself to legal liability for violations of intellectual property law. Fortunately, if you allow your site's user to post this type of content you can protect yourself from copyright infringement claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), so long as you establish effective "notice-and-takedown" procedures, promptly remove content when a copyright owner notifies you that it is infringing, and have no knowledge that the material in question is infringing. We cover liability associated with copyright, trademark, and trade secrets in the Intellectual Property section of this legal guide. For guidance on the procedures you should follow under the DMCA, see the section on Protecting Yourself Against Copyright Claims Based on User Content.
This page provides some background on section 230 of the Communications Decency Act ("Section 230") and highlights the types of claims and online activities it covers as well as the types of activities that might fall outside Section 230's immunity provisions.
For general information on legal liability associated with publishing the content of others, see the section on Publishing the Statements and Content of Others in this guide.
Under standard common-law principles, a person who publishes a defamatory statement by another bears the same liability for the statement as if he or she had initially created it. Thus, a book publisher or a newspaper publisher can be held liable for anything that appears within its pages. The theory behind this "publisher" liability is that a publisher has the knowledge, opportunity, and ability to exercise editorial control over the content of its publications.
Distributor liability is much more limited. Newsstands, bookstores, and libraries are generally not held liable for the content of the material that they distribute. The concern is that it would be impossible for distributors to read every publication before they sell or distribute it, and that as a result, distributors would engage in excessive self-censorship. In addition, it would be very hard for distributors to know whether something is actionable defamation; after all, speech must be false to be defamatory.
Not surprisingly, the first websites to be sued for defamation based on the statements of others argued that they were merely distributors, and not publishers, of the content on their sites. One of the first such cases was Cubby v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). CompuServe provided subscribers with access to over 150 specialty electronic "forums" that were run by third parties. When CompuServe was sued over allegedly defamatory statements that appeared in the "Rumorville" forum, it argued that it should be treated like a distributor because it did not review the contents of the bulletin board before it appeared on CompuServe’s site. The court agreed and dismissed the case against CompuServe.Four years later, a New York state court came to the opposite conclusion when faced with a website that held itself out as a "family friendly" computer network. In Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy, 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), the court held that because Prodigy was exercising editorial control over the messages that appeared on its bulletin boards through its content guidelines and software screening program, Prodigy was more like a "publisher" than a "distributor" and therefore fully liable for all of the content on its site.
The perverse upshot of the CompuServe and Stratton decisions was that any effort by an online information provider to restrict or edit user-submitted content on its site faced a much higher risk of liability if it failed to eliminate all defamatory material than if it simply didn’t try to control or edit the content of third parties at all.
This prompted Congress to pass the Communications Decency Act in 1996. The Act contains deceptively simple language under the heading "Protection for Good Samaritan blocking and screening of offensive material":
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.
Section 230 further provides that "[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section."
Is an "interactive computer service" some special type of website? No. For purposes of Section 230, an
"interactive computer service" means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.
Most courts have held that through these provisions, Congress granted interactive services of all types, including blogs, forums, and listservs, immunity from tort liability so long as the information is provided by a third party.
As a result of Section 230, Internet publishers are treated differently from publishers in print, television, and radio. Let's look at these difference in more detail.
Section 230 has most frequently been applied to bar defamation-based claims. In the typical case, a plaintiff who believes she has been defamed sues both the author of the statement and the website that provided a forum or otherwise passively hosted the material. Courts have held with virtual unanimity that such claims against a website are barred by Section 230.
But immunity under Section 230 is not limited to defamation or speech-based torts. Courts have applied Section 230 immunity to bar claims such as invasion of privacy, misappropriation, and most recently in a case brought against MySpace (Doe v. MySpace, 474 F.Supp.2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007)), a claim asserting that MySpace was negligent for failing to implement age verification procedures and to protect a fourteen-year old from sexual predators.
However, Section 230 explicitly exempts from its coverage criminal law, communications privacy law, and "intellectual property claims." In interpreting these exclusions, courts agree that Congress meant to exclude federal intellectual property claims, such as copyright and trademark, but they disagree whether state-law intellectual property claims (or claims that arguably could be classified as intellectual property claims, such as the right of publicity) are also exempted from the broad immunity protection Section 230 provides.
Finally, Section 230 does not immunize the actual creator of content. The author of a defamatory statement, whether he is a blogger, commenter, or anything else, remains just as responsible for his online statements as he would be for his offline statements.
Courts have consistently held that exercising traditional editorial functions over user-submitted content, such as deciding whether to publish, remove, or edit material, is immunized under Section 230. As one moves farther away from these basic functions, immunity may still exist, but the analysis becomes more fact-specific. We analyze in detail the types of activites that are covered by Section 230 and those activities that fall outside its protections in the Online Activities Covered by Section 230 and Online Activities Not Covered by Section 230 pages of this legal guide. (We strongly advise that you review these pages if your activities extend beyond traditional editorial functions.)
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act grants interactive online services of all types, including blogs, forums, and listservs, broad immunity from tort liability so long as the information at issue is provided by a third party. Relatively few court decisions, however, have analyzed the scope of this immunity in the context of "mixed content" that is created jointly by the operator of the interactive service and a third party through significant editing of content or the shaping of content by submission forms and drop-downs.
So what are the practical things you can take away from this guide? Here are five:
To follow recent developments in the law concerning these immunity provisions, see our Section 230 summary page, where you will find background on Section 230, links to our legal guide materials, and feeds showing recent legal threats from our database, blog posts, and news.
Note: For a general overview of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, see the page on Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act in this legal guide.
Courts have consistently held that exercising traditional editorial functions over user-submitted content, such as deciding whether to publish, remove, or edit material, is immunized under Section 230. As one moves farther away from these basic functions, immunity may still exist, but the analysis becomes more fact-specific. While the case law addressing some of these activities is still developing, generally speaking Section 230 provides immunity for the following actions:
While most courts have held that Section 230 grants interactive computer services broad, expansive immunity, some courts have been willing to limit Section 230's immunity. We cover these cases in the Online Activities Not Covered by Section 230 page of this guide.
While most courts have held that Section 230 grants interactive computer services broad, expansive immunity, this recognition often comes with some reluctance by the courts. Occasionally courts try to find ways around the broad immunity grant of Section 230. Early on, most courts that tried to hold service providers liable were trial courts that eventually found themselves reversed on appeal.
Lately, however, some appellate courts have been willing to limit Section 230's immunity. This has primarily involved two types of activities by online publishers:
Note: For a general overview of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, see the page on Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act in this legal guide.
As you publish your work online you may want to correct things you have previously published. This may occur when someone contacts you and asks you to correct or retract your statements, or, you might decide on your own that something you've published needs to be changed. While the terms correction and retraction are sometimes used interchangeably, in general, a correction alerts your audience to factual errors that do not take away from your main point, while a retraction informs your audience of factual errors that impact the main point of the statements.
Your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. First, it will make your work more accurate and reliable. This will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views.
Second, it will likely diminish your liability for defamation and other potential legal claims. Keep in mind that correcting or retracting something you've previously published won't not necessarily mean that you will escape liability. Although a retraction might satisfy the person making the request, in some cases the requester may still sue you for defamation.
This section will provide you with an overview of the laws governing retractions and provide some practical tips for handing retraction requests.
Retraction Laws
A growing number of states have laws -- both statutory and case law -- that require that a plaintiff must first request a retraction before they can recover certain types of damages in a defamation lawsuit. Keep in mind that each state defines what is required under its law and the procedures vary from state to state. You should consult your individual state guide for specifics on how the law operates in your jurisdiction.
Generally speaking, states that have retraction laws require the following:
Retraction laws differ in their impact on the damages available to a plaintiff. In the majority of states, a retraction prevents a plaintiff from recovering punitive damages unless the plaintiff can prove malice on the part of the defendant. Even if the plaintiff proves malice, a timely retraction can mitigate any punitive damages. For example, see the retraction statutes in Michigan, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia. And in one state, North Dakota, which has adopted the Uniform Correction Act, a plaintiff can only recover his out-of-pocket costs (i.e., direct economic losses) if the defendant has made a timely retraction. Some states without retraction statutes have similar principles in their common law. In these states, a defendant's retraction can be used to demonstrate an absence of malice in a defamation suit.
Most retraction laws were created before the Internet made online publishing a reality. As a result, it is not clear whether many of these laws apply to online publishers. North Dakota is the only state whose retraction statute specifically mentions electronic publications. Although several other states' retraction statutes are broad enough to include online publications, relatively few courts have addressed the issue.
This is likely a subject that will be determined by future courts and legislators, so consult your individual state guide for trends in your jurisdiction. For example, California's retraction statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 48a, applies to the publication of libel in a newspaper or slander by radio broadcast. Although the statute does not specifically state that it only applies to newspapers in print, two recent court decisions in California suggest that an online publication may be a "newspaper" if certain conditions are met. Refer to the section on California's retraction statute for details on these decisions.
Even if your state's retraction statute does not apply to internet publications, publishing a retraction is often good practice if you realize that you have made a factual error. Often this will be enough to satisfy a potential plaintiff.
Handling Retraction Requests
Receiving a retraction request may be an indication of a pending lawsuit, and you should carefully consider your legal liability before publishing a retraction that admits liability. If you do not have a lawyer you can consult with, refer to the section on finding legal help for some guidance. A lawyer experienced in defamation law can help you assess the validity of the retraction request, discuss the potential for a defamation claim, determine which state's defamation and retraction law applies, and help you craft an appropriate retraction notice.
Look closely at the specifics of the request and evaluate the accuracy of your work. If the retraction request contains specific, convincing details of factual errors, and your own grounds for making those factual statements appear shaky, a retraction might be a good idea to stave off a potential lawsuit and improve the reliability of your work. (Many potential defamation plaintiffs are satisfied with a correction and an apology because they do not want to draw yet more attention to the negative statements published about themselves.) On the other hand, if the retraction request is vague and you are confident that the information you published is accurate, the request may be an empty threat.
Responding to a retraction request will vary with the nature of your statements and the details of your state's retraction statute or case law. Generally speaking, to be effective, a retraction must be a "frank and full" withdrawal of the defamatory accusation. Merely stating that the subject of the statement denies the accusation is not enough, nor is a weak, grudging, or half-hearted correction. Additionally, the retraction must appear in a manner comparable to that of the original publication and be disseminated to the same audience.
If your state's law does not cover online work, tailor your retraction to match the guidelines established by your state's statute for the print media by publishing the retraction in an equal size and prominence to the original story, and reaching the same audience as the original. You should account for the different ways your audience accesses your content to make sure the retraction is sufficiently prominent. For example, if the statements are in your blog, and send out your blog posts in a weekly newsletter, you should publish the retraction in both your blog and newsletter. Also, if your site provides an RSS feed, attach the retraction to the feed to ensure that you reach the same audience.
For additional information on what practical steps you should consider, see Practical Tips for Handling Requests to Correct or Remove Material.
While you can't always eliminate your legal risks when publishing online, there are a number of ways you can minimize your risk of being on the receiving end of an lawsuit if you publish incorrect information. Some suggestions include:
Each state has its own definition of what constitutes a retraction, and whether a plaintiff's damages are limited when a defendant publishes a retraction. Choose from the list below to determine whether your state has a retraction law, and if so, the procedure to follow if you wish to get the law's benefits. (Note that the guide does not include every state at this time.)
Note: This page covers information specific to Arizona and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Arizona has a retraction statute, A.R.S. § 12‑653.02, that applies to “an action for damages for the publication of a libel in a newspaper or magazine, or of a slander by radio or television broadcast.” The statute does not specifically state whether it covers online publications. Because the statute does not explicitly require publication in physical as opposed to electronic form, if an online publication can be characterized as a “newspaper or magazine,” you may have a colorable argument that the retraction law applies. However, at least one federal court in Arizona has stated that the retraction statute applies only to “libel actions based on newspaper or magazine articles” and does not apply to comments made on an online forum. Dealer Comp. Servs. v. Fullers’ White Mt. Motors, Inc., No. CV07-00748-PCT-JAT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83311 at *19 (D. Ariz. Oct. 16, 2008).
Under A.R.S. § 12‑653.02, a plaintiff must “serve upon the publisher at the place of publication, or broadcaster at the place of broadcast, a written notice specifying the statements claimed to be libelous and demanding that the same be corrected . . . within twenty days after actual knowledge of the plaintiff of the publication or broadcast of the statements claimed to be libelous.”
If someone contacts you with a retraction or correction request, you should first determine whether a retraction or correction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction or correction is appropriate, you should issue a retraction or correction “in substantially as conspicuous a manner in the newspaper or magazine, or on the radio or television broadcasting station, as the statements claimed to be libelous, in a regular issue thereof published or broadcast within three weeks after service” of the demand for the correction. A.R.S. § 12‑653.03. If you follow these requirements, you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages. See id.
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for libel, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. The statute provides that he or she will be able to recover only for his or her actual economic losses and will not be able to recover general damages (e.g., loss of reputation generally) or punitive damages unless he or she can prove actual malice. A.R.S. § 12‑653.03. However, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that the retraction statute violates art. 18, § 6 of the Arizona constitution in part, to the extent that it eliminates “general damages for both loss of reputation and emotional harm, preventing those damaged by defamation from recovering general damages for actual injury.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 19 (Ariz. 1986). Therefore, the limits on liability might not apply only to punitive damages, and may not apply to the extent a plaintiff can prove actual damage to her reputation or actual emotional harm.
The retraction statute also does not apply not apply “to any publication or broadcast made within thirty days preceding any election, if such publication or broadcast is designed to in any way influence the results of such election.” A.R.S. § 12‑653.05.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of Arizona’s retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to California and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
California has a retraction statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 48a, that applies to the "publication of libel in a newspaper" or "slander by radio broadcast." Although the statute does not specifically state whether it covers online publications, two recent court decisions suggest that an online publisher may be covered by the statute if the publisher's main focus is the rapid dissemination of news.
In the first case, a federal court interpreting California law observed that the legislature passed the retraction statute to protect publishing enterprises that engage "in the immediate dissemination of news," because such enterprises "cannot always check their sources for accuracy and their stories for inadvertent publication errors." Condit v. National Enquirer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 945, 955 (2002). The court concluded that the National Enquirer, which published the statements at issue in print and online, was not covered by the retraction statute because its primary focus was not the rapid dissemination of news. Thus the court held that the National Enquirer had time to verify the truth of the allegations before publishing the statements.
The federal court's definition of "newspaper" in the National Enquirer case dovetails with an important state appellate court decision referring to "reporters" as persons gathering news for dissemination to the public online. O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App.4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). In that case, Jason O'Grady operated an "online news magazine" about Apple in which he published confidential information he received about a new Apple product. Apple wished to sue the person who divulged the confidential information to O'Grady and subpoenaed him for information about the identity of his confidential source. The court concluded that the state shield law applied to O'Grady because he engaged in "open and deliberate publication on a news-oriented Web site of news gathered by that site's operators." For more on the O'Grady case, see the Apple v. Does entry in the CMLP database. Taken together, the O'Grady and Condit decisions suggest that future courts may be willing to apply the state's retraction law to an online work depending on the nature of the publication.
Although O'Grady involves California's shield law, both the O'Grady and the Condit decisions suggest that future courts may be willing to entertain the possibility that the state's retraction law applies to an online publication if the main focus of the publication is the rapid dissemination of news.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should follow the procedures outlined in the California retraction statute so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the California retraction statute:
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request (or the plaintiff fails to ask for a retraction as required under the statute) and you are found to be liable for defamation, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. He or she will be able to recover only for his or her actual economic losses and will not be able to recover general damages (e.g., loss of reputation generally) or punitive damages.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of California's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Florida and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Florida has a retraction statute, Fla. Stat. § 770.02, that applies to a newspaper or periodical's "publication" of a libel, or a "broadcast" of a slander. Although the statute does not specifically state whether it covers online publications, the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Ross v. Gore, 48 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1950) suggests that an online publisher may be covered by the statute if the publisher's main focus is the dissemination of news.
In Ross, the plaintiff Julian Ross brought suit against publisher R.H. Gore for an allegedly defamatory editorial published in Gore's newspaper, the Fort Lauderdale Daily News. Ross argued that the state's retraction statute violated Florida's constitution because it prevented him from collecting punitive damages. The court disagreed and noted that the retraction statute encouraged the free dissemination of "news" and "fair comment" in a short timeframe by not placing unreasonable restraints on the working news reporter or editor, thus preserving an important component of American democracy. In a later case, an appellate court concluded that the retraction statute applied to anyone writing for a newspaper, and based its reasoning on the need to protect the swift dissemination of news in order to inform the public of "pending matters while there is still time for public opinion to form and be felt." Mancini v. Personalized Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 702 So.2d 1376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). Both the Ross and Mancini decisions suggest that future courts may be willing to apply Florida's retraction law to an online publication as long as the publication is dedicated to the rapid dissemination of news.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should follow the procedures outlined in the Florida retraction statute so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the Florida retraction statute:
* ten days of notice, for a daily or weekly publication;
* twenty days of notice, for a semimonthly publication;
* forty-five days of notice, for a monthly publication; or
* the next issue, for a work published "less frequently than monthly," as long as the plaintiff serves the notice no later than 45 days prior to such publication.
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for defamation, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. He or she will be able to recover only for his or her actual economic losses and will not be able to recover general damages (e.g., loss of reputation generally) or punitive damages.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of Florida's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Georgia and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Georgia has a retraction statute that applies to libel published in a "newspaper or other publication" ( Ga. Code Ann. § 51-5-11) and to a "broadcast" of a slander (Ga. Code Ann. § 51-5-12). (The links direct you to the Georgia Code hosted on Lexis Nexis. If you agree with the terms and conditions of the access, click "Ok." Scroll down and click on the circled plus symbol next to "Title 51," and then on the same symbol next to "Chapter 5" where you will find the sections of the Georgia Code mentioned on this page.)
Although the statute does not specifically state whether it covers online publications, it defines the term "publication" as any communication made to any person other than the party libeled. Ga. Code Ann. § 51-5-3. This definition stems from the Supreme Court of Georgia's ruling in Mathis v. Cannon, 276 Ga. 16, 28 (2002). The Mathis case is interesting because the court applied the retraction statute to an online publication. The plaintiff, Thomas Cannon, brought suit over Bruce Mathis' allegedly libelous comments in an Internet chat room. Cannon argued that Mathis' failure to seek a retraction prevented Mathis from receiving punitive damages in accordance with the retraction statute; Mathis disagreed arguing that the retraction statute applied to newspapers and print media only and did not apply to statements made in an Internet chat room. The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the retraction statute's use of the term "other publication" encompassed any communication made to a third person, regardless of its medium, because:
It treats a publication for purposes of seeking a retraction the same as a publication for purposes of imposing liability. It acknowledges that the legislature extended the retraction defense originally created for newspapers, magazines, and periodicals to include newspapers and “other publications.” It encourages defamation victims to seek self-help, their first remedy, by “using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.” It eliminates the difficult task of determining what is a “ written publication” and who is the “print media” at a time when any individual with a computer can become a publisher. It supports free speech by extending the same protection to the private individual who speaks on matters of public concern as newspapers and other members of the press now enjoy. In short, it strikes a balance in favor of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate in an age of communications when “anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet” can address a worldwide audience of readers in cyberspace.
Thus, the Mathis decision allows the publisher of an online publication to benefit from the Georgia retraction statute as long as the publisher complies with the statute's requirements (discussed below).
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should follow the procedures outlined in the Georgia retraction statute so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the Georgia retraction statute:
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for libel, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. He or she will be able to recover only for his or her actual economic losses and will not be able to recover general damages (e.g., loss of reputation generally) or punitive damages. However, note that in a slander case, the plaintiff's retraction request of a defamatory statement has no bearing on whether the plaintiff's ability to recover punitive damages. See Ga. Code Ann. § 51-5-12.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of Georgia's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note that even in the absence of any relevant cases, you should still consider correcting or retracting an erroneous statement because your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Indiana and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Indiana has a retraction statute, Ind. Code § 34-15-4-3, which applies to libel published in a "newspaper" or by a "news service." Although the statute does not specifically state whether it covers online publications, the court's decision in Christopher v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1948) suggests that Indiana's retraction statute covers an online publisher if the publisher's primary focus is the reporting of factual occurrences.
In the Christopher case, Louis Christopher brought suit against the American News Company (ANC) for allegedly libelous statements made in The Nation, a weekly magazine. ANC argued that because Christopher neglected to serve it with written notice of the allegedly libelous statements, he did not comply with the Indiana retraction statute and thus could not succeed in his libel suit. The court observed that ANC's argument assumed that The Nation was a "newspaper" and thus subject to Indiana's retraction law. The court disagreed with that assumption, explaining:
Although The Nation does print some news items of general interest, articles, classified advertisements, and editorials, it is not a newspaper in the sense in which the term is commonly used. While the line between a newspaper and other periodicals is difficult to draw, it would seem that a possible distinction might be that a newspaper reports or claims to report occurrences factually, however the facts may be slanted or distorted, whereas a periodical such as The Nation reports facts not primarily for the interest in the factual narrative in and of itself but for some other possible significance.
The court declined to decide whether The Nation was a newspaper stating that it was a question for a later time. However, the Christopher decision suggests that future courts may be willing to entertain the possibility that the state's retraction law applies to an online publication if the main focus of the publication is to report facts that make up a factual narrative with no other significance in mind.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should follow the procedures outlined in the Indiana retraction statute so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the Indiana retraction statute:
1. within three days by a news service;
2. within five days, if the newspaper is a daily publication; or
3. within ten days, if the newspaper is a weekly publication.
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for libel, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. He or she will be able to recover only for his or her actual economic losses and will not be able to recover general damages (e.g., loss of reputation generally) or punitive damages.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of Indiana's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Massachusetts and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Massachusetts has a retraction statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 93, that applies to the publication of libel. The retraction statute bars a plaintiff from recovering punitive and exemplary damages in a defamation suit, and allows the court or jury to consider a defendant's retraction as a factor in mitigating an award of general damages to the plaintiff. The statute states in its entirety:
Although the statute doesn't state whether it applies to online publishers, the statute's use of the phrase "publication of libel" without limitation would seem to suggest that an online publisher is covered by the Massachusetts retraction statute.Where the defendant in an action for libel, at any time after the publication of the libel hereinafter referred to, either before or after such action is brought, but before the answer is required to be filed therein, gives written notice to the plaintiff or to his attorney of his intention to publish a retraction of the libel, accompanied by a copy of the retraction which he intends to publish, and the retraction is published, he may prove such publication, and, if the plaintiff does not accept the offer of retraction, the defendant may prove such nonacceptance in mitigation of damages. If within a reasonable time after receiving notice in writing from the plaintiff that he claims to be libelled the defendant makes such offer and publishes a reasonable retraction, and such offer is not accepted, he may prove that the alleged libel was published in good faith and without actual malice, and, unless the proof is successfully rebutted, the plaintiff shall recover only for any actual damage sustained. In no action of slander or libel shall exemplary or punitive damages be allowed, whether because of actual malice or want of good faith or for any other reason. Proof of actual malice shall not enhance the damages recoverable for injury to the plaintiff’s reputation.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should follow the procedures outlined in the Massachusetts retraction statute so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the Massachusetts retraction statute, a publisher should send written notice to the plaintiff of:
at any time before the plaintiff files a suit against the publisher, or, by the time of the publisher has to file a response to the plaintiff's lawsuit.
If you comply with this procedure after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for defamation, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited to recovering his or her actual economic losses only.
Even in the unlikely event that your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of Massachusetts's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Michigan and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Michigan has a retraction statute, Mich. Comp. Laws 600.2911, that applies to libel "based on a radio or television broadcast," libel "based on a publication," and "other libel." Although the statute does not specifically state whether it covers online publications, the statute does not require that a libel based on publication be published in a specific medium. Additionally, the statute's inclusion of "other libel" gives rise to the possibility that future courts may apply the state's retraction law to an online publication.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should follow the procedures outlined in the Michigan retraction statute so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the Michigan retraction statute:
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for defamation, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. Under the retraction statute, she will be able to recover only for her actual economic losses. You will be able to show your good faith and the jury will be able to consider your retraction in the mitigation of exemplary or punitive damages. Note that under Michigan libel law, "exemplary and punitive damages" are a species of "actual" damages, and are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for "the increased injury to feelings directly attributable to the defendant's fault in publishing the libel." Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 421 Mich. 125, 131 (Mich. 1984) (emphasis in original).
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of Michigan's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to New Jersey and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
New Jersey has a retraction statute, N.J. Stat. § 2A:43-2, that applies to "the owner, manager, editor, publisher or reporter of any newspaper, magazine, periodical, serial or other publication." Although the statute does not specifically state whether it covers online publications, it does not require that the article be published in a specific medium (e.g. print only). Thus, if your role can be characterized as the owner, manager, editor, publisher or reporter of an online "newspaper, magazine, periodical, serial or other publication," you have a colorable argument that the retraction law applies you.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should follow the procedures outlined in the New Jersey retraction statute so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the New Jersey statute:
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for libel, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. He or she will be able to recover only for his or her actual economic losses and will not be able to recover punitive damages.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of New Jersey's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to New York and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
New York has a retraction statute, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 78, that applies to the publication of libelous statements. Although the statute is silent on what constitutes publication, New York's Court of Appeals has broadly defined to signify any communication of a defamatory statement to a third party. See Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 NE 505 (N.Y. 1931) for the court's rationale. The Court of Appeal's expansive definition in Ostrowe suggests that a future court will likely find that the retraction statute covers an online publication.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should publish one so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 78, you can use your retraction, and even your offer to publish a retraction, to show mitigating circumstances for the jury to consider in determining damages. The jury may use the retraction to reduce punitive damages but not compensatory damages.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of New York's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to North Carolina and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
North Carolina has a retraction statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99-2, that applies to libelous statements published in an "article" of a "newspaper or periodical." Although the statute does not specifically state whether it covers online articles, it also does not require that the article be published in a specific medium. Thus, if your online work can be characterized as a newspaper or periodical, you have a colorable argument that the retraction law applies to your online work.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should follow the procedures outlined in the North Carolina retraction statute so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the North Carolina retraction statute:
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for libel, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. He or she will be able to recover only for his or her actual economic losses and will not be able to recover general damages (e.g., loss of reputation generally) or punitive damages.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of North Carolina's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Ohio and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Ohio has a retraction statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 2739.14, which applies to a "newspaper company" that prints, publishes, or circulates a false statement in its "newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication." Under § 11 of the statute, a newspaper company refers to "[a]ny person, firm, partnership, voluntary association, joint-stock association, or corporation, wherever organized or incorporated, engaged in the business of printing or publishing a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical sold or offered for sale in this state." (Emphasis added.) Because the statute does not state that the false statement must be made in a specific medium (e.g. print only), a future court may be persuaded to find that the retraction law applies to a publisher's online periodical publication that is sold or offered for sale in Ohio.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should follow the procedures outlined in the Ohio retraction statute so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
Under the Ohio retraction statute:
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for defamation, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will likely be limited. Under the retraction statute, you will be able to use your retraction to show your good faith and the jury will be able to consider your retraction as a mitigating circumstance to reduce damages.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of Ohio's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Pennsylvania and should be read in conjunction with Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication, which has general information applicable to all states.
While no court has spoken directly on the issue of retractions and online publications, you have a strong argument that a jury can consider your retraction for the purpose of mitigation of damages under Pennsylvania commonlaw.
Although Pennsylvania does not have a retraction statute, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered the effect of a retraction in Wharen v. Dershuck, 264 Pa. 562 (Pa. 1919). In that case, the plantiff George Warren sued the publisher of the newspaper The Plain Speaker over an article describing Wharen's behavior as a mail carrier. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant-publisher, and in his appeal Wharen argued that the judge's instructions to the jury were in error. These instructions included the judge's statement that while the jury could not consider the defendant's retraction for purposes of liability, the jury could consider it to mitigate the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found no reversible error and upheld the jury instructions.
Two other Pennsylvania cases, Duh v. Bethlehem's Globe Publishing Co. (No. 1), 48 Pa. D. & C.2d 268 (Pa.Com.Pl. 1969) and Rossi v. McDonnell, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 550 (Pa.Com.Pl. 1959), similarly held that a defendant in a libel suit is entitled to offer his or her retraction to a jury to mitigate damages. While it is difficult to predict how a court will rule on whether the above standard applies to online publications, you have a colorable argument that you can offer your retraction to a jury for the purpose of mitigation of damages under Pennsylvania commonlaw.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, issuing a retraction may mitigate your damages in accordance with the Wharen decision.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of the Wharen decision, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. Correcting errors will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, by placating a potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find that a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Texas and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Texas has a retraction statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 73.003, that applies to libel "expressed in written or other graphic form." The statute does not require that the publication has to be in a specific medium (e.g. print only), which leaves open the possibility that the statute may cover an online publication. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 73.001.
Handling Requests to Remove or Retract Material in Texas
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should publish one so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages.
If you issue a "public apology, correction, or retraction" of a false statement and you are found to be liable for defamation, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. Under the Texas retraction statute, you will be able to use your retraction to show your good faith and the jury will be able to consider your retraction in determining the "extent and source" of the plaintiff's actual (economic) damages and to mitigate exemplary damages, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of Texas' retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith.
Note: This page covers information specific to Virginia and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Virginia has a retraction statute, Va. Code § 8.01-48, that applies to "the publisher, owner, editor, reporter or employee of any newspaper, magazine or periodical" who face a libel suit for an "article, statement or other matter contained in any such newspaper, magazine or periodical." Although the statute does not specifically state whether it covers online publications, it does not require that the article be published in a specific medium (e.g. print only). Thus, if your role can be characterized as the publisher, owner, editor, reporter or employee of an online newspaper, magazine or periodical, you have a colorable argument that the retraction law applies you.
If someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should issue an "apology or retraction" with "reasonable promptness and fairness" so that you can avail yourself of the statutory benefit of limiting potential defamation damages. See Va. Code § 8.01-48.
If you comply with these procedures after receiving a retraction request and you are found to be liable for libel, the plaintiff's ability to recover damages from you will be limited. He or she will be able to recover only for his or her actual economic losses and will not be able to recover general damages (e.g., loss of reputation generally) or punitive damages.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of Virginia's retraction statute, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note: This page covers information specific to Washington and should be read in conjunction with the general section on retraction in the section on Correcting or Retracting Your Work After Publication which has additional information applicable to all states.
Although Washington does not have a retraction statute, the Supreme Court of Washington decided one case, Coffman v. Spokane Chronicle Pub. Co., 117 P. 596 (Wash. 1911), involving the effect of a publisher's offer to retract its statements in a libel case. In the Coffman case, the plaintiffs Elizabeth and Thomas Coffman brought a defamation suit against the Spokane Chronicle for statements made in the a series of articles published in the Chronicle about their marriage. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Coffmans, and the Spokane Chronicle appealed the jury verdict in favor of the Coffmans, arguing in part that they "had been at all times ready and willing to publish any fair, reasonable, and truthful article or correction which the [plaintiffs] ... might desire" and that the plaintiffs neglected to request such retraction. The court disagreed, noting that duty falls on a newspaper to issue a "full and complete retraction" if it has libeled a person, and that the newspaper can offer the retraction in mitigation of damages.
It is difficult to predict how a court will rule on whether the above standard applies to online publications given that the state only has the Coffman case from 1911 and no retraction statute. However, if someone contacts you with a retraction request, you should first determine whether a retraction is warranted; review the steps under the handling a retraction request section of this guide for help in making this assessment. If you determine that a retraction is appropriate, you should issue one so that you can use it to argue that your damages should be mitigated in accordance with the Coffman decision.
Even if your online publishing activities do not fall within the scope of the Coffman decision, your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
Note that even in the absence of any relevant cases, you should still consider correcting or retracting an erroneous statement because your willingness to correct past errors in your work will provide several benefits. It will make your work more accurate and reliable, which will increase your credibility, influence, and (hopefully) your page views. It will also diminish the likelihood of your being sued in the first place, as it might placate the potential plaintiff. Furthermore, courts and juries may find a retraction shows your good faith, which will benefit you in a defamation suit.
In October 2009, the Federal Trade Commission issued "Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising" (the "Guidelines") that may impose a disclosure requirement on bloggers and social media users who review or otherwise write about products and services. The Guidelines, which officially went into effect on December 1, 2009, call for online publishers to disclose "material connections" they have with a company whose products or services they "endorse." Without the legal jargon, this means that bloggers and social media users must disclose their relationship with a company when they are being paid or otherwise compensated by the company to comment favorably on its products or services. The Guidelines also say that bloggers may be held liable for making misleading or unsubstantiated claims about a product or service.
The Guidelines have provoked quite a bit of anxiety and consternation, but there's little that can't be handled with some common sense and transparency. The Guidelines impact a relatively narrow category of online publishing activities that can be construed as "endorsements," like writing reviews or otherwise commenting favorably on products or services. And, putting aside a few gray areas, the Guidelines require disclosure of only relatively established relationships with companies—like getting paid, participating in a network marketing program, or receiving a steady stream of freebies. On top of that, the Guidelines are easy to comply with, and they require nothing more than upholding good journalistic standards and prinicples, namely independence and transparency. Finally, the FTC staff have made numerous public statements indicating that they are more interested in educating than suing bloggers.
The Guidelines are the FTC's interpretations of the FTC Act—they tell the public what the FTC thinks deceptive advertising is in the area of testimonials and endorsements. The Guidelines do not have independent force of law; they are not "rules"; and there is no automatic fine for violating them.
If the FTC staff think that someone has violated the Guidelines, the agency may commence an enforcement action against the alleged wrongdoer for violating the FTC Act. In that enforcement action, the FTC would have the burden of proving that the challenged conduct violates the FTC Act, and the outcome would be reviewable in federal court. The primary remedy in an FTC enforcement action is a cease-and-desist order commanding the defendant to stop violating the FTC Act. Fines are only available in particularly egregious cases or when the defendant violates the cease-and-desist order.
Bloggers and users of social media only need to disclose their relationship with a company when they "endorse" a product of service. Accordingly, for the vast majority of online publishers, the Guidelines probably won't come into play much. But if you publish reviews or otherwise regularly discuss products and services, the Guidelines could impact your work, and you should have a sense of what constitutes an "endorsement."
The Guidelines define an "endorsement" as "any advertising message . . . that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views expressed by that party are identicial to those of the sponsoring advertiser." Guides, § 255.0(b).
Not all online discussion of product attributes or consumer experiences will qualify as an "endorsement." The FTC explains in its commentary on the Guidelines: "the fundamental question is whether, viewed objectively, the relationship between the advertiser and the speaker is such that the speaker's statement can be considered 'sponsored' by the advertiser and therefore an 'advertising message.'" Federal Register Notice, at 8.
The FTC will look at the following factors to determine whether a message conveying positive statements about a product or service is an "endorsement":
Federal Register Notice, at 9. That's a lot of factors, but most of the FTC's examples in the Guidelines and its public statements suggest that it is primarily concerned with those getting paid in cash, those participating in network marketing programs, and those receiving a steady stream of products from a company or group of companies.
For instance, in an FTC instructional video (embedded below), Mary Engle, Associate Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, answers the question "what do the Enforcement Guides mean for bloggers." In doing so, she focuses on these categories of relationship:
If you are one of those bloggers whose in a marketing program with an advertiser and you're being paid to blog about a product, or you're receiving a steady stream of products from a company, then you need to disclose that relationship you have with the company.
Rebecca Tushnet's notes from a December 1 panel discussion, which included Stacey Ferguson of the FTC's Division of Advertising Practices, provide a little more detail, but basically the same gist:
Disclosure of connection: when does a consumer become an endorser? When the consumer is sponsored by the advertiser, looked at objectively. Are they acting independently, or are they part of the advertiser’s marketing campaign? Definitely: Explicit understanding; cash payments; additional perks; network marketing programs; network advertising agencies; commissions. It depends: Continuous free merchandise; value of the product or service; links to where the product can be purchased.
Note: The FTC is also cracking down on astroturfing by company employees, which makes sense because there is certainly a "material connection" between employer and employee that readers would like to know about in evaluating the credibility of the message.
The pages below dig into some of the most important issues surrounding the Guidelines and their application to online publishing activities:
For additional information, be sure to check out the resources on FTC's website.
If you have a relationship with a company that needs to be disclosed, then you should do so in a "clear and conspicuous" manner. Don't put it in small print or hide it away on a backwater page on your website. You want readers to easily notice the disclosure, and you want them to understand it. So make the disclosure clear and unambiguous so it can be understood by the average reader.
The form of the disclosure can be very simple. In a second FTC instructional video (embedded below), FTC staffer Mary Engle gives some examples of good disclosures:
In March 2013, the FTC provided further information about how to make effective online disclosures in a guidance document entitled ".com Disclosures: How to Make Effective Disclosures in Digital Advertising." Among the recommendations made in the new document are the following:
Here are some additional suggestions from Stacey Ferguson of the FTC (as reported on Rebecca Tushnet's blog) on how to handle disclosure in various other media:
If you're unsure about your disclosure, consider the purpose of the disclosure requirement. The FTC is concerned about statements that look like personal recommendations or neutral reviews but are in fact advertisements. Think about your readers. Are you giving them the information they need to evaluate the credibility of your message in a way that they are both likely to see and to understand?
The FTC Guidelines state that, besides disclosing "material connections" with advertisers, endorsements "must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser" and "may not convey any express or implied representation that would be deceptive if made directly by the advertiser." Guides, §255.1(a). In plain language, this means you should not make false, misleading, or unsubstantiated claims about a product or service you write about in return for compensation from the company.
In case that's not clear, the Guidelines provide the following example of a misleading and unsubstantiated claim:
Example 5: A skin care products advertiser participates in a blog advertising service. The service matches up advertisers with bloggers who will promote the advertiser’s products on their personal blogs. The advertiser requests that a blogger try a new body lotion and write a review of the product on her blog. Although the advertiser does not make any specific claims about the lotion’s ability to cure skin conditions and the blogger does not ask the advertiser whether there is substantiation for the claim, in her review the blogger writes that the lotion cures eczema and recommends the product to her blog readers who suffer from this condition. The advertiser is subject to liability for misleading or unsubstantiated representations made through the blogger’s endorsement. The blogger also is subject to liability for misleading or unsubstantiated representations made in the course of her endorsement. The blogger is also liable if she fails to disclose clearly and conspicuously that she is being paid for her services.
In order to limit its potential liability, the advertiser should ensure that the advertising service provides guidance and training to its bloggers concerning the need to ensure that statements they make are truthful and substantiated. The advertiser should also monitor bloggers who are being paid to promote its products and take steps necessary to halt the continued publication of deceptive representations when they are discovered.
Guides, at 4-5. Common sense should take you a long way here: stick to your own experience with a product or service and don't make any factual claims you can't support. If you're unsure about something, contact the company to see if it can provide you with guidance and/or factual support.
And don't worry too much! The FTC is not going to go after a blogger or social media user for stating an "incorrect' opinion or getting minor facts wrong. The FTC's commentary explains that, in the example above, the blogger is not "giv[ing] her opinion about subjective product characteristics (e.g., that she liked the fragrance) or relat[ing] her own experience with it (the example does not say that she had eczema). Rather, she made a blanket claim that the product 'cures' eczema without having any substantiation for that claim." Federal Register Notice, at 15-16. The FTC will no doubt choose to focus its investigative energy on the most egregious misrepresentations.
Many are asking whether the FTC is really going to sue bloggers and other users of social media. The short answer is "probably not," but no one can say for sure. In a series of recent interviews with Internet publications, FTC staff have bent over backwards to downplay the risks to bloggers and, by implication, other users of social media. For example:
"Is the FTC planning to sue bloggers? Well, let me put it this way. That is not why we issued this guidance. We issued this guidance to make it clear that everybody should be playing by the same rules, whether you're a professional reviewer or an amateur reviewer. Just be up front about the connections you have and any conflict of interest you might have with the company."
As heartening as these messages may be, they don't mean it is OK to simply disregard the Guidelines. In the end, it is up to the discretion of the FTC staff whether or not to bring an enforcement action, and none of these public statements bind them in any formal way. One of the fiercest objections to the Guidelines has been that they are written broadly to encompass all sorts of conduct, leaving to the FTC the decision whether to go after technical violators. On the other hand, some level of prosecutorial/agency discretion is common to all U.S. law enforcement.
On this page, we look at some areas where it is not entirely clear how the FTC's Guidelines will apply to online publishing activities:
The Occasional Freebie. Perhaps the most troubling gray area is whether you have to disclose your "relationship" with a company that sends you a freebie once in a while in anticipation of your writing a review about it, but with whom you have no other formal ties. It is not clear how the FTC will deal with this situation.
One thing we know is that when the random, occasional freebie becomes a steady, predictable stream of free products, then it's time to disclose the relationship. The Blog of LegalTimes reports:
Engle did acknowledge a substantial gray area when it comes to blogging. If a blogger received an occasional free sample and happened to write something positive, she said, “that’s not something we think would change the expectation of the audience,” and might not require disclosure. But if at some point it became a steady stream of freebies, then disclosure would be called for. “It’s not burdensome and it’s not hard,” she said.
Just how many free items will trigger the obligation is difficult to say. FTC staffer Stacey Ferguson has some good advice: "When in doubt, disclose freebies."
Besides the frequency of receipt, another important factor is the value of the freebie. The more expensive the item, the more likely your receipt of it requires disclosure. Example 7 under § 255.5 of the Guidelines reinforces this view:
A college student who has earned a reputation as a video game expert maintains a personal weblog or “blog” where he posts entries about his gaming experiences. Readers of his blog frequently seek his opinions about video game hardware and software. As it has done in the past, the manufacturer of a newly released video game system sends the student a free copy of the system and asks him to write about it on his blog. He tests the new gaming system and writes a favorable review. Because his review is disseminated via a form of consumer-generated media in which his relationship to the advertiser is not inherently obvious, readers are unlikely to know that he has received the video game system free of charge in exchange for his review of the product, and given the value of the video game system, this fact likely would materially affect the credibility they attach to his endorsement. Accordingly, the blogger should clearly and conspicuously disclose that he received the gaming system free of charge. The manufacturer should advise him at the time it provides the gaming system that this connection should be disclosed, and it should have procedures in place to try to monitor his postings for compliance.
Guides, at 12 (emphasis added). The blogger in the example doesn't have an established arrangement with the gaming company; he doesn't get paid in cash, and it doesn't look like we're dealing with a "steady stream" of freebies. But it's also not a purely isolated occasion—the hypothetical carefully notes that the manufacture has sent gaming systems in the past (how many times, we don't know). Here, what seems to drive the disclosure requirement is the value of the gaming system. It's worth a lot of money and could conceivably be enough to skew the blogger's review. A comment by Stacey Ferguson in the December 1 panel discussion supports this view:
Free products should be disclosed because they can be considered compensation on a fact-specific basis. Depends on the value of the product—is it enough to push the consumer towards a positive review?
Just how expensive an items needs to be is not clear. Repeat the mantra: "When in doubt, disclose freebies."
Affiliate Links. The Guidelines don't say a whole lot about this, but some statements by FTC staff suggest that the agency believes that affiliate links may require disclosure of the blogger or website operator's relationship with the affiliate sponsor.
Given this uncertainty, it might be a good idea to disclose your participation in an affiliate program on a "disclosures and relationships" page or section. The fashion blog Deep Glamour provides a sardonic example of how to handle the disclosure:
DeepGlamour is an Amazon
affiliate. Virginia Postrel receives a percentage of the purchase price on anything you buy through one of our Amazon
links, including purchases you make while on Amazon
that we did not link directly to.
The Federal Trade Commission demands that we tell you this—they think you're idiots and are violating the First Amendment with their regulation of what bloggers publish—but it's also a friendly reminder to Support DeepGlamour by starting all your Amazon
shopping here.
Something more concise, like “Disclosure: Compensated Affiliate” will also suffice on a link-by-link basis, according to the Affilliate Marketing Blog.
No disclosure is required for ordinary advertisements that clearly look like ads. See Karen Brunet: New FTC Rules and Guidelines - How Does This Apply to Advertising?
Negative Reviews. While it is not 100% clear that disclosure is only required for positive reviews, common sense and the plain meaning of the words "endorsement" and "advertising message" suggest that the FTC won't be paying attention to good-faith negative reviews. Employees of a competitor who engage in astroturfing could run afoul of the FTC Act with negative content, however.
Online publishers should realize that Internet content is available worldwide, and may lead to legal problems outside the United States. While this tends to primarily be an issue for big companies (with deep pockets), it's still a matter of concern for small organizations and even individuals, as illustrated by the French prosecution of an NYU law professor in 2010 for hosting an allegedly defamatory book review.
Because the focus of CMLP's legal guide is U.S. law, this section cannot explain in detail the legal issues that online content may run into abroad. But it is important to realize that foreign laws can differ—sometimes significantly—from American law.
If you post something online that upsets someone in another country, that person may use several means to contact you about their complaint: sending a cease-and-desist letter or e-mail; filing a lawsuit; and/or sending a subpoena. If a lawsuit is filed against you, it could be in a U.S. court or in a foreign court. Either way, your initial response should be the same: Don't panic, but also don't delay.
One big issue when it comes to a lawsuit or threat involving a foreign court is jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the power of the foreign court to hear the case and exert power over you. In some countries, the fact that the material at issue is posted on the Internet and available worldwide—including in the country in question—is enough for the courts of that country to have jurisdiction over a case, at least according to that country's laws.
For example, in 2002 the Australia Supreme Court held that an American company, Dow Jones, Inc., could be sued in Australia over an article that appeared in the printed version and on the web site of its publication Barron's, which was accessible online in Australia. Dow Jones & Company Inc. v. Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (Austl.). In 2010, Germany's highest court overruled two lower courts to hold that The New York Times could be sued in that country by a German citizen over a 2001 article available online, citing the article's references to Germany and the 14,484 registered users of the Times website with German addresses. VI ZR 23/09 (BGHZ March 2010). (Translated press release here.)
As an example of how complicated this can get, in August 2009 an American-based computer game company sued a British blogger in an Australian court. The company dropped the case after a second day of initial hearings in the case.
A judgment against you in a foreign country could remain dormant until you enter the country at a later time, for whatever reason. Therefore, you should consider whether a foreign threat you are facing comes from a country where you may want to travel in the future.
In order to respond to a threat of legal action in a foreign country, even if only to challenge the court's jurisdiction, you either have to handle the situation yourself, find non-profit legal help, or hire a lawyer in that country. In any case, the general advice on our Finding Legal Help still applies, but you will need to deal with the added complexity presented by a foreign legal system. (Sorry, our Online Media Legal Network is currently limited to U.S. lawyers.)
While an exhaustive list is beyond the scope of this guide, here are some resources that may help you find legal help abroad:
Alternately, if you do not have any assets, employees, or other interests in and do not plan to travel to the country from which the legal threat originates, you may choose to not to respond to the foreign legal action. This is not an action to take lightly, and it is not the same as ignoring the threat. In most cases, the decision to not respond to a foreign legal threat should be made in consultation with an attorney.
This was the course of action taken byAmerican author Rachel Ehrenfeld, who was sued in England by Saudi businessman Khalid bin Mahfouz over statements in her book Funding Evil. Ehrenfeld decided to not respond to bin Mahfouz's lawsuit. An English court held her in "default" in 2005, enjoined publication of the book in Great Britain, and eventually awarded £110,000 in compensation and costs to bin Mahfouz and his two sons. bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, No. HQ04X01988 (Q.B. judgment May 3, 2005).
Ehrenfeld then sued bin Mahfouz in a federal court in New York, seeking a declaration that any English libel judgment against her could not be enforced in the United States consistent with the First Amendment. The court dismissed Ehrenfeld's lawsuit on the grounds that bin Mahfouz had not actually tried to enforce the judgment in the United States, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2007) (certifying jurisdictional question to New York Court of Appeals); Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102 (2nd Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of case after New York Court of Appeals answered the certified question, 9 N.Y. 3rd 501 (2007)).
Ehrenfeld and her allies then launched an effort to pass statutes barring the enforcement of foreign libel judgments that do not comport with First Amendment standards. Such statutes, dubbed "libel tourism" laws, have been adopted in California (Cal. Civ. Pro. §§ 1716, 1717); Florida (Fla. Stat. §§ 55.605 (2)(h); 55.6055); Illinois (735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-621 (b)(7), 5/2-209(b-5)); and New York (N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 302(d); 5304 (b)(8)). A federal libel tourism law was enacted in 2010 (28 USC § 4101-4105).
Libel tourism stautes like these would make it harder for a foreign plaintiff to enforce a foreign judgment against you in the U.S. Even without a libel tourism statute, U.S. courts may not recognize a foreign judgment as valid if you have no ties to the foreign country other than that your content can be accessed there. But, there is no guarantee.Again, choosing not to respond to a foreign lawsuit is a decision that must not be made lightly and should in most cases be done in consultation with an attorney.
Creating a legal guide for online and citizen media is a significant undertaking, so it is no surprise that we haven't been able to cover every topic we think should be covered. This page collects some "special situations" that we think warrant additional discussion in the guide. If you have suggestions for additional subjects or would like to help us work on the guide, please let us know.
Some of the topics we are working on, or hope to address in the future, include:
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